WEBVTT - Is Musk Getting Cold Feet About Acquiring Twitter?

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<v Speaker 1>This is Bloombird Law with June Brusso from Bloomberg Radio.

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<v Speaker 1>All the speculation that Elon Musk is getting cold feet

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<v Speaker 1>about acquiring Twitter comes from Musk himself, from his tweet

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<v Speaker 1>last Friday that the deal was on hold, to his

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<v Speaker 1>very tentative answer to the question at the All In

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<v Speaker 1>summit in Miami on Monday, is this Twitter deal gonna

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<v Speaker 1>get closed? Do you think the chances here? Well, I

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<v Speaker 1>mean it really depends on a lot of factors here. Um,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm still waiting for some sort of logical explanation for

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<v Speaker 1>the number of sort of fake or spam accounts on Twitter. Um,

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<v Speaker 1>and Twitter is refusing to tell us. And then a

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<v Speaker 1>Musk attempt at some legal ease. You know, it's a

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<v Speaker 1>material adverse, uh misstatement. You know, if if if they

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<v Speaker 1>in fact have been um vociferously claiming less than five

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<v Speaker 1>percent of Vega spam accounts, but in fact it is

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<v Speaker 1>four or five times that number, of perhaps ten times

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<v Speaker 1>that number. This is a big deal. Joining me to

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<v Speaker 1>help pass through the latest from Musk is Eric Tallely,

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<v Speaker 1>a professor at Columbia Law School. Eric Musk even made

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<v Speaker 1>a comparison to buying a house with termites. Does it

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<v Speaker 1>sound like he's trying to give some legal reasons for

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<v Speaker 1>getting out of the deal. It sounds like it is.

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<v Speaker 1>It sounds like he has been undergoing some coaching, possibly

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<v Speaker 1>therapy by his lawyer. The grounds that he is now fighting,

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<v Speaker 1>he's starting to invoke some formal legal terms that are

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<v Speaker 1>part of the contract that he signed with Twitter related

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<v Speaker 1>to what's known as a material adverse effect. Now, what

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<v Speaker 1>this basically is, it's sort of an act of God

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<v Speaker 1>type of provision that says, if something, you know, crazy happened,

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<v Speaker 1>there is something that is really awrived from what we

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<v Speaker 1>thought we were getting into, then the buyer or the

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<v Speaker 1>seller can walk away. However, the usual has to these

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<v Speaker 1>sorts of provisions is that they are hard to invoke,

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<v Speaker 1>and if you're going to try to use one of them,

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<v Speaker 1>you actually bear the burden of demonstrating that there was

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<v Speaker 1>this incredible surprise that one would never have expected that

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<v Speaker 1>now has materially undercut the value of this company. And there,

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<v Speaker 1>I think that's going to be an incredibly difficult pill

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<v Speaker 1>for Musket to surmount. The main thing that he is

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<v Speaker 1>citing is that various securities disclosures, Twitter misstated the number

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<v Speaker 1>of their bots. But if, first of all, if you

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<v Speaker 1>actually read the disclosure, they say in a very lawyered

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<v Speaker 1>way that you know, we've tried the best we can

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<v Speaker 1>to determine how many of our accounts are bots and

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<v Speaker 1>how many are not. And this is actually a really

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<v Speaker 1>hard thing to figure out. We may not be getting

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<v Speaker 1>it right. But what we've come up with with our

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<v Speaker 1>sampling is that fewer than five percent. But just realized

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<v Speaker 1>that we might be wrong, and it maybe is it

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<v Speaker 1>the best way to measure there's something up and on

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<v Speaker 1>the way that we've measured it. This does not strike

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<v Speaker 1>me as the type of claim that is analogous to

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<v Speaker 1>saying I hereby proclaimed that there are no termites in out.

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<v Speaker 1>It's almost like proclaiming there might be termites. We haven't

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<v Speaker 1>seen any. We looked, we had a particularly strategy for

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<v Speaker 1>looking for him. We didn't see any, or we didn't

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<v Speaker 1>see that many. But our strategy might be wrong. So

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<v Speaker 1>you've got both a standard for a material adverse effect

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<v Speaker 1>that is very very high, something that's going to have

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<v Speaker 1>to be borne by him that he's going to try

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<v Speaker 1>to make this argument in court, and a glaring alternative

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<v Speaker 1>theory as to why he doesn't want to go through

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<v Speaker 1>with this deal, which is the fact that the prices

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<v Speaker 1>have fallen in the text sector since he signed up

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<v Speaker 1>the deal at fifty four dollars and twenty cents, and

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<v Speaker 1>he now has buyers remorse and therefore is looking anywhere

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<v Speaker 1>to try to find an escape hatch to jump out of.

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<v Speaker 1>But this one does not strike me as one that

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<v Speaker 1>is going to be all that friendly for him. There

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<v Speaker 1>was some talk about renegotiating the price when the house

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<v Speaker 1>has termites, although according to Bloomberg sources, the deal is

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<v Speaker 1>still on track as is. There's always a possibility of

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<v Speaker 1>recutting the price of a deal, but it's always done

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<v Speaker 1>in the shadow of what are the likely rights, duties,

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<v Speaker 1>and obligations that the parties have if they don't. Based

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<v Speaker 1>on this particular assertion by Musk, it seems like a

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<v Speaker 1>notably weak case for him to be able to walk

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<v Speaker 1>away from the deal, very low probability, and therefore, if

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<v Speaker 1>everyone knows that he's bargaining not holding an ace in

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<v Speaker 1>his hand, but holding a tool of club, he's not

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<v Speaker 1>going to be able to bargain for very much. If

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<v Speaker 1>the Twitter board is doing their job, Is any of

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<v Speaker 1>this really surprising given that his approach to this deal

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<v Speaker 1>has been unconventional from the start. But the one thing

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<v Speaker 1>that is maybe a little surprising about his tactics is

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<v Speaker 1>that he has ended up seizing upon something that looks

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<v Speaker 1>like it is going to be a very difficult to

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<v Speaker 1>engineer theory. The material ever's affect the argument very much

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<v Speaker 1>is stacked against him, I would have thought, and in fact,

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<v Speaker 1>I think it may well be the case that this

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<v Speaker 1>strategy may shift if he continues to want to either

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<v Speaker 1>get out of the deal or to go back to

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<v Speaker 1>the bargaining table. Another aspect of this deal is that

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<v Speaker 1>he could potentially walk away, or maybe only walk away

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<v Speaker 1>and have to pay a billion dollars if the financings

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<v Speaker 1>that the deal falls through, And there it seems like

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<v Speaker 1>there might be more rooms for things to happen, particularly

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<v Speaker 1>if the folks who have agreed to lend thirteen billion

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<v Speaker 1>dollars into this deal get cold feet, either get cold

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<v Speaker 1>feet by themselves, or get cold feet after having been

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<v Speaker 1>encouraged to get cold feet from Elon buskinself. So I'm

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<v Speaker 1>going to guess that if this melodrama continues to play out,

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<v Speaker 1>it may end up shifting away from the Bot issue,

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<v Speaker 1>which in my view is a bit of a side show,

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<v Speaker 1>and this financing contingency may take more center stage. Former

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<v Speaker 1>President Trump said, there's no way that Elon Musk will

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<v Speaker 1>buy Twitter such a ridiculous price. Do you agree with that.

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<v Speaker 1>It's seeming more and more unlikely that Musk is going

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<v Speaker 1>to buy Twitter. Well, at last I checked, former President

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<v Speaker 1>Trump had not been to law school. And one of

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<v Speaker 1>the things that is considerable complication here is that Elon

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<v Speaker 1>Musk has already entered into a contract in which he

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<v Speaker 1>substantially obliges himself to make steps towards buying Twitter at

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<v Speaker 1>a cash price that he's already stated. So the economics

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<v Speaker 1>of this deal, I think are probably causing Elon Musk

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<v Speaker 1>to think twice about whether he really has buyer's remorse here.

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<v Speaker 1>Man I suspect he does, if for no other reason,

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<v Speaker 1>because he ended up paying a price that was probably

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<v Speaker 1>higher than it would have been had he just waited

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<v Speaker 1>for a few more weeks. That having been said, the

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<v Speaker 1>history books are filled with people who are buying companies

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<v Speaker 1>who then get some buyer's remorse and try to get

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<v Speaker 1>out of that. But the contracts that they've entered into

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<v Speaker 1>make it either hard or impossible to get out of it.

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<v Speaker 1>So one big factor here is trying to determine to

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<v Speaker 1>what extent the deal that Must ended up entering into

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<v Speaker 1>with Twitter is gonna end up tying his own hands

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<v Speaker 1>later on or forcing a fairly difficult renegotiation with the

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<v Speaker 1>Twitter board sitting on a fair amount of bargaining power.

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<v Speaker 1>If you just sort of stare at the document itself,

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<v Speaker 1>this is a document that looks what they say in

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<v Speaker 1>the industry, relatively seller friendly the company that's selling itself,

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<v Speaker 1>there aren't that many ways that Must can walk away. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>there are some aspects to it that make it look

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<v Speaker 1>like he could. Right. There's a termination fee that he

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<v Speaker 1>would have to pay of a billion dollars if he

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<v Speaker 1>were to walk away, But that's really only one of

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<v Speaker 1>the provisions in the deal. And another one which is

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<v Speaker 1>far more important, is a provision that's called a specific

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<v Speaker 1>performance provision, and that's just legal ease for the either side.

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<v Speaker 1>If the other side wants to try to back out,

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<v Speaker 1>they can essentially force the party or get a court

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<v Speaker 1>order forcing the to go forward. And that's a provision

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<v Speaker 1>that's in this deal. It doesn't provide that many outs

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<v Speaker 1>for Elon Musk. The one that it might help provide

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<v Speaker 1>is if for some reason he's unable to secure financing

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<v Speaker 1>for the deal, then that might allow that specific performance

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<v Speaker 1>provision to fall away. So, you know, I think a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of people are sort of thinking that the disclosure

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<v Speaker 1>he made this weekend about you know, whether Twitter has

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<v Speaker 1>more than five percent spots type or automaton type accounts

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<v Speaker 1>was essentially trying to set the stage for possibly engineering

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<v Speaker 1>a failing of the financing of the deal. Now that

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<v Speaker 1>one itself is kind of complicated for at least two

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<v Speaker 1>or three reasons. The first is there isn't a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of financing left on this deal. It's still a fair

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<v Speaker 1>amount of financing, but most of this deal always has

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<v Speaker 1>been Elon must buying a bunch of stock of Twitter,

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<v Speaker 1>and he's been conscripting a bunch of co investors to

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<v Speaker 1>come on with him and actually reducing the amount of

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<v Speaker 1>debt that he's pledging his Testla shares to help secure.

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<v Speaker 1>So he's been actually reducing the debt that's part of

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<v Speaker 1>this deal, and that's going to make it even harder

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<v Speaker 1>to you know, engineer a situation where the lenders get

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<v Speaker 1>cold feet and walk away. The second thing is that

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<v Speaker 1>the provision that he's you know, evidently complaining about is

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<v Speaker 1>something that has been in Twitter's disclosures for a long time.

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<v Speaker 1>It's a heavily lawyered provision that says, by our account,

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<v Speaker 1>we don't have more than five percent of these thoughts

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<v Speaker 1>who are account holders, but realize that there are just

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<v Speaker 1>a bunch of different ways to count this up in

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<v Speaker 1>the hand, other ways of counting it up may differ.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's a heavily lawyered disclosure, one that I don't

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<v Speaker 1>think anyone would really rely on per se. And yet

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<v Speaker 1>this seems to be the attack that Musk is taking,

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<v Speaker 1>either so he can figure out a way to walk

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<v Speaker 1>away himself or give his lenders a pretext to say

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<v Speaker 1>we refuse to lend from here on end. But it

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<v Speaker 1>looks relatively thin. It has a very pretext little aspect

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<v Speaker 1>about it. Given what we've always known about Twitter, when

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<v Speaker 1>would must be forced into specific performance and when would

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<v Speaker 1>he be allowed to pay the billion dollar breakup fee?

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<v Speaker 1>So if, for example, some of the things that were

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<v Speaker 1>warranted or represented in the transaction didn't materialize, or if

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<v Speaker 1>some of the structures that were part of the deal

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<v Speaker 1>just couldn't come together, he might be able to walk

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<v Speaker 1>away and pay this termination. See on the other hand,

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<v Speaker 1>that termination is clearly subservient to this specific performance provisions.

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<v Speaker 1>So a lot of people have sort of thought, oh,

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<v Speaker 1>he always has this option just to walk away and

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<v Speaker 1>pay at the excellent That's only true if the specific

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<v Speaker 1>performance provision is not in play, and that provision turns

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<v Speaker 1>out that you can draft them in a bunch of

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<v Speaker 1>different ways, And a lot of these contracts have specific

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<v Speaker 1>performance provisions. Some of them have more escape hatches than

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<v Speaker 1>the others. By my read of this specific big performance division,

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<v Speaker 1>the only real escape hatch is a failure of financing,

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<v Speaker 1>and so the specific performance aspect of this contract is

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<v Speaker 1>very much a strong hand that the Twitter board is

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<v Speaker 1>going to be able to play. You know, the one

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<v Speaker 1>thing that he might end up trying to do is

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<v Speaker 1>to attempt to be active in engineering. A failure of

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<v Speaker 1>financing essentially a you know, bring the dog to the homework,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, put some dog food on the homework and

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<v Speaker 1>has the dog eat it. But that raises a bunch

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<v Speaker 1>of risks itself. It maybe that some of these lenders,

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<v Speaker 1>maybe the whole reason they came along is that They

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<v Speaker 1>just want to make sure that they stay in in

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<v Speaker 1>Musk's good graces so that next time Twitter needs some financing,

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<v Speaker 1>or next time SpaceX or the boring company needs to

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<v Speaker 1>do some deals, they're going to be in his role

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<v Speaker 1>of decks and they don't want to, you know, push

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<v Speaker 1>him back, And so it might be that they'll play

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<v Speaker 1>ball with possibly you know, sort of faking their way

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<v Speaker 1>to a refusal to finance the deal. But that comes

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<v Speaker 1>with risks as well. You know, those banks also have

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<v Speaker 1>other clients that they want to maintain reputations for, and

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<v Speaker 1>you know, when they come in to finance a deal

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<v Speaker 1>and say, no, this financing is firm, do they cannibalize

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<v Speaker 1>their own reputation by having a case in the past

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<v Speaker 1>where they just change their mind willing nearly on the

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<v Speaker 1>hest of an important client that causes them to lose

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<v Speaker 1>credibility in the market. Possibly just as important is that

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<v Speaker 1>if these third parties play an active role in trying

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<v Speaker 1>to gin up kind of a fabricated case for why

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<v Speaker 1>financing is impossible anymore, that could put them in some

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<v Speaker 1>legal peril themselves for basically playing an active role in

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<v Speaker 1>effectively helping someone else breach a contract. And so there

0:12:39.840 --> 0:12:42.000
<v Speaker 1>is a little bit of exposure if you're too willing

0:12:42.040 --> 0:12:43.880
<v Speaker 1>to play ball with the elon Musk, even if you

0:12:43.920 --> 0:12:46.800
<v Speaker 1>really want to preserve those later potential fields. So where

0:12:46.840 --> 0:12:49.040
<v Speaker 1>does this all add up the Twitter board. If they

0:12:49.080 --> 0:12:51.000
<v Speaker 1>want to play our strong hand, they're going to be

0:12:51.040 --> 0:12:54.000
<v Speaker 1>able to play a strong legally. They've got a very

0:12:54.000 --> 0:12:56.720
<v Speaker 1>good position from which the bargain. On the other hand,

0:12:56.920 --> 0:12:59.520
<v Speaker 1>you know, Musk is a guy who clearly has shown

0:12:59.600 --> 0:13:02.960
<v Speaker 1>himself to be disruptive in all walks of life, including

0:13:03.760 --> 0:13:06.559
<v Speaker 1>various other people out there who are his adoring fans

0:13:06.600 --> 0:13:09.120
<v Speaker 1>and who might take it upon themselves to have a

0:13:09.120 --> 0:13:12.800
<v Speaker 1>personal mission to you know, crash Twitter stock if things

0:13:12.840 --> 0:13:16.280
<v Speaker 1>go poorly, and so that type of disruption is probably

0:13:16.520 --> 0:13:18.480
<v Speaker 1>the main thing he's going to bring to the table

0:13:18.520 --> 0:13:21.960
<v Speaker 1>of that potential for disruption. It isn't a legal claim.

0:13:22.240 --> 0:13:24.960
<v Speaker 1>You know, Well, he's got a couple of windows of opportunity.

0:13:25.120 --> 0:13:28.520
<v Speaker 1>Maybe they are relatively narrow, and most people, I think,

0:13:28.559 --> 0:13:30.839
<v Speaker 1>don't sort of think that that's going to have much

0:13:30.880 --> 0:13:33.440
<v Speaker 1>of an effect. But his broader sort of you know,

0:13:33.640 --> 0:13:37.160
<v Speaker 1>social influence, you know, no doubt, could throw some turbulence

0:13:37.160 --> 0:13:40.840
<v Speaker 1>into these negotiations. My sense probably what's going to end

0:13:40.920 --> 0:13:43.200
<v Speaker 1>up happening is that they will go back and they

0:13:43.240 --> 0:13:45.640
<v Speaker 1>will sort of consider whether there's a deal to be had.

0:13:45.720 --> 0:13:47.439
<v Speaker 1>I don't think the Twitter board is going to give

0:13:47.559 --> 0:13:50.280
<v Speaker 1>up much, if anything at all. Possibly there will be

0:13:50.320 --> 0:13:53.600
<v Speaker 1>a small readjustment to price, simply so everyone could claim

0:13:53.720 --> 0:13:56.160
<v Speaker 1>victory and walk away with their arms in the air.

0:13:56.440 --> 0:13:58.760
<v Speaker 1>But I don't see this. I don't see this price

0:13:59.400 --> 0:14:04.199
<v Speaker 1>migrating very far below the price. I mean, the Twitter

0:14:04.240 --> 0:14:08.080
<v Speaker 1>board was forced into a green and musque, weren't they,

0:14:08.120 --> 0:14:10.800
<v Speaker 1>I mean, do they want musk? Well, the irony of

0:14:10.800 --> 0:14:13.040
<v Speaker 1>this is that they hadn't put up this poison pill

0:14:13.160 --> 0:14:16.080
<v Speaker 1>before they finally reached an agreement to busk. And the

0:14:16.240 --> 0:14:18.360
<v Speaker 1>usual reason that a board will put up a poison

0:14:18.400 --> 0:14:20.080
<v Speaker 1>pill is to say, look, we're not going to allow

0:14:20.160 --> 0:14:23.120
<v Speaker 1>this person to manipulate our shareholders into selling it too

0:14:23.120 --> 0:14:25.080
<v Speaker 1>low of a price. So we're putting up the poison

0:14:25.080 --> 0:14:27.720
<v Speaker 1>till so we can bargain for a better price so

0:14:27.760 --> 0:14:31.480
<v Speaker 1>that this potential acquirer doesn't go around us and end

0:14:31.560 --> 0:14:35.120
<v Speaker 1>up manipulating our shareholders. When they finally reached the deal,

0:14:35.200 --> 0:14:36.600
<v Speaker 1>one of the things that a lot of people were

0:14:36.640 --> 0:14:39.680
<v Speaker 1>surprised at including myself, is that the price that they

0:14:39.720 --> 0:14:42.360
<v Speaker 1>reached didn't change at all from the very price that

0:14:42.440 --> 0:14:44.400
<v Speaker 1>he offered them to begin with. And so there was

0:14:44.440 --> 0:14:47.400
<v Speaker 1>almost a sense in which a lot of people were thinking, hey,

0:14:47.480 --> 0:14:50.040
<v Speaker 1>Board of Directors, if you did the poison pills so

0:14:50.080 --> 0:14:52.000
<v Speaker 1>that you could have a lot of bargaining power, you

0:14:52.040 --> 0:14:55.000
<v Speaker 1>sure didn't seem to exercise very much when the same

0:14:55.160 --> 0:14:57.240
<v Speaker 1>terms that he offered came out the other end of

0:14:57.280 --> 0:15:00.400
<v Speaker 1>the bargaining. And so, weirdly enough, the twitter A board

0:15:00.480 --> 0:15:03.000
<v Speaker 1>was already taking a little bit of heat for being

0:15:03.200 --> 0:15:06.800
<v Speaker 1>too limp when it came to bargaining with Elon Musk.

0:15:06.920 --> 0:15:10.800
<v Speaker 1>And now how fortunes have turned now that seemingly limp

0:15:10.880 --> 0:15:13.160
<v Speaker 1>deal that they reached with him, that they didn't really

0:15:13.160 --> 0:15:16.440
<v Speaker 1>extract that much more from him, is now looking like

0:15:16.520 --> 0:15:19.520
<v Speaker 1>it was certainly a fortuitous, if not a genius move

0:15:19.600 --> 0:15:21.680
<v Speaker 1>by the board. So there's almost a sense in which,

0:15:21.800 --> 0:15:24.200
<v Speaker 1>you know, I think part of the you know, part

0:15:24.200 --> 0:15:27.520
<v Speaker 1>of the board sort of fighting to reclaim their honor

0:15:27.800 --> 0:15:30.560
<v Speaker 1>right that said, no, we we really engaged in heavy

0:15:30.560 --> 0:15:34.200
<v Speaker 1>bargaining is going to probably push them to dig their

0:15:34.240 --> 0:15:36.680
<v Speaker 1>heels in a little bit more than they might otherwise

0:15:36.720 --> 0:15:40.160
<v Speaker 1>do do they have also fiduciary duties that they have

0:15:40.400 --> 0:15:45.680
<v Speaker 1>this offer at and if they go much below that,

0:15:45.960 --> 0:15:50.320
<v Speaker 1>are they for going their fiduciary duties to the shareholders. Yeah.

0:15:50.360 --> 0:15:52.800
<v Speaker 1>Once a company has decided it's going to sell control

0:15:52.840 --> 0:15:55.400
<v Speaker 1>to someone else, it is under a heightened form of

0:15:55.400 --> 0:15:58.720
<v Speaker 1>fiduciary duties. It's sometimes called Revlon duties. It has to

0:15:58.720 --> 0:16:00.920
<v Speaker 1>do with a famous case in involve Revalent back in

0:16:00.960 --> 0:16:04.160
<v Speaker 1>the nineteen eighties. And when you are under those sort

0:16:04.200 --> 0:16:08.320
<v Speaker 1>of heightened fiduciary obligations, you're under an obligation to take

0:16:08.400 --> 0:16:11.400
<v Speaker 1>to only take steps that are going to reasonably maximize

0:16:11.440 --> 0:16:14.560
<v Speaker 1>the benefit to your shareholders in the short term. So

0:16:14.680 --> 0:16:17.360
<v Speaker 1>right now, if they're sitting as the board and they've

0:16:17.400 --> 0:16:21.520
<v Speaker 1>got a fifty four offer that has been signed up,

0:16:21.560 --> 0:16:24.000
<v Speaker 1>that is on the table, that doesn't have very many

0:16:24.040 --> 0:16:26.960
<v Speaker 1>closing conditions associated with it, it's going to be really

0:16:26.960 --> 0:16:29.160
<v Speaker 1>hard for the other side to get out of. If

0:16:29.160 --> 0:16:31.240
<v Speaker 1>they end up sort of backing out of it, that

0:16:31.320 --> 0:16:34.120
<v Speaker 1>could put the board itself into peril for not having

0:16:34.120 --> 0:16:37.720
<v Speaker 1>a backup plan yet letting go of what is clearly

0:16:37.840 --> 0:16:40.880
<v Speaker 1>now emerged as a relatively good offer better than anything

0:16:40.960 --> 0:16:43.480
<v Speaker 1>else that twitters can have. If you kind of combine

0:16:43.520 --> 0:16:46.040
<v Speaker 1>that with the fact that you know, in the days,

0:16:46.360 --> 0:16:50.120
<v Speaker 1>you know, leading up to Musk's um suddenly getting cold feet,

0:16:50.600 --> 0:16:54.000
<v Speaker 1>the senior executive riggs that at Twitter looked like a

0:16:54.440 --> 0:16:57.640
<v Speaker 1>rotisserie oven. They were moving, they were moving out old

0:16:57.640 --> 0:17:00.320
<v Speaker 1>ones and moving in new ones almost start only at

0:17:00.320 --> 0:17:02.480
<v Speaker 1>the hest of trying to get this company ready for

0:17:02.560 --> 0:17:04.920
<v Speaker 1>its take over by Elon Boston, some of the people

0:17:04.960 --> 0:17:06.879
<v Speaker 1>that you know he was going to clearly butt heads with.

0:17:07.160 --> 0:17:10.000
<v Speaker 1>So there's a sense in which now Twitter has effectively

0:17:10.359 --> 0:17:13.680
<v Speaker 1>morphed itself enough into something that might even be damaged

0:17:13.720 --> 0:17:15.520
<v Speaker 1>goods to anyone else who is going to buy the

0:17:15.520 --> 0:17:17.520
<v Speaker 1>company later on. And I think that gives the board

0:17:17.600 --> 0:17:20.320
<v Speaker 1>m an additional reason why they should fight right and

0:17:20.359 --> 0:17:23.159
<v Speaker 1>not concede, because if they concede, it may not be

0:17:23.359 --> 0:17:25.920
<v Speaker 1>very long before a plaintive attorney says, hey, what were

0:17:25.920 --> 0:17:27.919
<v Speaker 1>you doing? You have this great deal signed up and

0:17:27.960 --> 0:17:31.119
<v Speaker 1>now basically, you know, gave away the farm with no

0:17:31.200 --> 0:17:34.640
<v Speaker 1>backup plan. What do you make of this? Elon Musk

0:17:34.680 --> 0:17:38.560
<v Speaker 1>tweeting Twitter Legal just call to complain that I violated

0:17:38.600 --> 0:17:44.560
<v Speaker 1>your nondisclosure agreement by revealing the box check sample sizes one. Yeah,

0:17:44.600 --> 0:17:47.000
<v Speaker 1>so we don't actually know what's in the NBA because

0:17:47.040 --> 0:17:50.399
<v Speaker 1>that's not been disclosed us. But there probably is an

0:17:50.480 --> 0:17:52.600
<v Speaker 1>NBA that has to do with some aspects of the

0:17:52.680 --> 0:17:56.000
<v Speaker 1>due diligence associated with the deal. So anytime you are

0:17:56.080 --> 0:17:58.760
<v Speaker 1>buying a company, you usually want to do a fair

0:17:58.800 --> 0:18:01.480
<v Speaker 1>amount of investigation on some of the aspects of what

0:18:01.560 --> 0:18:04.840
<v Speaker 1>are inside the company. That's usually why these deals end

0:18:04.920 --> 0:18:07.520
<v Speaker 1>up taking a fair amount of time, because the buyer

0:18:07.600 --> 0:18:10.640
<v Speaker 1>is trying to satisfy themselves that they're getting something that's valuable.

0:18:10.880 --> 0:18:13.600
<v Speaker 1>In this case, it appears that that musk not only

0:18:13.880 --> 0:18:16.560
<v Speaker 1>didn't try to do a lot of that due diligence,

0:18:16.800 --> 0:18:21.040
<v Speaker 1>but he also didn't extract a contractual warranty in the

0:18:21.119 --> 0:18:23.560
<v Speaker 1>contract itself. A says you know, don't worry, we have

0:18:23.600 --> 0:18:25.639
<v Speaker 1>at most five percent bought. You can't find that in

0:18:25.640 --> 0:18:28.359
<v Speaker 1>the contract itself. That's one of the reasons why you

0:18:28.400 --> 0:18:31.480
<v Speaker 1>know he's sort of you know, casting about the securities

0:18:31.520 --> 0:18:34.119
<v Speaker 1>markets disclosures. So there's a sense in which you know,

0:18:34.160 --> 0:18:37.000
<v Speaker 1>this dog ate my homework thing really is resonant. There's

0:18:37.040 --> 0:18:40.680
<v Speaker 1>there's essentially nothing surprising in any of the disclosures, he

0:18:40.760 --> 0:18:42.920
<v Speaker 1>talked about it. It was out there in plain sight

0:18:43.080 --> 0:18:45.280
<v Speaker 1>for everyone to see. You know, there had even been

0:18:45.520 --> 0:18:48.639
<v Speaker 1>a public dispute about the number of boss that members

0:18:48.640 --> 0:18:51.000
<v Speaker 1>the Twitter hand, so you know it's he was suggesting

0:18:51.040 --> 0:18:54.000
<v Speaker 1>he didn't bother doing his diligence of the deal, or

0:18:54.119 --> 0:18:56.399
<v Speaker 1>he didn't intend to do any diligence on the deal.

0:18:56.880 --> 0:18:59.960
<v Speaker 1>And he also didn't bake in any promises to the

0:19:00.040 --> 0:19:03.359
<v Speaker 1>contrary in the contract. So it has a lot of

0:19:03.359 --> 0:19:07.960
<v Speaker 1>the trappings of a fairly hastily entered into contract that

0:19:08.160 --> 0:19:11.280
<v Speaker 1>was for cash, that didn't have too many contingencies in it.

0:19:11.359 --> 0:19:13.960
<v Speaker 1>And now he's starting to feel like, oh wow, maybe

0:19:13.960 --> 0:19:15.320
<v Speaker 1>I don't really want to go through with it, or

0:19:15.320 --> 0:19:18.119
<v Speaker 1>maybe I can threaten to walk away and get a

0:19:18.160 --> 0:19:22.399
<v Speaker 1>better price. In most universes, given the documents that I've seen,

0:19:22.760 --> 0:19:26.520
<v Speaker 1>that that is a pretty speculative bet. But you know,

0:19:26.720 --> 0:19:29.760
<v Speaker 1>who knows what to expect in the Elon Musk universe.

0:19:29.800 --> 0:19:32.040
<v Speaker 1>We've already learned that it is somewhat of a parallel

0:19:32.119 --> 0:19:34.760
<v Speaker 1>universe from the one everyone else of us lives in.

0:19:35.280 --> 0:19:38.520
<v Speaker 1>Looking at the paperwork it's or looking at the deal,

0:19:39.200 --> 0:19:41.840
<v Speaker 1>what do you think the chances are that he will

0:19:41.880 --> 0:19:46.439
<v Speaker 1>actually buy Twitter. I think they are still pretty high.

0:19:46.600 --> 0:19:49.399
<v Speaker 1>I think the specific performance aspect of it is going

0:19:49.440 --> 0:19:53.200
<v Speaker 1>to play a fairly large role. Ultimately, it may take

0:19:53.240 --> 0:19:55.320
<v Speaker 1>a while, and they may end up, you know, trying

0:19:55.480 --> 0:19:58.520
<v Speaker 1>deciding to grease the wheels and having a light break

0:19:58.800 --> 0:20:02.040
<v Speaker 1>in price. Much is going to turn on whether the

0:20:02.119 --> 0:20:05.119
<v Speaker 1>lenders that are lined up to lend money for this

0:20:05.240 --> 0:20:08.320
<v Speaker 1>acquisition themselves get cold beat. And if they do get

0:20:08.359 --> 0:20:11.240
<v Speaker 1>cold beat, do they do so sort of honestly or

0:20:11.280 --> 0:20:13.280
<v Speaker 1>do they do so in a somewhat of a managed

0:20:13.359 --> 0:20:16.240
<v Speaker 1>and engineered way. If they do so and do so honestly,

0:20:16.320 --> 0:20:18.639
<v Speaker 1>that's the only contingency I can see in which this

0:20:18.720 --> 0:20:21.240
<v Speaker 1>deal doesn't end up closing. I think a lot of

0:20:21.240 --> 0:20:23.800
<v Speaker 1>people out there sort of feel like it probably will

0:20:23.920 --> 0:20:26.040
<v Speaker 1>end up closing. And I think this is all a

0:20:26.040 --> 0:20:28.119
<v Speaker 1>big dance to see if he can get a slight

0:20:28.160 --> 0:20:31.440
<v Speaker 1>price reduction. Thanks for being in the Bloomberg Law Show, Eric.

0:20:31.720 --> 0:20:37.520
<v Speaker 1>That's professor Eric Tally of Columbia Law School. On Monday,

0:20:37.560 --> 0:20:40.040
<v Speaker 1>the Supreme Court, by a vote of six to three,

0:20:40.280 --> 0:20:44.040
<v Speaker 1>struck down another campaign finance law, adding to a line

0:20:44.040 --> 0:20:49.000
<v Speaker 1>of rulings throwing out campaign finance restrictions. Republican Senator Ted

0:20:49.080 --> 0:20:53.399
<v Speaker 1>Cruz had challenged the two fifty dollar cap on candidates

0:20:53.480 --> 0:20:57.840
<v Speaker 1>using political contributions made after an election to recoup their

0:20:57.840 --> 0:21:02.240
<v Speaker 1>personal campaign loans. The this vision was along ideological lines,

0:21:02.560 --> 0:21:06.639
<v Speaker 1>and Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the majority opinion, finding

0:21:06.680 --> 0:21:10.760
<v Speaker 1>that the provision burden's core political speech without furthering an

0:21:10.760 --> 0:21:14.879
<v Speaker 1>anti corruption goal. Echoing what Roberts and Justice Amy Coney

0:21:14.920 --> 0:21:18.360
<v Speaker 1>Barrett said during the oral arguments, there isn't a sufficient

0:21:18.400 --> 0:21:22.240
<v Speaker 1>corruption anti corruption interests sort of up to two thousand,

0:21:22.280 --> 0:21:27.440
<v Speaker 1>but then all of a sudden there is says that

0:21:28.359 --> 0:21:31.640
<v Speaker 1>this doesn't enrich him personally because he's no better off

0:21:31.640 --> 0:21:34.920
<v Speaker 1>than he was before. It's paying alone, not lining his pockets,

0:21:35.480 --> 0:21:39.320
<v Speaker 1>but in a blistering descent. Justice Elena Kagan, writing for

0:21:39.359 --> 0:21:42.800
<v Speaker 1>the liberal justices, said that it doesn't take a political

0:21:42.920 --> 0:21:46.560
<v Speaker 1>genius to see the heightened risk of corruption from donations

0:21:46.640 --> 0:21:50.679
<v Speaker 1>made after Accountada has won and can quote return the

0:21:50.720 --> 0:21:54.200
<v Speaker 1>favor by a vote, a contract, and appointment. Here are

0:21:54.240 --> 0:21:58.359
<v Speaker 1>Justices Kagan and Sonya. So to mayor, if I have

0:21:58.600 --> 0:22:02.200
<v Speaker 1>a debt of ten thousand and dollars and somebody comes

0:22:02.240 --> 0:22:05.160
<v Speaker 1>along and says you're doing such a good job. I'm

0:22:05.200 --> 0:22:07.840
<v Speaker 1>going to read, I'm going to pay that debt off

0:22:08.040 --> 0:22:12.239
<v Speaker 1>for you. Isn't that a financial benefits to me? Of

0:22:12.280 --> 0:22:16.600
<v Speaker 1>course it's a gift. But you just said the magic

0:22:16.680 --> 0:22:21.639
<v Speaker 1>words to make a contribution to the winner, not too

0:22:22.040 --> 0:22:25.919
<v Speaker 1>a campaign and for instance, but for the pockets of

0:22:25.920 --> 0:22:29.240
<v Speaker 1>the winner. My guest is Richard Brafald, a professor at

0:22:29.240 --> 0:22:34.200
<v Speaker 1>Columbia Law School. So the court struck down another campaign

0:22:34.320 --> 0:22:37.640
<v Speaker 1>finance rule. Are you surprised at all? Not at all,

0:22:37.920 --> 0:22:41.040
<v Speaker 1>Both based on the oral argument, which pretty much telegraph

0:22:41.080 --> 0:22:43.639
<v Speaker 1>where it was going to go, and more generally based

0:22:43.640 --> 0:22:46.760
<v Speaker 1>on the court's philosophy of the last pen plus years,

0:22:47.080 --> 0:22:49.720
<v Speaker 1>the court has been pretty hostile to campaign finance law.

0:22:49.840 --> 0:22:52.040
<v Speaker 1>I don't think it broke any new ground in this case.

0:22:52.320 --> 0:22:54.760
<v Speaker 1>It's kind of deepened the ground that was already there.

0:22:55.240 --> 0:22:58.120
<v Speaker 1>Tell us about the rule that the court struck down, right,

0:22:58.240 --> 0:23:00.760
<v Speaker 1>So this was a part of a m can findal

0:23:00.880 --> 0:23:04.160
<v Speaker 1>law adopted about twenty years ago now which basically limited

0:23:04.200 --> 0:23:09.560
<v Speaker 1>the ability of campaigns to repay loans that a candidate

0:23:09.600 --> 0:23:12.040
<v Speaker 1>made today a campaign to pay for the election. So

0:23:12.119 --> 0:23:14.359
<v Speaker 1>currently a candidate can spend as much money as he

0:23:14.400 --> 0:23:17.080
<v Speaker 1>wants on an election, and the candidate can lend as

0:23:17.119 --> 0:23:19.720
<v Speaker 1>much money as he wants to his own campaign and

0:23:19.760 --> 0:23:22.639
<v Speaker 1>the campaign can pay him that. But the problem is

0:23:22.640 --> 0:23:25.640
<v Speaker 1>that the campaign starts to pay him back with donations

0:23:25.720 --> 0:23:29.760
<v Speaker 1>received after election day. So under the law, the campaign

0:23:29.840 --> 0:23:33.919
<v Speaker 1>can repay the candidate only up to tun fifty dollars

0:23:33.920 --> 0:23:36.919
<v Speaker 1>with donations that come in after election day. They can

0:23:37.000 --> 0:23:38.919
<v Speaker 1>use any amount of money from donations that came in

0:23:38.960 --> 0:23:42.720
<v Speaker 1>before election day, but only after tune with donations that

0:23:42.800 --> 0:23:46.160
<v Speaker 1>came in after. The concern was that after election day

0:23:46.200 --> 0:23:49.359
<v Speaker 1>the donor know who's who won, so it's more likely

0:23:49.440 --> 0:23:51.760
<v Speaker 1>that the money is being given to influence the candidate.

0:23:52.359 --> 0:23:54.399
<v Speaker 1>And if the money is being used to repay a

0:23:54.440 --> 0:23:57.399
<v Speaker 1>loan to the candidate, in any ways, the money is

0:23:57.440 --> 0:23:59.840
<v Speaker 1>almost like a gift to the candidate. The money is

0:23:59.880 --> 0:24:02.359
<v Speaker 1>not going to be used actually for campaigning the election

0:24:02.480 --> 0:24:04.920
<v Speaker 1>is over, it's going to be used to repay the candidate.

0:24:05.040 --> 0:24:07.560
<v Speaker 1>So those are the two ideas behind having this special

0:24:07.600 --> 0:24:12.040
<v Speaker 1>restriction on the use of post election donations to repay loans.

0:24:12.520 --> 0:24:15.560
<v Speaker 1>To tell us about the reasoning, and the Chief Justices

0:24:15.880 --> 0:24:20.000
<v Speaker 1>majority opinion for the Conservatives, So basically, the Chief Justice

0:24:20.040 --> 0:24:23.439
<v Speaker 1>reiterated ideas he's put forward in the past that although

0:24:23.720 --> 0:24:27.359
<v Speaker 1>some contribution restrictions can be upheld, they present the First

0:24:27.359 --> 0:24:30.080
<v Speaker 1>Amendment problem because they make it harder for candidates to

0:24:30.160 --> 0:24:32.960
<v Speaker 1>raise money. That this rule in particular was a problem

0:24:33.040 --> 0:24:35.879
<v Speaker 1>because by creating the possibility of a limit on the

0:24:35.920 --> 0:24:38.879
<v Speaker 1>repayment of a loan, it makes it less likely candidate

0:24:38.960 --> 0:24:41.200
<v Speaker 1>will make the loan, which means will be less money

0:24:41.200 --> 0:24:44.159
<v Speaker 1>for the candidates campaign. So he emphasized that there is

0:24:44.200 --> 0:24:47.960
<v Speaker 1>a First Amendment Burton posed by this restriction on loaning payments,

0:24:48.040 --> 0:24:51.159
<v Speaker 1>and then he basically dismissed the argument that there is

0:24:51.200 --> 0:24:56.800
<v Speaker 1>any special corruption danger coming from post election contributions. In

0:24:56.840 --> 0:24:59.960
<v Speaker 1>his view, the other rules dealing with contributions, the fact

0:25:00.040 --> 0:25:03.080
<v Speaker 1>that no donor can give more than twenty nine dollars

0:25:03.160 --> 0:25:06.639
<v Speaker 1>under federal contribution restrictions and that any contribution that is

0:25:06.680 --> 0:25:09.480
<v Speaker 1>made will be disclosed, that those are enough to deal

0:25:09.520 --> 0:25:12.560
<v Speaker 1>with the corruption problem. That the government failed to show

0:25:13.000 --> 0:25:17.920
<v Speaker 1>that there's any special corruption problem from post election donations

0:25:18.040 --> 0:25:20.920
<v Speaker 1>to repay a loan. The average person may not see

0:25:20.920 --> 0:25:25.600
<v Speaker 1>this explain how the court sees campaign finance restrictions as

0:25:25.920 --> 0:25:29.640
<v Speaker 1>violations of the First Amendment. In the fourth view, campaigning

0:25:29.720 --> 0:25:32.760
<v Speaker 1>is speech. The spending of money to support a campaign

0:25:32.800 --> 0:25:36.119
<v Speaker 1>is speech, and therefore the raising of money to support

0:25:36.119 --> 0:25:39.960
<v Speaker 1>a campaign supports speech, supports the candidates speech, so that

0:25:40.080 --> 0:25:44.840
<v Speaker 1>anything that burdens the ability of the candidate to campaign,

0:25:44.880 --> 0:25:47.560
<v Speaker 1>to um to spend money in support of the candidates

0:25:47.560 --> 0:25:51.000
<v Speaker 1>campaign raises a First Amendment problem. The Court has up

0:25:51.040 --> 0:25:54.040
<v Speaker 1>held some restrictions. It has up held limits on the

0:25:54.080 --> 0:25:56.280
<v Speaker 1>amount of money a donor can give directly to a

0:25:56.359 --> 0:25:59.040
<v Speaker 1>candidates campaign because of the danger of what the court

0:25:59.080 --> 0:26:02.720
<v Speaker 1>calls quick broke corruption and the courters that pulled disclosure requirements.

0:26:02.720 --> 0:26:05.640
<v Speaker 1>But the Court has struck down any slimits on candidates spending,

0:26:05.840 --> 0:26:08.639
<v Speaker 1>any limits by organizations that's the port of candidate, but

0:26:08.680 --> 0:26:12.160
<v Speaker 1>don't literally give money to the candidate, and other kinds

0:26:12.200 --> 0:26:15.960
<v Speaker 1>of restrictions in this area. And basically the Court said

0:26:16.040 --> 0:26:19.679
<v Speaker 1>that if you can show that the donation really raises

0:26:19.720 --> 0:26:22.600
<v Speaker 1>a serious danger of what the quirt calls quit pro

0:26:22.720 --> 0:26:26.360
<v Speaker 1>quote corruption, you can limit it. But the Court basically

0:26:26.400 --> 0:26:29.359
<v Speaker 1>says that other kinds of concerns the public has on

0:26:29.520 --> 0:26:33.080
<v Speaker 1>equal amounts of money, or the fact that campaign contributions

0:26:33.880 --> 0:26:38.040
<v Speaker 1>raised dangers of unequal influence or access that influence our

0:26:38.080 --> 0:26:41.960
<v Speaker 1>access are not themselves something that Congress can regulate, only

0:26:42.119 --> 0:26:45.600
<v Speaker 1>something that they call quit pro quote corrussion, which comes

0:26:45.640 --> 0:26:49.399
<v Speaker 1>close to an outright bribe. Did Justice Keigan wrote a

0:26:49.440 --> 0:26:53.840
<v Speaker 1>blistering dissent, saying the donors know as they paid him,

0:26:54.160 --> 0:26:57.000
<v Speaker 1>so he will pay them well. She basically says that

0:26:57.119 --> 0:27:00.919
<v Speaker 1>the special corruption potential for donation is given after the

0:27:00.960 --> 0:27:03.560
<v Speaker 1>election is over, when the donor knows who the winner is,

0:27:03.640 --> 0:27:05.600
<v Speaker 1>and it's going to be used to repay a loan

0:27:05.720 --> 0:27:08.640
<v Speaker 1>made by the candidates, so it's going basically directly back

0:27:08.680 --> 0:27:11.399
<v Speaker 1>to the candidate. She says that the special corruption potential

0:27:11.440 --> 0:27:14.240
<v Speaker 1>there is self evident, that it's obvious that there's a

0:27:14.280 --> 0:27:17.120
<v Speaker 1>real problem here, and then she actually goes and finds

0:27:17.160 --> 0:27:20.800
<v Speaker 1>examples and basically news accounts as instances, I mean states

0:27:20.840 --> 0:27:23.399
<v Speaker 1>in the past hasn't happened federally because the law is

0:27:23.440 --> 0:27:26.680
<v Speaker 1>prohibited until now. The instances in the past where you

0:27:26.760 --> 0:27:30.480
<v Speaker 1>have particularly sleazy situations of donors giving money to a

0:27:30.560 --> 0:27:33.919
<v Speaker 1>candidates campaign after the election and then basically getting some

0:27:34.000 --> 0:27:37.040
<v Speaker 1>kind of reward from that candidate a governor who is

0:27:37.080 --> 0:27:40.240
<v Speaker 1>able to steer certain contracts in certain directions. She basically

0:27:40.240 --> 0:27:43.240
<v Speaker 1>says that the potential for corruption here is obvious, that

0:27:43.280 --> 0:27:45.680
<v Speaker 1>there's evidence is support it. And she also returns to

0:27:45.720 --> 0:27:47.720
<v Speaker 1>the themes she's used in the past, which is and

0:27:47.800 --> 0:27:50.480
<v Speaker 1>trying to figure out whether something really does present the

0:27:50.520 --> 0:27:53.320
<v Speaker 1>Corrussian danger, you should defer to Congress. You should defer

0:27:53.359 --> 0:27:56.000
<v Speaker 1>to the politicians. They have a better sense of whether

0:27:56.119 --> 0:27:59.240
<v Speaker 1>something is likely to read a Corrussian problem than the Court,

0:27:59.240 --> 0:28:03.200
<v Speaker 1>which is removed from the political sphere. And so again

0:28:03.560 --> 0:28:06.240
<v Speaker 1>she has made these arguments in the past that the

0:28:06.400 --> 0:28:09.560
<v Speaker 1>Congress is a better judge of what graces of corruption danger,

0:28:10.080 --> 0:28:14.080
<v Speaker 1>that the Court is basically missing this and its willingness

0:28:14.080 --> 0:28:18.200
<v Speaker 1>to strike down restrictions that serve interests in public confidence

0:28:18.200 --> 0:28:23.000
<v Speaker 1>in government. Is campaign finance an issue that always divides

0:28:23.160 --> 0:28:27.160
<v Speaker 1>the liberals and the conservatives? And if so, why it's

0:28:27.200 --> 0:28:30.680
<v Speaker 1>certainly been true for about the last almost twenty years.

0:28:30.680 --> 0:28:33.000
<v Speaker 1>Further in the past, I think it was more complicated,

0:28:33.200 --> 0:28:36.160
<v Speaker 1>and you did have some judges, some of the Republican

0:28:36.160 --> 0:28:39.360
<v Speaker 1>appointees in the past, famously Justice O'Connor, who had been

0:28:39.400 --> 0:28:41.720
<v Speaker 1>an elected official. I think she was the last member

0:28:41.720 --> 0:28:45.000
<v Speaker 1>the Supreme Court wod actually been an elected official. Sharing

0:28:45.080 --> 0:28:48.320
<v Speaker 1>some some of the concerns that support campaign finance regulation.

0:28:48.720 --> 0:28:50.360
<v Speaker 1>And you have had some liberals in the past worried

0:28:50.400 --> 0:28:54.240
<v Speaker 1>about the potential for limiting the ability of nonprofits and

0:28:54.520 --> 0:28:57.960
<v Speaker 1>independent groups of the campaign, but it really has solidified

0:28:58.120 --> 0:29:01.360
<v Speaker 1>in the last twenty years along the conservative liberal divide.

0:29:01.560 --> 0:29:05.560
<v Speaker 1>The conservatives are concerned that any kind of government regulation

0:29:05.640 --> 0:29:09.920
<v Speaker 1>here will interfere with the free movement of the political process,

0:29:09.960 --> 0:29:13.680
<v Speaker 1>and the liberals see that by giving a total green

0:29:13.760 --> 0:29:17.680
<v Speaker 1>light to money that striking down campaign financed laws kind

0:29:17.680 --> 0:29:21.240
<v Speaker 1>of has the potential to corrupt the political process. Ted

0:29:21.320 --> 0:29:26.400
<v Speaker 1>Cruz engineered this legal dispute, and the Biden administration also

0:29:26.600 --> 0:29:30.520
<v Speaker 1>argued that he lacked legal standing to challenge the provision.

0:29:31.400 --> 0:29:34.040
<v Speaker 1>If the court had wanted to, could they have taken

0:29:34.040 --> 0:29:37.280
<v Speaker 1>an off ramp here and just said he doesn't have

0:29:37.400 --> 0:29:41.240
<v Speaker 1>standing here. Yeah. The argument was that he basically gave himself,

0:29:41.520 --> 0:29:44.960
<v Speaker 1>just loaned just enough money to his campaign to make

0:29:45.000 --> 0:29:48.160
<v Speaker 1>this a real dispute. Remember I said that the cap

0:29:48.200 --> 0:29:50.360
<v Speaker 1>on the amount of money that could be refunded in

0:29:50.440 --> 0:29:54.080
<v Speaker 1>post election contributions was two in fifty dollars. Well, he

0:29:54.160 --> 0:29:57.000
<v Speaker 1>loaned his campaign tour in the sixty they repaid in

0:29:57.080 --> 0:29:59.600
<v Speaker 1>the two fifty, so it was really about the remaining ten.

0:30:00.160 --> 0:30:02.320
<v Speaker 1>So it really it did look as though it had

0:30:02.360 --> 0:30:05.960
<v Speaker 1>been engineered to generate a case rather than be the

0:30:06.000 --> 0:30:09.080
<v Speaker 1>source of any real problem. So that was that was

0:30:09.400 --> 0:30:13.960
<v Speaker 1>argued and the court rejected. Interestingly, actually, Justice Kagan and

0:30:14.000 --> 0:30:16.600
<v Speaker 1>her Descent didn't really go there. I think she was

0:30:16.640 --> 0:30:19.600
<v Speaker 1>willing to defend the statute on the merits rather than

0:30:19.640 --> 0:30:22.520
<v Speaker 1>just say that there was no standing. There's also another

0:30:22.560 --> 0:30:26.080
<v Speaker 1>even more obscure question in the case, which is whether

0:30:26.080 --> 0:30:28.600
<v Speaker 1>the All Britain and cruise came from the statute or

0:30:28.640 --> 0:30:31.840
<v Speaker 1>from some implementing rags of the Federal Election Commission, including

0:30:31.880 --> 0:30:34.760
<v Speaker 1>which which had put in a time deadline for the

0:30:34.840 --> 0:30:38.280
<v Speaker 1>repayment of the loan and which was not actually in

0:30:38.280 --> 0:30:41.600
<v Speaker 1>the statute. The Crews needed to challenge the statute to

0:30:41.640 --> 0:30:44.120
<v Speaker 1>get what's called a special free judge court and a

0:30:44.240 --> 0:30:47.120
<v Speaker 1>direct appeal to the Supreme Court, rather than go through

0:30:47.160 --> 0:30:51.040
<v Speaker 1>the normal district court Court of Appeals court process, which

0:30:51.080 --> 0:30:53.480
<v Speaker 1>he wouldn't have had it he was only challenging a regulation.

0:30:54.040 --> 0:30:56.840
<v Speaker 1>So there were some kind of technical issues in the case,

0:30:57.200 --> 0:30:59.479
<v Speaker 1>but in the end, I think the Descent really just

0:30:59.560 --> 0:31:03.760
<v Speaker 1>went with the substance and and the majority also spent

0:31:04.000 --> 0:31:07.360
<v Speaker 1>the little focusing majorities on the substn As you mentioned,

0:31:07.360 --> 0:31:10.960
<v Speaker 1>this adds to a line of Supreme Court cases striking

0:31:11.000 --> 0:31:14.960
<v Speaker 1>down campaign finance restrictions. The Chief even said this case

0:31:15.080 --> 0:31:19.080
<v Speaker 1>was a logical progression in a series of cases. Tell

0:31:19.160 --> 0:31:21.360
<v Speaker 1>us about some of them. Tell us about some of

0:31:21.400 --> 0:31:25.000
<v Speaker 1>the ways the Supreme Court has cut back on campaign

0:31:25.040 --> 0:31:28.719
<v Speaker 1>finance restrictions. Well, what's interesting a number of things interesting,

0:31:28.720 --> 0:31:30.360
<v Speaker 1>but a couple of them is the way that the

0:31:30.440 --> 0:31:34.360
<v Speaker 1>Court has in the Buckley decision, which is now almost

0:31:34.400 --> 0:31:36.600
<v Speaker 1>fifty years old, forty or five years old, the Court

0:31:36.640 --> 0:31:40.480
<v Speaker 1>to a sharp line between expenditure restrictions and contribution restrictions.

0:31:40.920 --> 0:31:44.400
<v Speaker 1>Consistently is struck down expenditure restrictions except for the ones

0:31:44.480 --> 0:31:47.800
<v Speaker 1>thing with corporations, which lasted until City the United ten

0:31:47.880 --> 0:31:52.800
<v Speaker 1>years ago, and consistently upheld restrictions on contributions. What's been

0:31:52.800 --> 0:31:55.080
<v Speaker 1>happening now is they now beginning to strike down some

0:31:55.160 --> 0:32:00.800
<v Speaker 1>contribution restrictions as essentially unnecessary. So this decision invalidated a

0:32:00.840 --> 0:32:06.240
<v Speaker 1>contribution restriction effectively, you know, restricting the use of donated

0:32:06.280 --> 0:32:09.400
<v Speaker 1>contributions to repay a loan. Had nothing to do with spending.

0:32:09.640 --> 0:32:12.240
<v Speaker 1>A few years ago, the court struck down a rule

0:32:12.280 --> 0:32:14.840
<v Speaker 1>that have been in place really since the since Buckley,

0:32:15.320 --> 0:32:18.200
<v Speaker 1>since the original Sattal Campaign for Men's Law, which limited

0:32:18.240 --> 0:32:21.880
<v Speaker 1>the amount of money a donor could give in total

0:32:21.960 --> 0:32:25.400
<v Speaker 1>to all candidates. So federal law restricts the amount of

0:32:25.400 --> 0:32:29.440
<v Speaker 1>money a donor can give to one candidate on individual restriction,

0:32:29.480 --> 0:32:32.160
<v Speaker 1>but there was also an aggregate cap on the amount

0:32:32.160 --> 0:32:36.080
<v Speaker 1>of money wealthy donors could give to all candidates. That

0:32:36.160 --> 0:32:39.080
<v Speaker 1>cap had been raised substantially in the McCain fine Goal

0:32:39.240 --> 0:32:42.000
<v Speaker 1>law and has been adjusted for inflation. But the court

0:32:42.040 --> 0:32:44.240
<v Speaker 1>in this case, which is called McCutchen, which is now

0:32:44.280 --> 0:32:47.760
<v Speaker 1>about six years ago, so there was no justification for

0:32:47.800 --> 0:32:51.920
<v Speaker 1>that that the only justification was the potential corruption of

0:32:51.920 --> 0:32:55.040
<v Speaker 1>individual officials and the fact that a wealthy individual could

0:32:55.080 --> 0:32:58.720
<v Speaker 1>give to a hundred officials so long as that those

0:32:58.760 --> 0:33:02.480
<v Speaker 1>donations are under what is now the twcount there's no

0:33:02.560 --> 0:33:07.080
<v Speaker 1>danger of corruption. And then in another case involving a

0:33:07.120 --> 0:33:11.280
<v Speaker 1>public funding law that Arizona adopted law that basically allowed

0:33:11.560 --> 0:33:13.680
<v Speaker 1>that allows the state that will authorize as the state

0:33:14.040 --> 0:33:16.680
<v Speaker 1>to give money to candidates if candidates raise a certain

0:33:16.680 --> 0:33:19.520
<v Speaker 1>amount of money and private donations uh, the state will

0:33:19.560 --> 0:33:22.760
<v Speaker 1>give them public funds as a way of reducing the

0:33:22.760 --> 0:33:26.640
<v Speaker 1>need to raise campaign contributions and maybe reducing the dependence

0:33:26.640 --> 0:33:29.720
<v Speaker 1>on campaign contributions. The state also said that if the

0:33:29.880 --> 0:33:34.280
<v Speaker 1>publicly funded candidate was facing a candidate who chose not

0:33:34.360 --> 0:33:36.320
<v Speaker 1>to take public funds and as a result, was able

0:33:36.360 --> 0:33:40.200
<v Speaker 1>to raise more private money, or is being the publicly

0:33:40.200 --> 0:33:43.160
<v Speaker 1>funded candidate was also being hit hard by independent spending,

0:33:43.560 --> 0:33:47.240
<v Speaker 1>the state would give that publicly funded candidate additional money.

0:33:47.400 --> 0:33:51.960
<v Speaker 1>This didn't restrict any contributions to or expenditures by of

0:33:52.040 --> 0:33:55.160
<v Speaker 1>the other candidates, but it basically said that we're gonna,

0:33:55.360 --> 0:33:58.360
<v Speaker 1>in effect, helped maintain a fair fight for people who

0:33:58.360 --> 0:34:01.200
<v Speaker 1>take public funding. The Core said that also has to

0:34:01.240 --> 0:34:05.320
<v Speaker 1>go because that operated as a ways to discourage spending

0:34:05.720 --> 0:34:09.160
<v Speaker 1>by candidates not taking public funding. So in some ways,

0:34:09.200 --> 0:34:12.480
<v Speaker 1>what you're seeing is that they're expanding the notion of

0:34:12.480 --> 0:34:15.719
<v Speaker 1>what constitutes a limit to address something which in that

0:34:15.760 --> 0:34:18.760
<v Speaker 1>case wasn't a limit at all. It was a support

0:34:18.880 --> 0:34:21.719
<v Speaker 1>for the speech of publicly funded candidates, but the court

0:34:21.760 --> 0:34:24.800
<v Speaker 1>treated that as a limit on the privately funding candidates.

0:34:24.800 --> 0:34:27.719
<v Speaker 1>And I'll give you one last one, which was part

0:34:27.760 --> 0:34:31.560
<v Speaker 1>of the McCain fine Gold Law was something similar, which said,

0:34:31.600 --> 0:34:35.600
<v Speaker 1>we have these campaign contribution restrictions, but that loss of

0:34:35.640 --> 0:34:38.400
<v Speaker 1>it is a a candidate is faced with an opponent

0:34:38.840 --> 0:34:41.880
<v Speaker 1>who is self funding to an unlimited amount, to a

0:34:41.960 --> 0:34:45.280
<v Speaker 1>very high level. You remember the Supin Court and Buckley

0:34:45.320 --> 0:34:48.120
<v Speaker 1>said that you cannot limit how much money candidate can

0:34:48.400 --> 0:34:51.760
<v Speaker 1>can spend on his own campaign. Congress in two thousand

0:34:51.960 --> 0:34:55.000
<v Speaker 1>and two Pastball basically saying that we're going to raise

0:34:55.080 --> 0:34:59.480
<v Speaker 1>the contribution restrictions, the restrictions on contributions to candidates who

0:34:59.520 --> 0:35:03.840
<v Speaker 1>are relying on contributions if they're being opposed by the

0:35:03.920 --> 0:35:06.480
<v Speaker 1>candidate who is raising his own money to a very

0:35:06.560 --> 0:35:10.400
<v Speaker 1>high level. The so called millionaires Amendment if your opponent

0:35:10.840 --> 0:35:14.520
<v Speaker 1>a millionaire obviously wasn't really about millionaires themselves, but if

0:35:14.520 --> 0:35:16.560
<v Speaker 1>you had a very wealthy opponent was spending a huge

0:35:16.600 --> 0:35:18.719
<v Speaker 1>amount of his own money or her own money into

0:35:18.719 --> 0:35:22.359
<v Speaker 1>her campaign, we would allow you to raise larger contributions

0:35:22.360 --> 0:35:25.520
<v Speaker 1>than we normally would. And the court struck that down again.

0:35:25.719 --> 0:35:28.440
<v Speaker 1>It was really in some ways the liberalization of the

0:35:28.520 --> 0:35:31.600
<v Speaker 1>law for the candidate depending on on donations, but the

0:35:31.640 --> 0:35:36.720
<v Speaker 1>court said that also operated to discourage the wealthy candidate

0:35:36.800 --> 0:35:41.040
<v Speaker 1>from spending more money. So, um, it wasn't a limit

0:35:41.080 --> 0:35:43.560
<v Speaker 1>on the wealthy candidate, but the court treated it is

0:35:43.680 --> 0:35:47.760
<v Speaker 1>as like a limit on the wealthy candidate. So these

0:35:48.000 --> 0:35:53.120
<v Speaker 1>decisions really, going back over the last decade or more,

0:35:53.800 --> 0:35:57.120
<v Speaker 1>that decision, I think, with some late to thousands all

0:35:57.200 --> 0:36:00.400
<v Speaker 1>kind of reflect this pattern of saying that he ben

0:36:00.440 --> 0:36:03.440
<v Speaker 1>even cases in which candidates get more money, which was

0:36:03.520 --> 0:36:07.440
<v Speaker 1>that case and the Arizona public funding case, or cases

0:36:07.560 --> 0:36:10.799
<v Speaker 1>in which what we're really looking at is money that

0:36:11.120 --> 0:36:15.080
<v Speaker 1>isn't really restricted, that we're looking at contribution restrictions rather

0:36:15.120 --> 0:36:18.319
<v Speaker 1>than spending restrictions. The court has has invalidated all of

0:36:18.320 --> 0:36:22.440
<v Speaker 1>those restrictions. The Supreme Court that upheld the bulk of

0:36:22.480 --> 0:36:26.280
<v Speaker 1>the McCain fine Gold campaign finance law in two thousand

0:36:26.360 --> 0:36:29.400
<v Speaker 1>three was a very different court. I just wonder if

0:36:29.440 --> 0:36:32.040
<v Speaker 1>if they would do it now. Oh, these courts almost

0:36:32.040 --> 0:36:34.200
<v Speaker 1>certainly would not. And I think one of the interesting

0:36:34.239 --> 0:36:37.560
<v Speaker 1>things is, I mean, some of those restrictions remain in place.

0:36:37.719 --> 0:36:41.520
<v Speaker 1>They're less effective because of other developments like the rise

0:36:41.520 --> 0:36:44.279
<v Speaker 1>of independent spending, and Congress has changed the laws in

0:36:44.320 --> 0:36:47.200
<v Speaker 1>some respects, but there were still in place restrictions on

0:36:47.760 --> 0:36:51.520
<v Speaker 1>donations to political parties and so called soft money restrictions,

0:36:51.880 --> 0:36:54.960
<v Speaker 1>as well as older restrictions like the limits on direct

0:36:55.000 --> 0:36:58.120
<v Speaker 1>contributions to candidate. So there are some elements of the

0:36:58.160 --> 0:37:00.920
<v Speaker 1>law they're still in place. But yeah, the current court

0:37:01.080 --> 0:37:04.000
<v Speaker 1>that was a five four decision back in two thousand

0:37:04.040 --> 0:37:07.279
<v Speaker 1>and three, so Connor wrote much of it, and she

0:37:07.400 --> 0:37:10.359
<v Speaker 1>of course has left the court. And look, I mean

0:37:10.400 --> 0:37:13.919
<v Speaker 1>the conservative majority is now. It seems very likely that

0:37:14.040 --> 0:37:16.759
<v Speaker 1>if some of the elements of that case that came back,

0:37:17.120 --> 0:37:19.640
<v Speaker 1>they would probably be struck down today. Thanks for your

0:37:19.640 --> 0:37:23.280
<v Speaker 1>insights as always, rich that's Professor Richard Brifault of Columbia

0:37:23.360 --> 0:37:25.400
<v Speaker 1>Law School, and that's it for this edition of The

0:37:25.440 --> 0:37:28.400
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Law Show. Remember you can always get the latest

0:37:28.480 --> 0:37:31.600
<v Speaker 1>legal news on our Bloomberg Law Podcast. You can find

0:37:31.600 --> 0:37:36.200
<v Speaker 1>them on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and at www dot Bloomberg

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<v Speaker 1>dot com, slash podcast, Slash Law, and remember to tune

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<v Speaker 1>into The Bloomberg Law Show every week night at ten

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<v Speaker 1>BM Wall Street Time. I'm June Grosso and you're listening

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<v Speaker 1>to Bloomberg