1 00:00:01,280 --> 00:00:04,320 Speaker 1: Welcome to Stuff You Missed in History Class, a production 2 00:00:04,360 --> 00:00:13,440 Speaker 1: of I Heart Radio. Hello, and welcome to the podcast. 3 00:00:13,440 --> 00:00:17,200 Speaker 1: I'm Holly Fry, and I'm Tracy V. Wilson. Okay, Tracy, 4 00:00:17,280 --> 00:00:20,000 Speaker 1: I think it's fairly safe to say that almost everyone 5 00:00:20,040 --> 00:00:23,360 Speaker 1: in our age group, probably younger and certainly some older, 6 00:00:23,640 --> 00:00:28,800 Speaker 1: has seen the famous footage of Galloping Gurtie. Yeah. Even 7 00:00:29,120 --> 00:00:31,400 Speaker 1: I have a memory of it being used in a 8 00:00:31,400 --> 00:00:35,600 Speaker 1: commercial for something like car speakers at one point, either 9 00:00:35,760 --> 00:00:39,559 Speaker 1: the exact footage or or like a spoof of the footage. 10 00:00:39,960 --> 00:00:42,479 Speaker 1: But it was like, with the car speaker on, the 11 00:00:42,560 --> 00:00:45,560 Speaker 1: bridge is shaking itself apart, but with the speaker off, 12 00:00:46,400 --> 00:00:51,560 Speaker 1: it's not I missed that one. Um. Just in case 13 00:00:51,600 --> 00:00:53,760 Speaker 1: anyone doesn't know what we're talking about, we're talking about 14 00:00:53,760 --> 00:00:57,200 Speaker 1: the first Tacoma Narrow's Bridge, which is nicknamed Galloping Gurtie, 15 00:00:57,440 --> 00:01:00,560 Speaker 1: and this footage shows it undulating in ways that to 16 00:01:00,680 --> 00:01:04,280 Speaker 1: me are just completely stomach churning until it finally breaks 17 00:01:04,319 --> 00:01:08,080 Speaker 1: apart and collapses. It's very dramatic footage. But here's the thing. 18 00:01:08,160 --> 00:01:11,480 Speaker 1: The drama of that first Tacoma Narrows Bridge is hardly 19 00:01:11,520 --> 00:01:15,160 Speaker 1: relegated just to its turbulent end, there's a lot more 20 00:01:15,240 --> 00:01:19,200 Speaker 1: to that bridge's story, from its inception, to financing issues, 21 00:01:19,280 --> 00:01:23,560 Speaker 1: to some surprising legal happenings after it fell apart, and 22 00:01:23,760 --> 00:01:28,160 Speaker 1: how it spawned this entirely new approach to bridge design. 23 00:01:28,440 --> 00:01:31,200 Speaker 1: So today we're going to talk about Galloping Gertie, how 24 00:01:31,240 --> 00:01:34,680 Speaker 1: it came to be, it's collapse, and what happened after 25 00:01:34,760 --> 00:01:38,680 Speaker 1: its failure. Pretty much as soon as people started driving, 26 00:01:39,200 --> 00:01:41,360 Speaker 1: people started talking about how there needed to be a 27 00:01:41,440 --> 00:01:45,399 Speaker 1: bridge connecting Tacoma to the Great Peninsula also known as 28 00:01:45,440 --> 00:01:49,040 Speaker 1: the Kitsap Peninsula. There were ferry services, there was a 29 00:01:49,120 --> 00:01:51,920 Speaker 1: train that could take people south around this big U 30 00:01:52,080 --> 00:01:55,120 Speaker 1: shape that's created by the waterway. But as more and 31 00:01:55,120 --> 00:01:58,880 Speaker 1: more people started embracing automobile travel, there was more demand 32 00:01:58,920 --> 00:02:02,800 Speaker 1: for roadways all over the US, including requests for a 33 00:02:02,840 --> 00:02:07,040 Speaker 1: faster way to make that particular crossing. And as these 34 00:02:07,080 --> 00:02:11,280 Speaker 1: discussions became more serious, the finances of such a project 35 00:02:11,320 --> 00:02:14,240 Speaker 1: came into sharp focus. So there was going to need 36 00:02:14,280 --> 00:02:17,639 Speaker 1: to be a toll to offset the costs, but that 37 00:02:17,760 --> 00:02:20,840 Speaker 1: was unlikely to generate enough revenue to make up for 38 00:02:20,880 --> 00:02:25,760 Speaker 1: the expense of construction and to fund ongoing upkeep. Similarly, 39 00:02:26,080 --> 00:02:29,360 Speaker 1: there was a whole puzzle about which municipality could manage 40 00:02:29,400 --> 00:02:32,880 Speaker 1: this project. There were provisions in an eighteen fifty four 41 00:02:33,000 --> 00:02:37,640 Speaker 1: law that gave the county's jurisdiction over ferry services to 42 00:02:37,680 --> 00:02:41,399 Speaker 1: get across waterways, but bridges were not even mentioned in it. 43 00:02:42,040 --> 00:02:44,720 Speaker 1: There was an operating ferry service that would need to 44 00:02:44,720 --> 00:02:48,120 Speaker 1: be bought out. It had exclusivity rights that had been 45 00:02:48,160 --> 00:02:50,920 Speaker 1: granted in order to cross this narrows, and so they 46 00:02:50,960 --> 00:02:53,359 Speaker 1: would have to buy out that contract for a bridge, 47 00:02:53,600 --> 00:02:55,480 Speaker 1: or else it would create a whole legal problem for 48 00:02:55,520 --> 00:02:59,320 Speaker 1: the state in terms of that contract. Still, the allure 49 00:02:59,480 --> 00:03:01,560 Speaker 1: of this because it would shorten a two and a 50 00:03:01,600 --> 00:03:04,760 Speaker 1: half hour drive down to something closer to eleven minutes, 51 00:03:05,520 --> 00:03:08,680 Speaker 1: kept interest in this project very steady, and by the 52 00:03:08,720 --> 00:03:11,560 Speaker 1: end of the nineteen twenties, the Tacoma Chamber of Commerce 53 00:03:11,600 --> 00:03:14,680 Speaker 1: had assembled a committee to investigate whether such a bridge 54 00:03:14,720 --> 00:03:18,200 Speaker 1: was realistic and also to raise funds for a survey 55 00:03:18,240 --> 00:03:21,919 Speaker 1: to make that determination. Much of this effort had been 56 00:03:21,919 --> 00:03:24,760 Speaker 1: stoked by a man named Edmund Chandler. He had a 57 00:03:24,800 --> 00:03:28,840 Speaker 1: financial interest in seeing this bridge built because Chandler already 58 00:03:28,919 --> 00:03:32,320 Speaker 1: ran another toll bridge that connected White Salmon in Washington 59 00:03:32,440 --> 00:03:35,840 Speaker 1: State to Hood River in Oregon across the Columbia River. 60 00:03:36,720 --> 00:03:41,800 Speaker 1: So he had experience and expertise to offer the bridge project. Uh. 61 00:03:41,840 --> 00:03:44,200 Speaker 1: He kind of thought like he could become the toll 62 00:03:44,240 --> 00:03:47,520 Speaker 1: guy and like run another toll bridge and potentially have 63 00:03:47,640 --> 00:03:51,080 Speaker 1: that as a money making um endeavor. And so he 64 00:03:51,160 --> 00:03:54,360 Speaker 1: worked to promote the need for this bridge in Tacoma. 65 00:03:54,600 --> 00:03:59,480 Speaker 1: Bridge engineers Joseph B. Strauss and John L. Harrington independently 66 00:03:59,560 --> 00:04:03,080 Speaker 1: complete feasibility surveys is the first step for the Chamber 67 00:04:03,120 --> 00:04:07,520 Speaker 1: of Commerce's committee that was finished in ninety. Both the 68 00:04:07,560 --> 00:04:10,600 Speaker 1: Harrington and Strauss reports were pretty positive, and by early 69 00:04:10,720 --> 00:04:14,400 Speaker 1: nine a license was approved by the state to build 70 00:04:14,440 --> 00:04:19,040 Speaker 1: a toll bridge. That license was renewed every two years. Yeah, 71 00:04:19,080 --> 00:04:21,560 Speaker 1: the license renewal kept happening because they weren't in the 72 00:04:21,600 --> 00:04:23,719 Speaker 1: midst of building it. They were still like, we're planning, 73 00:04:23,720 --> 00:04:27,280 Speaker 1: we're planning, we need their license to carry for so 74 00:04:27,320 --> 00:04:29,800 Speaker 1: they would renew it as they continued to raise funds. 75 00:04:29,839 --> 00:04:34,520 Speaker 1: Because even though the paperwork side was moving things along. Uh, 76 00:04:34,560 --> 00:04:36,760 Speaker 1: it is worth noting that the country was about to 77 00:04:36,839 --> 00:04:40,080 Speaker 1: hit the Great Depression when this whole thing started, and 78 00:04:40,160 --> 00:04:44,000 Speaker 1: naturally that complicated the enterprise because money for a large 79 00:04:44,000 --> 00:04:47,120 Speaker 1: scale project of this nature became harder and harder to 80 00:04:47,160 --> 00:04:50,840 Speaker 1: come by as the projected budget needs were also expanding, 81 00:04:51,640 --> 00:04:54,120 Speaker 1: and there were also legal limits on how much money 82 00:04:54,200 --> 00:04:57,400 Speaker 1: the county could borrow. Those limits, of course, were intended 83 00:04:57,480 --> 00:05:01,080 Speaker 1: to keep the county from taking on insurmountable at but 84 00:05:01,160 --> 00:05:04,279 Speaker 1: as it related to this particular initiative, it was making 85 00:05:04,320 --> 00:05:07,240 Speaker 1: the Tacoma Narrows Bridge seemed less and less likely to 86 00:05:07,279 --> 00:05:12,080 Speaker 1: become a reality. Once again, Edmund Chandler offered his services. 87 00:05:12,400 --> 00:05:15,200 Speaker 1: He worked with Pierce County and the Tacoma Chamber of 88 00:05:15,240 --> 00:05:19,480 Speaker 1: Commerce to set up the Tacoma Narrows Bridge Company. This 89 00:05:19,560 --> 00:05:22,840 Speaker 1: was a private corporation and Chandler owned it, and this 90 00:05:22,880 --> 00:05:25,520 Speaker 1: setupment that the limits that would be applied to a 91 00:05:25,640 --> 00:05:29,360 Speaker 1: government entity borrowing for the construction of a bridge, those 92 00:05:29,400 --> 00:05:32,800 Speaker 1: limits were no longer a hurdle. The plan was that 93 00:05:32,880 --> 00:05:35,719 Speaker 1: Chandler's company would borrow the money, build the bridge, and 94 00:05:35,760 --> 00:05:38,159 Speaker 1: then sell it to the county when it was done. 95 00:05:38,880 --> 00:05:43,320 Speaker 1: Feels a little shady, which will come up again. The 96 00:05:43,360 --> 00:05:46,880 Speaker 1: Tacoma Narrows Bridge Company applied for a three million dollar 97 00:05:47,000 --> 00:05:51,719 Speaker 1: loan from the federal government's Reconstruction Finance Corporation. On the 98 00:05:51,800 --> 00:05:54,559 Speaker 1: one hand, that loan had kind of a favorable view 99 00:05:54,680 --> 00:05:58,720 Speaker 1: because this one bridge was genuinely valuable. It would connect 100 00:05:58,720 --> 00:06:02,960 Speaker 1: to national parks, to military bases, so on paper, this 101 00:06:03,040 --> 00:06:07,160 Speaker 1: project made total sense. But on the other an assessment 102 00:06:07,200 --> 00:06:10,680 Speaker 1: by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation determined that the tools that 103 00:06:10,720 --> 00:06:13,520 Speaker 1: the bridge would collect, we're just not going to recoup 104 00:06:13,640 --> 00:06:16,440 Speaker 1: the loan amount in any kind of worthwhile time frame. 105 00:06:17,240 --> 00:06:21,240 Speaker 1: The application was temporarily withdrawn for reworking, and in the meantime, 106 00:06:21,360 --> 00:06:24,680 Speaker 1: the state governor had allocated seven hundred thousand dollars for 107 00:06:24,720 --> 00:06:28,600 Speaker 1: the project, and the law that had initially not granted 108 00:06:28,600 --> 00:06:33,560 Speaker 1: county's jurisdiction over bridge building was amended to include that capability. 109 00:06:33,839 --> 00:06:37,680 Speaker 1: Chandler's company once again submitted the loan application, but this 110 00:06:37,800 --> 00:06:41,520 Speaker 1: time he went to the newly established Public Works Administration 111 00:06:42,040 --> 00:06:43,880 Speaker 1: and the hope that some of the funding would be 112 00:06:43,920 --> 00:06:46,920 Speaker 1: from a grant rather than this entire thing coming as 113 00:06:46,960 --> 00:06:51,040 Speaker 1: a loan. But this plan did not work. The application 114 00:06:51,279 --> 00:06:54,240 Speaker 1: was denied citing the fact that quote the funds of 115 00:06:54,279 --> 00:06:59,400 Speaker 1: the Public Works Administration are now practically depleted, and further, 116 00:06:59,720 --> 00:07:03,840 Speaker 1: the of Washington has already shared liberally in these funds. 117 00:07:04,440 --> 00:07:06,599 Speaker 1: It did not help that the p w A could 118 00:07:06,680 --> 00:07:10,320 Speaker 1: plainly see that the Tacoma Naro's Bridge Company had been 119 00:07:10,360 --> 00:07:14,240 Speaker 1: set up to sidestep that law regarding loan sizes, and 120 00:07:14,280 --> 00:07:18,680 Speaker 1: the whole thing made Chandler seem really, really shady. Additionally, 121 00:07:18,840 --> 00:07:20,960 Speaker 1: the p w A felt that the numbers in his 122 00:07:21,000 --> 00:07:24,400 Speaker 1: loan application were way off. It seemed like the estimates 123 00:07:24,400 --> 00:07:27,760 Speaker 1: for toll revenue were higher than was really realistic, and 124 00:07:27,920 --> 00:07:30,560 Speaker 1: that the estimated cost of the construction was lower than 125 00:07:30,600 --> 00:07:32,440 Speaker 1: it should have been. So at this point it seemed 126 00:07:32,440 --> 00:07:35,120 Speaker 1: like the bridge was back to square one. When the 127 00:07:35,200 --> 00:07:39,520 Speaker 1: state minimized Chandler's role and created the Washington's Toll Bridge 128 00:07:39,560 --> 00:07:44,080 Speaker 1: Authority in ninety seven, it helped this project finally gain 129 00:07:44,200 --> 00:07:48,840 Speaker 1: traction with the p w A. Incidentally, Chandler later sued 130 00:07:48,880 --> 00:07:51,560 Speaker 1: the w t b A for moneys he believed he 131 00:07:51,680 --> 00:07:55,880 Speaker 1: was owed for a quote preparation of estimates, surveys, maps, 132 00:07:55,920 --> 00:07:59,480 Speaker 1: and other items which he prepared prior to nineteen thirty 133 00:07:59,520 --> 00:08:02,920 Speaker 1: six in connection with the then proposed construction of a 134 00:08:02,960 --> 00:08:05,920 Speaker 1: toll bridge across that portion of Huget Sound known as 135 00:08:05,920 --> 00:08:11,600 Speaker 1: the Tacoma Narrows that case was dismissed in in creating 136 00:08:11,640 --> 00:08:14,600 Speaker 1: the Washington Toll Bridge Authority, the state had been really, 137 00:08:14,640 --> 00:08:18,120 Speaker 1: really careful and deliberate, nothing had been rushed, and the 138 00:08:18,280 --> 00:08:21,400 Speaker 1: w t b A was modeled after other organizations in 139 00:08:21,480 --> 00:08:23,720 Speaker 1: places that had been able to get p w A 140 00:08:23,800 --> 00:08:28,200 Speaker 1: funding by meeting all of their very specific requirements, including 141 00:08:28,520 --> 00:08:31,440 Speaker 1: the California group that had obtained capital for the construction 142 00:08:31,440 --> 00:08:35,720 Speaker 1: of the Golden Gate Bridge. Ultimately, the funding came through 143 00:08:35,920 --> 00:08:39,120 Speaker 1: as roughly half as a p w A grant, in 144 00:08:39,160 --> 00:08:42,959 Speaker 1: the remaining amount as a loan from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. 145 00:08:43,520 --> 00:08:46,640 Speaker 1: Although this meant that more than six million dollars had 146 00:08:46,640 --> 00:08:50,160 Speaker 1: been secured, the bridge's budget had to be really carefully managed, 147 00:08:50,640 --> 00:08:53,199 Speaker 1: and the years after the collapse there was a lot 148 00:08:53,360 --> 00:08:56,840 Speaker 1: of scrutiny into how that money had been spent and 149 00:08:56,880 --> 00:09:00,079 Speaker 1: if any of the budget based decisions had led to 150 00:09:00,160 --> 00:09:02,960 Speaker 1: the bridge is failure. We're gonna come right back and 151 00:09:03,000 --> 00:09:05,280 Speaker 1: talk about the firm that was hired to design the 152 00:09:05,280 --> 00:09:09,160 Speaker 1: bridge and some early indications that something was wrong, But 153 00:09:09,280 --> 00:09:20,400 Speaker 1: first we will take a quick sponsor break. The New 154 00:09:20,480 --> 00:09:24,240 Speaker 1: York firm of Leon s moc F designed the superstructure 155 00:09:24,320 --> 00:09:27,720 Speaker 1: of this bridge. Mossyf had worked on the engineering of 156 00:09:27,760 --> 00:09:30,640 Speaker 1: the Golden Gate Bridge as well as just about every 157 00:09:30,679 --> 00:09:33,400 Speaker 1: other suspension bridge that had been built in the US 158 00:09:33,920 --> 00:09:37,480 Speaker 1: during the nineties and thirties, so his firm was kind 159 00:09:37,480 --> 00:09:40,839 Speaker 1: of the ideal choice for the project. Depending on how 160 00:09:40,880 --> 00:09:43,160 Speaker 1: deep down a research rabbit hole you'll go, you'll find 161 00:09:43,160 --> 00:09:45,040 Speaker 1: people that say that he lobbied for it and was 162 00:09:45,320 --> 00:09:47,640 Speaker 1: put a little bit of pressure on on the state 163 00:09:47,640 --> 00:09:51,080 Speaker 1: of Washington to get this job, But most had become 164 00:09:51,160 --> 00:09:55,079 Speaker 1: known for his bridges designed based on deflection theory, which 165 00:09:55,120 --> 00:09:58,080 Speaker 1: stated that longer suspension bridges could be built with less 166 00:09:58,120 --> 00:10:01,880 Speaker 1: steel because their weight didn't require trusses built beneath the 167 00:10:01,960 --> 00:10:06,000 Speaker 1: road to a stand wind in traffic. That approach, which 168 00:10:06,040 --> 00:10:09,040 Speaker 1: required two towers for the bridge work to stretch between, 169 00:10:09,160 --> 00:10:11,959 Speaker 1: rather than what you've seen in bridges that are older 170 00:10:12,000 --> 00:10:14,680 Speaker 1: that have physical supports from below all along the length 171 00:10:14,720 --> 00:10:18,840 Speaker 1: of the bridgeway, had been very successful on many bridges 172 00:10:18,880 --> 00:10:22,920 Speaker 1: already long before Mosciff was given the Tacoma Narrow's job, 173 00:10:23,160 --> 00:10:27,160 Speaker 1: and he used that same design approach again. Construction started 174 00:10:27,200 --> 00:10:30,960 Speaker 1: in November of night, and while the bridge was being built, 175 00:10:31,120 --> 00:10:34,000 Speaker 1: workers had noticed that there was a lot of movement, 176 00:10:34,320 --> 00:10:38,320 Speaker 1: just a rippling movement, even in a light wind. Towards 177 00:10:38,320 --> 00:10:42,440 Speaker 1: the end of construction, that movement had become so common 178 00:10:42,559 --> 00:10:45,640 Speaker 1: and intense enough that workers were said to have tewed 179 00:10:45,640 --> 00:10:50,560 Speaker 1: on lemons to stave off motion sickness. This sounds miserable 180 00:10:50,600 --> 00:10:55,440 Speaker 1: to me as a person prone some motion sickness. Uh. 181 00:10:55,600 --> 00:10:58,960 Speaker 1: The thinking had been that once the bridge is concrete, 182 00:10:59,040 --> 00:11:01,720 Speaker 1: lanes were poor, so traffic could cross the bridge, that 183 00:11:01,880 --> 00:11:05,679 Speaker 1: rippling would diminish, but it really did not. There were 184 00:11:05,760 --> 00:11:08,800 Speaker 1: various efforts made to try to get this vibration to 185 00:11:09,040 --> 00:11:12,400 Speaker 1: stop or even just be reduced, none of them really 186 00:11:12,440 --> 00:11:16,280 Speaker 1: had a significant result. Of course, this was concerning so 187 00:11:16,360 --> 00:11:19,120 Speaker 1: a study was commissioned by the Washington Told Bridge Authority 188 00:11:19,160 --> 00:11:22,400 Speaker 1: to examine the issue. And that study was headed up 189 00:11:22,400 --> 00:11:25,599 Speaker 1: by a professor of civil engineering from the University of Washington, 190 00:11:25,679 --> 00:11:30,040 Speaker 1: that was Fbert Farkworson, and he made a detailed scale 191 00:11:30,080 --> 00:11:32,240 Speaker 1: model of the bridge and he put it through various 192 00:11:32,280 --> 00:11:35,040 Speaker 1: conditions in a wind tunnel to see how it behaved. 193 00:11:35,640 --> 00:11:38,920 Speaker 1: He gave a preliminary report, but even though it included 194 00:11:38,960 --> 00:11:43,319 Speaker 1: some suggestions about how to manage this movement problem. Farkerson 195 00:11:43,640 --> 00:11:46,960 Speaker 1: also included his opinion that really there needed to be 196 00:11:47,040 --> 00:11:50,120 Speaker 1: more study of this movement, but having the report on 197 00:11:50,160 --> 00:11:54,120 Speaker 1: file with suggestions was all The bridge project engineers felt 198 00:11:54,160 --> 00:11:56,440 Speaker 1: that they needed to give assurances to the public that 199 00:11:56,520 --> 00:12:01,160 Speaker 1: this bridge was safe. On July one, the bridge opened. 200 00:12:01,640 --> 00:12:06,400 Speaker 1: A local newspaper, The Spokesman Review of Spokane, Washington, ran 201 00:12:06,520 --> 00:12:10,800 Speaker 1: the headline quote share six million, four hundred thousand dollar 202 00:12:10,920 --> 00:12:15,520 Speaker 1: bridge opening east Side citizens will attend dedication of Tacoma 203 00:12:15,559 --> 00:12:19,600 Speaker 1: structure today. The opening ceremony was attended by the Governor 204 00:12:19,679 --> 00:12:22,880 Speaker 1: Clarence dy Martin, as well as highway officials and heads 205 00:12:22,920 --> 00:12:25,480 Speaker 1: of the three counties who had stakes in this project. 206 00:12:26,000 --> 00:12:29,440 Speaker 1: Colonel E. W. Clark, the acting Commissioner of Public Works, 207 00:12:29,760 --> 00:12:32,480 Speaker 1: gave a speech at this ceremony, and he touted the 208 00:12:32,480 --> 00:12:35,959 Speaker 1: bridge's beauty and noted how it was going to expand commerce. 209 00:12:36,840 --> 00:12:39,640 Speaker 1: Like Clark, the press coverage spoke about what a boon 210 00:12:39,760 --> 00:12:42,960 Speaker 1: the bridge would be for tourism, stateing quote, the bridge 211 00:12:43,000 --> 00:12:46,120 Speaker 1: will bring closer to the population centers of Puget Sound 212 00:12:46,160 --> 00:12:50,120 Speaker 1: and the heavily traveled lanes of tourists the Olympic Peninsula. 213 00:12:50,440 --> 00:12:53,439 Speaker 1: It will form a connecting link between Mount Rainier National 214 00:12:53,480 --> 00:12:57,360 Speaker 1: Park and the Olympic National Park. The press coverage also 215 00:12:57,440 --> 00:13:01,640 Speaker 1: noted the bridge's significance for military connect activity, writing quote. 216 00:13:01,679 --> 00:13:04,600 Speaker 1: In addition to providing access to the tourist attractions of 217 00:13:04,640 --> 00:13:08,160 Speaker 1: the peninsula, the bridge connects the two great military and 218 00:13:08,240 --> 00:13:11,880 Speaker 1: naval centers of the state, Fort Lewis and McCord Field 219 00:13:11,880 --> 00:13:15,079 Speaker 1: at Tacoma, and the huge Sound Navy Yard at Bremerton. 220 00:13:15,679 --> 00:13:18,800 Speaker 1: The bridge opening was tied to McCord not only because 221 00:13:18,800 --> 00:13:21,719 Speaker 1: it created a physical connection to it. The bridge in 222 00:13:21,760 --> 00:13:25,600 Speaker 1: the airfield were actually sharing a birthday week. The airfield 223 00:13:25,600 --> 00:13:28,000 Speaker 1: had been in operation for ten years at that point, 224 00:13:28,040 --> 00:13:30,720 Speaker 1: but had been a municipal airport before becoming part of 225 00:13:30,720 --> 00:13:34,360 Speaker 1: the military's war preparation, and it was renamed for Army 226 00:13:34,360 --> 00:13:37,120 Speaker 1: Air Corps Colonel William McCord. The same week that the 227 00:13:37,160 --> 00:13:41,640 Speaker 1: Tacoma Narrows Bridge was opened, another floating bridge across Lake 228 00:13:41,720 --> 00:13:45,160 Speaker 1: Washington was also opened. That same week. There were five 229 00:13:45,280 --> 00:13:49,160 Speaker 1: days of events and ceremonies as the area celebrated all 230 00:13:49,200 --> 00:13:52,200 Speaker 1: of these new openings, and there was a water carnival 231 00:13:52,280 --> 00:13:54,559 Speaker 1: in honor of the bridges leading up to a huge 232 00:13:54,640 --> 00:13:57,680 Speaker 1: Fourth of July party, which concluded the holiday and the 233 00:13:57,720 --> 00:14:01,160 Speaker 1: celebrations of the new bridges and rename airfield with a 234 00:14:01,240 --> 00:14:05,960 Speaker 1: spectacular fireworks show. The papers also ran statistics on the 235 00:14:06,000 --> 00:14:10,240 Speaker 1: Tacoma Narrows Bridge. It was the third largest suspension bridge 236 00:14:10,320 --> 00:14:13,239 Speaker 1: in the world. The Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco 237 00:14:13,360 --> 00:14:16,079 Speaker 1: and the George Washington Bridge that spans the Hudson River 238 00:14:16,200 --> 00:14:18,640 Speaker 1: between Manhattan and Fort Lee, New Jersey, were the two 239 00:14:18,679 --> 00:14:21,760 Speaker 1: bigger ones. On the Tacoma side of the bridge, there 240 00:14:21,800 --> 00:14:25,200 Speaker 1: was a toll center and an observation plaza where tourists 241 00:14:25,240 --> 00:14:28,080 Speaker 1: could stop and take in the view. Per the Spokesman 242 00:14:28,120 --> 00:14:31,800 Speaker 1: Review quote, each of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge tower stands 243 00:14:31,840 --> 00:14:35,200 Speaker 1: four hundred twenty five ft above the water. The cables 244 00:14:35,240 --> 00:14:38,160 Speaker 1: carried by these towers were spun from six thousand, three 245 00:14:38,240 --> 00:14:41,760 Speaker 1: hundred eight wires anchored at each end two huge blocks 246 00:14:41,760 --> 00:14:46,600 Speaker 1: of concrete weighing approximately fifty two five hundred tons. The 247 00:14:46,680 --> 00:14:49,960 Speaker 1: two main cables have a total weight of approximately three thousand, 248 00:14:49,960 --> 00:14:53,680 Speaker 1: eight hundred seventeen tons, and the total suspended weight which 249 00:14:53,720 --> 00:14:57,200 Speaker 1: they sustain is an excess of eleven thousand, two hundred 250 00:14:57,200 --> 00:15:01,600 Speaker 1: fifty tons at the final tally. The Public Works Administration 251 00:15:01,600 --> 00:15:05,440 Speaker 1: grant had provided two million, eight hundred eighty thousand dollars 252 00:15:05,440 --> 00:15:08,960 Speaker 1: to the project, and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation loaned the 253 00:15:08,960 --> 00:15:12,760 Speaker 1: State of Washington another three million, five hundred twenty thousand. 254 00:15:13,520 --> 00:15:17,800 Speaker 1: This bridge allegedly had the nickname galloping Gurdie from the 255 00:15:18,000 --> 00:15:22,520 Speaker 1: very start because of its tendency to undulate. Construction workers 256 00:15:22,520 --> 00:15:24,560 Speaker 1: are said to have started calling it that as it 257 00:15:24,680 --> 00:15:28,880 Speaker 1: was being built. It also got another nickname among motorists, 258 00:15:28,880 --> 00:15:32,320 Speaker 1: which was the roller coaster. Was not unusual to be 259 00:15:32,440 --> 00:15:34,920 Speaker 1: driving across the bridge and just see the car in 260 00:15:35,000 --> 00:15:37,000 Speaker 1: front of you dip out of you, which in the 261 00:15:37,080 --> 00:15:41,040 Speaker 1: daytime was unsettling, and at night and minute just sometimes 262 00:15:41,040 --> 00:15:44,160 Speaker 1: looked like their lights suddenly blinked off. That kind of 263 00:15:44,160 --> 00:15:48,280 Speaker 1: sounds more unsettling. There were even some drivers who sought 264 00:15:48,320 --> 00:15:51,520 Speaker 1: out that unsettling thrill. They would try to time their 265 00:15:51,560 --> 00:15:55,200 Speaker 1: crossing of the bridge to the best wind conditions. They 266 00:15:55,240 --> 00:15:58,200 Speaker 1: could really get that roller coaster effect. Yeah, there were 267 00:15:58,200 --> 00:16:00,680 Speaker 1: also pedestrians that did this. It were like, I'm gonna 268 00:16:00,720 --> 00:16:04,320 Speaker 1: walk across that bridge when it's all crazy. I don't 269 00:16:04,320 --> 00:16:07,240 Speaker 1: think that sounds fun, but everybody has their own desires. 270 00:16:08,280 --> 00:16:12,200 Speaker 1: On November seven, just four months and six days after 271 00:16:12,240 --> 00:16:16,520 Speaker 1: the bridge open, it famously collapsed. That day, the wind 272 00:16:16,600 --> 00:16:19,680 Speaker 1: blowing from the west to east reached an estimated forty 273 00:16:19,680 --> 00:16:22,920 Speaker 1: two miles per hour that's about sixty seven point six kilometers. 274 00:16:23,600 --> 00:16:25,920 Speaker 1: And while it was common for the bridge to buck 275 00:16:26,000 --> 00:16:28,480 Speaker 1: up and down in the wind, the motion that the 276 00:16:28,520 --> 00:16:32,200 Speaker 1: westerly wind stirred up seemed a little bit different that day. 277 00:16:32,360 --> 00:16:35,040 Speaker 1: The sides of the bridge were rippling, but not in 278 00:16:35,120 --> 00:16:38,080 Speaker 1: phase with one another, so the bridge started this twisting 279 00:16:38,240 --> 00:16:41,040 Speaker 1: side to side motion as well as up and down. 280 00:16:41,560 --> 00:16:43,640 Speaker 1: This was a motion that was not normal for it 281 00:16:43,800 --> 00:16:46,320 Speaker 1: at all. So one of the reasons we can say 282 00:16:46,400 --> 00:16:49,440 Speaker 1: that it famously collapsed is that there is footage of it, 283 00:16:49,600 --> 00:16:52,920 Speaker 1: quite a lot of footage of it. The most famous 284 00:16:52,960 --> 00:16:56,440 Speaker 1: footage was shot by Barney Elliott and Harbin Monroe. They 285 00:16:56,440 --> 00:16:59,560 Speaker 1: owned a Tacoma business called the Camera Shop, and both 286 00:16:59,600 --> 00:17:03,080 Speaker 1: of them always kept their cameras loaded. According to the 287 00:17:03,080 --> 00:17:06,640 Speaker 1: account of Monroe's widowed decades later, quote, when they got 288 00:17:06,640 --> 00:17:09,679 Speaker 1: the call the bridge was really jumping, They jumped in 289 00:17:09,720 --> 00:17:13,840 Speaker 1: their cars and prayed they got something. That's something being pictures, 290 00:17:14,080 --> 00:17:17,480 Speaker 1: and they did. Their film made it into newsreels that 291 00:17:17,520 --> 00:17:20,719 Speaker 1: were shown in theaters all over the US and around 292 00:17:20,760 --> 00:17:25,439 Speaker 1: the world. That footage was awarded Outstanding Domestic Newsreel of 293 00:17:25,480 --> 00:17:29,040 Speaker 1: the Year by the National Headliners Club. Copies were requested 294 00:17:29,040 --> 00:17:32,480 Speaker 1: by engineers around the world so they could study what happened. 295 00:17:32,920 --> 00:17:35,880 Speaker 1: But it is very likely that most people have seen 296 00:17:35,880 --> 00:17:39,040 Speaker 1: this footage at the wrong speed. According to a paper 297 00:17:39,160 --> 00:17:43,000 Speaker 1: that was released in by Texas State University physics and 298 00:17:43,040 --> 00:17:47,840 Speaker 1: astronomy professor Don Olson and collaborators Joseph Hook and Russell Dosher, 299 00:17:48,400 --> 00:17:51,439 Speaker 1: when reviewing the footage, which had been converted from film 300 00:17:51,440 --> 00:17:54,720 Speaker 1: to video a very long time ago, the researchers noted 301 00:17:54,760 --> 00:17:58,600 Speaker 1: that the bridge was shown having eighteen twisting cycles per minute, 302 00:17:59,160 --> 00:18:02,399 Speaker 1: but this didn't match up with the recorded information that 303 00:18:02,440 --> 00:18:05,240 Speaker 1: had been noted by engineers the day of the collapse. 304 00:18:05,960 --> 00:18:09,000 Speaker 1: That data listed the most rapid pacing of the twisting 305 00:18:09,080 --> 00:18:12,600 Speaker 1: at twelve cycles per minute. Elliott and Monroe's footage had 306 00:18:12,600 --> 00:18:15,639 Speaker 1: been shot at sixteen frames per second, but when it 307 00:18:15,720 --> 00:18:18,560 Speaker 1: was converted to video, it had been presumed to have 308 00:18:18,640 --> 00:18:21,880 Speaker 1: been shot at twenty four frames per second, so the 309 00:18:21,920 --> 00:18:25,120 Speaker 1: movement has long appeared to have been even more frantic 310 00:18:25,119 --> 00:18:27,600 Speaker 1: than it actually was. We still don't want to play 311 00:18:27,640 --> 00:18:30,919 Speaker 1: this down. It was plenty frantic in reality. Yeah, I 312 00:18:30,920 --> 00:18:35,000 Speaker 1: feel like even at the slightly slower pace, that would 313 00:18:35,040 --> 00:18:40,439 Speaker 1: almost be more alarming because you could really see the 314 00:18:40,520 --> 00:18:42,879 Speaker 1: movement of it, and how dramatic was it was a 315 00:18:42,960 --> 00:18:46,520 Speaker 1: little bit clearer. Yeah, it's funny. I read one while 316 00:18:46,560 --> 00:18:49,040 Speaker 1: I was I was researching this particular part of it. 317 00:18:49,240 --> 00:18:52,679 Speaker 1: One uh quote, I don't remember if it was from 318 00:18:52,720 --> 00:18:55,320 Speaker 1: the main researcher or not, that was like, no, slow down, 319 00:18:55,359 --> 00:18:57,680 Speaker 1: it's really quite beautiful and elegant. I was like, for real, 320 00:18:58,680 --> 00:19:04,560 Speaker 1: beautiful and elegant and uh and terrifying. Regardless of the speed, though, 321 00:19:04,840 --> 00:19:07,960 Speaker 1: the various footage taken means that you can easily see 322 00:19:08,000 --> 00:19:11,840 Speaker 1: this twisting motion which it points had the roadway tilted 323 00:19:11,880 --> 00:19:15,800 Speaker 1: at a forty five degree angle. The last pedestrian on 324 00:19:15,920 --> 00:19:18,480 Speaker 1: the bridge, who had been one of those thrill seekers 325 00:19:18,480 --> 00:19:21,080 Speaker 1: who had wanted to cross it on a windy day, 326 00:19:21,440 --> 00:19:25,320 Speaker 1: reported seeing straight down into the water below at one point. 327 00:19:25,359 --> 00:19:28,120 Speaker 1: Because of the pitch of the bridge, he was able 328 00:19:28,160 --> 00:19:31,000 Speaker 1: to crawl to safety. I'm not sure if he is 329 00:19:31,040 --> 00:19:34,919 Speaker 1: specifically the person in the picture I found for this episode, 330 00:19:36,000 --> 00:19:38,040 Speaker 1: but I did find a picture of a person trying 331 00:19:38,040 --> 00:19:40,399 Speaker 1: to get off that bridge. I think that is the 332 00:19:40,480 --> 00:19:43,960 Speaker 1: journalist that we'll talk about in a bit. Okay, Um, 333 00:19:43,960 --> 00:19:45,880 Speaker 1: this was a person that got off the bridge well 334 00:19:45,920 --> 00:19:49,120 Speaker 1: before the collapse, but was just like as it was starting, 335 00:19:49,240 --> 00:19:51,159 Speaker 1: was like, WHOA, I can look right down to my 336 00:19:51,280 --> 00:19:54,120 Speaker 1: right and it's like looking into the water. Um. That collapse, 337 00:19:54,200 --> 00:19:56,800 Speaker 1: though was not instant. The bridge had been closed to 338 00:19:56,840 --> 00:20:00,679 Speaker 1: traffic as soon as officials realized just how extreme and 339 00:20:00,760 --> 00:20:04,399 Speaker 1: unsafe the situation was, and from the beginning of the 340 00:20:04,480 --> 00:20:08,119 Speaker 1: failure conditions to the actual collapse that took between forty 341 00:20:08,119 --> 00:20:11,200 Speaker 1: five and sixty minutes, so there was enough time for 342 00:20:11,240 --> 00:20:13,760 Speaker 1: several different people to get their cameras out and get 343 00:20:13,800 --> 00:20:17,399 Speaker 1: footage of the whole thing finally reaching its crescendo of 344 00:20:17,480 --> 00:20:22,000 Speaker 1: movement and collapsing at eleven am. A large section of 345 00:20:22,000 --> 00:20:26,000 Speaker 1: the bridge fell, as included concrete and steel girders that 346 00:20:26,040 --> 00:20:28,520 Speaker 1: had been part of the center deck, and the rest 347 00:20:28,560 --> 00:20:31,320 Speaker 1: of the center span fell right after it. The main 348 00:20:31,400 --> 00:20:34,000 Speaker 1: cables went slack and the towers leaned away from each 349 00:20:34,040 --> 00:20:35,800 Speaker 1: other and towards the side of the river. The bridge 350 00:20:35,840 --> 00:20:37,960 Speaker 1: at that point was just gone. On a bit of 351 00:20:37,960 --> 00:20:41,200 Speaker 1: a sad note, there was only one fatality that day. 352 00:20:41,200 --> 00:20:43,840 Speaker 1: It was not a person but a dog. That dog, 353 00:20:43,920 --> 00:20:46,119 Speaker 1: named Tubby, was the pet of a man named Leonard 354 00:20:46,160 --> 00:20:48,879 Speaker 1: Coatesworth and coats Earth was a reporter working for the 355 00:20:48,920 --> 00:20:51,679 Speaker 1: Tacoma News Tribune at the time, and he had to 356 00:20:51,760 --> 00:20:53,800 Speaker 1: leave the car on the bridge and crawl to a 357 00:20:53,840 --> 00:20:58,120 Speaker 1: safe spot. He later described this ordeal quote, just as 358 00:20:58,160 --> 00:21:00,639 Speaker 1: I drove past the towers, the bridge game to sway 359 00:21:00,800 --> 00:21:04,199 Speaker 1: violently from side to side. Before I realized that the 360 00:21:04,240 --> 00:21:07,200 Speaker 1: tilt became so violent that I lost control of the car. 361 00:21:08,040 --> 00:21:10,119 Speaker 1: I jammed on the brakes and got out, only to 362 00:21:10,160 --> 00:21:13,760 Speaker 1: be thrown onto my face against the curb around me. 363 00:21:13,800 --> 00:21:17,320 Speaker 1: I could hear concrete cracking. I started to get my dog, Tubby, 364 00:21:17,359 --> 00:21:19,720 Speaker 1: but was thrown again before I could reach the car. 365 00:21:20,119 --> 00:21:22,800 Speaker 1: The car itself began to slide from side to side 366 00:21:22,800 --> 00:21:26,000 Speaker 1: of the roadway on hands and knees. Most of the 367 00:21:26,040 --> 00:21:29,160 Speaker 1: time I crawled five hundred yards or more to the towers. 368 00:21:29,440 --> 00:21:32,640 Speaker 1: My breath was coming in gasps, my knees were raw 369 00:21:32,720 --> 00:21:36,119 Speaker 1: and bleeding, my hands bruised and swollen from gripping the 370 00:21:36,160 --> 00:21:40,040 Speaker 1: concrete curb. Toward the last I risked, rising to my 371 00:21:40,080 --> 00:21:42,720 Speaker 1: feet and running a few yards at a time, safely 372 00:21:42,760 --> 00:21:44,879 Speaker 1: back at the toll plaza, I saw the bridge in 373 00:21:44,920 --> 00:21:50,040 Speaker 1: its final collapse and saw my car plunge into the narrows. Incidentally, 374 00:21:50,680 --> 00:21:54,920 Speaker 1: Focusson had attempted to rescue this dog when the bridge's 375 00:21:54,960 --> 00:21:58,760 Speaker 1: motion eased for a brief period, but the dog, obviously frightened, 376 00:21:58,880 --> 00:22:00,919 Speaker 1: bit him. He wasn't able to get it from the 377 00:22:00,960 --> 00:22:05,320 Speaker 1: car before needing to get back off of the bridge himself. Yeah, 378 00:22:05,359 --> 00:22:08,320 Speaker 1: far Coorson is another person who took footage that day. 379 00:22:08,800 --> 00:22:12,560 Speaker 1: You can actually there's footage of him walking back from 380 00:22:12,560 --> 00:22:14,600 Speaker 1: trying to save the dog, and you can see him 381 00:22:14,680 --> 00:22:17,840 Speaker 1: kind of cradling his arm that has been bitten. Um, 382 00:22:17,920 --> 00:22:19,879 Speaker 1: we're going to take a quick sponsor break, and when 383 00:22:19,960 --> 00:22:22,680 Speaker 1: we come back we will talk about what happened after 384 00:22:22,720 --> 00:22:34,879 Speaker 1: the bridge collapsed. Papers around the world ran the story 385 00:22:34,920 --> 00:22:39,040 Speaker 1: of the bridge for days underheadlines like galloping grdie lies 386 00:22:39,080 --> 00:22:42,800 Speaker 1: down in river. One of the biggest issues immediately following 387 00:22:42,800 --> 00:22:46,800 Speaker 1: the bridge disaster was, of course, placing blame somewhere who 388 00:22:46,920 --> 00:22:50,480 Speaker 1: or what entity had dropped the ball and as a consequence, 389 00:22:50,640 --> 00:22:54,320 Speaker 1: endangered the public in the process. There was a lot 390 00:22:54,560 --> 00:22:58,320 Speaker 1: of finger pointing. Congressman John Coffee, who was born and 391 00:22:58,400 --> 00:23:02,000 Speaker 1: raised in Tacoma, made public statements that corners had been 392 00:23:02,000 --> 00:23:05,879 Speaker 1: cut to meet budget limitations. The bridge engineering firm that 393 00:23:05,920 --> 00:23:08,960 Speaker 1: the federal government had assigned to the project, including Leon 394 00:23:09,040 --> 00:23:12,040 Speaker 1: mosey Of himself, was initially blamed for the failure by 395 00:23:12,040 --> 00:23:15,800 Speaker 1: the project's engineer, Clark Eldridge, but he walked those statements 396 00:23:15,800 --> 00:23:19,239 Speaker 1: back almost immediately, claiming that he had been misunderstood by 397 00:23:19,240 --> 00:23:23,000 Speaker 1: the press. Eldridge had been frustrated about the bridge budget 398 00:23:23,040 --> 00:23:26,560 Speaker 1: from the very beginning. He had estimated the needed budget 399 00:23:26,760 --> 00:23:30,560 Speaker 1: at eleven million dollars that was almost twice what was 400 00:23:30,640 --> 00:23:34,399 Speaker 1: eventually obtained. It seemed really natural to him to blame 401 00:23:34,880 --> 00:23:38,880 Speaker 1: Mocyfs cost cutting design. And as for mocyf, he told 402 00:23:38,880 --> 00:23:41,400 Speaker 1: the press quote, I'm completely at a loss to explain 403 00:23:41,440 --> 00:23:44,280 Speaker 1: the collapse. Yeah. Do keep in mind he had built 404 00:23:44,320 --> 00:23:47,080 Speaker 1: a lot of bridges before this time on this same 405 00:23:47,200 --> 00:23:50,600 Speaker 1: set of principles and there had not been problems. There 406 00:23:50,600 --> 00:23:54,639 Speaker 1: were twenty three different insurance companies involved in trying to 407 00:23:54,680 --> 00:23:57,680 Speaker 1: sort this whole situation out well at the same time, 408 00:23:57,680 --> 00:24:02,359 Speaker 1: the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Federal Public Works Administration, and 409 00:24:02,440 --> 00:24:06,080 Speaker 1: the Washington Toll bridge authority were feverishly trying to ensure 410 00:24:06,119 --> 00:24:10,000 Speaker 1: that no government entity was made a scapegoat. To that end, 411 00:24:10,200 --> 00:24:14,239 Speaker 1: multiple investigative commissions were established by those various entities and 412 00:24:14,359 --> 00:24:18,320 Speaker 1: insurance companies to analyze all of the information available and 413 00:24:18,400 --> 00:24:21,240 Speaker 1: to try to identify the critical failure that had caused 414 00:24:21,240 --> 00:24:25,160 Speaker 1: the bridge to collapse. Bert Farkworson also continued his own 415 00:24:25,160 --> 00:24:28,600 Speaker 1: examination of the bridge using his lab and wind tunnel 416 00:24:28,680 --> 00:24:33,199 Speaker 1: set up. The various commissions and investigations initially all had 417 00:24:33,280 --> 00:24:37,160 Speaker 1: similar assessments. The materials were ruled out as a problem. 418 00:24:37,200 --> 00:24:40,520 Speaker 1: That put down rumors that inferior material had been used 419 00:24:40,560 --> 00:24:45,360 Speaker 1: to cut costs. Similarly, the workmanship was deemed to be sound. 420 00:24:45,520 --> 00:24:48,320 Speaker 1: That meant that the problem was somewhere in the design, 421 00:24:48,720 --> 00:24:52,000 Speaker 1: But most assessments were that the project had been designed 422 00:24:52,119 --> 00:24:57,040 Speaker 1: in accordance with current standards. Naturally, Leon Mosef's firm began 423 00:24:57,320 --> 00:25:00,840 Speaker 1: a very careful watch of some of the or other projects, 424 00:25:00,840 --> 00:25:04,560 Speaker 1: including their other famous suspension bridge on the West Coast, 425 00:25:04,600 --> 00:25:08,560 Speaker 1: the Golden Gate Bridge. There were of course fears that 426 00:25:08,680 --> 00:25:11,280 Speaker 1: it too could have issues that could result in a 427 00:25:11,359 --> 00:25:15,600 Speaker 1: similar catastrophe, but it never evidenced any of these problems 428 00:25:15,680 --> 00:25:18,880 Speaker 1: or instabilities that had ultimately led to the collapse of Gurdie. 429 00:25:19,359 --> 00:25:21,280 Speaker 1: I think if at that point, if I had been 430 00:25:22,119 --> 00:25:24,520 Speaker 1: if I had been Leon Mosef, or if I had 431 00:25:24,520 --> 00:25:26,800 Speaker 1: been anybody that needed to drive back and forth across 432 00:25:26,840 --> 00:25:29,000 Speaker 1: the Golden Gate Bridge, I probably would have been terrified 433 00:25:29,040 --> 00:25:34,000 Speaker 1: for just uh an indefinite amount of time. After this, yeah, 434 00:25:34,119 --> 00:25:39,159 Speaker 1: investigations continued. The road deck was scrutinized as part of it, 435 00:25:39,200 --> 00:25:42,359 Speaker 1: and one problem identified there was that it was too 436 00:25:42,440 --> 00:25:46,000 Speaker 1: light and flexible to handle windy conditions, although it was 437 00:25:46,040 --> 00:25:49,119 Speaker 1: definitely strong enough to handle the loads of vehicular traffic 438 00:25:49,160 --> 00:25:51,320 Speaker 1: that it had been designed for. But it was an 439 00:25:51,320 --> 00:25:56,160 Speaker 1: aerodynamicist from Pasadena who really started introducing some theories into 440 00:25:56,200 --> 00:26:00,800 Speaker 1: these investigations that would ultimately change how bridges are just mind. 441 00:26:01,080 --> 00:26:05,200 Speaker 1: Theodore von Carmen of the California Institute of Technology put 442 00:26:05,280 --> 00:26:08,040 Speaker 1: forth the idea that focusing on the flexibility of the 443 00:26:08,119 --> 00:26:10,720 Speaker 1: roadway was really not getting at the cause of the 444 00:26:10,720 --> 00:26:14,960 Speaker 1: bridge's disastrous end. The real problem, in his estimation, was 445 00:26:15,000 --> 00:26:17,719 Speaker 1: the way that the structure of the roadway met the wind. 446 00:26:18,119 --> 00:26:21,480 Speaker 1: This wasn't something that all of the other researchers embraced Initially, 447 00:26:21,680 --> 00:26:24,400 Speaker 1: aerodynamics had not at this point really been a part 448 00:26:24,440 --> 00:26:27,919 Speaker 1: of projects like this. The calculations that were made in 449 00:26:28,000 --> 00:26:32,399 Speaker 1: design were all about strength calculated using static forces. So 450 00:26:32,480 --> 00:26:35,200 Speaker 1: while wind was considered, for example, it was just about 451 00:26:35,520 --> 00:26:38,240 Speaker 1: how strong a gust could be at a given speed, 452 00:26:38,320 --> 00:26:41,840 Speaker 1: and it didn't really include analysis of how that wind 453 00:26:41,920 --> 00:26:46,439 Speaker 1: might move around a structure. Incidentally, von Karmen weighed in 454 00:26:46,840 --> 00:26:51,120 Speaker 1: on the tacoman Eras bridge collapse because the initial investigations 455 00:26:51,160 --> 00:26:54,800 Speaker 1: had chalked up the disaster basically to being a freak accident. 456 00:26:55,400 --> 00:26:57,959 Speaker 1: There was no fault found with the bridge design, so 457 00:26:58,040 --> 00:27:01,119 Speaker 1: papers reported that the plan and was to rebuild the 458 00:27:01,200 --> 00:27:05,560 Speaker 1: structure according to the same design. When von Karmen read this, 459 00:27:05,640 --> 00:27:09,160 Speaker 1: he worried that the exact same thing would just happen again. Yeah, 460 00:27:09,160 --> 00:27:11,280 Speaker 1: he was like, I have I have information, I have 461 00:27:11,359 --> 00:27:15,240 Speaker 1: ideas you should hear. Uh. There are a few different 462 00:27:15,280 --> 00:27:18,200 Speaker 1: factors that contributed to this bridge collapse. This is something 463 00:27:18,200 --> 00:27:20,159 Speaker 1: that has evolved over time, so we'll talk about this 464 00:27:20,200 --> 00:27:22,800 Speaker 1: a bit. One was the width of the roadway on 465 00:27:22,840 --> 00:27:26,040 Speaker 1: the structure, so it was a two lane bridge. If 466 00:27:26,080 --> 00:27:28,399 Speaker 1: it had been wider, it would have been heavier and 467 00:27:28,480 --> 00:27:30,840 Speaker 1: less likely to twist and buck in the wind like 468 00:27:30,920 --> 00:27:33,920 Speaker 1: it did. The decision to make it a two lane 469 00:27:33,920 --> 00:27:38,119 Speaker 1: structure was driven by two major factors. One at the time, 470 00:27:38,320 --> 00:27:40,760 Speaker 1: they weren't really anticipating that it was going to be 471 00:27:40,800 --> 00:27:43,240 Speaker 1: a heavily trafficked roadway. Keep in mind, this was thought 472 00:27:43,280 --> 00:27:47,360 Speaker 1: of as like a connector for tourists and a connector 473 00:27:47,400 --> 00:27:51,000 Speaker 1: for military things, not really like part of the infrastructure 474 00:27:51,000 --> 00:27:53,720 Speaker 1: that would be used every day by a bunch of citizens. 475 00:27:54,119 --> 00:27:56,760 Speaker 1: And for another thing, they were trying to maximize their spend, 476 00:27:56,840 --> 00:27:58,480 Speaker 1: so they were like, we can get the whole roadway, 477 00:27:58,520 --> 00:28:01,439 Speaker 1: but it should be narrower other than wider. But what 478 00:28:01,520 --> 00:28:04,520 Speaker 1: has come to be known as a Carmen vortex street, 479 00:28:05,000 --> 00:28:08,560 Speaker 1: or sometimes just vortex shedding, has long been considered the 480 00:28:08,680 --> 00:28:12,920 Speaker 1: big contributor, and what happened very basically, when wind meets 481 00:28:12,920 --> 00:28:17,280 Speaker 1: an object, it forms eddies as it's cleaved by that object, 482 00:28:17,640 --> 00:28:21,679 Speaker 1: and those eddies than exert their own vibrational force. This 483 00:28:21,720 --> 00:28:25,080 Speaker 1: means that alternating zones of high and low pressure above 484 00:28:25,160 --> 00:28:27,480 Speaker 1: and below the bridge deck were causing it to move 485 00:28:27,600 --> 00:28:29,840 Speaker 1: up and down in a way that made the road 486 00:28:29,960 --> 00:28:34,040 Speaker 1: twist side to side while simultaneously rising and falling the 487 00:28:34,040 --> 00:28:36,479 Speaker 1: way it always had. Yes, as we talk about all 488 00:28:36,480 --> 00:28:39,440 Speaker 1: of this, keep in mind, like I said, our knowledge 489 00:28:39,440 --> 00:28:41,600 Speaker 1: of this is evolving. So this is what was believed 490 00:28:41,600 --> 00:28:44,800 Speaker 1: to be entirely it at the time. Because the bridge 491 00:28:44,800 --> 00:28:47,120 Speaker 1: had been built with solid plates on the side rather 492 00:28:47,160 --> 00:28:49,360 Speaker 1: than open trusses that would have allowed the wind to 493 00:28:49,440 --> 00:28:53,959 Speaker 1: pass through, the wind was hitting those plates, forming those vortices, 494 00:28:54,000 --> 00:28:56,520 Speaker 1: and then interacting with the bridge at the same time 495 00:28:56,840 --> 00:29:01,000 Speaker 1: it was experiencing its usual undulation. So in addition to 496 00:29:01,080 --> 00:29:03,920 Speaker 1: suggesting that open trusses be used on the sides of 497 00:29:03,920 --> 00:29:07,200 Speaker 1: the new structure, von Karmen also recommended that there be 498 00:29:07,320 --> 00:29:10,120 Speaker 1: greats in between lanes of the roadway that would allow 499 00:29:10,160 --> 00:29:13,120 Speaker 1: air to pass through that angle of the structure as well. 500 00:29:13,680 --> 00:29:17,960 Speaker 1: Most testing models supported von Karmen's assertions, even though there 501 00:29:18,000 --> 00:29:21,480 Speaker 1: was still some resistance within the engineering community about his 502 00:29:21,560 --> 00:29:25,360 Speaker 1: thoughts on bridge design. He was brought into the rebuild 503 00:29:25,360 --> 00:29:29,080 Speaker 1: project as an advisor by the Washington Toll Bridge Authority. 504 00:29:29,160 --> 00:29:32,120 Speaker 1: For a long time, really decades, the failure of the 505 00:29:32,160 --> 00:29:35,600 Speaker 1: bridge had been chocked up to resonance, meaning a scenario 506 00:29:35,680 --> 00:29:39,280 Speaker 1: when a force vibrating at the same natural frequency of 507 00:29:39,280 --> 00:29:43,120 Speaker 1: a second object forces that second object into an amplified 508 00:29:43,200 --> 00:29:49,000 Speaker 1: vibrational motion that can destroy things. But that explanation oversimplified 509 00:29:49,040 --> 00:29:51,840 Speaker 1: what was happening with the bridge the day that it collapsed. 510 00:29:51,920 --> 00:29:54,719 Speaker 1: I feel like I had this and as an example 511 00:29:54,760 --> 00:29:58,840 Speaker 1: in like a physics class, you absolutely did. You absolutely did, 512 00:29:58,920 --> 00:30:03,480 Speaker 1: because it really wasn't until fairly recently the last decade 513 00:30:03,480 --> 00:30:07,040 Speaker 1: that this idea changed a little bit, like that's a 514 00:30:07,080 --> 00:30:10,600 Speaker 1: completely sound explanation. You know, as the bridge was dropping 515 00:30:10,640 --> 00:30:13,800 Speaker 1: on one side, there were high and low pressures forming 516 00:30:13,800 --> 00:30:16,560 Speaker 1: above and below it that countered each other and would 517 00:30:16,600 --> 00:30:19,280 Speaker 1: cause it to twist the other way. But today that 518 00:30:19,400 --> 00:30:22,360 Speaker 1: idea of vortex shedding as the cause has been refined 519 00:30:22,480 --> 00:30:25,840 Speaker 1: to reflect that after the bridge twisted one way due 520 00:30:25,920 --> 00:30:28,760 Speaker 1: to vortex shedding, its momentum is it returned back to 521 00:30:28,840 --> 00:30:32,280 Speaker 1: its flat position. Meant that it was actually carrying it 522 00:30:32,320 --> 00:30:35,720 Speaker 1: past that flat state and into the other direction, allowing 523 00:30:35,760 --> 00:30:39,680 Speaker 1: winds to catch it again and increase the ongoing twisting 524 00:30:39,720 --> 00:30:43,560 Speaker 1: in what's called arrow elastic flutter. The big difference here 525 00:30:43,640 --> 00:30:46,720 Speaker 1: is that the mechanism isn't the vortex shedding applying force 526 00:30:46,800 --> 00:30:49,960 Speaker 1: to the objects. The movement of the object itself is 527 00:30:50,000 --> 00:30:53,720 Speaker 1: contributing to the flutter. That's basically saying it essentially rocked 528 00:30:53,760 --> 00:30:57,920 Speaker 1: itself apart. One of the kind of like easy day 529 00:30:57,920 --> 00:31:00,200 Speaker 1: to day world examples that people give when they're to 530 00:31:00,280 --> 00:31:03,360 Speaker 1: explain this is like if you're holding a blade of 531 00:31:03,440 --> 00:31:05,840 Speaker 1: grass or a piece of paper and you blow on 532 00:31:05,880 --> 00:31:07,720 Speaker 1: the edge of it, you'll see it like flutter, And 533 00:31:07,760 --> 00:31:09,440 Speaker 1: it's kind of the same thing, but just at a 534 00:31:09,480 --> 00:31:13,840 Speaker 1: massive scale. This catastrophe and all of this study also 535 00:31:13,920 --> 00:31:17,080 Speaker 1: led to the development of the field of bridge aerodynamics 536 00:31:17,120 --> 00:31:22,640 Speaker 1: aero elastics. There was perhaps surprisingly, only one person who 537 00:31:22,680 --> 00:31:26,320 Speaker 1: had legal ramifications after the bridge collapse. It had nothing 538 00:31:26,400 --> 00:31:28,880 Speaker 1: to do with its design or construction, though it had 539 00:31:28,920 --> 00:31:33,680 Speaker 1: to do with insurance. On December four, the following article 540 00:31:33,760 --> 00:31:38,520 Speaker 1: appeared in the Brooklyn Daily Eagle titled Galloping Gurdie insurer 541 00:31:38,640 --> 00:31:43,320 Speaker 1: bailed out. Quote insurance agent Hewett French forty four, who 542 00:31:43,360 --> 00:31:47,040 Speaker 1: wrote an eight hundred thousand dollar policy on galloping Gurdie, 543 00:31:47,080 --> 00:31:49,920 Speaker 1: was free on two thousand dollars bailed today on a 544 00:31:50,040 --> 00:31:54,760 Speaker 1: charge of grand larceny. His company, the Merchant's Fire Insurance 545 00:31:54,800 --> 00:31:57,400 Speaker 1: Company of New York, charged that he had failed to 546 00:31:57,440 --> 00:32:01,200 Speaker 1: remit seventy thousand dollars in premiums, including an eight thousand 547 00:32:01,280 --> 00:32:05,560 Speaker 1: dollar premium on the policy he issued against galloping Gertie collapsing. 548 00:32:06,240 --> 00:32:08,600 Speaker 1: The company said it was unaware that it had issued 549 00:32:08,640 --> 00:32:11,640 Speaker 1: a policy on the bridge. French was the company's general 550 00:32:11,680 --> 00:32:15,400 Speaker 1: agent and was authorized to issue policies without prior authorization. 551 00:32:15,600 --> 00:32:18,800 Speaker 1: The policy is binding, but company officials did not expect 552 00:32:18,840 --> 00:32:21,920 Speaker 1: their loss to total more than two hundred thousand dollars 553 00:32:22,240 --> 00:32:24,680 Speaker 1: because much of the bridge can be salvaged and the 554 00:32:24,760 --> 00:32:28,280 Speaker 1: total loss will be pro rated among twenty two companies 555 00:32:28,320 --> 00:32:31,560 Speaker 1: which had issued policies on it. Yeah, so just in 556 00:32:31,600 --> 00:32:34,960 Speaker 1: case it's not clear he had written a policy, had 557 00:32:35,000 --> 00:32:39,360 Speaker 1: collected the premiums, and had pocketed those premiums. He was 558 00:32:39,440 --> 00:32:42,960 Speaker 1: not actually then turning that over to his company. They 559 00:32:42,960 --> 00:32:45,280 Speaker 1: didn't know he had written this policy and was collecting 560 00:32:45,320 --> 00:32:48,040 Speaker 1: money on it, so they weren't catching it on the 561 00:32:48,080 --> 00:32:51,440 Speaker 1: books because there was no record of it. Um. But 562 00:32:51,600 --> 00:32:54,440 Speaker 1: because of his high position in the company, he had 563 00:32:54,600 --> 00:32:59,800 Speaker 1: issued a valid policy. So, uh, that's even more ridiculous 564 00:32:59,840 --> 00:33:03,360 Speaker 1: than I really understood from having said that barag account. 565 00:33:03,800 --> 00:33:07,680 Speaker 1: I mean, that's like that's a that's a brazen con 566 00:33:07,840 --> 00:33:10,680 Speaker 1: right there. Um, he took a gamble on this one 567 00:33:10,720 --> 00:33:13,480 Speaker 1: and lost very badly. Don't be like Hallett, French kids 568 00:33:14,000 --> 00:33:17,040 Speaker 1: um That last line, though that Tracy read about the 569 00:33:17,040 --> 00:33:21,560 Speaker 1: bridge's salvage ability turned out to be untrue. Engineers working 570 00:33:21,600 --> 00:33:24,080 Speaker 1: for the Washington Toll Bridge Authority determined that the bridge 571 00:33:24,120 --> 00:33:27,200 Speaker 1: could not be salvaged and deemed it a total loss. 572 00:33:27,720 --> 00:33:31,960 Speaker 1: This assessment was supported by additional independent studies. The back 573 00:33:32,000 --> 00:33:34,680 Speaker 1: and forth over this over whether they could actually reuse 574 00:33:34,800 --> 00:33:38,160 Speaker 1: some of the bridge material, led to a trial being 575 00:33:38,200 --> 00:33:41,760 Speaker 1: scheduled in nineteen forty one to rule on the dispute 576 00:33:41,760 --> 00:33:44,320 Speaker 1: between the w t b A and the insurance companies, 577 00:33:44,760 --> 00:33:46,800 Speaker 1: but that case was settled out of court before the 578 00:33:46,800 --> 00:33:50,320 Speaker 1: trial began. In that settlement, the state of Washington was 579 00:33:50,360 --> 00:33:55,000 Speaker 1: given salvage rights and four million dollars in nine The 580 00:33:55,080 --> 00:33:57,440 Speaker 1: parts of the original bridge which had not been pulled 581 00:33:57,480 --> 00:33:59,440 Speaker 1: up from where they fell into the water in nineteen 582 00:33:59,480 --> 00:34:03,160 Speaker 1: forty were added to the National Register of Historic Places, 583 00:34:03,680 --> 00:34:06,360 Speaker 1: in part to protect them from salvagers trying to go 584 00:34:06,480 --> 00:34:09,920 Speaker 1: and pick up these relics from the ocean. As for 585 00:34:10,000 --> 00:34:12,239 Speaker 1: how it our French, he returned at chunk of the 586 00:34:12,239 --> 00:34:15,640 Speaker 1: money he had pocketed and begged for mercy with Judge 587 00:34:15,640 --> 00:34:18,800 Speaker 1: Malcolm Douglas. He was sentenced to fifteen years in prison, 588 00:34:18,840 --> 00:34:22,319 Speaker 1: but got out on good behavior after serving just two. Yeah, 589 00:34:22,360 --> 00:34:24,879 Speaker 1: he remained I believe in Washington, Washington, for the rest 590 00:34:24,920 --> 00:34:26,840 Speaker 1: of his life. I think he died. I'm pulling this 591 00:34:26,920 --> 00:34:30,120 Speaker 1: from memory, not from immediate notes. Uh. In the late 592 00:34:30,200 --> 00:34:34,000 Speaker 1: nineteen sixties, Leon Mosey I continued to study what had 593 00:34:34,040 --> 00:34:37,279 Speaker 1: happened in Washington and used his ongoing examination of the 594 00:34:37,320 --> 00:34:41,880 Speaker 1: failure to improve the field of bridge design. His reputation 595 00:34:42,040 --> 00:34:45,160 Speaker 1: had definitely suffered, but he also seemed to really have 596 00:34:45,239 --> 00:34:47,600 Speaker 1: wanted to try to make some good come out of 597 00:34:47,640 --> 00:34:50,880 Speaker 1: the fall of Galloping Gertie and to advance his field 598 00:34:50,880 --> 00:34:54,080 Speaker 1: through the knowledge that could be gained from this. He 599 00:34:54,160 --> 00:34:56,120 Speaker 1: had less than three years to work on that, though. 600 00:34:56,200 --> 00:34:58,200 Speaker 1: He died of a heart attack at his summer home 601 00:34:58,200 --> 00:35:01,560 Speaker 1: in New Jersey in ninete, at the age of seventy. 602 00:35:01,719 --> 00:35:04,880 Speaker 1: The Tacoma Narrows Bridge was rebuilt, and the new bridge, 603 00:35:04,960 --> 00:35:09,920 Speaker 1: dubbed Sturdy Gurdie, was opened in nineteen fifty. This bridge, 604 00:35:10,000 --> 00:35:12,800 Speaker 1: which was designed to incorporate the learnings from the nineteen 605 00:35:12,840 --> 00:35:16,920 Speaker 1: forty bridge collapse, remains in use today. On July fifteenth 606 00:35:16,960 --> 00:35:20,400 Speaker 1: of two thousand seven, another Tacoma Narrows Bridge was built 607 00:35:20,520 --> 00:35:23,640 Speaker 1: parallel and just south of the nineteen fifty structure to 608 00:35:23,680 --> 00:35:27,800 Speaker 1: accommodate more traffic volume, So the nineteen fifty bridge carries 609 00:35:27,840 --> 00:35:31,000 Speaker 1: westbound traffic and the two thousand seven bridge handles the 610 00:35:31,040 --> 00:35:34,840 Speaker 1: eastbound flew. When the two thousand seven bridge opened, the 611 00:35:34,880 --> 00:35:37,200 Speaker 1: first car to cross it after the Runners of a 612 00:35:37,280 --> 00:35:41,040 Speaker 1: Charity five K, was a ninety three Lincoln touring car, 613 00:35:41,440 --> 00:35:43,640 Speaker 1: which was the exact same car that had been the 614 00:35:43,680 --> 00:35:47,000 Speaker 1: first one to cross Galloping Gurtie back in nine And 615 00:35:47,080 --> 00:35:50,160 Speaker 1: now for an element of the story that is almost 616 00:35:50,160 --> 00:35:53,799 Speaker 1: worthy of an October Halloween season episode, it has long 617 00:35:53,880 --> 00:35:56,600 Speaker 1: been rumored that a mammoth version of the giant Pacific 618 00:35:56,640 --> 00:35:59,920 Speaker 1: octopus species lives in the wreckage of Galloping Gurtie that 619 00:36:00,000 --> 00:36:03,320 Speaker 1: remains on the floor of the Narrows underneath those modern bridges. 620 00:36:04,120 --> 00:36:06,640 Speaker 1: King Octopus, as he is often called, is practically a 621 00:36:06,680 --> 00:36:12,399 Speaker 1: local celebrity. There are g p os giant Pacific octopuses 622 00:36:12,440 --> 00:36:14,080 Speaker 1: that live in the area, but the sad fact is 623 00:36:14,120 --> 00:36:16,279 Speaker 1: they are not a long looped species. They only live 624 00:36:16,320 --> 00:36:18,920 Speaker 1: about three to five years at most, so the idea 625 00:36:19,000 --> 00:36:21,240 Speaker 1: that there has been one that is there for decades. 626 00:36:22,000 --> 00:36:26,399 Speaker 1: Is very fun, it's not really founded in reality. There 627 00:36:26,400 --> 00:36:28,920 Speaker 1: are some sad aspects to that whole octopus thing that 628 00:36:28,960 --> 00:36:32,279 Speaker 1: we'll talk about in our behind the scenes. Yeah, I'm 629 00:36:32,280 --> 00:36:34,160 Speaker 1: glad you picked this one. It was one of those 630 00:36:34,160 --> 00:36:37,799 Speaker 1: things where I was like, I'm surprised somehow neither we 631 00:36:38,200 --> 00:36:41,400 Speaker 1: or any of the previous hosts have taken us on. Well. 632 00:36:41,440 --> 00:36:43,359 Speaker 1: I think it's one of those things that people think 633 00:36:43,400 --> 00:36:46,960 Speaker 1: everybody knows about, right because we have all seen that footage, 634 00:36:47,000 --> 00:36:51,200 Speaker 1: But like all of the crazy insurance and financing and 635 00:36:51,280 --> 00:36:56,440 Speaker 1: like weird stuff that doesn't really ever hit the public 636 00:36:56,920 --> 00:36:59,839 Speaker 1: knowledge in the same way. It's like disc I see 637 00:36:59,840 --> 00:37:02,520 Speaker 1: a lot of discussions about like what caused this bridge 638 00:37:02,520 --> 00:37:04,120 Speaker 1: to collapse and what have we learned from it in 639 00:37:04,160 --> 00:37:07,880 Speaker 1: like physics discussions, But when you get into the actual 640 00:37:08,920 --> 00:37:14,000 Speaker 1: mechanisms of you know, bureaucracy and red tape that are involved, 641 00:37:14,040 --> 00:37:17,839 Speaker 1: it becomes a whole other story with its own sub 642 00:37:17,920 --> 00:37:22,920 Speaker 1: dramas that play out. Yeah. Yeah, I think I mostly 643 00:37:22,920 --> 00:37:27,560 Speaker 1: remembered it as like physics problem dramatic footage and what 644 00:37:27,680 --> 00:37:30,040 Speaker 1: I have now confirmed as we took a moment to 645 00:37:31,040 --> 00:37:37,640 Speaker 1: leave room for an ad break a Pioneer car audio commercial. UM. 646 00:37:37,680 --> 00:37:40,759 Speaker 1: I don't know exactly when, but yeah, yeah, somehow I 647 00:37:40,800 --> 00:37:43,799 Speaker 1: missed that one, even though I think I probably have 648 00:37:43,840 --> 00:37:49,759 Speaker 1: always watched more TV than you. I it seems like 649 00:37:49,840 --> 00:37:52,080 Speaker 1: this would have been when I was in maybe high 650 00:37:52,080 --> 00:37:55,840 Speaker 1: school or possibly college age. But I could just be 651 00:37:55,920 --> 00:37:58,480 Speaker 1: making that up, I have. I did not confirm when 652 00:37:58,520 --> 00:38:01,480 Speaker 1: that commercial was actually airing. Uh do you have? Do 653 00:38:01,480 --> 00:38:03,960 Speaker 1: you have listener mail? I do? I actually have two 654 00:38:03,960 --> 00:38:07,480 Speaker 1: pieces of listener mail. The first is from our listener David, 655 00:38:07,560 --> 00:38:09,800 Speaker 1: who writes, Hi, Holly and Tracy. I'm a longtime listener 656 00:38:09,800 --> 00:38:12,759 Speaker 1: and huge fan. I always enjoy recommending an episode to 657 00:38:12,840 --> 00:38:15,240 Speaker 1: friends who mentioned an event or a person you've covered 658 00:38:15,280 --> 00:38:18,120 Speaker 1: in depth. I also suspect my teenage kids have picked 659 00:38:18,160 --> 00:38:21,000 Speaker 1: up a cool anecdote or perspective by Osmosis more than once, 660 00:38:21,000 --> 00:38:23,320 Speaker 1: so thank you for that. When I was listening to 661 00:38:23,360 --> 00:38:26,360 Speaker 1: the Grand Central episode, you mentioned the extensive cleaning the 662 00:38:26,400 --> 00:38:29,520 Speaker 1: building received a few decades back. One of my favorite 663 00:38:29,520 --> 00:38:31,960 Speaker 1: little details to point out to visitors is the tiny 664 00:38:32,000 --> 00:38:34,560 Speaker 1: little spot on the ceiling that the crew left filthy 665 00:38:34,680 --> 00:38:38,120 Speaker 1: on purpose. You can still see a tiny rectangle of 666 00:38:38,239 --> 00:38:40,920 Speaker 1: layered on soot and smoke and grime. If you know 667 00:38:40,960 --> 00:38:43,799 Speaker 1: where to look, stand between the famous clock and the 668 00:38:43,800 --> 00:38:46,960 Speaker 1: west stairway facing the steps, look up and to the 669 00:38:47,040 --> 00:38:50,000 Speaker 1: right along the vaulted edge, close to the painted image 670 00:38:50,000 --> 00:38:52,800 Speaker 1: of the constellation Cancer, and you will see a small 671 00:38:52,880 --> 00:38:55,280 Speaker 1: area that was left blackened to give you a sense 672 00:38:55,280 --> 00:38:57,600 Speaker 1: of just how bad it was. I was there for 673 00:38:57,640 --> 00:39:00,239 Speaker 1: the first time in about fifteen months last weekend. Took 674 00:39:00,239 --> 00:39:02,759 Speaker 1: a photo and he sent us photo and it is. 675 00:39:02,880 --> 00:39:05,040 Speaker 1: It's a very tiny It looks almost like someone put 676 00:39:05,040 --> 00:39:08,280 Speaker 1: a sticker on the wall because it looks so completely 677 00:39:08,360 --> 00:39:11,600 Speaker 1: different and weird. But in fact that is historical dirt, 678 00:39:13,320 --> 00:39:17,920 Speaker 1: which I absolutely love knowing that it's there. Um, So 679 00:39:17,960 --> 00:39:20,120 Speaker 1: thank you for that. I'm gonna absolutely be looking for 680 00:39:20,160 --> 00:39:23,960 Speaker 1: that the next time that i'm there. So thank you 681 00:39:23,960 --> 00:39:27,239 Speaker 1: for that, David, because I'm looking. Our second email is 682 00:39:27,280 --> 00:39:31,960 Speaker 1: from our listener, Aaron. This email delights me utterly. Uh 683 00:39:32,160 --> 00:39:34,520 Speaker 1: Eron writes, Hi, Tracy and Holly just wanted to let 684 00:39:34,520 --> 00:39:37,520 Speaker 1: you know that lu Garu, the beloved Rugaru at the 685 00:39:37,560 --> 00:39:40,920 Speaker 1: Audubon Zoo in New Orleans, is now vaccinated. He has 686 00:39:40,920 --> 00:39:43,480 Speaker 1: been social distancing and wearing his mask all year, but 687 00:39:43,600 --> 00:39:46,399 Speaker 1: is ready to start meeting in small groups soon. As 688 00:39:46,400 --> 00:39:49,320 Speaker 1: you can see on his vaccination card there's a photo 689 00:39:49,320 --> 00:39:52,560 Speaker 1: attached he received the I believe this is pronounced zodas vaccine, 690 00:39:52,760 --> 00:39:55,520 Speaker 1: which is used for the great apes. He enjoys dressing 691 00:39:55,560 --> 00:39:58,120 Speaker 1: up for holidays throughout the year. As Kim easily be 692 00:39:58,160 --> 00:40:00,959 Speaker 1: seen through a quick Google search. Hopefully he'll be ready 693 00:40:00,960 --> 00:40:02,960 Speaker 1: to go for the next Ruguru festival so you can 694 00:40:03,040 --> 00:40:05,880 Speaker 1: visit soon. I enjoyed the podcast in your New Orleans 695 00:40:05,880 --> 00:40:08,719 Speaker 1: Live show. Is great. Thanks for all that you do, Aaron. Um. 696 00:40:08,760 --> 00:40:11,600 Speaker 1: I did not know that there was a rugarou at 697 00:40:11,600 --> 00:40:13,759 Speaker 1: the Audubon Zoo, and now there's another place I have 698 00:40:13,800 --> 00:40:17,640 Speaker 1: to go. This is adorable. It's basically a cute figure 699 00:40:17,719 --> 00:40:21,480 Speaker 1: that they have set up, a rugaru standing there in 700 00:40:21,640 --> 00:40:27,839 Speaker 1: his his majesty, wearing a mask, so for anybody, it's 701 00:40:27,880 --> 00:40:31,279 Speaker 1: not an actual animal, it's a display. It's adorable though. 702 00:40:31,320 --> 00:40:33,319 Speaker 1: I want to go so bad now, and I love 703 00:40:33,360 --> 00:40:36,680 Speaker 1: that he's got a little vaccine card. Um that means 704 00:40:36,840 --> 00:40:39,839 Speaker 1: we can hug him. I hope, um so, Aaron, thank 705 00:40:39,880 --> 00:40:42,360 Speaker 1: you so much because that is an absolute delight and 706 00:40:42,440 --> 00:40:44,160 Speaker 1: the thing I didn't know about now I know and 707 00:40:44,200 --> 00:40:48,520 Speaker 1: look out, look out zoo, I'm coming. If you would 708 00:40:48,560 --> 00:40:50,680 Speaker 1: like to write us, you can do so at History 709 00:40:50,719 --> 00:40:53,160 Speaker 1: Podcast at iHeart radio dot com. You can also find 710 00:40:53,200 --> 00:40:56,799 Speaker 1: us everywhere on social media as Missed in History. And 711 00:40:56,840 --> 00:40:59,000 Speaker 1: if you for some reason, I'm not yet subscribed and 712 00:40:59,040 --> 00:41:00,919 Speaker 1: you're thinking you want to you that it's easiest pie 713 00:41:01,000 --> 00:41:02,600 Speaker 1: you can do that on the I heart Radio app, 714 00:41:02,640 --> 00:41:10,960 Speaker 1: at Apple podcast or wherever it is you listen. Stuff 715 00:41:10,960 --> 00:41:12,920 Speaker 1: you missed in History Class is a production of I 716 00:41:13,040 --> 00:41:16,439 Speaker 1: heart Radio. For more podcasts from I heart Radio, visit 717 00:41:16,480 --> 00:41:19,760 Speaker 1: the iHeart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen 718 00:41:19,840 --> 00:41:20,800 Speaker 1: to your favorite shows.