1 00:00:09,664 --> 00:00:13,104 Speaker 1: Mission Implausible is now something you can watch. Just go 2 00:00:13,144 --> 00:00:16,823 Speaker 1: to YouTube and search Mission Implausible podcasts or click on 3 00:00:16,864 --> 00:00:18,704 Speaker 1: the link to our channel. In our show. 4 00:00:18,504 --> 00:00:23,544 Speaker 2: Notes, I'm John Cipher and I'm Jerry O'Shea. We have 5 00:00:23,624 --> 00:00:27,344 Speaker 2: over sixty years of experience as clandestine officers in the CIA, 6 00:00:27,504 --> 00:00:30,264 Speaker 2: serving in high risk areas all around the world, and. 7 00:00:30,304 --> 00:00:34,464 Speaker 3: Part of our job was creating conspiracies to deceive our adversaries. 8 00:00:34,784 --> 00:00:37,504 Speaker 2: Now we're going to use that experience to investigate the 9 00:00:37,504 --> 00:00:40,504 Speaker 2: conspiracy theories everyone's talking about, as well as some you 10 00:00:40,584 --> 00:00:41,224 Speaker 2: may not have heard. 11 00:00:41,304 --> 00:00:43,584 Speaker 3: Could they be true or are we being manipulated? 12 00:00:43,664 --> 00:00:46,263 Speaker 2: We'll find out now on Mission Implausible. 13 00:00:50,424 --> 00:00:53,103 Speaker 4: We now return with part two of our conversation with 14 00:00:53,184 --> 00:00:57,384 Speaker 4: Michael Weiss. Michael's an investigative journalist, author, and an editor 15 00:00:57,504 --> 00:01:01,504 Speaker 4: of The Insider. His recent reporting focuses on Russian intelligence, 16 00:01:01,664 --> 00:01:04,304 Speaker 4: the Kremlins war against the Ukraine and the West, and 17 00:01:04,384 --> 00:01:06,744 Speaker 4: Havana Cindera. 18 00:01:06,904 --> 00:01:09,384 Speaker 5: So I agree, I am more skeptical of a t 19 00:01:09,864 --> 00:01:13,264 Speaker 5: on Us soil than I am where it's more permissive 20 00:01:13,464 --> 00:01:16,104 Speaker 5: environment for the Russian stop errate. I mean, Vienna, Austria, 21 00:01:16,184 --> 00:01:17,984 Speaker 5: give me a fucking break. I mean, that's a playground 22 00:01:17,984 --> 00:01:23,103 Speaker 5: for Russian spies, you knowies frankly, yeah. And also another 23 00:01:23,264 --> 00:01:25,383 Speaker 5: kind of key theme here, and it was in the 24 00:01:25,464 --> 00:01:29,063 Speaker 5: first investigation was when we started looking at the subset 25 00:01:29,104 --> 00:01:31,544 Speaker 5: that I just mentioned very narrow, we found that a 26 00:01:31,544 --> 00:01:35,344 Speaker 5: lot of these guys and women either served in Kiev 27 00:01:35,384 --> 00:01:40,624 Speaker 5: station after twenty fourteen, so after the Euromaydan Revolution, when CIA, 28 00:01:40,703 --> 00:01:42,744 Speaker 5: as we know through great reporting by Adamantus in the 29 00:01:42,744 --> 00:01:45,943 Speaker 5: New York Times quote, put in the plumbing with Gour, 30 00:01:46,264 --> 00:01:50,504 Speaker 5: Ukraine military intelligence built paramilitary organizations, including the one that 31 00:01:50,584 --> 00:01:53,864 Speaker 5: graduated Kadel Buldanov who's now chief of Staff do Zolenski 32 00:01:53,864 --> 00:01:57,064 Speaker 5: and before that director of Gour. Basically, CIA helped Ukraine 33 00:01:57,664 --> 00:01:59,824 Speaker 5: learn how to do what they do best, which is 34 00:01:59,864 --> 00:02:00,944 Speaker 5: go after and kill Russians. 35 00:02:01,024 --> 00:02:01,184 Speaker 3: Right. 36 00:02:01,424 --> 00:02:03,624 Speaker 5: The Russians knew that, and the Russians would have every 37 00:02:03,624 --> 00:02:07,264 Speaker 5: interest in taking those chess pieces, those American spies off 38 00:02:07,304 --> 00:02:10,544 Speaker 5: the chessboard in advance of what they were calculating was 39 00:02:10,544 --> 00:02:13,304 Speaker 5: going to be a full scale invasion. So Frankfurt, Germany 40 00:02:13,344 --> 00:02:17,224 Speaker 5: twenty fourteen happened after the takeover of Crimea, and the 41 00:02:17,224 --> 00:02:20,264 Speaker 5: CIA officer there was also working to counterman Russian influence 42 00:02:20,264 --> 00:02:24,024 Speaker 5: in what country Syria. Prior to this, Mark I mean 43 00:02:24,504 --> 00:02:26,944 Speaker 5: Mark was the what Deputy chief of the Europe and 44 00:02:26,984 --> 00:02:30,424 Speaker 5: Eurasia Center, and before that had extensive experience in the 45 00:02:30,424 --> 00:02:34,784 Speaker 5: Middle East going after Russian client state interests and Russia the. 46 00:02:34,744 --> 00:02:37,344 Speaker 2: War could explain also why these seem to have stopped too. 47 00:02:38,104 --> 00:02:40,824 Speaker 5: So we know that Bill Burns and he put out 48 00:02:40,864 --> 00:02:45,024 Speaker 5: a communication to the agency after the last ICA. He says, 49 00:02:45,104 --> 00:02:47,464 Speaker 5: I went to Moscow and I told putin, you know, 50 00:02:47,584 --> 00:02:49,624 Speaker 5: we suspect you're doing this to our people. You need 51 00:02:49,664 --> 00:02:52,144 Speaker 5: to knock it off. And so the juju was that 52 00:02:52,504 --> 00:02:54,304 Speaker 5: they did knock it off. But they might have knocked 53 00:02:54,304 --> 00:02:55,744 Speaker 5: it off because they didn't have to do it anymore. 54 00:02:55,744 --> 00:02:58,864 Speaker 5: They were already at war. If Ahi was waged as 55 00:02:58,864 --> 00:03:02,184 Speaker 5: a way to take away the most well trained American 56 00:03:02,224 --> 00:03:04,264 Speaker 5: operatives who would be in a position to really fuck 57 00:03:04,264 --> 00:03:07,184 Speaker 5: with the Russian spot after they invaded. After they invaded, 58 00:03:07,224 --> 00:03:09,744 Speaker 5: there's less of an incentive to do this, right. We 59 00:03:09,824 --> 00:03:12,904 Speaker 5: get all these questions, why is it only Americans? Answer, 60 00:03:12,984 --> 00:03:16,144 Speaker 5: it's not. Plenty of Canadians have been hit, including Canadians 61 00:03:16,184 --> 00:03:18,264 Speaker 5: that were doing things that the Canadian government has every 62 00:03:18,264 --> 00:03:21,904 Speaker 5: interest to disavow. Also, the old KGB, the old Soviet 63 00:03:22,024 --> 00:03:27,224 Speaker 5: intelligence services, had bespoke missions targeting only Americans because Europeans 64 00:03:27,264 --> 00:03:30,984 Speaker 5: they dealt with differently. The Brits, British Intelligence six and 65 00:03:31,104 --> 00:03:34,064 Speaker 5: I five they solidly believe in Havana syndrome and couldn't 66 00:03:34,104 --> 00:03:36,424 Speaker 5: understand why CIA didn't agree with them. And yet the 67 00:03:36,424 --> 00:03:39,464 Speaker 5: Brits have recorded no cases against themselves, but they're amply 68 00:03:39,464 --> 00:03:41,464 Speaker 5: familiar with two nine one five five ever since the 69 00:03:41,464 --> 00:03:44,584 Speaker 5: Scrippall poison. You know there's an answer for these questions. 70 00:03:44,584 --> 00:03:47,664 Speaker 5: And also, I just I want to emphasize the following right. 71 00:03:48,024 --> 00:03:50,704 Speaker 5: One of the things the analysts always say, or I 72 00:03:50,704 --> 00:03:53,344 Speaker 5: should say, what has been conveyed to us as a 73 00:03:53,344 --> 00:03:55,784 Speaker 5: reason for why they were so skeptical. We collect on 74 00:03:55,824 --> 00:03:57,544 Speaker 5: the Russians all the time, and we have collections of 75 00:03:57,624 --> 00:03:59,984 Speaker 5: Russians saying, what the hell are the Americans talking about? 76 00:03:59,984 --> 00:04:02,544 Speaker 5: What is ahi? We're not doing this, to which I 77 00:04:02,544 --> 00:04:05,824 Speaker 5: would answer, we at the Insider collect on two nine 78 00:04:05,904 --> 00:04:08,704 Speaker 5: one five five. We're in their emails, we're in their communications, 79 00:04:08,944 --> 00:04:10,904 Speaker 5: and we have people in two nine one five five 80 00:04:10,944 --> 00:04:12,944 Speaker 5: who say there's no way we could be doing it. 81 00:04:13,024 --> 00:04:14,544 Speaker 5: We have other people in two nine one five five, 82 00:04:14,544 --> 00:04:16,584 Speaker 5: who say, oh, we're absolutely doing this is exactly the 83 00:04:16,704 --> 00:04:18,424 Speaker 5: kind of thing we were stood up to do. So 84 00:04:18,504 --> 00:04:22,104 Speaker 5: even within a subunit of Russian military intelligence, things are 85 00:04:22,104 --> 00:04:24,424 Speaker 5: so compartmentalized that one hand doesn't know what the other 86 00:04:24,504 --> 00:04:24,704 Speaker 5: is doing. 87 00:04:24,743 --> 00:04:28,743 Speaker 2: And I can give a quick example of compartmentation. The US, 88 00:04:28,904 --> 00:04:32,904 Speaker 2: through the FBI, recruited sources in the Russian residentur of 89 00:04:32,904 --> 00:04:36,504 Speaker 2: the Russian KGB office in the nineteen eighties in Washington. 90 00:04:36,984 --> 00:04:39,703 Speaker 2: We recruited two sources, at least two sources there that 91 00:04:39,743 --> 00:04:41,743 Speaker 2: were spying for US for the West and the CIA. 92 00:04:41,784 --> 00:04:44,583 Speaker 2: The FBI at the time where that same office was 93 00:04:44,623 --> 00:04:48,904 Speaker 2: handling Alder James and Robert Hanson. So we had spies 94 00:04:48,984 --> 00:04:51,383 Speaker 2: inside their office who didn't know that they were running 95 00:04:51,383 --> 00:04:54,104 Speaker 2: these other spies. And so it's not unusual that certain 96 00:04:54,144 --> 00:04:56,183 Speaker 2: people would know things and other people might not know things. 97 00:04:56,183 --> 00:04:59,183 Speaker 2: So if it's if we collected information of some people 98 00:04:59,183 --> 00:05:01,703 Speaker 2: in an organization saying oh, what's going on, that doesn't 99 00:05:01,743 --> 00:05:04,544 Speaker 2: mean I have no idea what cases Jerry ran for 100 00:05:04,623 --> 00:05:07,344 Speaker 2: his career and he doesn't know what mine were. That's 101 00:05:07,383 --> 00:05:10,903 Speaker 2: just the nature of the business improve anything. In other words, no, it. 102 00:05:10,904 --> 00:05:13,624 Speaker 5: Doesn't and the Russians do things different. We can't mirror image. 103 00:05:13,664 --> 00:05:15,424 Speaker 5: That's the problem, and I think analysts have a tendency 104 00:05:15,424 --> 00:05:17,703 Speaker 5: to mirror image, So we would do that the following way. 105 00:05:17,943 --> 00:05:19,303 Speaker 5: You know, one of the things that we got back 106 00:05:19,424 --> 00:05:23,463 Speaker 5: from this investigation was they sent to the Special Activity Centers, 107 00:05:23,503 --> 00:05:25,463 Speaker 5: here's what is alleged the Russians are up to. And 108 00:05:25,503 --> 00:05:28,424 Speaker 5: they showed them fifteen hundred examples, and Sack came back 109 00:05:28,464 --> 00:05:30,384 Speaker 5: and said, we couldn't do this to fifteen hundred people 110 00:05:30,383 --> 00:05:32,664 Speaker 5: without getting caught. Could you do it to six people 111 00:05:33,063 --> 00:05:36,984 Speaker 5: or to twelve in these following conditions where basically the 112 00:05:37,063 --> 00:05:42,464 Speaker 5: United States ran these like their own terrain, Central Asia, Ukraine, whatever. 113 00:05:42,904 --> 00:05:44,743 Speaker 2: So before they knew that there was a device that 114 00:05:44,823 --> 00:05:46,383 Speaker 2: was small enough for us too correct. 115 00:05:46,503 --> 00:05:50,383 Speaker 5: And also there's a level of paranoia and universal suspiciousness 116 00:05:50,383 --> 00:05:52,944 Speaker 5: and mistrust in the Russian government. I mean, the GRU 117 00:05:53,104 --> 00:05:55,184 Speaker 5: was always spied on by the KGB, which is why 118 00:05:55,224 --> 00:05:57,984 Speaker 5: so many GRU directors in the Soviet period were KGB 119 00:05:58,303 --> 00:06:01,623 Speaker 5: officers right to keep them from defecting within two nine 120 00:06:01,704 --> 00:06:04,623 Speaker 5: one five five. I mean Andrea Avrianov, the commanding founder, 121 00:06:05,144 --> 00:06:08,544 Speaker 5: he's not beloved by everybody. In fact, there is murderous 122 00:06:08,623 --> 00:06:11,743 Speaker 5: rivalry going on between and amongst the various services and 123 00:06:11,863 --> 00:06:15,223 Speaker 5: units within those services. So the idea that everyone would 124 00:06:15,264 --> 00:06:18,024 Speaker 5: know what to nine one, what a cadre within two nine, one, 125 00:06:18,024 --> 00:06:20,343 Speaker 5: five five was up to is absurd to me. Added 126 00:06:20,383 --> 00:06:23,224 Speaker 5: to which, the Russians also know we listen to their 127 00:06:23,303 --> 00:06:26,104 Speaker 5: chatter and they put out disinformation all the time to 128 00:06:26,664 --> 00:06:28,344 Speaker 5: throw us off the scent. I mean that that is 129 00:06:28,383 --> 00:06:30,024 Speaker 5: also just classic tradecraft for them. 130 00:06:30,344 --> 00:06:32,624 Speaker 3: One, Michael, one thing that you haven't touched down yet, 131 00:06:32,623 --> 00:06:35,424 Speaker 3: and I wish you would let me come out with 132 00:06:35,464 --> 00:06:39,303 Speaker 3: just a quick statement. So operations officers, we often take 133 00:06:39,544 --> 00:06:42,263 Speaker 3: risks with our lives, right we go off to this place. 134 00:06:42,743 --> 00:06:44,823 Speaker 3: But we also, and there's no way around it, we 135 00:06:44,943 --> 00:06:48,344 Speaker 3: take risks with our families. Right. So when I go 136 00:06:48,424 --> 00:06:51,504 Speaker 3: to India and they're spraying ddt out and we've got 137 00:06:51,544 --> 00:06:55,424 Speaker 3: cobras in the yard and there's malaria, or I'm in Alaska, 138 00:06:55,743 --> 00:06:58,184 Speaker 3: excuse me, in Alaska in Africa, and you know, and 139 00:06:58,544 --> 00:07:01,104 Speaker 3: we find a black mamba in the backyard which could 140 00:07:01,144 --> 00:07:03,863 Speaker 3: kill one of my children, that is something that we do. 141 00:07:04,863 --> 00:07:08,104 Speaker 3: But with this and we sort of like, okay, we 142 00:07:08,544 --> 00:07:10,784 Speaker 3: inculcate that into it to how we look at things. 143 00:07:11,264 --> 00:07:14,064 Speaker 3: But if you were thinking that the Russians are out 144 00:07:14,464 --> 00:07:18,664 Speaker 3: going after my kids, right, you're like, maybe I don't 145 00:07:18,704 --> 00:07:20,583 Speaker 3: want to go to Moscow, maybe I don't want to 146 00:07:20,584 --> 00:07:23,184 Speaker 3: do this. Now. I'm not saying the analysts think this way, 147 00:07:23,264 --> 00:07:25,984 Speaker 3: but the analysts never bump into that, right, I mean, 148 00:07:26,264 --> 00:07:29,064 Speaker 3: it is not like, well, it just doesn't. They can't 149 00:07:29,104 --> 00:07:31,824 Speaker 3: understand it because they've never their children have never been 150 00:07:31,864 --> 00:07:34,344 Speaker 3: placed in that sort of position. Ours have and we've 151 00:07:34,384 --> 00:07:39,024 Speaker 3: dealt with it. And I'm just saying, if this is true, 152 00:07:39,104 --> 00:07:43,024 Speaker 3: and I think it is, that these attacks that impacts 153 00:07:43,064 --> 00:07:45,184 Speaker 3: on who's going to take what position and who's going 154 00:07:45,264 --> 00:07:50,184 Speaker 3: to do what job, and that is really cancerous inside 155 00:07:50,184 --> 00:07:53,104 Speaker 3: of an organization, especially if there's a suspicion that your 156 00:07:53,104 --> 00:07:55,624 Speaker 3: own organization isn't going to help you if it happens, 157 00:07:55,664 --> 00:07:58,143 Speaker 3: and isn't looking to make sure that it doesn't happen. 158 00:07:58,224 --> 00:08:01,184 Speaker 3: So you've talked to other people, how have they dealt 159 00:08:01,224 --> 00:08:05,064 Speaker 3: with that sort of you know, emotional gut feel. 160 00:08:05,024 --> 00:08:08,544 Speaker 5: Yeah, are whistleblower John Thorne as he's called in this story, 161 00:08:08,784 --> 00:08:12,064 Speaker 5: he said it sort of cut both ways. If you 162 00:08:12,104 --> 00:08:15,064 Speaker 5: were a victim of AHI and you told your story 163 00:08:15,984 --> 00:08:19,344 Speaker 5: in house or publicly. You kind of operated under a cloud, right, 164 00:08:19,624 --> 00:08:22,064 Speaker 5: Certain chiefs of station abroad wouldn't want you in their 165 00:08:22,104 --> 00:08:24,424 Speaker 5: station because they were afraid of what was going to 166 00:08:24,464 --> 00:08:27,224 Speaker 5: do to morale or it's going to you know, their 167 00:08:27,264 --> 00:08:29,784 Speaker 5: ability to go do espionage, because everyone's going to be 168 00:08:29,824 --> 00:08:31,824 Speaker 5: worried like they're going to get hit with HI as 169 00:08:31,864 --> 00:08:36,664 Speaker 5: well if you weren't a victim and you didn't believe 170 00:08:36,784 --> 00:08:39,744 Speaker 5: other victims. I mean, it created all kinds of animosity 171 00:08:39,824 --> 00:08:43,983 Speaker 5: and sort of mutual suspicion inside the agency. I mean, 172 00:08:44,064 --> 00:08:47,424 Speaker 5: somebody planted this idea in my head as they were talking. 173 00:08:47,703 --> 00:08:49,944 Speaker 5: I forget which source. It was probably on deep background, 174 00:08:49,944 --> 00:08:53,024 Speaker 5: but I kind of reminded me of what Angleton did 175 00:08:53,064 --> 00:08:55,703 Speaker 5: to the building he goes as head of his counter intelligence. 176 00:08:55,744 --> 00:08:59,304 Speaker 5: He's because Kim Philby was his closest friend, and when 177 00:08:59,343 --> 00:09:01,944 Speaker 5: he was betrayed by Kim Philby, he just he saw 178 00:09:02,064 --> 00:09:05,544 Speaker 5: Russian spies everywhere, right, and he tore that building apart. 179 00:09:05,703 --> 00:09:09,024 Speaker 5: He ripped the guts out of it in this mad, feverish, 180 00:09:09,103 --> 00:09:12,024 Speaker 5: paranoid hunt for Russian moles. And I'm not saying, you know, 181 00:09:12,064 --> 00:09:15,064 Speaker 5: this is a CI issue or a mole hunt, but 182 00:09:15,264 --> 00:09:17,583 Speaker 5: this too has torn the building apart. If you're the 183 00:09:17,664 --> 00:09:21,144 Speaker 5: Russians and you're sitting back and you've attacked Americans like this, 184 00:09:21,624 --> 00:09:24,504 Speaker 5: you are hugging yourself with glee. You cannot believe your luck, 185 00:09:24,944 --> 00:09:28,583 Speaker 5: you know. Inflicting a few casualties at very little expense, 186 00:09:29,264 --> 00:09:32,503 Speaker 5: with plausible deniability has now not only led the US 187 00:09:32,624 --> 00:09:36,343 Speaker 5: government to officially say this never happened, basically acting as 188 00:09:36,384 --> 00:09:40,424 Speaker 5: defense counsel for a hostile adversary, but inside the premier 189 00:09:40,504 --> 00:09:44,264 Speaker 5: intelligence organization on the planet, everyone hates each other. It 190 00:09:44,264 --> 00:09:48,264 Speaker 5: has cannibalized the CIA. This is a runaway success as 191 00:09:48,343 --> 00:09:48,664 Speaker 5: let me. 192 00:09:48,624 --> 00:09:51,504 Speaker 2: Comment on that quickly, Michael, Yeah, what's interesting to me 193 00:09:51,984 --> 00:09:56,544 Speaker 2: is the Russian success with all they call active measures 194 00:09:56,624 --> 00:09:59,744 Speaker 2: or covert action, an attack, what have you, was radically 195 00:09:59,784 --> 00:10:03,384 Speaker 2: successful because of our mistakes. It wasn't because really what 196 00:10:03,424 --> 00:10:07,463 Speaker 2: they did necessarily so the fact that we distrusted it, 197 00:10:07,504 --> 00:10:10,424 Speaker 2: we created these problems in the inside the building. It 198 00:10:10,463 --> 00:10:12,743 Speaker 2: made things one hundred times worse. And what that comes 199 00:10:12,784 --> 00:10:14,824 Speaker 2: to mind from me is the twenty sixteen effort to 200 00:10:15,024 --> 00:10:17,464 Speaker 2: interfere in our election. They've tried to do that over 201 00:10:17,504 --> 00:10:20,464 Speaker 2: the years, over the decades, and because we acknowledged it, 202 00:10:20,544 --> 00:10:22,904 Speaker 2: we talked about it. It didn't cause great problems. But 203 00:10:22,944 --> 00:10:25,384 Speaker 2: the fact is, in twenty sixteen it became such a 204 00:10:25,384 --> 00:10:30,824 Speaker 2: political football. Who became the president used it against his enemies. 205 00:10:31,024 --> 00:10:33,704 Speaker 2: They made the Russian effort a thousand times worse than 206 00:10:33,703 --> 00:10:35,623 Speaker 2: it would have been if they just said, hey, the 207 00:10:35,703 --> 00:10:38,504 Speaker 2: Russians are doing this. They ought to stop it and 208 00:10:38,624 --> 00:10:41,863 Speaker 2: just move on. So it's our mistakes that make the 209 00:10:41,944 --> 00:10:44,584 Speaker 2: Russians successful, not as much their activities. 210 00:10:44,824 --> 00:10:48,064 Speaker 5: That is the perennial story. I mean, you know, were 211 00:10:48,064 --> 00:10:50,863 Speaker 5: their Soviet spies in the State Department and the Treasury Department, 212 00:10:50,864 --> 00:10:52,703 Speaker 5: in all levels of the US government on the Roosevelt 213 00:10:52,703 --> 00:10:53,264 Speaker 5: administration in. 214 00:10:53,343 --> 00:10:54,824 Speaker 2: McCarthy times, yes, there were. 215 00:10:55,144 --> 00:10:58,264 Speaker 5: And when people started to inform and blow the whistle 216 00:10:58,304 --> 00:11:01,984 Speaker 5: and testify before Congress to that effect, including Elizabeth Bentley 217 00:11:01,984 --> 00:11:05,264 Speaker 5: and Whittiger Chambers, and they told the truth that created 218 00:11:05,304 --> 00:11:08,144 Speaker 5: the mood music for what became McCarthyism, which was grounded 219 00:11:08,144 --> 00:11:11,504 Speaker 5: in absolute nonsense, laws and hysteria. Right, So if you're 220 00:11:11,544 --> 00:11:14,704 Speaker 5: the Soviets, you're like, okay, our operational failure, our agents 221 00:11:14,744 --> 00:11:18,504 Speaker 5: got blown has led to a kind of broader, almost metaphysical, 222 00:11:18,583 --> 00:11:20,664 Speaker 5: kind of success because now the Americans are destroying their 223 00:11:20,703 --> 00:11:23,504 Speaker 5: own society looking for moles everywhere. And as you say 224 00:11:23,504 --> 00:11:25,703 Speaker 5: in twenty sixteen, I mean I would rank that effort 225 00:11:25,984 --> 00:11:28,703 Speaker 5: both the hack and league operation done by the GRU 226 00:11:29,264 --> 00:11:32,104 Speaker 5: and what Tragosian's troll farm got up to, you know, 227 00:11:32,304 --> 00:11:35,584 Speaker 5: fake news and whatever on Twitter and Facebook. That was 228 00:11:35,664 --> 00:11:38,744 Speaker 5: probably you know, a B minus effort all things considered, 229 00:11:38,864 --> 00:11:41,064 Speaker 5: but it turned into an A plus effort because it 230 00:11:41,144 --> 00:11:44,343 Speaker 5: led everybody to suddenly reinvent themselves as an expert in 231 00:11:44,424 --> 00:11:48,584 Speaker 5: Russian disinformation and active measures and get you know, contributing 232 00:11:49,223 --> 00:11:51,703 Speaker 5: whatever is on cable news. And all of a sudden, 233 00:11:51,784 --> 00:11:54,624 Speaker 5: it was like the Russians are hiding everywhere, They're doing everything. 234 00:11:54,664 --> 00:11:57,223 Speaker 5: They are ten feet tall. They're responsible for the President 235 00:11:57,264 --> 00:11:59,703 Speaker 5: of the United States being installed in the White House 236 00:11:59,703 --> 00:12:01,503 Speaker 5: and all of these things. And it's like, wait a minute, 237 00:12:01,544 --> 00:12:04,704 Speaker 5: they're not that clever, they're not that capable, but we 238 00:12:04,784 --> 00:12:07,583 Speaker 5: can dig up them to such a degree that they 239 00:12:07,624 --> 00:12:10,784 Speaker 5: look invincible. And you know, the greatest weapon they have 240 00:12:10,904 --> 00:12:15,984 Speaker 5: apart from nukes, is propaganda, right, Propaganda is what led them. 241 00:12:16,223 --> 00:12:19,024 Speaker 5: I mean, you know, come back to the divide between 242 00:12:19,144 --> 00:12:23,463 Speaker 5: operations an analysts. Every operations person who spent ten minutes 243 00:12:23,504 --> 00:12:26,624 Speaker 5: in Ukraine before the full scale invasion said, there's no 244 00:12:26,664 --> 00:12:28,624 Speaker 5: fucking way the Russian's going to take this country without 245 00:12:28,624 --> 00:12:30,864 Speaker 5: a fight. Ukrainians will fight like hell. They've been fighting 246 00:12:30,864 --> 00:12:32,904 Speaker 5: like hell for a decade and they've done well, and 247 00:12:32,944 --> 00:12:35,343 Speaker 5: now they're even better. The analysts were like, well, wait 248 00:12:35,384 --> 00:12:38,504 Speaker 5: a minute, we've seen here from the Ministry of Defense 249 00:12:38,544 --> 00:12:42,064 Speaker 5: that Sergei Shoigu built himself a bright, shining new military 250 00:12:42,544 --> 00:12:44,304 Speaker 5: and they say they can do all these things, they 251 00:12:44,304 --> 00:12:47,024 Speaker 5: can work miracles. Kie Evan three, you know, two weeks 252 00:12:47,064 --> 00:12:50,464 Speaker 5: to the Polish border. That's our assessment. Hang on, did 253 00:12:50,463 --> 00:12:52,704 Speaker 5: you not bother to interrogate, like, maybe the Russians are 254 00:12:52,744 --> 00:12:55,264 Speaker 5: full of shit. Maybe they're lying to themselves, and maybe 255 00:12:55,264 --> 00:12:57,744 Speaker 5: they're lying to their superiors because guess what they've stolen 256 00:12:57,784 --> 00:12:59,904 Speaker 5: all the money they've been meant to use to build 257 00:12:59,944 --> 00:13:02,224 Speaker 5: this bright, shining new army. I mean, anybody who's watched 258 00:13:02,223 --> 00:13:07,104 Speaker 5: Alexi Navalni's anti corruption investigations on YouTube or read them 259 00:13:07,144 --> 00:13:10,264 Speaker 5: on his website over the last ten years would know 260 00:13:10,343 --> 00:13:16,584 Speaker 5: that corruption thievery is the grand pathology of Putin's system. Right, 261 00:13:16,904 --> 00:13:20,464 Speaker 5: how is it possible that the one institution somehow impervious 262 00:13:20,544 --> 00:13:25,623 Speaker 5: to this grand pathology is their military industrial complex. I mean, generalists, 263 00:13:25,624 --> 00:13:27,343 Speaker 5: I think had a better view of how this war 264 00:13:27,384 --> 00:13:29,224 Speaker 5: was going to go than the so called experts did. 265 00:13:29,744 --> 00:13:31,864 Speaker 5: And yet the experts are the ones who, as I say, 266 00:13:32,024 --> 00:13:35,184 Speaker 5: crafted the policy. You know, had we armed Ukraine with 267 00:13:35,304 --> 00:13:37,984 Speaker 5: sophisticated weaponry at the start, it would have saved a 268 00:13:37,984 --> 00:13:39,784 Speaker 5: lot of lives, and it probably would have kept the 269 00:13:39,824 --> 00:13:42,784 Speaker 5: Russians farther afield than they've now gotten to be because 270 00:13:42,824 --> 00:13:44,983 Speaker 5: instead we were preparing for a government in exile in 271 00:13:45,064 --> 00:13:48,424 Speaker 5: Poland and guerrilla warfare. That was the best case scenario. Whoops, 272 00:13:48,864 --> 00:13:49,984 Speaker 5: who takes ownership of that? 273 00:14:03,064 --> 00:14:03,424 Speaker 2: Michael? 274 00:14:03,424 --> 00:14:07,143 Speaker 3: When did it become okay for Russians to kill Americans? 275 00:14:07,624 --> 00:14:11,463 Speaker 3: And I'm going to jump forward into into today, where 276 00:14:11,544 --> 00:14:15,343 Speaker 3: my understanding is that President Trump has said, yeah, I'm 277 00:14:15,343 --> 00:14:20,504 Speaker 3: sure the Russians are providing the Iranians with targeting information, 278 00:14:21,264 --> 00:14:24,024 Speaker 3: which is a direct threat to our troops. So I mean, 279 00:14:24,144 --> 00:14:27,744 Speaker 3: basically he's saying it's okay if the Russians try to 280 00:14:27,864 --> 00:14:30,944 Speaker 3: kill Americans to these proxies. Right Whereas a week ago 281 00:14:30,984 --> 00:14:32,624 Speaker 3: he said that what I think he went after a 282 00:14:32,624 --> 00:14:35,264 Speaker 3: Fox News reporter saying, oh, that couldn't possibly be true, 283 00:14:35,424 --> 00:14:37,024 Speaker 3: which takes me back. I mean, I spent a lot 284 00:14:37,064 --> 00:14:40,384 Speaker 3: of time in Iraq and Afghanistan. The bounty thing was 285 00:14:40,464 --> 00:14:43,664 Speaker 3: absolutely true, and there was that the Russians were putting 286 00:14:43,704 --> 00:14:47,184 Speaker 3: out bounties to kill American American CIA officers. And I've 287 00:14:47,184 --> 00:14:50,784 Speaker 3: got to tell you, there was deep, deep hurt, deep 288 00:14:51,024 --> 00:14:56,064 Speaker 3: dissatisfaction amongst those of us who served in Afghanistan knowing that, 289 00:14:56,264 --> 00:14:59,664 Speaker 3: like the Russians were trying to specifically target and kill us. 290 00:15:00,144 --> 00:15:02,224 Speaker 3: And the President says, a he didn't believe it, and 291 00:15:02,224 --> 00:15:04,424 Speaker 3: be he didn't even read it right, and holy fuck, 292 00:15:04,464 --> 00:15:07,144 Speaker 3: wait a minute, I'm risking my I'm risking my fucking life. 293 00:15:07,584 --> 00:15:09,864 Speaker 3: And the President doesn't give a shit. But now we're 294 00:15:09,904 --> 00:15:12,904 Speaker 3: to the point where he's like, it's okay. So I 295 00:15:12,904 --> 00:15:14,704 Speaker 3: don't know if it's not really a question, what's your 296 00:15:14,824 --> 00:15:15,184 Speaker 3: what's your? 297 00:15:16,064 --> 00:15:21,064 Speaker 5: You know we did a right So I say this, 298 00:15:21,104 --> 00:15:23,424 Speaker 5: I think, you know, with all due modesty, just as 299 00:15:23,464 --> 00:15:25,704 Speaker 5: a matter of fact, like the Insider has written the 300 00:15:25,704 --> 00:15:29,304 Speaker 5: book on two nine, I mean five occupied a lot 301 00:15:29,344 --> 00:15:31,664 Speaker 5: of space in the latter half of my gru history 302 00:15:31,704 --> 00:15:33,784 Speaker 5: because you know, we were able to show two nine 303 00:15:33,824 --> 00:15:39,064 Speaker 5: one five five was running money to the Taliban, actually 304 00:15:39,184 --> 00:15:42,504 Speaker 5: using Afghan couriers who were involved in the precious stones 305 00:15:43,024 --> 00:15:46,744 Speaker 5: trading industry for the purposes of this killing not just CIA, 306 00:15:46,864 --> 00:15:50,984 Speaker 5: but US, British Coalition and Afghan security forces. And we 307 00:15:50,984 --> 00:15:55,904 Speaker 5: we could even you know, locate specific money, operations, attacks 308 00:15:55,984 --> 00:15:58,264 Speaker 5: and on military basis and all of that to this 309 00:15:58,344 --> 00:16:01,664 Speaker 5: bounties program. And we had no problem saying, well, the 310 00:16:01,704 --> 00:16:04,184 Speaker 5: Russians would have every incentive to do it because guess 311 00:16:04,224 --> 00:16:06,304 Speaker 5: what what did we do to them in the eighties, right, 312 00:16:06,504 --> 00:16:09,904 Speaker 5: I mean basically the same thing. Now we're not drawing 313 00:16:09,944 --> 00:16:13,384 Speaker 5: moral equivalents. We're saying this would explain why they would 314 00:16:13,424 --> 00:16:15,584 Speaker 5: be so motivated to do it. So when Donald Trump 315 00:16:15,624 --> 00:16:17,064 Speaker 5: comes out and says, well, you know, we're doing it 316 00:16:17,104 --> 00:16:19,304 Speaker 5: to them, He's right, We're doing it to them. We're 317 00:16:19,304 --> 00:16:21,544 Speaker 5: doing it to them even under the Trump administration. I 318 00:16:21,624 --> 00:16:24,944 Speaker 5: knew within about twenty minutes that Putin's claim that, oh, 319 00:16:24,984 --> 00:16:27,744 Speaker 5: the Ukrainians tried to drone my house in Baldai was bullshit. 320 00:16:27,784 --> 00:16:30,384 Speaker 5: Why did I know that because somebody from the intelligence 321 00:16:30,384 --> 00:16:33,304 Speaker 5: community told me, oh, yeah, all those targeting packages come 322 00:16:33,344 --> 00:16:36,944 Speaker 5: from CIA and the Ukrainians didn't hit anything within fifty 323 00:16:36,944 --> 00:16:40,304 Speaker 5: clicks of Valdai. Oh whoopsie. Okay, so we're killing Russians 324 00:16:40,344 --> 00:16:43,664 Speaker 5: or we're bombing Russian oil facilities inside Russian Federation territory. 325 00:16:43,824 --> 00:16:46,704 Speaker 5: Even under a president who's desperate to do rob Prochmann 326 00:16:46,704 --> 00:16:50,464 Speaker 5: at minimum, strategic realignment at maximum, he's probably not even 327 00:16:50,504 --> 00:16:53,064 Speaker 5: aware of what CIA is doing because he's an idiot. 328 00:16:53,184 --> 00:16:56,384 Speaker 5: All that to the point, why would they do Why 329 00:16:56,384 --> 00:16:59,184 Speaker 5: would they provide targeting packages to the Iranians to hit 330 00:16:59,424 --> 00:17:02,864 Speaker 5: American service people because they can and because they send 331 00:17:02,864 --> 00:17:04,304 Speaker 5: their nature to do this kind of thing. 332 00:17:04,424 --> 00:17:07,064 Speaker 3: That's the point. The point is the president saying, he's like, 333 00:17:07,624 --> 00:17:09,664 Speaker 3: we're indicating he's cool with it, right. 334 00:17:09,544 --> 00:17:11,944 Speaker 5: Because he doesn't have a disobliging word to say about Putin. 335 00:17:11,984 --> 00:17:15,824 Speaker 5: We're lifting sanctions on Russia temporarily to keep the global 336 00:17:15,904 --> 00:17:18,584 Speaker 5: energy market afloat when the Russians are making one hundred 337 00:17:18,584 --> 00:17:20,824 Speaker 5: and fifty million dollars a day because of the war 338 00:17:20,824 --> 00:17:22,904 Speaker 5: in Iran, And what are they using that money for 339 00:17:23,384 --> 00:17:26,304 Speaker 5: building highways and hospitals in the Far East. No, they're 340 00:17:26,304 --> 00:17:29,064 Speaker 5: putting it directly into the war against Ukraine. Ukraine has 341 00:17:29,064 --> 00:17:31,504 Speaker 5: provided more security assistance to the United States than we 342 00:17:31,544 --> 00:17:34,024 Speaker 5: have to them in the last two weeks by sending 343 00:17:34,064 --> 00:17:36,504 Speaker 5: anti drone operators to the Gulf, and their offer to 344 00:17:36,544 --> 00:17:39,584 Speaker 5: provide anti drone mechanisms to the United States eight months 345 00:17:39,584 --> 00:17:42,504 Speaker 5: ago was poo pooed because apparently Zelenski is a self promoter, 346 00:17:42,584 --> 00:17:44,784 Speaker 5: because there's one thing Donald Trump hates more than anything 347 00:17:44,824 --> 00:17:47,504 Speaker 5: in this world, it's self promoters. Right, Yeah, No, but 348 00:17:48,104 --> 00:17:50,784 Speaker 5: it actually was just on this point, it actually was 349 00:17:51,144 --> 00:17:54,424 Speaker 5: thought to be a bridge too far or too escalatory 350 00:17:54,664 --> 00:17:57,344 Speaker 5: for the Russians to kill Americans or to harm them 351 00:17:57,384 --> 00:17:59,864 Speaker 5: in this way. Until recently. I mean, I would hazard 352 00:17:59,944 --> 00:18:04,264 Speaker 5: that the old rules have kind of disintegrated, and the 353 00:18:05,384 --> 00:18:09,544 Speaker 5: recklessness and the boldness with which the Russians apply their 354 00:18:09,664 --> 00:18:13,904 Speaker 5: trade has increased exponentially. I remember interviewing ol like Khalugan, 355 00:18:13,984 --> 00:18:16,944 Speaker 5: you know, old KGB officer wrote a book about his 356 00:18:17,024 --> 00:18:21,504 Speaker 5: operations about the poisoning arkoff in London, and I so, 357 00:18:21,704 --> 00:18:24,824 Speaker 5: you know you're going to kill you know, a Bulgarian 358 00:18:25,264 --> 00:18:28,744 Speaker 5: you know, journalist on the River Thames in broad daylight. 359 00:18:28,824 --> 00:18:31,584 Speaker 5: I mean it's Britain, it's NATO territory. How He's like, eh, 360 00:18:31,784 --> 00:18:33,984 Speaker 5: fuck it. I mean the europe is our playground, He's like, 361 00:18:34,024 --> 00:18:37,344 Speaker 5: But the main adversarious territory that's a no go for us. 362 00:18:37,384 --> 00:18:40,064 Speaker 5: We can spy, we can harass, we can break into 363 00:18:40,064 --> 00:18:42,344 Speaker 5: their homes in Moscow, we can poison their pets, we 364 00:18:42,384 --> 00:18:44,544 Speaker 5: can do all kinds of things to make their life unpleasant, 365 00:18:44,704 --> 00:18:47,304 Speaker 5: but we never actually bring harm to them physically. Now, 366 00:18:47,944 --> 00:18:50,944 Speaker 5: you mentioned kids. Right in that Central Asian country that 367 00:18:50,944 --> 00:18:53,984 Speaker 5: I lead my investigation with, there were more hits in 368 00:18:54,024 --> 00:18:57,704 Speaker 5: that capital city, and there's a nanny cam footage of 369 00:18:58,224 --> 00:19:02,424 Speaker 5: a young infant or toddler being hit with Havana syndrome 370 00:19:02,424 --> 00:19:05,424 Speaker 5: because the Russians targeted that his parents' home and the 371 00:19:05,464 --> 00:19:09,064 Speaker 5: parent was working. Guess where so are kids inventing this? 372 00:19:09,144 --> 00:19:12,704 Speaker 5: Are they coming up with fantastical tales of Russian perfidy? 373 00:19:12,904 --> 00:19:15,624 Speaker 2: Michael? Let me give you a quote that this idea 374 00:19:15,664 --> 00:19:17,384 Speaker 2: that you know, the Russians do it, we do it, 375 00:19:17,624 --> 00:19:21,944 Speaker 2: therefore it's okay, or therefore they're both equivalent. William Buckley 376 00:19:21,944 --> 00:19:23,704 Speaker 2: had a great quote that I often try to use 377 00:19:23,744 --> 00:19:25,864 Speaker 2: and put in papers, and he said, to say that 378 00:19:25,904 --> 00:19:30,104 Speaker 2: the CIA and the KGB engage in similar practices is 379 00:19:30,144 --> 00:19:32,344 Speaker 2: the equivalent of saying that the man who pushes an 380 00:19:32,384 --> 00:19:36,144 Speaker 2: old lady into the path of a hurdling bus is 381 00:19:36,184 --> 00:19:38,384 Speaker 2: not to be distinguished from the man who pushes an 382 00:19:38,384 --> 00:19:40,944 Speaker 2: old lady out of the path of a hurdling bus, 383 00:19:41,344 --> 00:19:44,144 Speaker 2: on the grounds that, after all, in both cases, someone 384 00:19:44,184 --> 00:19:47,304 Speaker 2: who's pushing old ladies around, Right, So doing this for 385 00:19:47,304 --> 00:19:50,144 Speaker 2: the Russians and doing it on behalf of a Western 386 00:19:50,144 --> 00:19:52,344 Speaker 2: democratic system makes all the difference in the world. 387 00:19:52,464 --> 00:19:54,264 Speaker 3: And I mean, you know, invading Ukraine, we won't do 388 00:19:54,304 --> 00:19:54,824 Speaker 3: it anymore. 389 00:19:54,984 --> 00:19:57,904 Speaker 5: Yeah, And you know what was the main motive for 390 00:19:57,984 --> 00:20:00,744 Speaker 5: most people to defect in the Soviet era and even 391 00:20:00,824 --> 00:20:03,704 Speaker 5: until the post Soviet era under putin money could be 392 00:20:03,744 --> 00:20:06,224 Speaker 5: a consideration or an incentive, but really it was just 393 00:20:06,304 --> 00:20:09,144 Speaker 5: they had it with their own system. It was venal, 394 00:20:09,224 --> 00:20:12,584 Speaker 5: it was corrupt, it was criminal. They liked the cut 395 00:20:12,624 --> 00:20:14,104 Speaker 5: of our jib. They liked the way of life that 396 00:20:14,144 --> 00:20:16,144 Speaker 5: we had. They liked the values that we espoused or 397 00:20:16,304 --> 00:20:19,384 Speaker 5: pretended to espouse. Anyway, Now the problem is all of 398 00:20:19,384 --> 00:20:22,184 Speaker 5: that's being chipped away, that's being eroded. We're not at 399 00:20:22,184 --> 00:20:25,144 Speaker 5: war with Iran, we're engaged in a special combat operations. 400 00:20:26,464 --> 00:20:27,304 Speaker 5: What does that sound like? 401 00:20:27,584 --> 00:20:30,064 Speaker 2: Well, let me ask you a question. You wrote it 402 00:20:30,184 --> 00:20:32,864 Speaker 2: even more recent article in The Insider that reveals the 403 00:20:32,904 --> 00:20:35,944 Speaker 2: existence of a of another sort of gru thing Center 404 00:20:36,024 --> 00:20:40,104 Speaker 2: seven ninety five, an assassination squad created in twenty twenty 405 00:20:40,104 --> 00:20:44,904 Speaker 2: two after earlier failures gr Unit gru Unit two nine 406 00:20:45,304 --> 00:20:47,144 Speaker 2: that you were talking about, and as you explained, it 407 00:20:47,144 --> 00:20:49,784 Speaker 2: was compromised by an idiotic, idiotic lapse and trade cut. 408 00:20:49,824 --> 00:20:51,504 Speaker 2: Can you tell us a little bit about that article. 409 00:20:51,264 --> 00:20:54,424 Speaker 5: And yeah, so we just published it today. This is 410 00:20:54,424 --> 00:20:57,664 Speaker 5: the work of many months of investigative kind of field work, 411 00:20:57,704 --> 00:21:00,464 Speaker 5: but actually it accidentally fell into our lap. So what 412 00:21:00,544 --> 00:21:05,864 Speaker 5: happened is this center nine seventy five was sorry, seven nine, 413 00:21:06,744 --> 00:21:09,064 Speaker 5: this was stood up as you said, because you know, 414 00:21:09,184 --> 00:21:11,064 Speaker 5: and I made this point earlier, there's a lot of 415 00:21:11,064 --> 00:21:14,624 Speaker 5: competition and rivalrousness within the services and because two nine 416 00:21:14,744 --> 00:21:19,184 Speaker 5: one five five had been compromised by sloppy tradecraft scripples 417 00:21:19,184 --> 00:21:22,784 Speaker 5: of assassins getting their picture taken on CCTV and the UK. 418 00:21:24,224 --> 00:21:27,624 Speaker 5: You knows that Kristo Grozev and ramand de bro Jhotev, 419 00:21:27,664 --> 00:21:29,464 Speaker 5: my two colleagues at The Insider, were able to figure 420 00:21:29,464 --> 00:21:32,424 Speaker 5: out based on the issuing of passports in the same 421 00:21:32,744 --> 00:21:35,784 Speaker 5: numerical sequence for the use of their legends and going 422 00:21:35,784 --> 00:21:37,904 Speaker 5: abroad and all the rest of it just really lousy 423 00:21:37,944 --> 00:21:41,224 Speaker 5: Keystone cop style behavior. There was a kind of prevailing scent, 424 00:21:41,264 --> 00:21:43,664 Speaker 5: that sentiment that we need to create a unit that 425 00:21:43,704 --> 00:21:45,744 Speaker 5: can do what they claim to do, but to be 426 00:21:45,944 --> 00:21:50,384 Speaker 5: quote air gapped or water tight, so perfect trade craft, undetectable, 427 00:21:50,864 --> 00:21:52,384 Speaker 5: and so what do they do. One of their first 428 00:21:52,384 --> 00:21:57,424 Speaker 5: operations was to assassinate, to either kidnap or assassinate members 429 00:21:57,464 --> 00:22:00,384 Speaker 5: of the Zakia family, which is that, you know, Achmedzakaiev 430 00:22:00,464 --> 00:22:03,064 Speaker 5: is the prime Minister in exile for you know that 431 00:22:03,264 --> 00:22:06,824 Speaker 5: the Independent Chechen Republic and been at war with ramzam 432 00:22:06,864 --> 00:22:09,544 Speaker 5: Khadirov for twenty some odd year thirty some odd years now. 433 00:22:10,024 --> 00:22:13,464 Speaker 5: And this was actually, you know, quite a dangerous thing 434 00:22:13,544 --> 00:22:19,624 Speaker 5: because one of the operatives recruited a Serbian national to 435 00:22:19,744 --> 00:22:23,384 Speaker 5: act as his main agent and assassin. That Serbian national 436 00:22:23,504 --> 00:22:26,944 Speaker 5: was recruiting sub agents, including one in the United States. 437 00:22:27,104 --> 00:22:29,504 Speaker 5: All of this was in US court files. And I'll 438 00:22:29,504 --> 00:22:31,624 Speaker 5: get to why in a minute. The reason why is 439 00:22:31,704 --> 00:22:35,144 Speaker 5: the main operative that this center dispatched to run this 440 00:22:35,264 --> 00:22:39,144 Speaker 5: mission is a Russian speaker, spoke not a word of Serbian, 441 00:22:39,224 --> 00:22:41,224 Speaker 5: so he could not communicate with his own agent. So 442 00:22:41,264 --> 00:22:45,144 Speaker 5: what did he do. He was doing issuing taskings using 443 00:22:45,184 --> 00:22:48,464 Speaker 5: Google Translate, perhaps not realizing or just simply not giving 444 00:22:48,464 --> 00:22:51,944 Speaker 5: a shit that Google servers are located in California and 445 00:22:52,024 --> 00:22:55,704 Speaker 5: the FBI was literally hoovering up all of his communication 446 00:22:55,784 --> 00:22:57,464 Speaker 5: with his agent in real time. Well even say it 447 00:22:57,504 --> 00:22:59,944 Speaker 5: was better than a wire tap, because it was already 448 00:22:59,984 --> 00:23:03,744 Speaker 5: became pre transcribed, I think clicking translate, and you know 449 00:23:04,184 --> 00:23:06,984 Speaker 5: the agent was he was googling things like, you know, 450 00:23:07,064 --> 00:23:10,344 Speaker 5: glock pistol whatever, and where do I find one in 451 00:23:10,544 --> 00:23:13,704 Speaker 5: the Montenegrin capital. I mean, it was just so embarrassing. 452 00:23:24,304 --> 00:23:26,224 Speaker 5: But the thing about this center that was kind of 453 00:23:26,304 --> 00:23:29,144 Speaker 5: unique is it combined all of the aspects of a 454 00:23:29,184 --> 00:23:33,024 Speaker 5: traditional unit of military intelligence with some of the aspects 455 00:23:33,064 --> 00:23:36,864 Speaker 5: of a private military company Alla Yubeni Progosians Wagner Group, 456 00:23:37,184 --> 00:23:40,144 Speaker 5: except much more sprawling, like this was a shadow army. 457 00:23:40,504 --> 00:23:44,344 Speaker 5: They had their own fleet of tanks, multiple launch rockets, 458 00:23:44,744 --> 00:23:47,584 Speaker 5: different departments. I mean, it was like staffed almost like 459 00:23:47,624 --> 00:23:50,424 Speaker 5: its own sovereign intelligence agency, not a unit within the 460 00:23:50,464 --> 00:23:55,344 Speaker 5: gru And most importantly, it was domiciled under the corporate structure, 461 00:23:55,824 --> 00:23:59,784 Speaker 5: an umbrella of Kalashnikov as in the famous arms manufacturer 462 00:24:00,104 --> 00:24:02,584 Speaker 5: in Russia, and so that the head of that concern 463 00:24:02,824 --> 00:24:05,784 Speaker 5: was the financier. So everybody is duty bound under the 464 00:24:05,864 --> 00:24:08,224 Speaker 5: current system and model, since the full scale invasion, you 465 00:24:08,264 --> 00:24:11,824 Speaker 5: have to kick in some of your revenue toward national 466 00:24:11,864 --> 00:24:15,944 Speaker 5: security interests. So the head of Colossa basically financed this operation, 467 00:24:16,064 --> 00:24:19,264 Speaker 5: and he's quite close with Chemezov, the CEO of Rostek, 468 00:24:19,624 --> 00:24:23,024 Speaker 5: who's probably arguably, i should say, the second or third 469 00:24:23,104 --> 00:24:25,824 Speaker 5: most powerful man in Russia. The Chemosov is distinguished by 470 00:24:25,824 --> 00:24:29,384 Speaker 5: the fact that he's not seen as so as quite 471 00:24:29,384 --> 00:24:32,344 Speaker 5: so extreme and ideological. He's certainly not seen as somebody 472 00:24:32,344 --> 00:24:36,464 Speaker 5: who's going to be subsidizing wetwork and assassinations in the West. 473 00:24:36,824 --> 00:24:40,704 Speaker 5: And the fact that you know, this has involved US jurisdiction. 474 00:24:40,904 --> 00:24:44,664 Speaker 5: So there was grand jury sealed indictments which were unsealed 475 00:24:44,664 --> 00:24:49,144 Speaker 5: and re acquired, indicting both the officer from the center 476 00:24:49,704 --> 00:24:53,104 Speaker 5: and his Serbian agent and another co conspirator unnamed who 477 00:24:53,224 --> 00:24:56,464 Speaker 5: was in the United States, and the Serbian agent was 478 00:24:56,504 --> 00:24:59,664 Speaker 5: traveling to and from Manhattan. So now what happens. The 479 00:24:59,704 --> 00:25:03,344 Speaker 5: operative goes to Bogata and because the FBI you know, 480 00:25:03,384 --> 00:25:06,344 Speaker 5: basically put out a red notice, an Interpol red notice. 481 00:25:06,344 --> 00:25:08,704 Speaker 5: Columbian authorities arrest him. He's sitting in a jail cell 482 00:25:08,744 --> 00:25:11,464 Speaker 5: awaiting extra disition into the US. So before this whole 483 00:25:11,544 --> 00:25:16,544 Speaker 5: center again meant to be impeccably professional and above reproach 484 00:25:16,624 --> 00:25:18,984 Speaker 5: and with the perfect trader, before it even flapped its 485 00:25:19,064 --> 00:25:21,904 Speaker 5: wings and fled the nest, the whole thing has just 486 00:25:22,264 --> 00:25:26,023 Speaker 5: come a cropper because of unbelievably stupid tradecraft. And you know, 487 00:25:26,304 --> 00:25:28,464 Speaker 5: knives are out now, right, So this thing was set 488 00:25:28,504 --> 00:25:32,024 Speaker 5: up as kind of an alternative, and you know, a 489 00:25:32,064 --> 00:25:35,664 Speaker 5: superior alternative to Avrianov's two nine to one. But Arianof 490 00:25:35,704 --> 00:25:37,624 Speaker 5: is deputy director of the gru You think he's going 491 00:25:37,664 --> 00:25:39,744 Speaker 5: to look on this kindly now that his rivals have 492 00:25:39,864 --> 00:25:42,504 Speaker 5: so badly shited the bed like this. You never know 493 00:25:42,544 --> 00:25:44,144 Speaker 5: who's going to wind up being pushed out of a 494 00:25:44,184 --> 00:25:46,744 Speaker 5: tall window or with a bag dropped over their head 495 00:25:46,784 --> 00:25:49,184 Speaker 5: and rendered to La Fort de Vaux as an enemy 496 00:25:49,184 --> 00:25:50,304 Speaker 5: of the state as a result of this. 497 00:25:50,464 --> 00:25:52,824 Speaker 2: So your term knives out is probably the best way 498 00:25:52,824 --> 00:25:55,144 Speaker 2: to start to end this, because you've been gracious with 499 00:25:55,224 --> 00:25:57,904 Speaker 2: your time. I'm interested to see on knives out what 500 00:25:57,944 --> 00:26:01,264 Speaker 2: happens to the GRU. I'm interested to see what happens 501 00:26:01,264 --> 00:26:05,024 Speaker 2: with the DNI and Tulca Gabbard from your reporting. I'm 502 00:26:05,024 --> 00:26:08,104 Speaker 2: interested to see what happens inside CIA to these analysts, 503 00:26:08,184 --> 00:26:11,784 Speaker 2: whether if you're reporting accurate, you know what happens here. 504 00:26:12,184 --> 00:26:14,464 Speaker 2: And I'm also interested to see what happens to those 505 00:26:14,544 --> 00:26:17,263 Speaker 2: of you who've written spoken about this. Are people going 506 00:26:17,304 --> 00:26:18,624 Speaker 2: to come after you mark others? 507 00:26:18,664 --> 00:26:19,504 Speaker 3: So that was my question. 508 00:26:19,504 --> 00:26:22,264 Speaker 2: There's a lot to continue here. I think the reporting 509 00:26:22,264 --> 00:26:24,944 Speaker 2: has been fantastic, it's worth people reading, and as more 510 00:26:24,944 --> 00:26:27,544 Speaker 2: information comes out, we will we will look at it 511 00:26:27,584 --> 00:26:29,064 Speaker 2: and hopefully we'll be able to talk to you about it. 512 00:26:29,064 --> 00:26:31,584 Speaker 2: But you've been really great with your time today, so thanks, 513 00:26:31,584 --> 00:26:33,704 Speaker 2: And if you wanted to help tell our listeners where 514 00:26:33,744 --> 00:26:36,664 Speaker 2: they can find your reporting or other any anything else 515 00:26:36,664 --> 00:26:37,064 Speaker 2: you'd like it. 516 00:26:37,624 --> 00:26:40,664 Speaker 5: Yes, I'm the English language editor of The Insider. Really, 517 00:26:40,704 --> 00:26:43,904 Speaker 5: I just helm the big investigations that I co byline 518 00:26:43,944 --> 00:26:46,624 Speaker 5: with Christo and Raman. So you can go to The Insider. 519 00:26:47,024 --> 00:26:49,744 Speaker 5: I think it's the in THEI N s dot ru 520 00:26:49,824 --> 00:26:51,384 Speaker 5: as our u ur l to find all of our 521 00:26:51,424 --> 00:26:54,944 Speaker 5: work there. On Twitter, it's at Michael d Weiss and 522 00:26:54,984 --> 00:26:57,464 Speaker 5: I also have a substack called Foreign Office, which is 523 00:26:57,504 --> 00:27:00,624 Speaker 5: extended from an old podcast which I still intermittently do, 524 00:27:00,704 --> 00:27:03,064 Speaker 5: which is dedicated to all this fun stuff. And I 525 00:27:03,104 --> 00:27:05,264 Speaker 5: sometimes write original pieces on there as well. 526 00:27:05,304 --> 00:27:07,384 Speaker 2: So and you're still doing the book on gru. 527 00:27:07,264 --> 00:27:09,304 Speaker 5: Yeah, still did in the book, making good progress. It's 528 00:27:09,304 --> 00:27:11,304 Speaker 5: just you know, it was gonna be one of these 529 00:27:11,304 --> 00:27:15,064 Speaker 5: sort of year long quickie turnarounds, and it's become i mean, 530 00:27:15,184 --> 00:27:18,704 Speaker 5: almost Robert Caro esque in its ambition, which is terrifying 531 00:27:18,704 --> 00:27:20,384 Speaker 5: to me because I've never done anything like that before. 532 00:27:20,464 --> 00:27:21,264 Speaker 5: But hopefully, I. 533 00:27:21,184 --> 00:27:22,784 Speaker 2: Promise I will be one of the people who read 534 00:27:22,784 --> 00:27:25,144 Speaker 2: the whole thing, So don't worry any Thank you so much, Michael, 535 00:27:25,184 --> 00:27:26,904 Speaker 2: really appreciate it. That's always great to have you on. 536 00:27:26,944 --> 00:27:29,224 Speaker 2: This is recording, and yeah, please be careful. 537 00:27:29,024 --> 00:27:30,104 Speaker 5: You guys appreciate it. 538 00:27:34,144 --> 00:27:39,224 Speaker 1: Mission Implausible is produced by Adam Davidson, Jerry O'shay, John Cipher, 539 00:27:39,504 --> 00:27:43,904 Speaker 1: and Jonathan Stern. The associate producer is Rachel Harner. Mission 540 00:27:43,944 --> 00:27:47,944 Speaker 1: Implausible It's a production of honorable mention and abominable pictures 541 00:27:48,024 --> 00:27:49,384 Speaker 1: for iHeart Podcasts.