1 00:00:00,360 --> 00:00:05,480 Speaker 1: This story contains adult content and language. Listener discretion is advised. 2 00:00:12,960 --> 00:00:15,760 Speaker 2: And they can see all of these messages and they 3 00:00:15,800 --> 00:00:20,599 Speaker 2: realize these phones this is where the criminals have been hided. 4 00:00:25,800 --> 00:00:29,680 Speaker 1: I'm Kate Winkler Dawson, a nonfiction author and journalism professor 5 00:00:29,720 --> 00:00:32,440 Speaker 1: in Austin, Texas. I'm also the co host of the 6 00:00:32,479 --> 00:00:36,320 Speaker 1: podcast Buried Bones on Exactly Right, and throughout my career 7 00:00:36,600 --> 00:00:40,360 Speaker 1: research for my many audio and book projects has taken 8 00:00:40,400 --> 00:00:43,640 Speaker 1: me around the world. On Wicked Words, I sit down 9 00:00:43,680 --> 00:00:48,400 Speaker 1: with the people I've met along the way, amazing writers, journalists, filmmakers, 10 00:00:48,400 --> 00:00:52,840 Speaker 1: and podcasters who have investigated and reported on notorious true 11 00:00:52,840 --> 00:00:56,640 Speaker 1: crime cases. This is about the choices writers make, both 12 00:00:56,680 --> 00:00:59,600 Speaker 1: good and bad, and it's a deep dive into the 13 00:01:00,000 --> 00:01:05,679 Speaker 1: publish details behind their stories. In twenty eighteen, the FBI 14 00:01:05,840 --> 00:01:09,440 Speaker 1: discovered that high level criminals around the world were using 15 00:01:09,640 --> 00:01:14,319 Speaker 1: encrypted devices to plot intricate crimes. When a powerful, secure 16 00:01:14,480 --> 00:01:18,320 Speaker 1: new app began courting these syndicates, members of the underworld 17 00:01:18,400 --> 00:01:21,720 Speaker 1: flocked to it. One problem for the criminals, though the 18 00:01:21,760 --> 00:01:25,679 Speaker 1: app was created by the FBI. Joseph Cox tells us 19 00:01:25,720 --> 00:01:31,640 Speaker 1: the incredible story from his book Dark Wire. Why don't 20 00:01:31,640 --> 00:01:33,800 Speaker 1: you give me sort of your elevator pitch of what 21 00:01:34,040 --> 00:01:37,319 Speaker 1: this book is about. When you're talking to someone who says, oh, 22 00:01:37,319 --> 00:01:38,880 Speaker 1: I heard you read a book. I don't know anything 23 00:01:38,880 --> 00:01:40,040 Speaker 1: about it. Tell me about it. 24 00:01:40,360 --> 00:01:42,920 Speaker 2: I mean to come out swinging straight away. It is 25 00:01:42,959 --> 00:01:47,280 Speaker 2: about how the FBI secretly ran a tech startup for 26 00:01:47,360 --> 00:01:51,720 Speaker 2: organized crime in order to wiatap the world. It's very 27 00:01:51,760 --> 00:01:54,040 Speaker 2: crazy when you put it into one sentence like that, 28 00:01:54,360 --> 00:01:58,240 Speaker 2: but this was the largest sing operation ever. Usually you 29 00:01:58,280 --> 00:02:02,840 Speaker 2: may think about the FBI investigating one drug trafficking ring, 30 00:02:03,080 --> 00:02:06,360 Speaker 2: or some money launderers, or even one murder. Here they 31 00:02:06,440 --> 00:02:12,320 Speaker 2: investigated thousands, potentially over ten thousand at once. By providing 32 00:02:12,760 --> 00:02:17,240 Speaker 2: the critical infrastructure that these criminals use. It's basically the 33 00:02:17,240 --> 00:02:21,880 Speaker 2: biggest wire app that's ever existed. And of course tons 34 00:02:21,919 --> 00:02:24,520 Speaker 2: of interesting questions come up from that. And I really 35 00:02:24,520 --> 00:02:29,080 Speaker 2: think the book is about trust. These criminals trusted this 36 00:02:29,240 --> 00:02:31,680 Speaker 2: phone so much that they were willing to commit crimes 37 00:02:31,680 --> 00:02:35,240 Speaker 2: on it. The FBI trusted its international partners, which I'm 38 00:02:35,280 --> 00:02:37,880 Speaker 2: sure we'll get into, the Germans, the Swedes, the Dutch, 39 00:02:38,000 --> 00:02:41,880 Speaker 2: and hoping that this audacious operation would not leak. It 40 00:02:41,919 --> 00:02:44,440 Speaker 2: was basically a miracle and then also, I think for 41 00:02:44,600 --> 00:02:48,880 Speaker 2: us trusting, well, when are we really communicating in private? 42 00:02:49,160 --> 00:02:51,840 Speaker 2: And how do we know when the messaging apps that 43 00:02:51,880 --> 00:02:54,520 Speaker 2: we're using, or the phone line we're using or whatever 44 00:02:55,120 --> 00:02:58,200 Speaker 2: is really secure? And it's almost getting harder and harder 45 00:02:58,400 --> 00:02:59,880 Speaker 2: to answer that question. 46 00:03:00,360 --> 00:03:03,760 Speaker 1: How did the FBI get this kind of information about 47 00:03:03,840 --> 00:03:07,320 Speaker 1: organized crime before we had wire taps and apps and 48 00:03:07,360 --> 00:03:09,519 Speaker 1: all of that, was that mostly informants. 49 00:03:09,760 --> 00:03:13,320 Speaker 2: Yeah, you're going to have human intelligence like informants, you're 50 00:03:13,360 --> 00:03:16,640 Speaker 2: going to have old fashioned police work. I mean, the 51 00:03:16,639 --> 00:03:20,600 Speaker 2: wiretap now is over a century old, right, and they 52 00:03:20,600 --> 00:03:23,639 Speaker 2: were very very quick to exploit that, as were other 53 00:03:23,720 --> 00:03:27,320 Speaker 2: law enforcement agencies. But then there is always this cat 54 00:03:27,360 --> 00:03:31,360 Speaker 2: and mouse between law enforcement and criminals, and criminals will 55 00:03:31,360 --> 00:03:34,600 Speaker 2: then move to something like a pager, for example, or 56 00:03:34,680 --> 00:03:38,280 Speaker 2: then maybe they start using cell phones and mobile phones 57 00:03:38,280 --> 00:03:40,920 Speaker 2: and that sort of thing. And you can imagine, of course, 58 00:03:41,240 --> 00:03:44,000 Speaker 2: you know, the wire or the sopranos or something like that, 59 00:03:44,080 --> 00:03:46,760 Speaker 2: and those are sort of the stereotypical cases of well, 60 00:03:46,800 --> 00:03:50,600 Speaker 2: this is how the FBI or other agencies investigate organized crime. 61 00:03:51,040 --> 00:03:54,360 Speaker 2: But there's been a technological leap that I think people 62 00:03:54,800 --> 00:03:57,040 Speaker 2: in the general public aren't really aware of, which is 63 00:03:57,120 --> 00:04:00,960 Speaker 2: that criminals have started using these very sophisticated encryptive phones, 64 00:04:01,320 --> 00:04:06,160 Speaker 2: and it's basically the most important technological leap that criminals 65 00:04:06,200 --> 00:04:09,360 Speaker 2: have made since the invention of the cell phone in 66 00:04:09,400 --> 00:04:12,720 Speaker 2: the first place. So whereas for decades upon decades, as 67 00:04:12,720 --> 00:04:15,920 Speaker 2: you say, going back, all of that time is informants 68 00:04:15,920 --> 00:04:18,760 Speaker 2: and the normal phone lines, we're in a different world 69 00:04:18,839 --> 00:04:25,400 Speaker 2: now where many top tier criminals can basically communicate securely, 70 00:04:25,640 --> 00:04:27,520 Speaker 2: and they can communicate in such a way where law 71 00:04:27,600 --> 00:04:30,359 Speaker 2: enforcement probably aren't actually going to get the contents of 72 00:04:30,400 --> 00:04:33,960 Speaker 2: their communications. It's an entirely different world now to even 73 00:04:34,480 --> 00:04:37,080 Speaker 2: you know, the eighties or seventies, the nineties, it's just 74 00:04:37,120 --> 00:04:38,320 Speaker 2: a different ecosystem now. 75 00:04:38,520 --> 00:04:41,000 Speaker 1: I know this might be an odd question. I'm curious, 76 00:04:41,120 --> 00:04:44,239 Speaker 1: is there a way to easily explain why the FBI 77 00:04:44,440 --> 00:04:46,240 Speaker 1: at some point in history might have been able to 78 00:04:46,320 --> 00:04:49,839 Speaker 1: tap landlines but then not cell phones, Because I feel 79 00:04:49,839 --> 00:04:52,680 Speaker 1: like in every kind of cloak and Dagger movie, it's like, oh, no, 80 00:04:52,760 --> 00:04:54,320 Speaker 1: we're safe, let's talk on a cell phone, but we 81 00:04:54,360 --> 00:04:57,320 Speaker 1: can't talk on landlines. So what would be the difference. 82 00:04:57,320 --> 00:05:00,280 Speaker 1: As we're moving more towards the modern part of the story. 83 00:05:00,360 --> 00:05:04,440 Speaker 2: Back with original wire taps. It was literally that law 84 00:05:04,560 --> 00:05:07,599 Speaker 2: enforcement would go and they would place a device or 85 00:05:07,600 --> 00:05:11,800 Speaker 2: even crocodile clips or some sort of interception capability onto 86 00:05:11,880 --> 00:05:15,520 Speaker 2: the literal wires which are carrying the communication. Of course, 87 00:05:15,560 --> 00:05:19,520 Speaker 2: when criminals start to move towards cell phones, the infrastructure 88 00:05:19,560 --> 00:05:21,320 Speaker 2: of that has changed, and then that's where you see 89 00:05:21,360 --> 00:05:25,479 Speaker 2: the FBI or other agencies doing closer collaboration with AT 90 00:05:25,600 --> 00:05:29,520 Speaker 2: and TV, Verizon, T Mobile, whoever. And they're always catching 91 00:05:29,560 --> 00:05:32,760 Speaker 2: up to where the criminals are moving towards. And that's 92 00:05:32,839 --> 00:05:35,440 Speaker 2: just a constant theme over the past one hundred years 93 00:05:35,440 --> 00:05:37,920 Speaker 2: and decades. The criminals go a few little steps forward, 94 00:05:38,080 --> 00:05:41,440 Speaker 2: and then the law enforcement agencies catch up, and it's 95 00:05:41,440 --> 00:05:45,160 Speaker 2: gone from something that was purely physical as in touching 96 00:05:45,200 --> 00:05:48,480 Speaker 2: the cable getting the communication to of course, now not 97 00:05:48,560 --> 00:05:51,400 Speaker 2: just cell phones, but the Internet writ large, and there 98 00:05:51,400 --> 00:05:54,279 Speaker 2: are places where you can go and intercept Internet data. 99 00:05:54,760 --> 00:05:57,840 Speaker 2: Thinking about the NSA and GCHQ, where they literally tap 100 00:05:57,920 --> 00:06:01,360 Speaker 2: the undersea cables that carry the world data. Of course, 101 00:06:01,400 --> 00:06:03,880 Speaker 2: that's not something that law enforcement is typically going and doing. 102 00:06:03,920 --> 00:06:06,960 Speaker 2: That's in the realm of intelligence agency. So there's always 103 00:06:07,000 --> 00:06:08,479 Speaker 2: going to be a divide there as well. 104 00:06:09,000 --> 00:06:11,599 Speaker 1: Well. Before we get into the sting operation that just 105 00:06:11,640 --> 00:06:16,320 Speaker 1: seems so elaborate and overwhelming and creative. I do want 106 00:06:16,360 --> 00:06:19,440 Speaker 1: to dip in a tiny bit about the encrypted apps, 107 00:06:19,600 --> 00:06:22,280 Speaker 1: because you know, in the last month or two apps 108 00:06:22,320 --> 00:06:26,560 Speaker 1: that are encrypted, like Signal, have popped up in hearings 109 00:06:26,600 --> 00:06:29,880 Speaker 1: and house hearings through a lot of controversy. To simplify it, 110 00:06:29,920 --> 00:06:34,039 Speaker 1: are there sort of three levels of secure phone lines. 111 00:06:34,120 --> 00:06:36,240 Speaker 1: There's the lowest level like what I use, where anybody 112 00:06:36,279 --> 00:06:39,600 Speaker 1: could probably tap into it. Then there is something like Signal, 113 00:06:39,760 --> 00:06:41,960 Speaker 1: you know, an app where it says it's encrypted, but 114 00:06:42,040 --> 00:06:46,159 Speaker 1: obviously it's not as secure as the third highest level, 115 00:06:46,160 --> 00:06:48,400 Speaker 1: which would be whatever the government is using. I'm not 116 00:06:48,440 --> 00:06:51,080 Speaker 1: even one hundred percent sure what encrypted means, so maybe 117 00:06:51,080 --> 00:06:52,680 Speaker 1: give me the dummy version of all of that. 118 00:06:52,960 --> 00:06:55,160 Speaker 2: I think that's a totally fair characterization, where you have 119 00:06:55,240 --> 00:06:59,400 Speaker 2: those free levels of a completely ordinary phone line, which yes, 120 00:06:59,480 --> 00:07:01,320 Speaker 2: it might be rypt in some ways, but it's not 121 00:07:01,400 --> 00:07:03,680 Speaker 2: exactly done in a robust way, and you can have 122 00:07:04,040 --> 00:07:06,600 Speaker 2: people intercepting it, or you can have wide apps as 123 00:07:06,640 --> 00:07:10,840 Speaker 2: well that next level, such as the Signals or potentially 124 00:07:10,920 --> 00:07:13,440 Speaker 2: the telegrams of people familiar with that app as well. 125 00:07:13,680 --> 00:07:16,520 Speaker 2: What that does is that it will take the message 126 00:07:16,560 --> 00:07:18,800 Speaker 2: that you've typed out on your phone, a text message 127 00:07:18,880 --> 00:07:21,840 Speaker 2: or a voicemail or whatever, and it will encrypt it 128 00:07:22,240 --> 00:07:24,720 Speaker 2: while it's still on the phone, so it hasn't crossed 129 00:07:24,760 --> 00:07:27,760 Speaker 2: the cables yet, it hasn't entered the wider Internet yet, 130 00:07:27,920 --> 00:07:31,040 Speaker 2: and it's safely packaged that up it transmits across and 131 00:07:31,080 --> 00:07:34,680 Speaker 2: then hopefully only the person who's supposed to receive that 132 00:07:34,920 --> 00:07:37,080 Speaker 2: is able to decrypt it. And you don't notice any 133 00:07:37,080 --> 00:07:39,600 Speaker 2: of this, right You're just using signal or whatever, and 134 00:07:39,640 --> 00:07:44,200 Speaker 2: it happens instantaneously, but in the background, that very robust 135 00:07:44,400 --> 00:07:47,800 Speaker 2: set of security steps is happening. Now, if somebody did 136 00:07:47,840 --> 00:07:50,760 Speaker 2: intercept that, it would just be absolute gibber. It should 137 00:07:50,800 --> 00:07:53,240 Speaker 2: be ones and zeros or random letters, and they could 138 00:07:53,280 --> 00:07:55,760 Speaker 2: intercept something, but they won't be able to read any 139 00:07:55,760 --> 00:07:58,360 Speaker 2: of it. And then, as you say, the next layer 140 00:07:58,960 --> 00:08:03,000 Speaker 2: is the device and the systems that hopefully members of 141 00:08:03,040 --> 00:08:05,480 Speaker 2: the US governments and other governments are using, whereas it 142 00:08:05,480 --> 00:08:09,040 Speaker 2: won't just be encrypted, but the phone or the device 143 00:08:09,080 --> 00:08:12,920 Speaker 2: itself will be hardened as well. You know, you can 144 00:08:12,960 --> 00:08:15,800 Speaker 2: have the best encryption in the world. If someone has 145 00:08:15,880 --> 00:08:19,240 Speaker 2: hacked your phone, that's the place where the message is landing, well, 146 00:08:19,240 --> 00:08:21,280 Speaker 2: then potentially they can read it as well. 147 00:08:21,400 --> 00:08:24,400 Speaker 1: What is the danger of sending something that's very sensitive 148 00:08:24,440 --> 00:08:26,720 Speaker 1: through signal if they're not going to receive any kind 149 00:08:26,720 --> 00:08:28,280 Speaker 1: of a real quote unquote information. 150 00:08:28,760 --> 00:08:34,120 Speaker 2: The benefit of signal is that you can send stuff 151 00:08:34,440 --> 00:08:37,160 Speaker 2: and then if it's intercepted, it's not going to be 152 00:08:37,200 --> 00:08:40,320 Speaker 2: readable by any authorities or any third parties they're getting it. 153 00:08:40,480 --> 00:08:43,200 Speaker 2: But yes, if you hack onto the if somebody hacks 154 00:08:43,200 --> 00:08:44,719 Speaker 2: the phone at the end of that, they're going to 155 00:08:44,720 --> 00:08:46,680 Speaker 2: be able to read that. And that's just something which 156 00:08:46,720 --> 00:08:50,360 Speaker 2: is the limit of encryption technology. Encryption can protect the 157 00:08:50,400 --> 00:08:52,720 Speaker 2: contents of your messages and can protect it as it's sent. 158 00:08:53,320 --> 00:08:55,960 Speaker 2: It can't protect you if a hacker is broken into 159 00:08:56,000 --> 00:08:59,280 Speaker 2: your phone, or if you accidentally add a journalist to 160 00:08:59,320 --> 00:09:01,640 Speaker 2: a group chat and then they are of course receiving 161 00:09:01,679 --> 00:09:04,400 Speaker 2: all of that data as well. It can't protect against 162 00:09:04,840 --> 00:09:08,400 Speaker 2: mistakes or to be less charitable, stupidity depending on the 163 00:09:08,400 --> 00:09:10,439 Speaker 2: way that you're looking at it. You have to use 164 00:09:10,480 --> 00:09:13,760 Speaker 2: the technology in the right way. And the great thing 165 00:09:13,760 --> 00:09:16,480 Speaker 2: about these consumer apps like Signal or other ones like it, 166 00:09:16,600 --> 00:09:21,359 Speaker 2: they try to eliminate the room for you to make mistakes. Basically, 167 00:09:21,640 --> 00:09:24,480 Speaker 2: encryption has been around for decades, but I remember when 168 00:09:24,520 --> 00:09:26,360 Speaker 2: I started using it round about the time of the 169 00:09:26,520 --> 00:09:30,400 Speaker 2: Edward snowd Of revelations of twenty thirteen. It was so difficult. 170 00:09:30,480 --> 00:09:33,280 Speaker 2: It was cumbersome. You had to use all these different 171 00:09:33,280 --> 00:09:36,920 Speaker 2: tools and encrypture email in this really fancy way. Nowadays, 172 00:09:37,080 --> 00:09:39,040 Speaker 2: you can just use WhatsApp, which is also end to 173 00:09:39,120 --> 00:09:41,120 Speaker 2: end encrypted. You can use I Message, you can use 174 00:09:41,160 --> 00:09:43,000 Speaker 2: any of these other ones and we don't even have 175 00:09:43,080 --> 00:09:45,560 Speaker 2: to think about it. And that's a net positive that 176 00:09:45,679 --> 00:09:48,920 Speaker 2: billions of people around the world are able to communicate 177 00:09:49,240 --> 00:09:52,880 Speaker 2: more privately with confidentiality, and of course criminals can now 178 00:09:52,920 --> 00:09:53,520 Speaker 2: do that as well. 179 00:09:56,760 --> 00:09:59,600 Speaker 1: So was there to get to your story? Was there 180 00:10:00,040 --> 00:10:03,280 Speaker 1: an incident that started all of this for the FBI? 181 00:10:03,480 --> 00:10:06,760 Speaker 1: Did they start realizing that the criminal enterprises around the 182 00:10:06,800 --> 00:10:10,360 Speaker 1: world were getting these encrypted phones that they could not access. 183 00:10:10,559 --> 00:10:14,200 Speaker 2: Yeah, So, in around twenty fifteen twenty sixteen, the FBI 184 00:10:14,640 --> 00:10:18,960 Speaker 2: is investigating this drug trafficker called Owen Hanson, and it 185 00:10:19,040 --> 00:10:23,120 Speaker 2: seems he's pretty successful. They use an informant to basically 186 00:10:23,240 --> 00:10:27,120 Speaker 2: bait him into doing a methmthetamine deal. They presume he's 187 00:10:27,160 --> 00:10:30,360 Speaker 2: selling many more drugs. But they actually can't get a 188 00:10:30,360 --> 00:10:33,600 Speaker 2: tap on his phone because he's using this very unusual 189 00:10:34,040 --> 00:10:36,680 Speaker 2: BlackBerry back when those were cool and popular. 190 00:10:36,800 --> 00:10:37,760 Speaker 1: I love blackberries. 191 00:10:38,000 --> 00:10:40,640 Speaker 2: They had they're very cool keyboard. Drug traffickers loved those 192 00:10:40,679 --> 00:10:43,439 Speaker 2: as well. But the FBI found that owen Hanson was 193 00:10:43,559 --> 00:10:46,400 Speaker 2: using one of those and it could send encrypted emails. 194 00:10:46,679 --> 00:10:50,240 Speaker 2: It also had the microphone removed, the camera taken out, 195 00:10:50,440 --> 00:10:53,800 Speaker 2: the GPS as well. It basically wasn't a phone, it 196 00:10:53,840 --> 00:10:56,520 Speaker 2: was like a computer in his pocket that could send 197 00:10:56,640 --> 00:11:02,120 Speaker 2: encrypted messages. So the FBI investigate him without fully understanding 198 00:11:02,440 --> 00:11:05,199 Speaker 2: all of the contours of his crimes, they still have 199 00:11:05,320 --> 00:11:08,120 Speaker 2: enough to prosecute him. They get hold of this phone 200 00:11:08,400 --> 00:11:12,320 Speaker 2: made by a company called Phantom Secure. Unfortunately for owen Hanson, 201 00:11:12,559 --> 00:11:15,559 Speaker 2: he hadn't changed the default password, so the FBI were 202 00:11:15,559 --> 00:11:18,600 Speaker 2: able to log in very very quickly, and they can 203 00:11:18,640 --> 00:11:21,760 Speaker 2: see all of these messages because again now they're on 204 00:11:21,760 --> 00:11:24,559 Speaker 2: the endpoint, they're on the device, and they're scrolling through 205 00:11:24,840 --> 00:11:29,480 Speaker 2: and there's just thousands talking about criminal activity and they realize, oh, 206 00:11:29,840 --> 00:11:34,240 Speaker 2: these phones, this is where the criminals have been hiding. 207 00:11:34,520 --> 00:11:36,679 Speaker 2: They're not on the normal phone lines anymore. They're not 208 00:11:36,760 --> 00:11:41,200 Speaker 2: on the cell phones. They're on these really sophisticated, customized 209 00:11:41,760 --> 00:11:46,880 Speaker 2: pocket sized computers, And that basically starts the FBI's near obsession, 210 00:11:47,240 --> 00:11:51,080 Speaker 2: or the San Diego fbis near obsession with looking into 211 00:11:51,120 --> 00:11:55,000 Speaker 2: these companies, shutting them down, and eventually running their own 212 00:11:55,000 --> 00:11:55,439 Speaker 2: as well. 213 00:11:55,600 --> 00:11:59,000 Speaker 1: So the FBI's understanding in twenty fifteen or before was 214 00:11:59,040 --> 00:12:02,720 Speaker 1: that these enterprises were run over at and T cell phones, 215 00:12:02,760 --> 00:12:04,400 Speaker 1: normal cell phones that were encrypted. 216 00:12:04,760 --> 00:12:08,000 Speaker 2: I think when they've been investigating drug trafficking rings before 217 00:12:08,120 --> 00:12:11,960 Speaker 2: or other criminals, the sort of approach of these criminals 218 00:12:12,000 --> 00:12:16,040 Speaker 2: has just been to sort of compartmentalize information, only tell 219 00:12:16,200 --> 00:12:19,160 Speaker 2: people certain things, maybe use code words, all of the 220 00:12:19,280 --> 00:12:22,440 Speaker 2: very stereotypical things you see in TV. But then when 221 00:12:22,480 --> 00:12:26,120 Speaker 2: they're scrolling through these messages Owen Hanson and other people 222 00:12:26,200 --> 00:12:29,959 Speaker 2: later on, they're not using code words. They're saying I'm 223 00:12:30,000 --> 00:12:33,280 Speaker 2: going to send the five thousand kilos of cocaine or whatever. 224 00:12:33,440 --> 00:12:36,640 Speaker 2: Because they're so confident in this encryption technology. Well, what's 225 00:12:36,679 --> 00:12:38,360 Speaker 2: the point of using code words. We can just be 226 00:12:38,760 --> 00:12:41,360 Speaker 2: explicit and blunt about it and say I'm sending the 227 00:12:41,400 --> 00:12:43,719 Speaker 2: heroin to this place. And as they were going through 228 00:12:43,760 --> 00:12:47,920 Speaker 2: the messages. There were addresses of where where these drugs 229 00:12:47,920 --> 00:12:49,800 Speaker 2: were being picked up, where they were being sent to, 230 00:12:49,880 --> 00:12:53,480 Speaker 2: as well the names of contacts. It was like opening 231 00:12:53,559 --> 00:12:57,239 Speaker 2: up an entire new window to criminality. 232 00:12:57,760 --> 00:13:01,880 Speaker 1: So in twenty twenty five terms this twenty fifteen technology, 233 00:13:01,920 --> 00:13:05,160 Speaker 1: where does that fall, that encryption technology? Where does what 234 00:13:05,240 --> 00:13:07,520 Speaker 1: Owen Hansen was using. Where does that fall on our 235 00:13:07,600 --> 00:13:10,400 Speaker 1: three levels? Is it closer to the government level these days? 236 00:13:10,520 --> 00:13:12,360 Speaker 1: Or is it more the signal level. 237 00:13:12,600 --> 00:13:15,160 Speaker 2: It's kind of in between two of them, in between 238 00:13:15,200 --> 00:13:17,280 Speaker 2: the signal one and the sort of the government level, 239 00:13:17,320 --> 00:13:20,920 Speaker 2: because yes, it's encrypted, so if it gets intercepted, you're 240 00:13:20,920 --> 00:13:22,840 Speaker 2: not going to be able to read it. But where 241 00:13:23,240 --> 00:13:26,400 Speaker 2: these companies selling these phones to organize criminals, they did 242 00:13:26,440 --> 00:13:30,000 Speaker 2: take that extra step of removing the camera, removing the GPS, 243 00:13:30,080 --> 00:13:33,040 Speaker 2: taking out the microphone as well, and you know, it's 244 00:13:33,120 --> 00:13:37,160 Speaker 2: kind of debatable how beneficial those removals are. But your 245 00:13:37,280 --> 00:13:41,840 Speaker 2: traffickers love it when these companies introduce bells and whistles, 246 00:13:41,880 --> 00:13:44,240 Speaker 2: new gadgets, or they take features out, when really the 247 00:13:44,280 --> 00:13:47,120 Speaker 2: most important thing is that it's sending encrypted text messages, 248 00:13:47,200 --> 00:13:50,479 Speaker 2: but it sits somewhere in between because they're highly customized 249 00:13:50,640 --> 00:13:52,880 Speaker 2: and they're really expensive as well. To get one of 250 00:13:52,920 --> 00:13:55,360 Speaker 2: these phones, it's going to cost you thousands of dollars 251 00:13:55,679 --> 00:13:58,440 Speaker 2: for a six or a twelve month subscription. This isn't 252 00:13:58,440 --> 00:14:01,320 Speaker 2: something you just go into the T mobile store and buy. 253 00:14:01,960 --> 00:14:05,440 Speaker 2: We go to Fison and his four three iPhones or whatever. 254 00:14:05,720 --> 00:14:09,240 Speaker 2: It is a completely different business model. And the drug 255 00:14:09,240 --> 00:14:11,719 Speaker 2: traffickers love is expensive as well, because well, if it 256 00:14:11,760 --> 00:14:14,160 Speaker 2: cost me thousands of dollars, that's got to mean it's good. 257 00:14:14,200 --> 00:14:16,479 Speaker 2: And I mean that literally. I've spoken to drug traffickers 258 00:14:16,720 --> 00:14:18,959 Speaker 2: and the people who sell the phones, and price is 259 00:14:18,960 --> 00:14:21,600 Speaker 2: a major factor of building that trust. 260 00:14:22,040 --> 00:14:23,840 Speaker 1: So do you have to if we're just let's say 261 00:14:23,840 --> 00:14:26,280 Speaker 1: we're just talking about Phantom Secure number one, is this 262 00:14:26,360 --> 00:14:29,080 Speaker 1: an above board company in any way or do they 263 00:14:29,120 --> 00:14:32,800 Speaker 1: strictly deal with criminal Back then criminal enterprise. 264 00:14:32,640 --> 00:14:36,440 Speaker 2: They started legit and then when it became clear that 265 00:14:36,560 --> 00:14:40,840 Speaker 2: criminals were the primary customer base, the CEO of the company, 266 00:14:40,880 --> 00:14:44,080 Speaker 2: a guy called Vincent Ramos, he leaned into that essentially 267 00:14:44,200 --> 00:14:47,320 Speaker 2: is very competitive space as well, and you have to 268 00:14:47,360 --> 00:14:51,720 Speaker 2: think that unlike the normal phone market, where there's potentially 269 00:14:52,040 --> 00:14:54,680 Speaker 2: an unlimited number of customers for AT and T to 270 00:14:54,680 --> 00:14:58,600 Speaker 2: get or whoever there's a finite number of drug traffickers 271 00:14:58,600 --> 00:15:00,920 Speaker 2: in the world, probably kind of want them to come 272 00:15:00,960 --> 00:15:04,040 Speaker 2: over to your company. If criminals are using your phone, 273 00:15:04,320 --> 00:15:06,040 Speaker 2: you start to lean into that, and that's what many 274 00:15:06,040 --> 00:15:06,920 Speaker 2: of these companies did. 275 00:15:07,360 --> 00:15:10,160 Speaker 1: When Owen Hanson was using this encrypted phone, did he 276 00:15:10,280 --> 00:15:13,600 Speaker 1: have to message with somebody who also had a phone 277 00:15:13,680 --> 00:15:16,160 Speaker 1: from phantom secure or was it? Could it be any 278 00:15:16,200 --> 00:15:18,000 Speaker 1: kind of phone. What if he's calling somebody on AT 279 00:15:18,080 --> 00:15:21,320 Speaker 1: and T who's not upon the latest criminal technology. 280 00:15:21,640 --> 00:15:25,440 Speaker 2: Yeah, these operate generally as closed networks. So if you're 281 00:15:25,440 --> 00:15:28,680 Speaker 2: a phantom secure you can only message another phantom secure phone. 282 00:15:28,760 --> 00:15:31,520 Speaker 2: If you're on another phone from a different company called Sky, 283 00:15:31,640 --> 00:15:34,760 Speaker 2: for example, you can only message Sky people. And that 284 00:15:34,840 --> 00:15:38,600 Speaker 2: has sort of two reasons, the first being that presumably 285 00:15:38,640 --> 00:15:41,920 Speaker 2: it's more secure. You know, if only the phantom phones 286 00:15:41,920 --> 00:15:45,480 Speaker 2: are talking to each other, then maybe there's less chance 287 00:15:45,560 --> 00:15:48,760 Speaker 2: of law enforcement infiltrating or in informant getting in or 288 00:15:48,800 --> 00:15:52,320 Speaker 2: something like that. The other one is a pure business decision. 289 00:15:52,560 --> 00:15:55,320 Speaker 2: It's like, well, if I'm phantom secure, I only want 290 00:15:55,360 --> 00:15:56,800 Speaker 2: my customers to be able to talk to each other, 291 00:15:56,840 --> 00:15:58,520 Speaker 2: because that means other people have to come to my 292 00:15:58,560 --> 00:16:01,640 Speaker 2: ecosystem as well, kind of like Apple and its app store. 293 00:16:01,680 --> 00:16:04,480 Speaker 2: You know, you can't really move apps between an Android 294 00:16:04,520 --> 00:16:06,800 Speaker 2: phone and an Apple phone. It's the same sort of 295 00:16:06,800 --> 00:16:08,640 Speaker 2: business decision for these guys as well. 296 00:16:09,040 --> 00:16:11,760 Speaker 1: When the FBI talks to Owen Hanson, I'm assuming he 297 00:16:11,800 --> 00:16:14,520 Speaker 1: doesn't illuminate anything about any of this. Is he at 298 00:16:14,560 --> 00:16:17,240 Speaker 1: all helpful to the FBI once he has been convicted. 299 00:16:17,920 --> 00:16:21,680 Speaker 2: Not At first He's put into a room and the 300 00:16:21,720 --> 00:16:24,880 Speaker 2: authorities and Australian authorities which have been tracing him as well, 301 00:16:25,120 --> 00:16:28,680 Speaker 2: they start telling Hanson all about the alleged crimes that 302 00:16:28,800 --> 00:16:31,640 Speaker 2: he's done, and he very quickly shuts up and says, 303 00:16:32,200 --> 00:16:34,120 Speaker 2: this is the moment when I'm going to bring in 304 00:16:34,360 --> 00:16:38,760 Speaker 2: my lawyer. Later on. I think he does testify against 305 00:16:38,800 --> 00:16:42,000 Speaker 2: other people in his organization, But of course his arrest 306 00:16:42,320 --> 00:16:44,960 Speaker 2: is absolutely not the end, not just for the FBI 307 00:16:45,040 --> 00:16:46,800 Speaker 2: but for his story as well, because then they start 308 00:16:46,800 --> 00:16:50,360 Speaker 2: to round up more members of his criminal enterprise, because 309 00:16:50,400 --> 00:16:52,400 Speaker 2: now they're in the phone which has all of their 310 00:16:52,480 --> 00:16:54,080 Speaker 2: contact information as well. 311 00:16:54,320 --> 00:16:56,600 Speaker 1: Oh my gosh, I wonder what his reaction was when 312 00:16:56,600 --> 00:16:58,720 Speaker 1: he found out he just had never changed that password 313 00:16:58,760 --> 00:17:01,760 Speaker 1: and didn't think it was necessary. In the FBI got 314 00:17:01,840 --> 00:17:03,640 Speaker 1: in within you know, thirty seconds. 315 00:17:03,960 --> 00:17:06,760 Speaker 2: Yeah. I mean I've spoken to Owen Hanson a couple 316 00:17:06,760 --> 00:17:10,399 Speaker 2: of times. He didn't specifically talk about the password, but 317 00:17:10,440 --> 00:17:14,040 Speaker 2: he did admit that to me. And I mean, it's 318 00:17:14,400 --> 00:17:17,160 Speaker 2: a sloppy mistake for a drug trafficker to make. And again, 319 00:17:17,200 --> 00:17:19,840 Speaker 2: I think that just shows how much confidence these people 320 00:17:20,320 --> 00:17:24,040 Speaker 2: have in the technology, and technology can only go so far. 321 00:17:24,320 --> 00:17:27,840 Speaker 2: You may have the fanciest quantum encryption in the world, 322 00:17:28,000 --> 00:17:32,120 Speaker 2: just tons of fancy algorithms. What it doesn't matter if 323 00:17:32,119 --> 00:17:35,600 Speaker 2: you make a mistake like that, like not changing the password. 324 00:17:39,000 --> 00:17:41,960 Speaker 1: So the FBI is realizing that their traditional methods of 325 00:17:42,040 --> 00:17:45,439 Speaker 1: monitoring these folks aren't working. What is their next step? 326 00:17:45,560 --> 00:17:48,480 Speaker 1: Is it sort of taking you know, Hanson's contacts and 327 00:17:48,520 --> 00:17:51,040 Speaker 1: looking through and then are they flipping these people? How 328 00:17:51,040 --> 00:17:53,480 Speaker 1: do they know how many how many criminals are going 329 00:17:53,480 --> 00:17:55,360 Speaker 1: to places like sky or Phantom Secure. 330 00:17:55,920 --> 00:17:59,760 Speaker 2: Yeah, so they do flip people in and around Hanson's 331 00:17:59,880 --> 00:18:03,560 Speaker 2: or organization, and they investigate them with sort of traditional 332 00:18:03,760 --> 00:18:09,639 Speaker 2: law enforcement tactics, but a prosecutor inside the San Diego office, 333 00:18:10,040 --> 00:18:12,520 Speaker 2: they start to have this really interesting idea, which is 334 00:18:12,560 --> 00:18:15,600 Speaker 2: that well, we're looking at the messages inside this one phone, 335 00:18:16,000 --> 00:18:20,080 Speaker 2: but presumably many other criminals are using Phantom Secure phones 336 00:18:20,240 --> 00:18:22,959 Speaker 2: as well, and they get some intelligence from other agencies, 337 00:18:23,400 --> 00:18:25,960 Speaker 2: the Canadians and the Australians, and they do start to 338 00:18:25,960 --> 00:18:29,280 Speaker 2: build up a picture of oh, Phantom Secure is a 339 00:18:29,320 --> 00:18:33,320 Speaker 2: serious player in this space with thousands and thousands of customers. 340 00:18:33,640 --> 00:18:35,840 Speaker 2: If we're looking at the messages of this one phone 341 00:18:36,000 --> 00:18:39,000 Speaker 2: because we got lucky with this guy's bad password, what 342 00:18:39,080 --> 00:18:41,760 Speaker 2: would it be like to look at the messages of 343 00:18:41,880 --> 00:18:44,280 Speaker 2: all of these customers. And that plants the seed of 344 00:18:44,320 --> 00:18:48,120 Speaker 2: an idea, which is, like, we need to infiltrate one 345 00:18:48,160 --> 00:18:51,280 Speaker 2: of these companies, and specifically they focus on Phantom Secure 346 00:18:51,560 --> 00:18:53,280 Speaker 2: because that's the one that's right in front of them. 347 00:18:53,520 --> 00:18:57,720 Speaker 1: Eventually, their plan is to build their own telecommunications company 348 00:18:57,760 --> 00:19:00,000 Speaker 1: to draw these guys in, which I just think is 349 00:19:00,160 --> 00:19:03,560 Speaker 1: so brilliant and I'm sure a daunting task for them, 350 00:19:03,720 --> 00:19:05,960 Speaker 1: But they start with saying, we need to figure out 351 00:19:06,000 --> 00:19:08,560 Speaker 1: how this company works before we replicate our own company. 352 00:19:08,600 --> 00:19:09,040 Speaker 1: Is that right? 353 00:19:09,280 --> 00:19:13,280 Speaker 2: Yeah, So they focus first on Phantom Secure. They investigate 354 00:19:13,440 --> 00:19:18,560 Speaker 2: the CEO I mentioned, Vincent Ramos, and they do various 355 00:19:19,119 --> 00:19:22,399 Speaker 2: sort of undercover exercises. The Canadians try to buy the 356 00:19:22,480 --> 00:19:26,879 Speaker 2: phones while posing as drug traffickers, and Phantom Secure is like, sure, 357 00:19:27,640 --> 00:19:30,640 Speaker 2: here you go. In another case, I think the Canadians 358 00:19:31,000 --> 00:19:34,679 Speaker 2: also then ask Phantom to wipe one of their phones. 359 00:19:34,720 --> 00:19:36,879 Speaker 2: And that's sort of another key feature of these devices, 360 00:19:36,920 --> 00:19:40,239 Speaker 2: which is that for Apple iPhones, you have iCloud. You know, 361 00:19:40,480 --> 00:19:42,640 Speaker 2: your phone gets stolen or you lose it, you log 362 00:19:42,680 --> 00:19:45,000 Speaker 2: into iCloud and you wipe the device so nobody gets 363 00:19:45,000 --> 00:19:47,639 Speaker 2: all of your personal details or your photos or whatever. 364 00:19:48,160 --> 00:19:51,239 Speaker 2: Phantom Secure in these companies have that as well. But 365 00:19:51,359 --> 00:19:54,520 Speaker 2: you go to the company and you say, my phone 366 00:19:54,680 --> 00:19:57,680 Speaker 2: has landed in somebody else's hands, and you can say 367 00:19:57,680 --> 00:20:00,680 Speaker 2: specifically law enforcement, and there's a bunch of evidence about 368 00:20:00,800 --> 00:20:03,679 Speaker 2: cocaine trafficking on my phone. Can you wipe it? And 369 00:20:03,720 --> 00:20:06,720 Speaker 2: they will do that. And the allegation, which was later 370 00:20:06,800 --> 00:20:10,600 Speaker 2: proved in court, is that Phantom Secure knew it was 371 00:20:10,640 --> 00:20:14,119 Speaker 2: obstructing justice by wiping these phones, which is again is 372 00:20:14,160 --> 00:20:17,480 Speaker 2: different to Tim Cook and Apple. You know, Tim Cook 373 00:20:17,560 --> 00:20:22,080 Speaker 2: is not knowingly wiping Apple iPhones of criminal evidence, but 374 00:20:22,160 --> 00:20:26,800 Speaker 2: Phantom Secure absolutely was doing that. So the FBI, the Australians, 375 00:20:26,880 --> 00:20:29,760 Speaker 2: and the Canadians, they get all of these little bits 376 00:20:29,760 --> 00:20:34,320 Speaker 2: and bobs about Phantom Secure until crucially they trick Vincent 377 00:20:34,400 --> 00:20:37,679 Speaker 2: Ramos in a Las Vegas hotel room. They're filming it 378 00:20:37,760 --> 00:20:42,160 Speaker 2: with undercover agents posing as drug traffickers, who they say 379 00:20:42,200 --> 00:20:45,080 Speaker 2: they're interested in buying some Phantom Secure phones, and they 380 00:20:45,119 --> 00:20:47,760 Speaker 2: make it very clear that they're drug traffickers. You know, 381 00:20:47,760 --> 00:20:50,760 Speaker 2: we're trying to move cocaine from South America to Europe. 382 00:20:50,960 --> 00:20:53,439 Speaker 2: We want to use these phones as part of that expansion. 383 00:20:53,800 --> 00:20:57,520 Speaker 2: And they even ask Vincent Ramos, what if we wanted 384 00:20:57,840 --> 00:21:00,720 Speaker 2: to kill one of our associates who maybe steals money 385 00:21:00,720 --> 00:21:03,399 Speaker 2: from us or something, could we use your phones to 386 00:21:03,480 --> 00:21:07,200 Speaker 2: do that? And Vincent sort of dances around it until 387 00:21:07,359 --> 00:21:11,080 Speaker 2: eventually admitting, Hey, you don't know me, but we made 388 00:21:11,080 --> 00:21:14,520 Speaker 2: the phones for this, meaning drug trafficking. And that's the 389 00:21:14,560 --> 00:21:16,840 Speaker 2: moment where he's basically sealed his fate. Even though it 390 00:21:16,880 --> 00:21:19,919 Speaker 2: was like a very passing comment, he's just basically omitted 391 00:21:19,960 --> 00:21:23,359 Speaker 2: to under cover officials that Phantom Secure is made or 392 00:21:23,400 --> 00:21:27,199 Speaker 2: at least used for drug trafficking. So they let Vincent 393 00:21:27,240 --> 00:21:29,720 Speaker 2: go for a bit while they're still investigating. They lure 394 00:21:29,800 --> 00:21:33,639 Speaker 2: him back to Vegas, and this time the FBI is 395 00:21:33,640 --> 00:21:36,200 Speaker 2: not undercover. They're all waiting for him in the hotel room. 396 00:21:36,960 --> 00:21:40,119 Speaker 2: He comes in and the agents tell him, look, we 397 00:21:40,200 --> 00:21:42,840 Speaker 2: know what you're doing, we know all about Phantom Secure. 398 00:21:43,200 --> 00:21:46,000 Speaker 2: We are prepared to arrest you on the spot right now, 399 00:21:46,600 --> 00:21:49,199 Speaker 2: or you do something for us, and that's put a 400 00:21:49,240 --> 00:21:52,480 Speaker 2: backdoor into Phantom Secure so we can read all of 401 00:21:52,520 --> 00:21:57,320 Speaker 2: your customer's messages. Again, it would be like reading Owen 402 00:21:57,359 --> 00:22:01,000 Speaker 2: Hanson's messages, but not for one phone, for seven, eight, nine, 403 00:22:01,160 --> 00:22:05,240 Speaker 2: ten thousand, and that would I can't stress how incredible 404 00:22:05,240 --> 00:22:09,040 Speaker 2: that would be for the FBI. Vincent doesn't put the 405 00:22:09,040 --> 00:22:11,239 Speaker 2: back door in. Some people I speak to say he 406 00:22:11,280 --> 00:22:14,320 Speaker 2: couldn't do it. Others say that he wouldn't do it 407 00:22:14,359 --> 00:22:17,320 Speaker 2: because he doesn't want to impact the privacy of his customers. 408 00:22:17,800 --> 00:22:20,399 Speaker 2: I definitely think it's the former. He wasn't really a 409 00:22:20,440 --> 00:22:23,440 Speaker 2: tech guy who was a business guy. But he eventually 410 00:22:23,440 --> 00:22:26,840 Speaker 2: decides to cooperate somewhat with the authorities, and they spend 411 00:22:27,160 --> 00:22:29,840 Speaker 2: three or four days in there, sleeping on the floor, 412 00:22:30,240 --> 00:22:34,119 Speaker 2: getting takeout food, and the FBI and other agents are 413 00:22:34,119 --> 00:22:38,240 Speaker 2: grilling Ramos about the company, about the industry, until Vincent decides, 414 00:22:38,760 --> 00:22:42,200 Speaker 2: for some reason he gets cold feet and he leaves 415 00:22:42,440 --> 00:22:45,399 Speaker 2: the hotel suite while the agents are sleeping. He tries 416 00:22:45,400 --> 00:22:49,440 Speaker 2: to escape to the Canadian border, which is incredibly embarrassing 417 00:22:49,840 --> 00:22:53,040 Speaker 2: for the FBI, where you have your prime criminal suspect 418 00:22:53,080 --> 00:22:55,200 Speaker 2: and he basically slips out in the middle of the night. 419 00:22:55,640 --> 00:22:58,359 Speaker 2: I won't spoil everything about how he's caught, but the 420 00:22:58,400 --> 00:23:03,359 Speaker 2: authorities deploy every resource at their disposal to catch this guy, 421 00:23:03,720 --> 00:23:09,480 Speaker 2: and they eventually do. And Andrew Young, the main prosecutor involved, 422 00:23:09,760 --> 00:23:12,959 Speaker 2: who I spoke to many many times for this book, 423 00:23:13,280 --> 00:23:16,280 Speaker 2: he said it was like getting to the Super Bowl 424 00:23:16,680 --> 00:23:19,920 Speaker 2: and then losing. You finally track down this guy, you 425 00:23:20,160 --> 00:23:22,119 Speaker 2: might be able to get a backdoor into the network, 426 00:23:22,520 --> 00:23:25,320 Speaker 2: and then he does something stupid like runs away. Now 427 00:23:25,320 --> 00:23:27,200 Speaker 2: we're back to square one. Now we don't have anything. 428 00:23:27,200 --> 00:23:29,040 Speaker 2: We can just arrest the guy and shut down the company, 429 00:23:29,080 --> 00:23:30,879 Speaker 2: but how are we even going to get our backdoor? 430 00:23:31,320 --> 00:23:35,000 Speaker 1: The theme here is dumb silly mistakes. Obviously for a moment, 431 00:23:35,040 --> 00:23:38,280 Speaker 1: Hanson's you know, not changing his password to the FBI, 432 00:23:38,359 --> 00:23:41,280 Speaker 1: letting this guy slip away. When the FBI comes to 433 00:23:41,359 --> 00:23:44,480 Speaker 1: him initially and says, hey, we're we're drug traffickers or 434 00:23:44,560 --> 00:23:47,680 Speaker 1: anybody who comes to Phantom Secure and says, I want 435 00:23:47,680 --> 00:23:50,560 Speaker 1: a phone. I'm a drug trafficker. Is there no criminal 436 00:23:50,640 --> 00:23:53,560 Speaker 1: background check, as in, let's find out if you're really 437 00:23:53,600 --> 00:23:57,080 Speaker 1: a criminal? Can somebody vouch for you? Situation happening with 438 00:23:57,119 --> 00:23:59,320 Speaker 1: this company, I mean that would to me, would say, 439 00:23:59,720 --> 00:24:01,440 Speaker 1: so I need Joe Shmo can come off the street 440 00:24:01,480 --> 00:24:02,720 Speaker 1: and if you've got a couple of thousand dollars, you 441 00:24:02,720 --> 00:24:03,800 Speaker 1: can buy one of our phones. 442 00:24:04,400 --> 00:24:08,600 Speaker 2: Yes, And typically the companies do that. They do check 443 00:24:08,640 --> 00:24:11,119 Speaker 2: out who their customers or their potential customers are, to 444 00:24:11,320 --> 00:24:13,840 Speaker 2: know if they're legit, at least in the criminal world. 445 00:24:14,160 --> 00:24:17,520 Speaker 2: It seems that the FBI and his partners had a 446 00:24:17,560 --> 00:24:20,920 Speaker 2: pretty good backstory, Like it wasn't completely out of the blue. 447 00:24:21,119 --> 00:24:23,840 Speaker 2: From what I've read through court documents and speaking to 448 00:24:23,880 --> 00:24:28,840 Speaker 2: people involved, it was a pretty well developed undercover identity. 449 00:24:29,520 --> 00:24:32,600 Speaker 2: You know what authorities call a backstop, and it has 450 00:24:32,720 --> 00:24:35,320 Speaker 2: all of this context and history where this wasn't just 451 00:24:35,320 --> 00:24:40,600 Speaker 2: invented entirely out of cloth. There's enough to convince somebody that, Okay, 452 00:24:40,680 --> 00:24:44,240 Speaker 2: this person's a criminal, you know, and I can trust 453 00:24:44,240 --> 00:24:45,719 Speaker 2: them potentially. 454 00:24:45,520 --> 00:24:48,040 Speaker 1: So they get Vincent Ramos and you said that he 455 00:24:48,200 --> 00:24:51,640 Speaker 1: does cooperate sort of, is that right? What happens after that. 456 00:24:51,960 --> 00:24:54,200 Speaker 2: He cooperates someone and he says he's going to go 457 00:24:54,280 --> 00:24:56,960 Speaker 2: to San Diego, and then of course that goes out 458 00:24:57,000 --> 00:25:00,200 Speaker 2: of the window when he tries to escape, and then 459 00:25:00,200 --> 00:25:04,360 Speaker 2: eventually it's just that, well, the game is over for him, 460 00:25:04,640 --> 00:25:08,560 Speaker 2: you know, he tried to run away. He's now been recaptured. 461 00:25:09,080 --> 00:25:13,160 Speaker 2: He's completely blown the authorities attempts of getting a backdoor 462 00:25:13,400 --> 00:25:17,200 Speaker 2: into Phantom secure out of the water. But what does 463 00:25:17,280 --> 00:25:22,760 Speaker 2: happen is that as news spreads of Vincent Ramos's arrest, 464 00:25:22,800 --> 00:25:25,159 Speaker 2: and I actually learned of that before the FBI announced it. 465 00:25:25,200 --> 00:25:27,280 Speaker 2: I had a source come to me instead that the 466 00:25:27,359 --> 00:25:30,679 Speaker 2: FBI has arrest of Ramos, and I did an article 467 00:25:31,200 --> 00:25:34,919 Speaker 2: around that time as well. What becomes clear is that 468 00:25:35,000 --> 00:25:36,919 Speaker 2: it freaks out all of the other people who are 469 00:25:36,920 --> 00:25:40,760 Speaker 2: selling in cryptophones in this industry, so much so that 470 00:25:40,840 --> 00:25:44,760 Speaker 2: one of them comes forward, seeing the writing on the 471 00:25:44,800 --> 00:25:48,280 Speaker 2: wall and realizes, I need to make a decision here. 472 00:25:48,640 --> 00:25:52,280 Speaker 2: I either need to stay in the cryptophone industry and 473 00:25:52,359 --> 00:25:55,080 Speaker 2: maybe Laura Enforcement is going to come after me as well, 474 00:25:55,640 --> 00:25:58,199 Speaker 2: or how about I flip and maybe I approached the 475 00:25:58,240 --> 00:26:01,439 Speaker 2: FBI with a truly amazing off. And that's how we 476 00:26:01,480 --> 00:26:03,679 Speaker 2: start to get into the FBI running its own company. 477 00:26:04,040 --> 00:26:06,399 Speaker 1: Okay, so who is this? Who's this person who's flipping 478 00:26:06,440 --> 00:26:08,159 Speaker 1: and coming forward? Is this a Sky person? 479 00:26:08,600 --> 00:26:13,920 Speaker 2: This is somebody called afgu Afgo. I'm going to use 480 00:26:13,960 --> 00:26:17,119 Speaker 2: that moniker because you know, they're very much a threat 481 00:26:17,280 --> 00:26:20,440 Speaker 2: to their life for cooperating with law enforcement. But they 482 00:26:20,480 --> 00:26:24,840 Speaker 2: sold phantom secure phones. They sold phones for other company Sky. 483 00:26:25,359 --> 00:26:29,040 Speaker 2: What they were doing was developing their own encryptive phone 484 00:26:29,040 --> 00:26:32,240 Speaker 2: company almost to compete with Ramos and the other ones. 485 00:26:32,320 --> 00:26:35,800 Speaker 2: And that was going to be called a non anom. 486 00:26:36,400 --> 00:26:40,280 Speaker 2: And this person thinks, well, if the FBI is investigating 487 00:26:40,320 --> 00:26:42,919 Speaker 2: these companies, I need to play the ace at my sleeve. 488 00:26:43,359 --> 00:26:46,159 Speaker 2: And his lawyers contact the FBI and the prosecutors and 489 00:26:46,960 --> 00:26:50,880 Speaker 2: they say, my client has this encryptophone company they've just started, 490 00:26:51,119 --> 00:26:53,440 Speaker 2: called a non would you like to use it in 491 00:26:53,480 --> 00:26:56,440 Speaker 2: your own investigations? Of course, not for free. There will 492 00:26:56,480 --> 00:26:59,119 Speaker 2: be money involved, a relatively small amount of about one 493 00:26:59,200 --> 00:27:04,199 Speaker 2: hundred thousand dollars. More importantly, you will not prosecute, or 494 00:27:04,240 --> 00:27:06,560 Speaker 2: you will give a lighter sentence to my client for 495 00:27:06,720 --> 00:27:08,800 Speaker 2: charges they may or may not face in the future. 496 00:27:09,080 --> 00:27:13,080 Speaker 2: But this is an incredible deal for the FBI. Rather 497 00:27:13,119 --> 00:27:17,040 Speaker 2: than investigating a company like Phantom Secure have to deal 498 00:27:17,080 --> 00:27:19,439 Speaker 2: with all of the work they're trying to get a 499 00:27:19,440 --> 00:27:23,800 Speaker 2: backdoor in. This opportunity basically falls into their lap, which 500 00:27:23,840 --> 00:27:26,639 Speaker 2: is like, would you like this tech startup which is 501 00:27:26,680 --> 00:27:29,199 Speaker 2: probably going to be trusted by criminals because it's in 502 00:27:29,240 --> 00:27:31,920 Speaker 2: that world, is in that ecosystem, and you can put 503 00:27:31,960 --> 00:27:35,880 Speaker 2: a backdoor in yourself. Rather than shutting money these companies down, 504 00:27:36,440 --> 00:27:39,080 Speaker 2: they would become the phone of choice for criminals. 505 00:27:39,400 --> 00:27:42,040 Speaker 1: And at this point you've got people scared who are 506 00:27:42,080 --> 00:27:45,439 Speaker 1: running these companies anyway, right, so maybe their competition is 507 00:27:45,520 --> 00:27:49,440 Speaker 1: even lighter than before because you know people are running 508 00:27:49,600 --> 00:27:52,359 Speaker 1: so anam. I know it needs to still be developed, 509 00:27:52,400 --> 00:27:55,120 Speaker 1: but has word gotten out that this is being developed 510 00:27:55,160 --> 00:27:57,480 Speaker 1: or you're gonna have another option. We're still working through 511 00:27:57,480 --> 00:27:59,520 Speaker 1: the kinks kind of thing. So there was no even 512 00:27:59,560 --> 00:28:02,000 Speaker 1: real hour advertise it needed once it was ready to 513 00:28:02,000 --> 00:28:02,800 Speaker 1: go by the FBI. 514 00:28:03,200 --> 00:28:06,160 Speaker 2: It was still super early days, but there was absolutely 515 00:28:06,680 --> 00:28:10,440 Speaker 2: a void or a vacuum in place. Because the FBI 516 00:28:10,480 --> 00:28:14,400 Speaker 2: shuts down Phantom, all of the other companies are pretty spooked. 517 00:28:14,480 --> 00:28:16,359 Speaker 2: You know, they're not closing down just yet, but it's 518 00:28:16,400 --> 00:28:21,240 Speaker 2: pretty scary. But there is a vacuum, especially in Australia 519 00:28:21,359 --> 00:28:26,159 Speaker 2: where Phantom Secure was particularly popular, and criminals need a 520 00:28:26,160 --> 00:28:29,199 Speaker 2: phone obviously, and you can imagine how annoying it is 521 00:28:29,240 --> 00:28:31,640 Speaker 2: for us when what sapp goes down or a message 522 00:28:31,680 --> 00:28:35,800 Speaker 2: goes down. Imagine if you are a cocaine trafficker moving 523 00:28:36,400 --> 00:28:40,360 Speaker 2: multiple tons of drugs week after week, you need to 524 00:28:40,400 --> 00:28:42,840 Speaker 2: be online and if you don't have an encryptive phone 525 00:28:42,840 --> 00:28:44,800 Speaker 2: for a week, you are going to lose a lot 526 00:28:44,840 --> 00:28:48,000 Speaker 2: of money. So there is an urgent need and demand 527 00:28:48,040 --> 00:28:50,880 Speaker 2: for people to find a new provider. But it does 528 00:28:50,920 --> 00:28:56,760 Speaker 2: start exceptionally small. It's basically word of mouth at first. Afku, 529 00:28:56,920 --> 00:28:59,200 Speaker 2: the creator of a non even gives out some of 530 00:28:59,200 --> 00:29:02,480 Speaker 2: the phones for free just to get it in front 531 00:29:02,520 --> 00:29:05,560 Speaker 2: of people, like here's the new phone, I'm trying. Please 532 00:29:05,560 --> 00:29:08,239 Speaker 2: give it a go. And it's very very slow at 533 00:29:08,240 --> 00:29:13,000 Speaker 2: the start, but eventually major gangs in Australia star getting 534 00:29:13,040 --> 00:29:16,680 Speaker 2: onto it, biker gangs, members of the Italian Mafia, those 535 00:29:16,720 --> 00:29:20,120 Speaker 2: sorts of people, and it's effective. It's a cool new phone, 536 00:29:20,160 --> 00:29:24,640 Speaker 2: whereas Owen Hanson's BlackBerry was. I mean, we laugh because 537 00:29:24,640 --> 00:29:27,240 Speaker 2: Blackberries were cool back in the day. They're not cool 538 00:29:27,520 --> 00:29:31,280 Speaker 2: in this point in the timeline in twenty eighteen, twenty nineteen. 539 00:29:31,400 --> 00:29:33,560 Speaker 2: You know, we all want Android now. We want to 540 00:29:33,560 --> 00:29:38,240 Speaker 2: send encrypted photos, we want to send encrypted voicemails, videos, 541 00:29:38,280 --> 00:29:40,080 Speaker 2: all of that sort of thing. And a Noon was 542 00:29:40,120 --> 00:29:42,720 Speaker 2: promising that it was going to be the cool new 543 00:29:43,280 --> 00:29:45,400 Speaker 2: sort of player on the block when it came to 544 00:29:45,520 --> 00:29:47,120 Speaker 2: giving encryption to criminals. 545 00:29:47,520 --> 00:29:50,240 Speaker 1: Let me ask a question. If they're moving forward, you know, 546 00:29:50,280 --> 00:29:54,200 Speaker 1: the FBI is moving forward with this plan tentatively. They 547 00:29:54,200 --> 00:29:57,040 Speaker 1: have all this information from Phantom Secure that they got 548 00:29:57,440 --> 00:30:00,880 Speaker 1: during this time with Vincent Romo's. Do they move on 549 00:30:01,000 --> 00:30:03,760 Speaker 1: any of those people, any of these messages that they've read, 550 00:30:03,880 --> 00:30:06,040 Speaker 1: or do they hold off because they don't want to spook, 551 00:30:06,560 --> 00:30:08,680 Speaker 1: you know, all of the potential customers they could have 552 00:30:08,800 --> 00:30:10,400 Speaker 1: later on with this new company. 553 00:30:10,880 --> 00:30:14,960 Speaker 2: They and especially Australian foresties do make some arrests, particularly 554 00:30:15,040 --> 00:30:19,000 Speaker 2: of people who are helping sell the Phantom Secure phones. 555 00:30:19,560 --> 00:30:21,640 Speaker 2: They can't just like let that go. And they also 556 00:30:21,640 --> 00:30:25,520 Speaker 2: shut down servers, They seize websites and web domains used 557 00:30:25,520 --> 00:30:29,760 Speaker 2: by Phantom Secure. So it is a large scale disruption effort, 558 00:30:30,120 --> 00:30:34,800 Speaker 2: but absolutely the resources move pretty quickly over making no 559 00:30:35,360 --> 00:30:40,040 Speaker 2: the new sexy, interesting phone that criminals are going to 560 00:30:40,040 --> 00:30:41,160 Speaker 2: want to flock to. 561 00:30:41,560 --> 00:30:45,160 Speaker 1: So as Afku the face of this company, how involved 562 00:30:45,320 --> 00:30:48,400 Speaker 1: is he this criminal? The FBI is now saying, we're 563 00:30:48,440 --> 00:30:50,120 Speaker 1: going to work with you to make this legitimate. 564 00:30:50,360 --> 00:30:53,920 Speaker 2: Yeah, so Afku definitely knows people in the criminal underworld, 565 00:30:53,960 --> 00:30:56,080 Speaker 2: and that's how it gets its start. It would be very, 566 00:30:56,160 --> 00:31:00,440 Speaker 2: very difficult for a norm or really any encryptophone company 567 00:31:00,480 --> 00:31:03,640 Speaker 2: in the criminal space to get any sort of headway 568 00:31:04,080 --> 00:31:07,240 Speaker 2: if you don't have those criminal connections. And that's another 569 00:31:07,680 --> 00:31:11,600 Speaker 2: crucial thing about trust is that if you're a cocaine 570 00:31:11,640 --> 00:31:14,400 Speaker 2: trafficker and you buy an a cryptophone from somebody like 571 00:31:14,440 --> 00:31:18,560 Speaker 2: AFGA or anyone in that space, there's a specific person 572 00:31:19,160 --> 00:31:22,560 Speaker 2: you can go and blame if something goes wrong. If 573 00:31:22,600 --> 00:31:25,760 Speaker 2: a criminal I don't know gets an iPhone and installs 574 00:31:25,840 --> 00:31:27,920 Speaker 2: signal of it, they're not going to go and beat 575 00:31:27,960 --> 00:31:29,600 Speaker 2: up Tim Cook. I mean they might do, but that 576 00:31:29,640 --> 00:31:32,000 Speaker 2: would be absolutely insane obviously. 577 00:31:32,200 --> 00:31:32,440 Speaker 1: Yeah. 578 00:31:32,480 --> 00:31:35,640 Speaker 2: But when they buy a phone from somebody in an 579 00:31:35,720 --> 00:31:38,960 Speaker 2: alley in Amsterdam or from a safe house in South America, 580 00:31:39,480 --> 00:31:42,200 Speaker 2: there's a specific person you can go blame. You can 581 00:31:42,240 --> 00:31:45,600 Speaker 2: go hurt, you can torture potentially, and that comes up 582 00:31:45,640 --> 00:31:48,640 Speaker 2: in the book as well. So he is the face 583 00:31:48,960 --> 00:31:53,000 Speaker 2: of a nom, but he starts spreading out the phones 584 00:31:53,000 --> 00:31:55,479 Speaker 2: to people who then have more criminal connections, who can 585 00:31:55,520 --> 00:31:59,360 Speaker 2: then directly sell them to the actual cocaine traffickers or 586 00:31:59,360 --> 00:32:01,320 Speaker 2: the hit men or anybody else who wants to use 587 00:32:01,360 --> 00:32:04,320 Speaker 2: the phone. It's basically a pyramid scheme where you have 588 00:32:04,520 --> 00:32:07,920 Speaker 2: Afriga at the top, you have the sellers underneath, maybe 589 00:32:07,960 --> 00:32:11,560 Speaker 2: even more sellers underneath them. Then you have the end users, 590 00:32:11,560 --> 00:32:14,960 Speaker 2: the hit men, the traffickers, whoever. But in that pyramid scheme, 591 00:32:15,200 --> 00:32:18,360 Speaker 2: there's almost a secret top layer, which is the FBI 592 00:32:18,600 --> 00:32:21,520 Speaker 2: above the entire pyramid in the clouds, which is actually 593 00:32:21,520 --> 00:32:22,680 Speaker 2: dictating the entire thing. 594 00:32:23,120 --> 00:32:25,680 Speaker 1: Are all of the people who work for a noom 595 00:32:25,840 --> 00:32:28,400 Speaker 1: like Afgu, I mean, are they all aware of what's 596 00:32:28,440 --> 00:32:29,520 Speaker 1: happening and what they're doing. 597 00:32:30,080 --> 00:32:32,760 Speaker 2: Afgu is the only one who knows at least is 598 00:32:32,800 --> 00:32:35,880 Speaker 2: my understanding. And I've spoken to people who coded the 599 00:32:35,920 --> 00:32:39,960 Speaker 2: actual phone, they developed the actual app, and these were 600 00:32:40,640 --> 00:32:44,800 Speaker 2: ordinary people based around Asia and Southeast Asia. They had 601 00:32:44,800 --> 00:32:49,400 Speaker 2: no idea they were building basically an FBI surveillance apparatus, 602 00:32:49,440 --> 00:32:51,520 Speaker 2: and I know that might be a a little bit 603 00:32:51,520 --> 00:32:54,200 Speaker 2: hard for people to believe, like, well, surely they must 604 00:32:54,240 --> 00:32:56,360 Speaker 2: have figured it out. I don't know. They were getting 605 00:32:56,360 --> 00:32:59,320 Speaker 2: one thousand bucks to make a chat app and they 606 00:32:59,400 --> 00:33:02,800 Speaker 2: log on. One I spoke to was working from his 607 00:33:02,880 --> 00:33:05,400 Speaker 2: bed with his MacBook Pro on his chest, just kind 608 00:33:05,400 --> 00:33:09,280 Speaker 2: of like anybody else working remotely anywhere else around the world. 609 00:33:09,480 --> 00:33:14,240 Speaker 2: It's just a paycheck. Only years later did they realize, oh, 610 00:33:14,520 --> 00:33:17,160 Speaker 2: I just helped wiite up the world. It was a 611 00:33:17,200 --> 00:33:21,120 Speaker 2: complete secret to of course the cocaine traffickers who are 612 00:33:21,200 --> 00:33:23,280 Speaker 2: using the phones, it has to remain a secret from them, 613 00:33:23,520 --> 00:33:26,200 Speaker 2: but even people inside the company itself as well. 614 00:33:26,520 --> 00:33:29,520 Speaker 1: So we know the United States is the mastermind of this. 615 00:33:29,680 --> 00:33:33,160 Speaker 1: Who else is involved? It's Australia and Canada and other countries. 616 00:33:33,160 --> 00:33:33,920 Speaker 1: Who else is in this? 617 00:33:34,360 --> 00:33:37,040 Speaker 2: Yeah, so it definitely changes over the years. The Europeans 618 00:33:37,080 --> 00:33:39,800 Speaker 2: eventually become involved, but right at the start it's the 619 00:33:39,800 --> 00:33:44,280 Speaker 2: Australians and specifically the Australian Federal Police AFP. And the 620 00:33:44,360 --> 00:33:46,680 Speaker 2: reason for that is not just because these phones are 621 00:33:46,680 --> 00:33:49,280 Speaker 2: so popular in Australia, because you can make a lot 622 00:33:49,320 --> 00:33:52,360 Speaker 2: of money if you get drugs to that island. Drugs 623 00:33:52,400 --> 00:33:54,840 Speaker 2: cost a hell of a lot more money inside Australia 624 00:33:54,880 --> 00:33:57,240 Speaker 2: than they do in the UK or the Netherlands or 625 00:33:57,280 --> 00:34:00,160 Speaker 2: the United States or whatever. But the FBI wanted the 626 00:34:00,160 --> 00:34:03,320 Speaker 2: Australians to sort of test it out first, like they 627 00:34:03,320 --> 00:34:05,840 Speaker 2: don't even know if this backdoor is going to work. Essentially, 628 00:34:05,880 --> 00:34:09,400 Speaker 2: this is a really crazy idea that nobody inside the 629 00:34:09,440 --> 00:34:12,839 Speaker 2: FBI or really any agency apart from potentially the CIA, 630 00:34:12,960 --> 00:34:16,640 Speaker 2: has ever done before. So the Australians try it out, 631 00:34:16,760 --> 00:34:20,720 Speaker 2: and very quickly they do realize, Wow, we're getting really 632 00:34:20,719 --> 00:34:24,240 Speaker 2: good intelligence. We're getting really good messages from these criminals, 633 00:34:24,280 --> 00:34:25,960 Speaker 2: and they can literally see them flash up on their 634 00:34:25,960 --> 00:34:29,280 Speaker 2: computer screens in a part of their headquarters called the Bunker, 635 00:34:29,680 --> 00:34:33,200 Speaker 2: and it's kept incredibly tight lipped. You know, only a 636 00:34:33,239 --> 00:34:37,399 Speaker 2: few people know about this incredibly sensitive capability. But then 637 00:34:37,440 --> 00:34:40,800 Speaker 2: when it starts to grow in Australia, it quickly becomes 638 00:34:40,800 --> 00:34:43,480 Speaker 2: apparent that we're going to need to rope in more 639 00:34:43,520 --> 00:34:47,520 Speaker 2: agencies just because of the globalized nature of organized crime. 640 00:34:47,760 --> 00:34:50,720 Speaker 2: You have these traffickers in Australia who are asking AFGU 641 00:34:50,719 --> 00:34:52,960 Speaker 2: and other people, well, can you start selling phones to 642 00:34:53,040 --> 00:34:56,240 Speaker 2: my contacts in Europe to my contacts in South America, 643 00:34:56,600 --> 00:34:59,480 Speaker 2: because of course drugs have to move. They're a physical 644 00:34:59,520 --> 00:35:02,360 Speaker 2: good and it's going to be connected to the worldwide 645 00:35:02,560 --> 00:35:05,319 Speaker 2: supply chain as well. So quickly as the phones go 646 00:35:05,400 --> 00:35:08,319 Speaker 2: abroad and they go into Europe and South American other locations, 647 00:35:08,560 --> 00:35:11,280 Speaker 2: the FBI has to bring in other law enforcement agencies 648 00:35:11,320 --> 00:35:11,680 Speaker 2: as well. 649 00:35:12,120 --> 00:35:14,480 Speaker 1: At its height, Do I remember this right that you said? 650 00:35:14,520 --> 00:35:18,960 Speaker 1: It was they were looking into ten thousand different criminals 651 00:35:19,120 --> 00:35:22,479 Speaker 1: that have joined this their company. Is that right? Really? 652 00:35:22,520 --> 00:35:23,400 Speaker 1: Over how many years? 653 00:35:23,680 --> 00:35:28,480 Speaker 2: Yeah? So the top number of phones sold was twelve thousand, 654 00:35:28,680 --> 00:35:31,520 Speaker 2: and then at some point they had nine thousand online, 655 00:35:31,600 --> 00:35:35,040 Speaker 2: all at the same time. And this stretch from twenty 656 00:35:35,080 --> 00:35:40,200 Speaker 2: eighteen up to twenty twenty one. So for years and years, 657 00:35:40,640 --> 00:35:44,839 Speaker 2: the FBI was reading these communications of all of these 658 00:35:44,880 --> 00:35:48,000 Speaker 2: criminals all over the world. And I think just to 659 00:35:48,040 --> 00:35:50,720 Speaker 2: stress sort of the safety and the danger to afgu 660 00:35:51,040 --> 00:35:53,480 Speaker 2: as you know, and as your listeners will know, if 661 00:35:53,520 --> 00:35:57,839 Speaker 2: you're an informant to a single criminal gang, your life 662 00:35:57,920 --> 00:36:00,799 Speaker 2: might be a risk. You know, obviously depends on the 663 00:36:00,840 --> 00:36:05,359 Speaker 2: crime involved. If you are the confidential human source who 664 00:36:05,400 --> 00:36:09,520 Speaker 2: provided the phone company that the FBI then used to 665 00:36:09,520 --> 00:36:12,560 Speaker 2: wipe up the world, which caught something like thousands of 666 00:36:12,560 --> 00:36:16,279 Speaker 2: thousands of criminals and about three hundred and fifty distinct 667 00:36:16,760 --> 00:36:20,360 Speaker 2: crime syndicates. You've just annoyed three hundred and three hundred 668 00:36:20,360 --> 00:36:23,279 Speaker 2: and fifty different criminal groups. Every single one of those 669 00:36:23,360 --> 00:36:24,759 Speaker 2: is probably going to want to kill you. 670 00:36:25,120 --> 00:36:27,560 Speaker 1: Well, now I have some technical questions because you've brought 671 00:36:27,560 --> 00:36:29,799 Speaker 1: that up. What I was thinking was, how do you 672 00:36:30,400 --> 00:36:33,759 Speaker 1: move in these investigations? How does the FBI figure out 673 00:36:34,320 --> 00:36:38,799 Speaker 1: at what pace what order that you would move, Because 674 00:36:38,960 --> 00:36:41,040 Speaker 1: don't you think at some point they would all catch 675 00:36:41,080 --> 00:36:43,720 Speaker 1: on and say, wait a second, The common denominator here 676 00:36:43,840 --> 00:36:46,719 Speaker 1: is not the drug traffickers in Mexico or in Canada. 677 00:36:47,200 --> 00:36:50,279 Speaker 1: It's this phone company that we all happen to belong to. 678 00:36:51,000 --> 00:36:54,560 Speaker 2: Yeah. That is the constant tension throughout the book and 679 00:36:54,640 --> 00:36:58,360 Speaker 2: throughout the FBI's investigation, is that we're getting all of 680 00:36:58,360 --> 00:37:02,680 Speaker 2: this intelligence. It's incredible, but if we move too quickly 681 00:37:02,920 --> 00:37:06,600 Speaker 2: and too aggressively, it's going to become obvious. There's the phones. 682 00:37:07,440 --> 00:37:10,520 Speaker 2: And then they have the tension of working with maybe 683 00:37:10,560 --> 00:37:13,640 Speaker 2: the Ecuadorian authorities or people in other countries as well, 684 00:37:13,800 --> 00:37:15,759 Speaker 2: and they want to seize the drugs. They don't want 685 00:37:15,800 --> 00:37:19,720 Speaker 2: cocaine flowing across their borders or whatever. So agencies would 686 00:37:19,719 --> 00:37:25,680 Speaker 2: take decisions to sometimes interceptor shipment, sometimes raid a drug lab, 687 00:37:25,840 --> 00:37:27,279 Speaker 2: but they would try to do it in such a 688 00:37:27,280 --> 00:37:30,000 Speaker 2: way that they were so spread out that it would 689 00:37:30,000 --> 00:37:34,839 Speaker 2: give the impression they were not connected whatsoever. Towards the end, 690 00:37:35,560 --> 00:37:38,760 Speaker 2: some people did start get suspicious when there's these thousands 691 00:37:38,800 --> 00:37:40,920 Speaker 2: of users all over the world and all of this 692 00:37:40,960 --> 00:37:44,520 Speaker 2: stuff is being shut down. But for years nobody had 693 00:37:44,880 --> 00:37:48,680 Speaker 2: any clue, and to the point where there's one particular 694 00:37:48,719 --> 00:37:52,360 Speaker 2: drug trafficker in the book called Maximilian Rifkin. He is 695 00:37:52,640 --> 00:37:57,600 Speaker 2: my favorite person I've ever covered. He is absolutely insane, crazy, 696 00:37:57,640 --> 00:38:00,439 Speaker 2: and I had a very good time digging in to him. 697 00:38:00,800 --> 00:38:04,319 Speaker 2: But he puts so much faith into a norm that 698 00:38:04,400 --> 00:38:08,120 Speaker 2: he tells all of his underlings, don't use Sky, don't 699 00:38:08,200 --> 00:38:11,800 Speaker 2: use these other companies all come to a norm because 700 00:38:11,840 --> 00:38:14,480 Speaker 2: not only was he using the phones to traffic drugs, 701 00:38:14,719 --> 00:38:17,040 Speaker 2: he was selling the phones as well, So he had 702 00:38:17,080 --> 00:38:21,360 Speaker 2: this duel motivation of protecting my drug trafficking and making 703 00:38:21,400 --> 00:38:24,080 Speaker 2: a lot of money by selling the phones as well. 704 00:38:24,480 --> 00:38:27,080 Speaker 2: And he puts so much blind faith into it, and 705 00:38:27,120 --> 00:38:31,240 Speaker 2: blind trust into these phones that it was his ultimate downfall, 706 00:38:31,360 --> 00:38:33,960 Speaker 2: not just of him but basically everybody he worked with. 707 00:38:34,280 --> 00:38:36,279 Speaker 1: So is he working directly for the company or is 708 00:38:36,280 --> 00:38:38,560 Speaker 1: he like a scalper basically buying a lot of phones 709 00:38:38,600 --> 00:38:39,680 Speaker 1: in then reselling them. 710 00:38:39,920 --> 00:38:42,520 Speaker 2: Here's why I would call a major distributor where he's 711 00:38:42,560 --> 00:38:45,760 Speaker 2: going to get the phones, he's going to resell them, 712 00:38:45,840 --> 00:38:47,880 Speaker 2: and he's going to take a commission or a cut 713 00:38:48,000 --> 00:38:49,839 Speaker 2: or try to upsell them and that sort of thing. 714 00:38:50,200 --> 00:38:53,760 Speaker 2: But often what I found through reading hundreds of thousands 715 00:38:53,760 --> 00:38:55,920 Speaker 2: of a non messages later that they managed to obtain 716 00:38:55,960 --> 00:38:58,560 Speaker 2: from the police and sources and courts and all of 717 00:38:58,560 --> 00:39:00,799 Speaker 2: that sort of thing. He would also give out the 718 00:39:00,800 --> 00:39:04,080 Speaker 2: phones for free because there was basically a turf war 719 00:39:04,280 --> 00:39:07,680 Speaker 2: between his company or a non incroachat and another one 720 00:39:07,920 --> 00:39:10,759 Speaker 2: Sky that we mentioned, and they're all trying to fight 721 00:39:11,000 --> 00:39:13,440 Speaker 2: for the same customers to the point where there's violence 722 00:39:13,600 --> 00:39:16,080 Speaker 2: as well. There isn't just violence in the drug trafficking world, 723 00:39:16,320 --> 00:39:20,000 Speaker 2: there's violence in the industry of selling the phones to 724 00:39:20,080 --> 00:39:24,120 Speaker 2: organize crimes as well, shooting, stabbings, bombings as well. But 725 00:39:24,200 --> 00:39:26,719 Speaker 2: he stood and others stood to make a lot of 726 00:39:26,800 --> 00:39:30,120 Speaker 2: money if they could provide the phones to drug traffickers. 727 00:39:30,640 --> 00:39:33,600 Speaker 1: Is there any kind of an ethical concern that they 728 00:39:33,680 --> 00:39:36,600 Speaker 1: cannot keep up with all of these messages. They're not 729 00:39:36,600 --> 00:39:40,400 Speaker 1: making all of these arrests. They are facilitating murders probably 730 00:39:40,480 --> 00:39:42,880 Speaker 1: all over the world because they simply are not going 731 00:39:42,960 --> 00:39:44,120 Speaker 1: to be able to go in with a big net 732 00:39:44,120 --> 00:39:46,279 Speaker 1: and sweep all these people up. Yeah, I mean, I 733 00:39:46,320 --> 00:39:48,920 Speaker 1: know they would have gotten phones somewhere, but still, is 734 00:39:48,920 --> 00:39:51,240 Speaker 1: there any kind of did you hear anybody say that. 735 00:39:51,560 --> 00:39:54,600 Speaker 2: One of the major concerns before the FBI got the 736 00:39:54,640 --> 00:39:57,759 Speaker 2: approval to go ahead was that this looks a lot 737 00:39:58,000 --> 00:40:01,680 Speaker 2: like Operation Fast and Furious, which is where US authorities 738 00:40:02,160 --> 00:40:05,880 Speaker 2: allowed the flow of guns into Mexico. And the idea 739 00:40:06,000 --> 00:40:08,480 Speaker 2: was that, well, we can follow the guns and then 740 00:40:08,520 --> 00:40:11,239 Speaker 2: we can arrest the cartel members who are using them. 741 00:40:11,280 --> 00:40:15,120 Speaker 2: That sort of thing that massively backfired, and those weapons 742 00:40:15,120 --> 00:40:17,319 Speaker 2: were then used in the murder of at least you know, 743 00:40:17,440 --> 00:40:20,360 Speaker 2: one border patrol agent and various other crimes as well. 744 00:40:20,719 --> 00:40:24,279 Speaker 2: There the US authorities are basically allowed the cartels to 745 00:40:24,320 --> 00:40:26,400 Speaker 2: get these weapons that were then used for horrible crimes 746 00:40:26,600 --> 00:40:31,000 Speaker 2: and people inside San Diego, inside the authorities, they made 747 00:40:31,000 --> 00:40:35,440 Speaker 2: that direct comparison and the counter which I find somewhat compelling, 748 00:40:35,480 --> 00:40:38,479 Speaker 2: even though I understand the concern is that, look, these 749 00:40:38,520 --> 00:40:42,319 Speaker 2: criminals are going to be using an encryptophone regardless, Like 750 00:40:43,280 --> 00:40:46,040 Speaker 2: these are all cocaine traffickers. They all use these phones. 751 00:40:46,239 --> 00:40:50,640 Speaker 2: This is standard operating procedure for drug traffickers nowadays. Wouldn't 752 00:40:50,680 --> 00:40:52,920 Speaker 2: it be better if they were using a phone that 753 00:40:52,960 --> 00:40:56,440 Speaker 2: we did have visibility into? And apparently that argument was 754 00:40:56,440 --> 00:41:00,600 Speaker 2: convincing enough for the FBI to get approved and for 755 00:41:00,640 --> 00:41:03,600 Speaker 2: the prosecutors in San Diego to go ahead as well. 756 00:41:03,800 --> 00:41:06,920 Speaker 2: That being said, just when there's that tension with well, 757 00:41:06,920 --> 00:41:09,400 Speaker 2: should we raid this drug lab? Should we seize all 758 00:41:09,440 --> 00:41:12,719 Speaker 2: of these narcotics, there's a lot of violence happening on 759 00:41:12,760 --> 00:41:17,560 Speaker 2: an arm as well. There's threats of assassination, torture as well, 760 00:41:17,760 --> 00:41:20,040 Speaker 2: and I document in the book there's one case where 761 00:41:20,480 --> 00:41:23,840 Speaker 2: a young man is unfortunately murdered in Sweden due to 762 00:41:23,880 --> 00:41:27,440 Speaker 2: assassins who used the FBI's own app. They sourced the gun, 763 00:41:27,920 --> 00:41:31,240 Speaker 2: they followed the target, they lured him to a specific location, 764 00:41:31,719 --> 00:41:34,080 Speaker 2: and then they murdered him. The FBI had all of 765 00:41:34,120 --> 00:41:36,440 Speaker 2: that information, but they didn't give it to the Swedish 766 00:41:36,440 --> 00:41:37,760 Speaker 2: authorities in time. 767 00:41:38,080 --> 00:41:41,400 Speaker 1: So are they able to monitor all of these messages 768 00:41:41,440 --> 00:41:43,360 Speaker 1: that are coming through? How is that even possible? 769 00:41:43,960 --> 00:41:47,680 Speaker 2: It's really really difficult. First of all, the messages come 770 00:41:47,719 --> 00:41:52,240 Speaker 2: to the FBI every three days, I think every Monday, Wednesday, Friday. 771 00:41:52,440 --> 00:41:54,560 Speaker 2: And the way it was prescribed to me by the 772 00:41:54,560 --> 00:41:57,040 Speaker 2: San Diego FBI was that they'd have a very long 773 00:41:57,080 --> 00:41:59,560 Speaker 2: week of going through all of these messages, translating them, 774 00:41:59,600 --> 00:42:03,680 Speaker 2: sometimes with automated technology or linguists as well disseminating it 775 00:42:03,719 --> 00:42:07,680 Speaker 2: to international partners. The weekend happens Monday, there's another batch 776 00:42:07,719 --> 00:42:10,600 Speaker 2: of messages, and now we have to go again. And 777 00:42:11,239 --> 00:42:16,320 Speaker 2: it absolutely became unsustainable. Towards the end, they're gathering something 778 00:42:16,400 --> 00:42:19,759 Speaker 2: like twenty twenty one million messages, to the point where 779 00:42:19,760 --> 00:42:23,120 Speaker 2: they're getting a million messages a day, and then every 780 00:42:23,160 --> 00:42:25,799 Speaker 2: single one of those messages has to be read, has 781 00:42:25,840 --> 00:42:28,240 Speaker 2: to be digested, because you don't know if you missed 782 00:42:28,239 --> 00:42:31,800 Speaker 2: this one single message, well maybe somebody's gonna get shot 783 00:42:32,080 --> 00:42:34,759 Speaker 2: or kidnapped or tortured or whatever. And they couldn't keep 784 00:42:34,840 --> 00:42:38,000 Speaker 2: up with it any longer. It's almost like the intelligence 785 00:42:38,400 --> 00:42:40,720 Speaker 2: and the capability was too good. 786 00:42:41,000 --> 00:42:45,120 Speaker 1: Essentially before this is you know, revealed and arm and 787 00:42:45,160 --> 00:42:47,440 Speaker 1: the origins of it. You have these people, you know, 788 00:42:47,440 --> 00:42:50,480 Speaker 1: going on trial. So let's say it's a criminal syndicate 789 00:42:50,520 --> 00:42:52,960 Speaker 1: that they broke up somewhere in America. They go on trial, 790 00:42:53,080 --> 00:42:56,400 Speaker 1: and these criminals do their defense attorneys know how this 791 00:42:56,480 --> 00:42:59,520 Speaker 1: information came to them? Is that disclosed at all? I 792 00:42:59,560 --> 00:43:01,920 Speaker 1: would think you would have to write, you have to. 793 00:43:01,880 --> 00:43:06,680 Speaker 2: Eventually, but especially and especially what the Australian authorities did 794 00:43:06,960 --> 00:43:10,080 Speaker 2: was that they would arrest people, they would intercept drug shipments, 795 00:43:10,480 --> 00:43:14,160 Speaker 2: and then they would basically publish Another reason why. One 796 00:43:14,200 --> 00:43:17,880 Speaker 2: concrete example is that some drugs were hidden inside a 797 00:43:17,920 --> 00:43:20,919 Speaker 2: shipment of welding machines being sent to Australia. The cops 798 00:43:21,000 --> 00:43:22,480 Speaker 2: knew where they were because they're reading all of the 799 00:43:22,520 --> 00:43:25,680 Speaker 2: messages on the encrypted app when they arrest somebody, and 800 00:43:25,719 --> 00:43:27,720 Speaker 2: then the issue at press release a couple days later, 801 00:43:28,080 --> 00:43:31,440 Speaker 2: the Australians just say, oh, well, we did an X 802 00:43:31,560 --> 00:43:34,000 Speaker 2: ray and then that's how we found the drugs, which 803 00:43:34,040 --> 00:43:38,360 Speaker 2: is technically true, but before that they had this gold 804 00:43:38,440 --> 00:43:40,600 Speaker 2: mine of intelligence that told them to do the X 805 00:43:40,719 --> 00:43:43,439 Speaker 2: ray in the first place. Now, of course, years after 806 00:43:43,480 --> 00:43:45,919 Speaker 2: the fact and many of these cases are still going 807 00:43:45,960 --> 00:43:51,600 Speaker 2: through the courts, especially in Australia, where Australian authorities remain 808 00:43:52,280 --> 00:43:54,960 Speaker 2: very very quiet about it because I mean they're still 809 00:43:55,000 --> 00:43:58,799 Speaker 2: legal proceedings and they can't discuss it basically whatsoever. But 810 00:43:59,000 --> 00:44:01,319 Speaker 2: now all of that information, all of that context has 811 00:44:01,320 --> 00:44:03,400 Speaker 2: come out. But at the time it just looks like 812 00:44:03,440 --> 00:44:06,879 Speaker 2: the authority's got incredibly lucky. But there's only so much 813 00:44:06,920 --> 00:44:08,800 Speaker 2: of that you can do. You can't get lucky again 814 00:44:08,880 --> 00:44:11,720 Speaker 2: and again and again and again before people start asking questions. 815 00:44:12,040 --> 00:44:15,799 Speaker 1: And is Afgu just unshakable in this role that he's in. 816 00:44:16,080 --> 00:44:18,960 Speaker 1: Does the FBI ever doubt him in any way as 817 00:44:19,000 --> 00:44:21,640 Speaker 1: being someone who is legitimately working with them. 818 00:44:22,080 --> 00:44:25,520 Speaker 2: I haven't seen any indication that they start to doubt 819 00:44:25,560 --> 00:44:28,359 Speaker 2: this person. And I think the reason for that would 820 00:44:28,400 --> 00:44:31,920 Speaker 2: be just like the back door works, you know. And 821 00:44:32,000 --> 00:44:36,480 Speaker 2: of course, if AFGU or anyone else is using those devices, 822 00:44:36,520 --> 00:44:39,000 Speaker 2: the FBI is going to see those messages as well. 823 00:44:39,160 --> 00:44:42,520 Speaker 2: So if Afgu decided to go do something silly and 824 00:44:42,520 --> 00:44:45,000 Speaker 2: start sending information to criminals, at least on a non 825 00:44:45,520 --> 00:44:47,319 Speaker 2: the FBI is going to see that as well. And 826 00:44:47,360 --> 00:44:49,879 Speaker 2: I mean, it would just be a very unfortunate thing 827 00:44:49,920 --> 00:44:53,040 Speaker 2: to do to agree to cooperate in a sort of backstab. 828 00:44:53,239 --> 00:44:56,839 Speaker 2: I saw no indication of that. If anything, I think 829 00:44:56,840 --> 00:45:02,719 Speaker 2: the FBI were ecstatic with the capability that this provided. 830 00:45:02,840 --> 00:45:04,759 Speaker 2: You know, I even heard that some of the geekier 831 00:45:05,080 --> 00:45:09,160 Speaker 2: employees inside the FBI and the AFP, they marveled at 832 00:45:09,200 --> 00:45:12,480 Speaker 2: this backdoor in this technology. And I'm sure they're thinking 833 00:45:12,480 --> 00:45:14,719 Speaker 2: of other ways to use it in the future as well. 834 00:45:14,760 --> 00:45:17,640 Speaker 2: Now that they've done it and they've built it, maybe 835 00:45:17,680 --> 00:45:20,560 Speaker 2: there's another way to build it again, at least potentially. 836 00:45:20,840 --> 00:45:22,759 Speaker 1: Well, this was so recent, So how long did this 837 00:45:22,840 --> 00:45:25,360 Speaker 1: go on? It started in twenty eighteen. Tell me what 838 00:45:25,440 --> 00:45:28,320 Speaker 1: the different stages were. Twenty eighteen the beginning, they're building 839 00:45:28,400 --> 00:45:30,799 Speaker 1: the company, they're marketing it and all of that. 840 00:45:31,040 --> 00:45:34,560 Speaker 2: Yeah, twenty eighteen, it starts very quiet in Australia, word 841 00:45:34,560 --> 00:45:38,040 Speaker 2: of mouth. By twenty nineteen it's moved to Europe. They 842 00:45:38,040 --> 00:45:41,440 Speaker 2: start to bring in some really big drug traffickers who 843 00:45:41,480 --> 00:45:44,919 Speaker 2: sort of act as brand ambassadors for the phone. The 844 00:45:45,040 --> 00:45:48,160 Speaker 2: US authorities actually call them influencers. Instead of you know, 845 00:45:48,800 --> 00:45:51,840 Speaker 2: selling shampoo or whatever on Instagram, it's selling phones to 846 00:45:51,880 --> 00:45:55,160 Speaker 2: the cartel and that catapults it. And then when you're 847 00:45:55,200 --> 00:45:59,120 Speaker 2: at twenty twenty and twenty twenty one. It's basically one 848 00:45:59,160 --> 00:46:01,960 Speaker 2: of the main players in this space, and it basically 849 00:46:01,960 --> 00:46:06,200 Speaker 2: becomes the same size as Phantom Secure, if not bigger 850 00:46:06,320 --> 00:46:10,960 Speaker 2: in some instances, and the FBI basically became better at 851 00:46:11,120 --> 00:46:14,879 Speaker 2: running a tech startup for criminals than the criminals were 852 00:46:15,320 --> 00:46:19,359 Speaker 2: doing it themselves. I mean, it becomes absolutely successful, and 853 00:46:20,400 --> 00:46:22,960 Speaker 2: on one hand, it's a long time to run that 854 00:46:23,000 --> 00:46:26,279 Speaker 2: company over years. On the other that's a very short 855 00:46:26,320 --> 00:46:29,200 Speaker 2: amount of time for a non to become as big 856 00:46:29,239 --> 00:46:32,920 Speaker 2: as it was. You know, it really ramped up exponentially, 857 00:46:33,160 --> 00:46:35,480 Speaker 2: and I really try to draw this parallel between this 858 00:46:35,560 --> 00:46:38,480 Speaker 2: tech startup for criminals and Silicon Valley. Not that those 859 00:46:38,520 --> 00:46:42,759 Speaker 2: speaking for criminals, but you will have this phenomenon in 860 00:46:43,040 --> 00:46:46,840 Speaker 2: tech and business called hockey stick growth where it starts 861 00:46:46,920 --> 00:46:49,319 Speaker 2: rail ray stagnant, then all of a sudden it just 862 00:46:49,320 --> 00:46:52,040 Speaker 2: shoots up. And that's basically what happened with a numb. 863 00:46:52,280 --> 00:46:55,799 Speaker 1: How many people total at its height knew about this 864 00:46:56,120 --> 00:46:58,480 Speaker 1: around the world. I cannot believe it didn't get out 865 00:46:58,920 --> 00:46:59,600 Speaker 1: at its height. 866 00:47:00,200 --> 00:47:04,400 Speaker 2: Was dozens of people knew about this at the start. 867 00:47:04,480 --> 00:47:07,920 Speaker 2: It's basically the organized crime squad inside San Diego FBI, 868 00:47:08,120 --> 00:47:10,600 Speaker 2: which to be clear, is a small office. I mean 869 00:47:10,680 --> 00:47:13,319 Speaker 2: I've been there. I walked through the rooms where they 870 00:47:13,400 --> 00:47:16,719 Speaker 2: read the a non messages. They're not the fanciest or 871 00:47:16,760 --> 00:47:19,920 Speaker 2: the biggest FBI field office. You know, they're not LA, 872 00:47:20,360 --> 00:47:23,919 Speaker 2: they're not DC obviously, or Southern District of New York. 873 00:47:23,960 --> 00:47:26,879 Speaker 2: They're very much an underdog. And I think that mentality 874 00:47:27,280 --> 00:47:30,120 Speaker 2: really permeated throughout the FBI of like, well, we're going 875 00:47:30,200 --> 00:47:32,719 Speaker 2: to show them that we can actually do this. And 876 00:47:32,760 --> 00:47:35,720 Speaker 2: that was you know, six seven, eight people at first, 877 00:47:35,760 --> 00:47:38,680 Speaker 2: and then they're superiors. And then as it starts to 878 00:47:38,719 --> 00:47:42,320 Speaker 2: spread to different agencies, the Germans, the Swedes, the Dutch 879 00:47:42,360 --> 00:47:45,239 Speaker 2: as well, most of which I spoke to, it was 880 00:47:45,280 --> 00:47:49,439 Speaker 2: a handful of people in each agency. And I think 881 00:47:49,440 --> 00:47:53,520 Speaker 2: it's a genuine miracle that this did not leak. Sort 882 00:47:53,560 --> 00:47:56,400 Speaker 2: of in parallel, as I go to go into in 883 00:47:56,440 --> 00:47:59,680 Speaker 2: the book, there were these other investigations into Sky, into 884 00:47:59,800 --> 00:48:03,960 Speaker 2: end Chat by the Europeans. They did leak. Criminals did 885 00:48:04,040 --> 00:48:06,840 Speaker 2: learn that those companies were being investigated, and we know 886 00:48:06,960 --> 00:48:08,799 Speaker 2: that because they were talking about it on a non 887 00:48:09,160 --> 00:48:12,080 Speaker 2: they were saying, don't use Sky, don't use Ancho Chat, 888 00:48:12,120 --> 00:48:16,160 Speaker 2: they're compromised. Whoever was saying that clearly had an insider 889 00:48:16,520 --> 00:48:19,600 Speaker 2: somewhere in those agencies, but they didn't know that a 890 00:48:19,680 --> 00:48:23,120 Speaker 2: non was compromised. So they were still in a trap, 891 00:48:23,239 --> 00:48:24,200 Speaker 2: but they didn't realize it. 892 00:48:24,400 --> 00:48:26,319 Speaker 1: So run those numbers again for me. What were the 893 00:48:26,400 --> 00:48:30,040 Speaker 1: total number of convictions, investigations, all of that stuff, So 894 00:48:30,080 --> 00:48:33,480 Speaker 1: we can be impressed with this, with this enterprise. 895 00:48:33,719 --> 00:48:39,000 Speaker 2: Yeah, nine thousand users, more than a thousand arrests, tons 896 00:48:39,160 --> 00:48:42,680 Speaker 2: of drugs, hundreds of weapons, one hundred and fifty threats 897 00:48:42,719 --> 00:48:45,759 Speaker 2: to life mitigated. And now I don't know whether that 898 00:48:45,840 --> 00:48:48,320 Speaker 2: necessarily means, you know, somebody would stopped being killed or 899 00:48:48,320 --> 00:48:53,920 Speaker 2: anything like that, but the FBI least intervened. Cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, 900 00:48:54,040 --> 00:48:58,280 Speaker 2: and fetamine, all of these different drugs taken. But really 901 00:48:58,600 --> 00:49:02,960 Speaker 2: more than that was all of the smuggling techniques which 902 00:49:02,960 --> 00:49:05,640 Speaker 2: were detailed in the messages. They're now burned because now 903 00:49:05,640 --> 00:49:08,440 Speaker 2: the FBI knows that, oh, they do this thing to 904 00:49:08,520 --> 00:49:12,080 Speaker 2: move this drug. They somehow put it into the lever 905 00:49:12,200 --> 00:49:15,360 Speaker 2: of clothes or something like that in this amazing chemical 906 00:49:15,400 --> 00:49:17,720 Speaker 2: reaction to then smuggle the drugs. Well, now the cops 907 00:49:17,719 --> 00:49:19,239 Speaker 2: all know about that because they've read about it in 908 00:49:19,280 --> 00:49:23,000 Speaker 2: the messages. And most importantly, the overriding success of this 909 00:49:23,320 --> 00:49:27,080 Speaker 2: operation was that criminals don't trust these phones anymore. And 910 00:49:27,120 --> 00:49:31,279 Speaker 2: that was an explicit goal of the FBI, which is like, look, 911 00:49:31,320 --> 00:49:34,480 Speaker 2: it's great to see drugs, it's great to arrest people, obviously, 912 00:49:34,920 --> 00:49:38,080 Speaker 2: but the underlying goal was like they wanted to shatter 913 00:49:38,200 --> 00:49:42,399 Speaker 2: trust in the encryptophone industry in the hope that these 914 00:49:42,440 --> 00:49:45,560 Speaker 2: criminals were moved back to other forms of communication that 915 00:49:45,640 --> 00:49:48,479 Speaker 2: we were talking about earlier, maybe an ordinary phone. Maybe 916 00:49:48,480 --> 00:49:50,560 Speaker 2: they'll meet each other face to face, and the FBI 917 00:49:50,600 --> 00:49:53,520 Speaker 2: can use more human intelligence there. I mean, they were 918 00:49:53,560 --> 00:49:56,920 Speaker 2: absolutely successful in seeding paranoia. I know that from speaking 919 00:49:56,920 --> 00:49:58,920 Speaker 2: to drug traffickers and the people who sell those phones. 920 00:49:59,320 --> 00:50:02,239 Speaker 1: Did the FB do I have any surprising discoveries. I 921 00:50:02,280 --> 00:50:04,160 Speaker 1: don't know what that would be, like a connection to 922 00:50:04,200 --> 00:50:07,080 Speaker 1: a government official in another country with a drug trafficker 923 00:50:07,080 --> 00:50:09,400 Speaker 1: that they had never known about. I was just wondering 924 00:50:09,400 --> 00:50:11,479 Speaker 1: if anybody got trapped in this web that they didn't 925 00:50:11,520 --> 00:50:12,440 Speaker 1: expect to be there. 926 00:50:13,160 --> 00:50:17,160 Speaker 2: So they were so paranoid about leaks the FBI that 927 00:50:17,239 --> 00:50:22,239 Speaker 2: they did not share this secret with all countries. The 928 00:50:22,280 --> 00:50:25,759 Speaker 2: FBI were quite skittish and talking to me about this, 929 00:50:25,920 --> 00:50:29,799 Speaker 2: but they implied that, you know, countries in Eastern Europe, Serbia, 930 00:50:30,480 --> 00:50:34,040 Speaker 2: those sorts of places which absolutely have public corruption problems. 931 00:50:34,239 --> 00:50:36,799 Speaker 2: And then we've seen that through the non data later 932 00:50:36,840 --> 00:50:40,399 Speaker 2: on and other investigations, that officials in those countries do 933 00:50:40,520 --> 00:50:46,160 Speaker 2: collaborate directly with criminal entities. And that was absolutely the 934 00:50:46,239 --> 00:50:49,720 Speaker 2: paranoia of well, if we share this with XYZ country 935 00:50:49,920 --> 00:50:54,160 Speaker 2: too early, it could completely derail the operation as well. 936 00:50:54,280 --> 00:50:57,120 Speaker 2: And Andrew Young, again the main prosecutor on the case, 937 00:50:57,680 --> 00:51:00,120 Speaker 2: he was shocked by the amount of public corruption and 938 00:51:00,160 --> 00:51:03,239 Speaker 2: going across these platforms, and I think that's something a norm, 939 00:51:03,239 --> 00:51:06,640 Speaker 2: and these other investigations showed is that law enforcement often 940 00:51:06,640 --> 00:51:10,000 Speaker 2: catch drug traffickers, they often catch money launders, they never 941 00:51:10,040 --> 00:51:13,319 Speaker 2: get the people in public office or the insiders. Are 942 00:51:13,320 --> 00:51:16,880 Speaker 2: a law enforcement agency, they just don't see that activity. 943 00:51:17,200 --> 00:51:20,040 Speaker 2: And then that's what they saw on these encryptive footes. 944 00:51:20,440 --> 00:51:23,440 Speaker 1: So we're talking about this, you've named the company. Clearly 945 00:51:23,520 --> 00:51:25,440 Speaker 1: it has come to an end and this program has 946 00:51:25,480 --> 00:51:27,799 Speaker 1: been shut down. How does that look and when did 947 00:51:27,840 --> 00:51:28,400 Speaker 1: that happen? 948 00:51:28,680 --> 00:51:32,200 Speaker 2: Yes, so in early twenty twenty one, it becomes apparent 949 00:51:32,239 --> 00:51:34,840 Speaker 2: that the FBI cannot do this anymore. They're getting a 950 00:51:34,880 --> 00:51:39,040 Speaker 2: million messages a day. They simply cannot keep tempo with 951 00:51:39,120 --> 00:51:42,799 Speaker 2: the amount of intelligence coming in. So they decide on 952 00:51:42,840 --> 00:51:46,359 Speaker 2: a date in early June twenty twenty one to bring 953 00:51:46,360 --> 00:51:49,279 Speaker 2: an end to the operation. The European authorities don't want this. 954 00:51:49,760 --> 00:51:53,319 Speaker 2: They say, this is an incredible intelligence gold mine. Let's 955 00:51:53,360 --> 00:51:55,640 Speaker 2: just keep running it and we can keep arresting people quietly. 956 00:51:55,719 --> 00:51:57,960 Speaker 2: All of that sort of thing. That's just not possible. 957 00:51:58,120 --> 00:52:00,440 Speaker 2: This had to end at some point, and again the 958 00:52:00,520 --> 00:52:03,359 Speaker 2: FBI wanted it to end to some point because they 959 00:52:03,400 --> 00:52:06,880 Speaker 2: wanted to undermine criminals trust in these encryptophone companies. And 960 00:52:06,920 --> 00:52:09,640 Speaker 2: they can't do that unless they pull the rug underneath 961 00:52:09,640 --> 00:52:12,320 Speaker 2: and come clean on it was us the entire time 962 00:52:12,520 --> 00:52:15,440 Speaker 2: reading an arm. They have to do that very theatrical 963 00:52:15,760 --> 00:52:19,600 Speaker 2: sort of reveal. So it starts with a series of 964 00:52:19,680 --> 00:52:23,520 Speaker 2: raids and arrests in Australia in the early morning, and 965 00:52:23,520 --> 00:52:26,840 Speaker 2: then as the sun moves they start doing arrests in Europe, 966 00:52:27,080 --> 00:52:30,359 Speaker 2: and it's all very very dramatic. There's a big room 967 00:52:30,440 --> 00:52:34,920 Speaker 2: inside EUROPEOL, which is the European Union's law enforcement coordination body, 968 00:52:35,400 --> 00:52:39,520 Speaker 2: and you have German officers talking to Dutch officers, talking 969 00:52:39,520 --> 00:52:42,680 Speaker 2: to Swedish officers, and they're all coordinating. I have a 970 00:52:42,719 --> 00:52:45,040 Speaker 2: warrant for this guy. He's crossed over the border into 971 00:52:45,080 --> 00:52:47,480 Speaker 2: your country. Can you pick him up? They're doing all 972 00:52:47,480 --> 00:52:50,360 Speaker 2: that in real time, just like the criminals are presumably 973 00:52:50,400 --> 00:52:53,040 Speaker 2: as well, and they're rounding up hundreds upon hundreds of 974 00:52:53,120 --> 00:52:56,200 Speaker 2: people in this one single day. It's the single largest 975 00:52:56,239 --> 00:53:01,160 Speaker 2: law enforcement action ever. Something like nine thousand police officers 976 00:53:01,200 --> 00:53:04,120 Speaker 2: acted in some capacity on that day, I mean a 977 00:53:04,160 --> 00:53:08,759 Speaker 2: small army essentially of officers. Until eventually the sun moves 978 00:53:08,800 --> 00:53:12,640 Speaker 2: to San Diego and the DOJ holds a press conference 979 00:53:12,680 --> 00:53:14,880 Speaker 2: where they come clean and they say we were running 980 00:53:14,880 --> 00:53:17,880 Speaker 2: a NORM the entire time. I mean, I was blown away. 981 00:53:18,480 --> 00:53:20,840 Speaker 2: I found out the same time as everybody else. I 982 00:53:21,040 --> 00:53:24,800 Speaker 2: was speechless and stunned that, even after I've covered the 983 00:53:24,880 --> 00:53:28,440 Speaker 2: encryptophone industry for years, nearly ten years at this point, 984 00:53:28,960 --> 00:53:31,040 Speaker 2: I didn't think the FBI would go that far to 985 00:53:31,160 --> 00:53:33,480 Speaker 2: run their own and crypto company. And then of course 986 00:53:33,520 --> 00:53:36,880 Speaker 2: I start writing about it, and I'm pinging my sources 987 00:53:36,880 --> 00:53:38,840 Speaker 2: and asking them, did you know about a NORM? And 988 00:53:38,880 --> 00:53:41,879 Speaker 2: it turns out many of my sources did know because 989 00:53:41,920 --> 00:53:44,080 Speaker 2: they were selling the phones for the company. They just 990 00:53:44,120 --> 00:53:45,920 Speaker 2: didn't want to tell me as a journalist because they 991 00:53:45,920 --> 00:53:47,400 Speaker 2: thought they had a good They thought they had a 992 00:53:47,440 --> 00:53:49,080 Speaker 2: good gig going, they thought they were making a lot 993 00:53:49,080 --> 00:53:52,280 Speaker 2: of money, and then they got caught in the biggest 994 00:53:52,840 --> 00:53:54,760 Speaker 2: trap ever in law enforcement history. 995 00:53:54,960 --> 00:53:58,800 Speaker 1: What about AFGU doesn't this just put him in mortal danger? 996 00:53:59,239 --> 00:54:01,439 Speaker 2: Yeah? Absolutely, And I mean I don't know, of course, 997 00:54:01,560 --> 00:54:06,600 Speaker 2: specifically where this person is, but it's something they're going 998 00:54:06,680 --> 00:54:08,200 Speaker 2: to have to be very very careful for the rest 999 00:54:08,239 --> 00:54:11,600 Speaker 2: of their life. There was actually some potential dangers to 1000 00:54:11,640 --> 00:54:15,600 Speaker 2: them recently in that, in a cruel twist, the DOJ 1001 00:54:16,280 --> 00:54:20,440 Speaker 2: didn't just run this company, it then criminally charged the 1002 00:54:20,480 --> 00:54:22,960 Speaker 2: people who sold the phones, even though they were doing 1003 00:54:23,000 --> 00:54:25,879 Speaker 2: the FBI's dirty work for them, because technically you're selling 1004 00:54:25,920 --> 00:54:28,920 Speaker 2: these to criminals, were gonna arrest you as well. Very recently, 1005 00:54:28,960 --> 00:54:31,080 Speaker 2: some of these people were about to go to trial 1006 00:54:31,320 --> 00:54:33,920 Speaker 2: in San Diego and as part of that after you 1007 00:54:34,080 --> 00:54:36,440 Speaker 2: was going to have to testify, they were going to 1008 00:54:36,520 --> 00:54:38,160 Speaker 2: have to be in court, they would have to show 1009 00:54:38,200 --> 00:54:40,200 Speaker 2: their face, they were going to have to talk about 1010 00:54:40,239 --> 00:54:43,279 Speaker 2: how they created the company. And maybe this was just 1011 00:54:43,360 --> 00:54:47,000 Speaker 2: my naivety more as a technology journalist than an old 1012 00:54:47,000 --> 00:54:50,160 Speaker 2: school crime journalist. But that was staggering to me. This 1013 00:54:50,239 --> 00:54:52,279 Speaker 2: person's life is going to be in serious danger and 1014 00:54:52,280 --> 00:54:54,640 Speaker 2: you're going to have him in court speaking. I was 1015 00:54:54,640 --> 00:54:56,440 Speaker 2: blown away by that. But what it turned out in 1016 00:54:56,480 --> 00:54:58,800 Speaker 2: the end was that all of these people took guilty please, 1017 00:54:58,920 --> 00:55:01,560 Speaker 2: so that hadn't happened. But there are going to be 1018 00:55:01,600 --> 00:55:04,080 Speaker 2: more cases coming through the courts and the coming months 1019 00:55:04,080 --> 00:55:08,440 Speaker 2: and even years. So it's not over for that person. 1020 00:55:08,800 --> 00:55:11,279 Speaker 2: It's not over for the FBI, and it's not over 1021 00:55:11,320 --> 00:55:14,680 Speaker 2: for the Australians or the other foreign law enforcement agencies 1022 00:55:14,680 --> 00:55:17,880 Speaker 2: as well. They still have investigations which they are starting 1023 00:55:18,400 --> 00:55:19,840 Speaker 2: or continuing with this data. 1024 00:55:20,360 --> 00:55:24,160 Speaker 1: So ultimately, what is the lesson learned here? I'm the 1025 00:55:24,280 --> 00:55:26,759 Speaker 1: FBI is on the lookout for what these guys are 1026 00:55:26,800 --> 00:55:28,759 Speaker 1: going to next. They're not just going to give up 1027 00:55:28,760 --> 00:55:30,520 Speaker 1: and they're not going to start using landlines. 1028 00:55:31,000 --> 00:55:33,480 Speaker 2: I think the lesson here is the FBI is willing 1029 00:55:33,520 --> 00:55:39,719 Speaker 2: to go to extraordinary lengths to insert itself into criminal infrastructure, 1030 00:55:39,880 --> 00:55:43,080 Speaker 2: and that's running a phone company for criminals. They've even 1031 00:55:43,200 --> 00:55:46,200 Speaker 2: launched their own cryptocurrency since and they use that to 1032 00:55:46,719 --> 00:55:49,320 Speaker 2: sort of arrest people who are doing pump and dump schemes. 1033 00:55:49,520 --> 00:55:51,879 Speaker 2: There's actually an ARSK I'm working on right now which 1034 00:55:51,920 --> 00:55:55,280 Speaker 2: isn't published yet, but it's about how the FBI secretly 1035 00:55:55,360 --> 00:55:59,040 Speaker 2: ran a money laundering ring for nearly a year to 1036 00:55:59,160 --> 00:56:03,239 Speaker 2: move criminals so then they could identify the criminal customers 1037 00:56:03,320 --> 00:56:06,400 Speaker 2: as well. I think a NOM was a warning shot 1038 00:56:06,880 --> 00:56:09,320 Speaker 2: not just of how resourceful the FBI is when it 1039 00:56:09,360 --> 00:56:13,560 Speaker 2: comes to getting those criminals, but also encryption is such 1040 00:56:13,600 --> 00:56:17,600 Speaker 2: an issue for police and for law enforcement agencies that 1041 00:56:17,680 --> 00:56:20,759 Speaker 2: they're willing to spend what I think it's tens of 1042 00:56:20,760 --> 00:56:23,880 Speaker 2: millions of dollars on this operation to get messages that 1043 00:56:23,880 --> 00:56:25,799 Speaker 2: the otherwise would not be able to do. 1044 00:56:26,200 --> 00:56:29,000 Speaker 1: To me, this reminds me of the police officer sitting, 1045 00:56:29,120 --> 00:56:32,600 Speaker 1: you know, at the keyboard pretending to be a young girl, 1046 00:56:32,719 --> 00:56:36,560 Speaker 1: you know, approaching men on the internet. This is saving 1047 00:56:37,000 --> 00:56:38,960 Speaker 1: you know, the people having to go out undercover and 1048 00:56:39,640 --> 00:56:42,000 Speaker 1: you know, in bed with these criminal syndicates. I mean, 1049 00:56:42,040 --> 00:56:44,279 Speaker 1: is that another thought here? As you really are, you're 1050 00:56:44,400 --> 00:56:47,439 Speaker 1: able to cover so much just from a computer, rather 1051 00:56:47,480 --> 00:56:50,399 Speaker 1: than putting agents lives at risks by trying to get 1052 00:56:50,400 --> 00:56:51,920 Speaker 1: them into all of these places. 1053 00:56:52,239 --> 00:56:56,000 Speaker 2: I mean it would have been completely impossible to arrest 1054 00:56:56,040 --> 00:56:58,879 Speaker 2: all of the people the authorities did through a norm 1055 00:56:59,120 --> 00:57:01,680 Speaker 2: if they were doing it, for lack of a better term, 1056 00:57:01,880 --> 00:57:05,480 Speaker 2: manually or using more old school techniques to get a 1057 00:57:05,520 --> 00:57:08,799 Speaker 2: wire tap onto three hundred, three hundred and fifty different 1058 00:57:08,840 --> 00:57:11,480 Speaker 2: criminal syndicates, maybe get the informant in there. Like, it's 1059 00:57:11,480 --> 00:57:13,960 Speaker 2: completely unfathomable. You wouldn't be able to do that. What 1060 00:57:14,080 --> 00:57:17,960 Speaker 2: the FBI did here, they basically did global law enforcement 1061 00:57:18,360 --> 00:57:22,680 Speaker 2: at scale in one operation. And again I keep HARKing 1062 00:57:22,720 --> 00:57:24,520 Speaker 2: back to the idea of tech companies, and that was 1063 00:57:24,520 --> 00:57:26,160 Speaker 2: a very fun thing for me in the book when 1064 00:57:26,200 --> 00:57:30,440 Speaker 2: I'm my guilty pleasure is reading about corporate fraud like 1065 00:57:30,600 --> 00:57:33,640 Speaker 2: Farrnhose and Facebook, and they kind of married that into here, 1066 00:57:33,960 --> 00:57:35,960 Speaker 2: because at the end of the day, this is like 1067 00:57:36,000 --> 00:57:38,600 Speaker 2: a scam tech company it just happens to be is 1068 00:57:38,680 --> 00:57:40,880 Speaker 2: run by the FBI, and they catching criminals. They were 1069 00:57:40,920 --> 00:57:44,760 Speaker 2: able to enforce the law on a scale that's never 1070 00:57:44,760 --> 00:57:46,640 Speaker 2: been seen before, and I don't know if you'll actually 1071 00:57:46,960 --> 00:57:48,040 Speaker 2: ever be seen again. 1072 00:57:48,320 --> 00:57:51,520 Speaker 1: Well, simply a citizen spectator of all of this and 1073 00:57:51,560 --> 00:57:54,120 Speaker 1: a fan of your book, I have to say it 1074 00:57:54,160 --> 00:57:57,560 Speaker 1: gives me more confidence in the FBI. You know, you 1075 00:57:57,600 --> 00:58:01,440 Speaker 1: don't know what's happening. You've no idea, we don't know 1076 00:58:01,960 --> 00:58:05,040 Speaker 1: anything about how much they're actually trying to protect, you know, 1077 00:58:05,120 --> 00:58:08,720 Speaker 1: our country. And so when I read things like this, 1078 00:58:08,880 --> 00:58:11,560 Speaker 1: and you know, these undercover and these investigations, and you 1079 00:58:11,600 --> 00:58:13,480 Speaker 1: have all of these people coming forward and talking to you, 1080 00:58:13,920 --> 00:58:16,400 Speaker 1: I just think, well, thank god. I know that it's 1081 00:58:16,400 --> 00:58:19,680 Speaker 1: not perfect, but at least we know that they really 1082 00:58:19,720 --> 00:58:23,520 Speaker 1: are trying to pull off these big operations to protect people. 1083 00:58:24,000 --> 00:58:27,600 Speaker 2: Yeah, and I think people involved are very proud of that. 1084 00:58:27,720 --> 00:58:32,400 Speaker 2: They're very happy with the results. They're very happy with 1085 00:58:32,880 --> 00:58:34,959 Speaker 2: how they went about it, I think most of all. 1086 00:58:35,040 --> 00:58:37,439 Speaker 2: And I've spoken to many people who were in the book, 1087 00:58:37,480 --> 00:58:39,960 Speaker 2: and I've spoken to them since in the months and 1088 00:58:40,080 --> 00:58:45,360 Speaker 2: years after. They still talk about the lasting relationships between 1089 00:58:45,400 --> 00:58:48,840 Speaker 2: the FBI and the foreign law enforcement agencies. And you know, 1090 00:58:48,920 --> 00:58:52,360 Speaker 2: a lot of international collaboration happens. I cover a lot 1091 00:58:52,400 --> 00:58:55,960 Speaker 2: of different investigations where that's the case. This was different. 1092 00:58:56,160 --> 00:58:59,680 Speaker 2: These people became friends, They end up becoming drinking buddies, 1093 00:58:59,680 --> 00:59:03,040 Speaker 2: going to the pub after you know, they've successfully intercepted 1094 00:59:03,080 --> 00:59:06,200 Speaker 2: this drug shipment or whatever, and what they heard again 1095 00:59:06,240 --> 00:59:09,720 Speaker 2: and again and again was that this operation may not 1096 00:59:09,840 --> 00:59:13,640 Speaker 2: have been successful if it wasn't for those personal relationships. 1097 00:59:13,680 --> 00:59:15,720 Speaker 2: And specifically there are two agents at the head of it, 1098 00:59:16,320 --> 00:59:20,000 Speaker 2: Nicholas Chevron and Stephanie Stevens, and they were FBI agents 1099 00:59:20,200 --> 00:59:23,080 Speaker 2: who basically ran a noom essentially, and they built the 1100 00:59:23,120 --> 00:59:28,040 Speaker 2: personal relationships with the Swedish authorities, the Dutch authorities, the Australians, 1101 00:59:28,400 --> 00:59:32,800 Speaker 2: And if you don't have that informal but strong bond 1102 00:59:32,960 --> 00:59:37,560 Speaker 2: between the agencies, it's very hard again to trust we're 1103 00:59:37,560 --> 00:59:39,040 Speaker 2: going to give you. We're going to tell you about 1104 00:59:39,040 --> 00:59:42,440 Speaker 2: this secret. Hey, we're secretly running a phone company for criminals. 1105 00:59:42,600 --> 00:59:45,400 Speaker 2: You don't just tell any person or any law enforcement 1106 00:59:45,440 --> 00:59:47,360 Speaker 2: agency that. You need to know that you can trust 1107 00:59:47,360 --> 00:59:49,760 Speaker 2: this person and the personal relationships. I think we're a 1108 00:59:49,760 --> 00:59:50,480 Speaker 2: massive part of that. 1109 01:00:01,960 --> 01:00:04,880 Speaker 1: If you love historical true crime stories, check out the 1110 01:00:04,920 --> 01:00:07,800 Speaker 1: audio versions of my books The Ghost Club, All That 1111 01:00:07,920 --> 01:00:11,120 Speaker 1: Is Wicked and American Sherlock and Don't Forget There are 1112 01:00:11,240 --> 01:00:15,000 Speaker 1: twelve seasons of my historical true crime podcast Tenfold More 1113 01:00:15,000 --> 01:00:18,680 Speaker 1: Wicked right here in this podcast feed, scroll back and 1114 01:00:18,720 --> 01:00:21,480 Speaker 1: give them a listen if you haven't already. This has 1115 01:00:21,520 --> 01:00:26,000 Speaker 1: been an exactly Right Production. Our senior producer is Alexis M. Morosi. 1116 01:00:26,360 --> 01:00:30,840 Speaker 1: Our associate producer is Christina Chamberlain. This episode was mixed 1117 01:00:30,880 --> 01:00:34,760 Speaker 1: by John Bradley. Curtis Heath is our composer. Artwork by 1118 01:00:34,880 --> 01:00:39,280 Speaker 1: Nick Toga. Executive produced by Georgia Hardstark, Karen Kilgarriff, and 1119 01:00:39,400 --> 01:00:43,520 Speaker 1: Danielle Kramer. Listen to Wicked Words on the iHeartRadio app, 1120 01:00:43,680 --> 01:00:47,360 Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you get your podcasts. Follow Wicked 1121 01:00:47,400 --> 01:00:51,640 Speaker 1: Words on Instagram at tenfold more Wicked, and on Facebook 1122 01:00:51,680 --> 01:00:53,280 Speaker 1: at wicked Words Pod 1123 01:01:04,400 --> 01:01:04,600 Speaker 2: Yeah