WEBVTT - Antitrust Changes Could Hinder M&A

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<v Speaker 1>Hello, and welcome to the Votes and Verdicts podcast hosted

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<v Speaker 1>by Bloomberg Intelligence, the investment research platform of Bloomberg LP.

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<v Speaker 1>In this podcast series, we talk about the intersection of

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<v Speaker 1>business policy and law. My name is Jennifer Ree. I'm

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<v Speaker 1>a senior analyst with Bloomberg Intelligence covering US anti trust

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<v Speaker 1>litigation and policy. This is the third of the Votes

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<v Speaker 1>and Verdicts podcast series focused on anti trust issues, and

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<v Speaker 1>for this anti trust episode, I'm really excited to be

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<v Speaker 1>joined by mort Skrosure, the Senior Director for Technology Competition

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<v Speaker 1>Policy at the Software and Information Industry Association, which is

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<v Speaker 1>a mouthful, so I'll be calling it SIIA if we

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<v Speaker 1>mention it going forward now. Prior to his current role

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<v Speaker 1>at SIIA, Moret was a non resident Senior Fellow at

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<v Speaker 1>the Atlantic Council's Europe Center, and he served for more

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<v Speaker 1>than a decade as counsel and senior advisor to a

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<v Speaker 1>foreign ambassador in Washington, DC. Earlier in his career, he

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<v Speaker 1>worked in Europe as a government official and as chief

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<v Speaker 1>of staff to a political leader. He holds an LLB

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<v Speaker 1>and an LM from the University of Copenhagen, where he

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<v Speaker 1>studied under a former chief Justice of the European Court

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<v Speaker 1>of Justice and specialized in EU competition law. Now he

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<v Speaker 1>also has a jd from the Washington and Lee University

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<v Speaker 1>School of Law, so he's also well versed in US

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<v Speaker 1>anti trust law. More, thank you so much for joining

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<v Speaker 1>me for this podcast.

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<v Speaker 2>Thanks so much for having me, Jen. It's great to

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<v Speaker 2>be with you.

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<v Speaker 1>He know, you and I see each other at anti

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<v Speaker 1>trust events all the time, and we sit down and

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<v Speaker 1>I feel like we have the most interesting conversations about

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<v Speaker 1>just generally what's going on in the anti trust world.

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<v Speaker 1>And it occurred to me, well, that conversation might be

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<v Speaker 1>good for a podcast, So here we go. So mort

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<v Speaker 1>and I are going to be talking about some propose

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<v Speaker 1>changes the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice Anti

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<v Speaker 1>DRUSS Division are making to rules and guidelines, and these

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<v Speaker 1>changes are going to have a significant, in my mind

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<v Speaker 1>at least a significant impact on merger and acquisition activity

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<v Speaker 1>if the changes are implemented as they are proposed today. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>as I mentioned, More represents a trade association that's comprised

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<v Speaker 1>of technology and software companies. But how he thinks about

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<v Speaker 1>these initiatives and analyzes them really generally applies to any

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<v Speaker 1>industry impacted by the activities of the agencies. But we

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<v Speaker 1>are also going to take advantage of Mort's deep experience

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<v Speaker 1>with EU competition laws to discuss some legislation in New

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<v Speaker 1>York that may actually result in New York enacting anti

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<v Speaker 1>dress laws that are similar to those in the EU

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<v Speaker 1>and quite different from what we've been the framework we've

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<v Speaker 1>had in the US. So, but before we jump into

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<v Speaker 1>these topics, Mort, can you tell us a little bit

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<v Speaker 1>more ABOUTASIIA, still a mouthful and your role with the association?

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<v Speaker 2>Sure? So. My role at SIIA is primarily focused on

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<v Speaker 2>three issues. So one bucket is competition law and policy

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<v Speaker 2>in the US and Europe. Another bucket is content moderation

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<v Speaker 2>slash Section two thirty issues, and the third bucket is

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<v Speaker 2>made up of some discrete transatlantic digital issues such as

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<v Speaker 2>the EUS Digital Services Act, the EU Data Act, and

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<v Speaker 2>data flows. With respect to SIA, we're as an organization,

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<v Speaker 2>we're dedicated to the business of information. We represent about

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<v Speaker 2>three hundred and fifty large and small companies across the industry.

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<v Speaker 2>Our members provide the platforms, data, content and information that

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<v Speaker 2>drive the global economy, informs financial networks, and connects students

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<v Speaker 2>and educators. And to give you just a couple of examples,

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<v Speaker 2>policy Division of which I'm a part. We work to

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<v Speaker 2>shape technology and information policies to foster innovation and protect

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<v Speaker 2>consumer welfare. Our Financial Information Services Division or PHIZZZ, on

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<v Speaker 2>the other hand, it is the global form of choice

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<v Speaker 2>for financial information services companies and professionals UH and where

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<v Speaker 2>they can engage on trends in their industry. Great.

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<v Speaker 1>Now, I guess I should ask you, since you said

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<v Speaker 1>fizz D, whether i'm s I I A is correct

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<v Speaker 1>or do you say CIA.

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<v Speaker 2>We said it's called s I I A H it

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<v Speaker 2>is an out though I agree. I mean, I still

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<v Speaker 2>you know, I've been here for a while. I still

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<v Speaker 2>mix it up from.

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<v Speaker 1>There, right, And I get that, you know what, what

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<v Speaker 1>more described it seems so very focused on, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>tech and tech companies, but really when he's looking at

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<v Speaker 1>anti trust policy, you know, he's thinking about how that

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<v Speaker 1>policy is can impact tech companies. But that same policy

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<v Speaker 1>and the way it could impact a tech company will

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<v Speaker 1>impact any industry that is basically engaging in m and

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<v Speaker 1>A mergers and acquisitions activity and has to file before

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<v Speaker 1>the Federal Trade Commissioner, Department of Justice, and deal with

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<v Speaker 1>a potential following investigation. So let's move into this. I

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<v Speaker 1>mentioned that there are these initiatives at the FTC and

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<v Speaker 1>DJ and in my mind, for all intents and purposes,

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<v Speaker 1>it's really intended to combat consolidation across many industries. The

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<v Speaker 1>antitrust enforcers appointed by the Bid Administration have made it

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<v Speaker 1>really clear that they're going to aggressively seek to slower

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<v Speaker 1>stop consolidation, and we've definitely seen a lot of activity

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<v Speaker 1>aligned with this goal. So what I'm going to start

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<v Speaker 1>with are something a lot of people probably have never

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<v Speaker 1>even heard of, but they are proposed changes to the

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<v Speaker 1>heart Scott Redino filing rules sometimes called HSR filing rules.

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<v Speaker 1>So let's start just with background more. Do you just

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<v Speaker 1>want to explain what HSR is and what HSR notification

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<v Speaker 1>rules are?

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<v Speaker 2>Sure, So, between nineteen forty when Congress passed the Clayton

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<v Speaker 2>Act in nineteen seventy six, there was no obligation for

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<v Speaker 2>companies to give notice of a proposed merger. If a

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<v Speaker 2>transaction raised anti competitive concerns, the only avenue available to

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<v Speaker 2>the enforcement agency, so the Anti Trust Division and the

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<v Speaker 2>FTC was to go to court after the deal had

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<v Speaker 2>already closed and asked for a breakup. Order to remedy that,

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<v Speaker 2>Congress passed the HSR Act that you reference before, and

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<v Speaker 2>the HSR Act imposed an obligation to notify the agency

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<v Speaker 2>the agencies before con consummating mergers over a certain size,

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<v Speaker 2>and that number deal size is adjusted every year and

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<v Speaker 2>after the last adjust deals over with a value of

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<v Speaker 2>over four hundred and forty five point five million dollars

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<v Speaker 2>must always be notified, and deals with a value of

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<v Speaker 2>over one hundred and fourteen point five million dollars must

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<v Speaker 2>be notified if certain conditions are met. And in addition,

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<v Speaker 2>the HSRX set a timeline for merger reviews, so if

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<v Speaker 2>these requirements are met, the parties must file what is

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<v Speaker 2>called a merger notification and they along with that notification,

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<v Speaker 2>they must submit some basic information about their deal. The

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<v Speaker 2>notification also starts what is called an initial waiting period,

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<v Speaker 2>during which the agencies conduct an initial review, and it

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<v Speaker 2>also bars the parties from closing the deal. At the

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<v Speaker 2>end of that initial waiting period, the agencies can decide

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<v Speaker 2>to do nothing, which then frees up the parties to

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<v Speaker 2>close their deal, or they can issue what is called

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<v Speaker 2>a second request, which requires the parties to submit a

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<v Speaker 2>substantial amount of additional information, and the second request also,

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<v Speaker 2>or the issuance of a second request also starts a

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<v Speaker 2>new waiting period.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, exactly. I mean, that's a great background on it all.

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<v Speaker 1>And I should say that, you know, there are at

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<v Speaker 1>the big law firms that tend to handle mergers I

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<v Speaker 1>should say transactions, because they're not all mergers. There's always

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<v Speaker 1>somebody specialized or a small group specialized that just deal

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<v Speaker 1>with HSR. And that's it. You know. They look at

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<v Speaker 1>a deal that's coming in, they determine, you know, does

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<v Speaker 1>it exceed these thresholds, does it have to vile HSR?

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<v Speaker 1>And if it's determined that they do, then they go

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<v Speaker 1>ahead and start to prepare the materials. That's back when

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<v Speaker 1>I practiced, that's a little bit of what I did,

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<v Speaker 1>or at least I helped the sort of the primary

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<v Speaker 1>people in our law firm that did that to pull

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<v Speaker 1>those together and think about that, you know. And the

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<v Speaker 1>thing is really, at least at this point, the majority

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<v Speaker 1>of deals filed generally close after the first thirty days

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<v Speaker 1>the initial waiting period, right, and rather than as important

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<v Speaker 1>to that in depth or view.

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<v Speaker 2>Right.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, So okay, so there are proposing changes to these rules,

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<v Speaker 1>and I have to say that, you know, other than

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<v Speaker 1>tiny little tweaks or thresholds changing, maybe a few exemptions

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<v Speaker 1>being tweaked over the years that I practiced, I don't

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<v Speaker 1>really remember any kind of major changes to the HSR.

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<v Speaker 1>So more, what what is it they're trying to address

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<v Speaker 1>with the changes and what are those changes?

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<v Speaker 2>So, so the agency is you know, tying into what

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<v Speaker 2>you said at the outset about the agencies clearly looking

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<v Speaker 2>to you know, make it more difficult to engage in

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<v Speaker 2>m an a activity. You know, you know they've proposed

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<v Speaker 2>these rules or these changes to the ahs R rules,

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<v Speaker 2>and you know, also to the merger guides before, which

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<v Speaker 2>we're going to talk about later. So specifically as it

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<v Speaker 2>relates to the HSR or the proposed changes to the

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<v Speaker 2>hs ARE rule, the reason the agencies are proposing these

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<v Speaker 2>changes is that, according to them, the information collected under

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<v Speaker 2>the current rules and in the initial phases of an

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<v Speaker 2>investigation doesn't allow them to conduct an effective and initial,

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<v Speaker 2>effective and efficient initial review of a proposed merger. So

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<v Speaker 2>what are they trying to do or what are they

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<v Speaker 2>proposing to do? So if if these changes are adopted

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<v Speaker 2>in their current form. The changes would substantially and I

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<v Speaker 2>mean substantially, expand the scope of documents that the parties

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<v Speaker 2>would be required to submit at the outset, including all

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<v Speaker 2>agreements related to the transaction. But more important than that,

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<v Speaker 2>actually the parties would be required to submit narrative explanations

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<v Speaker 2>of their not only of their current business operations, but

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<v Speaker 2>they're rationale for the proposed transaction, something that we don't

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<v Speaker 2>have in the US, but which is fairly and in

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<v Speaker 2>you know, in in the EU, it's fairly common in

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<v Speaker 2>the in the UK if you notify a transaction, I

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<v Speaker 2>should say in the UK, parties are under no obligation

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<v Speaker 2>to notify transactions, but if they do, they're often asked

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<v Speaker 2>to submit these narrative explanations. In essence, what the proposal

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<v Speaker 2>would mean is that it would frontload, front load the

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<v Speaker 2>current the current process and require the parties at the

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<v Speaker 2>outset a lot of information that you know, they would

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<v Speaker 2>only under the current rules they would only be required

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<v Speaker 2>to produce if a second request is issued, and that is,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, second requests are only issued if a deal

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<v Speaker 2>after an initial review raises potential anti competitive concerns. It's

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<v Speaker 2>also important to UH to point out that the agencies

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<v Speaker 2>acknowledge that the proposed changes would increase the burden on

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<v Speaker 2>all filers UH, and that some of these changes would

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<v Speaker 2>increase the burden substantially on some filers.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, I mean I think that's that's absolutely true. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>when I think about HSR filings in the past, I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>they were a relatively in the scheme of things, right

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<v Speaker 1>when when you have the legal aspects of mergers and acquisitions,

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<v Speaker 1>they were a relatively easy thing to do. I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>it was filling out a form. It was a small

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<v Speaker 1>number of documents most of the time, not even in

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<v Speaker 1>the old days of paper copies, not even a full box.

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<v Speaker 1>And right, and companies even agree in their merger agreements,

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<v Speaker 1>we're going to get this filed within you know, a

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<v Speaker 1>week or ten business days or two weeks of signing

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<v Speaker 1>the agreement, which is, you know, pretty fast work. When

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<v Speaker 1>it comes to lawyers, I think this changes a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of things. I mean I think this really and also

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<v Speaker 1>I think there was no need, at least at that

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<v Speaker 1>point in time to start to strategize. I mean, lawyers

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<v Speaker 1>might already be internally strategizing about the deal and in

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<v Speaker 1>whether they're might need to be some anti trust defense

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<v Speaker 1>to the deal constructed, and what kind of arguments could

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<v Speaker 1>be made that the deal is pro competitive. But here

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<v Speaker 1>you may have to start thinking about that much earlier

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<v Speaker 1>on before actually getting the deal notified at all, which is,

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<v Speaker 1>as you mentioned, a little bit more like the way

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<v Speaker 1>it's done in the EU. I mean, I think this

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<v Speaker 1>is a really big change. I know you do too.

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<v Speaker 1>On behalf of SIIA. You did submit some comments to

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<v Speaker 1>the FTC and you outlined your thoughts and some concerns

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<v Speaker 1>about these proposed rules. So why don't we walk through

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<v Speaker 1>those because I thought, you know, they had a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of merit when I look through what you all had

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<v Speaker 1>proposed and submitted, and there are concerns that companies should

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<v Speaker 1>have today.

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely, so we have we have a number of concerns.

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<v Speaker 2>So at a very basic level, I mean, we believe

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<v Speaker 2>that the proposed changes run counter to the legislative intent

0:13:58.240 --> 0:14:02.280
<v Speaker 2>behind the HSR Act and also the express purpose of

0:14:02.360 --> 0:14:09.920
<v Speaker 2>the Paperwork Reduction Act. When Congress passed the HSR Act,

0:14:10.200 --> 0:14:15.840
<v Speaker 2>they said that the goal was to carefully balance the

0:14:15.880 --> 0:14:21.400
<v Speaker 2>need to detect and prevent the llegal mergers and acquisitions

0:14:21.440 --> 0:14:28.800
<v Speaker 2>prior to consummation without unduly burdening business with unnecessary paperwork

0:14:29.040 --> 0:14:36.120
<v Speaker 2>or delays. That's almost an exact quote from the relevant

0:14:36.120 --> 0:14:42.200
<v Speaker 2>Committee during its markup of the HSR Act. As far

0:14:42.240 --> 0:14:46.880
<v Speaker 2>as the Paperwork Reduction Act is concerned, the purpose of

0:14:46.880 --> 0:14:51.359
<v Speaker 2>that act or that law is to minimize the paperwork

0:14:51.400 --> 0:14:56.880
<v Speaker 2>burden for, among others, businesses, and to maximize the utility

0:14:56.880 --> 0:15:02.040
<v Speaker 2>of information collected and used by the federal government. In

0:15:02.080 --> 0:15:05.080
<v Speaker 2>this specific case, as it relates to the HSR Actor,

0:15:05.080 --> 0:15:08.600
<v Speaker 2>the proposed changes to the hs are rule. If you

0:15:08.640 --> 0:15:11.400
<v Speaker 2>look at the agency's own estimates, I said at the

0:15:11.440 --> 0:15:14.200
<v Speaker 2>outset that they recognized that it would be you know,

0:15:14.240 --> 0:15:17.520
<v Speaker 2>it would increase the burden on filers. And they they

0:15:17.600 --> 0:15:20.040
<v Speaker 2>say that a run of the mill, their own estimates

0:15:20.520 --> 0:15:22.880
<v Speaker 2>say that a run of the mill filing under the

0:15:22.920 --> 0:15:26.680
<v Speaker 2>proposed rule would take one hundred and forty four hours

0:15:26.720 --> 0:15:32.120
<v Speaker 2>to complete. That is four times the current average and

0:15:32.160 --> 0:15:37.760
<v Speaker 2>therefore not a trivial trivial increase, but even more than that,

0:15:37.840 --> 0:15:41.120
<v Speaker 2>A recent survey of in house councils and law firm

0:15:41.200 --> 0:15:46.240
<v Speaker 2>antitrust practitioners actually put the number closer to three hundred

0:15:46.280 --> 0:15:50.360
<v Speaker 2>and thirty hours. And that is to say, nothing of

0:15:50.400 --> 0:15:54.960
<v Speaker 2>the you know, the substantial additional cost that compliance for

0:15:55.080 --> 0:15:59.640
<v Speaker 2>companies would entail. On the agency side of the lecture,

0:15:59.680 --> 0:16:02.640
<v Speaker 2>there's also, I think a question of whether, as a

0:16:02.800 --> 0:16:06.480
<v Speaker 2>purely practical matter, they would even have the time to

0:16:06.600 --> 0:16:09.640
<v Speaker 2>review and process, or in the words of the Paperwork

0:16:09.720 --> 0:16:14.680
<v Speaker 2>Reduction Act, utilize all this additional information as part of

0:16:14.720 --> 0:16:19.640
<v Speaker 2>their initial review. In its most recent budget requests, the

0:16:19.720 --> 0:16:24.280
<v Speaker 2>FTC requests that a large increase in funding for its

0:16:24.320 --> 0:16:27.520
<v Speaker 2>Bureau of Competition, which is the bureau within the FTC

0:16:27.680 --> 0:16:32.920
<v Speaker 2>that handles mergers, just to be able to maintain its

0:16:32.960 --> 0:16:35.920
<v Speaker 2>current performance level and so on the basis of that,

0:16:35.960 --> 0:16:39.000
<v Speaker 2>I think the answer would appear to be that the

0:16:39.880 --> 0:16:43.880
<v Speaker 2>agencies actually would not be able to really take advantage

0:16:43.960 --> 0:16:49.359
<v Speaker 2>of or utilize this additional information so early in the process.

0:16:50.520 --> 0:16:52.840
<v Speaker 2>Together with the proposed changes to the merger guides that

0:16:52.880 --> 0:16:56.480
<v Speaker 2>we're going to talk about later, were concerned that these

0:16:56.560 --> 0:17:00.239
<v Speaker 2>changes or these proposed changes would have a chilling effect

0:17:00.440 --> 0:17:04.680
<v Speaker 2>on merger activity more broadly, which would in our mind,

0:17:05.640 --> 0:17:10.120
<v Speaker 2>deter innovation and hamper economic growth and those that are

0:17:10.480 --> 0:17:14.240
<v Speaker 2>likely to be hit the hardest, or actually small companies

0:17:14.280 --> 0:17:19.480
<v Speaker 2>and startups whose business models often are designed to maximize

0:17:19.720 --> 0:17:24.440
<v Speaker 2>exit options. So our bottom line is this, there may

0:17:24.480 --> 0:17:28.360
<v Speaker 2>be good reasons to update the current merger notification regime,

0:17:28.480 --> 0:17:31.919
<v Speaker 2>like you talked about, Jen, you know, it hasn't been

0:17:32.000 --> 0:17:35.280
<v Speaker 2>updated in many, many years, I think over forty years.

0:17:36.240 --> 0:17:39.200
<v Speaker 2>But we do not believe that the agencies have provided

0:17:39.240 --> 0:17:43.199
<v Speaker 2>a compelling or even a sufficient reason to justify the

0:17:43.240 --> 0:17:48.280
<v Speaker 2>imposition of substantial new burdens without any benefit for the

0:17:48.359 --> 0:17:51.639
<v Speaker 2>vast number of transactions that raise no concerns.

0:17:52.200 --> 0:17:54.560
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, and it really seems like, you know, some of

0:17:54.600 --> 0:17:58.080
<v Speaker 1>the goal here is just to simply discourage M and

0:17:58.160 --> 0:18:01.240
<v Speaker 1>A activity at its out me particularly you know you're

0:18:01.280 --> 0:18:04.480
<v Speaker 1>talking about the startups that are getting hard to hit.

0:18:04.520 --> 0:18:08.440
<v Speaker 1>I mean, this is an area that's created some difficulty

0:18:08.520 --> 0:18:11.320
<v Speaker 1>I think for business strategies and a lot of industries

0:18:11.320 --> 0:18:14.600
<v Speaker 1>because we are seeing these attempts by the Federal Trade

0:18:14.600 --> 0:18:19.280
<v Speaker 1>Commission and Department of Justice to try to stop in

0:18:19.520 --> 0:18:21.800
<v Speaker 1>a couple different ways. One try to stop what they

0:18:21.840 --> 0:18:25.040
<v Speaker 1>call potential competition deals where an incumbent buys up a

0:18:25.080 --> 0:18:28.560
<v Speaker 1>small startup. I intended just sort of quelch the competition

0:18:28.640 --> 0:18:31.000
<v Speaker 1>that might be posed in the future by that startup,

0:18:31.400 --> 0:18:35.960
<v Speaker 1>And you know, it makes it very difficult for those

0:18:36.000 --> 0:18:39.920
<v Speaker 1>startups that really intend to ultimately get sold for a

0:18:39.960 --> 0:18:43.280
<v Speaker 1>lot of money to some bigger company. This really gets

0:18:43.320 --> 0:18:44.800
<v Speaker 1>in the way and it does add a lot of

0:18:44.800 --> 0:18:47.640
<v Speaker 1>burdens for that startup, and I think that really impacts

0:18:47.680 --> 0:18:50.280
<v Speaker 1>the tech industry. I mean, we saw the FTC challenge

0:18:50.320 --> 0:18:52.720
<v Speaker 1>Meta when it tried to acquire within which sort of

0:18:52.800 --> 0:18:55.080
<v Speaker 1>falls within this category, and we've seen it in the

0:18:55.080 --> 0:19:00.639
<v Speaker 1>pharmaceutical area too, So you know, this this adds a

0:19:00.640 --> 0:19:05.040
<v Speaker 1>burden and it could actually in some ways dampen certain

0:19:05.119 --> 0:19:05.920
<v Speaker 1>kinds of innovation.

0:19:06.800 --> 0:19:10.200
<v Speaker 2>Absolutely, absolutely, Yeah.

0:19:10.000 --> 0:19:12.640
<v Speaker 1>It's it's a big change. And I know that they're

0:19:12.680 --> 0:19:15.879
<v Speaker 1>not final yet, so we do know that at the end,

0:19:15.880 --> 0:19:18.960
<v Speaker 1>they're accepting comments, they think about those comments, they discuss them.

0:19:19.200 --> 0:19:21.320
<v Speaker 1>You know, it's possible that the rules will have a

0:19:21.359 --> 0:19:23.920
<v Speaker 1>narrower scope. We don't know for sure. I mean, all

0:19:23.960 --> 0:19:25.920
<v Speaker 1>of this is going to kind of flesh itself out

0:19:25.960 --> 0:19:28.560
<v Speaker 1>next year, and nothing will get implemented till some point

0:19:28.640 --> 0:19:32.120
<v Speaker 1>next year. We don't really know when. But still it's

0:19:32.119 --> 0:19:34.320
<v Speaker 1>a warning that you know, companies need to think about,

0:19:34.440 --> 0:19:37.240
<v Speaker 1>and it may be maybe why I mean, I feel

0:19:37.240 --> 0:19:39.240
<v Speaker 1>like I'm kind of seeing an uptick in mergers now,

0:19:39.280 --> 0:19:41.720
<v Speaker 1>and it may be because of companies trying to get

0:19:41.720 --> 0:19:46.320
<v Speaker 1>these easier HSR filings in now before these rules change. Absolutely,

0:19:47.040 --> 0:19:48.920
<v Speaker 1>let's move over to the merger guidelines because I think

0:19:48.920 --> 0:19:52.640
<v Speaker 1>that's an even bigger deal in my mind. Maybe it'll

0:19:52.680 --> 0:19:55.560
<v Speaker 1>impact fewer deals than the HSR changes do it, but

0:19:55.760 --> 0:19:58.840
<v Speaker 1>it's a big change and also add to the burden

0:19:58.960 --> 0:20:03.160
<v Speaker 1>imposed on companies to certain deals at least. So let's

0:20:03.160 --> 0:20:05.880
<v Speaker 1>start again like we did with AHSR. Let's look at background.

0:20:06.000 --> 0:20:08.639
<v Speaker 1>Just for people who may be listening to aren't attorneys

0:20:08.680 --> 0:20:10.679
<v Speaker 1>don't really have a background in how this all works?

0:20:10.880 --> 0:20:12.840
<v Speaker 1>Do you want to at least explain more what the

0:20:12.880 --> 0:20:13.960
<v Speaker 1>merger guidelines are?

0:20:14.560 --> 0:20:19.280
<v Speaker 2>Sure so distilled to its essence. Section seven of the

0:20:19.320 --> 0:20:25.080
<v Speaker 2>Clayton Act says that mergers and acquisitions whose effect may

0:20:25.080 --> 0:20:30.199
<v Speaker 2>be to substantially lessen competition and create a monopoly are prohibited.

0:20:32.080 --> 0:20:35.320
<v Speaker 2>You know. The statutory language, you know, as anyone can see,

0:20:35.840 --> 0:20:39.119
<v Speaker 2>is fairly vague, and because of that, the courts have

0:20:39.200 --> 0:20:43.520
<v Speaker 2>played an outsized role in developing the body of law

0:20:43.600 --> 0:20:49.160
<v Speaker 2>that today governs mergers and acquisition activity in the United States. Traditionally,

0:20:49.520 --> 0:20:53.840
<v Speaker 2>the merger guidelines have provided a consensuve view of what

0:20:53.920 --> 0:21:00.159
<v Speaker 2>the law is, and through the guides, the agencies have

0:21:00.240 --> 0:21:04.640
<v Speaker 2>advised the business community, the courts, and the broader public

0:21:05.240 --> 0:21:09.720
<v Speaker 2>of how they so. In other words, the agencies that

0:21:09.840 --> 0:21:13.640
<v Speaker 2>the enforcement agencies intend to apply the law to individual cases.

0:21:15.040 --> 0:21:18.800
<v Speaker 2>This has allowed businesses to predict, predict with a fairly

0:21:18.920 --> 0:21:24.080
<v Speaker 2>high degree of certainty, what if any, actions the agencies

0:21:24.240 --> 0:21:28.680
<v Speaker 2>might take in response to a proposed merger. It's important

0:21:28.680 --> 0:21:33.000
<v Speaker 2>to understand also that the merger guides are what is

0:21:33.119 --> 0:21:36.480
<v Speaker 2>called a policy statement, which means that they are not

0:21:36.640 --> 0:21:40.520
<v Speaker 2>binding on the courts in order the courts owe them

0:21:40.520 --> 0:21:44.520
<v Speaker 2>any any deference. But the courts in general have found

0:21:44.520 --> 0:21:47.560
<v Speaker 2>the guides to be very helpful and have you know,

0:21:47.680 --> 0:21:51.120
<v Speaker 2>are using them or have been using them fairly extensively.

0:21:51.680 --> 0:21:53.560
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, and in particular, and I know you're going to

0:21:53.560 --> 0:21:56.520
<v Speaker 1>get into this later, but in particular they are willing

0:21:56.560 --> 0:22:00.240
<v Speaker 1>to use them many courts because at least up until now,

0:22:00.320 --> 0:22:05.199
<v Speaker 1>they haven't viewed the guidelines necessarily as a political a

0:22:05.400 --> 0:22:10.320
<v Speaker 1>political doctrine or a political document. They have been adopted

0:22:10.440 --> 0:22:13.320
<v Speaker 1>over the years slight changes made over the years in

0:22:13.359 --> 0:22:18.240
<v Speaker 1>a bipartisan manner by many different appointees from different administrations

0:22:18.960 --> 0:22:21.440
<v Speaker 1>and kind of have always had the same general core

0:22:21.560 --> 0:22:25.560
<v Speaker 1>and framework. I mean I am very intimately familiar with

0:22:25.600 --> 0:22:27.600
<v Speaker 1>what the guidelines say because that was my main area

0:22:27.640 --> 0:22:30.560
<v Speaker 1>of practice when I was a lawyer, was basically working

0:22:30.600 --> 0:22:32.960
<v Speaker 1>on M and A, dealing with those guidelines and walking

0:22:33.000 --> 0:22:35.720
<v Speaker 1>through them to say to the companies, hey, here is

0:22:35.800 --> 0:22:38.840
<v Speaker 1>how the agencies are going to evaluate your deal. And

0:22:39.000 --> 0:22:41.080
<v Speaker 1>you know, for people not familiar with the guidelines, look,

0:22:41.119 --> 0:22:45.320
<v Speaker 1>they talk about competitive conditions resulting from a merger, how

0:22:45.320 --> 0:22:48.119
<v Speaker 1>they might change. They look at markets, they look at competition,

0:22:48.480 --> 0:22:52.040
<v Speaker 1>they look at concentration in markets, they look at potential entry,

0:22:52.720 --> 0:22:56.639
<v Speaker 1>they look at coordination on price or output. Essentially, you

0:22:56.680 --> 0:22:59.560
<v Speaker 1>know the competitive conditions in an industry and how those

0:22:59.720 --> 0:23:02.960
<v Speaker 1>can dotions may change by virtue of a merger. So

0:23:04.320 --> 0:23:07.840
<v Speaker 1>similar to the HSR changes, I think that the agencies,

0:23:08.040 --> 0:23:10.479
<v Speaker 1>with some of the changes they're proposing and more you're

0:23:10.520 --> 0:23:12.600
<v Speaker 1>going to get into those in a minute, are again

0:23:13.119 --> 0:23:15.639
<v Speaker 1>sort of making it not only trying to sort of

0:23:15.640 --> 0:23:19.520
<v Speaker 1>hamper merger activity at the outset, making it a lot scarier,

0:23:19.640 --> 0:23:22.040
<v Speaker 1>let's say, to jump into one, but they're also trying

0:23:22.080 --> 0:23:25.199
<v Speaker 1>to identify mergers, making it easier to identify mergers that

0:23:25.240 --> 0:23:28.840
<v Speaker 1>have any trust problems easier to investigate them and potentially

0:23:29.280 --> 0:23:31.760
<v Speaker 1>ease their path in court as well when they try

0:23:31.800 --> 0:23:34.400
<v Speaker 1>to block those deals. So let's dig into these merger

0:23:34.480 --> 0:23:37.720
<v Speaker 1>guidelines changes, so more talk to us about what the

0:23:37.800 --> 0:23:39.240
<v Speaker 1>changes are trying to address.

0:23:39.840 --> 0:23:44.439
<v Speaker 2>Sure, so you know, as you said earlier, Jen, I mean,

0:23:44.480 --> 0:23:47.000
<v Speaker 2>it's no secret that the current heads of the enforcement

0:23:47.119 --> 0:23:51.600
<v Speaker 2>agencies have been critical of what they think was or

0:23:51.680 --> 0:23:56.920
<v Speaker 2>has been lax enforcement in previous administrations of both parties,

0:23:57.160 --> 0:23:59.720
<v Speaker 2>and that they are looking for ways to apply the

0:23:59.800 --> 0:24:04.600
<v Speaker 2>law law much more aggressively. In the proposed changes to

0:24:04.640 --> 0:24:10.920
<v Speaker 2>the merger guides, these agencies say that they want these

0:24:10.960 --> 0:24:14.480
<v Speaker 2>new guides, or the proposal that they have made there,

0:24:14.760 --> 0:24:20.080
<v Speaker 2>they're looking to achieve three primary objectives. So they want

0:24:20.520 --> 0:24:23.720
<v Speaker 2>the guides to reflect the law as written by conguerors

0:24:23.720 --> 0:24:27.320
<v Speaker 2>and interpret it by the courts. I think there's definitely

0:24:27.359 --> 0:24:30.840
<v Speaker 2>disagreement over whether their interpretation of what the law says

0:24:30.920 --> 0:24:36.280
<v Speaker 2>and what the courts have said fifty years ago exactly exactly,

0:24:37.680 --> 0:24:41.000
<v Speaker 2>But that's one of their goals. So a second goal

0:24:41.119 --> 0:24:43.480
<v Speaker 2>is that they want the guides to be more accessible

0:24:43.520 --> 0:24:48.119
<v Speaker 2>and transparent, and they they're also looking to provide a

0:24:48.160 --> 0:24:52.200
<v Speaker 2>framework that again and their you know, in their view

0:24:52.200 --> 0:24:56.840
<v Speaker 2>of reality, reflects the realities of the modern economy. They

0:24:56.880 --> 0:25:01.880
<v Speaker 2>also introduce thirteen principles or guide lines, some of which

0:25:01.920 --> 0:25:04.800
<v Speaker 2>we can discuss a little more in depth later, that

0:25:04.960 --> 0:25:10.320
<v Speaker 2>they that the agencies quote unquote may apply in making

0:25:10.359 --> 0:25:15.280
<v Speaker 2>their determination about whether a merger is anti competitive. Yeah.

0:25:15.280 --> 0:25:17.360
<v Speaker 1>And I have to say, in looking over those thirteen

0:25:17.400 --> 0:25:22.480
<v Speaker 1>principles or guidelines that may apply, rather than providing any

0:25:22.520 --> 0:25:25.080
<v Speaker 1>certainty for companies that are emerging to try to figure

0:25:25.119 --> 0:25:27.880
<v Speaker 1>out how to do it and whether their deal will

0:25:27.920 --> 0:25:32.160
<v Speaker 1>be considered you know, anti competitive or not, it really

0:25:32.280 --> 0:25:35.080
<v Speaker 1>makes it less certain to me. I think it adds

0:25:35.480 --> 0:25:39.000
<v Speaker 1>a lot of ambiguity. And I know again on behalf

0:25:39.040 --> 0:25:43.280
<v Speaker 1>of s IAU submitted comments to the FDC then outlining

0:25:43.359 --> 0:25:45.760
<v Speaker 1>your thoughts about these rules. So why don't you talk

0:25:45.800 --> 0:25:48.320
<v Speaker 1>through you know, how you're looking at these what your

0:25:48.359 --> 0:25:49.040
<v Speaker 1>concerns are.

0:25:49.600 --> 0:25:53.080
<v Speaker 2>Sure, so let's stipulate at the outset that you know,

0:25:53.160 --> 0:25:58.639
<v Speaker 2>conducting periodic reviews of existing policy documents and making changes

0:25:58.760 --> 0:26:03.639
<v Speaker 2>of circumstances weren't from our perspective, is good and responsible government.

0:26:03.800 --> 0:26:07.800
<v Speaker 2>So you know, you know, tweaks over time can certainly

0:26:07.880 --> 0:26:11.400
<v Speaker 2>be be a good idea and might actually be necessary

0:26:11.520 --> 0:26:13.359
<v Speaker 2>you know, as you know, as you know, as the

0:26:13.440 --> 0:26:18.520
<v Speaker 2>law develops, and as you know, economic uh theories developed,

0:26:18.640 --> 0:26:21.960
<v Speaker 2>and what have you. You know, in this specific case,

0:26:22.000 --> 0:26:26.120
<v Speaker 2>the horizontal guidelines were last updated in twenty to ten,

0:26:26.320 --> 0:26:29.640
<v Speaker 2>so it's you know, it's certainly not unreasonable to expect

0:26:29.720 --> 0:26:32.720
<v Speaker 2>or to suspect that, you know, that some updates might

0:26:32.760 --> 0:26:37.520
<v Speaker 2>be needed. That said, from our perspective, the draft Guidelines

0:26:37.680 --> 0:26:41.480
<v Speaker 2>raise a number of issues, some of which are likely

0:26:41.520 --> 0:26:46.600
<v Speaker 2>to adversely affect their persuasive value. You know, I mean,

0:26:46.600 --> 0:26:48.919
<v Speaker 2>I completely agree with you, they do not really you know,

0:26:48.960 --> 0:26:52.159
<v Speaker 2>the draft does not really provide much in the you know,

0:26:52.240 --> 0:26:54.679
<v Speaker 2>the sense of guidance for you know, for companies and

0:26:54.720 --> 0:26:57.960
<v Speaker 2>their legal advisors, and I and I suspect the you know,

0:26:58.000 --> 0:27:00.760
<v Speaker 2>that will be an issue you know, for the courts

0:27:00.760 --> 0:27:05.240
<v Speaker 2>as well. So but you know, among our concerns are

0:27:05.359 --> 0:27:08.480
<v Speaker 2>you know, first, they primarily, as you also alluded to before,

0:27:08.560 --> 0:27:13.159
<v Speaker 2>rely on old case law. The average age or the

0:27:13.200 --> 0:27:17.119
<v Speaker 2>average year of the cases cited in the guides or

0:27:17.160 --> 0:27:21.200
<v Speaker 2>the draft guidelines is nineteen eighty two, and the average

0:27:21.320 --> 0:27:26.080
<v Speaker 2>year by number of sites is nineteen seventy five. But

0:27:26.160 --> 0:27:29.119
<v Speaker 2>and I trust law today is in a completely different

0:27:29.160 --> 0:27:33.040
<v Speaker 2>place than it was forty or fifty years ago. Since

0:27:33.040 --> 0:27:36.280
<v Speaker 2>at least the early nineteen eighties, and I trust agent

0:27:36.560 --> 0:27:41.040
<v Speaker 2>enforcement has been focused primarily on price effects and whether

0:27:41.080 --> 0:27:45.280
<v Speaker 2>a proposed merger would harm consumers in a given market.

0:27:45.960 --> 0:27:49.080
<v Speaker 2>Absent a showing of such harm, the agencies and the

0:27:49.119 --> 0:27:54.000
<v Speaker 2>courts have been disinclined to condemn business conduct as anti competitive.

0:27:54.760 --> 0:27:57.720
<v Speaker 2>And you know, from our perspective, any statement of existing

0:27:57.840 --> 0:28:01.680
<v Speaker 2>law needs to acknowledge and reflect and the draft line,

0:28:01.760 --> 0:28:03.159
<v Speaker 2>the draft guidelines don't.

0:28:03.400 --> 0:28:05.320
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, and I'll just interrupt you there for a second

0:28:05.320 --> 0:28:09.280
<v Speaker 1>before you get into more additional issues here, just to

0:28:09.320 --> 0:28:13.080
<v Speaker 1>say that, you know what the main issue here is

0:28:13.119 --> 0:28:16.000
<v Speaker 1>that anti trust law is common law, meaning it's developed

0:28:16.000 --> 0:28:19.000
<v Speaker 1>by judges, it's developed by the courts. The laws themselves

0:28:19.040 --> 0:28:22.840
<v Speaker 1>are short and vague, which means that the real, the

0:28:22.880 --> 0:28:26.960
<v Speaker 1>more detailed law has been developed over many years. And

0:28:27.280 --> 0:28:31.560
<v Speaker 1>most think over time, you know, as economic analysis as

0:28:31.560 --> 0:28:34.240
<v Speaker 1>it applies to anti trust has been developed and honed,

0:28:35.520 --> 0:28:38.240
<v Speaker 1>and as courts have looked at these issues more and more,

0:28:38.280 --> 0:28:42.000
<v Speaker 1>that the law has become more sophisticated. That is, it

0:28:42.040 --> 0:28:45.040
<v Speaker 1>has advanced in a way that's been good for the economy. Now,

0:28:45.120 --> 0:28:47.680
<v Speaker 1>not everybody thinks that. Some people think that. Some people

0:28:47.720 --> 0:28:51.240
<v Speaker 1>think it's gone in completely the wrong direction and become

0:28:51.360 --> 0:28:55.120
<v Speaker 1>far too business friendly and far too antagonistic toward the

0:28:55.160 --> 0:28:57.960
<v Speaker 1>anti trust laws and what the agencies are trying to do.

0:28:58.280 --> 0:29:03.040
<v Speaker 1>But the the issue with using this older law and

0:29:03.080 --> 0:29:05.440
<v Speaker 1>basing some of these guidelines on the older law is

0:29:05.440 --> 0:29:08.640
<v Speaker 1>that we have all these new opinions that aren't necessarily

0:29:08.680 --> 0:29:12.960
<v Speaker 1>aligned in new opinions that the Supreme Court may be

0:29:13.080 --> 0:29:16.360
<v Speaker 1>more aligned with as well. Sir, I did mean to

0:29:16.360 --> 0:29:19.720
<v Speaker 1>an interrupt it, go on with what you were saying.

0:29:20.200 --> 0:29:24.520
<v Speaker 2>Absolutely, So that's our first concern. Our second concern is that,

0:29:24.760 --> 0:29:29.400
<v Speaker 2>unlike previous merger guides, these or the draft exhibits a

0:29:29.640 --> 0:29:32.320
<v Speaker 2>clear and we've talked about this, we're alluded to it before,

0:29:32.440 --> 0:29:36.760
<v Speaker 2>a clear anti merger bias, even going so far as

0:29:36.800 --> 0:29:40.360
<v Speaker 2>to claim based on Digta in a nineteen seventy three case.

0:29:40.720 --> 0:29:44.440
<v Speaker 2>And for the nerds out there, it's usb false that

0:29:44.480 --> 0:29:49.719
<v Speaker 2>the antitrust laws reflect a preference for internal growth over acquisition.

0:29:51.080 --> 0:29:54.320
<v Speaker 2>But there's simply no basis, either in law or precedent

0:29:54.400 --> 0:30:01.480
<v Speaker 2>for that assertion. Add to this that the ft TC herself,

0:30:01.920 --> 0:30:05.040
<v Speaker 2>in a recent interview, set that ninety eight percent of

0:30:05.160 --> 0:30:10.280
<v Speaker 2>mergers rate raise no anti competitive concerns and that only

0:30:10.320 --> 0:30:15.800
<v Speaker 2>a fraction of the remaining two percent merit legal challenge.

0:30:16.280 --> 0:30:19.640
<v Speaker 2>And third, we also believed it is deeply troubling that

0:30:19.720 --> 0:30:23.320
<v Speaker 2>the draft guidelines suggests that the agency is enjoy essentially

0:30:23.440 --> 0:30:28.760
<v Speaker 2>unlimited discretion in their review of proposed deals. Merger review,

0:30:28.880 --> 0:30:31.680
<v Speaker 2>as you know better than anyone, JEN is not an

0:30:31.720 --> 0:30:35.520
<v Speaker 2>exact science, and so it is necessary for the agencies

0:30:35.680 --> 0:30:39.840
<v Speaker 2>to have some lead when they're making decisions in individual cases.

0:30:40.800 --> 0:30:43.080
<v Speaker 2>But that is very different from saying that there is

0:30:43.120 --> 0:30:46.520
<v Speaker 2>no limit on that discretion, you know.

0:30:46.600 --> 0:30:49.000
<v Speaker 1>And it's also very different from how a judge might

0:30:49.040 --> 0:30:51.560
<v Speaker 1>look at these things. I mean, the agencies themselves cannot

0:30:51.640 --> 0:30:53.800
<v Speaker 1>block a deal. They have to go to court and

0:30:53.840 --> 0:30:55.400
<v Speaker 1>they have to get in order from the court, and

0:30:55.440 --> 0:30:57.400
<v Speaker 1>a judge may look at these things in a very

0:30:57.440 --> 0:31:03.200
<v Speaker 1>different way, particularly given that, let's say these guidelines get

0:31:03.200 --> 0:31:05.640
<v Speaker 1>implement implemented, they're going to be brand new and quite

0:31:05.640 --> 0:31:08.800
<v Speaker 1>different from what these judges have seen in the past.

0:31:08.920 --> 0:31:12.880
<v Speaker 1>So let's I know that sii A has some concerns

0:31:12.920 --> 0:31:15.720
<v Speaker 1>about specific of those thirteen guidelines. We're not going to

0:31:15.720 --> 0:31:17.800
<v Speaker 1>go through all of them. We're just going to highlight

0:31:17.840 --> 0:31:20.320
<v Speaker 1>the ones I think and I agree with what you've

0:31:20.320 --> 0:31:23.080
<v Speaker 1>pulled out in our discussions about sort of the ones

0:31:23.120 --> 0:31:27.120
<v Speaker 1>that are of the greatest concern to companies and industries.

0:31:27.360 --> 0:31:29.840
<v Speaker 1>So why don't you go ahead and talk through those

0:31:29.880 --> 0:31:33.120
<v Speaker 1>guidelines that for which you have concerns.

0:31:33.560 --> 0:31:38.320
<v Speaker 2>Sure, I'll flag three of the of the thirteen. So

0:31:39.920 --> 0:31:42.440
<v Speaker 2>the first guideline that you know that I'm going to

0:31:42.480 --> 0:31:46.680
<v Speaker 2>flag here is guideline for Guideline four is concerned with

0:31:46.720 --> 0:31:50.560
<v Speaker 2>the possibility that a merger might eliminate a potential entrant

0:31:51.720 --> 0:31:56.400
<v Speaker 2>in a concentrated market. The relevant standard would be a

0:31:56.640 --> 0:32:03.440
<v Speaker 2>reasonable properability of entry shown through either objective evidence the

0:32:03.440 --> 0:32:07.560
<v Speaker 2>companies has the size or the means to enter, or

0:32:07.800 --> 0:32:11.400
<v Speaker 2>subjective evidence the company has at some point thought about

0:32:11.920 --> 0:32:17.200
<v Speaker 2>entering the market. But for the merger, we think there

0:32:17.240 --> 0:32:19.760
<v Speaker 2>are a couple of problems here. You know, one, a

0:32:19.880 --> 0:32:24.240
<v Speaker 2>large number of pro competitive mergers involved a company buying

0:32:24.320 --> 0:32:27.840
<v Speaker 2>a complementary serve as a product, or, as we talked

0:32:27.840 --> 0:32:32.560
<v Speaker 2>about before, a startup that augments its existing offerings in

0:32:32.680 --> 0:32:36.600
<v Speaker 2>order to better serve the needs of their customers. What's more,

0:32:36.800 --> 0:32:41.680
<v Speaker 2>expanding the potential competitor theory in this way would allow

0:32:41.800 --> 0:32:47.240
<v Speaker 2>the agencies to conjure a virtually unlimited number of scenarios

0:32:47.280 --> 0:32:51.840
<v Speaker 2>where a merger could be deemed anti competitive.

0:32:52.400 --> 0:32:54.239
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, and you know, to some extent, I see this

0:32:54.280 --> 0:32:56.360
<v Speaker 1>as a bit of a response to what happened when

0:32:56.520 --> 0:32:59.800
<v Speaker 1>the FTC tried to block Meta from acquiring a small

0:32:59.840 --> 0:33:02.760
<v Speaker 1>vertual reality company called Within. I mean, really that this

0:33:02.880 --> 0:33:05.240
<v Speaker 1>is exactly what they used in court. They said, Hey,

0:33:05.240 --> 0:33:08.520
<v Speaker 1>it's Meta, they have unlimited resources and talent, and if

0:33:08.560 --> 0:33:10.680
<v Speaker 1>they wanted to get into it. I should say that

0:33:10.720 --> 0:33:13.440
<v Speaker 1>what Within had was a virtual reality app for fitness

0:33:13.440 --> 0:33:16.600
<v Speaker 1>purposes that was very popular, and they said, if Meta

0:33:16.640 --> 0:33:19.560
<v Speaker 1>wants to get into virtual reality apps for fitness, they

0:33:19.560 --> 0:33:21.480
<v Speaker 1>could do this on their own. They have the means,

0:33:21.520 --> 0:33:22.960
<v Speaker 1>and you know, at one point in time they kind

0:33:22.960 --> 0:33:25.760
<v Speaker 1>of thought about it, and the judge said, look, you

0:33:25.760 --> 0:33:28.120
<v Speaker 1>know that's not really enough. I mean, you didn't really

0:33:28.160 --> 0:33:31.360
<v Speaker 1>show that there there is actually the illumination of a

0:33:31.400 --> 0:33:35.800
<v Speaker 1>potential entrant here. There just wasn't sufficient evidence that Meta

0:33:36.440 --> 0:33:39.320
<v Speaker 1>could or you know, no matter how many resources it had,

0:33:39.400 --> 0:33:42.800
<v Speaker 1>or would actually do this, and it was simply intending

0:33:42.840 --> 0:33:46.959
<v Speaker 1>to expand what it offered with respect to virtual virtual

0:33:47.000 --> 0:33:50.240
<v Speaker 1>reality types of apps by moving into fitness, by buying

0:33:50.280 --> 0:33:52.560
<v Speaker 1>within And certainly, you know a company has a right

0:33:53.080 --> 0:33:57.520
<v Speaker 1>to expand its product offerings non organically. You know, there

0:33:57.640 --> 0:34:00.200
<v Speaker 1>is no rule of law that says that companies have

0:34:00.280 --> 0:34:02.120
<v Speaker 1>to do everything organically.

0:34:03.760 --> 0:34:04.000
<v Speaker 2>Right.

0:34:04.080 --> 0:34:07.520
<v Speaker 1>So this seems to me a response in a way

0:34:08.200 --> 0:34:11.719
<v Speaker 1>to the failure in that case, what's the next guideline

0:34:11.760 --> 0:34:13.960
<v Speaker 1>for which you have some significant concerns?

0:34:15.200 --> 0:34:18.480
<v Speaker 2>So we also we also have concerns about Guidelines seven,

0:34:20.640 --> 0:34:24.960
<v Speaker 2>where the agencies must determine whether a merger involving an

0:34:25.000 --> 0:34:31.520
<v Speaker 2>already dominant firm may substantially reduce the competitive structure of

0:34:31.560 --> 0:34:36.760
<v Speaker 2>an industry. Among relevant factors are that they would according

0:34:36.800 --> 0:34:40.000
<v Speaker 2>to these proposed changes to the guides, they would look at,

0:34:40.160 --> 0:34:43.160
<v Speaker 2>or whether one or both firms have the power to

0:34:43.280 --> 0:34:48.520
<v Speaker 2>raise prices, reduce quality, or one of the parties has

0:34:48.560 --> 0:34:53.080
<v Speaker 2>at least a thirty percent market share. So the thirty

0:34:53.120 --> 0:34:57.200
<v Speaker 2>percent market share in particular is really puzzling because that

0:34:57.320 --> 0:35:00.719
<v Speaker 2>is not the threshold that is usually used to determine

0:35:00.719 --> 0:35:05.840
<v Speaker 2>dominance under US law. The guideline is also written in

0:35:05.880 --> 0:35:08.680
<v Speaker 2>a way that would allow the agencies to challenge essentially

0:35:08.719 --> 0:35:12.960
<v Speaker 2>any merger where a company of non trivial size seeks

0:35:13.040 --> 0:35:17.000
<v Speaker 2>to merge with another company. And what is left unexplained

0:35:17.080 --> 0:35:20.760
<v Speaker 2>is how this guideline fits with the consumer welfare standard

0:35:20.760 --> 0:35:24.080
<v Speaker 2>that I referenced earlier. The whole point of what is

0:35:24.160 --> 0:35:28.319
<v Speaker 2>called competing on the merits is that companies seek to

0:35:28.400 --> 0:35:31.520
<v Speaker 2>gain an advantage on their rivals. As long as the

0:35:31.560 --> 0:35:35.600
<v Speaker 2>post merger firm generates business benefits that are crue to consumers,

0:35:36.360 --> 0:35:39.160
<v Speaker 2>we believe the mergers should be presumptively legal.

0:35:41.360 --> 0:35:44.640
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, I would say that that thirty percent certainly is

0:35:44.760 --> 0:35:48.760
<v Speaker 1>lower than what courts have said in the last twenty

0:35:48.840 --> 0:35:51.200
<v Speaker 1>or thirty years with respect to a firm actually having

0:35:51.320 --> 0:35:54.520
<v Speaker 1>market power, and not to mention monopoly power, it's nowhere

0:35:54.520 --> 0:35:59.480
<v Speaker 1>near what's needed in the precedent for monopoly power and

0:35:59.520 --> 0:36:02.760
<v Speaker 1>definitely below what most would think of as market power.

0:36:03.440 --> 0:36:07.760
<v Speaker 1>So that has an impact on companies going forward today

0:36:07.840 --> 0:36:12.360
<v Speaker 1>to deals for sure. Let's get into that third guideline

0:36:12.400 --> 0:36:13.520
<v Speaker 1>that you mentioned.

0:36:14.560 --> 0:36:18.080
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, so the third guideline excuse me that we have

0:36:18.120 --> 0:36:22.759
<v Speaker 2>concerns about as Guideline ten, which focuses on mergers that

0:36:22.880 --> 0:36:27.719
<v Speaker 2>involve one or more multi sided platforms. So essentially, tech

0:36:27.760 --> 0:36:32.600
<v Speaker 2>mergers and our concerns here are twofold. First, you know,

0:36:32.640 --> 0:36:35.279
<v Speaker 2>it's a principal matter we think it's ill advised to

0:36:35.440 --> 0:36:40.480
<v Speaker 2>use generally applicable guidelines to single out specific industries for

0:36:40.600 --> 0:36:46.040
<v Speaker 2>special attention and treatment. And second, the guideline uses the

0:36:46.160 --> 0:36:49.960
<v Speaker 2>term conflict of interest in a way that has no

0:36:50.080 --> 0:36:55.359
<v Speaker 2>connection to that term's traditional meaning legal meaning. Here it

0:36:55.400 --> 0:36:59.360
<v Speaker 2>is used to describe the very common practice where a

0:36:59.520 --> 0:37:04.279
<v Speaker 2>company gives preference to its own products or services over

0:37:04.360 --> 0:37:08.239
<v Speaker 2>those of its competitors. And I think it's important to

0:37:08.280 --> 0:37:11.000
<v Speaker 2>point out here that you know, only in very rare

0:37:11.080 --> 0:37:16.040
<v Speaker 2>circumstances is that considered a violation of the anti trust laws.

0:37:16.719 --> 0:37:20.280
<v Speaker 2>But even more importantly, it is not a recognized element

0:37:20.440 --> 0:37:25.160
<v Speaker 2>of merger review. And so it really is a very

0:37:25.200 --> 0:37:30.000
<v Speaker 2>strange guideline to throw in there, although of course it's

0:37:30.120 --> 0:37:32.520
<v Speaker 2>you know, it sort of fits with the overall sort

0:37:32.560 --> 0:37:34.960
<v Speaker 2>of tenor of what they're trying to do. And certainly,

0:37:35.239 --> 0:37:39.520
<v Speaker 2>you know, one of their animating uh you know forces,

0:37:39.719 --> 0:37:42.640
<v Speaker 2>or one of the animating forces behind this whole exercise,

0:37:42.680 --> 0:37:45.719
<v Speaker 2>of course, is to to go after, you know, a

0:37:45.840 --> 0:37:47.160
<v Speaker 2>tech merger.

0:37:47.320 --> 0:37:50.200
<v Speaker 1>So that's just going to see this one seems very

0:37:50.239 --> 0:37:53.200
<v Speaker 1>focused on trying to stop tech platforms from being able

0:37:53.239 --> 0:37:59.000
<v Speaker 1>to uh, you know, further engage in fur their acquisition activity.

0:37:59.040 --> 0:38:00.399
<v Speaker 2>Exactly right.

0:38:00.800 --> 0:38:03.760
<v Speaker 1>And the interesting thing is that, you know, there's some

0:38:03.840 --> 0:38:07.600
<v Speaker 1>acknowledgment in an implicit way, I guess by the FTC

0:38:07.680 --> 0:38:11.799
<v Speaker 1>that self preferencing conduct doesn't necessarily violate US anti DRUSS

0:38:11.880 --> 0:38:14.799
<v Speaker 1>laws because we heard for so long two years or

0:38:14.840 --> 0:38:18.480
<v Speaker 1>more about this potential big, huge anti dress lawsuit against Amazon,

0:38:19.000 --> 0:38:21.799
<v Speaker 1>and one of the elements of that lawsuit might have

0:38:21.840 --> 0:38:26.560
<v Speaker 1>been self preferencing conduct by Amazon, but when the suit

0:38:26.640 --> 0:38:30.759
<v Speaker 1>was brought, that wasn't part of it. So there's some

0:38:31.080 --> 0:38:33.480
<v Speaker 1>so this is a way to sort of, I don't know,

0:38:33.560 --> 0:38:36.600
<v Speaker 1>insert that into the law in my mind, or at

0:38:36.640 --> 0:38:39.520
<v Speaker 1>least connect it to merger activity and stop mergers on

0:38:39.560 --> 0:38:42.640
<v Speaker 1>that basis. And you know, again it's this one to

0:38:42.680 --> 0:38:45.480
<v Speaker 1>me is pretty vague, you know. And so these are

0:38:45.520 --> 0:38:49.719
<v Speaker 1>just three of the thirteen principles. And there are actually,

0:38:50.080 --> 0:38:53.200
<v Speaker 1>you know, many others in the anti trust community that

0:38:53.640 --> 0:38:56.759
<v Speaker 1>aren't necessarily aligned with what the FTC and DJ are

0:38:56.800 --> 0:38:59.799
<v Speaker 1>doing here have expressed concerns about other principles. These aren't,

0:39:00.440 --> 0:39:03.240
<v Speaker 1>by any event, you know, the only ones that could

0:39:03.320 --> 0:39:06.120
<v Speaker 1>cause an impact on big companies. But the three I

0:39:06.160 --> 0:39:08.640
<v Speaker 1>think that mort had really wanted to highlight, and I

0:39:08.680 --> 0:39:13.640
<v Speaker 1>agree with that. But let's talk about you know, let's

0:39:13.680 --> 0:39:17.200
<v Speaker 1>just assume, I mean, these are still all proposed, their

0:39:17.280 --> 0:39:21.280
<v Speaker 1>comments are being accepted. They may not be implemented as written.

0:39:23.040 --> 0:39:25.879
<v Speaker 1>We don't know necessarily exactly what the final product will

0:39:25.880 --> 0:39:29.920
<v Speaker 1>look like. But just assuming that they are implemented as proposed. Now,

0:39:29.960 --> 0:39:33.040
<v Speaker 1>from a practical standpoint for companies that are going to

0:39:33.080 --> 0:39:35.080
<v Speaker 1>be trying to do transactions going forward, what do you

0:39:35.120 --> 0:39:36.759
<v Speaker 1>think the biggest impact is going to be.

0:39:38.400 --> 0:39:43.319
<v Speaker 2>Well, I mean, I think uncertainty it is, you know,

0:39:43.520 --> 0:39:47.080
<v Speaker 2>our overall takeaway is you know, as you mentioned before,

0:39:47.160 --> 0:39:52.560
<v Speaker 2>I mean the animating you know, principle behind this is

0:39:52.560 --> 0:39:55.120
<v Speaker 2>is to I mean, I think it's hard to reach

0:39:55.200 --> 0:39:59.719
<v Speaker 2>a conclusion other than it is to chill merger activity

0:40:00.160 --> 0:40:03.880
<v Speaker 2>by making it as ownerous. You know, it's difficult and

0:40:04.000 --> 0:40:09.480
<v Speaker 2>uncertainty or uncertain uh for interest at parties to to

0:40:09.600 --> 0:40:12.799
<v Speaker 2>engage in. So I think the you know, the uncertainty

0:40:13.160 --> 0:40:19.240
<v Speaker 2>is it's going to be quite significant. Uh if these uh,

0:40:19.800 --> 0:40:23.279
<v Speaker 2>you know, if they end up promulgating no guides that

0:40:23.320 --> 0:40:29.080
<v Speaker 2>are anywhere close to, uh, what the proposal is. But

0:40:29.200 --> 0:40:33.440
<v Speaker 2>we also believe that the closer that the new guidelines

0:40:34.280 --> 0:40:38.120
<v Speaker 2>are to the draft, and as we talked about earlier,

0:40:38.120 --> 0:40:42.000
<v Speaker 2>its departure from existing law, uh, the higher the likelihood

0:40:42.040 --> 0:40:46.280
<v Speaker 2>that they will be subject to a pre application judicial

0:40:46.280 --> 0:40:49.960
<v Speaker 2>review and a possible injunction. Ah.

0:40:50.080 --> 0:40:52.200
<v Speaker 1>You mean you think somebody will challenge them in court?

0:40:52.840 --> 0:40:53.360
<v Speaker 2>Yeah?

0:40:53.560 --> 0:40:56.319
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, And I think even if they aren't challenged in

0:40:56.400 --> 0:40:58.800
<v Speaker 1>court or that drags on and on and in the

0:40:58.840 --> 0:41:02.680
<v Speaker 1>meantime they're implemented, and you know, I wonder how judges

0:41:02.719 --> 0:41:05.720
<v Speaker 1>will treat them going forward when the FDC or DJ

0:41:05.920 --> 0:41:09.279
<v Speaker 1>does sue to try to block a deal, because so far,

0:41:09.440 --> 0:41:12.239
<v Speaker 1>you know, I've always seen that judges find the guidelines

0:41:12.280 --> 0:41:16.080
<v Speaker 1>to be quite persuasive. But with such a big change,

0:41:16.840 --> 0:41:19.160
<v Speaker 1>and it clearly seems to be pushing a view of

0:41:19.200 --> 0:41:24.240
<v Speaker 1>the law that the FDC would like to see, would

0:41:24.280 --> 0:41:28.000
<v Speaker 1>like to see, rather than probably what exists today, I'm

0:41:28.000 --> 0:41:31.480
<v Speaker 1>not really sure how they'll be received by judges who

0:41:31.520 --> 0:41:32.560
<v Speaker 1>are looking at these deals.

0:41:33.880 --> 0:41:36.000
<v Speaker 2>I mean, I completely agree, Yeah, And.

0:41:35.960 --> 0:41:38.440
<v Speaker 1>Do you think you know, I've seen both sides of this,

0:41:38.640 --> 0:41:41.640
<v Speaker 1>But it seemed to me when I first read these

0:41:42.160 --> 0:41:45.680
<v Speaker 1>that more deals that are filed would be subjected to

0:41:45.800 --> 0:41:50.280
<v Speaker 1>lawsuits to block than are today. And I don't really

0:41:50.840 --> 0:41:53.800
<v Speaker 1>and that may or may not be true, because maybe

0:41:53.840 --> 0:41:57.120
<v Speaker 1>also these guidelines will allow them to better screen out

0:41:57.520 --> 0:42:01.120
<v Speaker 1>those deals that they initially thought my have anti competitive

0:42:01.120 --> 0:42:03.759
<v Speaker 1>problems but then determined don't. But it seems to me

0:42:03.880 --> 0:42:06.520
<v Speaker 1>that the FTC and d o J are both really

0:42:06.560 --> 0:42:09.640
<v Speaker 1>really at the limit of their resources today with respect,

0:42:09.680 --> 0:42:11.319
<v Speaker 1>and I'm not sure how they handle that.

0:42:12.560 --> 0:42:15.440
<v Speaker 2>I mean, I completely agree, and that is I mean,

0:42:15.560 --> 0:42:18.360
<v Speaker 2>that is there. I mean, that is an open question.

0:42:19.239 --> 0:42:23.759
<v Speaker 2>There definitely are. There are resource constraints at the end

0:42:23.840 --> 0:42:27.000
<v Speaker 2>of the day, no matter what the guides say, Uh,

0:42:27.160 --> 0:42:29.919
<v Speaker 2>that will limit uh, you know, what they can do

0:42:30.400 --> 0:42:35.279
<v Speaker 2>in terms of actually bringing cases uh and uh and

0:42:35.360 --> 0:42:40.120
<v Speaker 2>proceeding to you know, second requests and and uh and

0:42:40.200 --> 0:42:42.960
<v Speaker 2>in depth investigations. I mean, there just are limits to

0:42:43.000 --> 0:42:44.799
<v Speaker 2>what they can do. But that of course does not

0:42:44.920 --> 0:42:48.880
<v Speaker 2>change the fact that you know, it will inject a

0:42:48.920 --> 0:42:53.120
<v Speaker 2>lot of uncertainty uh companies because you don't know and

0:42:53.800 --> 0:42:55.480
<v Speaker 2>you know, like we talked about before, I mean, how

0:42:55.520 --> 0:42:59.400
<v Speaker 2>much guidance do these guides really provide. And so you

0:42:59.480 --> 0:43:02.680
<v Speaker 2>don't know as a company, as a as a law

0:43:02.760 --> 0:43:05.640
<v Speaker 2>firm that's advising these companies, I mean you don't know

0:43:06.640 --> 0:43:09.920
<v Speaker 2>what you know, what specific deals they're gonna you know,

0:43:10.520 --> 0:43:16.000
<v Speaker 2>zero in on and and and and so that that

0:43:16.160 --> 0:43:21.960
<v Speaker 2>uncertainty alone, we believe will have a significant chilling effect

0:43:22.160 --> 0:43:25.000
<v Speaker 2>on on m an A activity.

0:43:25.080 --> 0:43:28.280
<v Speaker 1>But it also seems to me that companies, big companies,

0:43:28.680 --> 0:43:31.960
<v Speaker 1>big companies with resources, time and and the wherewithal to

0:43:32.040 --> 0:43:36.480
<v Speaker 1>do this, will just choose to go forward and realize

0:43:36.520 --> 0:43:39.040
<v Speaker 1>they just will have to fight in court, but that

0:43:39.200 --> 0:43:40.880
<v Speaker 1>if they do so, they have a good chance of

0:43:40.880 --> 0:43:42.480
<v Speaker 1>winning absolutely.

0:43:42.520 --> 0:43:45.239
<v Speaker 2>And I think you know, I've talked to legal advisors

0:43:45.280 --> 0:43:50.799
<v Speaker 2>who actually are of that mindset, uh, you know, who

0:43:50.920 --> 0:43:54.319
<v Speaker 2>essentially say, you know, if you have the if you

0:43:54.400 --> 0:43:57.320
<v Speaker 2>have the wherewithal too you know, to fight this out.

0:43:57.520 --> 0:44:02.879
<v Speaker 2>If the agencies decide to sue, go ahead, because they're

0:44:03.000 --> 0:44:05.759
<v Speaker 2>just they're not gonna be They're not going to be

0:44:05.880 --> 0:44:09.920
<v Speaker 2>able to uh, you know, to bring that many cases

0:44:11.360 --> 0:44:14.640
<v Speaker 2>and and and even cases they you know they can

0:44:14.800 --> 0:44:20.600
<v Speaker 2>bring if you know, if you know they pursue. Uh,

0:44:20.840 --> 0:44:23.759
<v Speaker 2>you know, these theories that are sort of enunciated in

0:44:23.840 --> 0:44:28.200
<v Speaker 2>the guides. You know, a lot of you know, it's

0:44:28.280 --> 0:44:31.920
<v Speaker 2>questionable how many courts will actually buy into them, and

0:44:32.000 --> 0:44:35.520
<v Speaker 2>so and so they're you know, there is a fair

0:44:36.600 --> 0:44:39.600
<v Speaker 2>likelihood that you know, that the that the agencies at

0:44:39.600 --> 0:44:40.719
<v Speaker 2>the end of the day are going to end up

0:44:40.719 --> 0:44:44.520
<v Speaker 2>shooting themselves in the foot by bringing cases that they

0:44:44.520 --> 0:44:49.240
<v Speaker 2>can't win and so, you know, wasting resources and also

0:44:49.400 --> 0:44:54.759
<v Speaker 2>is you know, essentially you know, uh, losing credibility in

0:44:54.840 --> 0:44:57.919
<v Speaker 2>the process. So so that's I mean, that's certainly one,

0:44:58.440 --> 0:45:00.360
<v Speaker 2>you know, one potential avenue.

0:45:00.200 --> 0:45:03.080
<v Speaker 1>Or even failing to win cases that they should win

0:45:03.160 --> 0:45:06.279
<v Speaker 1>because the deal is anti competitive, but they're stretched so

0:45:06.440 --> 0:45:09.000
<v Speaker 1>thin that they're just not able to carry their burden

0:45:09.040 --> 0:45:11.759
<v Speaker 1>in court. You know, they're not able to do the

0:45:11.880 --> 0:45:14.960
<v Speaker 1>job because they're so limited in resources. And that you know,

0:45:15.040 --> 0:45:18.760
<v Speaker 1>that has the opposite impact because certainly there are definitely

0:45:18.800 --> 0:45:21.440
<v Speaker 1>deals that are anti competitive and probably should be blocked

0:45:21.880 --> 0:45:25.319
<v Speaker 1>and it may prevent that from happening. So it'll be

0:45:25.320 --> 0:45:27.319
<v Speaker 1>really interesting to see how this all plays out. But

0:45:28.080 --> 0:45:29.920
<v Speaker 1>we are getting close on time, and I did have

0:45:29.960 --> 0:45:32.800
<v Speaker 1>one more topic because it's really interesting, and you brought

0:45:32.800 --> 0:45:34.760
<v Speaker 1>this up more to something you wanted to talk about

0:45:34.760 --> 0:45:37.319
<v Speaker 1>and I think it's interesting because not that many people

0:45:37.360 --> 0:45:39.799
<v Speaker 1>are talking about it. But we've seen over the last

0:45:39.840 --> 0:45:42.560
<v Speaker 1>couple of years that state anti trust enforcers that really

0:45:42.600 --> 0:45:44.840
<v Speaker 1>have just as much power as the FDC and DJ

0:45:45.360 --> 0:45:48.760
<v Speaker 1>to go after companies have really stepped up. They've become

0:45:48.800 --> 0:45:52.040
<v Speaker 1>more aggressive. They're taking things matters into their own hands.

0:45:52.080 --> 0:45:55.120
<v Speaker 1>And not only are they bringing enforcement actions or joining

0:45:55.200 --> 0:45:59.200
<v Speaker 1>enforcement actions with the federal agencies, but they're also talking

0:45:59.239 --> 0:46:01.360
<v Speaker 1>about their own life legislation. And part of that is

0:46:01.400 --> 0:46:04.200
<v Speaker 1>because and you and I talked a whole lot last

0:46:04.239 --> 0:46:07.440
<v Speaker 1>year about some legislation that was pending in Congress that

0:46:07.560 --> 0:46:10.360
<v Speaker 1>actually looked like it was coming close that would have

0:46:10.360 --> 0:46:13.080
<v Speaker 1>had a serious impact on some of the clients of SIIA.

0:46:13.520 --> 0:46:13.759
<v Speaker 2>You know.

0:46:13.920 --> 0:46:16.840
<v Speaker 1>One of them was about regulating apps and it was

0:46:16.880 --> 0:46:18.880
<v Speaker 1>called the Open App Markets Act, and the other was

0:46:19.520 --> 0:46:21.879
<v Speaker 1>something that would have banned self preferencing. And these things

0:46:21.920 --> 0:46:26.280
<v Speaker 1>actually got voted out of Senate committees. But then after

0:46:26.560 --> 0:46:29.040
<v Speaker 1>the election and we now have a divide to Congress,

0:46:29.040 --> 0:46:31.839
<v Speaker 1>that kind of the pressure has really waned, But the

0:46:31.840 --> 0:46:36.600
<v Speaker 1>pressure hasn't waned from states. So in particular, we're looking

0:46:36.600 --> 0:46:39.640
<v Speaker 1>at New York and New York's talking a little bit

0:46:39.640 --> 0:46:42.439
<v Speaker 1>about some legislation that's very interesting. I think it goes

0:46:42.480 --> 0:46:44.480
<v Speaker 1>pretty far. Do you want to talk about what that is? Mart?

0:46:45.200 --> 0:46:49.120
<v Speaker 2>Sure? So New York has what they call or would

0:46:49.120 --> 0:46:52.640
<v Speaker 2>you guys call the twenty first Century and I Trust Act.

0:46:54.160 --> 0:46:58.000
<v Speaker 2>And this act would do three things. It would create

0:46:58.120 --> 0:47:03.000
<v Speaker 2>a state level pre your notification obligation somewhat akin to

0:47:03.080 --> 0:47:07.560
<v Speaker 2>the hs R Act, but at a much lower threshold.

0:47:08.440 --> 0:47:13.160
<v Speaker 2>It would prohibit monopolization and attempt at monopolization similar to

0:47:13.239 --> 0:47:17.200
<v Speaker 2>the Sherman Act. And it would introduce an abuse of

0:47:17.320 --> 0:47:21.959
<v Speaker 2>dominance standard that is completely foreign to to US law

0:47:23.320 --> 0:47:23.799
<v Speaker 2>this law.

0:47:23.840 --> 0:47:25.880
<v Speaker 1>Would you talk about that? Talk about that a little bit,

0:47:25.880 --> 0:47:28.279
<v Speaker 1>because you really know, you know, you have such great

0:47:28.320 --> 0:47:31.880
<v Speaker 1>EU training and that is sort of an EU concept.

0:47:31.880 --> 0:47:33.600
<v Speaker 1>So talk about what that what that is?

0:47:34.560 --> 0:47:40.960
<v Speaker 2>Yeah? So, so the so the abuse of dominance standard is,

0:47:41.760 --> 0:47:44.960
<v Speaker 2>I mean, it's the prevalent or or the predominant standard

0:47:45.560 --> 0:47:48.759
<v Speaker 2>that's used in the EU and the and the New

0:47:48.840 --> 0:47:53.800
<v Speaker 2>York law or the New York Bill has its language

0:47:53.840 --> 0:47:58.480
<v Speaker 2>is modeled essentially on the on on Article one oh

0:47:58.520 --> 0:48:02.000
<v Speaker 2>two of the EU Treaty, and it appears to have

0:48:02.239 --> 0:48:05.719
<v Speaker 2>a broader scope than Section two of the Sherman Act,

0:48:06.800 --> 0:48:10.000
<v Speaker 2>and so under the New York Bill, dominance can be

0:48:10.160 --> 0:48:15.759
<v Speaker 2>established through either direct evidence, you know, and that can

0:48:15.800 --> 0:48:18.920
<v Speaker 2>be higher prices, it can be lower input, which is

0:48:18.960 --> 0:48:22.000
<v Speaker 2>not typically how you would try to prove monopolization under

0:48:22.040 --> 0:48:25.840
<v Speaker 2>the Sherman Act, or indirect evidence in the form of

0:48:25.920 --> 0:48:30.680
<v Speaker 2>market shares. But the threshold that are suggested in the bill,

0:48:30.800 --> 0:48:34.400
<v Speaker 2>which are forty percent for sellers and thirty percent for buyers,

0:48:35.040 --> 0:48:38.319
<v Speaker 2>is a centric but it is substantially lower than what

0:48:38.520 --> 0:48:43.400
<v Speaker 2>is required under the Sherman Act and the bill, So

0:48:43.480 --> 0:48:46.000
<v Speaker 2>that's the abuse part of it, the dominance part of it.

0:48:47.080 --> 0:48:49.880
<v Speaker 2>The bill has a non exhaustive list of what you

0:48:49.920 --> 0:48:53.960
<v Speaker 2>know of what might constitute abuse, but it includes several

0:48:54.000 --> 0:48:58.480
<v Speaker 2>practices such as refusal to deal that are not illegal

0:48:58.640 --> 0:49:02.880
<v Speaker 2>under a federal law and and proof of pro competitive effects.

0:49:03.440 --> 0:49:07.080
<v Speaker 2>Unlike under a traditional Sherman Sherman Acts Section two rule

0:49:07.120 --> 0:49:10.239
<v Speaker 2>of reason analysis would not be a defense. So that's

0:49:10.320 --> 0:49:16.120
<v Speaker 2>also you know, fairly fairly significant. I think it's also

0:49:16.560 --> 0:49:20.880
<v Speaker 2>really really important to understand that the abuse of dominant

0:49:20.920 --> 0:49:25.799
<v Speaker 2>standard as it's used in Europe UH is you know,

0:49:26.200 --> 0:49:29.719
<v Speaker 2>was created in and has been applied in enforced in

0:49:30.360 --> 0:49:34.560
<v Speaker 2>circumstances that are vastly different than what we have here.

0:49:35.040 --> 0:49:39.320
<v Speaker 2>So for one, it is enforced by an administrative agency,

0:49:39.560 --> 0:49:42.520
<v Speaker 2>so in the EU would be the EU Commission, or

0:49:42.560 --> 0:49:45.880
<v Speaker 2>it could be a an enforcement agency and a member

0:49:46.120 --> 0:49:49.560
<v Speaker 2>EU member state which is under an obligation to act

0:49:49.680 --> 0:49:52.520
<v Speaker 2>only in the public interest. So that would be the

0:49:52.560 --> 0:49:56.200
<v Speaker 2>same as obviously the FTC here the dog and a

0:49:56.280 --> 0:50:01.160
<v Speaker 2>trust division or a state and I trust in enforcement agency.

0:50:02.239 --> 0:50:06.720
<v Speaker 2>But here, you know, the New York bill UH would

0:50:06.760 --> 0:50:10.880
<v Speaker 2>open you know, would essentially open this to the enforcement

0:50:10.920 --> 0:50:14.120
<v Speaker 2>of the abuse of dominance standard to private enforcement actions

0:50:14.640 --> 0:50:19.560
<v Speaker 2>by actors whose sole responsibility is to their shareholders. And

0:50:19.600 --> 0:50:23.560
<v Speaker 2>it would permit class actions, and it would permit recovery

0:50:23.600 --> 0:50:27.880
<v Speaker 2>of trouble damages, none of which are available to a

0:50:27.960 --> 0:50:33.760
<v Speaker 2>claim if in Europe. And because of this, we urge,

0:50:34.200 --> 0:50:38.520
<v Speaker 2>you know, great caution before sitting down this path, because

0:50:38.560 --> 0:50:43.680
<v Speaker 2>we believe that the risks of series unintended consequences is

0:50:44.160 --> 0:50:44.800
<v Speaker 2>quite high.

0:50:45.760 --> 0:50:48.759
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, it's a real it's a real distinctive change from

0:50:48.920 --> 0:50:51.920
<v Speaker 1>federal antitrust law, and most state anti trust laws kind

0:50:51.920 --> 0:50:54.520
<v Speaker 1>of align with the federal laws now. And we have

0:50:54.719 --> 0:50:57.759
<v Speaker 1>seen what can happen when a state's law is a

0:50:57.840 --> 0:51:00.920
<v Speaker 1>bit broader. So, for instance, when Epic Game sued Apple

0:51:00.960 --> 0:51:03.839
<v Speaker 1>and that went through trial in the Northern District of California,

0:51:04.320 --> 0:51:07.120
<v Speaker 1>even though the judge found that Apple hadn't violated any

0:51:07.160 --> 0:51:10.359
<v Speaker 1>federal anti trust laws by its conduct, it did find

0:51:10.360 --> 0:51:12.960
<v Speaker 1>that at least one aspect of something Apple was doing

0:51:13.360 --> 0:51:17.600
<v Speaker 1>violated a California state law against unfair competition, And so

0:51:17.960 --> 0:51:21.080
<v Speaker 1>that was sort of a sword of a slightly broader interpretation,

0:51:21.239 --> 0:51:26.319
<v Speaker 1>and so it puts companies really at risk when the

0:51:26.320 --> 0:51:28.239
<v Speaker 1>cases are brought under both the state law and the

0:51:28.239 --> 0:51:32.800
<v Speaker 1>federal law. Absolutely, all right, now we've been really sufficiently nerdy.

0:51:32.800 --> 0:51:35.640
<v Speaker 1>We've been very nerdy. You cannot be nerdy when you're

0:51:35.680 --> 0:51:37.840
<v Speaker 1>talking about anti trust. So I'm going to do something.

0:51:38.120 --> 0:51:40.040
<v Speaker 1>We're going to do something here that's also nerdy, but

0:51:40.080 --> 0:51:43.000
<v Speaker 1>in a very different way, more fun. So it's your

0:51:43.080 --> 0:51:46.320
<v Speaker 1>last question, and that question is if you were stranded

0:51:46.360 --> 0:51:49.719
<v Speaker 1>on a desert island, what music would you want with you? Now,

0:51:49.719 --> 0:51:51.439
<v Speaker 1>I'm not going to put any pressure on you here,

0:51:51.800 --> 0:51:53.880
<v Speaker 1>but from Mick mulvaney, who was a guest in one

0:51:53.960 --> 0:51:57.760
<v Speaker 1>of the very first Votes and Verdicts podcast episodes, he said,

0:51:58.120 --> 0:52:02.120
<v Speaker 1>very interestingly Dire Straits, the Beatles, White Album, Mozart, and

0:52:02.160 --> 0:52:04.200
<v Speaker 1>pet Shop Boys. So more, what's your list?

0:52:05.239 --> 0:52:08.560
<v Speaker 2>Wow, that is a good list. They were actually playing

0:52:08.600 --> 0:52:12.920
<v Speaker 2>Western Girls by the Petschow Boys at my coffee shop

0:52:12.960 --> 0:52:18.040
<v Speaker 2>here in DC this morning. Like Miss mulvaney, my taste

0:52:18.080 --> 0:52:21.799
<v Speaker 2>in music is fairly eclectic, but my two all time

0:52:21.880 --> 0:52:26.520
<v Speaker 2>favorite singers are Al Jio and Michael McDonald, so a

0:52:26.560 --> 0:52:31.160
<v Speaker 2>healthy dose of their music would be a must. In addition,

0:52:31.719 --> 0:52:37.920
<v Speaker 2>I really really love Barber's Adagio for strings, especially recording

0:52:37.960 --> 0:52:42.520
<v Speaker 2>I have where the maestro Leonard Bernstein conducts the New

0:52:42.600 --> 0:52:47.760
<v Speaker 2>York Philharmonic and around the holidays. I also I also

0:52:47.880 --> 0:52:51.560
<v Speaker 2>really enjoy listening to a choral piece by my name,

0:52:51.719 --> 0:52:59.440
<v Speaker 2>say my namesake, Morton Lawrence called Omagnum Mysterium. So I

0:52:59.480 --> 0:53:01.359
<v Speaker 2>mean I can think of others too, but those would

0:53:01.400 --> 0:53:03.319
<v Speaker 2>definitely be my top four.

0:53:03.760 --> 0:53:07.279
<v Speaker 1>Well, I would say that's equally as eclectic, and I

0:53:07.360 --> 0:53:09.040
<v Speaker 1>have to go and listen to some of that the

0:53:09.160 --> 0:53:12.200
<v Speaker 1>great answers, So we're going to close this out here more.

0:53:12.280 --> 0:53:13.960
<v Speaker 1>Thank you so much for being with us for this

0:53:14.080 --> 0:53:17.520
<v Speaker 1>episode of Votes and Verdicts, and for anybody listening, please

0:53:17.560 --> 0:53:19.839
<v Speaker 1>watch for our next episode, which will be coming soon.

0:53:20.280 --> 0:53:23.400
<v Speaker 1>It's also going to deal with policy and regulatory issues

0:53:23.400 --> 0:53:26.920
<v Speaker 1>and big tech. My colleagues Matt Chettenhelm and Tamlin Basin

0:53:26.960 --> 0:53:29.400
<v Speaker 1>will be hosting that one, and it should be pretty

0:53:29.400 --> 0:53:33.239
<v Speaker 1>interesting too. And with that we'll just say thank you

0:53:33.360 --> 0:53:33.759
<v Speaker 1>very much.