Speaker 1: Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots Podcast.
Speaker 1: I'm Joel and I'm Tracy Alloway. So, Tracy, I think, um,
Speaker 1: you know, we're obviously in the midst of this ongoing
Speaker 1: trade dispute between US and China. Lots of big questions
Speaker 1: about what's going to happen there. We talked with Brad
Speaker 1: Setser a few weeks ago about this topic, but it's
Speaker 1: such a big topic. I feel like there's a lot
Speaker 1: more to cover. Yeah, I I totally agree with you.
Speaker 1: I remember when we spoke to Brad, there was one
Speaker 1: section in particular of US China trade relations that you
Speaker 1: were quite interested in, which was the intellectual property proportion.
Speaker 1: And the US is always accusing China of trying to
Speaker 1: steal its technological expertise or it's intellectual property. Meanwhile, China
Speaker 1: is always saying that it's trying to cultivate its own
Speaker 1: home grown expertise. Yeah, and I think that this trade
Speaker 1: dispute is probably one of the first times that the
Speaker 1: American public, to the extent that the American public is
Speaker 1: paying attention to trade disputes, is really learning about the
Speaker 1: full extent of China's ambitions to be a real global
Speaker 1: leader in many high tech industries, and that there is
Speaker 1: a very extensive plan in place to really get ahead
Speaker 1: from at least where they are right now. Well, I guess,
Speaker 1: to be fair, you wouldn't expect much else from a
Speaker 1: centrally planned economy, right, I mean, people talk about China liberalizing,
Speaker 1: but at its heart it's still very much a sort
Speaker 1: of command economy with a huge degree of power coming
Speaker 1: from the ruling class. I guess, yeah, And I think
Speaker 1: that's exactly right. And of course there're gonna be a
Speaker 1: lot of people who question whether a centrally planned economy
Speaker 1: really can be an innovative leader. I think in technologies
Speaker 1: we often sort of I think we sort of associate
Speaker 1: innovation with free market capitalism quite a bit, and China
Speaker 1: is perhaps trying to show that there is another model
Speaker 1: for how you can get there, well, not just free
Speaker 1: market capitalism. You think of technological innovation, you think sort
Speaker 1: of the Silicon Valley model, right, A bunch of guys
Speaker 1: sort of sat in a garage somewhere coming up with
Speaker 1: brilliant ideas, and because of the way our economy is structured,
Speaker 1: they're allowed to act on those ideas and eventually build
Speaker 1: successful businesses. So it's almost a cultural difference. I guess yeah.
Speaker 1: I think that's well put. So anyway, today we're going
Speaker 1: to be talking to someone who is actually one of
Speaker 1: the first people to introduce me to this idea, and
Speaker 1: so I'm very excited to talk to him. He's Dan Wong.
Speaker 1: He is a analyst at gav quel Dragon Omics. He's
Speaker 1: a technology analyst based in Hong Kong there and he
Speaker 1: has been following China's ambitions to really grow its own
Speaker 1: homegrown technology sector for a while and he joined us. Now, hey, damn,
Speaker 1: thanks for joining us. Hey guys, thanks for having me on.
Speaker 1: So let's start with the big picture. What is the
Speaker 1: Made in China initiatives? Sure thing so Made in China
Speaker 1: is a comprehensive industrial upgrading plan that the government unfailed
Speaker 1: three years ago. Its targets about twenty different technologies for
Speaker 1: broad technological leadership. These include things like semiconductors, telecom equipment, robotics,
Speaker 1: electric vehicles, medical devices and pharmaceuticals, aviation equipment, and a
Speaker 1: whole bunch of other things. To make it happen, that
Speaker 1: the Chinese government is offering an enormous amount of credit,
Speaker 1: subsidies and policy support to make it all work. So,
Speaker 1: just to be clear, we think of a lot of
Speaker 1: high tech manufacturing already happening in China. US tech giants
Speaker 1: like Apple obviously work with big Chinese tech companies to
Speaker 1: assemble their iPhones. But I guess the idea is that
Speaker 1: a lot of that is sort of still pretty low
Speaker 1: on the value chain labor type stuff, and that the
Speaker 1: real innovative stuff on things like semiconductors that you mentioned,
Speaker 1: that's still not really happening in China. Yeah, that's right.
Speaker 1: So basically, the further downstream you go, the more that
Speaker 1: China looks pretty innovative. So Chinese companies have become pretty
Speaker 1: good at making consumer goods and offering fun our retail experiences.
Speaker 1: China is also the only country aside from the US
Speaker 1: to have built big internet companies, namely ten Cent and
Speaker 1: Ali Baba. I used to work in Silicon Valley, and
Speaker 1: the level of dynamism I observed in the tech scenes
Speaker 1: of Beijing and Shinjen our justice and pressive as what
Speaker 1: I saw when I worked in California. But basically, if
Speaker 1: you look a little bit more upstream at what the
Speaker 1: at the more upstream segments of China's technology foundations, it's
Speaker 1: really quite weak. So China is pretty heavily dependent on
Speaker 1: other countries for semiconductors, airplanes, machinery goods, and many other things.
Speaker 1: So I'm glad you brought up the iPhone. So the
Speaker 1: full value of an iPhone is booked as a Chinese export,
Speaker 1: but only about ten percent of the value added was
Speaker 1: actually generated in China. So that means it's the value
Speaker 1: of the labor used in assembling the phone and a
Speaker 1: few of the components. But the most important technologies are
Speaker 1: not actually Chinese. The processor for the phone is coming
Speaker 1: from Taiwan, the memory chips are coming from Korea, the
Speaker 1: screen from Korea, and so on. So China would be
Speaker 1: much happier if the value added generated in the country
Speaker 1: actually approaches little closer to the full value of the
Speaker 1: iPhone export. And so I think that's a good way
Speaker 1: of seeing what is about So jan why are they
Speaker 1: focused on these particular technologies, because I guess the law
Speaker 1: of comparative advantage in economics would suggest that they should
Speaker 1: keep doing what they've been doing, what they're good at
Speaker 1: um and instead they're they're clearly trying to branch out
Speaker 1: into things that they haven't done before, So why is
Speaker 1: that sure? So I think there are three big reasons
Speaker 1: that China is trying to do made in China. First
Speaker 1: of all, the GDP per capita is now close to
Speaker 1: about ten thousand dollars and at that level it's close
Speaker 1: to middle income status defined by the World Bank. And
Speaker 1: the World Bank has also come up with this concept
Speaker 1: called the middle income trap, which is a fairly common
Speaker 1: term that you can see in the domestic media, and
Speaker 1: the middle income trap in the original World Bank formulation
Speaker 1: outlines the problem in industrializing country faces when it gets
Speaker 1: squeezed tween poorer countries which have cheap labor and richer
Speaker 1: countries which have advanced technologies. So only a small handful
Speaker 1: of countries have managed to pull out of the middle
Speaker 1: income trap, and China is really obsessed with leaving it. Japan,
Speaker 1: South Korea, and Taiwan each managed to escape the middle
Speaker 1: income trap by climbing various technological pinnacles, almost always with
Speaker 1: the help of the state, and is the Chinese government's
Speaker 1: plan to climb a bunch of related or different technological pinnacles.
Speaker 1: So that's one reason that China wants to do this.
Speaker 1: A second element is there's this bit of economic security
Speaker 1: and its concerns. So a fairly salient data point that
Speaker 1: shows how dependent China is on foreign technologies is that
Speaker 1: every year it imports more semiconductors by value than it
Speaker 1: does crude oil. Now, some countries go to pretty great
Speaker 1: lens to secure their supply of oil, and China wants
Speaker 1: to secure its supply of semiconductors by creating strong domestic companies.
Speaker 1: And third, there's this national security element to it as well.
Speaker 1: When I talk to Chinese, a name keeps coming up Snowden.
Speaker 1: So the Snowden documents revealed that, you know, the US
Speaker 1: tech companies have been fairly cozy with the US government. Uh,
Speaker 1: And China's importing hundreds of billions of dollars worth of
Speaker 1: American semiconductors every year, and it doesn't want to be
Speaker 1: spied on because it has to import these things. It's
Speaker 1: funny because obviously a big source of anxiety here these
Speaker 1: days is the fear of being spied on with goods
Speaker 1: that the US imports from China or Russia. So interesting
Speaker 1: that it the anxiety goes in both directions, though, I
Speaker 1: guess that's just sort of perhaps to be expected. All right,
Speaker 1: let's talk about the mechanics that the government is actually
Speaker 1: using to foster this technological leap forward. How does it
Speaker 1: allocate resources or know how much to invest and say,
Speaker 1: semiconductors versus medical equipment versus wide body planes. What does
Speaker 1: it do specifically and how does it make those decisions? Sure,
Speaker 1: so it's trying to catch up to the technological frontier, UH,
Speaker 1: and to do so, I think you need at least
Speaker 1: three things. One of that is money, another is I
Speaker 1: P the technology, and the third is this process knowledge
Speaker 1: or what we can also call tacit knowledge managerial expertise
Speaker 1: or no. How So, if we look at each of
Speaker 1: these segments, we can pretty much assume that money is
Speaker 1: not going to be a problem. The state is going
Speaker 1: to be UH is going to provide a lot of
Speaker 1: credit subsidies to build up these industries. There's a lot
Speaker 1: of figures we see floating around, some as high as
Speaker 1: three hundred billion US dollars that the that the government
Speaker 1: is willing to spend on this and about hundred thirty
Speaker 1: billion dollars. So that is e R MAR for semiconductors alone,
Speaker 1: and that's just from the government. There will be private
Speaker 1: funds that will invest too. The second element when you
Speaker 1: look at technology of China trying to acquire I P.
Speaker 1: I think the best thing to read on this is
Speaker 1: the U s TRS Section three or one report. It
Speaker 1: prepares a pretty comprehensive case of all the ways that
Speaker 1: China tries to obtain technology UH. These include trying to
Speaker 1: venture requirements for foreign firms, compulsory licensing schemes, administrative demands
Speaker 1: for technology transfer, strategic overseas investments, and what the U
Speaker 1: s TR calls unauthorized cyber intrusions. And finally, in terms
Speaker 1: of know how, which is the knowledge that exists in
Speaker 1: people's heads that are hard to write down and actually
Speaker 1: give as instructions. China has been fairly active in trying
Speaker 1: to recruit people from overseas to share expertise. A lot
Speaker 1: of this involves trying to get overseas Chinese to move
Speaker 1: to China, but they also try to hire foreigners from
Speaker 1: all parts of the world. So is it easier or
Speaker 1: is it better to be able to sort of buy
Speaker 1: a tech industry like that or create a tech industry
Speaker 1: like that with this sort of centralized planning versus what
Speaker 1: we've seen in Western countries where the tech industry sort
Speaker 1: of grows up in some cases relatively natural, Like what
Speaker 1: are the differences between those two industries. So I think
Speaker 1: the big thing to keep in mind is that China
Speaker 1: is trying to catch up to the technological frontier for
Speaker 1: most of these things. There are a few of its
Speaker 1: technologies which seem to be at the technological frontier, and
Speaker 1: so these things would include I would say solar panels,
Speaker 1: telecom equipment, high speed rail, and wind turbines. China seems
Speaker 1: to be already fairly advanced in all of these before
Speaker 1: all the rest things like semiconductors, aviation equipment, pharmaceuticals. China
Speaker 1: is trying to follow a path that another country or
Speaker 1: company has already plazed. So in terms of trying to
Speaker 1: just basically reach what the what the what the technological
Speaker 1: front here is today, I think that's that that that
Speaker 1: is kind of a almost a qualitative difference with UH,
Speaker 1: this sustained innovation that we see UH in in the
Speaker 1: US of just incrementally pushing that technological frontier forward. I'm
Speaker 1: so curious about the specifics of the resource allocation. So
Speaker 1: you mentioned a hundred and thirty billion dollars to invest
Speaker 1: in UH semiconductor development, But who gets the money other
Speaker 1: startups that apply for grants? Are there existing state owned
Speaker 1: companies that then launched semiconductor units, how do they actually
Speaker 1: go and go about allocating it? And then you know,
Speaker 1: I assume it goes to multiple companies. Who decides who's
Speaker 1: leading the way and then gets further allocation, and then
Speaker 1: who decides you know, you're not cutting it. This project
Speaker 1: isn't going anywhere because I think in a lot of
Speaker 1: people's minds, this is where they see the free market
Speaker 1: doing a good job of, in theory, figuring out the
Speaker 1: winners and losers and allocating more to the winners. So
Speaker 1: how does China solve that problem? So pretty much this
Speaker 1: is um pretty much entirely decided by the state. So
Speaker 1: China has a bunch of money available. Some of it
Speaker 1: it will allocate to some of the existing semiconductor foundries
Speaker 1: fabs that have already been around, and then some of
Speaker 1: it will go towards just totally fresh efforts. So, for example,
Speaker 1: China basically has not done UH, does not have much
Speaker 1: of a position in making memory chips at all, and
Speaker 1: so the government basically decided to put something like UH
Speaker 1: thirty to forty billion dollars between these UH four different
Speaker 1: semiconductor fabs in Central China, So these were fresh efforts.
Speaker 1: The process of which city would get a memory fab
Speaker 1: was not entirely transparent. They're dispersed across a couple of
Speaker 1: big cities in central China, and they were they were
Speaker 1: given this money from the central government, from the from
Speaker 1: the local government, from the provincial government, and also from
Speaker 1: other state owned companies. So these things are not super transparent,
Speaker 1: and it's probably correct to suspect that a lot of
Speaker 1: this is driven by political connections. And that's just in
Speaker 1: the case of semiconductors. So if in seven years time
Speaker 1: we wake up and China has built a world class
Speaker 1: semiconductor industry, is that going to discredit the sort of
Speaker 1: western um pre economy way of doing things. Does that
Speaker 1: suggest that maybe the Chinese model is correct. I'm not
Speaker 1: sure that it does. I think that if China manages
Speaker 1: to catch up, basically, UH, this be another case of
Speaker 1: there is some success of protectionism. Basically, if you look
Speaker 1: at every country that has industrialized after Britain, did the US, Germany, Meiji, Japan,
Speaker 1: uh and UH. More recently, the East Asian countries. They
Speaker 1: each built their industries with some level of teriff protections,
Speaker 1: teriff protections, some level of government support, some level of
Speaker 1: trying to acquire technologies from overseas and plowing state subsidies,
Speaker 1: especially in more recent times, plowing state subsidies into trying
Speaker 1: to build to try to catch up to the technological
Speaker 1: front here. And that's pretty much what China is doing.
Speaker 1: China has taken a look at basically the memory industry
Speaker 1: is pretty interesting. Actually, uh memory was in d RAM
Speaker 1: was invented by this small American company named Intel. The
Speaker 1: US got pretty good at making d RAM. Japan took
Speaker 1: a look at memory, thought that it could do it
Speaker 1: as well, built up its memory industry, turned out to
Speaker 1: be pretty successful, mostly drove US players out of business.
Speaker 1: And then the Koreans did pretty much exactly the same
Speaker 1: things to Japan, and Taiwan also tried to do this
Speaker 1: to Korea. So at least in memory chips, at least
Speaker 1: we see that there is this progression of leadership helped
Speaker 1: by different countries. Right now, it's been Korea has continued
Speaker 1: to be the leader in making memory chips, and China
Speaker 1: is trying to unseat to Korea as Korea and seated Japan. Yeah.
Speaker 1: I wanted to follow up a little further and push
Speaker 1: the question about the U S model. You mentioned you
Speaker 1: used to work in Silicon Valley. Is there a myth
Speaker 1: that we have about Silicon Valley that's incorrect where we
Speaker 1: imagine all these people toiling away and their garages, raising
Speaker 1: money from friends and family and then building the next
Speaker 1: Hewlett Packard or Intel, We're Google, and that we end
Speaker 1: up downplaying the all that federal subsidies and federal industrial
Speaker 1: planning or military planning played in the fostering of U
Speaker 1: S technology. I think that's a great question, and to
Speaker 1: some extent, Silicon Valley itself downplaced this story. I think, UH,
Speaker 1: semiconductors were initially bootstrapped by a lot of government spending,
Speaker 1: including for for the space program and also for the military.
Speaker 1: So Silicon Valley, you know, silicon is in the name,
Speaker 1: comes from semiconductors, and that was significantly bootstrapped by federal
Speaker 1: funding UH and UH federal subsidies. UM, if we wanted
Speaker 1: to think about, you know, what is the opposite model
Speaker 1: of innovation UH from from Silicon Valley, I would say
Speaker 1: something like what we see in Germany Germany has basically
Speaker 1: a pretty strong culture of engineering that it's kept through
Speaker 1: many decades, arguably many centuries. And I was in Germany
Speaker 1: for a research trip a couple of weeks ago and
Speaker 1: listening to some of them explained basically, the German model
Speaker 1: of innovation is that they've built these systems of quality
Speaker 1: improvement to incrementally improve their technologies. UH. They have these
Speaker 1: systems of corporate encouragement, of vocational training, bridge between academia
Speaker 1: and companies. UH, this very strong sense that older people
Speaker 1: have to transfer their knowledge to the younger people. That
Speaker 1: is kind of what we see the opposite of what
Speaker 1: we see in Silicon Valley. Both of these places I
Speaker 1: think are fairly innovative, but in different ways. So should
Speaker 1: the world be at all concerned over China's plans? Here?
Speaker 1: Over the plans, is there any reason to worry if
Speaker 1: if they're essentially just pursuing protectionist measures that other countries
Speaker 1: at one time or another seemed to do themselves, I
Speaker 1: think there is a pretty good reason and to worry.
Speaker 1: So Chinese industrial policy has created a lot of overcapacity,
Speaker 1: for example in UH, in sectors like steel and solar panels,
Speaker 1: over capacity crushes everyone's profits, so that might reduce aggregate
Speaker 1: R and D spending and thereby slowing overall innovation around
Speaker 1: the world. And I think if we take a look
Speaker 1: a little bit more closely at the experience of high
Speaker 1: speed rail companies, that's also another cause for concern. So UM.
Speaker 1: When China was trying to build its high speed rail network,
Speaker 1: there were four companies that were around to basically supply
Speaker 1: it for high speed rail. It was Seamens of Germany,
Speaker 1: Kawasaki Heavy Industries of Japan, Bombardier of Canada, and Austam
Speaker 1: of France. UH. They brought their technologies to China, and
Speaker 1: China basically was in a pretty strong negotiating position at
Speaker 1: the time. There weren't that many other countries building high
Speaker 1: speed rail systems, and so ch ask these companies to
Speaker 1: transfer their technologies as a condition for accessing the Chinese market,
Speaker 1: and these four companies basically decided that they had to
Speaker 1: agree to transfer these technologies to domestic joint venture partners.
Speaker 1: The domestic joint venture partners digested their technology uh the
Speaker 1: Chinese term for for absorbing foreign technologies, and then they
Speaker 1: out computed these companies in the Chinese domestic market. So
Speaker 1: these foreign firms gave their technologies to um Chinese firms. Uh,
Speaker 1: they first lost the China market, and then they had
Speaker 1: to compete with Chinese companies in the global market. So
Speaker 1: that's another cautionary tale that makes people nervous about the
Speaker 1: success of And then there is this other aspect that
Speaker 1: the US is concerned about. China's doesn't allow much reciprocity.
Speaker 1: So China can invest in important companies of other countries,
Speaker 1: but it doesn't allow foreign companies to really invest in
Speaker 1: important domestic projects. It's a fairly protectionist place, and it's
Speaker 1: not a level playing field. You mentioned the overcapacity issue.
Speaker 1: The flip side is that for many of the things
Speaker 1: that China is building, there could be tremendous benefit to
Speaker 1: the consumers of those good So one area that comes
Speaker 1: to mind in recent years is the incredible collapse we've
Speaker 1: seen in the cost of solar panels all around the world.
Speaker 1: The estimate for when solar would reach price parity with
Speaker 1: other energy technologies have all proven to be way too pessimistic,
Speaker 1: and solar prices continue to plunge much faster than people expect.
Speaker 1: And that's a theoretically benefit too many people around the world.
Speaker 1: And uh sort of Chinese industrial policy has played a
Speaker 1: big role in that. Yeah, I think that's a pretty
Speaker 1: good example. If solar panels are really good for the environment,
Speaker 1: then this could be something that people can be glad about.
Speaker 1: And I think it's also possible that can be good
Speaker 1: for the world more broadly because downstream businesses can benefit
Speaker 1: a little bit. So capital goods industries tend to be
Speaker 1: pretty consolidated. If you want to buy memory chips, basically
Speaker 1: you only have three companies making d ram It's Samsun, SKA,
Speaker 1: high Nes, Micron, and that's it. So I've spoken to
Speaker 1: a smart phonemaker who told me that, you know, if
Speaker 1: the Chinese government is willing to spend billions and subsidies
Speaker 1: to lift Samsung's thumb from his business, uh, they're not
Speaker 1: going to complain about that. UM aviation is famously a
Speaker 1: duopoly between Boeing and Airbus, and many of these capital
Speaker 1: goods industries tend to be pretty consolidated. So if Chinese
Speaker 1: competition comes in and UH introduces a little bit more competition, Uh,
Speaker 1: that could be good for downstream users of these technologies.
Speaker 1: I'm curious, so looking at the list of different industries
Speaker 1: We've talked a lot about semi conductors, but there's obviously
Speaker 1: others include a wide body aircraft, advanced medical devices. Is
Speaker 1: there anything that you've seen so far in how the
Speaker 1: different industries or the different technologies have progressed that suggests
Speaker 1: that some of this is working better than others, or
Speaker 1: that this particular Chinese model of technological innovation might work
Speaker 1: really well in some areas, but it has more obvious
Speaker 1: limitations in the development of other areas. Sure, that's a
Speaker 1: great question. UM so China has already succeeded in reaching
Speaker 1: the technological front here in a few industries UH and
Speaker 1: I cited solar panels, telecom equipment, high speed rail, and
Speaker 1: wind turbans. And I think a couple of the things
Speaker 1: that unite UH these together is one is UH the
Speaker 1: UM nature of the buyers. So for basically all of
Speaker 1: these midstream products, government is an important procure of these
Speaker 1: UH different technology segments. And if government is a big procure,
Speaker 1: you can basically have UM provinces competing amongst themselves to
Speaker 1: get the best telecom equipment or solar panel offering from
Speaker 1: from these different companies, and then UH, basically these companies
Speaker 1: can get pretty good at making these technologies because there's
Speaker 1: a lot of government procurement of their products. Another is
Speaker 1: that these usually tend to have fairly long product cycles.
Speaker 1: So the longer the product cycle, the easier it is
Speaker 1: for Chinese firms to catch up to the frontier before
Speaker 1: it moves away again. So that's another characteristic of these
Speaker 1: different technologies. And China has had much less success trying
Speaker 1: to build through industrial policy more downstream goods, so things
Speaker 1: like automobiles is something that the leadership concedes has been
Speaker 1: a fairly big earlier in terms of trying to build
Speaker 1: homegrown companies that are making really excellent cars that are
Speaker 1: exportable as well. So the nature of the buyers, the
Speaker 1: product cycle, these are all factors that play into how
Speaker 1: successful industrial policy can be. Dan, that was a fascinating conversation.
Speaker 1: I feel like this is a going to be well
Speaker 1: obviously a huge story for the years ahead, and regardless
Speaker 1: of what happens with the trade talks right now, it
Speaker 1: just seems inevitable that there's going to be so much
Speaker 1: more interest in the progression of China on these various
Speaker 1: technological fronts in the years ahead. So thank you very
Speaker 1: much for joining well, thank you back. Thanks for having
Speaker 1: me on, Tracy. I really like that conversation, and why
Speaker 1: I liked it so much is the degree of specificity
Speaker 1: that Dan brought to the table in terms of this stuff.
Speaker 1: I mean, I think we sort of lots of people
Speaker 1: maybe understand the sort of real broad strokes here about
Speaker 1: China trying to acquire its own technology and the complaints
Speaker 1: that other countries have about how they're forced to hand
Speaker 1: over technology in order to compete in the market. But
Speaker 1: it's interesting to get in the weeds and learn about
Speaker 1: the specifics of how each industry operates in where they are. Yes,
Speaker 1: we know all about China's ambitious plans for advanced medical equipment.
Speaker 1: Now I feel good about that. I think you're right.
Speaker 1: It's an important conversation. It also throws up a lot
Speaker 1: of ideological questions around different economic models and also how
Speaker 1: they develop, which I find really fascinating. And you know,
Speaker 1: the notion that China is being criticized for doing something
Speaker 1: now that a lot of developed economies had done a
Speaker 1: hundred years ago or so. It's not really new, but
Speaker 1: you can see it's sort of an ongoing tension in
Speaker 1: the world economy. Yeah, and it is also a good
Speaker 1: reminder that, yeah, as you say, it's not really new.
Speaker 1: Every country has had its own model that is some
Speaker 1: combination of markets and private enterprise plus state directed R
Speaker 1: and D and subsidies. So there is a fair amount
Speaker 1: of double standard I think in this idea that suddenly
Speaker 1: China is doing something really terrible or really really flouting
Speaker 1: the rules of development. Yeah, that's right. But one other
Speaker 1: good thing about this conversation is it's only seven years until,
Speaker 1: which is kind of fascinating. So I guess we'll get
Speaker 1: to see the results of China's initiative here relatively soon.
Speaker 1: I'm sure we'll still be doing odd lots in yeah,
Speaker 1: seven years from now, and so let's schedule one for
Speaker 1: seven years from now, and then we will will grade
Speaker 1: them on how they did in each category. All right,
Speaker 1: I'm putting it in my diary right now, Joe. Okay,
Speaker 1: this has been another edition of the Odd Thoughts podcast.
Speaker 1: I'm Tracy Allowaite. You can follow me on Twitter at
Speaker 1: Tracy Allowhite, and I'm Joe wisn'hal. You can follow me
Speaker 1: on Twitter at the Stalwart, and you could follow Dan
Speaker 1: on Twitter at Dan w Wong. And you should follow
Speaker 1: our producer top foreheads at for Hest, as well as
Speaker 1: the bloomberg head of podcast, Francesca Levy at Francesca Today.
Speaker 1: Thanks for listening.