1 00:00:00,840 --> 00:00:05,920 Speaker 1: Welcome to America's now, Mr garbut chaf tear down this wall. 2 00:00:06,360 --> 00:00:10,000 Speaker 1: Either you're with us or you were with the terrorists. 3 00:00:10,080 --> 00:00:13,200 Speaker 1: If you've got healthcare already, then you can keep your plan. 4 00:00:13,320 --> 00:00:16,400 Speaker 1: If you're satisfied with Trump is not the president of 5 00:00:16,440 --> 00:00:19,800 Speaker 1: the United States, take it to a bank. Together, we 6 00:00:19,840 --> 00:00:27,120 Speaker 1: will make America great again. It's what you've been waiting 7 00:00:27,160 --> 00:00:31,120 Speaker 1: for all day. Buck Sexton, with America now join the 8 00:00:31,200 --> 00:00:36,040 Speaker 1: conversation called buck toll free at eight four four nine hundred. Buck. 9 00:00:36,400 --> 00:00:40,120 Speaker 1: That's eight four four nine hundred to eight to five. 10 00:00:40,720 --> 00:00:46,080 Speaker 1: Sharp mind, strong voice, Buck Sexton, Welcome to the freedom hunt. 11 00:00:46,159 --> 00:00:49,440 Speaker 1: My friends got a lot to discuss with you, Buck Sexton. Here, 12 00:00:49,560 --> 00:00:53,559 Speaker 1: of course, Donald Trump is calling for a look into 13 00:00:53,880 --> 00:00:59,080 Speaker 1: leaks on the Manchester terrorism investigation. We also have a 14 00:00:59,160 --> 00:01:06,240 Speaker 1: federal appeals court ruling against Donald Trump's revised travel ban. 15 00:01:06,920 --> 00:01:11,160 Speaker 1: We have his meeting with NATO members today. Donald Trump 16 00:01:11,240 --> 00:01:13,520 Speaker 1: met with members of NATO, and of course the media 17 00:01:13,600 --> 00:01:15,520 Speaker 1: is finding a way to make it sound like Trump's 18 00:01:16,840 --> 00:01:19,959 Speaker 1: disrespecting or slowly destroying that alliance, which is not true. 19 00:01:20,000 --> 00:01:23,560 Speaker 1: But no surprise there. Uh. And then we will get 20 00:01:23,600 --> 00:01:28,200 Speaker 1: into some startling revelations with our friends Andrew McCarthy of 21 00:01:28,280 --> 00:01:32,720 Speaker 1: National Review and Sarah Carter of h Circa about UH 22 00:01:33,440 --> 00:01:37,360 Speaker 1: surveillance and what's going on UH, the alleged surveillance going 23 00:01:37,400 --> 00:01:40,120 Speaker 1: on under well that was happening under the Obama administration, 24 00:01:40,160 --> 00:01:43,160 Speaker 1: according to Sarah and Andrew looks at the legalities of 25 00:01:43,200 --> 00:01:48,160 Speaker 1: it and talking about Syria with Hassan Hassan, who is 26 00:01:48,560 --> 00:01:52,000 Speaker 1: a brilliant guy, a fantastic vitie santalists looking at Syria 27 00:01:52,000 --> 00:01:54,000 Speaker 1: from a perspective that nobody is right now, which is 28 00:01:54,040 --> 00:01:58,600 Speaker 1: just defeating isis is not nearly enough, my friends, even 29 00:01:58,640 --> 00:02:02,520 Speaker 1: in terms of combating jee Hotis, never mind dealing with Assad. 30 00:02:02,720 --> 00:02:05,480 Speaker 1: And then we'll talk about the reporter body slam and 31 00:02:05,520 --> 00:02:07,320 Speaker 1: all the all the other stuff from today. I mean, 32 00:02:07,360 --> 00:02:10,880 Speaker 1: we have an absolutely jam pack day for I want 33 00:02:10,880 --> 00:02:16,359 Speaker 1: to start off with the Manchester investigation. Oh, because right 34 00:02:16,400 --> 00:02:20,400 Speaker 1: now you've got a lot of people in the media 35 00:02:20,720 --> 00:02:24,359 Speaker 1: and the on the pro Trump side as well, saying 36 00:02:24,360 --> 00:02:28,040 Speaker 1: that they are very angry and there has to be 37 00:02:28,800 --> 00:02:31,120 Speaker 1: a a look into the leaks. Where do these leaks 38 00:02:31,120 --> 00:02:34,840 Speaker 1: come from? Um? And everyone's saying this in the media, 39 00:02:34,840 --> 00:02:38,160 Speaker 1: Where where where are these leaks coming from? Right now? Um? 40 00:02:38,480 --> 00:02:41,400 Speaker 1: A few thoughts on this. First of all, we are 41 00:02:41,400 --> 00:02:44,200 Speaker 1: assuming and I don't know why, but the way this 42 00:02:44,320 --> 00:02:48,639 Speaker 1: is reported on, we assumed that it was a failing 43 00:02:49,320 --> 00:02:53,120 Speaker 1: on the American side. Right. There are British investigators looking 44 00:02:53,200 --> 00:02:58,960 Speaker 1: at this terrorist seen looking at all the connections and 45 00:02:59,360 --> 00:03:03,040 Speaker 1: you know, m I five British counter Terrorism Police. Uh. 46 00:03:03,160 --> 00:03:07,400 Speaker 1: They are working with with all of their different partners 47 00:03:07,480 --> 00:03:13,120 Speaker 1: and and counter terrorism aspects to try and track down 48 00:03:14,480 --> 00:03:17,240 Speaker 1: other members of the cell, members of the cluster. Those 49 00:03:17,280 --> 00:03:21,600 Speaker 1: would be people that aren't necessarily operational in the terrorist Act, 50 00:03:21,720 --> 00:03:24,600 Speaker 1: but I have connections that would make them perhaps either 51 00:03:24,639 --> 00:03:30,520 Speaker 1: accomplices or ideological allies in this process. Direct connections to 52 00:03:30,560 --> 00:03:35,160 Speaker 1: ISIS seem to have already been established based on the 53 00:03:35,200 --> 00:03:40,480 Speaker 1: families past, based on what we know about A Betty 54 00:03:40,840 --> 00:03:46,200 Speaker 1: and his his his father and his siblings, um, who 55 00:03:46,200 --> 00:03:49,720 Speaker 1: have already been picked up. So there's a there's a 56 00:03:49,720 --> 00:03:53,760 Speaker 1: lot of moving pieces in the investigation, which is a 57 00:03:54,320 --> 00:04:00,280 Speaker 1: certainly essential task of the British counter terrorism forces. But um, 58 00:04:00,320 --> 00:04:03,200 Speaker 1: here's what happened here, Well, here's why everyone's upset today. 59 00:04:03,240 --> 00:04:07,320 Speaker 1: There are photos, there were photos published the New York 60 00:04:07,320 --> 00:04:12,760 Speaker 1: Times of the bomb and very specific components of the 61 00:04:12,800 --> 00:04:15,920 Speaker 1: bomb that was used at the Ariana Grande concert in 62 00:04:15,960 --> 00:04:22,719 Speaker 1: Manchester City to murder twenty two young girls and grievously 63 00:04:22,760 --> 00:04:26,279 Speaker 1: wound dozens more. I mean, most of those wounded have 64 00:04:26,520 --> 00:04:30,000 Speaker 1: shrapnell wounds. The shrapnel from an explosive like that would 65 00:04:30,000 --> 00:04:34,760 Speaker 1: be at incredibly high velocity. In fact, they reported that 66 00:04:34,839 --> 00:04:38,000 Speaker 1: the that some of the nuts and bolts attached to 67 00:04:38,040 --> 00:04:41,719 Speaker 1: this bomb, and it was the the force from the 68 00:04:41,800 --> 00:04:46,039 Speaker 1: explosive device was all all in all facing out towards 69 00:04:46,120 --> 00:04:49,240 Speaker 1: the crowd. They looked at they broke down this entire 70 00:04:50,000 --> 00:04:53,040 Speaker 1: crime scene, terrorist scene, and they said and they showed that, 71 00:04:53,640 --> 00:04:57,080 Speaker 1: or they said that some of the shrapnel punctured metal doors. 72 00:04:57,440 --> 00:05:01,839 Speaker 1: So terrible injuries sustained even by those who survived it. 73 00:05:01,960 --> 00:05:04,839 Speaker 1: And Manchester, the UK and the whole world is still 74 00:05:05,240 --> 00:05:09,560 Speaker 1: in mourning. The New York Times just publishing photos of 75 00:05:09,960 --> 00:05:14,080 Speaker 1: has published photos of the bomb and of specific components 76 00:05:14,160 --> 00:05:18,440 Speaker 1: of it, and they're they're defending this. I read their statement. 77 00:05:18,440 --> 00:05:20,839 Speaker 1: They're saying that they're always very responsible about this and 78 00:05:20,880 --> 00:05:24,960 Speaker 1: they have the public has a right to know. Um. 79 00:05:25,000 --> 00:05:28,360 Speaker 1: I don't think that this is responsible reporting. I don't 80 00:05:28,360 --> 00:05:31,480 Speaker 1: know why The New York Times would choose to share 81 00:05:31,560 --> 00:05:35,600 Speaker 1: that information. There's there's nothing about us seeing what may 82 00:05:35,640 --> 00:05:39,919 Speaker 1: be very specific, telltale components of that explosive device that 83 00:05:40,040 --> 00:05:42,120 Speaker 1: at this juncture at least the public needs to know, 84 00:05:43,560 --> 00:05:48,120 Speaker 1: especially if they're trying to track down a bomb making 85 00:05:48,200 --> 00:05:53,320 Speaker 1: apparatus cell members who may have been assisting Salmon and Betty. 86 00:05:53,680 --> 00:05:57,520 Speaker 1: That's not the kind of information that should be just 87 00:05:58,120 --> 00:06:00,279 Speaker 1: blasted across the front page in that way. You know, 88 00:06:00,320 --> 00:06:02,240 Speaker 1: the British have a different system, and they have the 89 00:06:02,240 --> 00:06:07,479 Speaker 1: Official Secrets Act and the British Press while freedom, while 90 00:06:07,480 --> 00:06:11,520 Speaker 1: they have free speech on political issues, uh, they can't 91 00:06:11,520 --> 00:06:13,680 Speaker 1: just publish anything they want and say, yeah, it's our call. 92 00:06:15,080 --> 00:06:17,440 Speaker 1: It's interesting that in this country the assumption among all 93 00:06:17,480 --> 00:06:19,679 Speaker 1: reporters is just what we can publish whatever we want, 94 00:06:20,520 --> 00:06:22,919 Speaker 1: even though technically they're covered by the very same laws 95 00:06:22,920 --> 00:06:27,359 Speaker 1: about disclosure of classified that anybody inside of the government is. 96 00:06:27,880 --> 00:06:31,760 Speaker 1: Technically they technically they are. They like they think that 97 00:06:31,839 --> 00:06:34,400 Speaker 1: they're not, but they actually are. It's just a d 98 00:06:34,560 --> 00:06:39,200 Speaker 1: o J decision not to prosecute people who disclose who 99 00:06:39,240 --> 00:06:41,440 Speaker 1: are journalists, and only only to prosecute those who are 100 00:06:41,480 --> 00:06:44,600 Speaker 1: on the government side, which when you break this down 101 00:06:44,640 --> 00:06:47,800 Speaker 1: also into its ethical components. Okay, so let's say there's 102 00:06:47,839 --> 00:06:51,240 Speaker 1: an investigator in the UK. Uh, Let's say it's in 103 00:06:51,279 --> 00:06:53,960 Speaker 1: a Let's say there's an American who gets wind of 104 00:06:54,600 --> 00:06:57,560 Speaker 1: from his efforts to help investigate what's going on in 105 00:06:57,760 --> 00:06:59,840 Speaker 1: the UK, and he says, look in New York Time. 106 00:06:59,920 --> 00:07:01,880 Speaker 1: He reaches out, it says New York Times, I gotta 107 00:07:01,920 --> 00:07:04,760 Speaker 1: show you these photos. So he's terrible and should be 108 00:07:04,839 --> 00:07:07,000 Speaker 1: horribly punished. But the New York Times is just doing 109 00:07:07,000 --> 00:07:11,720 Speaker 1: great journalism and their heroes. What why they're Americans to 110 00:07:12,040 --> 00:07:14,880 Speaker 1: their citizens, treason still applies to them like it does 111 00:07:14,920 --> 00:07:17,840 Speaker 1: to everybody else. I just I have a different conception 112 00:07:17,920 --> 00:07:20,840 Speaker 1: of this then I guess a lot a lot of 113 00:07:20,880 --> 00:07:23,360 Speaker 1: other folks do, because I look at this from a 114 00:07:23,400 --> 00:07:25,840 Speaker 1: perspective of what's best for the country and what's ethical, 115 00:07:25,960 --> 00:07:32,280 Speaker 1: not what I think journalists take upon themselves as special privileges. 116 00:07:32,320 --> 00:07:34,720 Speaker 1: They they journalists think that they have special privileges because 117 00:07:34,720 --> 00:07:37,480 Speaker 1: they have an editor, and they have somebody who looks 118 00:07:37,520 --> 00:07:39,360 Speaker 1: over their work, and they have a massed head and 119 00:07:40,360 --> 00:07:44,760 Speaker 1: fancy type and stuff like that, that they have special 120 00:07:44,840 --> 00:07:48,840 Speaker 1: rights in this in this regard um. Now, I understand 121 00:07:48,840 --> 00:07:50,560 Speaker 1: on the other side of this, of course, is buck well, 122 00:07:50,800 --> 00:07:52,280 Speaker 1: if you're going to if people are going to be 123 00:07:52,280 --> 00:07:55,640 Speaker 1: in trouble for publishing information that they're not supposed to, 124 00:07:55,720 --> 00:07:59,040 Speaker 1: then the government can shut down all discussion of any 125 00:07:59,040 --> 00:08:01,400 Speaker 1: issues that doesn't want. I I get all of that, 126 00:08:01,480 --> 00:08:05,160 Speaker 1: but the Brits draw lines on that. The Brits are like, 127 00:08:05,200 --> 00:08:07,640 Speaker 1: you know, if you were to come into contact with 128 00:08:07,720 --> 00:08:10,160 Speaker 1: the most sensitive information imaginable as a member of the 129 00:08:10,200 --> 00:08:13,000 Speaker 1: British press, um, we're not okay with you just publishing 130 00:08:13,040 --> 00:08:16,760 Speaker 1: that because you know, in America, journalists are like, yeah, 131 00:08:16,800 --> 00:08:18,640 Speaker 1: we're just gonna do it if we if we think, 132 00:08:18,680 --> 00:08:20,680 Speaker 1: if we think we should do it. Now. Granted, a 133 00:08:20,680 --> 00:08:22,960 Speaker 1: lot of the Times journalists have information and they don't 134 00:08:22,960 --> 00:08:26,800 Speaker 1: share it, but sometimes they do, and it's very hard 135 00:08:26,840 --> 00:08:29,680 Speaker 1: to see how it's in the public interest or of 136 00:08:29,760 --> 00:08:32,160 Speaker 1: public benefit, and it's very easy to see how it 137 00:08:32,240 --> 00:08:34,400 Speaker 1: might be damaging. And that then brings me to the 138 00:08:34,440 --> 00:08:36,960 Speaker 1: photos of the New York Times was has shown and 139 00:08:37,160 --> 00:08:38,480 Speaker 1: you know, once they're out there, they're out there, right. 140 00:08:38,440 --> 00:08:40,240 Speaker 1: I Mean, that's the other thing is the government's like, oh, 141 00:08:40,280 --> 00:08:42,640 Speaker 1: we still can't you know, we're not gonna say anything 142 00:08:42,679 --> 00:08:46,720 Speaker 1: about the photo. I mean, come on, at some point, 143 00:08:47,160 --> 00:08:49,000 Speaker 1: all they're doing is making sure that people that work 144 00:08:49,040 --> 00:08:51,000 Speaker 1: for the government still are like I can't talk about 145 00:08:51,000 --> 00:08:52,440 Speaker 1: what's on the front page of the New York Times, 146 00:08:52,440 --> 00:08:54,600 Speaker 1: which sometimes is useful, but most of the time it 147 00:08:54,600 --> 00:08:57,840 Speaker 1: just means that everyone has to be petrified for no reason. Uh. 148 00:08:57,880 --> 00:09:01,760 Speaker 1: And in this case, though, with this backpack that was 149 00:09:02,360 --> 00:09:08,080 Speaker 1: apparently allegedly used in the terrible terrorist attack in Manchester, 150 00:09:09,440 --> 00:09:14,199 Speaker 1: the relationship between the Brits and the Americans, that intelligence 151 00:09:14,200 --> 00:09:16,320 Speaker 1: sharing has been the one of the main topics today. 152 00:09:16,559 --> 00:09:19,040 Speaker 1: And I think that's a really interesting way for the 153 00:09:19,080 --> 00:09:22,280 Speaker 1: media to take this because now I could be missing 154 00:09:22,320 --> 00:09:24,480 Speaker 1: something and I'm not on the inside anymore, have them 155 00:09:24,520 --> 00:09:26,520 Speaker 1: in for years, so I don't know about who's talking 156 00:09:26,520 --> 00:09:28,840 Speaker 1: to who and all this other stuff. That's why I 157 00:09:28,840 --> 00:09:32,000 Speaker 1: can talk to all of you now. Um, But well, 158 00:09:32,000 --> 00:09:33,280 Speaker 1: how do how do we know that it was an 159 00:09:33,280 --> 00:09:35,199 Speaker 1: American who leaked to the New York Times instead of 160 00:09:35,240 --> 00:09:38,320 Speaker 1: a brit who shared these photos. That's that's one thing 161 00:09:38,400 --> 00:09:41,839 Speaker 1: I in the Internet era, right, it could have maybe 162 00:09:41,840 --> 00:09:43,720 Speaker 1: I missed. I might be missing something there, but that 163 00:09:43,760 --> 00:09:47,640 Speaker 1: seems to be a leap for me, at least without 164 00:09:47,760 --> 00:09:49,800 Speaker 1: knowing and you know Trump is calling for a crack 165 00:09:49,880 --> 00:09:56,000 Speaker 1: down on the leakers without knowing, um, who the leaker is. 166 00:09:56,040 --> 00:09:57,480 Speaker 1: How can we know if it's an America? How can 167 00:09:57,520 --> 00:10:00,520 Speaker 1: we know if it's a breakdown an American O rational 168 00:10:01,400 --> 00:10:06,040 Speaker 1: or inform rather informational security. I'm just I'm I'm asking 169 00:10:06,040 --> 00:10:07,920 Speaker 1: a question. I don't have the answer to that. But 170 00:10:08,000 --> 00:10:10,319 Speaker 1: it seemed to me as though the assumption all of 171 00:10:10,400 --> 00:10:14,240 Speaker 1: day to day was this is somehow Trump's fault. Well, 172 00:10:14,360 --> 00:10:19,680 Speaker 1: this is a counter terrorism investigation in the UK um 173 00:10:19,800 --> 00:10:22,959 Speaker 1: on a what seems to be an i ISIS or 174 00:10:22,960 --> 00:10:26,520 Speaker 1: al Qaida inspired or directed attack or ISIS in this 175 00:10:26,600 --> 00:10:32,080 Speaker 1: case and directed attack. And there's an information finds way 176 00:10:32,120 --> 00:10:34,880 Speaker 1: of the New York Times, and the suggestion, you know, 177 00:10:34,920 --> 00:10:37,160 Speaker 1: the Prime Minister Theresa Mayo is all upset, and the 178 00:10:37,160 --> 00:10:40,080 Speaker 1: suggestion is that it's Trump's fault. And I have to say, 179 00:10:40,160 --> 00:10:42,760 Speaker 1: I don't think that that's the conclusion that people in 180 00:10:42,800 --> 00:10:46,040 Speaker 1: the press would be coming to. Right. So they got 181 00:10:46,600 --> 00:10:49,000 Speaker 1: photos that shouldn't be published in New York Times, even 182 00:10:49,040 --> 00:10:50,960 Speaker 1: if they have them, and they should know that that 183 00:10:51,040 --> 00:10:52,920 Speaker 1: are being that I've been published or in the New 184 00:10:53,000 --> 00:10:56,280 Speaker 1: York Times. Uh, And you've got the Brits all upset, 185 00:10:56,360 --> 00:10:58,520 Speaker 1: saying that they're not going to share information with us 186 00:10:58,559 --> 00:11:00,280 Speaker 1: if there's going to be these leaks. I don't know 187 00:11:00,320 --> 00:11:02,040 Speaker 1: how the Brits know that it came from an American 188 00:11:02,080 --> 00:11:04,079 Speaker 1: and not a brit but maybe they know. I don't know, 189 00:11:04,640 --> 00:11:08,319 Speaker 1: But I do know that the story got a lot 190 00:11:08,360 --> 00:11:12,040 Speaker 1: of extra lift today because it's just a continuation of 191 00:11:12,080 --> 00:11:14,640 Speaker 1: what we had been told before about Donald Trump and 192 00:11:14,640 --> 00:11:19,000 Speaker 1: the Russians. Right, Donald Trump doesn't understand classified. Donald Trump 193 00:11:19,120 --> 00:11:22,439 Speaker 1: is sharing sense of information. He's putting people at risk. 194 00:11:22,640 --> 00:11:26,520 Speaker 1: That's the storyline, just as in the case of Russia. 195 00:11:26,640 --> 00:11:30,160 Speaker 1: With this. I don't buy it. I don't I don't 196 00:11:30,160 --> 00:11:33,319 Speaker 1: see that as what's happening here. But you can understand 197 00:11:33,720 --> 00:11:36,040 Speaker 1: how this fits into the narrative. Why is it that 198 00:11:36,080 --> 00:11:38,560 Speaker 1: the main story for most of today until then, it 199 00:11:38,600 --> 00:11:41,160 Speaker 1: was Donald Trump is destroying NATO. In the morning, the 200 00:11:41,240 --> 00:11:45,000 Speaker 1: news cycle was donald Trump can't keep his people from 201 00:11:45,040 --> 00:11:48,560 Speaker 1: leaking sensitive kind of terrorism investigation stuff in the New 202 00:11:48,640 --> 00:11:51,640 Speaker 1: York Times, And in the afternoon it's Donald Trump is destroyed, 203 00:11:51,640 --> 00:11:56,119 Speaker 1: has destroyed NATO or whatever, undermining Article five, the Collective 204 00:11:56,120 --> 00:12:01,640 Speaker 1: Defense Packed part of NATO. But they can just turn 205 00:12:01,760 --> 00:12:05,280 Speaker 1: anything turns into a negative Donald Trump story. Uh, that 206 00:12:05,440 --> 00:12:07,160 Speaker 1: there have been so many leaks that have been hurting 207 00:12:07,200 --> 00:12:13,240 Speaker 1: the administration for months now, and yet we're also to 208 00:12:13,240 --> 00:12:16,920 Speaker 1: believe it somehow Trump is responsible for other leaks that 209 00:12:17,640 --> 00:12:20,480 Speaker 1: are very hard to stop, and that The New York 210 00:12:20,520 --> 00:12:23,000 Speaker 1: Times just shouldn't have printed this stuff. It just it 211 00:12:23,080 --> 00:12:25,440 Speaker 1: wasn't It wasn't the responsible thing to do. I'm not 212 00:12:25,480 --> 00:12:28,760 Speaker 1: saying that they should be getting legal jeopardy for this, 213 00:12:28,840 --> 00:12:31,839 Speaker 1: but I'm just saying that it's it's not helpful. I 214 00:12:32,320 --> 00:12:36,040 Speaker 1: don't know why they thought it was helpful um much 215 00:12:36,080 --> 00:12:37,920 Speaker 1: for that they did. In fact, there's a part of 216 00:12:37,920 --> 00:12:40,600 Speaker 1: me that thinks that maybe they had this information. Just 217 00:12:40,679 --> 00:12:42,920 Speaker 1: hear me out on this, everybody. Maybe the New York 218 00:12:42,960 --> 00:12:48,599 Speaker 1: Times gets this sensitive counter terrorism investigation information, these photographs 219 00:12:48,640 --> 00:12:54,440 Speaker 1: from the Manchester bombing terror crime scene and figures, well 220 00:12:54,480 --> 00:12:57,040 Speaker 1: will run these. It'll get a lot of clicks, and 221 00:12:57,080 --> 00:13:00,680 Speaker 1: also it'll show that Trump can't control since it information 222 00:13:01,200 --> 00:13:03,760 Speaker 1: at a time when the relationship between the US and 223 00:13:03,800 --> 00:13:06,200 Speaker 1: the Brits is so critical on kind of terrorism issues, 224 00:13:06,440 --> 00:13:08,560 Speaker 1: this this will just sort of, you know, throw some 225 00:13:08,600 --> 00:13:12,480 Speaker 1: gasoline on that fire too. Am I off on this? 226 00:13:12,520 --> 00:13:16,880 Speaker 1: One am I missing something? Is that beyond the thinking 227 00:13:16,960 --> 00:13:19,640 Speaker 1: and scope of those who make these decisions at the 228 00:13:19,640 --> 00:13:25,040 Speaker 1: New York Times. I'm asking questions. I think these are 229 00:13:25,120 --> 00:13:27,720 Speaker 1: questions that others should be asking too. But you will 230 00:13:27,800 --> 00:13:31,280 Speaker 1: notice that, oh, yes, leaks. Trump is saying the leaks 231 00:13:31,360 --> 00:13:36,040 Speaker 1: must be cracked down upon. But the one league from 232 00:13:36,040 --> 00:13:39,839 Speaker 1: today was supposed to make Trump look like he can't 233 00:13:39,920 --> 00:13:43,000 Speaker 1: control the relationship with the Brits. In some way, it 234 00:13:43,040 --> 00:13:45,040 Speaker 1: looked bad for the US, bad for the u S, 235 00:13:45,040 --> 00:13:49,319 Speaker 1: bad for Trump. I don't think that's a coincidence. I 236 00:13:49,360 --> 00:13:54,800 Speaker 1: don't think so at all. Eight four buck eight four 237 00:13:56,040 --> 00:13:59,000 Speaker 1: two five. We've got more on this and a whole 238 00:13:59,040 --> 00:14:02,120 Speaker 1: lot of other stuff, including updates in the kind of 239 00:14:02,160 --> 00:14:07,840 Speaker 1: terrorism investigation itself and surveillance issues spying. Oh my busy hour, 240 00:14:07,960 --> 00:14:16,240 Speaker 1: We'll be right back forgive me. Those were the last 241 00:14:16,400 --> 00:14:19,239 Speaker 1: words called in the Daily Mail here of the Manchester 242 00:14:19,440 --> 00:14:24,560 Speaker 1: suicide bomber Salmon of Betty when he called his mother, 243 00:14:24,560 --> 00:14:30,440 Speaker 1: who's a nuclear scientist by the way, right before the attack. 244 00:14:31,040 --> 00:14:38,320 Speaker 1: Um that's uh, that's what the Daily Mail is saying here. Um, 245 00:14:38,440 --> 00:14:41,960 Speaker 1: what a what a horrific, horrific incident. Although it follows 246 00:14:42,000 --> 00:14:44,520 Speaker 1: a script that we've become all too familiar with their 247 00:14:44,600 --> 00:14:51,560 Speaker 1: radicalization and repeated calls to authorities about the possible radical 248 00:14:51,640 --> 00:14:58,320 Speaker 1: radicalization of a young Muslim male, and they don't stay 249 00:14:58,320 --> 00:15:00,200 Speaker 1: on top of the issue because they've got a lot 250 00:15:00,200 --> 00:15:05,480 Speaker 1: of other radicalization problems to be looking at inside the UK, 251 00:15:05,840 --> 00:15:09,200 Speaker 1: thousands of them. If you see what's being reported these 252 00:15:09,280 --> 00:15:13,400 Speaker 1: days and nothing was done and now a lot of 253 00:15:13,400 --> 00:15:18,640 Speaker 1: people are dead, it's terrible. It is terrible. And as 254 00:15:18,640 --> 00:15:22,960 Speaker 1: I've said, to either or no satisfying solutions for what 255 00:15:23,040 --> 00:15:26,960 Speaker 1: to do now. There are some ideas, there's worthwhile pursuits 256 00:15:27,240 --> 00:15:31,840 Speaker 1: of UM, certain programs that we could try, counter counter 257 00:15:31,920 --> 00:15:37,280 Speaker 1: actization programs and UM. But you know, surveillance is imperfect. 258 00:15:37,320 --> 00:15:39,360 Speaker 1: All of this is imperfect. If you have people that 259 00:15:39,400 --> 00:15:43,560 Speaker 1: are this evil, very hard to stop them a percent 260 00:15:43,640 --> 00:15:48,040 Speaker 1: of the time from harming a lot of innocent people. UM. 261 00:15:48,600 --> 00:15:51,360 Speaker 1: And in Virginia on a w k C, I, what's 262 00:15:51,400 --> 00:16:00,640 Speaker 1: up in Mr wonderful? Hi? Thanks? In light of your background, 263 00:16:00,960 --> 00:16:04,080 Speaker 1: how do you respond to the effect a reactive effect 264 00:16:04,160 --> 00:16:08,600 Speaker 1: that these people were under what they monitor that I mean, 265 00:16:09,280 --> 00:16:14,320 Speaker 1: they were known about. Well, there's only there's only so 266 00:16:14,400 --> 00:16:17,240 Speaker 1: much that you can do on the security service side. 267 00:16:17,960 --> 00:16:22,000 Speaker 1: When there's no criminal activity that has been engaged. I 268 00:16:22,040 --> 00:16:24,680 Speaker 1: know this is people never like hearing this, and I 269 00:16:24,720 --> 00:16:29,480 Speaker 1: understand why. Unfortunately, it is just reality. Um you can 270 00:16:29,960 --> 00:16:34,560 Speaker 1: let's let's say, for example, salmona Betty, the the Imam 271 00:16:34,600 --> 00:16:37,280 Speaker 1: and a mosque called authorities, which I can't remember exactly 272 00:16:37,320 --> 00:16:40,080 Speaker 1: if that was what happened here, but let's say, uh 273 00:16:40,120 --> 00:16:44,120 Speaker 1: that salmona Betty had somebody in the community call the 274 00:16:44,160 --> 00:16:46,600 Speaker 1: police on him because he was saying that he likes 275 00:16:46,640 --> 00:16:50,280 Speaker 1: ISIS and he wants ISIS to defeat the coalition in Syria. 276 00:16:50,720 --> 00:16:53,360 Speaker 1: That's not I mean, it's certainly not by US law. 277 00:16:53,360 --> 00:16:56,800 Speaker 1: I don't I can't speak that that precisely do to 278 00:16:56,960 --> 00:16:59,720 Speaker 1: British law. But that's not illegal here. So what do 279 00:16:59,760 --> 00:17:01,720 Speaker 1: you do? So now you know the guy has some 280 00:17:01,800 --> 00:17:05,119 Speaker 1: really terrible ideas, but you put them under seven surveillance. 281 00:17:05,640 --> 00:17:09,800 Speaker 1: They probably had some effort to monitor him in place, 282 00:17:10,520 --> 00:17:12,560 Speaker 1: but it wasn't enough. And there are a lot of 283 00:17:12,600 --> 00:17:14,439 Speaker 1: there's a lot of other people they're trying to monitor, 284 00:17:15,160 --> 00:17:16,960 Speaker 1: so you know, and that also, by the way, ship 285 00:17:17,000 --> 00:17:20,240 Speaker 1: for those who are saying that there's no uh that 286 00:17:20,280 --> 00:17:23,480 Speaker 1: there that there's no connection here between like the Islamic 287 00:17:23,520 --> 00:17:26,879 Speaker 1: community and terrorism, and well, if there are three thousand 288 00:17:26,960 --> 00:17:30,320 Speaker 1: people who are all of of Muslim background in the 289 00:17:30,440 --> 00:17:37,360 Speaker 1: UK under surveillance for terrorism, uh, suspicion, that's that's meaningful. 290 00:17:37,680 --> 00:17:40,040 Speaker 1: That's a lot that that's not a one off thing 291 00:17:40,080 --> 00:17:43,040 Speaker 1: here or there so and that's that's the truth of 292 00:17:43,040 --> 00:17:44,400 Speaker 1: it on the list. I wish I had a more 293 00:17:44,400 --> 00:17:46,920 Speaker 1: satisfying answer for you, but thank you for thank you 294 00:17:46,960 --> 00:17:51,120 Speaker 1: for calling in Janet in Georgia on the I Heart 295 00:17:51,119 --> 00:17:56,320 Speaker 1: Apple's up. Janet H. I wanted to ask you, um, 296 00:17:56,359 --> 00:17:59,960 Speaker 1: what did you do? I have not heard anything reference 297 00:18:00,160 --> 00:18:03,399 Speaker 1: with regard to the two thousand and ten Russian spy 298 00:18:03,560 --> 00:18:08,959 Speaker 1: ring and how they infiltrated into um, you know, they 299 00:18:08,960 --> 00:18:14,080 Speaker 1: were trying to infiltrate into governmental agencies and they actually 300 00:18:14,119 --> 00:18:18,760 Speaker 1: have one of the spies was actually connected to Hillary Rodham, 301 00:18:18,880 --> 00:18:23,560 Speaker 1: Clinton's finance chairman for her two thousand and eight presidential campaigns. 302 00:18:24,440 --> 00:18:28,040 Speaker 1: And the fact that Robert Moehler was the FBI director 303 00:18:28,880 --> 00:18:31,679 Speaker 1: that was, you know, the head of the FBI at 304 00:18:31,720 --> 00:18:35,440 Speaker 1: the time that that investigation was going on. And from 305 00:18:35,440 --> 00:18:38,879 Speaker 1: what I've read, they actually the FBI actually pulled the 306 00:18:38,920 --> 00:18:44,119 Speaker 1: plug and had those guys rolled up because contrary to 307 00:18:44,240 --> 00:18:48,080 Speaker 1: some initial reporting, it seemed like they were actually making progress. 308 00:18:48,560 --> 00:18:52,120 Speaker 1: They weren't the you know, the bumbling idiots that the 309 00:18:52,200 --> 00:18:57,000 Speaker 1: press immediately Yeah, this is from the l. A. Times. Uh. 310 00:18:57,520 --> 00:19:01,280 Speaker 1: The Russian spies were succeeding FBI, she'll say, and the 311 00:19:01,320 --> 00:19:04,840 Speaker 1: ten sleeper agents exposed in and we're reportedly succeeding in 312 00:19:04,880 --> 00:19:10,160 Speaker 1: efforts to rise in American society and gain connections to policymakers. 313 00:19:10,280 --> 00:19:14,080 Speaker 1: This is from the l. A. Times. So and they did. 314 00:19:14,359 --> 00:19:18,120 Speaker 1: And one more thing that makes it so important, as 315 00:19:19,000 --> 00:19:21,480 Speaker 1: you know, were they actually you know, initially they were 316 00:19:21,480 --> 00:19:23,760 Speaker 1: acting like it was no big deal. But we had 317 00:19:23,800 --> 00:19:27,600 Speaker 1: a colonel, Colonel Alexander I don't know how to say 318 00:19:27,600 --> 00:19:31,120 Speaker 1: his last name, kot y e Z, who was high 319 00:19:31,160 --> 00:19:35,399 Speaker 1: up in the Soviet military in Moscow. And we burned 320 00:19:35,440 --> 00:19:40,440 Speaker 1: that guy, um too, because you know, it got revealed 321 00:19:40,440 --> 00:19:44,440 Speaker 1: that the um uh janet we're at we're at time. 322 00:19:44,480 --> 00:19:46,399 Speaker 1: But I do appreciate you calling and thank you, Siels. 323 00:19:46,440 --> 00:19:49,919 Speaker 1: High team will be right back. Welcome back to the 324 00:19:50,000 --> 00:19:53,080 Speaker 1: Freedom hud on an island of liberty where you're the 325 00:19:53,200 --> 00:19:57,240 Speaker 1: party and it's full of fellow patriots. Buck Sexton kicks 326 00:19:57,280 --> 00:20:04,840 Speaker 1: it off Explosive revelation of Obama administration illegal surveillance of Americans. 327 00:20:04,960 --> 00:20:08,800 Speaker 1: That is the headline from his piece on National Review 328 00:20:08,840 --> 00:20:10,840 Speaker 1: dot com. Right now, we are joined by our friend 329 00:20:10,880 --> 00:20:14,440 Speaker 1: Andy McCarthy. He's a former assistant U S Attorney for 330 00:20:14,480 --> 00:20:17,359 Speaker 1: the Southern District of New York, a best selling author 331 00:20:17,400 --> 00:20:20,760 Speaker 1: and contributing editor at National Review, and he always great 332 00:20:20,760 --> 00:20:24,000 Speaker 1: to have you. Bucks, Thanks you, Buck, thanks for having me. 333 00:20:25,040 --> 00:20:28,719 Speaker 1: Explosive revelation Obama administration legal surveillance. That's all in the 334 00:20:28,720 --> 00:20:33,240 Speaker 1: title Andy, tell us what's going on? Well, A five 335 00:20:33,280 --> 00:20:39,639 Speaker 1: accord UH found that the Obama administration with regularity and 336 00:20:39,720 --> 00:20:45,960 Speaker 1: extensively violated the restrictions that exist on how you do 337 00:20:46,400 --> 00:20:53,040 Speaker 1: UH a certain variety of foreign intelligence collection UH. And 338 00:20:53,119 --> 00:20:56,320 Speaker 1: the result of it was that lots and lots of 339 00:20:56,840 --> 00:21:02,879 Speaker 1: American communications inside the United Sates were not only collected, 340 00:21:02,960 --> 00:21:08,440 Speaker 1: but evidently scrutinized and made their ways into reporting, which 341 00:21:08,480 --> 00:21:12,000 Speaker 1: isn't supposed to happen. UM. To do what they did, 342 00:21:13,080 --> 00:21:19,359 Speaker 1: the administration had to basically violate a black and white 343 00:21:20,280 --> 00:21:24,880 Speaker 1: rule that's in the instructions for carrying out this kind 344 00:21:24,880 --> 00:21:27,480 Speaker 1: of surveillance, which says that you're not allowed to use 345 00:21:28,040 --> 00:21:33,639 Speaker 1: the identifying information of American citizens in searching through the 346 00:21:33,760 --> 00:21:40,320 Speaker 1: database that the n ESSAY has for intelligence collection that 347 00:21:40,400 --> 00:21:45,280 Speaker 1: it that it does by tapping into the switches that 348 00:21:45,359 --> 00:21:49,400 Speaker 1: connect big Internet systems. And that's what they did here. 349 00:21:49,440 --> 00:21:51,520 Speaker 1: I mean, basically, they get told you can't do this, 350 00:21:51,720 --> 00:21:53,840 Speaker 1: and they did it. And it looks like they did 351 00:21:53,880 --> 00:21:56,399 Speaker 1: it again and again and again. What would do it? 352 00:21:56,480 --> 00:22:00,000 Speaker 1: What is doing and me in this context, Andy, Well, 353 00:22:00,000 --> 00:22:04,560 Speaker 1: it means that you take um the identifying information of 354 00:22:04,600 --> 00:22:11,280 Speaker 1: an American citizen, like a email address or a phone number, 355 00:22:11,640 --> 00:22:15,000 Speaker 1: and you run it through the data system. And what 356 00:22:15,080 --> 00:22:19,879 Speaker 1: they were not allowed to do was use American identifying information. 357 00:22:20,000 --> 00:22:25,000 Speaker 1: The purpose of this kind of foreign intelligence surveillance is 358 00:22:25,080 --> 00:22:30,199 Speaker 1: to collect intelligence on foreigners outside the United States, and 359 00:22:30,240 --> 00:22:32,639 Speaker 1: the only way Americans are supposed to be relevant to 360 00:22:32,680 --> 00:22:38,560 Speaker 1: that is if they are communicating with the foreign person 361 00:22:38,680 --> 00:22:42,400 Speaker 1: outside the United States who is the subject of the 362 00:22:42,480 --> 00:22:46,800 Speaker 1: intelligence collection. Instead, the way that the administration did it, 363 00:22:46,880 --> 00:22:49,040 Speaker 1: the way the n s A did it under the 364 00:22:49,080 --> 00:22:57,440 Speaker 1: Obama administration enabled it to essentially collect not only American communications, 365 00:22:57,480 --> 00:23:01,280 Speaker 1: but the communications between two America cans inside the United 366 00:23:01,320 --> 00:23:04,920 Speaker 1: States that had absolutely nothing to do with foreign intelligence, 367 00:23:05,280 --> 00:23:07,400 Speaker 1: and the only way they were able to carry it out, Buck, 368 00:23:08,040 --> 00:23:12,080 Speaker 1: was by violating a rule that was very straightforward. The 369 00:23:12,160 --> 00:23:17,600 Speaker 1: rule said, do not use American identifying information to search 370 00:23:17,680 --> 00:23:21,719 Speaker 1: the database, and they used it anyway. How is that 371 00:23:21,840 --> 00:23:24,720 Speaker 1: not I mean, you're a former federal prosecutor. How is 372 00:23:24,760 --> 00:23:29,439 Speaker 1: this not a massive Fourth Amendment breach? It seems to 373 00:23:29,440 --> 00:23:31,720 Speaker 1: me that it is a massive Fourth Amendment breach. It's 374 00:23:31,760 --> 00:23:34,720 Speaker 1: not getting I think, Buck, you know, I mean you 375 00:23:34,840 --> 00:23:39,760 Speaker 1: and I UM are into this uh Intel stuff, and 376 00:23:39,800 --> 00:23:43,440 Speaker 1: we are into the technology, although I must say I've 377 00:23:43,440 --> 00:23:45,560 Speaker 1: had to learn a lot about it in the last 378 00:23:45,840 --> 00:23:49,480 Speaker 1: forty eight hours or so. But you know, we follow 379 00:23:49,520 --> 00:23:51,760 Speaker 1: this stuff, so it's of interest to us. My sense 380 00:23:51,800 --> 00:23:54,240 Speaker 1: in trying to explain it to people, which is why 381 00:23:53,920 --> 00:23:56,880 Speaker 1: I try to write the piece that you were kind 382 00:23:57,000 --> 00:23:59,639 Speaker 1: enough to refer to in a way that explains to 383 00:23:59,760 --> 00:24:05,359 Speaker 1: the um uneducated in this area, common person, what what 384 00:24:05,520 --> 00:24:08,879 Speaker 1: the problem is here? UM? But what I find is 385 00:24:08,920 --> 00:24:12,959 Speaker 1: the people's eyes plaze over. It's complicated. UM. So you know, 386 00:24:13,040 --> 00:24:17,400 Speaker 1: by the time you get finished explaining the the technology 387 00:24:17,480 --> 00:24:21,800 Speaker 1: to them and how they pulled this off. UM. You know, 388 00:24:21,840 --> 00:24:24,879 Speaker 1: I just think people sort of say, yeah, okay, that 389 00:24:24,960 --> 00:24:29,200 Speaker 1: sounds bad. But but but I read your piece very closely. Andy, 390 00:24:29,240 --> 00:24:31,359 Speaker 1: And for those listening, it's it's on National of you 391 00:24:31,440 --> 00:24:34,520 Speaker 1: dot com right now. We're speaking to Andrew McCarthy. Uh. 392 00:24:34,560 --> 00:24:37,760 Speaker 1: And it seems clear to me that you and this 393 00:24:37,840 --> 00:24:39,679 Speaker 1: is what you did. And you know, there's a special 394 00:24:39,720 --> 00:24:41,800 Speaker 1: set I tell people about this that people that work 395 00:24:41,800 --> 00:24:43,800 Speaker 1: in law enforce and people that are prosecutors, that they 396 00:24:43,840 --> 00:24:47,120 Speaker 1: develop instincts and senses about things. They know when things 397 00:24:47,119 --> 00:24:49,359 Speaker 1: are off. The cops that I worked with, the m 398 00:24:49,440 --> 00:24:51,200 Speaker 1: I p D. They always knew when somebody was lying. 399 00:24:51,240 --> 00:24:52,880 Speaker 1: I mean, if you were lying on what you put 400 00:24:52,880 --> 00:24:55,000 Speaker 1: in your coffee, they generally kind of knew that too. 401 00:24:55,000 --> 00:24:57,240 Speaker 1: They just get they just get used to knowing when 402 00:24:57,280 --> 00:24:59,720 Speaker 1: someone's lying, and they like to they like to, you know, 403 00:24:59,760 --> 00:25:01,560 Speaker 1: f that muscle and it It's can be kind of 404 00:25:01,560 --> 00:25:04,800 Speaker 1: funny sometimes, but I'm very serious issues. It's very useful. Uh. 405 00:25:05,160 --> 00:25:07,640 Speaker 1: You think that there's some funky smell here, you think 406 00:25:07,680 --> 00:25:11,240 Speaker 1: something nefarious is up, well, you know, if this is 407 00:25:11,280 --> 00:25:14,680 Speaker 1: a one off, buck, I would be willing to say 408 00:25:14,760 --> 00:25:19,400 Speaker 1: that this is one of those situations where what we're 409 00:25:19,440 --> 00:25:24,440 Speaker 1: dealing with here which is what they call upstream intelligence collection. 410 00:25:24,520 --> 00:25:28,359 Speaker 1: That is where you're tapping the switches that connect these 411 00:25:28,480 --> 00:25:32,800 Speaker 1: huge computer networks. This is the this is the stuff 412 00:25:32,880 --> 00:25:36,000 Speaker 1: that makes the Internet global. It's the stuff that allows 413 00:25:36,760 --> 00:25:40,280 Speaker 1: it's the it's the connections that allow uh, you know, 414 00:25:40,359 --> 00:25:45,000 Speaker 1: someone on a dime in New York to to hit 415 00:25:45,080 --> 00:25:49,520 Speaker 1: send and you know, in a nanosecond later, an email 416 00:25:49,560 --> 00:25:53,600 Speaker 1: shows up in Afghanistan or someplace right. Um, that's it 417 00:25:53,640 --> 00:25:56,440 Speaker 1: seems like magic to us that it happens that way. 418 00:25:56,480 --> 00:25:59,879 Speaker 1: But it's because of this complex architecture. And if this 419 00:26:00,160 --> 00:26:03,920 Speaker 1: was a one off, I would be willing to say 420 00:26:03,960 --> 00:26:08,760 Speaker 1: that the problem here is that the technology has outstripped 421 00:26:09,400 --> 00:26:12,840 Speaker 1: our ability to bring it into compliance with the Fourth Amendment. 422 00:26:13,200 --> 00:26:16,720 Speaker 1: And what I mean by that is it's now physically 423 00:26:17,359 --> 00:26:23,600 Speaker 1: technologically impossible two intercept on one of these switches a 424 00:26:23,720 --> 00:26:28,920 Speaker 1: single email from a foreign target of of intelligence collection. 425 00:26:29,400 --> 00:26:32,960 Speaker 1: What you have to do in tapping on these switches 426 00:26:33,600 --> 00:26:38,560 Speaker 1: is basically grab big packets of emails and then what 427 00:26:38,680 --> 00:26:42,760 Speaker 1: the what the programs they have do is sift through 428 00:26:42,800 --> 00:26:46,359 Speaker 1: the packet so that they can digitally reassemble one email 429 00:26:46,400 --> 00:26:49,240 Speaker 1: that they're interested in and get rid of everything else. 430 00:26:49,800 --> 00:26:52,800 Speaker 1: Which sounds like it's a perfectly reasonable thing to do. 431 00:26:53,280 --> 00:26:55,840 Speaker 1: But Fourth Amendment terms, what it means is that they 432 00:26:55,880 --> 00:27:00,960 Speaker 1: have seized and searched through your email, UH in order 433 00:27:01,080 --> 00:27:04,320 Speaker 1: to discount it as not part of the email that 434 00:27:04,359 --> 00:27:08,600 Speaker 1: they're looking for. So that's a long winded way of saying, 435 00:27:09,080 --> 00:27:12,520 Speaker 1: we have a big technological challenge if you're going to 436 00:27:12,600 --> 00:27:16,520 Speaker 1: do this kind of surveillance and bring it into compliance 437 00:27:16,560 --> 00:27:20,120 Speaker 1: with traditional Fourth Amendment principles. And people were struggling hard 438 00:27:20,160 --> 00:27:22,520 Speaker 1: with that, and I would imagine they make mistakes, and 439 00:27:22,560 --> 00:27:25,119 Speaker 1: I'd be willing to give them rhythm for that. But 440 00:27:25,320 --> 00:27:29,720 Speaker 1: the problem is that this violation happens in a broader 441 00:27:29,760 --> 00:27:34,920 Speaker 1: context where we have found that there's been the use 442 00:27:35,200 --> 00:27:42,600 Speaker 1: of foreign intelligence collection authority to do domestic surveillance on 443 00:27:42,920 --> 00:27:48,320 Speaker 1: political adversaries of the incumbent administration. And what I'm talking about, 444 00:27:48,320 --> 00:27:52,800 Speaker 1: of course, is the investigation of Trump. We have found 445 00:27:52,840 --> 00:27:57,119 Speaker 1: it in that context. Um, there's been a lot of 446 00:27:57,280 --> 00:28:00,680 Speaker 1: unmasking that's gone on in the last couple of years. 447 00:28:00,720 --> 00:28:05,280 Speaker 1: The pace of unmasking UH seems to have have spiked 448 00:28:05,800 --> 00:28:07,720 Speaker 1: a good deal in the last couple of years, which 449 00:28:07,760 --> 00:28:15,000 Speaker 1: means they are intercepting Americans supposedly incidentally in the course 450 00:28:15,040 --> 00:28:19,680 Speaker 1: of conducting foreign intelligence surveillance, and then they're revealing their 451 00:28:19,760 --> 00:28:22,720 Speaker 1: names in the reporting. And then the next thing you 452 00:28:22,800 --> 00:28:26,240 Speaker 1: have in the chain is the President issues these very 453 00:28:26,280 --> 00:28:31,520 Speaker 1: strange orders to make the intelligence more widely disseminated and 454 00:28:31,720 --> 00:28:36,280 Speaker 1: make it easier to unmask identities. And then we hear 455 00:28:36,320 --> 00:28:39,800 Speaker 1: from yet another person that the administration and people who 456 00:28:39,800 --> 00:28:43,400 Speaker 1: were friends outside the administration, we're putting pressure on Congress 457 00:28:43,840 --> 00:28:47,560 Speaker 1: to try to get the Congress to demand more and 458 00:28:47,640 --> 00:28:53,360 Speaker 1: more intelligence information, particularly about Trump, which guaranteed that there 459 00:28:53,400 --> 00:28:57,280 Speaker 1: would be more leaking. And finally, what we've seen again 460 00:28:57,320 --> 00:28:59,280 Speaker 1: and again and again in the last several months of 461 00:28:59,360 --> 00:29:04,000 Speaker 1: some really shocking leaks of classified information. So I don't 462 00:29:04,040 --> 00:29:05,840 Speaker 1: see this as a one off. I see it as 463 00:29:05,960 --> 00:29:10,120 Speaker 1: as as a violation that happens in the context of 464 00:29:10,160 --> 00:29:14,800 Speaker 1: a lot of very troubling activity. We're speaking to Andrew McCarthy, 465 00:29:15,000 --> 00:29:18,680 Speaker 1: he's a contributing editor National View as pieces explosive revelation 466 00:29:18,960 --> 00:29:23,720 Speaker 1: of Obama administration a legal surveillance of Americans. Andy, at 467 00:29:23,760 --> 00:29:27,160 Speaker 1: this point, if you were, if you were assigned to 468 00:29:27,240 --> 00:29:31,120 Speaker 1: this case once again, as as a federal prosecutor, I 469 00:29:31,200 --> 00:29:33,280 Speaker 1: know that you you wouldn't be able to prove it yet, 470 00:29:33,320 --> 00:29:35,680 Speaker 1: But would you be thinking that there were people in 471 00:29:35,720 --> 00:29:40,000 Speaker 1: the Obama administration who were using intelligence collection authority to 472 00:29:40,040 --> 00:29:45,600 Speaker 1: look at Trump campaign affiliated people? Yes, I mean that's stunning. 473 00:29:45,960 --> 00:29:49,000 Speaker 1: Would yeah, I would, Well, I think it's it's certainly 474 00:29:49,560 --> 00:29:52,680 Speaker 1: it needs the threshold of what you would look for 475 00:29:53,000 --> 00:29:56,640 Speaker 1: for purposes of an investigation. Now, whether it actually became 476 00:29:56,720 --> 00:30:00,200 Speaker 1: provable or once in place, or whether my theory, you know, 477 00:30:00,240 --> 00:30:02,800 Speaker 1: my working theory turned out to be either wrong or 478 00:30:02,880 --> 00:30:07,160 Speaker 1: something I couldn't prove is another story. But um, you 479 00:30:07,280 --> 00:30:10,920 Speaker 1: certainly would approach this in that manner. And you know, 480 00:30:11,040 --> 00:30:13,720 Speaker 1: I think I would go after it with the two 481 00:30:13,760 --> 00:30:17,720 Speaker 1: things that would be, you know, either most demanding of 482 00:30:17,760 --> 00:30:21,320 Speaker 1: attention or easiest information to wrap your brain around at 483 00:30:21,360 --> 00:30:23,959 Speaker 1: the beginning, and then go from there. The thing that 484 00:30:24,000 --> 00:30:27,360 Speaker 1: has to be looked at is leaks, because that's the 485 00:30:27,400 --> 00:30:30,360 Speaker 1: only crime that we know of. Uh. And if you're 486 00:30:30,360 --> 00:30:32,480 Speaker 1: gonna have a grand jury investigation, which I think this 487 00:30:32,560 --> 00:30:35,400 Speaker 1: ought to be, it's got to be centered around a crime. 488 00:30:35,440 --> 00:30:39,520 Speaker 1: So you have this leaking of classified information. Uh, And 489 00:30:39,600 --> 00:30:43,800 Speaker 1: I would be you know, trying to run uh, be 490 00:30:43,880 --> 00:30:49,560 Speaker 1: trying to isolate who had access, especially early access to 491 00:30:49,720 --> 00:30:53,120 Speaker 1: the information that ended up in the media. And the 492 00:30:53,160 --> 00:30:55,960 Speaker 1: second thing that I would um I'd be looking at 493 00:30:56,320 --> 00:30:59,160 Speaker 1: because this would be very easy to determine quickly. And 494 00:30:59,200 --> 00:31:01,440 Speaker 1: in fact, I really know why we don't publicly know 495 00:31:01,520 --> 00:31:05,840 Speaker 1: this already, and that is who in the administration did 496 00:31:05,880 --> 00:31:10,320 Speaker 1: the unmasking. We know Susan Rice at least it's been reported, 497 00:31:11,000 --> 00:31:13,480 Speaker 1: did it at least once, I believe in connection with 498 00:31:13,640 --> 00:31:15,880 Speaker 1: General Flynn, But there are obviously others who were doing 499 00:31:15,920 --> 00:31:18,800 Speaker 1: the unmasking. But I'd want to know who did the unmasking, 500 00:31:18,800 --> 00:31:23,400 Speaker 1: which is something they keep records of, and what Trump officials, 501 00:31:23,480 --> 00:31:27,360 Speaker 1: Trump campaign figures people and Trump's or it even Trump himself, 502 00:31:27,880 --> 00:31:33,840 Speaker 1: which Americans were unmasked, Because if an unmasking happens, you know, 503 00:31:33,960 --> 00:31:36,760 Speaker 1: once or twice, you can chalk that up to the 504 00:31:36,920 --> 00:31:40,440 Speaker 1: idea that somebody in good faith thought that the identity 505 00:31:40,480 --> 00:31:42,960 Speaker 1: of the American needed to be known in order to 506 00:31:43,080 --> 00:31:46,280 Speaker 1: understand and exploit the intelligence value of the communication or 507 00:31:46,320 --> 00:31:48,600 Speaker 1: the report they were looking at. But if it's a 508 00:31:48,640 --> 00:31:53,080 Speaker 1: pattern where it's a bunch of unmaskings of the same 509 00:31:53,120 --> 00:31:56,240 Speaker 1: people or people who uh, you know, have in common 510 00:31:56,320 --> 00:31:59,840 Speaker 1: that they're uh in the circle of somebody like Trump. 511 00:32:00,280 --> 00:32:02,960 Speaker 1: Then you start to say to yourself, now, this is 512 00:32:03,000 --> 00:32:07,160 Speaker 1: not something that was done at a good faith intelligence work. 513 00:32:07,240 --> 00:32:12,480 Speaker 1: This is done for purposes of domestic political spying. Any 514 00:32:12,520 --> 00:32:13,880 Speaker 1: one more for before we let you go, and we 515 00:32:13,920 --> 00:32:16,480 Speaker 1: appreciate you making the time for us today, I haven't 516 00:32:16,480 --> 00:32:18,160 Speaker 1: a chance you to ask you what you think about 517 00:32:18,480 --> 00:32:23,600 Speaker 1: the special counselor special counsel and the Mueller investigation as 518 00:32:23,640 --> 00:32:26,160 Speaker 1: it's going for a Muller investigation rather as it's going forward. 519 00:32:26,160 --> 00:32:28,560 Speaker 1: What do you think about all of it? Well, I'm 520 00:32:28,560 --> 00:32:33,240 Speaker 1: not a fan of special counsels, uh, for a variety 521 00:32:33,280 --> 00:32:39,120 Speaker 1: of reasons. Um, you know, I think they're they're unconstitutional. Um. 522 00:32:39,280 --> 00:32:41,800 Speaker 1: But here as a practical matter, I think the other 523 00:32:43,120 --> 00:32:46,080 Speaker 1: real big problem I have with it, Buck is that, um, 524 00:32:46,240 --> 00:32:49,240 Speaker 1: you usually want to have a crime before you assigned 525 00:32:49,240 --> 00:32:51,320 Speaker 1: a prosecutor to it. I mean, that's how it generally 526 00:32:51,360 --> 00:32:54,080 Speaker 1: works at a prosecutor's office, and no one to this 527 00:32:54,160 --> 00:32:57,960 Speaker 1: point can say there's a crime. And what that powerfully 528 00:32:57,960 --> 00:33:00,680 Speaker 1: suggests to me is that this is just a political narrative. 529 00:33:01,200 --> 00:33:03,680 Speaker 1: So the problem is if you appoint someone like a 530 00:33:03,720 --> 00:33:07,480 Speaker 1: special prosecutor to it. It fills a gaping hole in 531 00:33:07,480 --> 00:33:10,520 Speaker 1: the narrative because once a prosecutor is assigned to something, 532 00:33:11,000 --> 00:33:13,040 Speaker 1: even though we've been told again and again this is 533 00:33:13,040 --> 00:33:17,680 Speaker 1: a counterintelligence investigation, not a criminal investigation, people instantly assume 534 00:33:18,080 --> 00:33:20,840 Speaker 1: that there must be a crime, otherwise they wouldn't have 535 00:33:20,920 --> 00:33:23,160 Speaker 1: a point to a prosecutor. Do you think, then, process 536 00:33:23,160 --> 00:33:25,520 Speaker 1: our process crimes than andy what they're really looking for here, 537 00:33:25,640 --> 00:33:30,320 Speaker 1: like lying under owth obstruction? Well, I think I think 538 00:33:30,320 --> 00:33:33,480 Speaker 1: this is more political than legal book. I think what 539 00:33:33,520 --> 00:33:36,160 Speaker 1: they're trying to do, and what they have largely uh 540 00:33:36,240 --> 00:33:40,160 Speaker 1: succeeded in doing to this point, is paralyzing the administration 541 00:33:40,200 --> 00:33:43,040 Speaker 1: so that they can't really move forward with its agenda. 542 00:33:43,440 --> 00:33:46,160 Speaker 1: Whether they can get some process crimes out of it too, 543 00:33:47,040 --> 00:33:50,320 Speaker 1: or a couple of other prosecutions of people around Trump 544 00:33:50,360 --> 00:33:52,440 Speaker 1: that ends up having nothing to do with collusion with 545 00:33:52,480 --> 00:33:54,760 Speaker 1: the Russians, it's all the better for them. But I 546 00:33:54,760 --> 00:33:57,000 Speaker 1: really think this is more of a political exercise than 547 00:33:57,000 --> 00:33:59,880 Speaker 1: a legal one. Having said that, I think Muller's a 548 00:34:00,040 --> 00:34:02,560 Speaker 1: very good man. And if you have to have a 549 00:34:02,640 --> 00:34:07,760 Speaker 1: special prosecutor or what they call it, special counsel, now, um, 550 00:34:07,800 --> 00:34:09,480 Speaker 1: you know, I think he's a good man. He'll do 551 00:34:09,520 --> 00:34:12,200 Speaker 1: a good job. And I'm encouraged by the fact that, 552 00:34:12,280 --> 00:34:16,120 Speaker 1: you know, he's seventy two. He's already got a stellar reputation. 553 00:34:16,200 --> 00:34:19,200 Speaker 1: He's made his mark on the United States. And he 554 00:34:19,239 --> 00:34:21,640 Speaker 1: doesn't need this to make a big splash, right, he 555 00:34:21,680 --> 00:34:25,799 Speaker 1: doesn't need trophies. Yeah, that's goods how it'll go all right? 556 00:34:25,880 --> 00:34:29,560 Speaker 1: Andrew McCarthy. Everybody, he is a contributing editor nashal Review. 557 00:34:29,640 --> 00:34:31,759 Speaker 1: Read his latest piece, It is Excellence, up on nash 558 00:34:31,800 --> 00:34:34,040 Speaker 1: review dot com. And he always great to have you here. 559 00:34:34,080 --> 00:34:37,640 Speaker 1: Talk to you soon. Thanks so much, Buck, team phone 560 00:34:37,640 --> 00:34:54,320 Speaker 1: lines are open, eight buck. We'll be right back shortly. 561 00:34:54,400 --> 00:34:58,239 Speaker 1: I will be traveling to the NATO Summit, where I 562 00:34:58,280 --> 00:35:03,600 Speaker 1: will be working with international colleagues on defeating terrorism. I 563 00:35:03,640 --> 00:35:06,800 Speaker 1: will make clear to President Trump that intelligence that is 564 00:35:06,840 --> 00:35:13,200 Speaker 1: shared between our law enforcement agencies must remain secure. I 565 00:35:13,320 --> 00:35:16,480 Speaker 1: still don't know why I'm looking for the answer. I 566 00:35:16,560 --> 00:35:19,920 Speaker 1: might be missing something very obvious that can happen. I 567 00:35:20,400 --> 00:35:22,960 Speaker 1: have to read a tremendous amount every day before I 568 00:35:22,960 --> 00:35:25,040 Speaker 1: do this. Show my my eyes when they're just going 569 00:35:25,080 --> 00:35:27,680 Speaker 1: to fall out of my head from reading for radio. 570 00:35:27,800 --> 00:35:29,759 Speaker 1: But that's okay. As long as I have my voice, 571 00:35:29,760 --> 00:35:32,080 Speaker 1: I can do my job, I guess. But I I 572 00:35:32,080 --> 00:35:34,760 Speaker 1: don't understand why we assume that this was a failure 573 00:35:34,800 --> 00:35:37,600 Speaker 1: on the American side because an American paper published it. 574 00:35:38,480 --> 00:35:42,719 Speaker 1: That American papers have sources all over the place. New 575 00:35:42,800 --> 00:35:45,799 Speaker 1: York Time certainly does, so I just I don't know. 576 00:35:45,840 --> 00:35:48,160 Speaker 1: I don't have an answer to that question, but I 577 00:35:48,480 --> 00:35:53,960 Speaker 1: do think it's it's also unfair to blame President Trump 578 00:35:54,080 --> 00:35:57,399 Speaker 1: for that leak, Like, what what's he gonna do? I mean, 579 00:35:58,120 --> 00:36:00,680 Speaker 1: anybody who's worked in the government and hell to Clearance 580 00:36:00,680 --> 00:36:06,399 Speaker 1: had been around that national security community knows that there's 581 00:36:06,480 --> 00:36:10,800 Speaker 1: there's there's a lot of people, and you know, everyone 582 00:36:10,840 --> 00:36:12,560 Speaker 1: can be in contact with everybody with the touch of 583 00:36:12,560 --> 00:36:15,520 Speaker 1: a button these days. So I understand they're going to 584 00:36:15,600 --> 00:36:17,600 Speaker 1: try to look into this and crack down on this. 585 00:36:17,680 --> 00:36:22,719 Speaker 1: But here's here's my concern. Um, while a lot of 586 00:36:22,760 --> 00:36:25,880 Speaker 1: people are you know, shaking a finger and and getting 587 00:36:26,440 --> 00:36:28,400 Speaker 1: angry about leaks and say we need to find the leakers, 588 00:36:28,400 --> 00:36:30,479 Speaker 1: need to find the leakers, They're not going to find 589 00:36:30,480 --> 00:36:33,839 Speaker 1: the leakers who put stuff out there that really is dangerous, 590 00:36:34,040 --> 00:36:37,879 Speaker 1: that's my guess. But they will find some low level 591 00:36:37,960 --> 00:36:40,880 Speaker 1: guy in either the intelligence community or the military to 592 00:36:41,000 --> 00:36:47,680 Speaker 1: make an example of. And that really really uh, I 593 00:36:47,719 --> 00:36:50,520 Speaker 1: was trying to find the right word, really agitates me. 594 00:36:51,280 --> 00:36:54,040 Speaker 1: If it wasn't a family show, I'd use a very 595 00:36:54,040 --> 00:36:58,319 Speaker 1: different kind of word. Um. But it really gets me very, 596 00:36:58,440 --> 00:37:02,160 Speaker 1: very angry because it's so unfair. We see the way 597 00:37:02,160 --> 00:37:05,279 Speaker 1: that Hillary Clinton was treated with you know how with 598 00:37:05,280 --> 00:37:08,520 Speaker 1: with classified and those rules. Uh, we saw what happened. Look, 599 00:37:08,560 --> 00:37:09,960 Speaker 1: I know a lot of you think he's a he's 600 00:37:09,960 --> 00:37:11,880 Speaker 1: a good man, and he served his country honestly, and 601 00:37:11,880 --> 00:37:14,200 Speaker 1: I get all that. But you know, General petray Us, 602 00:37:14,320 --> 00:37:17,080 Speaker 1: and I don't so much object to portrays his treatment 603 00:37:17,560 --> 00:37:20,080 Speaker 1: as to the fact that if it wasn't portray us, 604 00:37:20,800 --> 00:37:23,799 Speaker 1: the treatment would have been much more severe. Um. And 605 00:37:23,840 --> 00:37:25,480 Speaker 1: that's what you're going to see here. So I know, 606 00:37:25,680 --> 00:37:28,680 Speaker 1: right now a lot of TV pundits and others, Oh, 607 00:37:28,760 --> 00:37:31,680 Speaker 1: we've gotta find the leakers. Find the leakers, Okay, Well, 608 00:37:31,719 --> 00:37:34,680 Speaker 1: what you're gonna do is create a political environment where 609 00:37:35,600 --> 00:37:38,239 Speaker 1: the people that are leaking really damaging stuff know that 610 00:37:38,320 --> 00:37:42,120 Speaker 1: they're doing it and so they are careful about it. Um. 611 00:37:42,200 --> 00:37:45,200 Speaker 1: But somebody else who makes a mistake, who's you know, 612 00:37:45,360 --> 00:37:48,319 Speaker 1: a good person and a patriot. You know some I 613 00:37:48,360 --> 00:37:51,480 Speaker 1: don't know, uh, some guy in the army or somebody 614 00:37:51,520 --> 00:37:54,000 Speaker 1: working at uh, you know, low level analysts at where, 615 00:37:54,000 --> 00:37:57,600 Speaker 1: at state department or somewhere. He's gonna mess up small time, 616 00:37:58,239 --> 00:38:00,160 Speaker 1: but they're gonna catch them, and they're gonna make it 617 00:38:00,239 --> 00:38:04,200 Speaker 1: big time, and they're gonna just annihilate somebody and say, see, 618 00:38:04,239 --> 00:38:06,560 Speaker 1: we punish the leakers. And that's one of the more 619 00:38:06,600 --> 00:38:08,880 Speaker 1: disgraceful things about the way the government functions in this 620 00:38:09,000 --> 00:38:12,920 Speaker 1: regard um. They make examples by destroying the lives of 621 00:38:12,960 --> 00:38:16,000 Speaker 1: the week and the those without connections, and we see 622 00:38:16,000 --> 00:38:18,520 Speaker 1: the powerful, for the same offenses and the same problems, 623 00:38:18,640 --> 00:38:22,600 Speaker 1: just get much gentler, easier treatment. And they're not going 624 00:38:22,640 --> 00:38:25,239 Speaker 1: to find the leakers off the really bad stuff. We'll 625 00:38:25,239 --> 00:38:32,400 Speaker 1: be right back. He spreads freedom because freedom is not 626 00:38:32,440 --> 00:38:38,360 Speaker 1: gonna spread itself. Bug sext in his back. Trump and NATO, 627 00:38:38,680 --> 00:38:42,440 Speaker 1: All right, North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO. Let's talk about 628 00:38:42,480 --> 00:38:47,480 Speaker 1: this a bit, shall we. Uh. First of all, you 629 00:38:47,520 --> 00:38:51,240 Speaker 1: have so many people who haven't mentioned NATO in years 630 00:38:51,520 --> 00:38:54,840 Speaker 1: in the press and in politics. Now all of a sudden, 631 00:38:55,200 --> 00:38:59,800 Speaker 1: NATO is is sacro sanct and uh, they're all NATO experts. 632 00:39:00,120 --> 00:39:01,680 Speaker 1: I know that happens with a lot of different things 633 00:39:01,719 --> 00:39:05,120 Speaker 1: in the new cycle, but right now, in particular, there's 634 00:39:05,160 --> 00:39:08,200 Speaker 1: a lot of sanctimonious NATO analysis out there. It's like 635 00:39:08,320 --> 00:39:11,760 Speaker 1: it's the lynch pin up the free world. If Trump 636 00:39:11,800 --> 00:39:15,640 Speaker 1: was running around saying NATO is dead along with Russia, 637 00:39:15,680 --> 00:39:18,800 Speaker 1: I could understand the reaction from some members of the press, 638 00:39:18,840 --> 00:39:22,680 Speaker 1: but that's that's not what's happened. UM. On some issues, 639 00:39:22,760 --> 00:39:28,760 Speaker 1: he in his speech today in Brussels, was right along 640 00:39:28,800 --> 00:39:33,359 Speaker 1: what you would expect. Right. He talked about fighting terrorism 641 00:39:33,440 --> 00:39:39,440 Speaker 1: and NATO's role in that all people who cherish life 642 00:39:40,200 --> 00:39:47,960 Speaker 1: must unite in finding, exposing and removing these killers and extremists, 643 00:39:49,280 --> 00:39:55,480 Speaker 1: and yes, losers, they are losers. Wherever they exist in 644 00:39:55,480 --> 00:40:00,360 Speaker 1: our societies, we must drive them out and never ever 645 00:40:00,880 --> 00:40:06,680 Speaker 1: let them back in. NATO has played a role certainly 646 00:40:06,719 --> 00:40:10,200 Speaker 1: in the war on Terror and UH in Afghanistan. UM 647 00:40:10,239 --> 00:40:14,239 Speaker 1: and many of our most important counter terrorism partners are 648 00:40:14,560 --> 00:40:18,120 Speaker 1: NATO allies. So there's a role for NATO in that. 649 00:40:18,160 --> 00:40:21,560 Speaker 1: But let's also all be very clear that the US 650 00:40:21,680 --> 00:40:24,440 Speaker 1: is still carrying a vast majority of the load of 651 00:40:25,560 --> 00:40:30,600 Speaker 1: UH counter terrorism operations against global g hottest entities wherever 652 00:40:30,600 --> 00:40:34,120 Speaker 1: they may be right, we are still doing the lion's 653 00:40:34,120 --> 00:40:36,520 Speaker 1: share of the work on that, no question about it. 654 00:40:36,560 --> 00:40:39,760 Speaker 1: But we have important, important allies in Europe. But NATO 655 00:40:39,880 --> 00:40:44,960 Speaker 1: isn't really a counter terrorism alliance um And and that's 656 00:40:45,719 --> 00:40:47,640 Speaker 1: not really the right tool. I mean, this is a 657 00:40:47,760 --> 00:40:56,000 Speaker 1: a collective security agreement among twenty eight countries soon I 658 00:40:56,040 --> 00:41:00,960 Speaker 1: think what Montenegro soon to join. That has to do 659 00:41:01,080 --> 00:41:05,520 Speaker 1: with great power conflict. Of course, it formed in opposition 660 00:41:05,560 --> 00:41:08,840 Speaker 1: to the Warsaw Pact, which is no more because the 661 00:41:08,880 --> 00:41:12,480 Speaker 1: Soviet Union is no more. Um. We have been led 662 00:41:12,520 --> 00:41:17,719 Speaker 1: to believe recently because it is politically expedient. It's fun 663 00:41:17,800 --> 00:41:20,400 Speaker 1: for Democrats right now to pretend that Russia is this 664 00:41:20,640 --> 00:41:27,200 Speaker 1: terrible omnipresent threat, and so they also see NATO as 665 00:41:27,320 --> 00:41:32,640 Speaker 1: more essential than ever before to push back on Russian encroachment. 666 00:41:33,640 --> 00:41:36,120 Speaker 1: It is an interesting question to ask because you get 667 00:41:36,320 --> 00:41:38,400 Speaker 1: different answers. I think that a lot of people would 668 00:41:38,400 --> 00:41:44,600 Speaker 1: expect when you pose, For example, okay, let's say Russia 669 00:41:45,120 --> 00:41:51,160 Speaker 1: UM pulls some kind of Maskarovka, some kind of deception 670 00:41:51,719 --> 00:41:57,279 Speaker 1: military deception operation, war by concealment, and let's say they 671 00:41:57,320 --> 00:42:02,840 Speaker 1: stage some problem in Latvia. And now you have a 672 00:42:02,960 --> 00:42:08,880 Speaker 1: group of paramilitary types, you know, soldiers without specific designation 673 00:42:08,880 --> 00:42:14,200 Speaker 1: insignia or national origin, at least defined national origin, and 674 00:42:14,200 --> 00:42:17,800 Speaker 1: and they are they create some incident. Right, there's a 675 00:42:18,239 --> 00:42:22,160 Speaker 1: they beat a Russian ship in Latvia and they say, oh, 676 00:42:22,200 --> 00:42:24,319 Speaker 1: we need to secure it, whatever it may be. I 677 00:42:24,360 --> 00:42:26,520 Speaker 1: don't know, you know, to put your Tom Clancy thinking 678 00:42:26,560 --> 00:42:28,600 Speaker 1: caps on and you'll come up with something. That's what 679 00:42:28,640 --> 00:42:30,239 Speaker 1: the Russians do though, right, I mean, you know that 680 00:42:30,440 --> 00:42:33,600 Speaker 1: all of a sudden in in eastern Ukraine, in what 681 00:42:33,719 --> 00:42:37,800 Speaker 1: is it Luhansk and Danets, you've got these breakaway areas 682 00:42:38,440 --> 00:42:41,279 Speaker 1: where guys that look a lot like there could be 683 00:42:41,320 --> 00:42:44,560 Speaker 1: Russian spet SNAs or all of a sudden taken over 684 00:42:44,640 --> 00:42:47,239 Speaker 1: government buildings and saying yeah, we're not. We're now an 685 00:42:47,239 --> 00:42:51,400 Speaker 1: independent republic from the rest of Ukraine. So this is 686 00:42:51,440 --> 00:42:53,560 Speaker 1: not far fetched stuff. The Russians have been trying this 687 00:42:53,640 --> 00:42:57,000 Speaker 1: out in recent years and other places. Uh. In Ukraine, 688 00:42:57,040 --> 00:43:01,760 Speaker 1: we agreed through the the Budapest Men Mirandum too, along 689 00:43:01,760 --> 00:43:04,960 Speaker 1: with Russia and Great Britain to protect Ukraine and if 690 00:43:05,000 --> 00:43:07,120 Speaker 1: it gave up its nuclear weapons, it gave up its 691 00:43:07,200 --> 00:43:10,520 Speaker 1: nuclear weapons and we did not protect Ukraine. So let's 692 00:43:10,520 --> 00:43:13,560 Speaker 1: just all be honest about that fact. We said, okay, 693 00:43:13,560 --> 00:43:15,120 Speaker 1: well we're not We're not going to go to war 694 00:43:15,160 --> 00:43:19,319 Speaker 1: with Russia over Ukraine. We're not. So that's just the 695 00:43:19,360 --> 00:43:24,440 Speaker 1: reality in Latvia. If the Russians rolled in an armored division, 696 00:43:25,160 --> 00:43:28,480 Speaker 1: do I think that Article five, which is the Collective 697 00:43:28,520 --> 00:43:32,560 Speaker 1: Security or the Common Defense Provision, do I think the 698 00:43:32,640 --> 00:43:35,759 Speaker 1: Article five would be invoked? Yeah? I do, UM, And 699 00:43:35,840 --> 00:43:37,640 Speaker 1: that would be a very terrible day for the world. 700 00:43:37,640 --> 00:43:43,080 Speaker 1: That things would get ugly and messy and tragic quite quickly. 701 00:43:44,080 --> 00:43:46,719 Speaker 1: Hopefully it would be a very short lived exchange. But 702 00:43:47,480 --> 00:43:50,960 Speaker 1: we have not seen a you know, a first world 703 00:43:51,000 --> 00:43:54,319 Speaker 1: military go up against a first world military in a 704 00:43:54,360 --> 00:43:57,880 Speaker 1: long time. This is this has not been a recent 705 00:43:57,960 --> 00:44:02,120 Speaker 1: American experience, right, or your Pian experience for that matter. 706 00:44:02,200 --> 00:44:07,160 Speaker 1: We've been fighting wars uh in place, in fact, generally speaking, 707 00:44:07,160 --> 00:44:11,080 Speaker 1: fighting wars and some of the most backwards, technologically inept 708 00:44:12,040 --> 00:44:16,000 Speaker 1: parts of the entire globe. Um. And this would be 709 00:44:16,280 --> 00:44:18,680 Speaker 1: anything against the Russians, even in a short and a 710 00:44:18,719 --> 00:44:25,160 Speaker 1: short term limited engagement, a limited incursion would be very um, 711 00:44:25,239 --> 00:44:29,680 Speaker 1: very precarious, very dangerous for US. UM. We'd win, but 712 00:44:30,080 --> 00:44:32,000 Speaker 1: at what cost and how quickly and on all the 713 00:44:32,040 --> 00:44:34,759 Speaker 1: rest of it. But let's say that the Russians did 714 00:44:34,760 --> 00:44:37,200 Speaker 1: something kind of sneaky in lat Fia. Do we all 715 00:44:37,280 --> 00:44:40,520 Speaker 1: of a sudden decide that we're just gonna, you know, 716 00:44:40,920 --> 00:44:44,160 Speaker 1: eighty second airborne shows up and takes care of the problem. 717 00:44:44,520 --> 00:44:46,960 Speaker 1: I don't know. I don't think it's as cut and 718 00:44:47,040 --> 00:44:50,919 Speaker 1: dry as a lot of people assume it would be. 719 00:44:50,920 --> 00:44:54,120 Speaker 1: Because the Russians have been testing out the limits of 720 00:44:54,160 --> 00:44:57,920 Speaker 1: the US and NATO response in recent years. And it's 721 00:44:57,920 --> 00:45:01,120 Speaker 1: a fair question to ask as well. Okay, well, uh, 722 00:45:01,160 --> 00:45:02,879 Speaker 1: you know, where do we where do we draw the line? 723 00:45:02,920 --> 00:45:05,840 Speaker 1: We do the line at NATO? Okay, fine, um, But 724 00:45:05,920 --> 00:45:07,480 Speaker 1: if that's going to be the way it is, if 725 00:45:07,520 --> 00:45:11,640 Speaker 1: we really are going to treat a violation of a 726 00:45:11,719 --> 00:45:16,480 Speaker 1: lot van sovereignty like it's a violation of Florida's sovereignty 727 00:45:16,800 --> 00:45:20,600 Speaker 1: in terms of her military response, then we can start 728 00:45:20,640 --> 00:45:24,320 Speaker 1: asking some questions too, and and making perhaps some demands. 729 00:45:24,719 --> 00:45:28,960 Speaker 1: And that's what Trump was saying today about the twenty 730 00:45:29,040 --> 00:45:32,800 Speaker 1: three NATO countries that are not paying the two percent 731 00:45:32,920 --> 00:45:35,640 Speaker 1: that they have agreed as a benchmark. It's not as 732 00:45:35,640 --> 00:45:38,120 Speaker 1: cut and dry as people say, it is agreed is 733 00:45:38,160 --> 00:45:42,360 Speaker 1: a benchmark for military spending. But twenty three of the 734 00:45:42,800 --> 00:45:46,600 Speaker 1: eight member nations are still not paying what they should 735 00:45:46,600 --> 00:45:51,040 Speaker 1: be paying and what they're supposed to be paying for 736 00:45:51,080 --> 00:45:55,200 Speaker 1: their defense. This is not fair to the people and 737 00:45:55,280 --> 00:45:59,800 Speaker 1: taxpayers of the United States, and many of these nations 738 00:46:00,040 --> 00:46:03,719 Speaker 1: oh massive amounts of money from past years and not 739 00:46:03,880 --> 00:46:08,120 Speaker 1: paying in those past years. Over the last eight years, 740 00:46:08,160 --> 00:46:12,399 Speaker 1: the United States spent more on defense than all other 741 00:46:12,520 --> 00:46:16,840 Speaker 1: NATO countries combined. If all NATO members had spent just 742 00:46:17,000 --> 00:46:22,680 Speaker 1: two percent of their GDP on defense last year, we 743 00:46:22,760 --> 00:46:26,839 Speaker 1: would have had another one hundred and nineteen billion dollars 744 00:46:26,960 --> 00:46:32,520 Speaker 1: for our collective defense and for the financing of additional 745 00:46:33,520 --> 00:46:38,600 Speaker 1: NATO reserves. So he's making a point here that I 746 00:46:38,719 --> 00:46:41,680 Speaker 1: know is not the most nuanced way of doing it. 747 00:46:42,760 --> 00:46:45,239 Speaker 1: They don't owe money, and we're certainly not going to 748 00:46:45,360 --> 00:46:49,560 Speaker 1: send a collection agency after the twenty three countries of 749 00:46:49,640 --> 00:46:53,920 Speaker 1: NATO that don't pay the two of GDP that they have. Remember, 750 00:46:53,960 --> 00:46:57,400 Speaker 1: they've set that up as a as a self m 751 00:46:58,480 --> 00:47:04,040 Speaker 1: a self identified or a self Uh. Well, it's a benchmark. 752 00:47:04,080 --> 00:47:06,600 Speaker 1: They're they're trying to hit it, but they're not bound 753 00:47:06,680 --> 00:47:09,360 Speaker 1: to it by any law. Um. And that's just the 754 00:47:09,400 --> 00:47:11,239 Speaker 1: way it is. I mean, I'm peopling, oh Bucks. I 755 00:47:11,280 --> 00:47:13,160 Speaker 1: said two percent. They're not doing two percent, I know, 756 00:47:13,239 --> 00:47:14,800 Speaker 1: but they said it's you know, we would like to 757 00:47:14,840 --> 00:47:17,280 Speaker 1: do two percent. There's not a there's not a mechanism 758 00:47:17,280 --> 00:47:20,000 Speaker 1: of enforcement. So whether they've said they'll do it or 759 00:47:20,120 --> 00:47:23,760 Speaker 1: not officially doesn't really make all that much difference because 760 00:47:23,800 --> 00:47:26,240 Speaker 1: we're not We're not going to do anything to force 761 00:47:26,280 --> 00:47:28,760 Speaker 1: their hand on this, other than try to exert diplomatic pressure, 762 00:47:28,760 --> 00:47:30,480 Speaker 1: which is what Trump is doing. He's saying, look, you 763 00:47:30,520 --> 00:47:33,120 Speaker 1: guys should be paying more for all this, and and uh, 764 00:47:33,120 --> 00:47:37,200 Speaker 1: and that's fair Europe. While we often talk about the 765 00:47:37,239 --> 00:47:41,200 Speaker 1: European social programs and the Bernie Sanders progressive left in 766 00:47:41,200 --> 00:47:45,440 Speaker 1: this country wants to create a mirror image of some 767 00:47:45,520 --> 00:47:47,880 Speaker 1: of those programs, especially when it comes to healthcare and 768 00:47:49,000 --> 00:47:53,680 Speaker 1: other large public expenditures, the other side of that is 769 00:47:53,719 --> 00:47:57,000 Speaker 1: that we have been providing an umbrella of security protection 770 00:47:57,080 --> 00:48:00,480 Speaker 1: for the Europeans for a long time, when you do 771 00:48:00,560 --> 00:48:03,680 Speaker 1: not have to worry about being the global hedgemon, and 772 00:48:03,719 --> 00:48:05,840 Speaker 1: in fact, you don't have to really worry about being 773 00:48:05,920 --> 00:48:10,200 Speaker 1: invaded or overrun, which is true of Europe in the 774 00:48:10,280 --> 00:48:13,600 Speaker 1: American post World War Two. We're sorry, in the post 775 00:48:13,640 --> 00:48:20,160 Speaker 1: Soviet American hegemony era. Then you can spend a lot 776 00:48:20,200 --> 00:48:22,359 Speaker 1: more money on you know, schools and healthcare and other 777 00:48:22,360 --> 00:48:24,360 Speaker 1: stuff and not worried as much about your defense budget. 778 00:48:25,280 --> 00:48:28,120 Speaker 1: Now there's another side of this as well that you 779 00:48:28,120 --> 00:48:31,239 Speaker 1: won't hear many people mentioning, which is that, you know, 780 00:48:31,280 --> 00:48:33,480 Speaker 1: Europe used to spend a lot of money on defense, 781 00:48:33,800 --> 00:48:35,920 Speaker 1: and a lot of these European countries had really serious 782 00:48:36,040 --> 00:48:40,239 Speaker 1: armies and that wasn't a good thing necessarily. That led 783 00:48:40,280 --> 00:48:43,160 Speaker 1: to depending on the period in time we're talking about it, 784 00:48:43,160 --> 00:48:47,000 Speaker 1: it went really bad. It sometimes uh, in fact almost 785 00:48:47,000 --> 00:48:51,239 Speaker 1: destroyed the world so uh and and in in at 786 00:48:51,280 --> 00:48:55,200 Speaker 1: least a couple of cases led to tens of tens 787 00:48:55,200 --> 00:48:59,600 Speaker 1: of millions of casualties, right, So you know that wasn't 788 00:48:59,680 --> 00:49:01,360 Speaker 1: long the go either. I think it's interesting, you know, 789 00:49:01,560 --> 00:49:04,360 Speaker 1: people would point out that NATO holds all of it 790 00:49:04,400 --> 00:49:09,359 Speaker 1: together and prevents that similar military escalation from occurring, and 791 00:49:09,360 --> 00:49:11,360 Speaker 1: that we're in a new where there's a new Europe 792 00:49:11,440 --> 00:49:14,400 Speaker 1: and there's the euro and but that stuff is beginning 793 00:49:14,400 --> 00:49:16,239 Speaker 1: to fracture. In fact, there are some books written by 794 00:49:16,360 --> 00:49:20,959 Speaker 1: very serious geo political experts in recent years about how 795 00:49:21,960 --> 00:49:24,480 Speaker 1: we think of Europe is just going to be charming 796 00:49:24,520 --> 00:49:27,480 Speaker 1: people speaking different languages, with cute cobble stone streets and 797 00:49:27,520 --> 00:49:31,640 Speaker 1: lots of wonderful history um for the decades ahead. But 798 00:49:31,880 --> 00:49:35,480 Speaker 1: if the euro uh splits apart as a currency, if 799 00:49:35,640 --> 00:49:37,799 Speaker 1: people just decided they've had enough and we've begun, we've 800 00:49:37,800 --> 00:49:41,080 Speaker 1: begun to see some of the cracks with brexit um, 801 00:49:41,239 --> 00:49:44,759 Speaker 1: but now you'll have You could see a future where 802 00:49:44,800 --> 00:49:47,920 Speaker 1: you have sovereign states acting as sovereign states in Europe 803 00:49:48,760 --> 00:49:55,120 Speaker 1: with large populations um and considerable military force at their disposal. 804 00:49:55,840 --> 00:49:58,360 Speaker 1: And maybe you know, we're not gonna see Germany and 805 00:49:58,400 --> 00:50:00,440 Speaker 1: France get to up with each other. You look at 806 00:50:00,440 --> 00:50:02,719 Speaker 1: some of the Eastern European countries that are at play here, 807 00:50:02,760 --> 00:50:06,040 Speaker 1: You look at what's going on with the Baltics and Russia, 808 00:50:06,160 --> 00:50:11,719 Speaker 1: and it becomes a combustible situation. So just because things 809 00:50:11,719 --> 00:50:14,359 Speaker 1: have been a certain way does not mean they will continue. 810 00:50:14,840 --> 00:50:17,920 Speaker 1: As we know, it's one of the most obvious uh. 811 00:50:18,080 --> 00:50:21,040 Speaker 1: You know, truism is imaginable, right, just because they've been 812 00:50:21,040 --> 00:50:22,719 Speaker 1: that way doesn't mean they will be. But in the 813 00:50:22,760 --> 00:50:25,440 Speaker 1: case of NATO that has meeting. I think we have 814 00:50:25,520 --> 00:50:28,359 Speaker 1: an assumption that Europe will just be what it has been, 815 00:50:28,400 --> 00:50:31,560 Speaker 1: and that's not necessarily the case. So that's my stuff 816 00:50:31,600 --> 00:50:33,640 Speaker 1: on Europe and NATO. I mean, look, the truth is 817 00:50:34,000 --> 00:50:37,400 Speaker 1: Trump's everyone's all upset because he didn't give an explicit 818 00:50:37,480 --> 00:50:42,080 Speaker 1: endorsement of the Common Defense Provision today. I mean, whatever, dude, 819 00:50:42,120 --> 00:50:45,880 Speaker 1: he's in for NATO. It's fine, he's look getting all Trump. 820 00:50:46,520 --> 00:50:48,160 Speaker 1: Like I said, in the morning, it was Trump can't 821 00:50:48,160 --> 00:50:50,520 Speaker 1: control leaks as if he controls every person who has 822 00:50:50,560 --> 00:50:54,040 Speaker 1: access to classified and in the afternoon it's, you know, 823 00:50:54,080 --> 00:50:56,560 Speaker 1: Trump didn't give enough lip service to NATO's Common Defense 824 00:50:56,600 --> 00:51:01,840 Speaker 1: Provision Article five. I mean, right, he didn't say disband 825 00:51:01,920 --> 00:51:04,360 Speaker 1: NATO or anything. There was also a news story that 826 00:51:04,400 --> 00:51:06,480 Speaker 1: said that Trump tried to push somebody out of the way, 827 00:51:06,520 --> 00:51:08,719 Speaker 1: and I forget who was one of these guys. Was 828 00:51:08,760 --> 00:51:11,759 Speaker 1: it Macrome of France? I was somebody Trump tried to 829 00:51:11,760 --> 00:51:15,040 Speaker 1: shove something. He didn't shove anybody. I mean, reporters are 830 00:51:15,080 --> 00:51:17,520 Speaker 1: just they're just whacko over all this stuff. All right, 831 00:51:17,960 --> 00:51:21,839 Speaker 1: we got we got the the travel band update for you, 832 00:51:21,880 --> 00:51:25,799 Speaker 1: the Trump Travel Band Order Update, et cetera. We gotta 833 00:51:25,880 --> 00:51:30,359 Speaker 1: hit that. We'll be right back, seem I was gonna 834 00:51:30,400 --> 00:51:35,000 Speaker 1: give you some updates on the um situation with the 835 00:51:35,040 --> 00:51:38,439 Speaker 1: travel band the fourth Circuit, But oh my, we got 836 00:51:38,480 --> 00:51:41,279 Speaker 1: some as tends to happen here in the Freedom Hub, 837 00:51:41,320 --> 00:51:45,359 Speaker 1: we got some breaking news late in the day from 838 00:51:45,480 --> 00:51:53,640 Speaker 1: NBC News. Oh, NBC Kushner under FBI scrutiny in Russia probes. 839 00:51:53,760 --> 00:51:56,319 Speaker 1: You got Jared Kushner here, who was the president's son 840 00:51:56,360 --> 00:52:01,240 Speaker 1: in law and one of his senior advisors. And I 841 00:52:01,239 --> 00:52:04,000 Speaker 1: I cannot begin to explain, nor would I try to 842 00:52:04,040 --> 00:52:07,279 Speaker 1: defend the practice of making children officially senior or son 843 00:52:07,320 --> 00:52:11,279 Speaker 1: in law and daughter senior advisors in a government. UM, 844 00:52:11,480 --> 00:52:14,759 Speaker 1: I do not. I do not approve. But Buck does 845 00:52:14,800 --> 00:52:18,160 Speaker 1: not thumbs up this process. But it's not up to me. UM, 846 00:52:18,200 --> 00:52:21,400 Speaker 1: but I think it does. The optics of it are poor, 847 00:52:21,880 --> 00:52:25,600 Speaker 1: that I will say. Um. But anyway, and Jared Kushner 848 00:52:25,719 --> 00:52:30,719 Speaker 1: is a billionaire scion of a billionaire family, and uh, 849 00:52:31,120 --> 00:52:35,120 Speaker 1: all that good stuff. Here's what it says in NBC News. Um, 850 00:52:35,280 --> 00:52:37,080 Speaker 1: Jared Kushner, the President's son in law and one of 851 00:52:37,080 --> 00:52:39,560 Speaker 1: his senior advisors, has come under FBI scrutiny in the 852 00:52:39,600 --> 00:52:44,320 Speaker 1: Russia investigation. Investigators believe Kushner has significant information relevant to 853 00:52:44,360 --> 00:52:47,239 Speaker 1: their inquiry. That does not mean they suspect him of 854 00:52:47,239 --> 00:52:51,000 Speaker 1: a crime or intend to charge him. The FBI scrutiny 855 00:52:51,000 --> 00:52:55,400 Speaker 1: of Kushner places the bureaus sprawling counter intelligence and criminal 856 00:52:55,400 --> 00:52:57,840 Speaker 1: investigation not only on the doorstep of the White House, 857 00:52:57,840 --> 00:53:02,719 Speaker 1: but on the cusp of the Trump Emily circle. Let 858 00:53:02,719 --> 00:53:05,279 Speaker 1: me break this down for a second, my friends. Uh So, 859 00:53:05,520 --> 00:53:08,040 Speaker 1: what this story, which is their big breaking news story 860 00:53:08,040 --> 00:53:12,600 Speaker 1: now in NBC News, What it really says, if you 861 00:53:12,920 --> 00:53:14,839 Speaker 1: read between the lines a little bit, if you just 862 00:53:15,040 --> 00:53:20,200 Speaker 1: poke around a bit, and it's a short piece, is 863 00:53:20,280 --> 00:53:24,919 Speaker 1: that there are people who are the US government who 864 00:53:25,000 --> 00:53:30,600 Speaker 1: just decided to tell the NBC News team or journalists 865 00:53:30,600 --> 00:53:35,040 Speaker 1: at NBC that they're looking at Jared Kushner for some stuff. 866 00:53:35,080 --> 00:53:41,000 Speaker 1: Just f y, I why is that appropriate? Who is 867 00:53:41,320 --> 00:53:45,000 Speaker 1: a a U s official with access to what the 868 00:53:45,040 --> 00:53:49,720 Speaker 1: FBI's counterintelligence and criminal investigation is up to and thinks 869 00:53:49,800 --> 00:53:55,120 Speaker 1: that it is right to pass this information onto NBC? 870 00:53:56,040 --> 00:54:01,640 Speaker 1: Why would they do that? Unless oh, here we go, 871 00:54:01,840 --> 00:54:05,319 Speaker 1: we go to motive, My friends, Remember motive. It's fun 872 00:54:05,400 --> 00:54:08,719 Speaker 1: tells you a lot. Unless the idea here is just 873 00:54:08,840 --> 00:54:14,359 Speaker 1: to put information out that raises this suspicion or uh, 874 00:54:14,640 --> 00:54:20,840 Speaker 1: cast a gray cloud over Jared Kushner and raises suspicions 875 00:54:20,840 --> 00:54:25,080 Speaker 1: around him without having to prove anything or say anything 876 00:54:25,160 --> 00:54:29,359 Speaker 1: at all. Any number of people could be involved as 877 00:54:29,680 --> 00:54:34,440 Speaker 1: not targets, but could be involved, just as people with 878 00:54:34,520 --> 00:54:40,040 Speaker 1: information with regard to this Russia collusion investigation. Why would 879 00:54:40,120 --> 00:54:44,560 Speaker 1: investigators release their names to the press. They're playing so 880 00:54:44,840 --> 00:54:49,280 Speaker 1: very dirty on all of this, and it's it's distressing 881 00:54:49,320 --> 00:54:52,640 Speaker 1: to see it because I do think there has been 882 00:54:53,560 --> 00:54:59,520 Speaker 1: a politicization at at very senior levels within the law 883 00:54:59,600 --> 00:55:05,040 Speaker 1: enforce of bureaucracy that is dangerous UM that seeks to 884 00:55:05,120 --> 00:55:10,720 Speaker 1: subvert the electoral process that elevated Donald Trump above Hillary Clinton. 885 00:55:10,719 --> 00:55:12,480 Speaker 1: There are people, and I don't like to use the 886 00:55:12,560 --> 00:55:16,319 Speaker 1: term deep state because as I've told you, that's a 887 00:55:16,320 --> 00:55:20,799 Speaker 1: bit strong, because it's not a uh it's not an 888 00:55:20,800 --> 00:55:25,399 Speaker 1: omnipresent force that has been overturning elections for decades, as 889 00:55:25,480 --> 00:55:28,040 Speaker 1: is the case in Turkey, which is where the deep 890 00:55:28,080 --> 00:55:32,960 Speaker 1: state concept comes from. But this isn't good, Uh, this 891 00:55:33,080 --> 00:55:36,160 Speaker 1: is yet another little league to the press meant to 892 00:55:36,200 --> 00:55:40,759 Speaker 1: look bad for the administration. Mentally bad for in this case, 893 00:55:40,840 --> 00:55:43,160 Speaker 1: Jared Kushner, even though if you read into the piece, 894 00:55:43,160 --> 00:55:44,719 Speaker 1: you're like, okay, so what they're saying is that they 895 00:55:44,719 --> 00:55:46,360 Speaker 1: want to talk to him because he might know some stuff, 896 00:55:46,400 --> 00:55:48,200 Speaker 1: but there's no reason to believe he's done anything wrong. 897 00:55:49,480 --> 00:55:53,600 Speaker 1: But if you repeat that, every day, FBI investors investors, whoops, 898 00:55:53,719 --> 00:55:57,600 Speaker 1: FBI investigators want to talk to you know, they want 899 00:55:57,600 --> 00:56:00,400 Speaker 1: to talk to my friend Bob. And every week I 900 00:56:00,440 --> 00:56:02,000 Speaker 1: hear about how the FBI wants to talk to my 901 00:56:02,000 --> 00:56:04,839 Speaker 1: friend Bob, I start to think that Bob did something wrong. Right. 902 00:56:05,440 --> 00:56:07,359 Speaker 1: I'm not just sitting around like, well, they just want 903 00:56:07,360 --> 00:56:09,280 Speaker 1: to talk to Bob because you know, they're the FBI, 904 00:56:09,320 --> 00:56:12,000 Speaker 1: that's what they do. No, I think that after a while, 905 00:56:12,040 --> 00:56:14,839 Speaker 1: I begin to reach the conclusion that good old Bob 906 00:56:14,920 --> 00:56:17,319 Speaker 1: has put up to some stuff and the FBI wants 907 00:56:17,320 --> 00:56:20,040 Speaker 1: to figure out what it is. This is obvious. Everyone 908 00:56:20,080 --> 00:56:23,640 Speaker 1: can understand this. Everyone knows this. So by just releasing 909 00:56:23,719 --> 00:56:26,279 Speaker 1: names in the context of FBI wishes to talk to 910 00:56:26,400 --> 00:56:30,600 Speaker 1: so and so, FBI has an interest in so and so. Um, 911 00:56:30,640 --> 00:56:34,520 Speaker 1: it's a means of sullying people, selling the names of 912 00:56:34,560 --> 00:56:39,080 Speaker 1: people who are out in well part of this White 913 00:56:39,120 --> 00:56:41,760 Speaker 1: House and part of this administration. Oh wait, I wanted 914 00:56:41,760 --> 00:56:43,239 Speaker 1: to throw one more thing in the mix before, and 915 00:56:43,239 --> 00:56:45,880 Speaker 1: I forgot to. So this is considered. This a a 916 00:56:45,960 --> 00:56:49,120 Speaker 1: quick redo about the whole NATO thing. Guess who was 917 00:56:49,200 --> 00:56:53,439 Speaker 1: in Germany. Uh, letting people know what he thinks about 918 00:56:53,560 --> 00:56:56,800 Speaker 1: the actual current president of the United States, the former 919 00:56:57,000 --> 00:57:01,680 Speaker 1: President Obama. Here's what he said. If there are disruptions 920 00:57:01,719 --> 00:57:05,080 Speaker 1: in these countries, that there's conflict, if there's bad governance, 921 00:57:05,120 --> 00:57:10,000 Speaker 1: if there's war, if there's poverty in this new world 922 00:57:10,000 --> 00:57:12,480 Speaker 1: that we live in, we can't isolate ourselves. We can't 923 00:57:12,560 --> 00:57:16,200 Speaker 1: hide behind the wall. Uh. And I think it's very 924 00:57:16,200 --> 00:57:21,120 Speaker 1: important for us to see about him as such a 925 00:57:21,120 --> 00:57:25,360 Speaker 1: clever swipe that our own well being as well as uh, 926 00:57:26,320 --> 00:57:30,120 Speaker 1: to the benefit of to the I've never heard Obama 927 00:57:30,160 --> 00:57:33,280 Speaker 1: say anything that I thought was insightful or profound in 928 00:57:33,280 --> 00:57:37,120 Speaker 1: a public speech ever, And maybe I'm missing something. I've 929 00:57:37,120 --> 00:57:39,080 Speaker 1: heard a lot of platitudes and a lot and I 930 00:57:39,120 --> 00:57:41,680 Speaker 1: know that that's what most politicians speeches are, but never 931 00:57:41,760 --> 00:57:44,200 Speaker 1: once has Obama come out and said anything. And I'm like, yeah, 932 00:57:44,240 --> 00:57:46,760 Speaker 1: that was really wow. That made me think that was 933 00:57:46,800 --> 00:57:53,400 Speaker 1: really it's really good stuff anyway. And notice how George W. 934 00:57:53,560 --> 00:57:56,720 Speaker 1: Bush stops being the president, goes on with his life 935 00:57:56,720 --> 00:57:59,080 Speaker 1: and enjoys life as a private citizen. In fact, recently 936 00:57:59,120 --> 00:58:04,000 Speaker 1: he kind of video obambed somebody from behind at baseball game. 937 00:58:04,240 --> 00:58:06,760 Speaker 1: I don't know if you saw that. Obama is not 938 00:58:06,760 --> 00:58:08,920 Speaker 1: going anywhere except in the public eye. He he, He 939 00:58:08,960 --> 00:58:10,800 Speaker 1: wants to be in front of everybody all the time. 940 00:58:11,600 --> 00:58:16,360 Speaker 1: I think that surprises none of us. The Freedom Hunt 941 00:58:16,440 --> 00:58:19,520 Speaker 1: rocks online too. You can hang out with Team Buck anytime. 942 00:58:19,600 --> 00:58:21,920 Speaker 1: Plus can bucks the latest news and analysis. Go to 943 00:58:22,080 --> 00:58:26,720 Speaker 1: Buck Sexton dot com. That's Buck Sexton dot com. The 944 00:58:27,000 --> 00:58:30,439 Speaker 1: Buck is back, all right, seem welcome back. Thank you 945 00:58:30,560 --> 00:58:33,000 Speaker 1: very much for being here with me. We are joined 946 00:58:33,040 --> 00:58:36,280 Speaker 1: by Hassan Hassan. He's a resident fellow at the Tough 947 00:58:36,320 --> 00:58:39,160 Speaker 1: Rear Institute for Middle East Policy, and he co wrote 948 00:58:39,160 --> 00:58:44,440 Speaker 1: the New York Times bestseller Isis Inside the Army of Terror. Hassan, 949 00:58:44,480 --> 00:58:48,520 Speaker 1: thanks so much for calling. I thought this piece in 950 00:58:48,520 --> 00:58:55,000 Speaker 1: Political magazine on the Islamic State and Israeli Israeli officers 951 00:58:55,120 --> 00:59:01,440 Speaker 1: um analysis of the situation was very, very provocative. They 952 00:59:01,440 --> 00:59:05,320 Speaker 1: said that the worst is yet to come about the 953 00:59:05,360 --> 00:59:09,720 Speaker 1: situation in Syria. What do you make of all this? Well, 954 00:59:09,880 --> 00:59:13,240 Speaker 1: I thought it was fascinating UH insights, especially if this 955 00:59:13,320 --> 00:59:15,880 Speaker 1: is the kind of UH to me, this was the 956 00:59:15,920 --> 00:59:20,400 Speaker 1: first time to see what the Israelis are thinking about this. 957 00:59:20,480 --> 00:59:24,880 Speaker 1: You know, they've been quiet about the Islamic state thinging 958 00:59:24,920 --> 00:59:27,840 Speaker 1: about the steering conflict for for quite a while, so 959 00:59:27,920 --> 00:59:30,680 Speaker 1: it was it was interesting. It's certainly in line what 960 00:59:30,800 --> 00:59:33,160 Speaker 1: I with what I've been saying for a long time 961 00:59:33,200 --> 00:59:37,240 Speaker 1: that the way the US is doing the fight against 962 00:59:37,240 --> 00:59:41,160 Speaker 1: ISIS is not it's not done in a way it 963 00:59:41,280 --> 00:59:46,880 Speaker 1: is not done. We're not basically defeat ISIS. Ultimately, isis 964 00:59:47,440 --> 00:59:49,560 Speaker 1: in many cases as ahead of the game in some 965 00:59:49,760 --> 00:59:53,760 Speaker 1: aspects of its uh. You know, for example, in terms 966 00:59:53,800 --> 00:59:58,680 Speaker 1: of adaptation. Every time it's losing more and more territory 967 00:59:59,840 --> 01:00:03,320 Speaker 1: or you know, it's loosing territory yet, but it's adapting 968 01:00:03,400 --> 01:00:07,000 Speaker 1: to the situation. It's changing tactics. And the forces that 969 01:00:07,040 --> 01:00:10,000 Speaker 1: the United States is working with in the ground under 970 01:00:10,040 --> 01:00:14,320 Speaker 1: gardens here in Iraq are not adapting as ISIS changes 971 01:00:14,720 --> 01:00:19,360 Speaker 1: tactics um. In fact, just last week, one State Apartment 972 01:00:19,480 --> 01:00:24,280 Speaker 1: officials admitted in a private conversation that ISIS has changed 973 01:00:24,960 --> 01:00:28,960 Speaker 1: its tactics to the insurgency taxes and tactic to the 974 01:00:29,000 --> 01:00:32,920 Speaker 1: tactics that ISIS used before they take over most of 975 01:00:33,000 --> 01:00:37,680 Speaker 1: before the rise of ICEIS and two thousands for and 976 01:00:38,160 --> 01:00:42,560 Speaker 1: the US Left coalition has not yet caught up with 977 01:00:42,640 --> 01:00:45,000 Speaker 1: these tactics, and they say, we don't have time and 978 01:00:45,040 --> 01:00:49,200 Speaker 1: resources to work on that aspect until we finish ices 979 01:00:49,240 --> 01:00:53,440 Speaker 1: and muscle. And Roca, one of the Israeli Defense Force 980 01:00:53,800 --> 01:00:56,880 Speaker 1: officials that's quoted this says about the Islamic state, if 981 01:00:56,880 --> 01:00:59,960 Speaker 1: going north or west is not an option, they're going 982 01:01:00,120 --> 01:01:03,960 Speaker 1: to go somewhere else. Um and Jordan's is very concerned 983 01:01:03,960 --> 01:01:08,760 Speaker 1: about the Islamic state. They also mentioned Lebanon and the 984 01:01:08,760 --> 01:01:11,680 Speaker 1: the push into Lebanon of of ISIS fighters. I don't 985 01:01:11,680 --> 01:01:15,240 Speaker 1: think that's often factored into our analysis, at least when 986 01:01:15,280 --> 01:01:17,760 Speaker 1: people talk about the Islamic State in the campaign against 987 01:01:17,800 --> 01:01:21,480 Speaker 1: it in this country, Hassan, when we discuss it that 988 01:01:21,680 --> 01:01:24,720 Speaker 1: there are ISIS fighters that are already infiltrating other parts 989 01:01:24,760 --> 01:01:29,240 Speaker 1: of the region. Yeah, it is. It is a problem. 990 01:01:29,480 --> 01:01:33,160 Speaker 1: I think for a year now or kind of a 991 01:01:33,560 --> 01:01:38,520 Speaker 1: year ago, I thought Isis appeal internationally as in beyond 992 01:01:38,680 --> 01:01:42,960 Speaker 1: the core Syrian, Iraq has sarsed to be separated from 993 01:01:43,000 --> 01:01:47,280 Speaker 1: its uh A military performance on the ground, meaning whatever 994 01:01:47,480 --> 01:01:51,600 Speaker 1: whatever happens to ISIS in Syrian Iraq no longer affects 995 01:01:51,600 --> 01:01:54,760 Speaker 1: its appeal outside. And that's dangerous because you can no 996 01:01:54,880 --> 01:01:59,920 Speaker 1: longer challenge the group based on defeating its military on 997 01:02:00,000 --> 01:02:05,240 Speaker 1: a gown. It's expanding and some aspect it's changing, it's adapting, 998 01:02:05,320 --> 01:02:09,480 Speaker 1: it's trying to pre end and kind of uh think 999 01:02:09,520 --> 01:02:13,919 Speaker 1: about how it can survive after it's dislodged from more 1000 01:02:14,000 --> 01:02:17,440 Speaker 1: sol and from WORKA. And I think it is dangerous 1001 01:02:17,440 --> 01:02:20,800 Speaker 1: as the reallys have identified that ISIS has started to 1002 01:02:21,000 --> 01:02:25,840 Speaker 1: look abroad uh, rather than just stick to searing a rout. 1003 01:02:26,160 --> 01:02:29,720 Speaker 1: So in a way, UH, when I is defeated, it 1004 01:02:29,760 --> 01:02:32,560 Speaker 1: doesn't mean that they start thinking small and they no 1005 01:02:32,640 --> 01:02:35,720 Speaker 1: longer think about expanding and doing the same thing again. 1006 01:02:36,240 --> 01:02:40,640 Speaker 1: They might think more big than they did before. So 1007 01:02:40,880 --> 01:02:43,600 Speaker 1: you saw the episode just a day or two days 1008 01:02:43,640 --> 01:02:49,240 Speaker 1: ago when they stormed into this stubbing Philippine UH town 1009 01:02:49,840 --> 01:02:52,920 Speaker 1: uh and and they almost took over the town. So 1010 01:02:53,000 --> 01:02:56,320 Speaker 1: they're no longer kind of satisfied with just doing hits 1011 01:02:56,320 --> 01:02:59,200 Speaker 1: and run operations. They think about these hits and run 1012 01:02:59,280 --> 01:03:02,360 Speaker 1: operations and and and uh for the goal of kind 1013 01:03:02,360 --> 01:03:06,480 Speaker 1: of roads and their enemy kind of depleting their opponents 1014 01:03:06,600 --> 01:03:08,720 Speaker 1: in order to gain more and more guard. They have 1015 01:03:08,800 --> 01:03:12,560 Speaker 1: a plan for long term survival. Speaking to Hassan Hassan, 1016 01:03:12,600 --> 01:03:15,560 Speaker 1: he's a resident fellow at the Terreer Institute for Middle 1017 01:03:15,600 --> 01:03:17,640 Speaker 1: East Policy. Back to this political piece for a second, 1018 01:03:17,640 --> 01:03:21,479 Speaker 1: Hassan Uh. They write what ISIS has been saying since 1019 01:03:21,480 --> 01:03:24,680 Speaker 1: the beginning, The concept of the caliphate was we need 1020 01:03:24,720 --> 01:03:27,120 Speaker 1: to put our house in order first, and then we 1021 01:03:27,160 --> 01:03:30,520 Speaker 1: have time to fight the outside powers. Um. And he 1022 01:03:30,560 --> 01:03:32,400 Speaker 1: said that he believes the United States, this is an 1023 01:03:32,400 --> 01:03:34,560 Speaker 1: I d F officer, the United States has failed to 1024 01:03:34,640 --> 01:03:39,080 Speaker 1: understand the competing interests and constantly shifting alliances among what 1025 01:03:39,160 --> 01:03:42,280 Speaker 1: the I d F estimates are between four hundred and 1026 01:03:42,400 --> 01:03:45,800 Speaker 1: five hundred different groups fighting in the Syrian Civil War, 1027 01:03:46,320 --> 01:03:51,280 Speaker 1: including underestimating the level of local support that ISIS actually 1028 01:03:51,360 --> 01:03:55,520 Speaker 1: has end quote, there's a lot of unpacked that first, Hassan, 1029 01:03:55,600 --> 01:03:57,960 Speaker 1: there's a lot that's being said there four or five 1030 01:03:58,000 --> 01:04:02,040 Speaker 1: hundred groups. ISIS has widespread or wider support than people realize. 1031 01:04:02,240 --> 01:04:06,440 Speaker 1: What do you make of that? To a certain degree, 1032 01:04:06,480 --> 01:04:09,160 Speaker 1: I agree, I agree on on that. But I also 1033 01:04:09,240 --> 01:04:12,720 Speaker 1: disagree on on the kind of the depiction of ISIS 1034 01:04:12,960 --> 01:04:16,320 Speaker 1: as um. Uh, you know, ices when it took over 1035 01:04:16,360 --> 01:04:19,240 Speaker 1: Syrian Iraq, it did to a large degree, did it 1036 01:04:19,480 --> 01:04:22,960 Speaker 1: by force. It wasn't welcomed by outside this But once 1037 01:04:23,520 --> 01:04:28,120 Speaker 1: it took over these areas, it used different types, used violence, 1038 01:04:28,160 --> 01:04:31,400 Speaker 1: extreme savagery to deter people from rising up against it. 1039 01:04:31,720 --> 01:04:34,800 Speaker 1: But they also did like positive things, good things if 1040 01:04:34,800 --> 01:04:37,080 Speaker 1: you like, in terms of services and stuff like that. 1041 01:04:37,120 --> 01:04:40,440 Speaker 1: They wanted to do incentivize people to do to to 1042 01:04:40,520 --> 01:04:43,800 Speaker 1: accept them. That's why some people accepted them because there 1043 01:04:44,400 --> 01:04:49,400 Speaker 1: they were more disciplined, more organized, They governed better than 1044 01:04:49,560 --> 01:04:54,160 Speaker 1: the chaos that uh, you know, the prevailed before them. 1045 01:04:55,120 --> 01:04:58,320 Speaker 1: But on the other hand, uh, the groups that kind 1046 01:04:58,320 --> 01:05:01,920 Speaker 1: of Syria has like not only a hundred different organizations, 1047 01:05:01,920 --> 01:05:06,000 Speaker 1: I think these are like the substantial organizations. Uh. They 1048 01:05:06,080 --> 01:05:08,280 Speaker 1: might have like I think probably a close to a 1049 01:05:08,320 --> 01:05:11,760 Speaker 1: thousand small groups in different areas and so and so forth. 1050 01:05:12,480 --> 01:05:15,920 Speaker 1: But ISIS has always been a third force in the 1051 01:05:15,960 --> 01:05:18,680 Speaker 1: Seram conflict. They were not the ones that are considered 1052 01:05:18,680 --> 01:05:22,720 Speaker 1: as part of the opposition. Uh. For a CD for example, 1053 01:05:22,800 --> 01:05:25,680 Speaker 1: has been considered part of the opposition because they worked 1054 01:05:25,760 --> 01:05:28,600 Speaker 1: very closely with the with the other five hundred groups, 1055 01:05:28,600 --> 01:05:32,320 Speaker 1: if you like, work with them and cooperative with them 1056 01:05:32,320 --> 01:05:35,760 Speaker 1: on a military level against this during regime in some areas. 1057 01:05:35,800 --> 01:05:40,160 Speaker 1: But IIIs wanted to dominate and raise the slogan which 1058 01:05:40,200 --> 01:05:44,320 Speaker 1: is either either you fight under our banner or your 1059 01:05:44,680 --> 01:05:46,840 Speaker 1: your the enemy. So either with also against us, and 1060 01:05:46,880 --> 01:05:51,280 Speaker 1: you have to have you have to abandon your organization 1061 01:05:51,320 --> 01:05:56,400 Speaker 1: and become an ISIS member. And what do you think 1062 01:05:56,480 --> 01:05:59,400 Speaker 1: about the ability of the force is currently a rate 1063 01:05:59,440 --> 01:06:03,600 Speaker 1: against ice IS in Syria to maint I mean well, 1064 01:06:03,600 --> 01:06:05,600 Speaker 1: and let me ask you, as actually asked the question 1065 01:06:05,680 --> 01:06:09,280 Speaker 1: this way. Once Rocca is taken and once I just 1066 01:06:09,320 --> 01:06:13,920 Speaker 1: no longer controls any large pieces of territory in Syria, 1067 01:06:14,600 --> 01:06:17,680 Speaker 1: what happens to the Kurdish militias and and the others 1068 01:06:17,760 --> 01:06:20,080 Speaker 1: that we've been working with to get rid of them. 1069 01:06:20,280 --> 01:06:23,760 Speaker 1: Are they going to be providing population security? And also 1070 01:06:23,800 --> 01:06:26,000 Speaker 1: what happens if Facade decides that he's going to take 1071 01:06:26,040 --> 01:06:30,360 Speaker 1: the fight to them? And that's the that's a good question, 1072 01:06:30,360 --> 01:06:32,920 Speaker 1: and it's really like the question that everyone else like, 1073 01:06:32,960 --> 01:06:36,840 Speaker 1: what HI is going to happen after Rocca? And you know, 1074 01:06:36,880 --> 01:06:38,400 Speaker 1: I still have the kind of the hope for like 1075 01:06:38,480 --> 01:06:42,080 Speaker 1: another two or three months and then we'll see what happens. 1076 01:06:42,120 --> 01:06:45,960 Speaker 1: But I have the hope that once Rocca is liberated 1077 01:06:46,080 --> 01:06:50,840 Speaker 1: by whoever there is, then you know, you have to 1078 01:06:50,840 --> 01:06:55,680 Speaker 1: have a different policy that the different from the Obama policy. 1079 01:06:56,160 --> 01:06:58,640 Speaker 1: You see, the tricky problem here is that when the 1080 01:06:58,760 --> 01:07:02,960 Speaker 1: Trump administration took all her it inherited a certain policy 1081 01:07:03,120 --> 01:07:05,680 Speaker 1: that primed the situation on the ground in such a 1082 01:07:05,680 --> 01:07:10,080 Speaker 1: way that the new team has to choose based on 1083 01:07:10,280 --> 01:07:12,760 Speaker 1: the you know, the reality on the ground, and the 1084 01:07:12,800 --> 01:07:17,880 Speaker 1: reality was that the Kurdish backed militias are surrounding and 1085 01:07:18,080 --> 01:07:21,760 Speaker 1: surrounding Rucca. So you can't really just ask them to 1086 01:07:21,800 --> 01:07:25,200 Speaker 1: go back and change them, change change the forces. That 1087 01:07:25,200 --> 01:07:28,480 Speaker 1: that was impossible to do almost very very difficult, and 1088 01:07:28,600 --> 01:07:31,600 Speaker 1: less you oppose the fight against RockA for another year, 1089 01:07:31,720 --> 01:07:35,360 Speaker 1: and they were not willing to do that. So you know, 1090 01:07:35,400 --> 01:07:37,520 Speaker 1: you can give them a pass to say, Okay, let's 1091 01:07:37,960 --> 01:07:41,120 Speaker 1: finish isis in Rocca. But there has to be something 1092 01:07:41,480 --> 01:07:44,720 Speaker 1: after Rucca that doesn't involve, like you said, the controlled 1093 01:07:44,760 --> 01:07:48,280 Speaker 1: by Kurdish militia. That's that is viewed suspiciously a boy 1094 01:07:48,400 --> 01:07:52,000 Speaker 1: people in Rocca and elsewhere and that has committed some 1095 01:07:52,440 --> 01:07:56,919 Speaker 1: crimes allegedly in in terms of kind of preventing people 1096 01:07:56,960 --> 01:07:58,960 Speaker 1: from going back to their areas and so on. So 1097 01:07:59,000 --> 01:08:02,440 Speaker 1: people accused them of ethnic cleansing in this. Uh. I 1098 01:08:02,480 --> 01:08:05,680 Speaker 1: don't think it's that dangerous, but it's uh, there are 1099 01:08:05,720 --> 01:08:09,160 Speaker 1: some incidents along these lines. By the way, I wanted 1100 01:08:09,160 --> 01:08:11,160 Speaker 1: to ask you, Samona while we've got you here. Um 1101 01:08:11,200 --> 01:08:14,720 Speaker 1: and Hassan. Hassan is co author of isis Inside the 1102 01:08:14,800 --> 01:08:18,120 Speaker 1: Army of Terror, which is year Times bestseller on the 1103 01:08:18,160 --> 01:08:22,280 Speaker 1: Islamic state. The campaign to take Mosel back, we have 1104 01:08:22,400 --> 01:08:24,720 Speaker 1: been hearing for a while that it was a slow, uh, 1105 01:08:24,880 --> 01:08:29,440 Speaker 1: difficult fight, but that it was moving in the right direction, progressing. 1106 01:08:29,680 --> 01:08:34,040 Speaker 1: They've always been concerns about sectarian bloodshed and extra judicial 1107 01:08:34,120 --> 01:08:37,280 Speaker 1: killings and other violence by the security forces. Have we 1108 01:08:37,360 --> 01:08:41,439 Speaker 1: seen that or is that still not yet getting Is 1109 01:08:41,640 --> 01:08:45,759 Speaker 1: that not yet a major problem? No, it has already 1110 01:08:45,800 --> 01:08:49,080 Speaker 1: been happening. It's a very it's very, very very sad 1111 01:08:49,160 --> 01:08:52,200 Speaker 1: that the dynamics that led led to the rise of 1112 01:08:52,200 --> 01:08:58,160 Speaker 1: ices into thousand are playing out again UH in the 1113 01:08:58,360 --> 01:09:02,320 Speaker 1: rock today. For example, of the federal police were always 1114 01:09:02,400 --> 01:09:07,360 Speaker 1: seen as this kind of thuggish, very indisciplined and disciplined 1115 01:09:07,400 --> 01:09:10,960 Speaker 1: the militias in in most so back in the day, 1116 01:09:11,479 --> 01:09:14,040 Speaker 1: and and uh, you know, we thought like we learned 1117 01:09:14,040 --> 01:09:17,080 Speaker 1: the lessons and no longer should have forces like that 1118 01:09:17,840 --> 01:09:22,320 Speaker 1: treating local locals in the same way torture, murder, even rape. 1119 01:09:22,920 --> 01:09:25,679 Speaker 1: Their speak has done. Ad just done a story about 1120 01:09:27,040 --> 01:09:32,160 Speaker 1: about the Federal Police. They're supposed to be a national force, 1121 01:09:32,200 --> 01:09:35,519 Speaker 1: but it's in fact it is dominated by a bed 1122 01:09:35,640 --> 01:09:38,880 Speaker 1: the bedroom organization, which is a run a running back 1123 01:09:38,960 --> 01:09:42,400 Speaker 1: to militias. So it's really kind of it's the core 1124 01:09:42,560 --> 01:09:45,839 Speaker 1: of the federal police. So we're already seeing these abuses. 1125 01:09:46,320 --> 01:09:50,760 Speaker 1: We have been already uh hearing about this from even 1126 01:09:50,800 --> 01:09:55,519 Speaker 1: Iraqi politicians. So I think similar patterns are playing out again. 1127 01:09:56,000 --> 01:09:59,400 Speaker 1: And the fear is, you know, because we're not fighting 1128 01:09:59,400 --> 01:10:02,240 Speaker 1: ACTIS in this in the in the proper way, this 1129 01:10:02,280 --> 01:10:06,040 Speaker 1: problem would continue. Hassan Hassan as a resident fellow at 1130 01:10:06,040 --> 01:10:08,640 Speaker 1: the Terreer Institute from Italy's Policy and co author of 1131 01:10:08,680 --> 01:10:12,400 Speaker 1: ISIS Inside the Army of Terror. Hassan. Always great to 1132 01:10:12,400 --> 01:10:15,240 Speaker 1: have you, sir. We appreciate it. Thank you for having 1133 01:10:15,280 --> 01:10:18,000 Speaker 1: me again. Thanks, uh, team, we are going to hit 1134 01:10:18,000 --> 01:10:24,080 Speaker 1: a quick break and We'll be right back, all right. 1135 01:10:24,160 --> 01:10:29,040 Speaker 1: The travel band. There is a new development in the 1136 01:10:29,160 --> 01:10:34,679 Speaker 1: Trump travel band situation. Here's what it is. Uh. Courtesy 1137 01:10:34,680 --> 01:10:38,080 Speaker 1: of the New York Times. A federal appeals court refused 1138 01:10:38,080 --> 01:10:41,800 Speaker 1: Thursday to reinstate President Trump's revised travel bands, saying it 1139 01:10:42,000 --> 01:10:49,040 Speaker 1: drips with religious intolerance, animous and discrimination. The decision from 1140 01:10:49,040 --> 01:10:51,240 Speaker 1: the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 1141 01:10:51,280 --> 01:10:55,439 Speaker 1: in Richmond, Virginia was a setback for the administration's efforts 1142 01:10:55,479 --> 01:11:01,240 Speaker 1: to limit travel from several predominantly Muslim countries. Attorney General 1143 01:11:01,280 --> 01:11:04,200 Speaker 1: Jeff Session said the administration would appeal the decision to 1144 01:11:04,200 --> 01:11:07,920 Speaker 1: the Supreme Court. The courts. This lower courts vote, I 1145 01:11:07,960 --> 01:11:14,240 Speaker 1: should note, was ten to three, divided strictly along ideological lines. 1146 01:11:15,600 --> 01:11:20,400 Speaker 1: And who wants to guess yep, that's right. Three Republicans 1147 01:11:20,479 --> 01:11:26,400 Speaker 1: were in dissent. Ten Democrats were part of the majority 1148 01:11:26,479 --> 01:11:30,320 Speaker 1: opinion here, which said that the uh, the band will 1149 01:11:30,320 --> 01:11:32,960 Speaker 1: not be reinstated. It's not even a ban. It's a 1150 01:11:33,000 --> 01:11:37,479 Speaker 1: temporary cessation of travel from whatever six Muslim majority countries 1151 01:11:37,520 --> 01:11:42,879 Speaker 1: for a predetermined window of time while vetting procedures are 1152 01:11:42,880 --> 01:11:47,479 Speaker 1: tightened and scrutinized. Um. You know, I I hate to 1153 01:11:47,520 --> 01:11:49,960 Speaker 1: say it, but you know, the British have got to 1154 01:11:50,000 --> 01:11:52,679 Speaker 1: be looking at their vetting procedures right now, right. I mean, 1155 01:11:52,840 --> 01:11:55,880 Speaker 1: let's be honest about this. They let in a refugee 1156 01:11:56,360 --> 01:12:00,680 Speaker 1: and the refugees kid was a terrorist and know if 1157 01:12:00,720 --> 01:12:04,519 Speaker 1: they look closer, the refugee himself was involved with extremism originally. 1158 01:12:04,560 --> 01:12:10,680 Speaker 1: Back in, vetting procedures are very serious business, especially when 1159 01:12:10,680 --> 01:12:14,680 Speaker 1: you're talking about refugees from countries where there is a 1160 01:12:14,840 --> 01:12:21,160 Speaker 1: very real threat of extremism. Uh, Islamist and jihadis indoctrination 1161 01:12:21,560 --> 01:12:27,040 Speaker 1: and the follow on effect of terrorism from that. So, 1162 01:12:27,960 --> 01:12:31,920 Speaker 1: but this is this is really damaging. Back to this decision. 1163 01:12:31,920 --> 01:12:35,040 Speaker 1: This is really damaging because it's yet another time where 1164 01:12:35,080 --> 01:12:37,280 Speaker 1: we see that the courts are now just another instrument 1165 01:12:37,320 --> 01:12:42,880 Speaker 1: of politics. That anyone could read that any judge, a 1166 01:12:43,439 --> 01:12:47,759 Speaker 1: person who is steeped in at least allegedly theoretically steeped 1167 01:12:47,760 --> 01:12:53,000 Speaker 1: in the law, and a scholar and a practitioner of 1168 01:12:53,040 --> 01:12:56,840 Speaker 1: the law, that a federal appeals court judge would say 1169 01:12:56,880 --> 01:13:01,760 Speaker 1: that the travel band quote drips with religious in tolerance, animus, 1170 01:13:01,760 --> 01:13:09,040 Speaker 1: and discrimination. Uh, there is nothing about religion in the 1171 01:13:09,080 --> 01:13:13,680 Speaker 1: band or whatever. We're gonna call it. There is absolutely 1172 01:13:13,720 --> 01:13:18,080 Speaker 1: nothing in it that discriminates against any religion, but because 1173 01:13:18,120 --> 01:13:21,120 Speaker 1: it names countries that happen to be places that are 1174 01:13:21,160 --> 01:13:27,560 Speaker 1: predominantly Muslim, but not entirely, they are viewing it as discriminatory. 1175 01:13:27,600 --> 01:13:30,559 Speaker 1: And then also on top of that, I'm sure they 1176 01:13:30,600 --> 01:13:36,559 Speaker 1: still feel that Trump's statements on the campaign trail um 1177 01:13:37,200 --> 01:13:41,479 Speaker 1: are somehow admissible here, which just kicks kicks open so 1178 01:13:41,560 --> 01:13:48,600 Speaker 1: many problems for judicial review going forward. Um I am, 1179 01:13:48,920 --> 01:13:51,560 Speaker 1: I am sitting here, and the more I think about it, 1180 01:13:51,600 --> 01:13:54,240 Speaker 1: the more I see that we no longer have any 1181 01:13:54,240 --> 01:14:00,960 Speaker 1: institutions of government that are free of partisanship. We just don't. 1182 01:14:01,240 --> 01:14:07,040 Speaker 1: I mean the military maybe there is the closest. But 1183 01:14:07,120 --> 01:14:10,040 Speaker 1: even when you get to the once people get stars 1184 01:14:10,080 --> 01:14:13,280 Speaker 1: on their shoulders, there tends to be a They tend 1185 01:14:13,280 --> 01:14:15,559 Speaker 1: to become very political and a lot of their approach 1186 01:14:15,600 --> 01:14:18,720 Speaker 1: to things. Um. So I'm not speaking about the rank 1187 01:14:18,760 --> 01:14:21,280 Speaker 1: and file, but if you look at the senior leadership. 1188 01:14:21,880 --> 01:14:24,320 Speaker 1: We know the FBI, the d o J are politicized, 1189 01:14:24,760 --> 01:14:29,439 Speaker 1: we know the courts are entirely politicized. And now everything 1190 01:14:29,560 --> 01:14:32,680 Speaker 1: is just a political fight through the prism of a 1191 01:14:32,800 --> 01:14:36,920 Speaker 1: U S institution. Right and we're told that. And that's 1192 01:14:36,960 --> 01:14:39,560 Speaker 1: also I think part of the disconnect year is that 1193 01:14:39,600 --> 01:14:43,000 Speaker 1: we're told that these are nonpartisan institutions, were told to respect, 1194 01:14:43,120 --> 01:14:46,679 Speaker 1: respect the judiciary, and and respect the Department of Justice, 1195 01:14:46,720 --> 01:14:51,800 Speaker 1: And uh, what is the what is the major US 1196 01:14:51,880 --> 01:14:55,680 Speaker 1: institution right now that has not been shown to be, 1197 01:14:55,960 --> 01:15:00,800 Speaker 1: if not full of partisan conflicts of interest at least 1198 01:15:01,400 --> 01:15:05,960 Speaker 1: subject to some pretty major ones at different times. The judiciary. Now, 1199 01:15:06,439 --> 01:15:10,000 Speaker 1: we can look at this and in many cases, especially 1200 01:15:10,040 --> 01:15:13,040 Speaker 1: depending on the on the circuit and depending on the 1201 01:15:13,760 --> 01:15:18,599 Speaker 1: um the how hot button a case, maybe you look 1202 01:15:18,640 --> 01:15:20,920 Speaker 1: and you say, okay, well, these are Democrat appointees, they're 1203 01:15:20,920 --> 01:15:22,920 Speaker 1: gonna go this way. And these are judges, it's not 1204 01:15:22,960 --> 01:15:24,439 Speaker 1: supposed to be like that. And you look at these 1205 01:15:24,439 --> 01:15:27,640 Speaker 1: are Republican appointees, they're gonna go this well. Although Republicans 1206 01:15:27,640 --> 01:15:30,920 Speaker 1: are much more likely as judges to say, well, you know, 1207 01:15:31,360 --> 01:15:33,719 Speaker 1: I don't like this, but this is what the law says, 1208 01:15:34,120 --> 01:15:37,519 Speaker 1: Democrats never seem to say that this is this is 1209 01:15:37,560 --> 01:15:40,240 Speaker 1: not oh, it happens on both sides. Kind of a 1210 01:15:40,280 --> 01:15:43,439 Speaker 1: thing with Democrat judges. It's I see it the way 1211 01:15:43,479 --> 01:15:45,160 Speaker 1: I want to see it. Yeah, that's not what the 1212 01:15:45,200 --> 01:15:48,120 Speaker 1: law says, but I don't care. And meanwhile, Republicans are 1213 01:15:48,160 --> 01:15:50,160 Speaker 1: the ones sending around on you know, on the bench, 1214 01:15:50,280 --> 01:15:52,800 Speaker 1: or I guess they're sitting on the bench and saying 1215 01:15:52,800 --> 01:15:56,400 Speaker 1: to themselves, you know, well, granted, I think this is 1216 01:15:56,439 --> 01:15:59,440 Speaker 1: a bad policy choice, and I think that this is unfair, 1217 01:15:59,479 --> 01:16:02,639 Speaker 1: but it's not unconstitutional, and that's what the law says. 1218 01:16:03,880 --> 01:16:09,280 Speaker 1: So we're always at a disadvantage here because the right 1219 01:16:09,400 --> 01:16:13,040 Speaker 1: still although it feels like some sometimes less so these 1220 01:16:13,120 --> 01:16:15,320 Speaker 1: days in the era of Trump, but the right still 1221 01:16:15,360 --> 01:16:20,000 Speaker 1: plays by rules. Um, and the right Uh and what 1222 01:16:20,040 --> 01:16:22,599 Speaker 1: I mean by the rules thing? Guys, we're gonna talk 1223 01:16:22,680 --> 01:16:27,679 Speaker 1: later about that. Uh Montana congressional candidate the elections tonight. 1224 01:16:27,760 --> 01:16:30,920 Speaker 1: It's the polls closed in a couple of hours. Um. 1225 01:16:30,960 --> 01:16:33,679 Speaker 1: But I mean, come on, we can't have I've seeing 1226 01:16:33,800 --> 01:16:35,760 Speaker 1: some people that I like on the social media that 1227 01:16:35,800 --> 01:16:40,240 Speaker 1: all of a sudden are like, yeah, you know body slammer, reporter, No, no, 1228 01:16:40,400 --> 01:16:44,840 Speaker 1: not okay, not allowable. Um. Anyway, back to this judge thing, 1229 01:16:44,880 --> 01:16:48,000 Speaker 1: it's just it's typical. The judiciary is considered a bulwark 1230 01:16:48,080 --> 01:16:51,080 Speaker 1: against Trump's agenda, and that's what they did here with 1231 01:16:51,120 --> 01:16:54,960 Speaker 1: the travel band. We've got more stay with me, Bug 1232 01:16:54,960 --> 01:17:00,920 Speaker 1: sextendable with America. Now the Freedom Hunt is fired up 1233 01:17:00,960 --> 01:17:05,120 Speaker 1: as Team Buck as symbols shouldered as shoulder shields high 1234 01:17:05,360 --> 01:17:09,519 Speaker 1: call in eight four four Buck, that's eight four four 1235 01:17:10,400 --> 01:17:15,479 Speaker 1: D to eight to five. Alright, team, welcome back. We 1236 01:17:15,520 --> 01:17:20,880 Speaker 1: are joined by Inez Feltcher Stepman. Congratulations on the Stepman part. Inez. 1237 01:17:21,160 --> 01:17:25,160 Speaker 1: She's Director of Education and Workforce at the American Legislative 1238 01:17:25,160 --> 01:17:28,880 Speaker 1: Exchange Council and a senior contributor to the Federalists. And 1239 01:17:28,920 --> 01:17:32,280 Speaker 1: it's great to have you. Thanks for having me, Buck. Um, 1240 01:17:32,320 --> 01:17:34,920 Speaker 1: All right, let's you know a lot about schools, charter school, 1241 01:17:34,960 --> 01:17:37,400 Speaker 1: school choice. Uh. There was a piece in the Wall 1242 01:17:37,479 --> 01:17:40,559 Speaker 1: Street Journal earlier in the week on what they call 1243 01:17:40,600 --> 01:17:44,599 Speaker 1: the Los Angeles charter school uprising. What what's happening here 1244 01:17:44,760 --> 01:17:46,479 Speaker 1: and what what implication do you think it might have 1245 01:17:46,560 --> 01:17:51,960 Speaker 1: for education policy going forward. So basically in the sort 1246 01:17:51,960 --> 01:17:55,240 Speaker 1: of liberal bastion of California, and even within California, the 1247 01:17:55,280 --> 01:17:58,800 Speaker 1: liberal bastion of l A UM, the school board of 1248 01:17:58,920 --> 01:18:03,000 Speaker 1: the second largest school district in the country has a 1249 01:18:03,040 --> 01:18:07,160 Speaker 1: pro charter majority UM, and that's causing a lot of consternation, 1250 01:18:07,479 --> 01:18:10,960 Speaker 1: UM and controversy in l a but I think it's 1251 01:18:10,960 --> 01:18:13,639 Speaker 1: a great thing. Yeah, So they're just assuming that because 1252 01:18:13,640 --> 01:18:16,080 Speaker 1: there are more people now, they haven't done anything yet. 1253 01:18:16,120 --> 01:18:18,080 Speaker 1: It's just there's a majority of board seats now that 1254 01:18:18,120 --> 01:18:20,439 Speaker 1: are held by people who are pro charter and the 1255 01:18:20,479 --> 01:18:24,280 Speaker 1: public schools system, or should say the public school unions 1256 01:18:24,360 --> 01:18:27,800 Speaker 1: are just freaking out in l A about this, absolutely, 1257 01:18:27,840 --> 01:18:29,800 Speaker 1: I mean, and they have good reason to freak out. 1258 01:18:30,360 --> 01:18:33,240 Speaker 1: On the merits, they're not delivering a great education to 1259 01:18:33,320 --> 01:18:37,160 Speaker 1: their students. Only one in five of their students are proficient. 1260 01:18:37,240 --> 01:18:39,679 Speaker 1: Our fourth grade students are proficient on the NAPE, which 1261 01:18:39,720 --> 01:18:43,519 Speaker 1: is our sort of national report card UH test. And 1262 01:18:43,720 --> 01:18:46,000 Speaker 1: even though they say they spend a lot around eleven 1263 01:18:46,000 --> 01:18:48,759 Speaker 1: thousand dollars a student, the real figure when you include 1264 01:18:48,760 --> 01:18:52,479 Speaker 1: bonds and local funds um from people's property taxes and 1265 01:18:52,520 --> 01:18:56,000 Speaker 1: so on, is closer to thirty thousand dollars per students. 1266 01:18:56,000 --> 01:18:58,240 Speaker 1: So they're paying a lot of money and they're not 1267 01:18:58,280 --> 01:19:02,160 Speaker 1: necessarily educating kids well so, so they're they're spending almost 1268 01:19:02,200 --> 01:19:05,920 Speaker 1: as much money as the most elite private schools in 1269 01:19:05,960 --> 01:19:10,120 Speaker 1: New York City charge students, and yet we're getting terrible 1270 01:19:10,240 --> 01:19:12,559 Speaker 1: results by and large in the public school system in 1271 01:19:12,760 --> 01:19:16,360 Speaker 1: l a how does the how does the public school 1272 01:19:16,479 --> 01:19:19,639 Speaker 1: union there try to defend this? So what's their complaint? 1273 01:19:19,680 --> 01:19:21,400 Speaker 1: We need more money? I mean, that's usually what it 1274 01:19:21,439 --> 01:19:24,120 Speaker 1: is in the past, That's always what it is. It's 1275 01:19:24,120 --> 01:19:26,200 Speaker 1: always more money. Even though if you look at charts 1276 01:19:26,240 --> 01:19:30,519 Speaker 1: about showing how much we've spent on public school education 1277 01:19:30,640 --> 01:19:33,240 Speaker 1: per pupil over the last thirty to forty years, what 1278 01:19:33,360 --> 01:19:35,559 Speaker 1: you see is we've spent more and more and more 1279 01:19:35,560 --> 01:19:39,840 Speaker 1: money and results are either flat or trending downwards. So um, 1280 01:19:39,880 --> 01:19:42,400 Speaker 1: clearly more money has not been the answer for a 1281 01:19:42,439 --> 01:19:45,439 Speaker 1: while now, and um, but it is always the answer 1282 01:19:45,479 --> 01:19:47,720 Speaker 1: we hear from unions as an excuse or that or 1283 01:19:47,760 --> 01:19:50,000 Speaker 1: they blame the kids. Right, Oh, well, you know, our 1284 01:19:50,080 --> 01:19:54,240 Speaker 1: kids are disadvantaged and in various ways, and I'm not 1285 01:19:54,280 --> 01:19:57,479 Speaker 1: denying that. Um. You know, for example, family structure makes 1286 01:19:57,520 --> 01:19:59,639 Speaker 1: a huge difference in in terms of a kid's life 1287 01:19:59,720 --> 01:20:03,040 Speaker 1: and and sort of how easy how easily that child 1288 01:20:03,080 --> 01:20:05,720 Speaker 1: will take to learning or learning environment. But the fact 1289 01:20:05,840 --> 01:20:08,280 Speaker 1: is that the charters are taking the exact same population 1290 01:20:08,320 --> 01:20:11,920 Speaker 1: of students and doing much much better than the public school. 1291 01:20:12,000 --> 01:20:15,000 Speaker 1: So clearly shifting the blame onto the kids is the 1292 01:20:15,479 --> 01:20:18,400 Speaker 1: wrong thing to do. We're speaking to Inas Belcher Stepman. 1293 01:20:18,479 --> 01:20:22,000 Speaker 1: She's Director of Education and Workforce at the American Legislative 1294 01:20:22,040 --> 01:20:26,320 Speaker 1: Exchange Council and a senior contributor to The Federalist in As. 1295 01:20:26,479 --> 01:20:31,599 Speaker 1: Betsy Divos is a polarizing figure on the left, which 1296 01:20:31,640 --> 01:20:34,160 Speaker 1: is amazing because she seems just like a really nice 1297 01:20:34,160 --> 01:20:37,479 Speaker 1: billionaire lady who wants to help out predominantly underprivileged and 1298 01:20:37,560 --> 01:20:41,080 Speaker 1: minority kids with the education system. But there have been 1299 01:20:41,160 --> 01:20:44,080 Speaker 1: protests when she shows up to speak places, She's gotten 1300 01:20:44,080 --> 01:20:49,840 Speaker 1: fooded places she is identified as a school choice advocate. Um, 1301 01:20:49,920 --> 01:20:53,280 Speaker 1: what policies is she planning to pursue that make the 1302 01:20:53,360 --> 01:20:55,600 Speaker 1: left so upset? Like, if we want to take this 1303 01:20:55,680 --> 01:20:58,800 Speaker 1: out beyond l A and the Education Department under Voss 1304 01:20:58,880 --> 01:21:02,040 Speaker 1: going forward, what is it look like? Well, I mean, 1305 01:21:02,080 --> 01:21:04,160 Speaker 1: I think that one of the major reasons you see 1306 01:21:04,200 --> 01:21:08,160 Speaker 1: this organized opposition is one because the teachers unions opposition 1307 01:21:08,479 --> 01:21:12,120 Speaker 1: is organized more well organized than say people who might 1308 01:21:12,160 --> 01:21:14,880 Speaker 1: support divorce or ideas. But I think that she's become 1309 01:21:14,920 --> 01:21:18,320 Speaker 1: a lightning rod because she has supported school toys very 1310 01:21:18,360 --> 01:21:21,800 Speaker 1: viciferously and publicly and with her money in the past. Um, 1311 01:21:21,920 --> 01:21:25,280 Speaker 1: And as we see in l A, right even giving 1312 01:21:25,320 --> 01:21:27,679 Speaker 1: a small amount of choice, even between a public charter 1313 01:21:27,760 --> 01:21:30,880 Speaker 1: school and a traditional public school to kids. That just 1314 01:21:31,000 --> 01:21:33,679 Speaker 1: drives the unions up the wall. UM, even that small 1315 01:21:33,760 --> 01:21:37,120 Speaker 1: modicum of choice, Whereas Betsy Divace not only champions charter schools, 1316 01:21:37,160 --> 01:21:41,160 Speaker 1: ch champions programs like vouchers or education savings accounts that 1317 01:21:41,200 --> 01:21:44,759 Speaker 1: allow parents total control over the money or a portion 1318 01:21:44,800 --> 01:21:46,880 Speaker 1: of the money that the state spends in their name. 1319 01:21:47,520 --> 01:21:49,639 Speaker 1: For parents at home, whore listening right now, and as 1320 01:21:49,840 --> 01:21:52,360 Speaker 1: what are some of the success stories, What are states 1321 01:21:52,400 --> 01:21:56,080 Speaker 1: or localities across the country that have shown really fantastic 1322 01:21:56,200 --> 01:21:59,640 Speaker 1: results with exactly the kind of school choice policies that 1323 01:22:00,040 --> 01:22:02,719 Speaker 1: see Divas and those on her side of the education 1324 01:22:02,800 --> 01:22:08,479 Speaker 1: reform issue would advocate for. UM. Well, Arizona is a 1325 01:22:08,560 --> 01:22:11,800 Speaker 1: really really great poster case. UM there number one in 1326 01:22:12,200 --> 01:22:17,040 Speaker 1: our rankings of state education policy. And they're they're really changing, 1327 01:22:17,280 --> 01:22:19,880 Speaker 1: not just you know, by adding a program here or 1328 01:22:19,920 --> 01:22:22,760 Speaker 1: there that allows choice to a small number of kids, 1329 01:22:22,800 --> 01:22:27,080 Speaker 1: but um, as of this legislative session, they have expanded 1330 01:22:27,360 --> 01:22:30,280 Speaker 1: education savings accounts, which is a program that allows parents 1331 01:22:30,280 --> 01:22:33,280 Speaker 1: complete control over those dollars. Literally, we put it in 1332 01:22:33,320 --> 01:22:34,800 Speaker 1: a debit account for them and they can use it 1333 01:22:34,840 --> 01:22:39,200 Speaker 1: for any education related purpose. UM. And they've expanded that 1334 01:22:39,600 --> 01:22:42,720 Speaker 1: program to every kid. Every kid is eligible for this 1335 01:22:42,800 --> 01:22:46,040 Speaker 1: program now. In Arizona, they have a fantastic charter sector 1336 01:22:46,320 --> 01:22:49,280 Speaker 1: and they have tax credit scholarship programs as well. So 1337 01:22:49,600 --> 01:22:52,600 Speaker 1: there's really an enormous amount of choice going on in Arizona. 1338 01:22:52,760 --> 01:22:56,240 Speaker 1: And we're seeing the results. So Arizona kids who are 1339 01:22:56,479 --> 01:23:00,840 Speaker 1: a much poorer and much um more hispan next population 1340 01:23:01,120 --> 01:23:05,400 Speaker 1: than the northeast Massachusetts Connecticut, they always sort of top 1341 01:23:05,439 --> 01:23:09,799 Speaker 1: out on the nape UM. And we're seeing is that 1342 01:23:09,800 --> 01:23:12,600 Speaker 1: that population of kids in Arizona, when given choice, is 1343 01:23:12,600 --> 01:23:16,519 Speaker 1: actually performing really close to the level of the much 1344 01:23:16,560 --> 01:23:21,639 Speaker 1: more privileged population UM near Harvard or Yale. Right. So, UM, 1345 01:23:21,680 --> 01:23:24,400 Speaker 1: we're seeing that that choice is making a huge difference. 1346 01:23:24,520 --> 01:23:27,599 Speaker 1: It's it's It's paradoxical though, isn't it, Because when there 1347 01:23:27,600 --> 01:23:31,320 Speaker 1: are phenomenal results shown, when there are experiments like this 1348 01:23:31,640 --> 01:23:35,800 Speaker 1: that are undertaken by certain school districts. Uh, that's the 1349 01:23:35,800 --> 01:23:39,520 Speaker 1: most terrifying thing the left and and that's so unfortunate. 1350 01:23:39,600 --> 01:23:41,599 Speaker 1: But we saw it here in New York City where 1351 01:23:41,600 --> 01:23:44,479 Speaker 1: I live. When early on in Billed the Blasio, the 1352 01:23:44,520 --> 01:23:48,560 Speaker 1: mayor of New York City, former close Hillary Clinton confidante, 1353 01:23:48,640 --> 01:23:51,320 Speaker 1: and uh, I think still in his own mind at 1354 01:23:51,400 --> 01:23:55,320 Speaker 1: least aspire into national democratic office um or you know, 1355 01:23:55,720 --> 01:23:58,720 Speaker 1: at least governor of New York and maybe something beyond that. 1356 01:23:59,080 --> 01:24:02,439 Speaker 1: He wanted to shut down a school in Harlem that 1357 01:24:02,640 --> 01:24:06,400 Speaker 1: was taking underprivileged almost I think it was entirely minority 1358 01:24:06,800 --> 01:24:10,120 Speaker 1: school population, and they are performing at the top state 1359 01:24:10,240 --> 01:24:13,160 Speaker 1: level in terms of math for their grade. I wanted 1360 01:24:13,160 --> 01:24:17,599 Speaker 1: to shut it down. You're referring to success academies. Um, yeah, 1361 01:24:17,600 --> 01:24:20,880 Speaker 1: they're They're doing fantastic work in New York. I do 1362 01:24:20,920 --> 01:24:23,960 Speaker 1: think it's important to note that test scores are not 1363 01:24:24,000 --> 01:24:27,639 Speaker 1: the only way to evaluate either charters or schools UM 1364 01:24:28,200 --> 01:24:32,160 Speaker 1: and and increasingly, what we're looking at our larger life outcomes. 1365 01:24:32,240 --> 01:24:34,360 Speaker 1: And and that's where I think choice begins to shine 1366 01:24:34,360 --> 01:24:37,760 Speaker 1: even more. Now. We do see hard test core increases 1367 01:24:37,960 --> 01:24:39,960 Speaker 1: UM in a lot of the programs, but to me, 1368 01:24:40,120 --> 01:24:43,400 Speaker 1: even more importantly, you see things like graduation rates in 1369 01:24:43,439 --> 01:24:46,040 Speaker 1: college attendance rates going up, which matters a lot more 1370 01:24:46,080 --> 01:24:48,559 Speaker 1: statistically for a kid's future. Whether or not you have 1371 01:24:48,640 --> 01:24:51,080 Speaker 1: that diploma actually turns out to be a lot more 1372 01:24:51,120 --> 01:24:53,120 Speaker 1: important in your life as to whether or not your 1373 01:24:53,160 --> 01:24:56,639 Speaker 1: your math scores go up or down, and for broader society. 1374 01:24:56,680 --> 01:24:58,800 Speaker 1: I think one of the most interesting pieces of data 1375 01:24:58,840 --> 01:25:02,639 Speaker 1: that's come out recently is that the Milwaukee Program UM 1376 01:25:02,720 --> 01:25:06,720 Speaker 1: in Minnesota, the UM students in the voucher program who 1377 01:25:06,720 --> 01:25:10,800 Speaker 1: went to private schools have a seventy nine percent reduction 1378 01:25:10,920 --> 01:25:15,280 Speaker 1: and felony charges then the public school appears. Yeah, you 1379 01:25:15,280 --> 01:25:17,439 Speaker 1: don't often hear about the behavioral impacts of going to 1380 01:25:17,439 --> 01:25:20,080 Speaker 1: a school that that has structure and a sense of 1381 01:25:20,080 --> 01:25:22,799 Speaker 1: commune and a real sense of durable community. But I'm 1382 01:25:22,840 --> 01:25:26,240 Speaker 1: that that's an astonishing statistic. Yeah, absolutely, I think that 1383 01:25:26,280 --> 01:25:28,320 Speaker 1: needs to be more known. Right, we're not just talking 1384 01:25:28,320 --> 01:25:31,759 Speaker 1: about kids as test taking machines. I think we um 1385 01:25:31,760 --> 01:25:34,200 Speaker 1: in the education community, maybe we get too focused on 1386 01:25:34,200 --> 01:25:37,800 Speaker 1: those test scores because they're the only standardized assessment that 1387 01:25:37,880 --> 01:25:39,960 Speaker 1: we have. So when you're looking at, you know, millions 1388 01:25:39,960 --> 01:25:41,840 Speaker 1: of kids, you've got to look at data points like 1389 01:25:41,880 --> 01:25:44,760 Speaker 1: test scores. But really, parents are the only ones and 1390 01:25:44,840 --> 01:25:46,760 Speaker 1: family members are the only ones who can look at 1391 01:25:46,760 --> 01:25:49,599 Speaker 1: a kid every day and say he's happy in this environment, 1392 01:25:49,640 --> 01:25:52,280 Speaker 1: he's learning, he wants to learn, right, I can see 1393 01:25:52,320 --> 01:25:54,320 Speaker 1: him going down a good path as opposed to a 1394 01:25:54,360 --> 01:25:57,200 Speaker 1: bad path in life. Parents are the only ones who 1395 01:25:57,240 --> 01:26:00,000 Speaker 1: can make those kinds of individualized assessments of their children, 1396 01:26:00,000 --> 01:26:02,320 Speaker 1: and they know their children best, and that's why those 1397 01:26:02,320 --> 01:26:04,519 Speaker 1: decisions should be in their hands rather than in some 1398 01:26:04,600 --> 01:26:07,680 Speaker 1: distant bureaucrats hands who's probably never met the kid and 1399 01:26:07,760 --> 01:26:10,760 Speaker 1: never will. And as um, one more for you, and 1400 01:26:10,840 --> 01:26:14,240 Speaker 1: before we let you go, you study education policy very closely. 1401 01:26:14,520 --> 01:26:18,439 Speaker 1: Are we at something of a tipping point here? Are 1402 01:26:18,479 --> 01:26:22,120 Speaker 1: we starting to win the battle for freedom and education? 1403 01:26:22,320 --> 01:26:25,799 Speaker 1: School choice? Is that happening or is it still in 1404 01:26:25,840 --> 01:26:27,760 Speaker 1: a stalemate and needs a lot of needs a lot 1405 01:26:27,800 --> 01:26:31,040 Speaker 1: more momentum. I think it needs a lot more momentum 1406 01:26:31,120 --> 01:26:33,719 Speaker 1: because even though we've had a lot of success passing 1407 01:26:33,760 --> 01:26:36,720 Speaker 1: small programs um, the majority of states now have some 1408 01:26:36,800 --> 01:26:39,519 Speaker 1: kind of private school choice program. I think it's forty 1409 01:26:39,560 --> 01:26:44,080 Speaker 1: two states have charter laws um. But what we haven't 1410 01:26:44,479 --> 01:26:47,080 Speaker 1: we need, that we still need, that really strong push 1411 01:26:47,160 --> 01:26:49,759 Speaker 1: is to to have a broader vision of education reform 1412 01:26:49,800 --> 01:26:52,759 Speaker 1: than just a ticket out of a really failing school. 1413 01:26:53,360 --> 01:26:56,600 Speaker 1: That's great, but really what we need to do is 1414 01:26:56,680 --> 01:26:59,880 Speaker 1: update our vision of public education. How about no more 1415 01:27:00,040 --> 01:27:06,320 Speaker 1: old schools, A diversity of options and and different content 1416 01:27:06,439 --> 01:27:08,439 Speaker 1: as well. I mean, I think we ignore the content 1417 01:27:08,520 --> 01:27:11,880 Speaker 1: piece of this, that we are an incredibly diverse country 1418 01:27:12,000 --> 01:27:17,280 Speaker 1: and UM, increasingly, right, the public school system has a 1419 01:27:17,320 --> 01:27:21,040 Speaker 1: particular point of view. All the teachers, UM. Teachers colleges 1420 01:27:21,080 --> 01:27:23,960 Speaker 1: pump out teachers with the same prep materials on the 1421 01:27:24,000 --> 01:27:27,120 Speaker 1: same point of view. UM, and increasingly, I think it's 1422 01:27:27,120 --> 01:27:31,040 Speaker 1: really important that parents have control not just over how 1423 01:27:31,080 --> 01:27:33,880 Speaker 1: their kids learn, but what their kids learn. And UM, 1424 01:27:33,920 --> 01:27:37,080 Speaker 1: I think that those kinds of broader vision choice programs 1425 01:27:37,080 --> 01:27:41,120 Speaker 1: have yet to really catch on any place outside of Arizona, 1426 01:27:41,120 --> 01:27:43,799 Speaker 1: which now has a universal program, and Nevada, which passed 1427 01:27:43,800 --> 01:27:47,080 Speaker 1: a universal essay program but the legislature has yet to 1428 01:27:47,120 --> 01:27:51,479 Speaker 1: fund it. Na's Filterer Stepman is a senior contributor to 1429 01:27:51,520 --> 01:27:54,160 Speaker 1: the Federalist and Director of Education Workforce at the American 1430 01:27:54,240 --> 01:27:57,040 Speaker 1: Legislative Exchange Council in As. Thanks so much for making 1431 01:27:57,040 --> 01:28:00,679 Speaker 1: the time. Come back soon. Thanks for having me, But team, 1432 01:28:00,720 --> 01:28:03,280 Speaker 1: we are gonna hit a quick break. We'll be right back. 1433 01:28:07,800 --> 01:28:10,559 Speaker 1: Welcome back, team. So earlier this week I went to 1434 01:28:10,800 --> 01:28:15,719 Speaker 1: a very nice dinner. I was I was a guest. 1435 01:28:16,320 --> 01:28:19,679 Speaker 1: I went with Molly, my girlfriend we had a lovely time. 1436 01:28:20,360 --> 01:28:23,479 Speaker 1: Food was excellent. Was one of these foundations that does 1437 01:28:24,280 --> 01:28:26,839 Speaker 1: you know, good work around the world. I'll be holess 1438 01:28:26,880 --> 01:28:29,200 Speaker 1: with you, it was. The mission statement is vague enough. 1439 01:28:29,240 --> 01:28:33,439 Speaker 1: That's still to this day, I'm wondering exactly what goes on. 1440 01:28:33,520 --> 01:28:37,280 Speaker 1: It's a lot of education foundation stuff, but not not 1441 01:28:37,360 --> 01:28:40,679 Speaker 1: working on education per se, just teaching people about things 1442 01:28:40,760 --> 01:28:44,840 Speaker 1: about about the world and about foreign policy. Um so 1443 01:28:44,880 --> 01:28:47,040 Speaker 1: that's and it was one of these things where you know, 1444 01:28:47,080 --> 01:28:49,120 Speaker 1: I was, I was an invited guest, and of course 1445 01:28:49,160 --> 01:28:52,920 Speaker 1: a lovely time. Was nice to sit down. I'm not 1446 01:28:53,080 --> 01:28:56,040 Speaker 1: one for I'm gonna give you a few of my rules, 1447 01:28:56,040 --> 01:28:57,760 Speaker 1: a few of buck rules when it comes to any 1448 01:28:57,840 --> 01:29:02,200 Speaker 1: events like this. One is, if you're the keynote speaker, 1449 01:29:02,800 --> 01:29:06,000 Speaker 1: all right, I will give you a max of twenty 1450 01:29:06,000 --> 01:29:09,000 Speaker 1: minutes before I just don't want to hear anything really anymore. 1451 01:29:09,040 --> 01:29:11,720 Speaker 1: I mean, there are some exceptions. I was at a 1452 01:29:11,800 --> 01:29:15,920 Speaker 1: charity event a while back where Chris Paranto tonto Um 1453 01:29:16,200 --> 01:29:19,640 Speaker 1: gave his version of events from the night of the 1454 01:29:19,680 --> 01:29:22,560 Speaker 1: Benghazi the Benghazi attack, I mean, and I could have 1455 01:29:22,600 --> 01:29:24,559 Speaker 1: listened to that for well as long as he could 1456 01:29:24,560 --> 01:29:26,200 Speaker 1: have possibly ever wanted to talk about it, right, But 1457 01:29:26,479 --> 01:29:30,439 Speaker 1: generally speaking, twenty minutes is the max for me. When 1458 01:29:30,439 --> 01:29:31,640 Speaker 1: you're at to sit down dinner and you have to 1459 01:29:31,680 --> 01:29:33,920 Speaker 1: hear someone giving a speech, especially when they're going off 1460 01:29:34,320 --> 01:29:38,720 Speaker 1: prepared remarks. Someone standing up at a lectern reading is 1461 01:29:38,760 --> 01:29:42,559 Speaker 1: never fun. But really I find that unless you're the keynote, 1462 01:29:42,600 --> 01:29:45,160 Speaker 1: and I think fifteen minutes is a sweet spot. I've 1463 01:29:45,200 --> 01:29:47,880 Speaker 1: never heard somebody give a fifteen minutes speech at a 1464 01:29:47,920 --> 01:29:51,360 Speaker 1: gathering of any kind and been like, well, I really 1465 01:29:51,360 --> 01:29:52,960 Speaker 1: wish it had gone on for an hour. But I 1466 01:29:53,040 --> 01:29:54,679 Speaker 1: have been at somewhere it went on for an hour 1467 01:29:54,720 --> 01:29:59,240 Speaker 1: and I was like, make it stop. So this this 1468 01:29:59,280 --> 01:30:02,360 Speaker 1: went on for a little while. There are a few 1469 01:30:02,400 --> 01:30:05,760 Speaker 1: speeches which was and it was after the food had 1470 01:30:05,800 --> 01:30:09,800 Speaker 1: been served. Now that's all fine, but you know, you 1471 01:30:10,080 --> 01:30:12,320 Speaker 1: want the speeches that come before the big speech to 1472 01:30:12,360 --> 01:30:15,519 Speaker 1: go buy very quickly. And I have to say I 1473 01:30:15,920 --> 01:30:19,320 Speaker 1: find myself falling back on my rule for wedding speeches, 1474 01:30:20,120 --> 01:30:23,720 Speaker 1: which is it's really a couple of things. I have 1475 01:30:23,720 --> 01:30:25,960 Speaker 1: a few rules about public speaking for people who don't 1476 01:30:25,960 --> 01:30:27,800 Speaker 1: do a public speaking or don't like it. Right, if 1477 01:30:27,840 --> 01:30:29,280 Speaker 1: you like it, then you know, you do your own thing. 1478 01:30:29,320 --> 01:30:31,920 Speaker 1: But if you don't like it, or if you have 1479 01:30:31,960 --> 01:30:34,479 Speaker 1: a captive audience that cannot escape, like you're at a 1480 01:30:34,520 --> 01:30:37,120 Speaker 1: dinner or sit down dinner or a wedding, a few 1481 01:30:37,120 --> 01:30:39,439 Speaker 1: things you're you're never allowed to start. And I borrow 1482 01:30:39,479 --> 01:30:41,040 Speaker 1: this from one of my family members who came up 1483 01:30:41,040 --> 01:30:42,519 Speaker 1: with this. You're not allowed to start by saying I 1484 01:30:42,560 --> 01:30:46,640 Speaker 1: hate giving public speeches. That's not an okay rule. If 1485 01:30:46,640 --> 01:30:48,360 Speaker 1: you're gonna speak in front of people, don't tell them 1486 01:30:48,360 --> 01:30:50,639 Speaker 1: beforehand you hate what you're about to do. So that's 1487 01:30:50,640 --> 01:30:54,000 Speaker 1: that's one thing I know people, Uh, public speaking is 1488 01:30:54,040 --> 01:30:57,960 Speaker 1: a very common fear, which which I understand. Um, you know, 1489 01:30:58,040 --> 01:31:00,519 Speaker 1: I'm scared of all kinds of weird stuff, but uh, 1490 01:31:00,640 --> 01:31:03,400 Speaker 1: public speaking is not one of the things that frightens me. 1491 01:31:03,439 --> 01:31:05,840 Speaker 1: Although I was somebody with a speech impediment growing up, 1492 01:31:05,840 --> 01:31:08,599 Speaker 1: so you can imagine to go from having a speech 1493 01:31:08,600 --> 01:31:10,879 Speaker 1: impediment as a kid and having to have speech therapy 1494 01:31:11,400 --> 01:31:15,120 Speaker 1: to doing three hours of nationally syndicated radio shoo every day, 1495 01:31:15,160 --> 01:31:19,719 Speaker 1: is is a bit of a a journey. Um. Anyway, 1496 01:31:19,920 --> 01:31:23,000 Speaker 1: public speaking, if you're gonna be at a dinner like this, 1497 01:31:23,120 --> 01:31:25,920 Speaker 1: if you're going to be addressing a room full of 1498 01:31:25,920 --> 01:31:29,080 Speaker 1: people who have no choice but to sit there at 1499 01:31:29,080 --> 01:31:31,800 Speaker 1: a wedding, it's under three minutes, right, if you're giving 1500 01:31:31,800 --> 01:31:34,360 Speaker 1: a toast or you're you're making one of those speeches, 1501 01:31:34,479 --> 01:31:38,200 Speaker 1: you know. You know, I met Susie when we were 1502 01:31:38,200 --> 01:31:41,120 Speaker 1: in our thriary together and we were just like just 1503 01:31:41,200 --> 01:31:45,599 Speaker 1: having so much fun, and that's fine three minutes, Okay. 1504 01:31:45,920 --> 01:31:49,080 Speaker 1: Beyond three minutes, everyone's like, all right, it's it's really enough. 1505 01:31:49,760 --> 01:31:51,720 Speaker 1: And once you get beyond ten minutes, it becomes a 1506 01:31:51,760 --> 01:31:54,920 Speaker 1: form of torture. Uh, so at to sit down dinner. 1507 01:31:54,960 --> 01:31:57,240 Speaker 1: I think that the rules are, if you're not the 1508 01:31:57,280 --> 01:32:00,760 Speaker 1: main speaker, three minutes is the sweets gotta be less 1509 01:32:00,760 --> 01:32:03,639 Speaker 1: than five. If you were the main speaker, fifteen minutes 1510 01:32:03,640 --> 01:32:06,080 Speaker 1: as a sweet spot's gotta be less than twenty. Because 1511 01:32:06,280 --> 01:32:08,320 Speaker 1: I just don't there's so few people that I want 1512 01:32:08,320 --> 01:32:12,599 Speaker 1: to sit there prepared when they're reading remarks too. Uh, 1513 01:32:12,760 --> 01:32:14,559 Speaker 1: there's so few people that you're gonna want to hear 1514 01:32:14,600 --> 01:32:18,320 Speaker 1: their prepared remarks on that. Uh, it's just better to 1515 01:32:18,360 --> 01:32:23,160 Speaker 1: go shorter. You you never spoil the party, You never 1516 01:32:23,400 --> 01:32:27,120 Speaker 1: mess things up by going too short. Uh, you definitely 1517 01:32:27,160 --> 01:32:29,640 Speaker 1: can mess things that you can definitely mess up the 1518 01:32:29,760 --> 01:32:33,760 Speaker 1: vibe by going way too long. And I've been at 1519 01:32:33,760 --> 01:32:35,640 Speaker 1: some weddings where you got to that point in the 1520 01:32:35,760 --> 01:32:38,760 Speaker 1: in the rehearsal dinner process, for example, where like all 1521 01:32:38,800 --> 01:32:41,880 Speaker 1: of a sudden, you know, you know, second cousin, you know, 1522 01:32:41,960 --> 01:32:44,800 Speaker 1: Morty is standing up and he's just like, um, I 1523 01:32:44,840 --> 01:32:47,080 Speaker 1: don't really know all the bride, I don't really know 1524 01:32:47,200 --> 01:32:51,320 Speaker 1: the girl, but you know, uh, we're a lot lessons 1525 01:32:51,320 --> 01:32:54,960 Speaker 1: in my life. It's like, oh gosh, here it goes. 1526 01:32:55,360 --> 01:32:58,800 Speaker 1: There's no escape, you know, and you're there's there's nowhere 1527 01:32:58,840 --> 01:33:00,519 Speaker 1: to go because if you get up, everyth is gonna 1528 01:33:00,520 --> 01:33:02,920 Speaker 1: know that you're bailing on on cousin Morty, you know, 1529 01:33:03,520 --> 01:33:06,240 Speaker 1: and it's your life is messed up, but you know, 1530 01:33:06,360 --> 01:33:10,120 Speaker 1: you gotta do what you gotta do. Uh So, anyway, 1531 01:33:10,360 --> 01:33:11,880 Speaker 1: none of that happened last night. It was a very 1532 01:33:12,000 --> 01:33:15,560 Speaker 1: uh very well put on, a lovely event. But I 1533 01:33:15,800 --> 01:33:17,320 Speaker 1: did one thing I did pick up on that I 1534 01:33:17,320 --> 01:33:20,960 Speaker 1: thought was a noteworthy and worth sharing views. There's a 1535 01:33:21,000 --> 01:33:24,679 Speaker 1: lot of talk of corporate culture, and I'm not often 1536 01:33:25,560 --> 01:33:28,280 Speaker 1: subject to the language of corporate culture, although I do 1537 01:33:28,400 --> 01:33:31,520 Speaker 1: come from the federal government originally as my first employer, 1538 01:33:32,080 --> 01:33:35,519 Speaker 1: where there is an entire language of acronyms, which is 1539 01:33:35,560 --> 01:33:40,439 Speaker 1: a whole other thing. And then there's also the the bureaucrates. 1540 01:33:40,520 --> 01:33:42,800 Speaker 1: I mean, there's the there's bureaucratic speak that's not just 1541 01:33:42,880 --> 01:33:46,360 Speaker 1: in government. It's uh, it's it's elsewhere. But people say, 1542 01:33:46,360 --> 01:33:48,360 Speaker 1: you know, I got a circle back. You know, people 1543 01:33:48,400 --> 01:33:50,400 Speaker 1: always say, right, we gotta circle back on this one. 1544 01:33:50,600 --> 01:33:53,280 Speaker 1: That was one thing that I remember hearing in corporate culture, 1545 01:33:53,439 --> 01:33:57,479 Speaker 1: and um, you you would also of course the classics, right, 1546 01:33:57,560 --> 01:34:03,240 Speaker 1: think outside the box. Uh, I consider you're probably rattling 1547 01:34:03,280 --> 01:34:04,680 Speaker 1: off more than I can off the top of your 1548 01:34:04,680 --> 01:34:06,280 Speaker 1: head right now, especially those of you that work in 1549 01:34:06,320 --> 01:34:10,760 Speaker 1: a in an offsite. Oh yeah, uh, Synergy, dynamism, these 1550 01:34:10,800 --> 01:34:13,400 Speaker 1: these are words that you can just use in a 1551 01:34:13,400 --> 01:34:17,599 Speaker 1: work environment, in a corporate environment, and people will think 1552 01:34:17,640 --> 01:34:20,559 Speaker 1: that somehow maybe maybe you know what you're talking about. 1553 01:34:20,960 --> 01:34:23,439 Speaker 1: You know, there's there's synergy and dynamism when we're thinking 1554 01:34:23,479 --> 01:34:27,080 Speaker 1: outside the box and circling back to close the loop 1555 01:34:27,200 --> 01:34:32,440 Speaker 1: on whether we're tackling that project with best practices best practices. 1556 01:34:32,439 --> 01:34:35,559 Speaker 1: It's another one. Uh. But I was listening last night 1557 01:34:35,600 --> 01:34:41,160 Speaker 1: to the the the sort of bureaucrates of of foundation 1558 01:34:41,320 --> 01:34:44,519 Speaker 1: speak and all I know about this now is and 1559 01:34:44,720 --> 01:34:46,639 Speaker 1: this isn't the first time I've been exposed to it before, 1560 01:34:46,960 --> 01:34:50,800 Speaker 1: but you just have to talk about community and development, 1561 01:34:51,400 --> 01:34:53,519 Speaker 1: and you can mix up those two term, you know, 1562 01:34:53,800 --> 01:34:59,160 Speaker 1: fostering community development working together with international partners for the 1563 01:34:59,200 --> 01:35:04,880 Speaker 1: community and also uh partnering together on development for the community, 1564 01:35:04,920 --> 01:35:08,280 Speaker 1: and just you just keep running around and circles on this. 1565 01:35:08,479 --> 01:35:12,560 Speaker 1: And I think that corporate America now has reached a 1566 01:35:12,600 --> 01:35:16,439 Speaker 1: point um even when we're talking about charity and areas 1567 01:35:16,520 --> 01:35:20,680 Speaker 1: of uh, what's social enterprise and and social giving and 1568 01:35:21,040 --> 01:35:26,840 Speaker 1: good things where there's almost an expectation of bland and 1569 01:35:27,040 --> 01:35:33,640 Speaker 1: neutral language so that you avoid offense, you avoid conveying 1570 01:35:33,680 --> 01:35:37,719 Speaker 1: any unwanted thoughts, and it results in just a long 1571 01:35:37,960 --> 01:35:43,760 Speaker 1: string of of cliches and pieties and just stuff that 1572 01:35:43,840 --> 01:35:48,840 Speaker 1: doesn't really have meaning to normal people. Right. You want 1573 01:35:48,840 --> 01:35:50,599 Speaker 1: to hear someone speak to you. And I was thinking 1574 01:35:50,640 --> 01:35:53,000 Speaker 1: about this last night, and I know you can just 1575 01:35:53,360 --> 01:35:56,200 Speaker 1: you know, slap me for saying this, but I was 1576 01:35:56,240 --> 01:36:00,800 Speaker 1: like this, this is what people respond to with Trump. Uh. 1577 01:36:00,840 --> 01:36:03,599 Speaker 1: They just want somebody who talks to them. They just 1578 01:36:03,800 --> 01:36:05,920 Speaker 1: want a person, if they have to listen to person, 1579 01:36:05,920 --> 01:36:08,120 Speaker 1: they just want someone who's like, hey, you're you're a 1580 01:36:08,200 --> 01:36:10,920 Speaker 1: human being, a human being. I am communicating thoughts and 1581 01:36:10,960 --> 01:36:14,439 Speaker 1: things to you now, and not I am filtering it 1582 01:36:14,520 --> 01:36:18,000 Speaker 1: through this robo speak because I don't want to offend. 1583 01:36:18,120 --> 01:36:22,120 Speaker 1: I don't want to be uh, you know, annoying. I 1584 01:36:22,439 --> 01:36:25,920 Speaker 1: don't want to be UNPC forget of being annoying. Actually 1585 01:36:25,920 --> 01:36:27,920 Speaker 1: that that's that's not the issue. I don't want to 1586 01:36:27,960 --> 01:36:30,720 Speaker 1: be politically incorrect, uh you know. And of course you 1587 01:36:30,760 --> 01:36:33,599 Speaker 1: can always throw in terms like you know, diversity and oh, 1588 01:36:33,680 --> 01:36:37,720 Speaker 1: collaboration is another one, right, I mean, you know, collaboration 1589 01:36:37,800 --> 01:36:40,680 Speaker 1: with Russian intelligence would be bad, but a collaboration as 1590 01:36:40,720 --> 01:36:44,559 Speaker 1: a general concept is usually warmly welcomed in these places. 1591 01:36:44,920 --> 01:36:48,559 Speaker 1: And I'm just so in favor of I do not 1592 01:36:48,680 --> 01:36:52,120 Speaker 1: like prepared remarks as a general rule. I know, for 1593 01:36:52,600 --> 01:36:54,840 Speaker 1: political purposes and the reason why people do it, but 1594 01:36:54,880 --> 01:36:57,760 Speaker 1: if you're addressing a room full of people, having some 1595 01:36:57,840 --> 01:36:59,760 Speaker 1: notes or at least prepare marks a little bit, and 1596 01:36:59,760 --> 01:37:02,080 Speaker 1: then just go off the cuff, but no matter where 1597 01:37:02,080 --> 01:37:04,000 Speaker 1: you are, I was thinking about it last night. I 1598 01:37:04,000 --> 01:37:05,760 Speaker 1: was having a lovely time. It was a great event 1599 01:37:05,840 --> 01:37:08,559 Speaker 1: and it was a very important cause. But people just 1600 01:37:08,560 --> 01:37:10,320 Speaker 1: want to be spoken to like people. They don't. They 1601 01:37:10,320 --> 01:37:15,479 Speaker 1: don't want the robo speak of bureaucrats. Um. Otherwise that's 1602 01:37:15,479 --> 01:37:18,120 Speaker 1: how you get Trump and the break will be right back. 1603 01:37:19,680 --> 01:37:22,320 Speaker 1: Welcome back to the Freedom hud On, an island of 1604 01:37:22,400 --> 01:37:26,480 Speaker 1: liberty where you're the party and it's full of fellow patriots. 1605 01:37:26,720 --> 01:37:30,479 Speaker 1: Buck Sexton kicks it off. Well, a couple of ladies 1606 01:37:30,560 --> 01:37:33,880 Speaker 1: wanted to make some burritos and that was a no 1607 01:37:33,880 --> 01:37:36,840 Speaker 1: no they found out. Let me tell you this story. 1608 01:37:37,120 --> 01:37:44,599 Speaker 1: It goes under the file of culinary cultural appropriation. Now, uh, 1609 01:37:44,680 --> 01:37:46,840 Speaker 1: for those of you who may be unfamiliar, which is 1610 01:37:46,880 --> 01:37:50,120 Speaker 1: fine because it's a nonsense concept, but it's one that 1611 01:37:50,200 --> 01:37:54,560 Speaker 1: now the progressive left is increasingly obsessed with. Cultural appropriation 1612 01:37:54,960 --> 01:37:58,639 Speaker 1: is when you take something from another culture as your 1613 01:37:58,680 --> 01:38:03,080 Speaker 1: own and without proper respect or you know, they add 1614 01:38:03,080 --> 01:38:05,880 Speaker 1: other little thing, but it's it's more or less when 1615 01:38:05,880 --> 01:38:09,120 Speaker 1: you take stuff as a white person from a non 1616 01:38:09,360 --> 01:38:12,360 Speaker 1: white culture and like it. It doesn't matter if you 1617 01:38:12,439 --> 01:38:15,639 Speaker 1: celebrate it, it doesn't matter if you think it's great 1618 01:38:16,320 --> 01:38:18,519 Speaker 1: that you are taking it is almost a form of 1619 01:38:18,760 --> 01:38:23,360 Speaker 1: intellectual property theft in the minds of the progressive left. Now, uh, 1620 01:38:23,360 --> 01:38:26,960 Speaker 1: it is such a crazy idea that it is hard 1621 01:38:27,000 --> 01:38:29,599 Speaker 1: to define and hard to understand, but it's a real thing. 1622 01:38:30,080 --> 01:38:35,240 Speaker 1: The latest example of this is in you Can't make 1623 01:38:35,240 --> 01:38:39,040 Speaker 1: this stuff up a Portland's pop up shop called Kok's 1624 01:38:39,320 --> 01:38:42,400 Speaker 1: Burritos where they wanted to make some really great burritos. 1625 01:38:42,439 --> 01:38:46,479 Speaker 1: And here's the problem. Uh, these two ladies, who are white, 1626 01:38:46,920 --> 01:38:50,559 Speaker 1: by the way, good gosh, these two ladies wanted to 1627 01:38:50,560 --> 01:38:54,080 Speaker 1: make some burritos. So they were on a trip to 1628 01:38:54,200 --> 01:39:00,559 Speaker 1: Puerto Nuevo, uh, Mexico, where they picked the brains. Uh. 1629 01:39:00,600 --> 01:39:02,519 Speaker 1: This is a quote from a heat Street Dot companies. 1630 01:39:02,520 --> 01:39:05,360 Speaker 1: They picked the brains of a local tortilla chefs and 1631 01:39:05,400 --> 01:39:09,479 Speaker 1: they brought those recipes back to the States. Quote. I 1632 01:39:09,560 --> 01:39:11,600 Speaker 1: picked the brains of every tortilla lady there in the 1633 01:39:11,600 --> 01:39:13,920 Speaker 1: worst broken Spanish ever, and they showed me a little 1634 01:39:13,920 --> 01:39:16,759 Speaker 1: of what they did. They told us the basic ingredients, 1635 01:39:16,760 --> 01:39:19,599 Speaker 1: and we saw them moving and stretching the dough similar 1636 01:39:19,640 --> 01:39:22,559 Speaker 1: to how pizza makers do before rolling it out with 1637 01:39:22,720 --> 01:39:26,080 Speaker 1: rolling pins. They wouldn't tell us too much about technique, 1638 01:39:26,240 --> 01:39:28,599 Speaker 1: but we were peeking into the windows of every kitchen, 1639 01:39:29,000 --> 01:39:33,800 Speaker 1: totally fascinated by how easy they made it look. We 1640 01:39:33,880 --> 01:39:37,719 Speaker 1: learned quickly it isn't quite that easy. Well, this, this 1641 01:39:37,960 --> 01:39:42,160 Speaker 1: was terrible for the the social justice warriors in the media. 1642 01:39:42,200 --> 01:39:44,920 Speaker 1: Of course, You've got two white ladies that are down 1643 01:39:45,000 --> 01:39:50,440 Speaker 1: in Mexico watching how Mexican ladies are making burrito tortillas, 1644 01:39:51,240 --> 01:39:56,200 Speaker 1: and this is this is similar to showing up and 1645 01:39:56,200 --> 01:40:00,120 Speaker 1: and stealing uh the most value, like like value you 1646 01:40:00,640 --> 01:40:04,360 Speaker 1: cultural insider knowledge. I guess that that's the accusation here. 1647 01:40:05,080 --> 01:40:06,920 Speaker 1: You think I'm making this up. There's a site called 1648 01:40:07,040 --> 01:40:10,000 Speaker 1: Mike dot com, which at one point, I will let 1649 01:40:10,000 --> 01:40:14,840 Speaker 1: you know, I considered writing a opposition column for uh. 1650 01:40:15,640 --> 01:40:18,400 Speaker 1: The this management over there is very nice. I was 1651 01:40:18,439 --> 01:40:20,920 Speaker 1: going to write for Mike dot com so that they 1652 01:40:20,920 --> 01:40:23,600 Speaker 1: could get a taste of what because their audience is 1653 01:40:23,640 --> 01:40:26,400 Speaker 1: far left millennial. You're like, what's Mike dot com? M 1654 01:40:26,400 --> 01:40:29,960 Speaker 1: I c dot com? Far left millennial progressive lunatics. That's 1655 01:40:30,000 --> 01:40:32,960 Speaker 1: that's their audience, right, The the most social justice e 1656 01:40:33,320 --> 01:40:37,160 Speaker 1: of of of social justice warriors, UH like to read 1657 01:40:37,560 --> 01:40:41,000 Speaker 1: Mike dot com. So I was going to be a 1658 01:40:41,080 --> 01:40:45,439 Speaker 1: highbrow trolling effort. I guess, a high concept trolling effort 1659 01:40:45,920 --> 01:40:48,200 Speaker 1: that would have maybe driven some clicks. But I decided 1660 01:40:48,280 --> 01:40:50,600 Speaker 1: that after spending a little time on the site. I 1661 01:40:50,640 --> 01:40:52,960 Speaker 1: just I just couldn't do it. Uh. There there was 1662 01:40:53,000 --> 01:40:57,000 Speaker 1: so crazy, so detached from reality, that I just wanted 1663 01:40:57,040 --> 01:40:59,680 Speaker 1: no part of it. Uh and and respectfully declined to 1664 01:40:59,720 --> 01:41:02,120 Speaker 1: write of them. Um, but here's what they say about 1665 01:41:02,160 --> 01:41:08,240 Speaker 1: this cultural appropriation issue. Quote, these white cooks bragged about 1666 01:41:08,360 --> 01:41:15,680 Speaker 1: stealing recipes from Mexico to start a Portland business. Uh. 1667 01:41:15,720 --> 01:41:18,880 Speaker 1: This is I mean, they're they're completely serious. Quote. The problem, 1668 01:41:18,880 --> 01:41:21,040 Speaker 1: of course, is that it's unclear whether the Mexican women 1669 01:41:21,040 --> 01:41:23,919 Speaker 1: who handed over their recipes ever got anything in return, 1670 01:41:24,439 --> 01:41:27,040 Speaker 1: and now those same recipes are being sold as a 1671 01:41:27,080 --> 01:41:34,559 Speaker 1: delicacy in Portland. Uh. This has gotten crazy. It's it's 1672 01:41:34,560 --> 01:41:38,240 Speaker 1: incredibly heated by the discussion over this. The comments section 1673 01:41:38,840 --> 01:41:41,599 Speaker 1: uh in in Mike and in and in heat Street 1674 01:41:41,640 --> 01:41:49,120 Speaker 1: about this is astonishingly nasty because they're being accused of theft. 1675 01:41:49,160 --> 01:41:51,840 Speaker 1: It's like, well, if people are making food at a 1676 01:41:51,880 --> 01:41:54,400 Speaker 1: restaurant and you watch how they make food, and you 1677 01:41:54,479 --> 01:41:57,000 Speaker 1: ask them, hey, how do you make that food and 1678 01:41:57,040 --> 01:41:59,920 Speaker 1: they tell you that is not theft, that is a conversation. 1679 01:42:00,880 --> 01:42:02,960 Speaker 1: There seems to be a lack of understanding here of 1680 01:42:03,000 --> 01:42:07,840 Speaker 1: what constitutes intellectual property and trade secrets. Um. But also 1681 01:42:08,080 --> 01:42:10,559 Speaker 1: they're trying to make this seem like it's more meaning 1682 01:42:10,760 --> 01:42:15,679 Speaker 1: the social justice complainers on this one who have started 1683 01:42:15,680 --> 01:42:17,200 Speaker 1: a total witch hunt. I mean that they've had to 1684 01:42:17,240 --> 01:42:20,160 Speaker 1: shut down this burrito store. I mean they have shut 1685 01:42:20,160 --> 01:42:26,720 Speaker 1: it down, um, with all of the nasty online commentary. Um, 1686 01:42:27,000 --> 01:42:30,720 Speaker 1: they had to stop it. And now we we go 1687 01:42:30,800 --> 01:42:33,320 Speaker 1: on and we're told that this is somehow I don't know, 1688 01:42:33,560 --> 01:42:38,680 Speaker 1: protecting foreign, foreign cultures and how wonderful they are. Um. 1689 01:42:38,720 --> 01:42:41,240 Speaker 1: This is this is an example of a comment on 1690 01:42:41,280 --> 01:42:44,240 Speaker 1: heat street dot com on this piece. Remember, so we've 1691 01:42:44,240 --> 01:42:46,479 Speaker 1: got a couple of white ladies good out in Mexico 1692 01:42:46,920 --> 01:42:49,200 Speaker 1: learn how to make some good burritos. Come back and say, hey, 1693 01:42:49,200 --> 01:42:50,800 Speaker 1: we learned how to make these by watching people in 1694 01:42:50,840 --> 01:42:54,679 Speaker 1: Mexico make them. And now they're being hounded on social media, 1695 01:42:55,120 --> 01:42:59,280 Speaker 1: terrible comments, all these one star reviews, um, and and 1696 01:42:59,320 --> 01:43:01,639 Speaker 1: they just couldn't keep going on with it. They were 1697 01:43:02,200 --> 01:43:05,599 Speaker 1: in Uh, it was forced to close. They were forced 1698 01:43:05,640 --> 01:43:08,479 Speaker 1: to close this shop because people were so nasty about it. 1699 01:43:08,920 --> 01:43:10,800 Speaker 1: And I wanted to here are some of the here's 1700 01:43:10,800 --> 01:43:13,920 Speaker 1: an example of a comment now that you all pretty 1701 01:43:13,960 --> 01:43:19,760 Speaker 1: boldly and blanking, unapologetically stole the basis of these women's livelihoods. 1702 01:43:20,160 --> 01:43:22,639 Speaker 1: You can make their exact same products, so other white 1703 01:43:22,680 --> 01:43:26,519 Speaker 1: people don't have to be inconvenience by dealing with a 1704 01:43:26,600 --> 01:43:31,760 Speaker 1: pesky brown woman getting in their way. Um, that's that's 1705 01:43:31,800 --> 01:43:34,479 Speaker 1: from the comments section. That's the level of and I 1706 01:43:34,760 --> 01:43:39,760 Speaker 1: cut out the curses there. That's the level of hatred 1707 01:43:39,920 --> 01:43:42,760 Speaker 1: that you see here from something that would seem to 1708 01:43:42,800 --> 01:43:46,600 Speaker 1: a normal, well adjusted person, so innocuous and and straightforward, 1709 01:43:46,600 --> 01:43:48,200 Speaker 1: it would seem like this is not a big deal 1710 01:43:48,920 --> 01:43:53,280 Speaker 1: at all, and yet here we are, there's their business shutdown. 1711 01:43:53,560 --> 01:43:56,559 Speaker 1: I also think it's fascinating that you have such a 1712 01:43:57,960 --> 01:44:01,519 Speaker 1: so much illiteracy when it comes to economics on display 1713 01:44:01,560 --> 01:44:03,519 Speaker 1: by the left all the time. They really do not 1714 01:44:03,680 --> 01:44:07,559 Speaker 1: believe in supply and demand. They do not understand how 1715 01:44:07,600 --> 01:44:10,920 Speaker 1: an economy works or functions. They just believe in justice, 1716 01:44:11,560 --> 01:44:14,120 Speaker 1: social justice, which is whatever they think it is, whatever 1717 01:44:14,200 --> 01:44:19,479 Speaker 1: makes them feel good. And here they don't seem to 1718 01:44:19,560 --> 01:44:22,800 Speaker 1: understand that women having a pop up shop making burritos 1719 01:44:23,360 --> 01:44:27,400 Speaker 1: in Portland does not put women in Mexico making burritos 1720 01:44:27,400 --> 01:44:31,200 Speaker 1: out of business. Uh, that's not how this works. And 1721 01:44:31,240 --> 01:44:36,080 Speaker 1: also there's no such thing as an intellectual copyright on 1722 01:44:36,360 --> 01:44:39,439 Speaker 1: a burrito. So you know, this would be like somebody saying, well, 1723 01:44:39,479 --> 01:44:42,680 Speaker 1: there's a sandwich unless they have patented a way of 1724 01:44:42,720 --> 01:44:45,360 Speaker 1: making their burritos that nobody else does, or unless they 1725 01:44:45,400 --> 01:44:49,200 Speaker 1: have an actual trade secret. Uh, this is just common knowledge. 1726 01:44:50,040 --> 01:44:52,040 Speaker 1: But you see, it's not about that. It's the the 1727 01:44:52,080 --> 01:44:54,720 Speaker 1: economic side of the argument is relevant to them because 1728 01:44:54,760 --> 01:44:57,599 Speaker 1: they do this with other things too. Social justice warriors 1729 01:44:57,600 --> 01:45:00,200 Speaker 1: get upset. Here's a piece on the BBC. It was 1730 01:45:00,240 --> 01:45:03,880 Speaker 1: trending just a couple of weeks ago um our food 1731 01:45:03,920 --> 01:45:08,840 Speaker 1: bloggers fueling racist stereotypes. And they say in this piece 1732 01:45:08,880 --> 01:45:12,519 Speaker 1: food media is predominantly generated by white people for white people, 1733 01:45:12,920 --> 01:45:15,680 Speaker 1: So when the subject veers toward anything outside of the 1734 01:45:15,680 --> 01:45:19,800 Speaker 1: western cannon, it's not uncommon to see things generalized, exotified, 1735 01:45:20,000 --> 01:45:23,720 Speaker 1: or misrepresented. Uh. And so they go into this and 1736 01:45:23,760 --> 01:45:27,519 Speaker 1: they complain about food bloggers who are sometimes pretty annoying 1737 01:45:27,560 --> 01:45:29,840 Speaker 1: people at restaurants who take like ten photos of their 1738 01:45:29,840 --> 01:45:32,679 Speaker 1: food with the flash on their on their camera phone, 1739 01:45:33,160 --> 01:45:36,240 Speaker 1: which I do find very irritating. I should not it. Uh. 1740 01:45:36,720 --> 01:45:38,680 Speaker 1: Part of the restaurant is the experience. It is not 1741 01:45:38,760 --> 01:45:40,200 Speaker 1: just the food. And I don't want to feel like 1742 01:45:40,200 --> 01:45:42,240 Speaker 1: I'm in some really crappy photo shoot when I'm sitting 1743 01:45:42,240 --> 01:45:45,040 Speaker 1: next to you. But I digress. But they will do 1744 01:45:45,080 --> 01:45:49,679 Speaker 1: things like set up chopsticks in a photo of uh, 1745 01:45:49,960 --> 01:45:52,519 Speaker 1: you know, ramen noodles, or in a in a photo 1746 01:45:52,640 --> 01:45:58,480 Speaker 1: of for which I believes Vietnamese UM. And that's considered 1747 01:45:58,640 --> 01:46:02,960 Speaker 1: according to the Social Justice is UH handbook, which changes 1748 01:46:02,960 --> 01:46:05,559 Speaker 1: every day based on what makes people on the left 1749 01:46:05,600 --> 01:46:09,840 Speaker 1: cry and wine. UH. That makes that makes a microaggression. 1750 01:46:10,080 --> 01:46:12,479 Speaker 1: So putting chopsticks in the photos you can show that 1751 01:46:12,520 --> 01:46:17,200 Speaker 1: it is Asian is exostifying the dish and UH making 1752 01:46:17,240 --> 01:46:20,000 Speaker 1: it seem like the other. So now we we can't 1753 01:46:20,000 --> 01:46:25,080 Speaker 1: even celebrate food from other cultures and learn how to 1754 01:46:25,080 --> 01:46:30,360 Speaker 1: make food from other cultures without being called imperialist UH 1755 01:46:30,400 --> 01:46:36,280 Speaker 1: aggressors who are exploiting the poor, non white people of 1756 01:46:36,320 --> 01:46:42,000 Speaker 1: the world by pillaging their their secrets of cuisine. I 1757 01:46:42,040 --> 01:46:43,879 Speaker 1: don't know. I mean, there's not a lot of secrets 1758 01:46:43,880 --> 01:46:46,280 Speaker 1: when it comes to food these days anyway. But I 1759 01:46:46,280 --> 01:46:48,160 Speaker 1: think everybody can pretty much go online and learn how 1760 01:46:48,200 --> 01:46:50,639 Speaker 1: to make anything they want, and practice makes perfect. That's 1761 01:46:50,640 --> 01:46:53,280 Speaker 1: why Buck Sexton makes the best scrambled eggs of any 1762 01:46:53,320 --> 01:46:55,200 Speaker 1: human being on the planet. Right. It's not because I 1763 01:46:55,280 --> 01:46:58,200 Speaker 1: read something that was crazy online secret, but it's because 1764 01:46:58,200 --> 01:46:59,800 Speaker 1: I just do it all the time because I think 1765 01:46:59,800 --> 01:47:02,479 Speaker 1: they in an egg is what people should eat for breakfast, 1766 01:47:02,520 --> 01:47:06,160 Speaker 1: and so I do like five days a week probably. Um. Anyway, 1767 01:47:06,280 --> 01:47:10,320 Speaker 1: I just cultural appropriation. You can't make burrito's, that's a 1768 01:47:10,400 --> 01:47:14,320 Speaker 1: no no. Uh. If you borrow some local techniques from 1769 01:47:14,360 --> 01:47:18,360 Speaker 1: Mexico gets you in trouble. Oh my, you can't make 1770 01:47:18,360 --> 01:47:21,559 Speaker 1: this stuff up, folks. Your cultural appropriation of food. It's 1771 01:47:21,560 --> 01:47:24,360 Speaker 1: it's a thing that upsets people on the left who knew. 1772 01:47:24,680 --> 01:47:26,519 Speaker 1: All right, we'll hit a quick break. We'll be right back. 1773 01:47:27,520 --> 01:47:29,920 Speaker 1: You know, you're waiting to make your decision about health 1774 01:47:29,920 --> 01:47:31,559 Speaker 1: care until you saw the bill and it just come out, 1775 01:47:32,040 --> 01:47:33,840 Speaker 1: and waiting. I will talk to you about that later. Yeah, 1776 01:47:33,840 --> 01:47:41,479 Speaker 1: but dere's not's gonna be time. I just curious. Guys, 1777 01:47:41,800 --> 01:47:43,760 Speaker 1: the last guy that came here, you did the same thing. 1778 01:47:44,040 --> 01:47:49,640 Speaker 1: Get the hell out. Get the last night did the 1779 01:47:49,720 --> 01:47:53,080 Speaker 1: sending you? Yes, you just broke my glasses. You last 1780 01:47:53,120 --> 01:47:55,920 Speaker 1: time did the same damn thing. You just body find me. 1781 01:47:55,920 --> 01:47:58,880 Speaker 1: It broke my glasses. Get the hell out of here. 1782 01:48:00,720 --> 01:48:01,880 Speaker 1: You'd like me to get the hot up here. I 1783 01:48:01,920 --> 01:48:05,479 Speaker 1: also like to call the police. Can I get you 1784 01:48:05,520 --> 01:48:14,479 Speaker 1: guys his names? So you could call it reporter rage, 1785 01:48:14,520 --> 01:48:19,160 Speaker 1: I guess, or rage against a reporter. Uh wow. This 1786 01:48:19,240 --> 01:48:22,479 Speaker 1: is not what you would usually expect in the twenty 1787 01:48:22,520 --> 01:48:26,840 Speaker 1: four hours before a congressional election. I know people have 1788 01:48:26,880 --> 01:48:29,479 Speaker 1: been talking about this one all day. That's why I'm 1789 01:48:29,560 --> 01:48:32,280 Speaker 1: hitting it late in the show today. But here's what 1790 01:48:32,400 --> 01:48:35,479 Speaker 1: happening in case you are not uh completely up to 1791 01:48:35,560 --> 01:48:41,519 Speaker 1: speed on on this. You have Greg John Forte. I 1792 01:48:41,520 --> 01:48:44,080 Speaker 1: don't know if or maybe it's a gene fort but 1793 01:48:44,360 --> 01:48:47,880 Speaker 1: the Italian would be Jean Forte. Um. So we got 1794 01:48:47,960 --> 01:48:52,320 Speaker 1: Mr John Forte here, who is the Republican candidate for 1795 01:48:52,520 --> 01:48:56,040 Speaker 1: the seat that was opened up by Congressman Zinki when 1796 01:48:56,040 --> 01:48:59,960 Speaker 1: he became the minister. Let's gonna say Minister of the Interior. 1797 01:49:00,120 --> 01:49:05,600 Speaker 1: Pardon me, um, he's he is the Secretary of the Interior, 1798 01:49:06,080 --> 01:49:09,400 Speaker 1: Minister of the Interior. Um. So there's this open seat 1799 01:49:09,400 --> 01:49:15,519 Speaker 1: in Montana and this election is happening. Ah well, has 1800 01:49:15,600 --> 01:49:19,320 Speaker 1: happened just hours before the polls were scheduled to open. 1801 01:49:19,400 --> 01:49:23,559 Speaker 1: This happened, So it happened today, which is crazy. And 1802 01:49:23,800 --> 01:49:26,719 Speaker 1: you have this guy Ben Jacobs, who was a reporter 1803 01:49:26,800 --> 01:49:33,240 Speaker 1: for The Guardian, apparently went into John Fortes uh office 1804 01:49:33,520 --> 01:49:36,879 Speaker 1: trying to get as some questions answered about the budget, 1805 01:49:36,880 --> 01:49:40,200 Speaker 1: which I have to say, as questions from a reporter, 1806 01:49:40,320 --> 01:49:42,760 Speaker 1: go hey, can you explain the budget to me? That 1807 01:49:42,760 --> 01:49:46,280 Speaker 1: that's about is straightforward and and acceptable and within boundaries 1808 01:49:46,360 --> 01:49:48,240 Speaker 1: is one is gonna get. It's not like he was 1809 01:49:48,240 --> 01:49:50,120 Speaker 1: busting in there. You know, there are allegations that you 1810 01:49:50,160 --> 01:49:53,160 Speaker 1: beat your wife or something like that. Uh And And 1811 01:49:53,600 --> 01:49:56,799 Speaker 1: I should be honest with you all. I, generally speaking, 1812 01:49:57,240 --> 01:50:00,800 Speaker 1: um really dislike reporters. There are some that are great. 1813 01:50:01,200 --> 01:50:04,479 Speaker 1: There are a lot that are terrible, especially in the 1814 01:50:04,520 --> 01:50:08,759 Speaker 1: modern era of social media and the the Twitter rotti, 1815 01:50:08,880 --> 01:50:15,400 Speaker 1: the constant twitter battling and jockeying for attention and digital influence. 1816 01:50:15,439 --> 01:50:18,000 Speaker 1: With reporters, I find a lot of journalists to be 1817 01:50:18,200 --> 01:50:23,160 Speaker 1: glorified gossip columnists and very self important and nasty and 1818 01:50:23,280 --> 01:50:28,960 Speaker 1: lacking in ethics and willing to play uh quite dirty. 1819 01:50:29,560 --> 01:50:31,160 Speaker 1: Um and and a lot of them are on trust me. 1820 01:50:31,360 --> 01:50:34,200 Speaker 1: Some of them are fantastic, patriotic Americans and they're great 1821 01:50:34,240 --> 01:50:38,280 Speaker 1: friends of mine. But a lot of journalists are terrible. 1822 01:50:39,360 --> 01:50:42,639 Speaker 1: That all said, I I cannot be one of these 1823 01:50:42,680 --> 01:50:48,200 Speaker 1: people who turns around and and condones body slamming or 1824 01:50:48,520 --> 01:50:50,920 Speaker 1: choking or whatever. I mean, there are different reports about 1825 01:50:50,960 --> 01:50:56,600 Speaker 1: what happened a as I understand it, diminutive guardian. Not 1826 01:50:56,680 --> 01:50:58,280 Speaker 1: that it would matter if you were huge, you also 1827 01:50:58,320 --> 01:51:02,160 Speaker 1: shouldn't body slamming. But uh, John for Day should not 1828 01:51:02,200 --> 01:51:05,920 Speaker 1: be throwing some reporter around and and breaking his glasses 1829 01:51:06,479 --> 01:51:09,719 Speaker 1: and doing what he did. I know this that there 1830 01:51:09,720 --> 01:51:14,360 Speaker 1: were some conservatives today who I think are getting a 1831 01:51:14,400 --> 01:51:18,639 Speaker 1: little too deep into the political tribalism here of left 1832 01:51:18,640 --> 01:51:22,479 Speaker 1: and right. Just because something happens to a leftist Democrat 1833 01:51:22,520 --> 01:51:25,920 Speaker 1: doesn't mean it's okay, you know, just something bad happens. Um. 1834 01:51:26,360 --> 01:51:29,720 Speaker 1: I was a little disappointed to see that people were 1835 01:51:29,720 --> 01:51:33,080 Speaker 1: defending this. I also should say this is not nearly 1836 01:51:33,840 --> 01:51:35,920 Speaker 1: as big a deal as a lot of people are 1837 01:51:36,040 --> 01:51:39,360 Speaker 1: pretending that it is. I mean, it's a misdemeanor assault charge. 1838 01:51:39,400 --> 01:51:42,080 Speaker 1: The guy's fine. It's not like he got his nose 1839 01:51:42,200 --> 01:51:44,599 Speaker 1: broken or had something, you know, he didn't get attacked 1840 01:51:44,640 --> 01:51:46,519 Speaker 1: with a deadly weapon or anything like that. That would 1841 01:51:46,520 --> 01:51:49,640 Speaker 1: be a felony, would be very serious. Um. If if 1842 01:51:49,720 --> 01:51:54,040 Speaker 1: John fort say gets uh, if he gets convicted, he 1843 01:51:54,160 --> 01:51:57,760 Speaker 1: faces up to six months in jail or fine a 1844 01:51:57,760 --> 01:52:00,519 Speaker 1: five dollars for a first offense missing in a charge 1845 01:52:00,560 --> 01:52:02,679 Speaker 1: like this, he's not gonna get any he's not gonna 1846 01:52:02,680 --> 01:52:08,080 Speaker 1: get any jail time. He's not going to be servant 1847 01:52:08,120 --> 01:52:11,400 Speaker 1: any time. That much, I think is clear at this point. 1848 01:52:11,960 --> 01:52:16,360 Speaker 1: I don't think that we should be willing to uh 1849 01:52:16,400 --> 01:52:21,439 Speaker 1: abandon our our principles just because of the politics of 1850 01:52:21,479 --> 01:52:23,439 Speaker 1: somebody on the other side. There's been far too much 1851 01:52:23,439 --> 01:52:26,800 Speaker 1: of this going on. Um, he can't he can't manhandle 1852 01:52:26,800 --> 01:52:31,160 Speaker 1: a reporter. It's not okay, I don't. I know it's 1853 01:52:31,200 --> 01:52:34,840 Speaker 1: fun to make jokes about body slamming annoying reporters on 1854 01:52:34,880 --> 01:52:39,120 Speaker 1: Twitter and such, but it's really not acceptable behavior. Paul 1855 01:52:39,200 --> 01:52:41,680 Speaker 1: Ryan was asked about this earlier today and he said, well, 1856 01:52:41,680 --> 01:52:44,800 Speaker 1: the people of Montana will get to decide, and yes, 1857 01:52:44,840 --> 01:52:47,479 Speaker 1: they certainly will. It'll be it'll be funny to see 1858 01:52:47,479 --> 01:52:51,320 Speaker 1: how this all shakes out. If this happened in a 1859 01:52:51,320 --> 01:52:53,800 Speaker 1: a bluer state, I have a feeling that it would 1860 01:52:53,800 --> 01:52:55,840 Speaker 1: have a real impact on what if it were a 1861 01:52:55,840 --> 01:52:58,800 Speaker 1: tight election. Um, I wouldn't be surprised that this guy 1862 01:52:58,840 --> 01:53:03,720 Speaker 1: managed to get elected anyway. Um. But I've had my 1863 01:53:03,800 --> 01:53:07,200 Speaker 1: fair share of times where I wish I could take 1864 01:53:07,280 --> 01:53:10,360 Speaker 1: matters literally into my own hands with a journalist and 1865 01:53:10,520 --> 01:53:13,640 Speaker 1: uh and and throw down. But I don't because I 1866 01:53:13,680 --> 01:53:15,519 Speaker 1: try to be a gentleman, and I tried to obey 1867 01:53:15,600 --> 01:53:20,400 Speaker 1: the law. So this, guys, Gianforte is um, well has 1868 01:53:20,439 --> 01:53:22,760 Speaker 1: made a mistake that much. That much, I think is 1869 01:53:22,760 --> 01:53:25,760 Speaker 1: clear at this point. And I and the conservatives who 1870 01:53:25,800 --> 01:53:29,280 Speaker 1: are out there, come on, guys, you know that again, 1871 01:53:29,479 --> 01:53:32,000 Speaker 1: it's inflated as an issue. This was like a major 1872 01:53:32,040 --> 01:53:35,000 Speaker 1: news story this morning. Uh. And you'll notice it's late 1873 01:53:35,000 --> 01:53:38,400 Speaker 1: in this program because there is actually important stuff going on, 1874 01:53:39,479 --> 01:53:42,800 Speaker 1: uh that we should be spending a lot more not us, 1875 01:53:42,840 --> 01:53:45,599 Speaker 1: but the rest of the news media should be spending 1876 01:53:45,600 --> 01:53:48,920 Speaker 1: a lot more time on. But so so it is inflated. 1877 01:53:49,000 --> 01:53:52,040 Speaker 1: And anytime something happens to a journalist, of course, because 1878 01:53:52,080 --> 01:53:57,639 Speaker 1: it's like the the brotherhood, Oh, microaggression, the the non 1879 01:53:58,280 --> 01:54:04,439 Speaker 1: the non Uh, what's the world looking for? Uh nonsense? Gender? Uh? 1880 01:54:04,880 --> 01:54:10,400 Speaker 1: Non intersectional or intersectional? Maybe it's intersectional group of reporters. 1881 01:54:10,479 --> 01:54:13,880 Speaker 1: I don't know. However, they would say it in progressive lend. Uh. 1882 01:54:13,960 --> 01:54:17,720 Speaker 1: They rally around each other and they find that this 1883 01:54:17,760 --> 01:54:20,519 Speaker 1: is a much bigger issue because it involves one of them. Anyway, 1884 01:54:20,600 --> 01:54:24,720 Speaker 1: John Forte, we'll see what happens with him, Republican congressional 1885 01:54:24,760 --> 01:54:27,000 Speaker 1: candidate in Montana. First one that I know of it 1886 01:54:27,040 --> 01:54:30,360 Speaker 1: has ever body slammed somebody the day of the election. 1887 01:54:30,960 --> 01:54:32,920 Speaker 1: So and I played the audio for you, so you 1888 01:54:33,000 --> 01:54:34,880 Speaker 1: got to hear it. Uh, Team, thank you so much 1889 01:54:34,920 --> 01:54:36,320 Speaker 1: for hanging out with me today. It is always a 1890 01:54:36,360 --> 01:54:38,440 Speaker 1: pleasure and an honor. Of course, we'll be with you 1891 01:54:38,480 --> 01:54:40,920 Speaker 1: live tomorrow same time. As always, please do check out 1892 01:54:40,920 --> 01:54:43,520 Speaker 1: buck Sexton dot com. We post stories throughout the day there. 1893 01:54:43,560 --> 01:54:46,240 Speaker 1: We are working on T shirt designs. They will be 1894 01:54:46,280 --> 01:54:49,840 Speaker 1: coming out soon. The t shirts will be amazing. Um. Also, 1895 01:54:50,640 --> 01:54:52,760 Speaker 1: I've got other projects in mind, but I'm gonna start 1896 01:54:52,760 --> 01:54:55,360 Speaker 1: just unveiling them instead of promising them for all things 1897 01:54:55,440 --> 01:54:57,480 Speaker 1: Team Bucks. So that'll be happening in the weeks ahead. 1898 01:54:57,480 --> 01:55:00,480 Speaker 1: Stay tuned and stay excited. Please do download Buck Sexon 1899 01:55:00,520 --> 01:55:05,160 Speaker 1: with America Now on iTunes. Um that's the place you 1900 01:55:05,160 --> 01:55:07,560 Speaker 1: can subscribe. You can also listen on demand the I 1901 01:55:07,680 --> 01:55:10,480 Speaker 1: Heart at Box sexon with America Now. I have a 1902 01:55:10,520 --> 01:55:14,360 Speaker 1: fantastic night, everybody, or whenever you're listening to this until 1903 01:55:14,400 --> 01:55:16,480 Speaker 1: the next time we get to hang. No matter what happens, 1904 01:55:16,720 --> 01:55:27,040 Speaker 1: no matter what comes your way, Shields high