WEBVTT - Opting in: Privacy in the Digital Age 0:00:00.120 --> 0:00:03.840 This is Baritune Day with a very special episode of 0:00:03.920 --> 0:00:08.920 Spit for You. Normally, with this show, I sit down 0:00:08.960 --> 0:00:12.399 with a musician who you know and love, and the 0:00:12.480 --> 0:00:15.520 scientists who you probably don't know but definitely love a 0:00:15.560 --> 0:00:17.720 little bit more by the end of our time together, 0:00:18.239 --> 0:00:21.520 and we take this approach to find the story in 0:00:21.560 --> 0:00:25.720 the science of DNA. We have explored race, we have 0:00:25.920 --> 0:00:30.880 explored adoption and sperm donation, but this show has a 0:00:30.880 --> 0:00:33.559 different format. It's still me and two people, but we 0:00:33.640 --> 0:00:38.400 are going back a little farther to the foundation of 0:00:38.440 --> 0:00:41.839 what genetic testing even involves, to the data, and to 0:00:41.920 --> 0:00:45.159 the big questions around what it means to spit in 0:00:45.159 --> 0:00:48.159 a tube and share your data with other people with 0:00:48.200 --> 0:00:50.360 a company, what it means for all of us to 0:00:50.400 --> 0:00:54.360 live in this very connected world where our information is 0:00:54.400 --> 0:00:57.800 a necessary input to get all the conveniences we have 0:00:57.920 --> 0:01:00.880 become attached to. We're gonna talk about data. We're gonna 0:01:00.880 --> 0:01:04.880 talk about privacy, We're gonna talk about permission and controls 0:01:04.920 --> 0:01:07.640 in this hyper connected world we're living in. And we're 0:01:07.640 --> 0:01:10.640 gonna do that because I think it's important and the 0:01:10.640 --> 0:01:12.440 folks who I make this show with at I heard 0:01:12.440 --> 0:01:14.840 and twenty three and Me gave me the keys. I 0:01:14.840 --> 0:01:18.840 could say whatever I want, y'all. In the past few years, 0:01:19.000 --> 0:01:23.040 I have started to question how the system is set up. 0:01:23.640 --> 0:01:26.440 Do I really need to disclose as much about myself 0:01:26.480 --> 0:01:29.760 as I have been in order to live a quality life. 0:01:30.200 --> 0:01:33.040 At the exact time that I was approached to host 0:01:33.080 --> 0:01:35.840 this show, I was really coming into my own as 0:01:35.840 --> 0:01:39.680 a critic of technology. So I couldn't just say yes 0:01:40.040 --> 0:01:43.760 to a show sponsored by a genetic testing company. I 0:01:43.800 --> 0:01:46.280 had to do my research, and I read the terms 0:01:46.280 --> 0:01:50.960 of service myself from front to back, which were very readable. 0:01:51.000 --> 0:01:54.520 To my surprise, I had some privacy oriented activist friends 0:01:54.600 --> 0:01:56.480 take a look and they said, you know, this is 0:01:56.520 --> 0:01:59.360 pretty good. In fact, I demanded to speak with the 0:01:59.400 --> 0:02:02.600 highest level people at twenty three and Me before I 0:02:02.640 --> 0:02:04.440 would agree to do the show, because I wanted to 0:02:04.520 --> 0:02:07.920 understand what they were doing to protect the information about 0:02:08.000 --> 0:02:10.600 me that they had, and to use it in a 0:02:10.639 --> 0:02:12.840 responsible way that I would always feel like I had 0:02:12.840 --> 0:02:16.240 some choice and some agency in that matter. I got 0:02:16.280 --> 0:02:20.840 onto the product because I trusted the representation of what 0:02:20.880 --> 0:02:24.360 that product was, and I have personal curiosity. My older 0:02:24.400 --> 0:02:27.400 sister had recently done a twenty three in me, and 0:02:27.440 --> 0:02:30.560 she was curious about my results because we don't share 0:02:30.560 --> 0:02:33.480 a father. So there's some mystery in there that science 0:02:33.560 --> 0:02:38.200 might help resolve. But this episode returns to that original 0:02:38.720 --> 0:02:42.080 hesitation I had about doing this show, that question what 0:02:42.200 --> 0:02:44.840 happens with our information? And this show is not just 0:02:44.919 --> 0:02:47.239 about twenty three and me and my information in those 0:02:47.320 --> 0:02:50.080 terms of service. It's actually a bigger view. We're gonna 0:02:50.160 --> 0:02:53.440 take on what it means to be connected in this 0:02:53.560 --> 0:02:55.720 data driven world and what some of the costs are 0:02:56.280 --> 0:02:59.160 on a security level, what does it mean to try 0:02:59.200 --> 0:03:01.840 to have people sponsibly hold our data, and on a 0:03:01.960 --> 0:03:07.360 larger system level, with artificial intelligence and algorithmic recommendations on 0:03:07.400 --> 0:03:09.880 everything from what we buy to how many years we 0:03:09.960 --> 0:03:13.320 might face in the criminal justice system. This stuff really matters. 0:03:13.840 --> 0:03:17.400 So I'm happy you're joining me. I have two other 0:03:17.480 --> 0:03:21.040 people to join me. Gina Matthews is a computer science 0:03:21.040 --> 0:03:25.560 professor whose research focuses on algorithmic decision making, on bias, 0:03:25.600 --> 0:03:29.760 on accountability, on essentially what we do with all the 0:03:29.840 --> 0:03:32.079 data that we've collected. She was a fellow at the 0:03:32.160 --> 0:03:37.320 Data in Society Research Institute. She received Magic Grant, which 0:03:37.360 --> 0:03:39.760 is the best type of grant to receive the Magic 0:03:39.800 --> 0:03:43.200 Grant from the Brown Institute for Media Innovation. Gina, Welcome 0:03:43.360 --> 0:03:46.040 to the show. Thanks so much for having me. Thank you. 0:03:46.640 --> 0:03:49.400 And we also have ri E L. Silverstone. He is 0:03:49.440 --> 0:03:53.000 a data privacy and security expert. He spent the past 0:03:53.040 --> 0:03:57.720 twenty five years focusing on really complex security processes and 0:03:57.760 --> 0:04:01.840 policies for all kinds of organizations, including companies that work 0:04:01.880 --> 0:04:06.440 with genetic information. His title is Incredible External Data Protection 0:04:06.520 --> 0:04:10.920 Officer and Managing Director at Data Protectors. Thank you so 0:04:11.000 --> 0:04:14.160 much for being here. Thank you for I'd like to 0:04:14.200 --> 0:04:18.160 start with you, r L. Because I think there's information 0:04:18.600 --> 0:04:22.280 that's about us, that's in systems and I want confidence 0:04:22.320 --> 0:04:26.240 to know that it is being managed responsibly and securely. 0:04:26.760 --> 0:04:30.200 And then further downstream, there's what we do with that information. 0:04:30.440 --> 0:04:33.520 On this first point on securing the data, what's an 0:04:33.520 --> 0:04:37.040 external data protection officer? So we bring the people together 0:04:37.160 --> 0:04:41.560 that can protect data best. There is such a lack 0:04:41.680 --> 0:04:45.800 of professionals with experience in the world, so we teach 0:04:45.839 --> 0:04:49.120 on companies how to protect their data. We also interact 0:04:49.600 --> 0:04:53.960 between the company and data protection authorities, especially in Europe, 0:04:54.320 --> 0:04:59.600 and advise them on how to solve for demanding situations. Okay, 0:04:59.640 --> 0:05:02.520 so you're really deep in there. How did you come 0:05:02.600 --> 0:05:06.000 to this field? A few years ago? I was in 0:05:06.000 --> 0:05:09.839 the middle of the computer revolution in Silicon Valley. What 0:05:09.839 --> 0:05:11.120 do you mean you were in the middle of it. 0:05:11.320 --> 0:05:13.560 So I went to high school in California, So you 0:05:13.600 --> 0:05:15.520 were literally in the middle of in the middle. Yeah. 0:05:15.600 --> 0:05:18.800 So I got very interested in computer science and security 0:05:18.800 --> 0:05:22.400 and privacy back when I was fourteen. Did something happen 0:05:22.440 --> 0:05:24.680 when you were fourteen to get you interested in this. 0:05:24.960 --> 0:05:30.920 It's my high school. Some students were contacted by the FBI, okay, 0:05:31.240 --> 0:05:33.480 because they were doing things they weren't supposed to do 0:05:34.040 --> 0:05:38.200 and freaking and hacking like early hacking days. So the 0:05:38.240 --> 0:05:42.720 word hacking is actually good. It's the freaking that's not good. So, 0:05:43.279 --> 0:05:46.040 and just to clarify, freaking is when people are getting 0:05:46.120 --> 0:05:49.640 unauthorized access to the phone network. Yes, you were saying, 0:05:49.640 --> 0:05:53.080 the FBI based some calls to more than calls. The 0:05:53.120 --> 0:05:55.720 FBI showed up in front of some of my schoolmates 0:05:56.160 --> 0:05:58.880 and they had some splaining to do because they were 0:05:58.960 --> 0:06:03.000 usually computers to do things that people didn't think they 0:06:03.160 --> 0:06:06.120 could or would do. And that's all we do in security. 0:06:06.720 --> 0:06:08.719 Your job is to decide what you could do with 0:06:08.760 --> 0:06:11.159 the computer, or what you should do with the computer. 0:06:11.400 --> 0:06:15.520 My job is what you shouldn't do. So since then 0:06:15.520 --> 0:06:17.120 you've been on the journey that's got you now at 0:06:17.200 --> 0:06:19.160 data protectors. But with some of the other type of 0:06:20.200 --> 0:06:22.359 risks you've been exposed to. Your problems you've seen in 0:06:22.440 --> 0:06:26.039 terms of trying to secure computer systems. Sure, so many 0:06:26.080 --> 0:06:29.000 people don't know how to secure computer systems, not because 0:06:29.200 --> 0:06:32.640 of evil, but because they just don't know. So they're 0:06:32.640 --> 0:06:35.359 looking for people to teach them. And opinions vary. But 0:06:35.480 --> 0:06:39.080 I've seen where data was used for bad for example, 0:06:39.160 --> 0:06:44.360 to human trafficking, for example, to affect a balanced transfer 0:06:44.480 --> 0:06:47.480 within the bank. But I've seen more computers and computer 0:06:47.520 --> 0:06:50.560 security really affect people. For example, one of the systems 0:06:50.600 --> 0:06:53.560 I was responsible for control the temperature of heart lung 0:06:53.920 --> 0:06:58.000 machines at hospitals. Imagine if that computer just shut down 0:06:58.000 --> 0:07:01.159 for no reason, people could die. One other questions that's 0:07:01.160 --> 0:07:03.800 been on my mind every day because I opened up 0:07:03.839 --> 0:07:07.000 my news app and I see the same story. I 0:07:07.080 --> 0:07:14.640 see organization company government entity X has lost millions of 0:07:14.760 --> 0:07:20.320 personal records of category. Why social security numbers, phone numbers, 0:07:20.360 --> 0:07:26.000 bank records, entire social media profiles. Why does this continue 0:07:26.040 --> 0:07:30.480 to happen Because companies generally see data protection as attacks 0:07:31.240 --> 0:07:33.160 and they like paying tacts as much as you and I, 0:07:34.040 --> 0:07:37.560 So they do either the bare minimum needed or they 0:07:37.560 --> 0:07:40.280 are very sensitive for security elect twenty three and me 0:07:40.400 --> 0:07:42.480 because they know they wouldn't have a business if there 0:07:42.520 --> 0:07:45.840 was a break. Then they invest more resources and make 0:07:45.880 --> 0:07:49.640 it the higher priority. That's it is. It's cost them money, 0:07:49.640 --> 0:07:51.360 and then many of them don't want to spend it. 0:07:51.680 --> 0:07:54.320 So that's the primary one. The secondary one is, look 0:07:54.800 --> 0:07:57.880 a security people, we've got to be right a hundred 0:07:57.920 --> 0:08:00.640 percent of the time. A hacker only has to be 0:08:00.720 --> 0:08:04.880 lucky once, so processes have to be fixed. Well, I'm 0:08:04.920 --> 0:08:07.960 glad someone like you is helpfully on the job. I 0:08:08.000 --> 0:08:10.240 want to bring you in Gina. I'd love for you 0:08:10.320 --> 0:08:13.560 to explain someone we know a bit from arial how 0:08:13.600 --> 0:08:18.000 he got started. What was your introduction to computers and computing? 0:08:18.120 --> 0:08:20.920 How did you end up in this field? I added 0:08:20.960 --> 0:08:24.120 computers and computing as a second major when I was 0:08:24.160 --> 0:08:28.280 an undergrad. Once I started with programming, I just really 0:08:28.320 --> 0:08:31.440 liked the instant gratification nature of it, the ability to 0:08:31.520 --> 0:08:34.840 change something and and also just build a whole world 0:08:34.880 --> 0:08:37.800 that you wanted to build. I went to graduate school 0:08:37.920 --> 0:08:40.400 at UC Berkeley, which also was kind of the heart 0:08:40.440 --> 0:08:43.520 of the dot com boom there in Silicon Valley, and 0:08:43.720 --> 0:08:46.120 was super excited about the potential of computing. I felt 0:08:46.120 --> 0:08:48.640 like it was kind of a fundamental human good. It 0:08:48.760 --> 0:08:52.320 was automating tasks that were drudgery, it was connecting people, 0:08:52.960 --> 0:08:56.439 was giving more people voice. I just felt super good 0:08:56.480 --> 0:08:59.760 about it. And then over time I just saw more 0:08:59.800 --> 0:09:03.280 and more uses. Not that those other uses ceased to exist, 0:09:03.720 --> 0:09:07.960 but I saw the funded uses, the pushed uses, drifting 0:09:07.960 --> 0:09:13.000 more and more to surveillance and manipulation. Over time, I 0:09:13.120 --> 0:09:17.000 just felt more and more compelled to try to do 0:09:17.040 --> 0:09:20.280 something to change that direction. On the front end of 0:09:20.280 --> 0:09:23.880 your career, your hands on with computing, and now you 0:09:23.920 --> 0:09:27.000 are hands on with trying to shift the direction of computing. 0:09:27.000 --> 0:09:29.760 But how does that early access, in that early atmosphere 0:09:30.360 --> 0:09:33.360 shape your perspective? Now it's interesting. I went to a 0:09:33.840 --> 0:09:36.800 twenty year reunion of my grad research group. I have 0:09:36.880 --> 0:09:40.560 a lot of academic siblings who are very highly placed 0:09:40.600 --> 0:09:43.439 at big companies, and some of them will even say 0:09:43.559 --> 0:09:45.680 I'm basically just a network plumber. I mean, they're, you know, 0:09:45.760 --> 0:09:50.040 incredibly talented systems building folks, but they feel very distant 0:09:50.640 --> 0:09:55.720 from the impact of those platforms and systems on the 0:09:55.760 --> 0:09:59.040 lives of individuals. I just can't do that. I've been 0:09:59.040 --> 0:10:03.120 a system builder and I enjoyed that very much, and 0:10:03.160 --> 0:10:07.720 I've been a security expert type person. But making the 0:10:07.800 --> 0:10:11.560 cargo faster and locking the car down into its current 0:10:11.559 --> 0:10:13.200 course doesn't seem to make a lot of sense when 0:10:13.240 --> 0:10:15.959 you don't agree with the way it's being driven. Can 0:10:16.000 --> 0:10:20.160 you explain kind of your approach on this topic, and 0:10:20.360 --> 0:10:23.840 especially around big data systems or algorithms. What is your 0:10:23.920 --> 0:10:27.280 role in this? I think we're right to worry about 0:10:27.440 --> 0:10:32.000 accidental breaches or hackers getting in and taking data, but 0:10:32.080 --> 0:10:36.360 I'm honestly more concerned about things that I consider to 0:10:36.480 --> 0:10:42.199 be unacceptable that are perfectly legal. Um. Just today, it's 0:10:42.240 --> 0:10:46.840 interesting I read uh that France is banning analytics on 0:10:46.960 --> 0:10:51.000 judges decisions. It's interesting, right, that's public information, So the 0:10:51.080 --> 0:10:54.360 pattern of decisions that judges make, they don't want people 0:10:54.400 --> 0:10:57.400 doing analytics on that. It's the same kind of thing 0:10:57.440 --> 0:10:59.640 when that happens to you and you realize it's not 0:10:59.720 --> 0:11:01.800 just little pieces of data, but people are stringing it 0:11:01.840 --> 0:11:05.080 together into big conclusions about your life. You feel violated, 0:11:06.240 --> 0:11:09.880 and this kind of let us surveil you, let us 0:11:09.920 --> 0:11:12.439 analyze you, but don't you dare do it to us 0:11:13.760 --> 0:11:15.920 is a pattern I'm not at all happy with. So 0:11:16.040 --> 0:11:22.040 I worry about the wild west of surveillance and manipulation 0:11:22.120 --> 0:11:26.520 of individuals, and especially about big decisions that are made 0:11:26.559 --> 0:11:31.679 about people's lives based on the little pieces of information 0:11:31.720 --> 0:11:35.760 about them that make up big data. Do you think 0:11:35.840 --> 0:11:40.440 that enough people understand the balance and the tradeoff that 0:11:40.480 --> 0:11:43.760 we're making. I think there are decisions I've made historically 0:11:43.760 --> 0:11:45.439 where I just didn't think about it. I was happy 0:11:45.480 --> 0:11:47.920 to get the free storage from the service. I was 0:11:47.920 --> 0:11:50.280 happy to get a discount or coupons from the grosser. 0:11:50.600 --> 0:11:54.120 How do you see awareness of that balance or the 0:11:54.160 --> 0:11:57.680 ability to challenge it developing over time. I think a 0:11:57.679 --> 0:12:01.680 lot of people are uneasy with it, but don't see 0:12:01.720 --> 0:12:03.839 an effective way to be a citizen of the modern 0:12:03.960 --> 0:12:09.120 world without it, because we haven't demanded a different playing field. 0:12:09.840 --> 0:12:13.280 The boundary for invasion of privacy really shifts over time. 0:12:14.360 --> 0:12:17.240 A photo of me posted, is that invading my privacy? 0:12:17.240 --> 0:12:21.520 You think? With facial recognition, you can find anybody. And 0:12:21.920 --> 0:12:25.240 what if I'm just in a picture someone took someplace. 0:12:25.800 --> 0:12:29.920 Do you think just your location information is personal data? 0:12:30.120 --> 0:12:33.920 It's just longitude latitude. But if you assemble that over time, 0:12:33.960 --> 0:12:36.679 you see where you work, where you live. Do you 0:12:36.720 --> 0:12:40.800 go to a religious institution, do you go to a psychiatrist? 0:12:41.320 --> 0:12:43.720 So many things that you might think are not private 0:12:44.280 --> 0:12:49.720 become private with more ability to analyze and link it 0:12:49.800 --> 0:12:52.120 with other types of information. So I want to play 0:12:52.360 --> 0:12:54.400 a game with both of you. I call it what's 0:12:54.400 --> 0:12:56.800 the worst that can happen? And so I'd like your 0:12:56.840 --> 0:13:00.480 imaginations and your experience to be brought to bear on question. 0:13:00.559 --> 0:13:03.280 I'll start with you R. E. L. There are theoretical 0:13:04.480 --> 0:13:08.480 risks associated with data breaches and hacking, and then there's 0:13:08.480 --> 0:13:11.160 things that actually have happened. What are the risks that 0:13:11.280 --> 0:13:14.760 most concern you? Where are the multiple alarms ringing in 0:13:14.840 --> 0:13:17.120 your business and in your life? That's a great question. 0:13:17.200 --> 0:13:21.520 So Number one, most of our data, our name in 0:13:21.559 --> 0:13:25.800 the US, even our picture, if it becomes hack. So 0:13:25.880 --> 0:13:27.880 what I mean? We used to have that in the 0:13:28.000 --> 0:13:31.360 phone books. We used to have it in our high 0:13:31.400 --> 0:13:34.760 school yearbooks. We printed it in a physical thing called 0:13:34.800 --> 0:13:39.079 the Facebook. So we have points of data that are 0:13:39.120 --> 0:13:42.680 out there. The points of data by themselves do absolutely nothing. 0:13:43.240 --> 0:13:45.320 I can even give you a copy of your d 0:13:45.400 --> 0:13:48.320 n A, but it doesn't mean anything to anyone because 0:13:48.360 --> 0:13:52.760 there's no context. When there is context, and when the 0:13:52.840 --> 0:13:55.120 data can be made to do things it wasn't mean 0:13:55.280 --> 0:13:59.000 to be, for example, not a GPS location, but the 0:13:59.040 --> 0:14:02.320 GPS location for time, which shows you how you're going 0:14:02.320 --> 0:14:05.960 around the city of London, for example. So when that 0:14:06.400 --> 0:14:08.880 is out there, not only can it be marketed to 0:14:09.040 --> 0:14:13.880 provide you things air quotes, but it is also dangerous 0:14:13.920 --> 0:14:17.120 because of two things that people don't normally think about. 0:14:17.480 --> 0:14:20.720 The first one is anticipating what you're going to do. 0:14:21.360 --> 0:14:25.120 So it's a big company knows that there are thirty 0:14:25.200 --> 0:14:29.520 year old single people in this building, they're more likely 0:14:29.560 --> 0:14:33.680 to offer lattice there. But the biggest strengths there is 0:14:33.720 --> 0:14:37.640 no technology today that would act to limit them trying 0:14:37.720 --> 0:14:41.440 to change you or your preference. So not just anticipating 0:14:41.480 --> 0:14:44.720 but I want, but creating what I want, manipulating right, 0:14:44.840 --> 0:14:47.440 and it actually exists right. We used to call it marketing, 0:14:47.520 --> 0:14:50.280 but in the future it can actually go into the 0:14:50.280 --> 0:14:54.200 psychological realms. You have more and more data. You can 0:14:54.240 --> 0:14:58.240 literally get into a situation that you're being manipulated to buy, 0:14:58.320 --> 0:15:02.200 to sell, or to do any other action good or bid. Right, 0:15:02.520 --> 0:15:04.840 that's pretty scary. You're playing a game very well, thank you. 0:15:04.920 --> 0:15:07.560 It's the terrifying future, Gina. Do you want to jump 0:15:07.600 --> 0:15:09.200 in on what's the worst that can happen? What are 0:15:09.200 --> 0:15:12.000 the grounded fears and concerns that you have based on 0:15:12.040 --> 0:15:14.000 your experience in the series. I love this game, and 0:15:14.040 --> 0:15:16.360 in fact I play this game exactly when I give 0:15:16.400 --> 0:15:19.480 talks about this. The thing that I think in fact 0:15:19.760 --> 0:15:23.320 is happening to you and is super important is big 0:15:23.360 --> 0:15:27.160 decisions made about your life based on that big data. 0:15:27.400 --> 0:15:30.160 Will you have access to credit? Will there be police 0:15:30.240 --> 0:15:33.240 in your neighborhood? Will you even hear about a job 0:15:33.320 --> 0:15:37.680 that's available. How will your performance on a job be rated? 0:15:38.280 --> 0:15:42.240 Will your insurance rates go up? Will you have access 0:15:42.280 --> 0:15:46.160 to a university? Big, big decisions about our lives are 0:15:46.200 --> 0:15:49.520 being made with little pieces of information that we cannot 0:15:50.080 --> 0:15:53.680 anticipate the risk of your insurance rates go up? If 0:15:53.720 --> 0:15:56.360 you purchase plus size clothing, what have you purchasing for 0:15:56.400 --> 0:15:58.960 somebody else? Your interest rates go up if you charge 0:15:58.960 --> 0:16:01.680 marriage counseling, because you know that could have a big 0:16:01.720 --> 0:16:04.560 financial impact on your life. There's lots of little things 0:16:04.640 --> 0:16:08.640 that you don't have any way of anticipating the outcome 0:16:08.840 --> 0:16:12.080 it could have. Well, follow up question on the insurance 0:16:12.160 --> 0:16:14.560 rates and plus size clothing, can you explain that a 0:16:14.600 --> 0:16:17.360 little further because I did not know that. Yeah, so 0:16:17.520 --> 0:16:22.280 information about your purchasing habits can be shared with insurance companies. 0:16:23.280 --> 0:16:26.080 Just like when you go to get a job, you 0:16:26.160 --> 0:16:30.520 can voluntarily sign away rights for them to look at 0:16:30.560 --> 0:16:33.840 your credit history, your social media history. When you're trying 0:16:33.840 --> 0:16:35.640 to get into the country and get a visa, there's 0:16:35.680 --> 0:16:37.720 many times you can say no, but if you want 0:16:37.760 --> 0:16:40.280 that job or you want that visa, you might have 0:16:40.400 --> 0:16:44.040 to say yes. And then you have voluntarily given people 0:16:44.160 --> 0:16:48.560 access to all sorts of deep wells of information about you. 0:16:50.080 --> 0:16:53.720 That's a perfect segue to my personal experience with this. 0:16:53.840 --> 0:16:56.400 I went on this data detox journey where I basically 0:16:56.400 --> 0:16:59.960 collected all the information that had been collected on me. 0:17:00.560 --> 0:17:05.160 It's a big social platforms search engines, credit agencies, data brokers. 0:17:05.440 --> 0:17:08.240 I found people with profiles of me that I've never 0:17:08.280 --> 0:17:11.400 heard of, and a lot of the information was inaccurate. 0:17:11.640 --> 0:17:14.320 I was frustrated by that because I thought, well, you're 0:17:14.320 --> 0:17:15.879 supposed to be big tech, you're supposed to know all 0:17:15.920 --> 0:17:18.359 these things. But I was also relieved because I'm like, 0:17:18.400 --> 0:17:21.359 thank goodness, they got that wrong. But then I'm like, 0:17:21.480 --> 0:17:23.760 but they're going to make these big life decisions, Gina 0:17:23.840 --> 0:17:26.560 that you're talking about. Do I want them making those 0:17:26.600 --> 0:17:30.760 decisions based on accurate information about me or inaccurate information 0:17:31.119 --> 0:17:33.600 like what is best for me? You know, Yeah, you 0:17:33.640 --> 0:17:36.480 tell me, you guess correctly and it's private information, or 0:17:36.520 --> 0:17:40.760 you guess incorrectly and you make an illegitimate decision about me. 0:17:41.359 --> 0:17:44.119 And this is another fact. If you don't participate in 0:17:44.200 --> 0:17:47.760 data collection, then people will make decisions about you based 0:17:47.800 --> 0:17:50.040 on people that they determined to be like you for 0:17:50.119 --> 0:17:54.360 whatever definition that is. Yeah, these are what shadow profiles 0:17:54.400 --> 0:17:57.480 that some companies create to kind of mimic the population 0:17:57.520 --> 0:17:59.359 that doesn't necessarily have an account with them, but they 0:17:59.359 --> 0:18:01.760 can still be re presented in a database. Sometimes we 0:18:01.840 --> 0:18:03.879 call them avatars, even though they don't have a picture. 0:18:03.960 --> 0:18:06.760 But there are some companies out there that create an 0:18:06.760 --> 0:18:10.280 avatar that knows to some degree what you're going to buy. 0:18:10.320 --> 0:18:14.520 Next week, next year, which is why the intent behind 0:18:14.600 --> 0:18:17.679 the g d PR in Europe was to give people 0:18:18.200 --> 0:18:22.600 the right to rectify their data and also declaration where 0:18:22.640 --> 0:18:25.800 companies got that data. You brought up g d p 0:18:26.080 --> 0:18:28.879 R R E L and this is the general Data 0:18:28.920 --> 0:18:33.840 Protection regulation rules set across the EU that a lot 0:18:33.880 --> 0:18:37.480 of us experienced through new pop ups on websites we 0:18:37.600 --> 0:18:41.400 visited and forcing us to acknowledge a very legal sounding 0:18:41.480 --> 0:18:45.960 thing would have been the practical results of g d 0:18:46.080 --> 0:18:48.320 p R, you know, in terms of what you just described. 0:18:48.480 --> 0:18:51.520 So here's the situation out there. G DPR has been 0:18:51.560 --> 0:18:55.200 in effect for a year. There's over three hundred thousand 0:18:55.400 --> 0:19:00.920 cases in Europe involving either complaints from individuals or data 0:19:01.000 --> 0:19:05.680 breaches data bridges about nine There's more than fifty six 0:19:05.760 --> 0:19:10.840 million euros and penalties already levied in the first year. 0:19:11.280 --> 0:19:15.040 Presumably is going to be much much higher. The law 0:19:15.080 --> 0:19:17.159 has been created to some degree because they wanted to 0:19:17.160 --> 0:19:20.040 get to a point where a potential penalty will be 0:19:20.040 --> 0:19:23.119 painful for those organizations. All right, So we've got a 0:19:23.119 --> 0:19:28.119 lot more complaint activity, We've got some fine levying activity. 0:19:28.320 --> 0:19:33.560 Do you see a shift in actual behavior by companies yes, absolutely, 0:19:33.640 --> 0:19:37.520 So I see behavior shift in two different areas. First, 0:19:37.680 --> 0:19:41.800 in Europe, people are asking a lot more questions. The 0:19:42.000 --> 0:19:46.560 individual citizen rate is more aware and they're asking more questions. 0:19:46.560 --> 0:19:50.080 And companies that before didn't have a data protection officer 0:19:50.440 --> 0:19:54.880 now does. So there's over half a million data protection 0:19:54.920 --> 0:19:58.120 officers in Europe right now. Full employment for data protectors, 0:19:58.160 --> 0:20:01.640 well there's only seventeen licens professionals. But so I'm hearing 0:20:01.680 --> 0:20:03.879 a great job opportunity here for those For those that 0:20:03.920 --> 0:20:05.880 you're looking for a new field to get into data 0:20:05.920 --> 0:20:09.560 protector growing market, go ahead, absolutely. But the exciting changes 0:20:09.600 --> 0:20:12.159 in the US. There are companies in the US that 0:20:12.240 --> 0:20:16.080 have never worried about data protection to that level, but 0:20:16.200 --> 0:20:18.320 now if they play in Europe, they have to play 0:20:18.320 --> 0:20:23.440 by European rules. In the US, many companies have started 0:20:23.640 --> 0:20:26.919 asking questions they never asked before. How do I protect 0:20:26.920 --> 0:20:29.000 the data so I won't get fine? How do I 0:20:29.000 --> 0:20:31.520 protect the data so I won't be in the newspapers? 0:20:31.600 --> 0:20:34.160 And how do I protect the data so customers will 0:20:34.160 --> 0:20:36.840 not stop buying for me? Well, that sounds like a 0:20:36.880 --> 0:20:40.040 good story, and I'd love to hear Gina from you. 0:20:40.400 --> 0:20:44.480 We've gotten shaken a bit by the negative possibilities. But 0:20:44.520 --> 0:20:47.439 what are you seeing in terms of a shift in 0:20:47.440 --> 0:20:50.480 a better direction, Whether it's you know, how we put 0:20:50.520 --> 0:20:54.560 some limits around the recommendations and algorithms and these big 0:20:54.600 --> 0:20:57.280 life decisions that are going to affect so many of us, 0:20:57.760 --> 0:21:01.119 Where is the oversight emerging from at I think the 0:21:01.240 --> 0:21:06.680 GDPR is a good first experiment in this space. I'm 0:21:06.720 --> 0:21:10.680 happy to see it. I think in the academic community, 0:21:10.800 --> 0:21:13.560 in the practitioner community, there's a lot of discussion about 0:21:13.680 --> 0:21:18.280 things we can do and that's a step in the 0:21:18.400 --> 0:21:25.880 right direction. So things like explainable AI algorithms so that 0:21:25.960 --> 0:21:29.560 it's not just a recommendation based on machine learning with 0:21:29.640 --> 0:21:33.119 big data that can't be explained. You can link it 0:21:33.200 --> 0:21:36.040 back to a particular data point and its weight in 0:21:36.080 --> 0:21:41.720 the decision. Doing things like looking at the demographics of 0:21:41.760 --> 0:21:46.399 the training data, there's ways to look for patterns of 0:21:46.520 --> 0:21:53.560 bias in decisions. Algorithms and systems developed and tested on 0:21:53.880 --> 0:21:57.240 a certain demographic are not going to automatically perform well 0:21:57.240 --> 0:22:01.199 on another. One of the things that emerges is how 0:22:01.240 --> 0:22:06.359 old this challenge is. I remember learning that the medical field, 0:22:06.600 --> 0:22:11.000 in terms of both treatments and drug development as is 0:22:11.160 --> 0:22:14.439 very long history of using the male body as the 0:22:14.480 --> 0:22:19.920 default human. Every recommendation, dosage is treatment. We're all designed 0:22:19.920 --> 0:22:22.639 for this kind of average male body, and it turns 0:22:22.640 --> 0:22:25.280 out that's not the average body in the world. There 0:22:25.280 --> 0:22:28.040 are many different types of bodies, and we're going back 0:22:28.080 --> 0:22:30.400 and people are kind of filling in the blanks. When 0:22:30.400 --> 0:22:33.080 I'm hearing you talk about opting in and having more 0:22:33.080 --> 0:22:36.760 accurate systems, having blanks in the data set, it seems 0:22:36.760 --> 0:22:40.800 to me that a we want a representation of as 0:22:40.800 --> 0:22:44.480 many as possible in this tool that's defining our whole future, 0:22:45.080 --> 0:22:49.920 so long as be it's paired with a level of accountability, oversight, 0:22:50.600 --> 0:22:52.560 correct ability, you know, in terms of we're going to 0:22:52.680 --> 0:22:54.960 find mistakes. No systems ever perfect, but do we have 0:22:55.000 --> 0:22:58.080 a mechanism to correct those mistakes and serve people in 0:22:58.119 --> 0:23:01.320 the process. But to count on the will of a company, Plus, 0:23:01.320 --> 0:23:03.520 it doesn't feel like a good long term plan for humanity. 0:23:04.080 --> 0:23:06.520 That's exactly the right. As human beings, we stink in 0:23:06.560 --> 0:23:11.040 self regulation just not gonna happen. Plus, look, the principles 0:23:11.040 --> 0:23:14.960 are simple. First principle is transparency. Here's what I'm going 0:23:15.000 --> 0:23:18.040 to collect from you, and here's why then there's the 0:23:18.040 --> 0:23:22.280 accountability actually do only the things I said I'm going 0:23:22.320 --> 0:23:26.359 to do, and then rectification. You've got to know about 0:23:26.520 --> 0:23:29.040 something that is wrong about your data. If you don't know, 0:23:29.119 --> 0:23:32.399 you can't fix it, and then your ability to both 0:23:32.680 --> 0:23:37.280