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Speaker 1: Get in touch with technology with tex Stuff from com

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Speaker 1: Hey there, and welcome to tex Stuff. I'm Jonathan Strickland,

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Speaker 1: and today joining me in the studio is Joe McCormick. Joe,

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Speaker 1: welcome back, Thanks for having me back. Thank thank you.

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Speaker 1: It was kind of a last minute jump in. It

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Speaker 1: was it was originally Lauren Vogelbaum was going to sit

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Speaker 1: in on this one, but Lauren's feeling a little under

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Speaker 1: the weather and we just wanted to look back at

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Speaker 1: the year two thousand fourteen. Some of the big stories

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Speaker 1: that happened, stuff that I didn't cover in the Predictions

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Speaker 1: episode because we didn't know it's going to happen, and

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Speaker 1: then it happened. That's kind of the way that tends

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Speaker 1: to work. I think your crystal ball is faulty. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: it turns out that I was actually just staring into

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Speaker 1: a magic eight ball, and uh, that was it. I

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Speaker 1: think the problem is that you're not actually using crystal

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Speaker 1: You're you've been peering into a plutonium core. That would

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Speaker 1: also explained the laws and teeth. So at any rate,

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Speaker 1: let's talk about some of the big stories in two

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Speaker 1: thousand and fourteen, some of the stuff that happened throughout

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Speaker 1: the year. Now we're just going to be kind of

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Speaker 1: covering some interesting things, not and not everything obviously the

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Speaker 1: highlights in the low lights. Yeah, nothing, nothing like every

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Speaker 1: story what happened in it would take us way too long,

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Speaker 1: you know. I think has been a really interesting year

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Speaker 1: for tech and one of the most interesting things about

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Speaker 1: it to me is that it seems like this has

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Speaker 1: really been the year of the hack. That is absolutely

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Speaker 1: the way I would put it. Yeah, I mean there

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Speaker 1: have been big hacks and security breaches in the past.

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Speaker 1: There were so many of them and with such far

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Speaker 1: ranging impact that I think it was the year where

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Speaker 1: the average person out there, the person who doesn't really

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Speaker 1: follow technology news, is really starting to understand that a

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Speaker 1: lot of the conflicts that are looming large in our

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Speaker 1: future gonna be technology and cybersecurity related conflicts. Yeah. You know,

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Speaker 1: we've heard stories in the past, everything from uh discovery

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Speaker 1: of code in infrastructure things like utility infrastructure that that

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Speaker 1: showed that there was possible Chinese incursions into our infrastructure.

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Speaker 1: You know, those stories have come and gone, and but

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Speaker 1: this year really has displayed it. I mean, there's been

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Speaker 1: a lot that have directly impacted consumers of course, in

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Speaker 1: there was the target um hack, the one that stole

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Speaker 1: a whole bunch of credit card information as well as

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Speaker 1: other stuff from Target, and the fallout of that continued

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Speaker 1: into But there are a lot of other stories we're

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Speaker 1: gonna touch on, some of them that involve hackers hitting

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Speaker 1: different sites. Yeah. Well, in fact, maybe we should just

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Speaker 1: go through all the stories of their chronologically, because it

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Speaker 1: looks like in your notes, Jonathan, the very first thing

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Speaker 1: you have is about a hack. No, it is, in fact,

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Speaker 1: that was that hackers who posted data about Snapchat users

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Speaker 1: claim they did so to show that Snapchat security wasn't sufficient.

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Speaker 1: In January of this, Yeries, it was. This is the

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Speaker 1: first story we have. So this the hack itself had

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Speaker 1: happened towards the tail end of but this was where

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Speaker 1: we started getting information about what the hackers say their

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Speaker 1: motivation happened to be. So, you know, there are different

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Speaker 1: types of hackers, and I've talked about this before. There

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Speaker 1: are hackers who what they're interested in is just learning

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Speaker 1: how a system works and then how to modify that system.

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Speaker 1: Has nothing to do with breaching security, right, It's just

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Speaker 1: learning how something works being able to build it yourself.

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Speaker 1: Maybe modify it, maybe make it do something it wasn't

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Speaker 1: intended to do, but it has nothing necessarily nefarious about it.

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Speaker 1: Then you've got things like white hack hat hackers versus

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Speaker 1: black hat hackers. White hat hackers are the ones who

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Speaker 1: work with companies to test their security, and they'll try

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Speaker 1: to breach that security and then explain to the company

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Speaker 1: how they were able to do it so that they

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Speaker 1: can patch that vulnerar ability. Black hat had hackers are

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Speaker 1: the ones that are trying to do it for some

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Speaker 1: sort of gain, either an ideological gain where they are

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Speaker 1: bringing down a company or organization that has a philosophy

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Speaker 1: that doesn't agree with their own philosophy, or monetary gain

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Speaker 1: where they're stealing stuff, either to directly benefit themselves or

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Speaker 1: to sell off to other people. So in this case,

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Speaker 1: the hackers were saying, we were just trying to prove

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Speaker 1: that this company that says it has your privacy at

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Speaker 1: heart doesn't really protect your privacy. That's all we were

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Speaker 1: trying to do. But the way they did it was

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Speaker 1: perhaps a little more on the black hat side than

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Speaker 1: the white hack It's not like they alerted Snapchat and said, hey,

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Speaker 1: by the way, we discovered this vulnerability, you need to

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Speaker 1: address it instead. They they actually attacked. So all related

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Speaker 1: to the fact that Snapchat. I think it was Snapchat

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Speaker 1: that they were claiming that they delete all of your messages,

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Speaker 1: but they actually don't. Yeah, there were a lot of

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Speaker 1: issues with that Snapchat because again, yet, like you were

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Speaker 1: pointing out, snapchat is all about sending someone a message

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Speaker 1: that's supposed to have kind of a self destruct element

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Speaker 1: to it, so that that's supposed to be ephemeral and

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Speaker 1: not leave a trail for future generations to come discover

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Speaker 1: what you know, Grandma and Grandpa were sending to each

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Speaker 1: other on their phones, right, And it doesn't necessarily have

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Speaker 1: to be you know, salacious. It often is, but it

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Speaker 1: doesn't have to be. It could just be I don't

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Speaker 1: want this to live anywhere because it's just a goofy

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Speaker 1: picture and I just thought it was funny and that's all.

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Speaker 1: But yeah, it turned out that they're they're promises of

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Speaker 1: things being deleted exactly when you expected them to be

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Speaker 1: were not completely true. The next story in January is

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Speaker 1: that the US Appeals Court struck down the FCCS two

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Speaker 1: thousand eleven regulations that demanded Internet providers treat all traffic

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Speaker 1: equally because the court said the FCC lacked the authority

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Speaker 1: to enact the regulations in the first place. It sounds

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Speaker 1: like this is going to lead to some more net

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Speaker 1: neutrality squabbles. Yeah, this was a big, big deal, I mean,

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Speaker 1: and a lot of people were pointing out that this

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Speaker 1: was a potential issue at the very beginning, saying it's

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Speaker 1: not that I like people were saying, I don't disagree

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Speaker 1: that we need to have net neutrality rules in place.

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Speaker 1: The problem is that the FCC is trying to uh

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Speaker 1: to exert authority over something it doesn't have authority over,

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Speaker 1: and it was because of the classification of Internet communications.

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Speaker 1: Will come back to the story towards the end of

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Speaker 1: two thousand and fourteen. But yeah, that was a big,

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Speaker 1: big news item early on. Also in January, Lenovo bought

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Speaker 1: Motorola Mobility from Google for three billion dollars, and meanwhile

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Speaker 1: Google bought Nest for three point two billion. Nest is

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Speaker 1: the company that made yeah, also did smoke detectors, which

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Speaker 1: in fourteen it ended up having to recall because of

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Speaker 1: some issues. Wait, no, okay, one sentence explanation. How is

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Speaker 1: the next thermostat actually special? Well, it It learns your behaviors.

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Speaker 1: So if you like to have your house nice and

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Speaker 1: cool in the evening and warm and toasty in the morning,

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Speaker 1: it learns that and then starts to preset things so

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Speaker 1: you don't have to ever program it to do so.

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Speaker 1: It just learns what you want and can even do

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Speaker 1: things like when it realizes there's no one in the house,

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Speaker 1: it can start to turn things off so that way

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Speaker 1: you're not wasting energy heating a house that has no

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Speaker 1: one in it. And the final story of January two

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Speaker 1: thou fourteen was that the Apple Mac turned thirty. What

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Speaker 1: year were you born, Joe? Oh? The old okay, so

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Speaker 1: that mac is older than you are. Uh, the Apple Mac?

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Speaker 1: I remember the I remember in night when the commercial

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Speaker 1: for the Apple Mac came out. That was the Orwellian one.

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Speaker 1: You probably have seen it even yea and chatters the

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Speaker 1: screen right Whose faces it up on the screen? Is

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Speaker 1: it like John Hurd or somebody? Uh yeah, something like that.

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Speaker 1: You know, although it was John Hurt, it might not

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Speaker 1: actually be a famous persons say if it was John Hurt,

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Speaker 1: that John Hurt hasn't has has remained old man age

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Speaker 1: since nineteen four and hasn't changed since it's not that

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Speaker 1: he stayed young, he's just stayed just as old. Actually,

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Speaker 1: you know, I think I'm thinking of him as the

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Speaker 1: big totalitarian face on the screen in uh oh, what's

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Speaker 1: the movie? Oh all right, yeah, John Hurt. I think

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Speaker 1: you're right. And I have never seen the Vendetta. It's

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Speaker 1: kind of odd, right, because I mean, that's well, it's

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Speaker 1: got a from what I recall, it's got John Hurt

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Speaker 1: talking into a big screen and you know, spittles coming

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Speaker 1: out of his mouth. He looks very angry about something.

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Speaker 1: He's being the big brother type character. Yeah. Well, in

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Speaker 1: February two thousand and fourteen, that was when we got

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Speaker 1: a big news item where Microsoft finally announced its new CEO.

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Speaker 1: So Balmer had stepped down as CEO. No, yeah, that

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Speaker 1: spoiler alert. Balmber stepped down the CEO Developers, Developers, I'm gone.

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Speaker 1: And then Satya Nadela became the new CEO of Microsoft,

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Speaker 1: and he was a veteran of the company. He had

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Speaker 1: been there for twenty two years. Bill Gates meanwhile transition

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Speaker 1: from chairman of the Microsoft Board to the role of

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Speaker 1: technology advisor. UH. Microsoft's competitor Sony announced five thousand job

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Speaker 1: cuts and that they were going to split the TV

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Speaker 1: division into a wholly owned subsidiary and to sell off

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Speaker 1: its PC business. So this was a big news and

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Speaker 1: not the last time we'll talk about Sony in this podcast. Obviously,

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Speaker 1: anyone who's aware of current news knows that we're gonna

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Speaker 1: have to come back around to Sony by the end

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Speaker 1: um Also in that month, February, the Lawrence Livermore National

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Speaker 1: Laboratory an nounced they had produced fusion power using high

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Speaker 1: powered lasers. And only that, but they got more energy

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Speaker 1: out of the fusion fuel than was put into the

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Speaker 1: fusion fuel. That's a big deal. Well, that would certainly

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Speaker 1: be the goal if you're going to try to generate

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Speaker 1: municipal energy of fusion exactly. And that was a tough goal, right.

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Speaker 1: It was one of those things where we can achieve fusion,

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Speaker 1: but we're pouring so much energy to make the reaction

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Speaker 1: happen that we're on a losing end of the proposition. Now,

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Speaker 1: one thing to keep in mind, this does not mean

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Speaker 1: that we're suddenly gonna have fusion power plants everywhere, because

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Speaker 1: the laser only reached about one percent of the fuel.

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Speaker 1: So this is still a long way from becoming a

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Speaker 1: new way of generating electricity. You got more energy out

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Speaker 1: of it, but you were only able to consume a

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Speaker 1: tiny portion of the actual fuel. So it's not an

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Speaker 1: efficient system yet, but it's very encouraging. Now in March

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Speaker 1: two fourteen, we get some another hacking story. Uh, Mount

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Speaker 1: Cox U g X. You know why it's called Mount Cox, right,

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Speaker 1: you know what the story is behind that? So Mount Cox.

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Speaker 1: If you were to spell out the first three letters,

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Speaker 1: you've got MT for Mount and then big upper case

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Speaker 1: G for Cox. Magic the Gathering. I know, I thought

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Speaker 1: you would enjoy that, Joe. It's so magical. So wait,

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Speaker 1: hold on, what does that have to do with bitcoin? Well,

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Speaker 1: it's it was. It was the world's largest bitcoin exchange. Now, no, no, no,

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Speaker 1: I mean, what does Magic the Gathering have to do

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Speaker 1: with it? You can buy a crap ton of Magic

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Speaker 1: the Gathering Cards with some bitcoin. My friend, Um, are

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Speaker 1: you going to tell me that Magic the Gathering Cards

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Speaker 1: are going to be the successor to Bitcoin is the

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Speaker 1: next cryptocurrency? I would say that there was definitely a

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Speaker 1: bartering system with Magic the Gathering Cards for a good

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Speaker 1: long while before bitcoin came around. But obviously Magic the

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Speaker 1: gathering is not a digital format. Hold on, you were

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Speaker 1: going to tell me an event what happened to Mount goss.

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Speaker 1: It's got hacked, dude, another hack. Yeah, in this case,

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Speaker 1: this was a true hack. This was not a d

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Speaker 1: d O S attack. This was the real deal. And

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Speaker 1: the exchange completely collapsed because seven hundred fifty thousand bitcoin

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Speaker 1: belonging to mountdocs customers, as well as a hundred thousand

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Speaker 1: bitcoins belonging to the exchange itself, we're stolen in that.

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Speaker 1: I may be misremembering, but I thought that the idea

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Speaker 1: of bitcoin was sold as an unhackable solution. You are correct, sir. Uh.

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Speaker 1: The idea was that it was it had security measures

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Speaker 1: in place that would prevent you from being able to

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Speaker 1: do something like spend the same bitcoin more than once,

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Speaker 1: because that's obviously a concern with any digital format. Obviously,

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Speaker 1: if I give you a digital file, let's say it's

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Speaker 1: music file, and you think this the song is pretty awesome,

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Speaker 1: I'd like to share this with all my friends. You

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Speaker 1: could copy it as many times as you wanted and

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Speaker 1: send as many copies as you wanted to everyone, or

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Speaker 1: you could upload a copy and everyone else could end

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Speaker 1: up grabbing that copy from the cloud, and they all

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Speaker 1: have a copy of that song. What happens when your

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Speaker 1: money is in this format? But bitcoin is supposed to

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Speaker 1: be made in such a way that it's impossible to steal.

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Speaker 1: It's impossible to to spend more than one bitcoin. Are

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Speaker 1: it's impossible to spend the same bitcoin more than once

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Speaker 1: at a time, I mean, unless it eventually made its

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Speaker 1: way back to you. But it's a little complex the

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Speaker 1: way the bitcoin transactions work at any rate. Um. The

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Speaker 1: people behind bitcoin were saying this was due to faulty

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Speaker 1: security at Mount Cox. It had nothing to do with

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Speaker 1: the format of the bitcoins themselves. They were it was

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Speaker 1: like saying, you can't fault a dollar for being stolen

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Speaker 1: from a bank. Like if if if thieves come into

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Speaker 1: a bank and they breach a bank security, it's not

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Speaker 1: the fault of the currency within it. Well then, I

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Speaker 1: mean that doesn't really matter to the average person using bitcoin.

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Speaker 1: Stuff can still be hacked. Yeah, that was the problem.

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Speaker 1: Was that the issue. The bottom issue is that this

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Speaker 1: exchange still collapsed, and another one, a smaller one called

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Speaker 1: flex Coin, just a week later also went billy up

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Speaker 1: after after being targeted and thieves attacked them and stole

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Speaker 1: bitcoins from them. So for a while people were wondering

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Speaker 1: if this was going to be the beginning of the

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Speaker 1: end of the cryptocurrency, but it's stuck around, So spoiler

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Speaker 1: alert for later in the year. Also in March, Edwards

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Speaker 1: Snowdon addressed the south By Southwest Interactive Conference via streaming

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Speaker 1: because he's still a wanted man UH to talk about

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Speaker 1: the need for better encryption systems in the era of

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Speaker 1: digital surveillance. Yeah, he's saying, hey, look, here's the deal.

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Speaker 1: People are spying on you one way or the other.

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Speaker 1: Maybe it's a company, maybe it's a government, maybe it's hackers,

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Speaker 1: but people are looking at your stuff. They might not

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Speaker 1: be actively looking at your stuff. They might be gathering

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Speaker 1: your stuff and then one day down the road they

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Speaker 1: might look at exactly. It could be one of those

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Speaker 1: things where someone gets this notion to search for a

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Speaker 1: particular search term and it pulls up all interactions between

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Speaker 1: people who use that search term in some way. Maybe

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Speaker 1: you're one of those people. So maybe what we need

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Speaker 1: to do is really look at some good ways to

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Speaker 1: encrypt communications so only the person who who only the

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Speaker 1: people communicating are the ones who have access to that info. Um,

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Speaker 1: so it was a very interesting thing that he was

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Speaker 1: actually virtually At south By Southwest also in March, IBM

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Speaker 1: showed off the power of artificial intelligence at south By

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Speaker 1: Southwest using a food truck in which the cooks prepared

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Speaker 1: food based off recipes made by an artificially intelligent program.

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Speaker 1: Huh yeah, users would put in did not read about

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Speaker 1: this at the time. It's kind of silly, but users

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Speaker 1: would put in a few preferences about what they liked

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Speaker 1: as food. The program would then essentially had a database

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Speaker 1: of recipes and based upon your preferences, would suggest, uh,

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Speaker 1: something interesting based on that, and then the cooks, the

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Speaker 1: human cooks inside the food truck, would actually make your meals.

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Speaker 1: So it's not like a robot was cooking your food.

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Speaker 1: It was just choosing what it was you were going

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Speaker 1: to eat, and obviously couldn't be I would love to

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Speaker 1: see all the ways that went wrong. Yeah, I don't know,

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Speaker 1: I don't know how el why did you put cinnamon

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Speaker 1: sticks on this piech Yeah? All right? Uh. There was

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Speaker 1: certainly not an unlimited choice. Obviously, they were limited to

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Speaker 1: whatever things they could prepare in that food truck. But

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Speaker 1: it was an interesting approach um and you know, just

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Speaker 1: showing that Watson can win at Jeopardy as well as

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Speaker 1: cook you a decent meal. Uh. The United States government

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Speaker 1: in March asked the Internet Corporation for assigned names numbers

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Speaker 1: that's called I CAN to come up with a transition

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Speaker 1: plan for the US to relinquish control of the Internet.

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Speaker 1: So this was essentially saying, when I say control of

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Speaker 1: the Internet, I really mean, uh, the whole naming convention

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Speaker 1: being in charge of all that kind of stuff that

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Speaker 1: all fell under the purview of the US. Does that

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Speaker 1: originally go back to DARPA? Yeah, yeah, I mean I

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Speaker 1: know the Internet does, but the naming conventions, well, well yeah,

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Speaker 1: because it was the it was the founders of Essentially,

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Speaker 1: it was the people working on our ponnet who came

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Speaker 1: up with the protocols that the Internet would end up following,

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Speaker 1: and it was through their work that, uh, the rules

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Speaker 1: were set like this is how we named things, and

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Speaker 1: uh it kind of evolved from there. So it's more

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Speaker 1: like the roots of this can be traced back to DARPA.

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Speaker 1: Maybe not direct, not a direct line in the sense

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Speaker 1: of it was exactly the same way, but yes, it

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Speaker 1: certainly does go back there. Uh. And in March that's

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Speaker 1: when Sony announced Project Morpheus, which is a VR headset

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Speaker 1: kind of a competitor to the Oculus Rift, although the

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Speaker 1: Oculus Rift has been uh is being developed just for

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Speaker 1: computer systems, not for consoles, whereas the Morpheus would presumably

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Speaker 1: work with the PlayStation. Now, wait a minute, did Sony

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Speaker 1: by the Oculus Rift? No? Facebook did. Facebook. That's right.

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Speaker 1: Facebook bought Oculus, which was a big you know, that's

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Speaker 1: a big head scratcher for a lot of people saying, well,

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Speaker 1: this is kind of weird, and uh, it was one

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Speaker 1: of those things that experienced three hundred and sixty degrees

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Speaker 1: of annoying people on your news feed. It was also

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Speaker 1: what caused uh the mo Yang found a Remojang founder, Notch,

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Speaker 1: the guy who created Minecraft, to say, well, that means

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Speaker 1: Minecraft is not coming to the Oculus Rift because he

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Speaker 1: didn't like Facebook at all. He later said that maybe

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Speaker 1: he was being a little reactionary, but he was just like,

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Speaker 1: I don't like Facebook's privacy policies, I don't like how

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Speaker 1: they make you know, they make people their product, and

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Speaker 1: I'm not not crazy about developing Minecraft for them. So

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Speaker 1: not that not that that matters, but we'll get to that.

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Speaker 1: So we've we've got another next generation VR headset in

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Speaker 1: the works. Yeah, yeah, and uh, have you has anybody

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Speaker 1: tried these out yet? I haven't read I've tried the

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Speaker 1: Oculus No, no, no, I mean the Morpheus. Oh no,

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Speaker 1: it hasn't it's still I think in the pro type stage.

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Speaker 1: It hasn't been released yet. Have you tried a VR headset,

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Speaker 1: like a recent one, not a recent one. I tried

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Speaker 1: one in the nineties, which when they were pretty funny. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: the the polygon pterodactyls and stuff. Yeah, and I I

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Speaker 1: did that too. I tried an Oculus Rift the first time.

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Speaker 1: I've got a friend who works for Google and he

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Speaker 1: had an Oculus Rift developer kit. So I went over

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Speaker 1: to his house and tried it out and was almost

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Speaker 1: immediately completely disoriented and feeling sick to my stife. So

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Speaker 1: I said, all right, I'm done with this. He's like,

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Speaker 1: don't you want to try? And this was this was

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Speaker 1: the programming gaming was literally you're walking around a villa

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Speaker 1: and like it's like a it's like a virtual villa

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Speaker 1: in Italy, So so you think, like then there's nothing

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Speaker 1: going on, It's just you're just just walking through a villa,

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Speaker 1: like there's no mafia hits going on in the lawn,

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Speaker 1: nothing like that. And um and so I did that,

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Speaker 1: and just that alone was enough to make me feel

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Speaker 1: a little like I'm feeling a little swimmy lucy goosey weird.

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Speaker 1: And part of it was because the control scheme right,

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Speaker 1: like I could move my head and that would change

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Speaker 1: my perspective, but I still had to use a controller

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Speaker 1: to move around, and it was that disconnect that was

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Speaker 1: causing some issues. Maybe if you had it with a

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Speaker 1: one of those in place treadmills, the gaming treadmill, sure

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Speaker 1: that might that might have helped a little bit. But

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Speaker 1: it was funny because he said, don't you want to

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Speaker 1: try the space ship game that I have that you

364
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Speaker 1: can run. I'm like, no, do you want your computer

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Speaker 1: to be covered and my lunch? Because that's what's gonna

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Speaker 1: happen if we try that. So but moving on, We've

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Speaker 1: got another hacker story for April two thousand fourteen. That's

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Speaker 1: when the heart bleed bug is discovered in certain versions

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Speaker 1: of the open s s L software, which is a

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Speaker 1: secure socket layer software. It's meant to provide that secure

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Speaker 1: or what you assume is a secure connection between your

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Speaker 1: browser and some other websites. So things like banking sites

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Speaker 1: use this. Lots of sites use this. I mean you know,

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Speaker 1: if you see like HTTPS, that's a type of the

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Speaker 1: secure software. Not everyone uses the specific type to to

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Speaker 1: do that, but it is one of the very popular ones.

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Speaker 1: They discovered that in one version of it, there was

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Speaker 1: this bug that could potentially allow attackers to access information

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Speaker 1: that could include sensitive material. It all was information that

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Speaker 1: was stored in UM random access memory, so it wasn't everything.

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Speaker 1: It was just a certain number of characters in the

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Speaker 1: way it worked was that, uh, if I send you

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Speaker 1: let's let's say that that we're gonna represent Joe, you

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Speaker 1: and I what happened with his heart lead bug. Okay,

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Speaker 1: I'm so I'm going to send out a message just

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Speaker 1: to make sure you are listening to me, and you

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Speaker 1: have to repeat back that message to me in order

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Speaker 1: to prove that you are listening to me, and then

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Speaker 1: everything's cool and we can keep on going. So when

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00:21:32,560 --> 00:21:35,320
Speaker 1: I send out that message to you, it is a

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Speaker 1: certain number of characters long. Let's say it's twenty characters long.

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Speaker 1: So you get it and you see this twenty characters long.

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Speaker 1: So you know that's how long the message has to be.

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Speaker 1: So you repeat the message, it's twenty characters long, send

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Speaker 1: it back to me. Now, let's say I send you

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Speaker 1: a message and it's twenty characters long, but the package

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00:21:51,960 --> 00:21:56,040
Speaker 1: says it's actually five characters long. Now, you, being a

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Speaker 1: dumb dumb can't tell the difference between twenty and five hundred.

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Speaker 1: You you see the twenty characters that are the beginning

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00:22:02,520 --> 00:22:06,840
Speaker 1: of this supposed character message. But now there's all this

401
00:22:06,880 --> 00:22:10,560
Speaker 1: empty space, So panicking, you just grab whatever happens to

402
00:22:10,560 --> 00:22:12,639
Speaker 1: be nearby and you shove it at the end of

403
00:22:12,640 --> 00:22:14,920
Speaker 1: the message. This is whatever happens to me in your

404
00:22:15,000 --> 00:22:18,400
Speaker 1: random acis memory. It's like short term memory for people. Now,

405
00:22:18,400 --> 00:22:22,600
Speaker 1: if we're talking about a service like a bank transaction,

406
00:22:23,119 --> 00:22:26,720
Speaker 1: that information might include my password because I had to

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00:22:26,840 --> 00:22:30,359
Speaker 1: enter it to get into the system. So you sent

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Speaker 1: in plain text back to me a message that has

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Speaker 1: twenty characters of whatever it was I I sent, plus

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Speaker 1: all this other information. So it meant that a hacker,

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Speaker 1: if that got in the middle of this, could end

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Speaker 1: up getting sensitive information like login information or other account information.

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Speaker 1: Obviously a huge vulnerability, but somewhat relying on the luck

414
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Speaker 1: of the draw. Yeah, well it did in the end

415
00:22:56,520 --> 00:22:59,000
Speaker 1: of me and that almost everybody on the internet had

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Speaker 1: changed some password. Yeah, and well, the scary thing was

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00:23:01,760 --> 00:23:05,000
Speaker 1: that people were saying, it doesn't you know, you gotta

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Speaker 1: wait until the service upgrades their version of open SSL,

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00:23:10,760 --> 00:23:13,680
Speaker 1: because if you just change your password before they've upgraded,

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Speaker 1: the same thing can keep on happening to you. So

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Speaker 1: it was it was truly scary. This is another one

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Speaker 1: of those things that really drove it home to the consumer,

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Speaker 1: at least people who are paying attention. It was truly

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Speaker 1: scary because there wasn't a lot we as consumers could do.

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Speaker 1: We had to depend upon other companies to do the

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00:23:30,960 --> 00:23:34,119
Speaker 1: right thing first, and then we could you know, end

427
00:23:34,200 --> 00:23:37,359
Speaker 1: up changing our passwords as a result. Right, and things

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Speaker 1: like this matter, I think because it's um it's something

429
00:23:41,400 --> 00:23:45,560
Speaker 1: that the consumer cannot be blamed for. It's not something

430
00:23:45,600 --> 00:23:48,840
Speaker 1: where it's just that the end user is not, you know,

431
00:23:49,640 --> 00:23:53,400
Speaker 1: following best practices designing week passwords or something like this.

432
00:23:53,800 --> 00:23:57,240
Speaker 1: You can be doing everything right and still have all

433
00:23:57,280 --> 00:24:00,320
Speaker 1: of your information threatened. Yeah, it's one of the most

434
00:24:00,480 --> 00:24:04,119
Speaker 1: frustrating parts about this kind of security vulnerability. It's that

435
00:24:04,760 --> 00:24:06,800
Speaker 1: you know, we already know there are all these things

436
00:24:06,800 --> 00:24:10,160
Speaker 1: that people don't do on on average, like they are

437
00:24:10,240 --> 00:24:13,880
Speaker 1: not keeping enough strong passwords. But then they could look

438
00:24:13,880 --> 00:24:15,639
Speaker 1: at these stories and say, look, it doesn't even matter

439
00:24:15,680 --> 00:24:19,080
Speaker 1: if I do everything right. It is a little frustrating.

440
00:24:20,080 --> 00:24:23,679
Speaker 1: Also in April, one week after assuming the position of

441
00:24:23,720 --> 00:24:27,399
Speaker 1: CEO of Mozilla, Brendan I stepped down because they've been

442
00:24:27,400 --> 00:24:30,160
Speaker 1: revealed that he had donated money to a California ballot

443
00:24:30,160 --> 00:24:35,080
Speaker 1: measure that was anti gay marriage. And Mozilla's corporate values

444
00:24:35,080 --> 00:24:38,320
Speaker 1: are focused on equal rights and free speech. So the

445
00:24:38,520 --> 00:24:41,919
Speaker 1: corporate philosophy of the company and the personal philosophy of

446
00:24:41,960 --> 00:24:45,280
Speaker 1: the new CEO we're not at all in alignment. And

447
00:24:45,440 --> 00:24:48,440
Speaker 1: there was an intense amount of pressure and so as

448
00:24:48,480 --> 00:24:51,320
Speaker 1: a result, one week after becoming CEO, he stepped down,

449
00:24:52,280 --> 00:24:56,120
Speaker 1: Which you know that that that's an interesting story. Mozilla

450
00:24:56,160 --> 00:24:59,440
Speaker 1: had a rough year overall in two thousand and fourteen,

451
00:24:59,520 --> 00:25:02,000
Speaker 1: but uh, that one really opened up my eyes when

452
00:25:02,040 --> 00:25:05,560
Speaker 1: it happened. And uh, the next one is probably the

453
00:25:05,560 --> 00:25:09,920
Speaker 1: most dramatic story of the year. Beyond these hacking stories,

454
00:25:10,560 --> 00:25:12,760
Speaker 1: this is the one that took place in a desert

455
00:25:13,640 --> 00:25:18,919
Speaker 1: Alamo Alamo, Alama Gordo. I can say it eventually, Alama Gordo,

456
00:25:18,960 --> 00:25:28,640
Speaker 1: New Mexico. It's when excavators we're digging and they discovered aliens. No, well,

457
00:25:28,680 --> 00:25:31,399
Speaker 1: cartridge is of of of a game about an alien.

458
00:25:32,400 --> 00:25:37,640
Speaker 1: You're talking about et for the the extraterrestrial for the Yes,

459
00:25:37,640 --> 00:25:41,760
Speaker 1: I am yeah. This was the long held story, the

460
00:25:41,960 --> 00:25:45,560
Speaker 1: belief that that that these cartridges had been taken out

461
00:25:45,560 --> 00:25:48,919
Speaker 1: to the desert and unceremoniously dumped. Now, I think it

462
00:25:49,000 --> 00:25:51,280
Speaker 1: was not just this game, right, There were a lot

463
00:25:51,280 --> 00:25:54,080
Speaker 1: of poorly performing games that were taken out there and

464
00:25:54,160 --> 00:25:57,280
Speaker 1: dumped because they just thought, we're never going to sell all. Yeah. No,

465
00:25:57,800 --> 00:26:01,160
Speaker 1: this was This was the the days of the crash

466
00:26:01,240 --> 00:26:05,960
Speaker 1: of three of video games, the home gaming um market,

467
00:26:06,359 --> 00:26:10,359
Speaker 1: when everyone suddenly realized home gaming is never gonna be big.

468
00:26:10,520 --> 00:26:12,840
Speaker 1: That was well, the problem was it got too big

469
00:26:12,880 --> 00:26:15,240
Speaker 1: too fast, right. The The issue was that they had

470
00:26:15,280 --> 00:26:17,320
Speaker 1: all these games that didn't have to go through any

471
00:26:17,359 --> 00:26:20,520
Speaker 1: kind of quality check before they hit stores, and the

472
00:26:20,560 --> 00:26:23,119
Speaker 1: market was flooded with a lot of crappy games, some

473
00:26:23,200 --> 00:26:26,640
Speaker 1: of which came from big name companies Because of one

474
00:26:26,640 --> 00:26:29,879
Speaker 1: reason or another. The guy who created the guy who programmed.

475
00:26:30,119 --> 00:26:35,200
Speaker 1: ET the Extraterrestrial also created one of the most um

476
00:26:35,720 --> 00:26:40,959
Speaker 1: uh well criticized games for the ad yards, Revenge. Uh.

477
00:26:41,000 --> 00:26:43,159
Speaker 1: And it turns out that he was you know, they

478
00:26:43,240 --> 00:26:45,919
Speaker 1: gave him a very short timeline and a lot of money,

479
00:26:45,960 --> 00:26:48,480
Speaker 1: and he says, all right, and so he made He

480
00:26:48,560 --> 00:26:50,800
Speaker 1: made a game that the game he could make in

481
00:26:50,840 --> 00:26:54,560
Speaker 1: that small amount of time. And as a result, uh.

482
00:26:54,760 --> 00:26:57,480
Speaker 1: It is largely pointed at as one of the reasons

483
00:26:57,480 --> 00:26:59,640
Speaker 1: for the video game crash. Truly, you want to get

484
00:26:59,800 --> 00:27:03,480
Speaker 1: more are specific. The problem was way more widespread than

485
00:27:03,520 --> 00:27:05,639
Speaker 1: one bad title, or even two if you point to

486
00:27:05,720 --> 00:27:08,320
Speaker 1: pac Man, which was another one that everyone cited as

487
00:27:08,359 --> 00:27:11,600
Speaker 1: being a reason for the crash. But they were good

488
00:27:11,600 --> 00:27:14,639
Speaker 1: examples of the problems that existed that caused the crash

489
00:27:14,680 --> 00:27:17,520
Speaker 1: to happen. Quick question, Yeah, did you ever actually play

490
00:27:17,600 --> 00:27:24,239
Speaker 1: a T I owned E T D Extraterrestrial For of

491
00:27:24,280 --> 00:27:27,359
Speaker 1: course I did. Well, well, there was no hard but

492
00:27:27,480 --> 00:27:29,800
Speaker 1: yes I did beat it. Uh did you get all

493
00:27:29,800 --> 00:27:34,560
Speaker 1: the DLC Joe? You might have an unrealistic view of

494
00:27:34,600 --> 00:27:38,640
Speaker 1: what the video game market was like back in Uh No,

495
00:27:38,800 --> 00:27:43,440
Speaker 1: there was no downloadable content. Okay, well, what's the next item?

496
00:27:43,600 --> 00:27:46,600
Speaker 1: So also in April, the FCC announced it was developing

497
00:27:46,600 --> 00:27:48,800
Speaker 1: new rules for the Internet now that you know their

498
00:27:48,880 --> 00:27:51,800
Speaker 1: last ones again and struck down. But these rules would

499
00:27:51,880 --> 00:27:56,000
Speaker 1: essentially say that carriers could charge content providers for premium speeds.

500
00:27:56,400 --> 00:27:59,719
Speaker 1: Now that neutrality advocates were protesting those rules because they

501
00:27:59,760 --> 00:28:03,440
Speaker 1: were say, and here's the problem. You've got carriers service

502
00:28:03,480 --> 00:28:07,399
Speaker 1: carriers that are also content providers, and that's a conflict

503
00:28:07,400 --> 00:28:10,520
Speaker 1: of interest. If if you are providing content as well

504
00:28:10,520 --> 00:28:15,040
Speaker 1: as the service to deliver that content, then what stops

505
00:28:15,119 --> 00:28:19,080
Speaker 1: you from giving your content preferential treatment and slowing down

506
00:28:19,119 --> 00:28:23,240
Speaker 1: everybody else? So anyone who's your customer is clearly going

507
00:28:23,280 --> 00:28:27,359
Speaker 1: to go with your content because they can't get anyone else's. Like,

508
00:28:27,440 --> 00:28:29,399
Speaker 1: that's a That's one of the big arguments about that

509
00:28:29,520 --> 00:28:33,080
Speaker 1: neutrality is that without it, you have the cards stacked

510
00:28:33,080 --> 00:28:37,520
Speaker 1: against you, especially for service carriers that also have either

511
00:28:37,600 --> 00:28:41,120
Speaker 1: relationships with content providers or they themselves are a content provider.

512
00:28:42,280 --> 00:28:47,000
Speaker 1: They opened up everybody watching Comcast Tube instead of YouTube. Yeah, no,

513
00:28:47,160 --> 00:28:50,720
Speaker 1: that was that's legitimately, or Comcast instead of Netflix or

514
00:28:50,760 --> 00:28:55,160
Speaker 1: Hulu whatever. Um, yeah, that's a big issue. And in fact,

515
00:28:55,800 --> 00:29:00,920
Speaker 1: uh recently it was revealed that there were some lots

516
00:29:00,920 --> 00:29:03,560
Speaker 1: of people left comments on this, like they have CC

517
00:29:03,720 --> 00:29:05,760
Speaker 1: opened it up to comments on the internet. Um, and

518
00:29:05,760 --> 00:29:07,520
Speaker 1: we'll talk a little bit about that a little bit later.

519
00:29:08,440 --> 00:29:12,760
Speaker 1: But recently it was revealed that more than three thousand

520
00:29:12,960 --> 00:29:20,680
Speaker 1: comments against this proposal were mysteriously lost or not counted,

521
00:29:21,400 --> 00:29:26,280
Speaker 1: and that a huge number that some argue we're generated

522
00:29:26,640 --> 00:29:31,120
Speaker 1: from special interest groups that were pro let's tear the

523
00:29:31,160 --> 00:29:34,080
Speaker 1: Internet and charge these different ways on accounts that had

524
00:29:34,120 --> 00:29:37,800
Speaker 1: just been created and it was their only post essentially

525
00:29:38,000 --> 00:29:41,080
Speaker 1: that kind of thing. Um. But anyway, that we'll we'll

526
00:29:41,120 --> 00:29:42,720
Speaker 1: talk a little bit more about that in a bit.

527
00:29:43,320 --> 00:29:48,600
Speaker 1: Moving on to may Target CEO Greg Steinhoffel's that stepped

528
00:29:48,600 --> 00:29:51,400
Speaker 1: down in response to the two thousand thirteen data security breached.

529
00:29:51,440 --> 00:29:56,560
Speaker 1: The compromise the personal information of seventy million customers. So yeah, another,

530
00:29:56,600 --> 00:29:59,040
Speaker 1: I mean, it was it was a half year after

531
00:29:59,160 --> 00:30:02,680
Speaker 1: that had happened, the it was the damages were still

532
00:30:02,760 --> 00:30:07,440
Speaker 1: rolling out, and so he he accepted responsibility stepped down. Um.

533
00:30:08,080 --> 00:30:11,280
Speaker 1: This again is one of those things where in hindsight,

534
00:30:11,440 --> 00:30:14,240
Speaker 1: it's very easy to say, well, clearly their security was

535
00:30:14,280 --> 00:30:18,560
Speaker 1: not not sufficient at the time. It's a lot harder

536
00:30:18,560 --> 00:30:22,240
Speaker 1: to say no, oh, well, we need to we need

537
00:30:22,280 --> 00:30:25,360
Speaker 1: to shore this up because we're vulnerable. Unless you are

538
00:30:25,480 --> 00:30:30,680
Speaker 1: actively using white hat hackers to test your security and

539
00:30:30,760 --> 00:30:34,920
Speaker 1: everything is being really put to a rigorous test, it's

540
00:30:34,960 --> 00:30:38,720
Speaker 1: hard to say how unless you're just being incredibly lax.

541
00:30:39,080 --> 00:30:41,040
Speaker 1: And I don't know that anyone was arguing that. But

542
00:30:41,160 --> 00:30:46,560
Speaker 1: still real world repercussions for that, beyond the the seventy

543
00:30:46,560 --> 00:30:50,600
Speaker 1: million customers who had their data stolen. Also in May,

544
00:30:50,720 --> 00:30:54,040
Speaker 1: a European court ruled that Google must delete personal data

545
00:30:54,120 --> 00:30:58,040
Speaker 1: when asked, and by personal data, they specifically meant links

546
00:30:58,120 --> 00:31:00,840
Speaker 1: to other existing sites in the Internet, because Google doesn't

547
00:31:00,920 --> 00:31:04,360
Speaker 1: own the pages that it links to in most cases,

548
00:31:04,440 --> 00:31:07,840
Speaker 1: it just it's a search engine. It pulls up links

549
00:31:07,880 --> 00:31:11,239
Speaker 1: in response to a query. So the argument here was that,

550
00:31:11,720 --> 00:31:13,800
Speaker 1: in fact, it was brought up by a guy who

551
00:31:13,960 --> 00:31:16,960
Speaker 1: when you searched his name, uh, I think it was

552
00:31:17,000 --> 00:31:19,920
Speaker 1: like an old court case from the nineties was popping

553
00:31:20,000 --> 00:31:22,800
Speaker 1: up as the top result, and I think it was

554
00:31:22,840 --> 00:31:25,280
Speaker 1: something about him not making a payment or something along

555
00:31:25,320 --> 00:31:28,320
Speaker 1: those lines. And he said, this happened a very long

556
00:31:28,360 --> 00:31:32,240
Speaker 1: time ago, it's completely resolved, it has no bearing on

557
00:31:32,320 --> 00:31:35,000
Speaker 1: my life anymore. And yet if people search my name,

558
00:31:35,520 --> 00:31:38,920
Speaker 1: this is what pops up, so it can still negatively

559
00:31:39,040 --> 00:31:41,880
Speaker 1: impact me, even though I've resolved this many years ago.

560
00:31:42,680 --> 00:31:45,440
Speaker 1: So this is this brought up this concept, the right

561
00:31:45,600 --> 00:31:48,840
Speaker 1: to be forgotten, the right to have things in your

562
00:31:48,880 --> 00:31:53,280
Speaker 1: past you fade away if you if you have done

563
00:31:53,880 --> 00:31:58,000
Speaker 1: your work in paying off whatever that thing was. Let's

564
00:31:58,040 --> 00:31:59,920
Speaker 1: say that you know you had to go to jail

565
00:32:00,160 --> 00:32:02,680
Speaker 1: or something, but you did, you served out your sentence,

566
00:32:02,720 --> 00:32:05,200
Speaker 1: You did everything you were supposed to do. You come

567
00:32:05,240 --> 00:32:08,520
Speaker 1: out reformed, you are trying to start a new life,

568
00:32:08,520 --> 00:32:10,560
Speaker 1: and yet if people search your name, that's the thing

569
00:32:10,600 --> 00:32:13,400
Speaker 1: that pops up. It's obviously going to continue to impact you.

570
00:32:13,880 --> 00:32:15,920
Speaker 1: So there's something to be said about that. The problem

571
00:32:16,000 --> 00:32:19,720
Speaker 1: is that the European court system said, well, Google, you now,

572
00:32:19,880 --> 00:32:22,520
Speaker 1: if you ever get a notice saying I want this

573
00:32:22,720 --> 00:32:26,400
Speaker 1: removed from your search results, you have to respond to it,

574
00:32:26,600 --> 00:32:28,800
Speaker 1: which opens up the doors for a couple of things. One,

575
00:32:29,080 --> 00:32:32,360
Speaker 1: Google will never not be doing that. That will be

576
00:32:32,480 --> 00:32:34,640
Speaker 1: the only thing Google does, like there will be a

577
00:32:34,680 --> 00:32:37,760
Speaker 1: department dedicated to it because it's just a huge undertaking.

578
00:32:38,000 --> 00:32:41,560
Speaker 1: I'd imagine most of these requests also will be without merit.

579
00:32:41,920 --> 00:32:44,160
Speaker 1: That's the other issue. That's the other one is that

580
00:32:44,240 --> 00:32:47,400
Speaker 1: if the request is for someone who doesn't want a

581
00:32:47,480 --> 00:32:51,320
Speaker 1: negative thing, that is possibly still very much relevant to

582
00:32:51,440 --> 00:32:55,560
Speaker 1: show up. What what's the criteria? How can let's say

583
00:32:55,560 --> 00:33:01,080
Speaker 1: a company that's being criticized for some sort of perceived

584
00:33:01,160 --> 00:33:06,400
Speaker 1: or otherwise malfeasance, like, how can how can they you know,

585
00:33:06,440 --> 00:33:08,680
Speaker 1: how can Google determine whether or not a request as

586
00:33:08,800 --> 00:33:12,400
Speaker 1: legitimate or if it is something that's just trying to

587
00:33:12,600 --> 00:33:17,080
Speaker 1: whitewash the background. That also seems like you'd have people

588
00:33:17,080 --> 00:33:19,720
Speaker 1: who would be very against this because they might own

589
00:33:19,800 --> 00:33:23,040
Speaker 1: the content. So you could have somebody petition Google to

590
00:33:23,560 --> 00:33:28,240
Speaker 1: undercut tremendously their traffic. Yeah, which then impacts the bottom

591
00:33:28,240 --> 00:33:30,800
Speaker 1: line of whatever that site is. So, if you're let's

592
00:33:30,800 --> 00:33:34,360
Speaker 1: say you're a whistleblower site and you know you are,

593
00:33:34,400 --> 00:33:38,280
Speaker 1: you're providing an actual valuable service. You're not You're not

594
00:33:38,480 --> 00:33:42,720
Speaker 1: trying to publish things that are unfounded. You're doing your

595
00:33:42,760 --> 00:33:46,160
Speaker 1: due diligence as a journalist to make sure that the

596
00:33:46,200 --> 00:33:49,600
Speaker 1: things you cover are as reliable as you can possibly

597
00:33:50,040 --> 00:33:55,360
Speaker 1: be expected to prove before publishing. And then you get

598
00:33:55,400 --> 00:33:58,160
Speaker 1: the links removed, and then that could mean that people

599
00:33:58,600 --> 00:34:01,600
Speaker 1: one they don't see it, So there's important information that's

600
00:34:01,640 --> 00:34:04,240
Speaker 1: not getting out there, and too, you are no longer

601
00:34:04,320 --> 00:34:07,520
Speaker 1: able to make a living, and now you know you're

602
00:34:07,600 --> 00:34:11,920
Speaker 1: you're effectively being censored at that point. So this is

603
00:34:11,920 --> 00:34:16,000
Speaker 1: still an issue that's going on right now where they

604
00:34:16,000 --> 00:34:19,960
Speaker 1: have not really resolved the problems around the demand. So

605
00:34:20,040 --> 00:34:23,040
Speaker 1: everyone has some valid arguments. The question is what's the

606
00:34:23,080 --> 00:34:26,759
Speaker 1: implementation going to be so that it doesn't cause more

607
00:34:26,800 --> 00:34:29,200
Speaker 1: harm than good. Yeah, it's tough. I kind of think

608
00:34:29,280 --> 00:34:32,239
Speaker 1: we're just kinda I mean, it's not nice, but we

609
00:34:32,280 --> 00:34:34,600
Speaker 1: are past the age where we can expect things to

610
00:34:34,600 --> 00:34:40,279
Speaker 1: be forgotten. We're an unfortunate transitional generation who did not

611
00:34:40,480 --> 00:34:43,879
Speaker 1: grow up with the expectation that everything we did would

612
00:34:43,920 --> 00:34:47,160
Speaker 1: always be remembered. But that's kind of the reality now.

613
00:34:47,200 --> 00:34:50,600
Speaker 1: Although you could argue also that that we're very fickle

614
00:34:50,680 --> 00:34:54,040
Speaker 1: as well, and things that probably should stick with us

615
00:34:54,080 --> 00:34:58,800
Speaker 1: longer can very easily get dropped in favor of other things.

616
00:34:59,280 --> 00:35:03,160
Speaker 1: That's some common terry about like some hacks, some reveals,

617
00:35:03,480 --> 00:35:07,960
Speaker 1: some leaks of information that were big, big deals that

618
00:35:08,080 --> 00:35:10,799
Speaker 1: then got eclipsed by other stories later on. That has

619
00:35:10,920 --> 00:35:14,120
Speaker 1: nothing to do with any active censorship or anything it's

620
00:35:14,160 --> 00:35:17,880
Speaker 1: just human nature, the way we can very quickly, uh

621
00:35:18,200 --> 00:35:21,319
Speaker 1: change our focus from one thing to another. Now that

622
00:35:21,360 --> 00:35:24,839
Speaker 1: doesn't mean that in posterity, like we won't like years

623
00:35:24,880 --> 00:35:27,520
Speaker 1: down the road, say look we need to really look

624
00:35:27,520 --> 00:35:31,120
Speaker 1: at this. That's still a possibility. But in the twenty

625
00:35:31,120 --> 00:35:34,279
Speaker 1: four hour news cycle world, we very quickly leap from

626
00:35:34,360 --> 00:35:37,440
Speaker 1: one big story to another. So sometimes the best way

627
00:35:37,440 --> 00:35:41,680
Speaker 1: to make people forget is just done. But don't bring

628
00:35:41,719 --> 00:35:46,160
Speaker 1: it up. Just let it go and it will be forgotten. Well,

629
00:35:46,200 --> 00:35:48,240
Speaker 1: it's been a full story since I talked about hacking,

630
00:35:49,360 --> 00:35:52,880
Speaker 1: so let's talk about hacking. Hack eBay announced it was

631
00:35:52,960 --> 00:35:58,960
Speaker 1: hacked and that users should change their passwords. In May. Yeah, yeah,

632
00:35:59,600 --> 00:36:04,440
Speaker 1: also May, Google unveiled a prototype driverless car that essentially

633
00:36:04,480 --> 00:36:07,200
Speaker 1: just has a start button and a stop button for controls,

634
00:36:07,360 --> 00:36:09,600
Speaker 1: with a top speed of twenty five miles hour. There

635
00:36:09,719 --> 00:36:12,279
Speaker 1: was like a little bit, I think a few more

636
00:36:12,320 --> 00:36:15,680
Speaker 1: than a hundred prototypes that they were going to build

637
00:36:15,840 --> 00:36:19,919
Speaker 1: from scratch. Like these were not converted vehicles, these were

638
00:36:20,040 --> 00:36:24,120
Speaker 1: little tiny smart car looking things. And uh, yeah, you

639
00:36:24,320 --> 00:36:26,480
Speaker 1: I guess you pair it with a Google device like

640
00:36:26,480 --> 00:36:29,239
Speaker 1: an Android phone, and you tell it where you want

641
00:36:29,239 --> 00:36:31,080
Speaker 1: it to go. And it takes you there at a

642
00:36:31,080 --> 00:36:34,399
Speaker 1: top speed of twenty Pretty awesome. Yeah, but no break,

643
00:36:34,480 --> 00:36:38,320
Speaker 1: no accelerator, no steering wheel, You completely hand over control

644
00:36:38,360 --> 00:36:40,120
Speaker 1: to the car. Wow. Well that's so that kind of

645
00:36:40,160 --> 00:36:42,759
Speaker 1: contradicts something I know I've heard you say before, which

646
00:36:42,800 --> 00:36:44,759
Speaker 1: is that you think cars like this are always going

647
00:36:44,800 --> 00:36:48,680
Speaker 1: to have manual override. I think, I think when they

648
00:36:48,880 --> 00:36:51,600
Speaker 1: come to market, because obviously these are prototype cars that

649
00:36:51,640 --> 00:36:53,719
Speaker 1: are being tested internally, when I think when they come

650
00:36:53,760 --> 00:36:57,120
Speaker 1: to market, they'll have to I think that, uh, and

651
00:36:57,320 --> 00:36:59,360
Speaker 1: I have to for two reasons. One, I think that

652
00:36:59,400 --> 00:37:02,680
Speaker 1: consumers are and demanded, They're only gonna be there's gonna

653
00:37:02,680 --> 00:37:05,440
Speaker 1: be a very small population of consumers who are going

654
00:37:05,480 --> 00:37:08,200
Speaker 1: to feel comfortable completely handing over control of a vehicle

655
00:37:08,239 --> 00:37:12,120
Speaker 1: to a computer. And then two, I think legally, I

656
00:37:12,160 --> 00:37:16,160
Speaker 1: think I think legislation will be passed where it will

657
00:37:16,719 --> 00:37:20,919
Speaker 1: still require manual control to be a possibility. I don't

658
00:37:20,960 --> 00:37:23,279
Speaker 1: think you will ever get to a point, at least

659
00:37:23,280 --> 00:37:28,359
Speaker 1: not probably not within my lifetime where um cars can

660
00:37:28,400 --> 00:37:32,200
Speaker 1: be sold that do not have a manual option at all. So,

661
00:37:33,000 --> 00:37:35,360
Speaker 1: but that's a guess. So I got a couple of

662
00:37:35,360 --> 00:37:38,279
Speaker 1: Apple stories, right, Yeah, one at the end of May.

663
00:37:38,360 --> 00:37:43,800
Speaker 1: That's when Apple bought Beats Electronics for three billion dollars. Well,

664
00:37:43,840 --> 00:37:46,120
Speaker 1: I guess they decided that was a correct amount of

665
00:37:46,120 --> 00:37:49,040
Speaker 1: money to pay. Yeah, I mean that's about the price

666
00:37:49,040 --> 00:37:53,520
Speaker 1: of what like three of their headphones. So right, Um,

667
00:37:53,640 --> 00:37:56,440
Speaker 1: did your headphones ever worked? Joe? You gotta beat right

668
00:38:00,120 --> 00:38:03,239
Speaker 1: to full. But beat beats may be beautiful, but my

669
00:38:03,360 --> 00:38:07,000
Speaker 1: beats there are no beats. That's terrible. See, mine works

670
00:38:07,080 --> 00:38:09,600
Speaker 1: so well that I've been We we got a whole

671
00:38:09,600 --> 00:38:12,919
Speaker 1: bunch in our office when our office moved to where

672
00:38:12,960 --> 00:38:16,120
Speaker 1: it currently is but won't be for much longer. We

673
00:38:16,200 --> 00:38:18,759
Speaker 1: moved into a big, open office environment, which meant that

674
00:38:18,760 --> 00:38:20,719
Speaker 1: we're all sitting right, you know, elbow to elbow with

675
00:38:20,719 --> 00:38:22,879
Speaker 1: each other, and so we all got The company bought

676
00:38:22,960 --> 00:38:25,880
Speaker 1: us Beats headphones to kind of help us have our

677
00:38:25,920 --> 00:38:29,120
Speaker 1: own like little sound space and hatchets to keep in

678
00:38:29,160 --> 00:38:32,200
Speaker 1: our death stowers. Yeah, which is very worrisome because I

679
00:38:32,200 --> 00:38:35,520
Speaker 1: sit right next to Robert Lamb and he's hatchett happy.

680
00:38:35,560 --> 00:38:38,120
Speaker 1: But at any rate, Uh, my beats were great. I'm

681
00:38:38,160 --> 00:38:40,440
Speaker 1: sorry that cheers never did. What color did you end

682
00:38:40,520 --> 00:38:45,160
Speaker 1: up picking? I got red color of cash. Well, moving

683
00:38:45,200 --> 00:38:48,560
Speaker 1: to June two thousand and fourteen and another Apple story.

684
00:38:48,600 --> 00:38:51,680
Speaker 1: Apple Actually a couple of things that happened in June.

685
00:38:51,680 --> 00:38:55,480
Speaker 1: But Apple introduced Swift, which is a new programming language

686
00:38:55,480 --> 00:38:58,879
Speaker 1: for iOS and O s X development. UM, I should

687
00:38:58,880 --> 00:39:02,920
Speaker 1: say OS ten development, not OSX, but yeah, it's it

688
00:39:03,040 --> 00:39:07,319
Speaker 1: was a new era of programming here. And this was

689
00:39:07,719 --> 00:39:12,239
Speaker 1: the time June's win. Apple holds the developers conference and

690
00:39:12,360 --> 00:39:15,319
Speaker 1: Google holds the io event. So I didn't write down

691
00:39:15,360 --> 00:39:19,040
Speaker 1: all the news that came out from that because a

692
00:39:19,080 --> 00:39:23,319
Speaker 1: lot of it doesn't have a direct impact on listeners necessarily,

693
00:39:23,320 --> 00:39:26,799
Speaker 1: at least not yet. And they tend to, you know,

694
00:39:26,840 --> 00:39:29,560
Speaker 1: we tend to look at the product releases more than

695
00:39:29,640 --> 00:39:32,200
Speaker 1: just the corporate announcements of here's some new, you know,

696
00:39:32,280 --> 00:39:36,640
Speaker 1: developers stuff. Um. Also in June, the FCC opened up

697
00:39:36,640 --> 00:39:39,400
Speaker 1: the discussion. This is when they specifically asked for public comment,

698
00:39:39,440 --> 00:39:43,800
Speaker 1: and John Oliver did the segment about net neutrality. It

699
00:39:44,600 --> 00:39:46,520
Speaker 1: was fantastic, wasn't it. He mean, he does a really

700
00:39:46,560 --> 00:39:49,680
Speaker 1: good job of laying out what the issue is and

701
00:39:49,719 --> 00:39:54,680
Speaker 1: why people should care about it. I love John Oliver's segments, UM,

702
00:39:54,800 --> 00:39:57,720
Speaker 1: and he urged people to leave comments on the FCC

703
00:39:57,840 --> 00:40:00,680
Speaker 1: site more than people did, so some that had actually

704
00:40:00,680 --> 00:40:03,200
Speaker 1: brought the site down for a little bit. Uh And

705
00:40:03,480 --> 00:40:06,560
Speaker 1: that was just the beginning. There were there'd be hundreds

706
00:40:06,560 --> 00:40:09,120
Speaker 1: of thousands of comments left over the next couple of months.

707
00:40:09,520 --> 00:40:11,480
Speaker 1: I'm sure they were thinking, if only we could give

708
00:40:11,520 --> 00:40:17,040
Speaker 1: preferential treatment to traffic going to the right right like

709
00:40:17,120 --> 00:40:20,680
Speaker 1: you know, in a year, this wouldn't have been a problem. Uh. Well,

710
00:40:20,719 --> 00:40:25,440
Speaker 1: also in June, despite facing resistance and lots of markets,

711
00:40:25,440 --> 00:40:27,840
Speaker 1: something that's still going on today, the car service Uber

712
00:40:28,400 --> 00:40:34,720
Speaker 1: was valued at seventeen billion dollars, part of the sharing economy. Uh.

713
00:40:34,840 --> 00:40:38,200
Speaker 1: Then we also in June had the computer chat program

714
00:40:38,239 --> 00:40:40,760
Speaker 1: that emulated a thirteen year old boy from the Ukraine.

715
00:40:40,880 --> 00:40:45,120
Speaker 1: What was his name, Eugene Goostman. I believe so. I

716
00:40:45,160 --> 00:40:48,320
Speaker 1: think you're right it was, but it was supposed to

717
00:40:48,360 --> 00:40:50,200
Speaker 1: be a thirteen year old boy from the Ukraine. It

718
00:40:50,200 --> 00:40:54,680
Speaker 1: was actually a software artificial intelligence program fooling one third

719
00:40:54,719 --> 00:40:57,600
Speaker 1: of the judges at the Allen Touring Festival, which led

720
00:40:57,600 --> 00:40:59,840
Speaker 1: lots of people to say it past the touring test,

721
00:41:00,040 --> 00:41:04,520
Speaker 1: although others were quick to criticize that that claim, saying

722
00:41:04,560 --> 00:41:09,319
Speaker 1: that it caused people to set their expectations lower. Than

723
00:41:09,840 --> 00:41:13,640
Speaker 1: perhaps otherwise because it was had a lot of qualifiers, right.

724
00:41:14,360 --> 00:41:18,640
Speaker 1: I on one hand, I think, obviously this is very

725
00:41:18,680 --> 00:41:22,279
Speaker 1: smart piece of software. But on the other hand, I

726
00:41:22,600 --> 00:41:24,960
Speaker 1: what I read about it suggested it's kind of tricks

727
00:41:25,000 --> 00:41:29,640
Speaker 1: ee like it it uses some very clever tricks on

728
00:41:29,680 --> 00:41:32,799
Speaker 1: the part of the designers, but it's not really It

729
00:41:32,840 --> 00:41:36,759
Speaker 1: was tricks that actually helped them avoid the necessity to

730
00:41:36,840 --> 00:41:41,000
Speaker 1: create really super robust AI. Well. Yeah, because it's a

731
00:41:41,040 --> 00:41:44,880
Speaker 1: non native English speaker communicating in English. Yeah, at the

732
00:41:44,880 --> 00:41:47,200
Speaker 1: age of their team, meaning that there is a limited

733
00:41:47,239 --> 00:41:50,200
Speaker 1: experience of the world, didn't get all kinds of cultural

734
00:41:50,239 --> 00:41:54,799
Speaker 1: references and stuff right. So by by limiting the references

735
00:41:54,840 --> 00:41:58,839
Speaker 1: that it would understand and the context that it could understand, Uh,

736
00:41:58,960 --> 00:42:03,040
Speaker 1: they end up set the questioner's expectations lower, and therefore

737
00:42:03,120 --> 00:42:06,080
Speaker 1: the bar is lower. Uh. This is different than if

738
00:42:06,120 --> 00:42:09,560
Speaker 1: you had an artificially intelligent program that was supposed to

739
00:42:09,600 --> 00:42:12,919
Speaker 1: be a native speaker in whatever language you're using and

740
00:42:13,000 --> 00:42:16,759
Speaker 1: to be relatively aware of most things. You're at the

741
00:42:17,120 --> 00:42:19,600
Speaker 1: same sort of stuff the average person of that culture

742
00:42:19,640 --> 00:42:22,239
Speaker 1: would be aware of, and to have a conversation, a

743
00:42:22,239 --> 00:42:25,799
Speaker 1: meaningful conversation with that. It also raised a lot of

744
00:42:26,080 --> 00:42:29,480
Speaker 1: interesting discussion about alternatives to the Turing test, Right, you know,

745
00:42:29,560 --> 00:42:32,719
Speaker 1: this idea that the Turing test is not necessarily a

746
00:42:32,760 --> 00:42:36,120
Speaker 1: great test for artificial intelligence. We did a podcast about

747
00:42:36,120 --> 00:42:38,040
Speaker 1: that over it Forward Thinking. Yeah, you should definitely go

748
00:42:38,120 --> 00:42:40,000
Speaker 1: check that out if you're interested in this subject. That

749
00:42:40,080 --> 00:42:42,839
Speaker 1: Forward Thinking episode was a lot of fun. Uh, And

750
00:42:42,960 --> 00:42:46,320
Speaker 1: all of our podcasts are are gathered at f W

751
00:42:46,520 --> 00:42:49,440
Speaker 1: thinking dot com. So if you like that kind of discussion,

752
00:42:49,480 --> 00:42:51,800
Speaker 1: definitely go check that out because that was a blast

753
00:42:51,800 --> 00:42:56,080
Speaker 1: to talk about. Also, in June, Amazon introduced the fire Phone,

754
00:42:56,560 --> 00:43:01,040
Speaker 1: which was which I kind of pretend I care about. Yeah, well,

755
00:43:01,080 --> 00:43:03,239
Speaker 1: you'd you'd be joining the millions of people who did

756
00:43:03,280 --> 00:43:05,719
Speaker 1: not flock to the Amazon Fire Phone. I think I

757
00:43:05,800 --> 00:43:09,319
Speaker 1: just failed at pretending. You know. It was one of

758
00:43:09,320 --> 00:43:12,600
Speaker 1: those that like the idea is interesting. It's it really

759
00:43:12,760 --> 00:43:15,399
Speaker 1: is supposed to appeal to the Amazon Prime members, people

760
00:43:15,440 --> 00:43:18,680
Speaker 1: who buy a lot of stuff on Amazon. The process

761
00:43:18,680 --> 00:43:20,719
Speaker 1: of buying things would have been a lot smoother on

762
00:43:20,760 --> 00:43:23,200
Speaker 1: this phone than on other devices. It had a lot

763
00:43:23,239 --> 00:43:26,640
Speaker 1: of interesting innovations as far as like um, so much

764
00:43:26,640 --> 00:43:29,480
Speaker 1: easier to just pour the money out of your wallet.

765
00:43:29,600 --> 00:43:33,080
Speaker 1: That's pretty much what every mobile device is all about Joe. Uh.

766
00:43:33,160 --> 00:43:35,600
Speaker 1: But yeah, this this one was supposed to also have

767
00:43:35,680 --> 00:43:37,960
Speaker 1: like a lot of cool features in it that would

768
00:43:38,160 --> 00:43:42,480
Speaker 1: allow for um better depth sensing with the camera, that

769
00:43:42,560 --> 00:43:45,080
Speaker 1: kind of thing. But yeah, it just never really made

770
00:43:45,080 --> 00:43:48,720
Speaker 1: a big impression. Also, just an interesting little note, Harley

771
00:43:48,760 --> 00:43:53,840
Speaker 1: Davidson introduced a prototype electric motorcycle, which kind of I

772
00:43:53,880 --> 00:43:55,920
Speaker 1: guess defeats the purpose of buying a Harley if you

773
00:43:55,960 --> 00:44:00,000
Speaker 1: can't revet and make that really obnoxious noise. I say

774
00:44:00,080 --> 00:44:01,960
Speaker 1: this as someone who really would love to own a

775
00:44:01,960 --> 00:44:06,400
Speaker 1: Harley Davidson. That's true. I did not know that about you.

776
00:44:06,520 --> 00:44:09,280
Speaker 1: There's a world we have seen you in black leather jackets.

777
00:44:09,320 --> 00:44:12,880
Speaker 1: But I also believe you don't drive vehicles. I don't drive. No,

778
00:44:13,000 --> 00:44:15,120
Speaker 1: I don't drive cars. I don't drive cars. But you

779
00:44:15,120 --> 00:44:19,480
Speaker 1: would drive a motorcycle, absolutely, I would. What a strange person.

780
00:44:19,680 --> 00:44:22,080
Speaker 1: You can have a way more situational awareness and not

781
00:44:22,120 --> 00:44:24,240
Speaker 1: on a motorcycle than you can in the car. But

782
00:44:24,239 --> 00:44:25,680
Speaker 1: but you do have to worry a lot more about

783
00:44:25,719 --> 00:44:28,439
Speaker 1: your safety. You have to, as as motorcyclist will say,

784
00:44:28,440 --> 00:44:31,160
Speaker 1: you have to imagine that you are invisible, so you

785
00:44:31,160 --> 00:44:34,840
Speaker 1: have to be hyper aware of the cars around you obviously,

786
00:44:35,480 --> 00:44:38,760
Speaker 1: but but there's a World War two era Harley Davidson

787
00:44:38,840 --> 00:44:42,680
Speaker 1: that I absolutely would love to own. And I wrote

788
00:44:42,680 --> 00:44:45,120
Speaker 1: the article on how stuff Works dot Com on how

789
00:44:45,239 --> 00:44:51,160
Speaker 1: choppers work, and that was fantastic. I loved it. UM Anyway,

790
00:44:51,840 --> 00:44:54,799
Speaker 1: last story for June often we found out that in

791
00:44:54,840 --> 00:44:59,200
Speaker 1: two thousand twelve, Facebook changed how the news feed displayed

792
00:44:59,400 --> 00:45:02,960
Speaker 1: to UM users as part of the psychological experiment, and

793
00:45:03,000 --> 00:45:05,600
Speaker 1: people got upset about it. You remember that story. Did

794
00:45:05,640 --> 00:45:09,000
Speaker 1: you hear anything about it? Yeah, this idea that they

795
00:45:09,000 --> 00:45:11,840
Speaker 1: wanted to see what the psychological impact was if they

796
00:45:11,880 --> 00:45:15,080
Speaker 1: if they tweaked the news feed so that certain types

797
00:45:15,120 --> 00:45:17,839
Speaker 1: of stories would show more than other types. Can they

798
00:45:17,840 --> 00:45:21,160
Speaker 1: make you more depressed? Yeah? And people got really mad

799
00:45:21,160 --> 00:45:24,520
Speaker 1: that they became unwitting getting pigs to uh this this

800
00:45:24,640 --> 00:45:29,200
Speaker 1: psychological state that happened two years previously. I was hoping

801
00:45:29,200 --> 00:45:32,759
Speaker 1: that my news feed would make me depressed in random ways. Yeah,

802
00:45:33,480 --> 00:45:36,200
Speaker 1: you were directing this. I thought you were just I

803
00:45:36,239 --> 00:45:38,359
Speaker 1: thought all my friends were emo, and it turns out

804
00:45:38,400 --> 00:45:41,920
Speaker 1: you were just making me think that. Well, I mean it,

805
00:45:42,760 --> 00:45:46,200
Speaker 1: anytime Facebook makes any sort of change, it's guaranteed to

806
00:45:46,320 --> 00:45:49,480
Speaker 1: upset people. But this in particular with people not feeling

807
00:45:49,520 --> 00:45:53,840
Speaker 1: like they were uninformed, that they were unwilling participants really

808
00:45:53,880 --> 00:45:57,200
Speaker 1: got to it psychologically. There was some big tech company

809
00:45:57,239 --> 00:46:00,400
Speaker 1: news in July. Wasn't oh gosh, so remember Only had

810
00:46:00,400 --> 00:46:02,120
Speaker 1: announced earlier in the year that they were going to

811
00:46:02,160 --> 00:46:05,479
Speaker 1: cut five thousand jobs, and everyone's like, oh, well, that's

812
00:46:05,520 --> 00:46:13,879
Speaker 1: when in July Microsoft announced plans to layoff eighteen thousand employees. Yeah.

813
00:46:13,920 --> 00:46:16,720
Speaker 1: It was the largest number of layoffs in company history

814
00:46:16,880 --> 00:46:20,160
Speaker 1: for a single layoff at any rate. Uh. And Nadella,

815
00:46:20,239 --> 00:46:23,160
Speaker 1: the CEO, said that the plan was to streamline the engineering,

816
00:46:23,200 --> 00:46:26,920
Speaker 1: operations and management processes and reduce the levels of management

817
00:46:26,960 --> 00:46:30,560
Speaker 1: to quote accelerate the flow of information and decision making

818
00:46:30,719 --> 00:46:33,160
Speaker 1: end quote. And most of those jobs were in the

819
00:46:33,200 --> 00:46:38,600
Speaker 1: Nokia division they had Microsoft had acquired Nokia, and now

820
00:46:38,640 --> 00:46:44,840
Speaker 1: they were getting rid of a lot of middle management largely. So, Yeah,

821
00:46:44,880 --> 00:46:48,080
Speaker 1: it was not not a great not a great day

822
00:46:48,160 --> 00:46:50,160
Speaker 1: to be at Microsoft. I think, I'm sure, I'm sure

823
00:46:50,160 --> 00:46:54,440
Speaker 1: anyone working there on that day was very much on

824
00:46:54,440 --> 00:46:56,920
Speaker 1: on the edge of their seat. And not all those

825
00:46:56,960 --> 00:47:00,640
Speaker 1: layoffs happened at once, obviously they rolled out over time. Uh.

826
00:47:00,760 --> 00:47:03,719
Speaker 1: Then there was this new story that that ended up

827
00:47:03,719 --> 00:47:06,239
Speaker 1: getting passed around became a little viral that I thought

828
00:47:06,239 --> 00:47:09,719
Speaker 1: was hilarious, largely because I knew the people involved. So

829
00:47:09,920 --> 00:47:13,040
Speaker 1: I've got a friend. Her name is Veronica. Veronica has

830
00:47:13,080 --> 00:47:16,960
Speaker 1: a husband named Ryan, and Veronica had gotten on the

831
00:47:17,000 --> 00:47:21,560
Speaker 1: phone with Comcast, a Comcast representative, and she wanted to

832
00:47:21,640 --> 00:47:26,239
Speaker 1: cancel her her service with Comcast. Hold on, let me

833
00:47:26,280 --> 00:47:29,440
Speaker 1: transfer you to somebody else. Yeah, it wasn't even that.

834
00:47:29,520 --> 00:47:33,239
Speaker 1: It wasn't even that. It got worse than that. Yeah,

835
00:47:33,280 --> 00:47:36,600
Speaker 1: she she handed After she got frustrated, Ryan, her husband,

836
00:47:36,600 --> 00:47:38,680
Speaker 1: took over the phone call and at that point started

837
00:47:38,680 --> 00:47:43,480
Speaker 1: to record the conversation he had with the Comcast representative,

838
00:47:43,840 --> 00:47:48,279
Speaker 1: and which and which the Comcast representative took every opportunity

839
00:47:48,320 --> 00:47:52,880
Speaker 1: to try and stop them from canceling their service, and um,

840
00:47:52,920 --> 00:47:56,120
Speaker 1: it ended up getting pretty absurd. It was hard to

841
00:47:56,160 --> 00:47:58,200
Speaker 1: believe it was real. Yeah, I think a lot of

842
00:47:58,200 --> 00:48:00,600
Speaker 1: people were saying, like, this is stage. It's got to

843
00:48:00,640 --> 00:48:03,080
Speaker 1: be it's got to be some sort of because every

844
00:48:03,080 --> 00:48:05,600
Speaker 1: single time the guy would just say, oh, I want

845
00:48:05,640 --> 00:48:08,080
Speaker 1: to proceed, can we just please in my service, he

846
00:48:08,120 --> 00:48:10,520
Speaker 1: would come back at him with something else, like, you know,

847
00:48:10,800 --> 00:48:15,239
Speaker 1: can't you just tell me why yeah, you know it was.

848
00:48:15,760 --> 00:48:19,480
Speaker 1: It was like a really needy breakup. Yeah right right,

849
00:48:20,120 --> 00:48:23,520
Speaker 1: I swear it could change. So this ended up leading

850
00:48:23,560 --> 00:48:29,320
Speaker 1: to Comcast uh delivering an apology to Ryan and Veronica

851
00:48:29,440 --> 00:48:33,399
Speaker 1: um saying that that was not the way customer representatives

852
00:48:33,400 --> 00:48:37,359
Speaker 1: were supposed to respond to calls. Then later there were

853
00:48:37,440 --> 00:48:42,279
Speaker 1: other customer representatives, mostly anonymous ones, claiming that no, they're

854
00:48:42,320 --> 00:48:46,359
Speaker 1: pretty much, you know, encouraged to take every opportunity to

855
00:48:46,560 --> 00:48:49,200
Speaker 1: discourage you from ending your service, Like that guy was

856
00:48:49,239 --> 00:48:51,759
Speaker 1: doing an awesome job, right like that guy, Like that

857
00:48:51,800 --> 00:48:55,680
Speaker 1: guy was essentially doing what he had been told to do,

858
00:48:55,920 --> 00:48:59,160
Speaker 1: or all the incentives point you toward doing like you

859
00:48:59,160 --> 00:49:02,359
Speaker 1: would get incentive of that would be based on uh,

860
00:49:02,560 --> 00:49:06,080
Speaker 1: customer retention, that kind of thing. And so anyway, it

861
00:49:06,120 --> 00:49:10,120
Speaker 1: became this whole story about corporate culture and the way

862
00:49:10,160 --> 00:49:14,440
Speaker 1: that companies handle customers. And it was interesting to me

863
00:49:14,520 --> 00:49:16,360
Speaker 1: just because I knew the people who were involved, and

864
00:49:16,440 --> 00:49:19,279
Speaker 1: I was actually chatted with Veronica about it later and

865
00:49:19,320 --> 00:49:22,880
Speaker 1: she's like, yeah, I didn't expect that end up snowballing

866
00:49:22,880 --> 00:49:27,080
Speaker 1: the way it did. Any rate. Also, in July, four

867
00:49:27,120 --> 00:49:30,880
Speaker 1: Square would split into two services, one that would remain

868
00:49:31,000 --> 00:49:34,440
Speaker 1: named four Square and one that was called Swarm and

869
00:49:34,480 --> 00:49:36,600
Speaker 1: the check in ability where you would go to a

870
00:49:36,640 --> 00:49:38,440
Speaker 1: place and you know, you normally would go to four

871
00:49:38,480 --> 00:49:41,040
Speaker 1: square and check in. That went with Swarm, which left

872
00:49:41,080 --> 00:49:45,240
Speaker 1: a lot of people asking what the heck is four square? Now? Uh,

873
00:49:45,360 --> 00:49:48,640
Speaker 1: I'm gonna say that I always thought what the heck

874
00:49:48,719 --> 00:49:51,399
Speaker 1: is four square? Now? I mean, I understand what it does,

875
00:49:51,680 --> 00:49:54,440
Speaker 1: I just don't get it. Yeah, I don't understand that.

876
00:49:54,560 --> 00:49:58,200
Speaker 1: I totally I totally understand your confusion. I loved four

877
00:49:58,239 --> 00:50:00,200
Speaker 1: square for two reasons. I love the idea of that

878
00:50:00,320 --> 00:50:03,400
Speaker 1: one other friends who used four square would be able

879
00:50:03,440 --> 00:50:05,040
Speaker 1: to see if I was nearby, and maybe we could

880
00:50:05,120 --> 00:50:08,200
Speaker 1: end up hanging out. Never worked out, but that says

881
00:50:08,239 --> 00:50:12,400
Speaker 1: more about me than four square. Uh. The other was

882
00:50:12,480 --> 00:50:15,560
Speaker 1: that four square you know some places that that would

883
00:50:15,560 --> 00:50:17,880
Speaker 1: allow you to check or some places that had a

884
00:50:17,880 --> 00:50:21,680
Speaker 1: presence on four square would have specials, like special deals

885
00:50:21,719 --> 00:50:24,080
Speaker 1: like check in three times, get a free appetizer at

886
00:50:24,120 --> 00:50:26,560
Speaker 1: this restaurant, that kind of thing. And my wife and

887
00:50:26,600 --> 00:50:28,719
Speaker 1: I go to enough of the same places where that

888
00:50:28,840 --> 00:50:31,759
Speaker 1: ended up being something cool and we like doing it.

889
00:50:32,080 --> 00:50:35,400
Speaker 1: But neither my wife nor I used Swarm. We both

890
00:50:35,560 --> 00:50:37,760
Speaker 1: I tried it. She didn't even bother She just deleted

891
00:50:37,760 --> 00:50:40,680
Speaker 1: four square and was done. I tried it and then

892
00:50:40,719 --> 00:50:44,040
Speaker 1: deleted it. I didn't did no one. Not enough people

893
00:50:44,040 --> 00:50:46,120
Speaker 1: were using it for me to care at the time.

894
00:50:46,160 --> 00:50:48,759
Speaker 1: It may be different now, um, and four square became

895
00:50:48,760 --> 00:50:53,719
Speaker 1: more of a recommendation engine, like you are in this neighborhood,

896
00:50:53,800 --> 00:50:56,080
Speaker 1: maybe you would like to have coffee here, that kind

897
00:50:56,080 --> 00:50:59,239
Speaker 1: of thing. But I don't know how their numbers are

898
00:50:59,280 --> 00:51:01,200
Speaker 1: doing right now, but I do know the initial response

899
00:51:01,280 --> 00:51:04,080
Speaker 1: was negative. I think four squares should have done a

900
00:51:04,120 --> 00:51:06,960
Speaker 1: thing where only four people can check in at a time,

901
00:51:07,040 --> 00:51:09,319
Speaker 1: and then there's a line of other people waiting, and

902
00:51:09,400 --> 00:51:13,840
Speaker 1: one of them is king and manufactured exclusivity has become

903
00:51:13,880 --> 00:51:19,319
Speaker 1: an incredibly popular tool. So you joke, but that could

904
00:51:19,320 --> 00:51:23,480
Speaker 1: probably work, Jonathan. I just realized we've been talking for

905
00:51:23,560 --> 00:51:28,880
Speaker 1: more than fifty minutes and we've only made it halfway through. Yeah. Yeah,

906
00:51:29,360 --> 00:51:31,879
Speaker 1: who would have thought that boilaying a whole year down

907
00:51:31,920 --> 00:51:34,719
Speaker 1: to an hour would be a hard thing to do? Uh?

908
00:51:34,800 --> 00:51:36,319
Speaker 1: You know if you make a good point, though, Joe,

909
00:51:36,360 --> 00:51:38,600
Speaker 1: if we were to continue on this pace, obviously, this

910
00:51:38,640 --> 00:51:41,239
Speaker 1: would be one the longest episode text Up has ever done,

911
00:51:41,760 --> 00:51:44,120
Speaker 1: so I'm sure you've had some long ones. Yeah, but

912
00:51:44,520 --> 00:51:46,360
Speaker 1: I think we should just make the second half of

913
00:51:46,400 --> 00:51:49,359
Speaker 1: the year another podcast. That sounds good to me. So

914
00:51:49,400 --> 00:51:52,080
Speaker 1: we are going to wrap up here and in our

915
00:51:52,160 --> 00:51:54,760
Speaker 1: next episode we'll pick up in August two thousan fourteen

916
00:51:54,800 --> 00:51:57,040
Speaker 1: and talk about what happened during the second half of

917
00:51:57,120 --> 00:51:59,680
Speaker 1: the year. So, guys, if you have any suggestions for

918
00:52:00,000 --> 00:52:02,239
Speaker 1: at your topics for tech stuff, let me know. Send

919
00:52:02,280 --> 00:52:04,880
Speaker 1: me an email that addresses tech stuff at how stuff

920
00:52:04,920 --> 00:52:07,440
Speaker 1: works dot com, or drop me a line on Facebook,

921
00:52:07,520 --> 00:52:10,200
Speaker 1: Twitter or Tumbler to handle it. All three of those

922
00:52:10,280 --> 00:52:13,520
Speaker 1: is tech Stuff H s W. And we'll finish out

923
00:52:13,520 --> 00:52:20,360
Speaker 1: two thousand and fourteen really soon for more on this

924
00:52:20,560 --> 00:52:23,040
Speaker 1: and thousands of other topics because it has stuff works

925
00:52:23,040 --> 00:52:33,160
Speaker 1: dot com