1 00:00:03,200 --> 00:00:07,960 Speaker 1: This is Bloomberg Law with June Brussel from Bloomberg Radio. 2 00:00:09,360 --> 00:00:11,920 Speaker 1: There are five major publishers in the country and the 3 00:00:11,960 --> 00:00:15,160 Speaker 1: federal government wants it to stay that way. So it's 4 00:00:15,200 --> 00:00:18,720 Speaker 1: suing to stop the number one publisher, Penguin Random House 5 00:00:19,079 --> 00:00:22,720 Speaker 1: from buying the number four publisher, Simon and Schuster in 6 00:00:22,760 --> 00:00:25,480 Speaker 1: a more than two billion dollar deal. Joining me is 7 00:00:25,560 --> 00:00:30,240 Speaker 1: Jennifer Bloomberg Intelligence Senior litigation analyst. Well, first of all, 8 00:00:30,320 --> 00:00:34,320 Speaker 1: what is the goal of this merger? Well, the goal 9 00:00:34,400 --> 00:00:37,400 Speaker 1: of the merger, according to what the companies are saying now, 10 00:00:37,600 --> 00:00:40,440 Speaker 1: is to become more efficient. I mean, essentially if it's 11 00:00:40,479 --> 00:00:43,640 Speaker 1: what most big merging parties would say, but in order 12 00:00:43,680 --> 00:00:47,240 Speaker 1: to provide better cloud or better leverage as against Amazon, 13 00:00:47,600 --> 00:00:50,040 Speaker 1: you know, which is a big seller of books out there, 14 00:00:50,400 --> 00:00:53,320 Speaker 1: and also just to become more efficient as some of 15 00:00:53,320 --> 00:00:56,600 Speaker 1: the advances that go to the really big top selling 16 00:00:56,600 --> 00:01:00,880 Speaker 1: authors have gone up. The Justice Department is suing and 17 00:01:01,000 --> 00:01:03,960 Speaker 1: it says if the merger went ahead, the deal would 18 00:01:04,000 --> 00:01:07,280 Speaker 1: give Penguin Random House nearly half the market for publishing 19 00:01:07,360 --> 00:01:11,280 Speaker 1: rights to blockbuster books, while it's nearest competitors will be 20 00:01:11,360 --> 00:01:15,039 Speaker 1: less than half its size. Tell us about why the 21 00:01:15,120 --> 00:01:19,440 Speaker 1: Justice Department is suing here. Well, it's an interesting theory 22 00:01:19,560 --> 00:01:22,840 Speaker 1: because usually when two companies come together, what the Justice 23 00:01:22,840 --> 00:01:25,840 Speaker 1: Department is looking at is whether they are too competing 24 00:01:25,840 --> 00:01:28,319 Speaker 1: sellers of products, and as a result of the merger, 25 00:01:28,400 --> 00:01:30,959 Speaker 1: the price of those products they sell will go up 26 00:01:31,040 --> 00:01:33,039 Speaker 1: because they'll have more market power and they'll have the 27 00:01:33,080 --> 00:01:35,720 Speaker 1: ability to increase the price. This is what's called them 28 00:01:35,720 --> 00:01:39,960 Speaker 1: ansony case. They are buyers of products, so essentially they 29 00:01:40,000 --> 00:01:43,280 Speaker 1: are paying authors for the rights to publish those authors 30 00:01:43,280 --> 00:01:46,600 Speaker 1: works their books. And the concern here is that if 31 00:01:46,640 --> 00:01:49,160 Speaker 1: they come together and they have that much leverage, they're 32 00:01:49,160 --> 00:01:51,840 Speaker 1: that much bigger than all the other publishing houses that 33 00:01:51,920 --> 00:01:55,240 Speaker 1: could be bidding for these top selling books, that authors 34 00:01:55,240 --> 00:01:58,080 Speaker 1: will start getting paid less. And as authors start to 35 00:01:58,080 --> 00:02:00,800 Speaker 1: get paid less, fewer can afford to write, and the 36 00:02:00,880 --> 00:02:04,320 Speaker 1: upshot would be fewer books for consumers to buy, less innovation, 37 00:02:04,640 --> 00:02:08,000 Speaker 1: less variety. So the concern here is the fees that 38 00:02:08,080 --> 00:02:11,280 Speaker 1: get paid to authors to write books, and they're mostly 39 00:02:11,320 --> 00:02:15,360 Speaker 1: focusing on big, top selling authors. They're arguing that a 40 00:02:15,440 --> 00:02:19,080 Speaker 1: top selling author, the competition will be less because it 41 00:02:19,120 --> 00:02:25,520 Speaker 1: will be down to four large publishers instead of five. Argument. Yes, 42 00:02:25,600 --> 00:02:28,040 Speaker 1: so it's four rather than five, which a five to 43 00:02:28,080 --> 00:02:30,440 Speaker 1: four merger. You know, it depends on the industry, it 44 00:02:30,480 --> 00:02:33,720 Speaker 1: depends on market shares. Sometimes these kinds of cases have 45 00:02:33,760 --> 00:02:36,120 Speaker 1: been successful for the d o J and sometimes not. 46 00:02:36,520 --> 00:02:40,080 Speaker 1: Five to four is sort of borderline, But in this 47 00:02:40,120 --> 00:02:43,240 Speaker 1: case it looks like the market would be very weighed 48 00:02:43,320 --> 00:02:45,840 Speaker 1: toward the merged entity. What the d o J is 49 00:02:45,880 --> 00:02:48,440 Speaker 1: saying here, they don't give exact market shares, but what 50 00:02:48,520 --> 00:02:51,840 Speaker 1: they're saying is that together they be far larger than 51 00:02:51,880 --> 00:02:55,680 Speaker 1: the other three that are left, So even unilaterally, they'd 52 00:02:55,680 --> 00:03:00,000 Speaker 1: have this ability to depress the wages being paid to authors. 53 00:03:00,080 --> 00:03:02,600 Speaker 1: And they do, actually, June have a lot of examples 54 00:03:02,600 --> 00:03:06,040 Speaker 1: in the complaint of bidding that occurred that drove these 55 00:03:06,040 --> 00:03:08,959 Speaker 1: advances way up. That was just bidding between these two 56 00:03:08,960 --> 00:03:12,400 Speaker 1: companies Penguin Random House and Simon and Schuster that ultimately 57 00:03:12,480 --> 00:03:14,840 Speaker 1: up some of these advances by sometimes even in the 58 00:03:14,919 --> 00:03:17,799 Speaker 1: millions of dollars. So they do have examples of where 59 00:03:17,800 --> 00:03:20,360 Speaker 1: the two of them go head to head and compete 60 00:03:20,360 --> 00:03:23,480 Speaker 1: to increase those prices. So theoretically, as a result of 61 00:03:23,480 --> 00:03:26,399 Speaker 1: this merger, that might not happen anymore because the other 62 00:03:26,480 --> 00:03:28,639 Speaker 1: three that are left just may simply not be able 63 00:03:28,680 --> 00:03:32,160 Speaker 1: to play in the same ballpark. Does any part of 64 00:03:32,240 --> 00:03:36,720 Speaker 1: the Justice Department's intent to hear concern the fact that 65 00:03:36,840 --> 00:03:41,480 Speaker 1: one of these companies is German. Oh no, I don't 66 00:03:41,480 --> 00:03:43,520 Speaker 1: think so at all. You know, if there was any 67 00:03:43,600 --> 00:03:46,200 Speaker 1: kind of concern about a German buyer, it would actually 68 00:03:46,240 --> 00:03:48,480 Speaker 1: be dealt with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 69 00:03:48,600 --> 00:03:51,600 Speaker 1: US over the Department of Justice, that they'll look at 70 00:03:51,640 --> 00:03:55,320 Speaker 1: foreign buyers and ask whether there's a US national security 71 00:03:55,360 --> 00:03:58,440 Speaker 1: issue in this case. I don't think that is of 72 00:03:58,520 --> 00:04:02,080 Speaker 1: concern or even being contemplated by the d J. I 73 00:04:02,120 --> 00:04:05,480 Speaker 1: think the main issue here is a new interest, particularly 74 00:04:05,520 --> 00:04:10,160 Speaker 1: pushed by Merritt Garland and promoted by Spiden's July executive order, 75 00:04:10,480 --> 00:04:13,120 Speaker 1: to look at the impact of mergers on labor and 76 00:04:13,160 --> 00:04:16,279 Speaker 1: on prices that are paid. It's always been a theory 77 00:04:16,320 --> 00:04:20,080 Speaker 1: of harmon anti trust, but not used often and rarely 78 00:04:20,160 --> 00:04:23,000 Speaker 1: is there a lawsuit brought based on this theory. So 79 00:04:23,279 --> 00:04:25,960 Speaker 1: it's kind of novel. I just say kind of because 80 00:04:26,000 --> 00:04:29,240 Speaker 1: it is a valid antitrust theory. There have been mergers 81 00:04:29,240 --> 00:04:31,080 Speaker 1: that have settled in the past and not gone to 82 00:04:31,160 --> 00:04:34,200 Speaker 1: litigation on the basis of this kind of depressing the 83 00:04:34,240 --> 00:04:38,000 Speaker 1: wages or monopsony type theory, particularly in agriculture. But what 84 00:04:38,080 --> 00:04:40,120 Speaker 1: we haven't seen as a lawsuit on this basis, so 85 00:04:40,160 --> 00:04:42,440 Speaker 1: it's going to be very interesting to see what happens 86 00:04:42,480 --> 00:04:45,720 Speaker 1: in court here. The Author's Guild, which supports the d 87 00:04:46,000 --> 00:04:50,560 Speaker 1: j's complaints, said, the DJ statements recognized the burden book 88 00:04:50,600 --> 00:04:53,600 Speaker 1: authors currently face, and we hope that today's decision is 89 00:04:53,640 --> 00:04:56,800 Speaker 1: a signal that the do J may be finally expanding 90 00:04:56,839 --> 00:05:01,040 Speaker 1: the definition of antitrust to consider the impact don creators. 91 00:05:01,720 --> 00:05:04,080 Speaker 1: Do you think that's what's going on here? Well, I 92 00:05:04,120 --> 00:05:07,520 Speaker 1: think it's meant to describe what I just talked about. 93 00:05:07,960 --> 00:05:10,360 Speaker 1: I have seen a lot of references to the concept 94 00:05:10,400 --> 00:05:13,760 Speaker 1: that they're expanding ideas an anti trust and expanding the harms. 95 00:05:14,120 --> 00:05:17,039 Speaker 1: I don't so much see it as an expansion because 96 00:05:17,520 --> 00:05:21,080 Speaker 1: impact on creators, or not just creators, but impact on 97 00:05:21,160 --> 00:05:23,760 Speaker 1: any kind of a wage earner, let's say, has been 98 00:05:23,760 --> 00:05:25,960 Speaker 1: an issue in anti trust in the past. It just 99 00:05:26,040 --> 00:05:28,880 Speaker 1: doesn't come up a lot, and we haven't seen a lawsuit, 100 00:05:28,960 --> 00:05:31,920 Speaker 1: so I think to some observers this seems very novel. 101 00:05:32,120 --> 00:05:34,760 Speaker 1: But in the agriculture markets, for example, the Department of 102 00:05:34,800 --> 00:05:37,120 Speaker 1: Justice will always look at the prices paid to the 103 00:05:37,160 --> 00:05:40,240 Speaker 1: small farmers by lets say, meat processors that are trying 104 00:05:40,240 --> 00:05:42,600 Speaker 1: to merge. And in fact, there have been the antitrust 105 00:05:42,680 --> 00:05:46,560 Speaker 1: price fixing lawsuits in the past related to the fixing 106 00:05:46,600 --> 00:05:49,440 Speaker 1: of wages paid to creators in Silicon Valley. So it's 107 00:05:49,480 --> 00:05:52,040 Speaker 1: not the first time that this has been considered an 108 00:05:52,040 --> 00:05:54,840 Speaker 1: anti trust harm. It's just the first time we're going 109 00:05:54,880 --> 00:05:57,440 Speaker 1: to see a merger that is challenged in court on 110 00:05:57,480 --> 00:05:59,960 Speaker 1: the basis of that theory. So J and the published 111 00:06:00,040 --> 00:06:03,320 Speaker 1: just say they'll fight this lawsuit. What are their arguments 112 00:06:03,360 --> 00:06:05,880 Speaker 1: against it? Right, Well, I think they have a lot 113 00:06:05,920 --> 00:06:08,760 Speaker 1: of different responses here. There's some very interesting issues. I 114 00:06:08,760 --> 00:06:11,120 Speaker 1: think first they say, look, this is going to create 115 00:06:11,120 --> 00:06:14,359 Speaker 1: efficiencies and allow us to deal or have better cloud 116 00:06:14,400 --> 00:06:17,680 Speaker 1: against Amazon and deal with this, you know, entity that 117 00:06:17,800 --> 00:06:21,440 Speaker 1: drives the price for books down. They also say that 118 00:06:21,640 --> 00:06:25,600 Speaker 1: the relevant market is defined by the DJ is not correct. 119 00:06:25,839 --> 00:06:29,240 Speaker 1: So the DJ is considering here only publishing by the 120 00:06:29,240 --> 00:06:31,640 Speaker 1: Big five. As you noted, they're calling it a five 121 00:06:31,680 --> 00:06:34,320 Speaker 1: to four. But there are other publishing houses, there are 122 00:06:34,320 --> 00:06:38,120 Speaker 1: smaller publishers, there are independent publishers, and there's also self publishing. 123 00:06:38,440 --> 00:06:40,320 Speaker 1: And I think if you include all of those in 124 00:06:40,360 --> 00:06:42,839 Speaker 1: the market, what it means is that the market shairs 125 00:06:42,880 --> 00:06:45,520 Speaker 1: of these two merging parties would be lower. And I 126 00:06:45,560 --> 00:06:47,640 Speaker 1: think they can argue that they're not looking at the 127 00:06:47,720 --> 00:06:50,640 Speaker 1: right market and they also face competition from some of 128 00:06:50,680 --> 00:06:53,800 Speaker 1: these smaller publishers, and therefore it's not really a five 129 00:06:53,880 --> 00:06:56,320 Speaker 1: to four, you know. They can argue that as well. 130 00:06:57,520 --> 00:07:00,919 Speaker 1: How much does Amazon play in year as a factor. 131 00:07:02,120 --> 00:07:05,520 Speaker 1: The Amazon issue is interesting because the Amazon defense I 132 00:07:05,560 --> 00:07:09,920 Speaker 1: think is used fairly often nowadays in mergers because it's 133 00:07:09,920 --> 00:07:13,280 Speaker 1: become so big and such a conglomerate and involved in 134 00:07:13,280 --> 00:07:17,120 Speaker 1: in so many different areas in industries, UH, particularly in 135 00:07:17,160 --> 00:07:20,360 Speaker 1: the types of items that itself and so the need 136 00:07:20,400 --> 00:07:23,120 Speaker 1: to come together to fight against Amazon, I think is 137 00:07:23,120 --> 00:07:26,800 Speaker 1: a common defense. What I'll say about it in the case, 138 00:07:26,880 --> 00:07:29,400 Speaker 1: it's interesting because the d o J does fight to 139 00:07:29,480 --> 00:07:32,520 Speaker 1: one document where one of the executives from one of 140 00:07:32,560 --> 00:07:35,679 Speaker 1: the company says, well, I don't really buy into that defense. 141 00:07:36,160 --> 00:07:38,360 Speaker 1: I get that that's what our defense is now, but 142 00:07:38,480 --> 00:07:40,960 Speaker 1: I don't really buy into it. And and they've also 143 00:07:41,040 --> 00:07:44,800 Speaker 1: cited two documents that show that the intention post merger 144 00:07:44,840 --> 00:07:48,120 Speaker 1: would be to align more with Amazon, and not necessarily 145 00:07:48,120 --> 00:07:50,640 Speaker 1: to have better leverage against Amazon. So I think the 146 00:07:50,720 --> 00:07:52,960 Speaker 1: evidence is going to have to show how the Amazon 147 00:07:53,000 --> 00:07:55,760 Speaker 1: factor really weighs in here. But the only other thing 148 00:07:55,760 --> 00:07:57,840 Speaker 1: I'll say is that an argument that we need to 149 00:07:57,840 --> 00:08:00,640 Speaker 1: come together to fight against some of a really big 150 00:08:00,680 --> 00:08:02,880 Speaker 1: b m off in in the M and A world 151 00:08:03,000 --> 00:08:06,160 Speaker 1: is never really a great argument. Um, It's made a lot, 152 00:08:06,360 --> 00:08:10,840 Speaker 1: it doesn't usually work. So Um, what will be the 153 00:08:10,880 --> 00:08:14,000 Speaker 1: main question here? Is it mainly what the market is? 154 00:08:15,000 --> 00:08:17,360 Speaker 1: What the market is is a big question, and what 155 00:08:17,440 --> 00:08:19,600 Speaker 1: the shares are and whether this is truly a five 156 00:08:19,640 --> 00:08:22,480 Speaker 1: to four. I think where the efficiencies are and what 157 00:08:22,560 --> 00:08:24,840 Speaker 1: they are will be a big question, and that's obviously 158 00:08:24,920 --> 00:08:27,520 Speaker 1: going to depend on the documents and the facts. These 159 00:08:27,520 --> 00:08:31,320 Speaker 1: companies obviously studied the efficiencies that they expect to be generated, 160 00:08:31,320 --> 00:08:33,800 Speaker 1: and it will be important to see what they're saying 161 00:08:33,840 --> 00:08:36,880 Speaker 1: about it and why they really need to merge. If 162 00:08:36,920 --> 00:08:39,720 Speaker 1: they have documents that just simply say, look, we'll take 163 00:08:39,760 --> 00:08:42,760 Speaker 1: over the market will be this enormous number one by 164 00:08:42,840 --> 00:08:45,920 Speaker 1: virtue of this deal, obviously that's going to be unhelpful 165 00:08:45,960 --> 00:08:49,120 Speaker 1: to them. Are they still unaware of what emails and 166 00:08:49,200 --> 00:08:53,440 Speaker 1: documents like that due to a case. You know, emails 167 00:08:53,440 --> 00:08:56,520 Speaker 1: and documents like that always exist, and and the issue 168 00:08:56,559 --> 00:08:59,040 Speaker 1: is really what is the bulk of the evidence show? 169 00:08:59,160 --> 00:09:01,720 Speaker 1: What is the bulk of the evidence say? It's easy 170 00:09:01,800 --> 00:09:05,560 Speaker 1: to take emails and documents and sort of cherry pick 171 00:09:06,000 --> 00:09:08,839 Speaker 1: and make a company look bad. And certainly what the 172 00:09:08,920 --> 00:09:11,120 Speaker 1: DJ sites in his complaint is going to be some 173 00:09:11,240 --> 00:09:13,760 Speaker 1: of the better documents that support its case. But it 174 00:09:13,880 --> 00:09:15,920 Speaker 1: depends what else is out there, and it may be 175 00:09:16,080 --> 00:09:18,400 Speaker 1: that there are an overwhelming number of documents to talk 176 00:09:18,440 --> 00:09:22,120 Speaker 1: about the efficiencies to be derived, pro competitive efficiencies to 177 00:09:22,160 --> 00:09:24,480 Speaker 1: be derived from the deal, or the need to come 178 00:09:24,520 --> 00:09:28,359 Speaker 1: together to be able to better distribute books by publishers, 179 00:09:28,640 --> 00:09:31,160 Speaker 1: you know, provide better backing for the book so that 180 00:09:31,200 --> 00:09:34,000 Speaker 1: they sell better, which would be a benefit to authors. 181 00:09:34,040 --> 00:09:37,080 Speaker 1: So you know, as much as they understand what those 182 00:09:37,120 --> 00:09:39,640 Speaker 1: documents say. In these big companies, you can have a 183 00:09:39,679 --> 00:09:42,440 Speaker 1: compliance program, but you can't control what all of those 184 00:09:42,480 --> 00:09:45,080 Speaker 1: documents say. But if you have a handful of bad 185 00:09:45,160 --> 00:09:48,200 Speaker 1: documents out of a very large mass, I don't think 186 00:09:48,240 --> 00:09:51,800 Speaker 1: that's necessarily going to sway a judge. Is this lawsuit 187 00:09:51,880 --> 00:09:57,360 Speaker 1: a sign of more aggressive antitrust enforcement in the Biden administration. 188 00:09:58,200 --> 00:10:00,480 Speaker 1: I do think it is June. Yes. I mean they're 189 00:10:00,480 --> 00:10:03,400 Speaker 1: going to court with what is a new theory to 190 00:10:03,480 --> 00:10:06,920 Speaker 1: be tested in court. That's always a little bit risky. Um, 191 00:10:06,960 --> 00:10:09,160 Speaker 1: they're going to court and what they're calling a five 192 00:10:09,200 --> 00:10:12,240 Speaker 1: to four merger, which again isn't you know, it's one 193 00:10:12,240 --> 00:10:15,120 Speaker 1: of these borderline situations. You know, six to five is 194 00:10:15,360 --> 00:10:18,360 Speaker 1: rarely ever going to be challenged, A four to three 195 00:10:18,440 --> 00:10:20,720 Speaker 1: is probably often going to be challenged. That five to 196 00:10:20,760 --> 00:10:23,320 Speaker 1: four is right in between. It's sort of as sometimes 197 00:10:23,320 --> 00:10:26,120 Speaker 1: will be challenged. And it was your very first impression 198 00:10:26,120 --> 00:10:27,839 Speaker 1: when you said, look, it's the five to four. Do 199 00:10:27,960 --> 00:10:30,240 Speaker 1: they really think that there will be harm in the market. 200 00:10:30,280 --> 00:10:32,240 Speaker 1: I think a judge will be asking the same thing. 201 00:10:32,600 --> 00:10:35,280 Speaker 1: So it's not the easiest case for them. It's not 202 00:10:35,320 --> 00:10:38,720 Speaker 1: necessarily a slam dunk. And and because of that, and 203 00:10:38,720 --> 00:10:41,240 Speaker 1: and it has focuses on labor, which which again is 204 00:10:41,400 --> 00:10:44,280 Speaker 1: somewhat new. So because of all that, I would say, yes, 205 00:10:44,320 --> 00:10:46,840 Speaker 1: it is showing that they intend to be more aggressive. 206 00:10:47,440 --> 00:10:49,520 Speaker 1: So in the past, we've talked about, you know, the 207 00:10:49,600 --> 00:10:55,439 Speaker 1: push for more aggressive antitrust enforcement, particularly with the tech companies. 208 00:10:56,080 --> 00:11:00,960 Speaker 1: Do you see any focus of the Biden administration. I 209 00:11:01,000 --> 00:11:04,120 Speaker 1: think the Biden administration is focusing across the board on 210 00:11:04,240 --> 00:11:07,280 Speaker 1: industries that they believe in the past twenty years of 211 00:11:07,400 --> 00:11:10,960 Speaker 1: consolidated quite a bit and have probably hit what they 212 00:11:11,120 --> 00:11:14,640 Speaker 1: view as what should be the peak of their consolidation. Now, 213 00:11:14,800 --> 00:11:17,600 Speaker 1: they haven't really talked about publishing. They generally tend to 214 00:11:17,600 --> 00:11:22,240 Speaker 1: talk about agriculture, airlines, some of the big tech areas, 215 00:11:22,320 --> 00:11:24,960 Speaker 1: you know, social media platforms of course, with Facebook having 216 00:11:24,960 --> 00:11:28,400 Speaker 1: bought Instagram and WhatsApp, even beer markets. They talk about 217 00:11:28,400 --> 00:11:32,160 Speaker 1: pharmaceutical certainly. So I haven't really heard them talk about publishing. 218 00:11:32,240 --> 00:11:34,439 Speaker 1: But it is a market that has seen quite a 219 00:11:34,480 --> 00:11:37,840 Speaker 1: bit of consolidation, and it is down to five. There 220 00:11:37,920 --> 00:11:41,240 Speaker 1: used to be quite a few bigger entities you saw. 221 00:11:41,679 --> 00:11:43,520 Speaker 1: Let me just pull it up. I have a list here. 222 00:11:43,920 --> 00:11:46,240 Speaker 1: And by the way, there also is a past history 223 00:11:46,280 --> 00:11:49,080 Speaker 1: of collusion amongst the Big five. In two thousand twelve, 224 00:11:49,120 --> 00:11:51,880 Speaker 1: there was a lawsuit in which a district court determined 225 00:11:51,920 --> 00:11:54,839 Speaker 1: that they'd engaged in a price fixing conspiracy. So the 226 00:11:54,960 --> 00:11:57,800 Speaker 1: end of these companies are not necessarily completely in the 227 00:11:57,840 --> 00:12:01,640 Speaker 1: clear on this stuff. But you've seen Random House and 228 00:12:01,760 --> 00:12:05,640 Speaker 1: Schuster haven't done. I think a lot of acquiring but 229 00:12:05,720 --> 00:12:11,320 Speaker 1: HarperCollins Publishers recently acquired Houghton Mifflin Hardcourt and had Chet 230 00:12:11,600 --> 00:12:15,640 Speaker 1: recently acquired Workman Publishing. So and I think before those 231 00:12:15,679 --> 00:12:18,600 Speaker 1: two deals that were also a few smaller deals. And 232 00:12:18,640 --> 00:12:21,839 Speaker 1: I think generally what the d o J and FTC 233 00:12:22,240 --> 00:12:25,640 Speaker 1: want to do at this point is just stem the 234 00:12:25,720 --> 00:12:30,920 Speaker 1: tide of further consolidation in industries that are fairly consolidated. 235 00:12:31,000 --> 00:12:33,679 Speaker 1: And I say fairly consolidated, because again we're talking about 236 00:12:33,720 --> 00:12:36,360 Speaker 1: five here and maybe more depending on how you define 237 00:12:36,400 --> 00:12:40,559 Speaker 1: the market. But there has been so much criticism from 238 00:12:40,600 --> 00:12:44,880 Speaker 1: the antitrust bar, from academics, from economists in the last 239 00:12:44,920 --> 00:12:47,520 Speaker 1: ten years, and so many studies done showing that across 240 00:12:47,559 --> 00:12:51,719 Speaker 1: the board that lacks antitrust enforcement has allowed for too 241 00:12:51,760 --> 00:12:55,360 Speaker 1: much consolidation just in general, not a specific industry, but 242 00:12:55,440 --> 00:12:58,560 Speaker 1: just in general. So I think now the focus for 243 00:12:58,600 --> 00:13:01,600 Speaker 1: the d o J and FTC just generally we're just 244 00:13:01,679 --> 00:13:04,480 Speaker 1: going to stem the tide. So every time we get 245 00:13:04,480 --> 00:13:07,040 Speaker 1: a merger in front of us that is in an 246 00:13:07,080 --> 00:13:09,680 Speaker 1: industry where we've seen quite a bit of consolidation in 247 00:13:09,679 --> 00:13:11,720 Speaker 1: the last ten or twenty years, we're going to look 248 00:13:11,760 --> 00:13:15,040 Speaker 1: more closely at that industry and possibly challenge that deal. 249 00:13:15,920 --> 00:13:21,839 Speaker 1: I just wonder how many books really have competitive publishing. 250 00:13:21,880 --> 00:13:24,480 Speaker 1: You know, you have a couple of big titles a year, 251 00:13:24,600 --> 00:13:27,959 Speaker 1: you have former President Obama, you have, but how many 252 00:13:28,080 --> 00:13:32,040 Speaker 1: of these books really have this kind of competitive auctioning 253 00:13:32,160 --> 00:13:35,920 Speaker 1: and stuff. It seems like it's just a handful. Really. Yeah, 254 00:13:35,960 --> 00:13:37,880 Speaker 1: you know, they don't really get into volume, and to 255 00:13:37,920 --> 00:13:41,720 Speaker 1: be perfectly honest, for antitrust purposes, volume doesn't really matter. 256 00:13:41,960 --> 00:13:44,320 Speaker 1: You know, two big companies can come together and even 257 00:13:44,320 --> 00:13:47,920 Speaker 1: if it's just a tiny segment of their businesses representing 258 00:13:47,960 --> 00:13:51,000 Speaker 1: a very small percentage of their own revenues um that 259 00:13:51,120 --> 00:13:54,200 Speaker 1: could create harm in the market, the DOJ or the 260 00:13:54,240 --> 00:13:57,440 Speaker 1: FTC will still go ahead and challenge that because it's 261 00:13:57,440 --> 00:14:00,600 Speaker 1: not like, well, if there's only harms a handful of consumers, 262 00:14:00,600 --> 00:14:03,079 Speaker 1: are small group of consumers, well then you know, we'll 263 00:14:03,160 --> 00:14:05,560 Speaker 1: let it go. If it could harm you know, any 264 00:14:05,600 --> 00:14:08,840 Speaker 1: small group of consumers, they will go ahead and challenge 265 00:14:08,920 --> 00:14:11,440 Speaker 1: the deal. And I think that at least what they 266 00:14:11,520 --> 00:14:15,200 Speaker 1: talk about in this case is that the advances, even 267 00:14:15,240 --> 00:14:18,120 Speaker 1: if it is a fairly small group of authors in 268 00:14:18,120 --> 00:14:21,120 Speaker 1: the scheme of all publishing, that the advances that have 269 00:14:21,200 --> 00:14:24,080 Speaker 1: been extended by the Big Vibe are are huge in 270 00:14:24,120 --> 00:14:26,520 Speaker 1: the last couple of years, you know, in the billions, 271 00:14:27,080 --> 00:14:31,280 Speaker 1: and that supports the writing. So Penguin, Random House and 272 00:14:31,320 --> 00:14:34,720 Speaker 1: Simon and Schuster said that they fight this lawsuit vigorously, 273 00:14:35,120 --> 00:14:37,600 Speaker 1: noting that the government had not alleged that the deal 274 00:14:37,600 --> 00:14:43,040 Speaker 1: would harm competition in book sales. Where does that factor in. Yeah, 275 00:14:43,080 --> 00:14:45,240 Speaker 1: they're pointing to the fact that this is a monopsony 276 00:14:45,320 --> 00:14:47,720 Speaker 1: case and not a monopoly case. They're saying, Look, they're 277 00:14:47,760 --> 00:14:51,800 Speaker 1: not saying that book prices for consumers like you and 278 00:14:51,840 --> 00:14:53,560 Speaker 1: me will go up, that when you go to buy 279 00:14:53,600 --> 00:14:55,600 Speaker 1: a book, the prices are going to be higher. That 280 00:14:55,720 --> 00:14:58,520 Speaker 1: what they're doing isn't going to impact those prices, and 281 00:14:58,600 --> 00:15:01,520 Speaker 1: that's the more traditional anti trust harm. So but I 282 00:15:01,560 --> 00:15:05,320 Speaker 1: think that's really just smoking mirrors because you know, again, 283 00:15:05,360 --> 00:15:07,680 Speaker 1: this is a monopsony case and what they're alleging is 284 00:15:07,720 --> 00:15:09,840 Speaker 1: harm to what's paid to the authors, and we can't 285 00:15:09,880 --> 00:15:12,520 Speaker 1: just ignore that. I mean, that is an antitrust harm, 286 00:15:12,560 --> 00:15:14,800 Speaker 1: even if we're not talking about harm to the people 287 00:15:14,800 --> 00:15:17,040 Speaker 1: who buy the book. As always, it's great to have 288 00:15:17,120 --> 00:15:20,640 Speaker 1: you on the show. Agin that's Bloomberg Intelligence senior litigation 289 00:15:20,680 --> 00:15:25,560 Speaker 1: analyst Jennifer Ree. A case over a center at a 290 00:15:25,640 --> 00:15:28,640 Speaker 1: Texas community college found its way to the highest court 291 00:15:28,680 --> 00:15:31,280 Speaker 1: in the land this week. David Wilson had a rocky 292 00:15:31,360 --> 00:15:34,800 Speaker 1: relationship with other trustees during his tenure on the Houston 293 00:15:34,840 --> 00:15:38,480 Speaker 1: Community College System board. So when the board centered Wilson 294 00:15:38,560 --> 00:15:41,520 Speaker 1: for his constant criticism and took steps to limit his 295 00:15:41,640 --> 00:15:46,000 Speaker 1: legislative privileges, Wilson sued, alleging of violation of his First 296 00:15:46,040 --> 00:15:50,480 Speaker 1: Amendment rights. Jonesice is on both sides of the ideological spectrum, 297 00:15:50,760 --> 00:15:53,520 Speaker 1: seemed ready to side with the college. Here at jonestice 298 00:15:53,640 --> 00:15:56,920 Speaker 1: is Samuel Alito and Sonya. So to Mayor, this is 299 00:15:56,960 --> 00:16:01,160 Speaker 1: a very easy case. One person says something derogatory about 300 00:16:01,200 --> 00:16:04,760 Speaker 1: another person, and then the other person responds by saying 301 00:16:04,800 --> 00:16:09,560 Speaker 1: something derogatory about the first person. That's that's not a violation. 302 00:16:09,560 --> 00:16:14,320 Speaker 1: Nobody's free speech rights are violated. There, You've got an 303 00:16:14,360 --> 00:16:18,840 Speaker 1: easy case on censure. Historically joining me his First Amendment 304 00:16:18,920 --> 00:16:21,640 Speaker 1: law expert Eugene Valla, a professor at u c l 305 00:16:21,680 --> 00:16:25,240 Speaker 1: A Law School, Eugene tell us about Wilson's relationship with 306 00:16:25,280 --> 00:16:28,400 Speaker 1: the board. So David Wilson was an elected member of 307 00:16:28,440 --> 00:16:32,520 Speaker 1: the community College Board and was a critic of other 308 00:16:32,600 --> 00:16:36,160 Speaker 1: board members. He voiced concerns that the trustees were violating 309 00:16:36,280 --> 00:16:39,840 Speaker 1: the boards by laws. He arranged robo calls regarding the 310 00:16:39,880 --> 00:16:43,880 Speaker 1: board's action. He filed the lawsuit against the individual board 311 00:16:43,880 --> 00:16:47,720 Speaker 1: trustees and against the community college system, and he hired 312 00:16:47,720 --> 00:16:50,720 Speaker 1: a private investigator to determine whether one of the trustees 313 00:16:50,800 --> 00:16:53,200 Speaker 1: resided in the district in which he was elected. He 314 00:16:53,280 --> 00:16:56,600 Speaker 1: had a website where he was criticizing fellow trustees and 315 00:16:56,640 --> 00:16:59,480 Speaker 1: the Houston Community College System, so they thought he wasn't 316 00:16:59,520 --> 00:17:03,520 Speaker 1: playing with others, and they censured him. They publicly chastised him, 317 00:17:03,520 --> 00:17:06,320 Speaker 1: and they also suspended a few of his privileges having 318 00:17:06,320 --> 00:17:09,000 Speaker 1: to do the reimbursement for various expenses and such. But 319 00:17:09,040 --> 00:17:12,240 Speaker 1: the key question facing the U. S. Supreme Court is 320 00:17:12,359 --> 00:17:17,840 Speaker 1: whether this censure, this public censure for Wilson's speech, is 321 00:17:18,119 --> 00:17:21,800 Speaker 1: a violation of Wilson's First Amendment right. Explain why the 322 00:17:21,800 --> 00:17:25,120 Speaker 1: Fifth Circuit allowed the case to proceed. So the Fifth 323 00:17:25,160 --> 00:17:30,720 Speaker 1: Circuit concluded that censure is essentially a form of official action, 324 00:17:31,160 --> 00:17:35,040 Speaker 1: that it's a retaliation for constitutionally protected speech, and that 325 00:17:35,280 --> 00:17:39,240 Speaker 1: therefore it is presumptively unconstitutional because it's a violation of 326 00:17:39,280 --> 00:17:41,840 Speaker 1: the First Amendment to retaliate for peach. And if you 327 00:17:41,880 --> 00:17:45,400 Speaker 1: think about it, in other contexts, censers are seen as 328 00:17:45,440 --> 00:17:48,200 Speaker 1: more than just government criticism. They're seen as a kind 329 00:17:48,200 --> 00:17:52,480 Speaker 1: of formal disciplinary action. For example, generally speaking, before a 330 00:17:52,600 --> 00:17:55,640 Speaker 1: lawyer can be formally censured by the bar, not even 331 00:17:55,720 --> 00:17:59,280 Speaker 1: suspended or debarred, but just formally censured. They're generally speaking, 332 00:17:59,400 --> 00:18:01,960 Speaker 1: have to be here rings if he is being censured 333 00:18:02,040 --> 00:18:04,560 Speaker 1: for his constitutionally protected speech, there might well be a 334 00:18:04,640 --> 00:18:09,240 Speaker 1: First Amendment violation. So the circuit concluded that likewise, this 335 00:18:09,280 --> 00:18:13,080 Speaker 1: sort of censure is more than just government speech criticizing 336 00:18:13,200 --> 00:18:16,240 Speaker 1: a member, but rather it is essentially a form of 337 00:18:16,280 --> 00:18:19,399 Speaker 1: discipline reaction of subject of First Amendment constraint. The question 338 00:18:19,440 --> 00:18:22,280 Speaker 1: before the US Supreme Court is whether that's indeed so, 339 00:18:22,800 --> 00:18:26,600 Speaker 1: or whether that it's either just government speech the government 340 00:18:26,640 --> 00:18:32,160 Speaker 1: can engage in under any circumstances, or perhaps whether more specifically, 341 00:18:32,240 --> 00:18:36,120 Speaker 1: there's just a tradition of government bodies being able to 342 00:18:36,160 --> 00:18:40,160 Speaker 1: censure their own members indeed as a discipline reaction, and 343 00:18:40,359 --> 00:18:43,959 Speaker 1: that that makes it quite different from situations where there 344 00:18:43,960 --> 00:18:46,760 Speaker 1: are employees. Let's say, are students or members of the 345 00:18:46,800 --> 00:18:50,680 Speaker 1: bar or doctors being censured by administrative board. What were 346 00:18:50,720 --> 00:18:53,879 Speaker 1: the main concerns that Justice has had, Well, there were 347 00:18:53,880 --> 00:18:57,560 Speaker 1: a couple. One was that they were skeptical that just 348 00:18:57,680 --> 00:19:02,119 Speaker 1: a label censure is really that significant. Here they pointed 349 00:19:02,160 --> 00:19:04,720 Speaker 1: out that, of course the government can speak out in 350 00:19:04,760 --> 00:19:08,639 Speaker 1: all sorts of ways, including about particular people, especially in 351 00:19:08,680 --> 00:19:12,560 Speaker 1: the context of political fights among elected officials. So they 352 00:19:12,600 --> 00:19:16,280 Speaker 1: were skeptical that there is really a sharp divide between 353 00:19:16,359 --> 00:19:19,280 Speaker 1: censure and ordinary government speech again, at least when it 354 00:19:19,359 --> 00:19:22,000 Speaker 1: comes to speech about government officials. And the other concerns 355 00:19:22,000 --> 00:19:23,960 Speaker 1: that they had is just there's a pretty long standing 356 00:19:24,000 --> 00:19:27,360 Speaker 1: tradition of government bodies being able to center their own members. 357 00:19:27,560 --> 00:19:30,399 Speaker 1: Houses of Congress are entitled to and often do, censure 358 00:19:30,440 --> 00:19:32,840 Speaker 1: their own members, and sometimes they do so for the 359 00:19:32,920 --> 00:19:36,439 Speaker 1: members speech, and the justices care a lot about tradition. 360 00:19:36,520 --> 00:19:41,280 Speaker 1: Occasionally they do invalidate longstanding traditions, but they're quite hesitant 361 00:19:41,320 --> 00:19:44,200 Speaker 1: to do so. Did some of the justices express concerns 362 00:19:44,240 --> 00:19:50,480 Speaker 1: about ruling on clashes between politicians and getting into that area, right, 363 00:19:51,000 --> 00:19:54,520 Speaker 1: But I think specifically what they were concerned about was 364 00:19:55,760 --> 00:20:01,680 Speaker 1: interfering with what they understand to be a very specific 365 00:20:01,800 --> 00:20:04,000 Speaker 1: kind of class, which is a class which is a 366 00:20:04,040 --> 00:20:08,640 Speaker 1: war of words. Somebody says something sharply criticizing his colleagues, 367 00:20:08,680 --> 00:20:12,400 Speaker 1: then they say something sharply criticizing him. I think there 368 00:20:12,400 --> 00:20:15,480 Speaker 1: are many of them. Took the view that that's really 369 00:20:15,600 --> 00:20:18,880 Speaker 1: something that's kind of normal in politics. Now. Not all 370 00:20:19,000 --> 00:20:24,080 Speaker 1: clashes among politicians are immune from constitutional scrutiny. So the 371 00:20:24,080 --> 00:20:27,480 Speaker 1: Supreme Court, as for example, held that UM Congress is 372 00:20:27,600 --> 00:20:31,920 Speaker 1: limited in its ability to just exclude members from Congress. 373 00:20:31,960 --> 00:20:34,800 Speaker 1: That's a tangible action, and that needs to be consistent 374 00:20:35,119 --> 00:20:40,200 Speaker 1: with the specific rules for expulsion that the Constitution sets forth. Likewise, 375 00:20:40,240 --> 00:20:42,480 Speaker 1: accord in another case that that you can't just a 376 00:20:42,800 --> 00:20:47,359 Speaker 1: state legislature can just exclude an elected member based on 377 00:20:47,520 --> 00:20:50,560 Speaker 1: his speech. But when it comes to these kinds of 378 00:20:51,080 --> 00:20:55,720 Speaker 1: essentially mutual public criticisms, I think the justices I think 379 00:20:55,800 --> 00:20:58,359 Speaker 1: that that's something that ought to be left to the 380 00:20:58,359 --> 00:21:04,120 Speaker 1: political process. So both liberal Justice Sonia Sotomayoran conservative Justice 381 00:21:04,119 --> 00:21:07,760 Speaker 1: Samuel Alito said this was an easy case on censure. 382 00:21:08,359 --> 00:21:11,240 Speaker 1: Does that tell you where the Court is going? Yeah. 383 00:21:11,359 --> 00:21:14,480 Speaker 1: It founded from the argument that the justices would reverse 384 00:21:14,520 --> 00:21:17,480 Speaker 1: the Fifth Circuit and say that this kind of political 385 00:21:17,520 --> 00:21:21,719 Speaker 1: censure is basically immune from first amoment's scrutiny. The interesting 386 00:21:21,800 --> 00:21:24,439 Speaker 1: question is how broad the opinion will be. So, for example, 387 00:21:24,480 --> 00:21:26,920 Speaker 1: you can imagine an opinion that says, well, any kind 388 00:21:26,960 --> 00:21:29,320 Speaker 1: of center is just government speech, and the government is 389 00:21:29,440 --> 00:21:31,840 Speaker 1: entitled to say what I want. That would suggest that 390 00:21:32,080 --> 00:21:35,399 Speaker 1: the bar could censure a lawyer simply because it doesn't 391 00:21:35,480 --> 00:21:39,080 Speaker 1: like his politics, or that the government as employer, let's say, 392 00:21:39,200 --> 00:21:43,000 Speaker 1: university could formally censure a faculty member for the faculty 393 00:21:43,000 --> 00:21:45,520 Speaker 1: member's research. Let's say that would be quite a broad 394 00:21:45,600 --> 00:21:48,399 Speaker 1: ruling in might unduly interfere with First Amendment rights in 395 00:21:48,440 --> 00:21:52,160 Speaker 1: some situations, because in any context, the law does recognize 396 00:21:52,240 --> 00:21:56,960 Speaker 1: that censure formal reprimand is a form of discipline reaction, 397 00:21:57,080 --> 00:21:59,880 Speaker 1: kind of a form of employment action. That's not quite 398 00:21:59,880 --> 00:22:02,560 Speaker 1: the same, of course as firing or demotion, but that's 399 00:22:02,600 --> 00:22:04,879 Speaker 1: in that same category. Or it could decide in a 400 00:22:05,000 --> 00:22:07,240 Speaker 1: narrowor theory, which is simply that this is a form 401 00:22:07,320 --> 00:22:11,600 Speaker 1: of government speech that has long been recognized as within 402 00:22:11,760 --> 00:22:15,639 Speaker 1: government power, precisely because it's politicians who are fighting at 403 00:22:15,640 --> 00:22:17,879 Speaker 1: out with each other, and all of them have political power, 404 00:22:18,440 --> 00:22:20,159 Speaker 1: and as a result that should be left to the 405 00:22:20,200 --> 00:22:23,920 Speaker 1: political process. Justice Kavanaugh said, do we have to get 406 00:22:24,000 --> 00:22:26,880 Speaker 1: into any of this in this case? Does it seem 407 00:22:26,920 --> 00:22:30,800 Speaker 1: as if they're more likely to issue a narrow ruling? 408 00:22:31,600 --> 00:22:35,080 Speaker 1: That's always difficult to predict. A lot depends on who's 409 00:22:35,080 --> 00:22:38,200 Speaker 1: assigned that to right, the opinion of what position they're 410 00:22:38,200 --> 00:22:40,760 Speaker 1: inclined to take, uh, of course, what they think they 411 00:22:40,760 --> 00:22:44,160 Speaker 1: can convince their colleagues of. But colleagues are often are 412 00:22:44,200 --> 00:22:46,800 Speaker 1: often willing to differ in some measure to the authoring justice. 413 00:22:47,280 --> 00:22:50,680 Speaker 1: Very hard to predict. For more Lark, do you think 414 00:22:50,800 --> 00:22:53,280 Speaker 1: that if they don't rule in Wilson's favor that it 415 00:22:53,359 --> 00:22:57,919 Speaker 1: could have a chilling effect on speech at these you know, 416 00:22:58,040 --> 00:23:01,480 Speaker 1: school boards? Well, again, I think the question is how 417 00:23:01,520 --> 00:23:05,280 Speaker 1: broad the decision is going to be. If they say, hey, 418 00:23:05,560 --> 00:23:09,760 Speaker 1: government speech, government can centure anybody who wants, and then 419 00:23:09,800 --> 00:23:15,440 Speaker 1: as a result, the government does start um formally censuring again, 420 00:23:15,600 --> 00:23:21,600 Speaker 1: let's say university faculty members, students, uh, doctors, lawyers for 421 00:23:21,720 --> 00:23:23,840 Speaker 1: their speech. Then I think a lot of people would 422 00:23:23,840 --> 00:23:29,520 Speaker 1: be chilled because it's the kind of formal government action 423 00:23:29,560 --> 00:23:32,159 Speaker 1: that goes into your file that might be used as 424 00:23:32,160 --> 00:23:36,280 Speaker 1: a basis in the future for increasing punishments in other situations, 425 00:23:37,000 --> 00:23:39,439 Speaker 1: it will be understood by the public as kind of 426 00:23:39,440 --> 00:23:42,600 Speaker 1: a disciplinary measure. So yes, I do think that would 427 00:23:42,640 --> 00:23:44,639 Speaker 1: be quite chilling. On the other hand, if all they 428 00:23:44,680 --> 00:23:49,960 Speaker 1: say is well, government elected officials are entitled to censure 429 00:23:50,359 --> 00:23:53,439 Speaker 1: their colleagues, I don't think it will be particularly chilling 430 00:23:53,480 --> 00:23:57,480 Speaker 1: because these are political actors. You have to have a 431 00:23:57,600 --> 00:24:00,399 Speaker 1: thick skin if you're going to be a politician. Even 432 00:24:00,400 --> 00:24:03,080 Speaker 1: somebody who just is elected elected to a relatively lower 433 00:24:03,200 --> 00:24:07,560 Speaker 1: level office like community college trustees board, presumably who are 434 00:24:07,560 --> 00:24:11,760 Speaker 1: familiar with sharp criticism from voters, from the media, and 435 00:24:11,920 --> 00:24:14,399 Speaker 1: from your colleagues, and presumably you're not going to be 436 00:24:14,480 --> 00:24:17,480 Speaker 1: much deterred by it. Do you think they took this 437 00:24:17,520 --> 00:24:20,639 Speaker 1: case because the Fifth Circuit was way out of line 438 00:24:21,520 --> 00:24:24,840 Speaker 1: or they just like interesting free speech cases. You know, 439 00:24:25,280 --> 00:24:30,520 Speaker 1: it's an interesting question. Houston Community College Systems petition claims 440 00:24:30,560 --> 00:24:33,359 Speaker 1: that there is a disagreement among lower courts as a 441 00:24:33,480 --> 00:24:36,199 Speaker 1: so called circuit split, with a fifth Circuit taking one 442 00:24:36,280 --> 00:24:40,600 Speaker 1: view and other circuits taking another, and that's that's often 443 00:24:40,960 --> 00:24:44,680 Speaker 1: an important ground for for the court to hear a 444 00:24:44,720 --> 00:24:48,080 Speaker 1: case to resolve the disagreement among lower courts first of them. 445 00:24:48,080 --> 00:24:50,080 Speaker 1: It is supposed to be the state throughout the country. 446 00:24:50,400 --> 00:24:53,440 Speaker 1: Thanks Eugene. That's Professor Eugene Volk of u c l 447 00:24:53,480 --> 00:24:57,240 Speaker 1: A Law School. Coming up next, the Supreme Court signals 448 00:24:57,240 --> 00:25:00,399 Speaker 1: it will strike down New York's gun control law. I'm 449 00:25:00,480 --> 00:25:04,080 Speaker 1: June Grosso and you're listening to Bloomberg. Thanks Eugene. That's 450 00:25:04,119 --> 00:25:06,760 Speaker 1: Professor Eugene Vallak of u c l A Law School. 451 00:25:07,080 --> 00:25:09,359 Speaker 1: And that's it for this edition of The Bloomberg Law Show. 452 00:25:09,720 --> 00:25:12,040 Speaker 1: Remember you can always get the latest legal news on 453 00:25:12,080 --> 00:25:16,400 Speaker 1: our Bloomberg Law Podcast. You can find them on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, 454 00:25:16,600 --> 00:25:21,640 Speaker 1: and at www dot Bloomberg dot com, slash podcast Slash Law, 455 00:25:22,040 --> 00:25:24,639 Speaker 1: and remember to tune into The Bloomberg Law Show every 456 00:25:24,680 --> 00:25:28,160 Speaker 1: week night at ten pm Wall Street Time. I'm June 457 00:25:28,160 --> 00:25:30,320 Speaker 1: Grosso and you're listening to Bloomberg.