Speaker 1: This is Bloomberg Law with June Brussel from Bloomberg Radio.
Speaker 1: A divided Supreme Court has made it easier to sendence
Speaker 1: minors convicted of murder to life in prison without parole.
Speaker 1: It is six to three decision that split the jostices
Speaker 1: along ideological lines. The courts that are judge does not
Speaker 1: have to find a minor to be permanently incorrigible or
Speaker 1: incapable of being rehabilitated before imposing a sentence of life
Speaker 1: without parole. The ruling follows more than a decade where
Speaker 1: the Court had moved toward more leniency from minors convicted
Speaker 1: of murder, treating them differently from adults. Joining me as
Speaker 1: Bloomberg Law reported Jordan Reuben Jordan tell us about the
Speaker 1: defendant in this case. Brett Jones was convicted of murder
Speaker 1: for a crime that he committed when he was fifteen
Speaker 1: years old. He fatally stabbed his grandfather during an argument
Speaker 1: at home, and he was initially sentenced to life without
Speaker 1: the possibility of parole, and his case called into question
Speaker 1: this line of Supreme Court precedents going back years, and
Speaker 1: the Court wound upholding in a previous decision that mandatory
Speaker 1: life without parole sentences for juveniles are unconstitutional, and so
Speaker 1: that raised further appeals in Jones's case, where the Supreme
Speaker 1: Court had to sort out what exactly is required of
Speaker 1: judges when they're handing down these life without parole sentences
Speaker 1: to juveniles in these discretionary schemes. Did a judge review
Speaker 1: his sentence after he was in prison? That's right, the
Speaker 1: judge did do that. However, the judge did not make
Speaker 1: a finding that Jones was quote permanently incorrigible end quote,
Speaker 1: which is some language that had been in some of
Speaker 1: these prior Supreme Court decisions. And he argued that that's
Speaker 1: required before a judge makes a finding that a person
Speaker 1: who was a minor when they committed the crime can
Speaker 1: be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. So
Speaker 1: what did the Supreme Court rule? The stream Court said
Speaker 1: that that is actually not required by those precedents, and
Speaker 1: that all these prior precedents require is that a statutory
Speaker 1: scheme is that a state's scheme be discretionary, and so
Speaker 1: so long as it's not a mandatory scheme, then that
Speaker 1: is enough under the Constitution. And so this was a
Speaker 1: six to three split tell us about the split right.
Speaker 1: This one split right along party lines. That was a
Speaker 1: decision written by Justice Kavanaugh, and he was joined by
Speaker 1: the other five Republican appointees and the three remaining Democratic
Speaker 1: appointees were in descent. And that's not super unusual in
Speaker 1: these types of cases under the Eighth Amendment. We've seen
Speaker 1: these types of divides before in these cases, and so
Speaker 1: this is continuing that pattern. So Justice Soda Mayor wrote
Speaker 1: the descent, and she said that the majority opinion guts precedent.
Speaker 1: Explain what she meant. So Justice so dom Oral looks
Speaker 1: back at those precedents and said that in order for
Speaker 1: the majority to make this ruling, that a permanent and
Speaker 1: corigibility finding is not required, that a factual finding is
Speaker 1: not required. In order to reach that result, the majority
Speaker 1: really had to contort precedent to a point where, in
Speaker 1: her words, they were gutting precedent without admitting it and
Speaker 1: rewriting those prior precedents in the process without admitting it.
Speaker 1: That was the descents view. The Court in the past
Speaker 1: has treated juveniles more leniently in violent crimes because of
Speaker 1: their lack of maturity. Tell us about that history. So
Speaker 1: there's been a series of decisions where one decision after
Speaker 1: the other, the Court, in a progression, really kept handing
Speaker 1: down rulings that were more and more favorable to people
Speaker 1: who committed crimes when they were miners. Although that was
Speaker 1: back when Justice Kennedy was still on the court before
Speaker 1: he retired and was replaced by Justice Kavanaugh. So this
Speaker 1: case really marked a halt to that progression, is one
Speaker 1: way to look at it. And it's obvious why that happened.
Speaker 1: It's because of the change in personnel on the court
Speaker 1: since those prior rulings were handed down. Explain how this
Speaker 1: case highlights the divide on the Court when it comes
Speaker 1: to the Eighth Amendment and cruel and unusual punishment cases. So,
Speaker 1: I think what we've seen in a lot of these
Speaker 1: Eighth Amendment cases, which is the backdrop for this cruel
Speaker 1: and unusual punishment, that's what the Eighth Amendment prohibits. However,
Speaker 1: there are pretty stark disagreements over what exactly that means.
Speaker 1: The same sort of divide that we've seen in death
Speaker 1: penalty cases, which are also Eighth Amendment cases. Issues that
Speaker 1: are implicated there, and so we see that same divide,
Speaker 1: and so this case is an example of really what
Speaker 1: the Republican appointees have seen as required under the Eighth
Speaker 1: Amendment as opposed to what the Democratic appointees have seen
Speaker 1: as required. And this case is really a perfect reflection
Speaker 1: of that split. I was surprised the United States is
Speaker 1: the only country that allows juveniles to be given life
Speaker 1: without parole. That's right. We're an outlier in the world, again,
Speaker 1: similar to the death penalty, where we're not the only one,
Speaker 1: but certainly in the minority of countries, certainly in so
Speaker 1: called developed nations that have it. And so this is
Speaker 1: another criminal justice aspect of our country where we're an
Speaker 1: outlier compared to the rest of the world, certainly the
Speaker 1: so called developed world. And what about the States? Where
Speaker 1: do the States stand on this issue? Right? So that's
Speaker 1: a very good question, June. I'm glad you asked, because,
Speaker 1: as in a lot of criminal justice spaces, we're seeing
Speaker 1: more attention being put on the state, especially where reformers
Speaker 1: are not seeing success at the Supreme Court, and so
Speaker 1: they've been making a stride there in their view in
Speaker 1: order to either curtail or ban the use of, for example,
Speaker 1: life without parole for juvenile offenders. And so as it
Speaker 1: stands down. More than half the state's either ban the
Speaker 1: practice or don't have anyone serving these types of sentences,
Speaker 1: And that's really where reformers are focusing their energy now
Speaker 1: is on the states. Jordan. The Court often takes cases
Speaker 1: when there's a split in the circuits. Was there a
Speaker 1: split in the circuits here? So they definitely took it
Speaker 1: in order to try and explain really these prior precedents,
Speaker 1: because it was not clear what exactly they meant in
Speaker 1: terms of what exactly was required. As Jones's case showed
Speaker 1: so fair at least, it was an incredibly important issue
Speaker 1: that the Court felt the need to explain, and there
Speaker 1: really could be still more left to explain. Although in
Speaker 1: this case the Court said judges don't need to make
Speaker 1: this certain finding. Perhaps we could see future cases falling
Speaker 1: somewhere in the middle between a judge saying nothing and
Speaker 1: a judge making this permanent and corige ability finding. There
Speaker 1: could still be a lingering question of what exactly do
Speaker 1: or do not judges have to do. So there's no
Speaker 1: rule right now, or does it depend on the states
Speaker 1: as to what a judge has to find in order
Speaker 1: to put a juvenile in prison for life. So it
Speaker 1: is it is clear now under the Supreme Court's latest
Speaker 1: decision in Jones's case, what's not required. A judge does
Speaker 1: not specifically have to say, I find this person to
Speaker 1: be permanently incorrigible. It's enough, according to this latest decision,
Speaker 1: for there to have been discretion for the judge to
Speaker 1: have considered youth as midgaining factor under those prior precedents.
Speaker 1: There just could potentially be another case delving further into
Speaker 1: perhaps there's an unclear situation of whether a judge made
Speaker 1: this consideration or not, because we have this pretty bright
Speaker 1: line rule from the Supreme Court now, So there could
Speaker 1: still be further challenges. But as I said, I really
Speaker 1: think the focus for people making these challenges is going
Speaker 1: to be more so putting their energy into the state
Speaker 1: level then necessarily hoping for success at the Supreme Court,
Speaker 1: at least as it's constructed now. I was struck in
Speaker 1: your story. You spoke to John Neeman, who had argued
Speaker 1: for the state in the Miller case when he was
Speaker 1: Alabama Solicitor General, and he said, we're all capable of redemption.
Speaker 1: I thought that was interesting because as he was on
Speaker 1: the other side of it, right and so I think
Speaker 1: ultimately he agreed with this decision. In the Jones case,
Speaker 1: he was raising an interesting point where this permanent incorrigibility standard,
Speaker 1: and it wasn't taken out of tanair, it was taken
Speaker 1: from prior precedence what Jones was arguing for. It raises
Speaker 1: interesting questions of what exactly is a judge doing when
Speaker 1: they're making this finding, Because the point that Mr Neeman
Speaker 1: was raising was if you're a person who finds that
Speaker 1: no one is beyond redemption, then it would be impossible
Speaker 1: for a judge to make this finding against a defendant.
Speaker 1: So that could be part of what was animating the
Speaker 1: majority's concerned here in the Jones case that if that's
Speaker 1: the rule, and then it ties the judge's hands. In effect,
Speaker 1: they have to say, I believe this person is beyond
Speaker 1: redemption and that's something that can cross different ideological and
Speaker 1: religious lines, what have you. And so it could be
Speaker 1: just a matter of the court saying we don't want
Speaker 1: judges to get into that specific type of business. So, now,
Speaker 1: as far as Jones is concerned, does he have any
Speaker 1: avenues left? Does he get to go back to the
Speaker 1: judge and say anything, or is this the end of
Speaker 1: the road. So I think it is the end of
Speaker 1: the road in Justice Kavanaugh's opinion. At the end, he
Speaker 1: had an interesting paragraph where he noted, in his view,
Speaker 1: in Justice Kavanaugh's view that it's not necessarily the end
Speaker 1: of the road, because there could be a state reform
Speaker 1: or Jones could ask for clemency. But that's true in
Speaker 1: every case, whether the Supreme Court makes that or not.
Speaker 1: And so I don't know of any particular reason why
Speaker 1: Jones would be successful on that front. It's possible, but
Speaker 1: the point is, if nothing else happened in his case,
Speaker 1: there's no reason to think that he will not be
Speaker 1: dying in prison. Has the Supreme Court taken up any
Speaker 1: other juvenile justice cases recently? Not very recently. No. Before
Speaker 1: this case, there was the same issue being raised in
Speaker 1: the case of one of the DC snipers, one of
Speaker 1: the two there, but that case wound up settling after
Speaker 1: a change in state law, and so this case, Brett
Speaker 1: Jones's case wound up being a replacement for that. But
Speaker 1: we don't have anything on the horizon now. As I said,
Speaker 1: I think we're going to be looking to the states
Speaker 1: for upcoming action there. Thanks for being on the Bloomberg
Speaker 1: Laws show Jordan's that's Bloomberg Law reporter Jordan Reuben. With
Speaker 1: the nation reeling from a series of mass shootings, the
Speaker 1: Supreme Court has decided to hear a major News Second
Speaker 1: Amendment case involving the right to carry a handgun in
Speaker 1: public for self defense. Joining me is Bloomberg News Supreme
Speaker 1: Court reporter Greg Store explain what gun rights are an
Speaker 1: issue in this case June. The Supreme Court has never
Speaker 1: said whether the Second Amendment applies outside the home, and
Speaker 1: in this case, that's really the core issue. New York
Speaker 1: and about seven other states sharply restrict who can get
Speaker 1: a license to carry a weapon handgun in public. New
Speaker 1: York requires people to show some special need beyond that
Speaker 1: of the average member of the public, and gun rights
Speaker 1: groups have been trying for years to get the Supreme
Speaker 1: Court to take up this issue and say that the
Speaker 1: Second Amendment does apply outside the home and gives people
Speaker 1: a right to carry handguns with them in public for
Speaker 1: self defense purposes. And that's what the Court is going
Speaker 1: to consider the next term. In June, the Supreme Court
Speaker 1: refused to take up challenges to the New Jersey, Massachusetts,
Speaker 1: and Maryland laws which are similar to New York's. So
Speaker 1: is the difference here the fact that Justice Amy Coney
Speaker 1: are it is now on the court. It would seem
Speaker 1: that way certainly from the outside. Of course, we don't
Speaker 1: know who which justice is voted to take up occasion
Speaker 1: which justices didn't, And this is a case where lower
Speaker 1: courts for quite a number of years have disagreed. So
Speaker 1: a number of people, myself included, kind of expected the
Speaker 1: Court to take up this issue a long time ago.
Speaker 1: That said, the one thing that does seem to be
Speaker 1: clearly different from the outside is that you do have
Speaker 1: another conservative justice. Justice Ginsburg, of course was a dissenter
Speaker 1: from the Court's previous gun rights decisions. Based on what
Speaker 1: we know about Justice Barrett, there's a good chance she'll
Speaker 1: be on the side of gun rights, so it's not
Speaker 1: a big jump to say that she probably made the
Speaker 1: difference here. Has there been a split among federal appeals
Speaker 1: courts in handling this issue, There have been. Most federal
Speaker 1: appeals courts have said that the Constitution does not protect
Speaker 1: gun rights outside their home, or at least they've said
Speaker 1: that these laws that restrict the ability of people to
Speaker 1: get carry permits are constitutional. There's one federal appeals court
Speaker 1: I believe that has gone the other way, so there
Speaker 1: is a split on the issue. It's been the issue
Speaker 1: that probably more than any other, gun rights advocates have
Speaker 1: asked of Supreme Courts to take up and to really
Speaker 1: expand the Second Amendment. In its last two gun rights
Speaker 1: decisions in two thousand and eight and two thousand and ten,
Speaker 1: the Court did expand gun rights. So is it likely
Speaker 1: that the Court is taking up this case in order
Speaker 1: to reverse New York's restrictions and expand gun rights again.
Speaker 1: That would seem the most likely, especially given the makeup
Speaker 1: of the court. Now that being said, there has been
Speaker 1: something holding the court back over these last few years.
Speaker 1: There's been some reporting that Chief Justice roberts is one
Speaker 1: justice who is reluctant to expand the Second Amendment in
Speaker 1: this sort of way. That said, the Conservatives don't need
Speaker 1: him in the majority anymore. If the three Trump appointed
Speaker 1: justices there, Kavanaugh, and gorst All agree that these people
Speaker 1: in this case do have a right to get a
Speaker 1: confield carry permit, then John Robertson's vote won't be necessary.
Speaker 1: Do we know where those three justices stand on gun rights?
Speaker 1: Have any of them dealt with gun rights issues when
Speaker 1: they were on circuit courts. Well, we know first of
Speaker 1: all that Kavanaugh and Corset have both expressed a desire
Speaker 1: for the Court to take more Second Amendment cases, including
Speaker 1: this very issue, So they had given us some indication
Speaker 1: that they are eager to get involved, at least in
Speaker 1: this particular issue. Justice bear It, as a lower court
Speaker 1: judge didn't consider this precise issue, but she has handled
Speaker 1: some other Second Amendment issues, including a case involving whether
Speaker 1: a non violence fellone could be banned for life from
Speaker 1: having a handgun, and she has indicated she is going
Speaker 1: to be an advocate of Second Amendment rights. So certainly
Speaker 1: New York has an uphill fight with this particular court.
Speaker 1: This is going to put the justices in the middle
Speaker 1: of one of the country's most divisive issues during a
Speaker 1: national crisis in firearm violence. And we've talked before about
Speaker 1: how the Court has been sort of reluctant to get
Speaker 1: into these kinds of divisive issues at this point. So
Speaker 1: does this look like a turning point for the court.
Speaker 1: It might be, and of course it could also be
Speaker 1: a one off of they felt like they just had
Speaker 1: to take up this particular issue, but yeah, something has
Speaker 1: been holding the court back. The court did, it's somewhat
Speaker 1: interestingly to meet wait for several weeks to decide to
Speaker 1: take this case up. It was relifted at their private
Speaker 1: conference four straight times, so and then they kind of
Speaker 1: modified the exact question about what exactly they're going to decide.
Speaker 1: So there may have been some hesitation from within the
Speaker 1: court about exactly how they wanted to jump in here,
Speaker 1: but certainly given the uh, I think not exaggeration to
Speaker 1: say dozens of cases over the years from gun Right
Speaker 1: to Advocate that the Court has refused to take up,
Speaker 1: this does seem like a turning point moment. So what
Speaker 1: they're going to decide is whether a state has to
Speaker 1: issue carry permits that's right to two typical people, people
Speaker 1: who don't show some special need that sets them apart.
Speaker 1: So New York does issue a very limited number of
Speaker 1: carry permits to people who can show there is something
Speaker 1: about their particular situation beyond just um, I live in
Speaker 1: a dangerous neighborhood and I want to protect myself. So
Speaker 1: it won't mean that every single person couldn't get a
Speaker 1: carry permit states uh, No, doubt will still be able
Speaker 1: to exclude, for example, convicted violent felons from from getting
Speaker 1: a handgun license, and those people are actually barret under
Speaker 1: federal law, but it would mean the average person, or
Speaker 1: potentially could mean the average person would be able to
Speaker 1: get a license to carry a handgun. Thanks Graig, that's
Speaker 1: Bloomberg News. Supreme Court reporter Greg's store. A Supreme Court
Speaker 1: case pits inventors against their former employers. The Supreme Court
Speaker 1: is considering how to balance the rights of companies to
Speaker 1: protect patent rights created with their resources against the ability
Speaker 1: of inventors to move freely between employers. The Court is
Speaker 1: reviewing a US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Speaker 1: decision that the inventor of a surgical device and his
Speaker 1: current company, Minervous Surgical, can't argue two patents on the
Speaker 1: device are invalid to defeat infringement claims by his former employer,
Speaker 1: Whole Logic, which now owns the rights to the inventions.
Speaker 1: Joining me is Joseph Ray, a partner Kenobi Martin and
Speaker 1: president of the American Intellectual Property Law Association, which submitted
Speaker 1: an amigas brief in the case. So start by explaining
Speaker 1: the facts here. What the issue is well, the facts
Speaker 1: here involve the application of an ancient UH patent law
Speaker 1: doctrine called assin or a stople and this is when
Speaker 1: somebody cannot challenge the validity of a patent that they
Speaker 1: previously sold for value. So in this case, the inventor
Speaker 1: sold the patent to a subsequent company and then later
Speaker 1: began competing with that company, and then the inventor was sued,
Speaker 1: his company was sued for patent infringement, and the appellate
Speaker 1: court said that the inventor could not challenge the validity
Speaker 1: of the patent that he had previously sold. This falls
Speaker 1: in all the other a stopples we have in the law,
Speaker 1: and you're you're familiar with lots of a stopples. We
Speaker 1: have traditional a stopple, we have collateral a stopple, we
Speaker 1: have equitable a stopple. Here we're dealing with asson or
Speaker 1: a stopple, and asson or stopple should be less of
Speaker 1: a legal ground and more of an equitable one, and
Speaker 1: that's what we're fighting over. The appellate court treated it
Speaker 1: as a legal a stopple, and really I think the
Speaker 1: court thinks that should be treated more equitably, like equitable
Speaker 1: as stopple, and that is, let's actually look at what
Speaker 1: the representation was, to what extent was their reliance and
Speaker 1: treat it more like a traditionalist stop rather than a
Speaker 1: rigid legal as stop them. Tell us a little bit
Speaker 1: more about the facts here. The employee sells the patent
Speaker 1: or give the rights to the patents to his employer.
Speaker 1: Then he leaves the company and he challenges that patent
Speaker 1: or is it more more discreet than that? Well, that's
Speaker 1: that's close enough. What happened was there was some transfers
Speaker 1: to subsequent companies. So the company was sold, and he
Speaker 1: was the founder of the original company, and he was
Speaker 1: paid and he he did receive some money for the
Speaker 1: sale of the company as a shareholder, and then there
Speaker 1: were successor companies. And so this rule applies to anybody
Speaker 1: in privaty. So he obviously was in privity with the
Speaker 1: sale of the patent initially, and so he was precluded
Speaker 1: by the appellate court, the United States Court of Appeals
Speaker 1: for the Federal Circuit in Washington, d c. They held
Speaker 1: that the but these really didn't matter that since he
Speaker 1: was the seller of the patent initially or the patent application,
Speaker 1: he has precluded no matter what happens in subsequent prosecution
Speaker 1: of the patent application. I think I think the the
Speaker 1: Supreme Court will think the Appellate Court was way too
Speaker 1: rigid in its application of the rule. They should have
Speaker 1: considered how the invention changed over time. So remember in
Speaker 1: patent sometimes the prosecution takes ten fifteen years before the
Speaker 1: patent office, and so I could sell you a disclosure
Speaker 1: on an automobile, but the ultimate claim that issues from
Speaker 1: the patent office may happen ten fifteen years later, and
Speaker 1: the claim may be much broader then simply the disclosure
Speaker 1: in the patent application. So if I sell you an
Speaker 1: application to a car, you could effectively prosecuted to have
Speaker 1: it covered any transport mechanism, something much broader than a car.
Speaker 1: And so that's what makes this different than real property
Speaker 1: where the boundaries are set. Those are the facts. So now,
Speaker 1: during the Supreme Court oral arguments, what were some of
Speaker 1: the main concerns the justices were expressing in their questioning, Well,
Speaker 1: there were many, and this case could be decided on
Speaker 1: many many grounds. First of all, is it settled doctrine?
Speaker 1: That's the first question, and there's much debate about whether
Speaker 1: or not this doctrine still survived much tortuous case law.
Speaker 1: The second question is is this a job for Congress?
Speaker 1: Should this be left alone? Did Congress ever adopt or
Speaker 1: sanction such a doctrine, and so the justices were not
Speaker 1: sure whose role it would be to cabineist doctrine in
Speaker 1: The third thing is also should the doctrine be curtailed?
Speaker 1: That was the main focus of the argument. It appears
Speaker 1: the doctrine will survive, but in a very modified scale
Speaker 1: down version. Did so of the justices expressing opinion that
Speaker 1: you know, why disturb this doctrine? It's been in place
Speaker 1: for so long. Yes, the best example of that would
Speaker 1: be Justice Kavanaugh. He specifically asked the petitioner, why should
Speaker 1: we upset a doctrine that has been around for so long?
Speaker 1: That's exactly what his point was. So, where do you
Speaker 1: think the Court is going to come out? I do
Speaker 1: think the Court will preserve the doctrine, but scale it back.
Speaker 1: Let the court's focus on some of the key equitable
Speaker 1: facts to show that the doctrine makes sense. The doctrine
Speaker 1: may not make sense under the facts of this case
Speaker 1: because the patent changed form, it did not claim the
Speaker 1: exact same invention that was transferred at the time of
Speaker 1: the initial assignment. And that's what makes intellectual property cases
Speaker 1: or patent cases so difficult. The legal rights change over
Speaker 1: time because there's continuing prosecution before the at in office,
Speaker 1: which changes the boundaries of the patent rights. So how
Speaker 1: would the Supreme Court then frame the ruling in order
Speaker 1: to reach some kind of middle ground? Is this going
Speaker 1: to be on a case by case basis, well, case
Speaker 1: by case basis by actually looking exactly what was assigned,
Speaker 1: What did the action or actually believe he was transferring?
Speaker 1: That's the key fact, and that's the position the government
Speaker 1: has taken. The government did advance a middle ground, as
Speaker 1: did we at the a I p l A, that
Speaker 1: you should look to the facts and actually try to
Speaker 1: determine what did the assonaur believe he was transferring and
Speaker 1: warranting at the time of the assignment. What's the position
Speaker 1: of tech companies? Are they afraid that this is going to,
Speaker 1: you know, erode their rights and intellectual properties? No? And
Speaker 1: it's it's funny how you label tech. These tech companies
Speaker 1: fall all over the spectrum. Many of the large tech
Speaker 1: companies normally are defendants in patent cases. So um, they
Speaker 1: are not as dependent on patents as smaller companies. So
Speaker 1: really we divide uh the markets and normally by the
Speaker 1: size of the company. Smaller companies tend to be more
Speaker 1: dependent on the patent system than larger tech companies. Does
Speaker 1: the Supreme Court take patent cases very often? Well, no, um,
Speaker 1: And depends what window of time you're looking at. I
Speaker 1: do remember in the nineties or in the eighties and nineties,
Speaker 1: they might take one or two a decade. Now they're
Speaker 1: taking three, four a year um. And so there the
Speaker 1: Court is showing much more interest in patent cases because
Speaker 1: they recognize the importance of our patent system. Thanks for
Speaker 1: being on the Bloomberg Laws Show. That's Joseph ray, a
Speaker 1: partner Canoby Martin and President of the American Intellectual Property
Speaker 1: Law Association. And that's it for the edition of the
Speaker 1: Bloomberg Law Show. Remember you can always get the latest
Speaker 1: legal news on our Bloomberg Lawn podcast. You can find
Speaker 1: them on Apple Podcasts, Spotify and at www dot Bloomberg
Speaker 1: dot com, slash podcast slash Law. I'm June Grosso and
Speaker 1: you're listening to Bloomberg