Speaker 1: Welcome to another episode of Odd Lots. I'm Tracy Alloway,
Speaker 1: executive editor at Bloomberg Markets, and listeners, you're going to
Speaker 1: be sad to hear that we've lost my co host,
Speaker 1: Joe Eisenthal to the global elite. That is, as a
Speaker 1: recording time. Joe is still at the World Economic Forum
Speaker 1: meeting in Davos, mingling with people like Kevin Spacey and
Speaker 1: Joe Biden and whoever else. But I'm happy to say
Speaker 1: that here with me now is Luke Kawa, who is
Speaker 1: Bloomberg Markets reporter and semi famous Canadian. Luke, we're both
Speaker 1: Davos rejects today, right, Yes, Tracy, they tend not to
Speaker 1: let riff raff like us in there. Yes, this is
Speaker 1: very sad. Well, on that note, look, I thought for
Speaker 1: this week's podcast it might be fun to go back
Speaker 1: to five Davos is ago, by which I mean two
Speaker 1: thousand eleven, when an analyst at a consultancy called Oliver
Speaker 1: Wyman published a report while at the meeting in Switzerland,
Speaker 1: and the report was called the Financial Crisis of two
Speaker 1: thousand fifteen and Avoidable History. Oh what I miss? I
Speaker 1: don't think we had a banking crisis in we definitely didn't,
Speaker 1: and we're gonna talk some more about that. But I
Speaker 1: think what the report was really really good at was
Speaker 1: kind of predicting the commodities crash and the idea that
Speaker 1: banks could have losses from bad energy loans, and in fact,
Speaker 1: we just got through a bank earning season where we
Speaker 1: did see a whole bunch of them setting aside more
Speaker 1: money to cover these sorts of things. Can you what
Speaker 1: my appetite a little give me a little sample of that?
Speaker 1: Hop Yeah, I've got the report right here. Um, bear
Speaker 1: in mind, once again, this is five years old. Now
Speaker 1: here's a here's one thing it said. Based on favorable
Speaker 1: demographic trends and continued liberalization, the growth story for emerging
Speaker 1: markets was accepted by almost everyone. However, much of the
Speaker 1: economic activity in these markets was buoyed by cheap money
Speaker 1: being pumped into the system by Western central banks. Commodities
Speaker 1: prices had acted as a sponge to soak up the
Speaker 1: excess money supply, and commodities rich emerging economies were the
Speaker 1: main beneficiaries. So pretty prescient, right, This was written in
Speaker 1: two thousand eleven and not a week ago. Yeah. Yeah,
Speaker 1: So I don't want to give the impression that everything
Speaker 1: in this report has happened. There are some things that
Speaker 1: it does get wrong, but it's looking pretty good. And
Speaker 1: I want to bring in the author of the report,
Speaker 1: who is a partner at Oliver Wyman. His name is
Speaker 1: Barry Wilkinson, and he is the one who wrote this
Speaker 1: very prescient thing some five years ago in another Snowy
Speaker 1: Davos meeting. Hi, Berry, welcome to the show. Just give
Speaker 1: us a bit of background about who you are and
Speaker 1: what you do at Oliver Wyman. But I'm currently the
Speaker 1: co head of Oliver Wyman's Finance and respractice. So I
Speaker 1: guess my specialty is risk managements. I've been working at
Speaker 1: the company twenty two years, so I got I've kind
Speaker 1: of got deep specialties in a number of risk management topics,
Speaker 1: credit risk, market risk. I work mainly with the big
Speaker 1: investment banks at the moment, so I've kind of got
Speaker 1: a specialties around the trading risk management side of things
Speaker 1: as well. All right, So take us back to January
Speaker 1: two thousand eleven and you publish this report to coincide
Speaker 1: with Dabos. What made you decide to do this? Yeah, well,
Speaker 1: I think I guess the main purpose of the report
Speaker 1: was to encourage banks to focus more on stress testing,
Speaker 1: and I think we've you know, we've seen since then, Um,
Speaker 1: you know, a large wave of work around you know
Speaker 1: CECR e B a e c B type stress testing.
Speaker 1: I actually have that background in you know, go back
Speaker 1: to my university days. I used to be sitting in
Speaker 1: the lab building bridges testing stress testing heavy load latteral
Speaker 1: in you know, trying to twist twist the bridge and
Speaker 1: it basically boiled down to you know, could be could
Speaker 1: the bridge with with strand you know a certain level
Speaker 1: of stress. That was kind of what the whole points
Speaker 1: of the exposs was. And was there any special reason
Speaker 1: why you chose to release it at Davos. Yeah, well,
Speaker 1: I mean I guess, um, we we we write these
Speaker 1: annual reports. You may have seen we just released another
Speaker 1: report more account around the fintech one this year. I
Speaker 1: think it was a you know, we're in the post
Speaker 1: crisis environment. The feeling I had at the time was,
Speaker 1: you know, there were still lessons to be learned from
Speaker 1: the from the previous crisis, and you know my sentiment was,
Speaker 1: you know, I being in risponagement for such a long cude.
Speaker 1: I've seen lots of crises come and go, and my
Speaker 1: worry was that we were very quickly going to lose
Speaker 1: the lessons learned from the previous crisis. And I wanted
Speaker 1: to really get out there this idea that we should
Speaker 1: constantly thinking ahead. It's not about thinking about chances of
Speaker 1: being another crisis. Actually, there will be another crisis, you know,
Speaker 1: in the next three or four or five years, and
Speaker 1: therefore we should move to a mode of banning and quantifying,
Speaker 1: quantifying the impact of potential crisis. Can you take us
Speaker 1: back to two thousand eleven and for the uninitiated, just
Speaker 1: you know, explain the basic thrust of your thesis. Yes, So,
Speaker 1: I mean, I guess I was trying to get across
Speaker 1: the idea of um, you know, so moving more towards
Speaker 1: you know, stress testing as a risk management philosophy. And
Speaker 1: then I I used a particular scenario as a way
Speaker 1: of bringing the whole topic for life. So I thought
Speaker 1: that I just you know, focused on the mechanics of
Speaker 1: stress testing, it would have been acquired dry read. So
Speaker 1: I I wrote a virtual history which was basically laying
Speaker 1: out the scenario, taking us from two thousand eleven to
Speaker 1: two thousand and fifteen, where I was talking about, you know,
Speaker 1: the commodity price price bubble getting you further inflated by
Speaker 1: loose monetary policy coming from you know, the western central banks. Um,
Speaker 1: you know, the emerging markets countries, particularly the commodities producers,
Speaker 1: feeling the benefit to that. And then at some point,
Speaker 1: you know, people realizing that the narrative around you know,
Speaker 1: China growing growing forever. Uh, you know, as China slowed,
Speaker 1: we'd see the whole bubble burst. And I guess the
Speaker 1: timing turned out to be quite um timely in terms
Speaker 1: of last year that really started to happen. Well, So
Speaker 1: I want to set the scene a little bit. So
Speaker 1: this is early two thousand eleven or two years out
Speaker 1: of the financial crisis. Markets have gone up, people are
Speaker 1: feeling pretty good. You have all these politicians, executives, bankers
Speaker 1: partying at Davos, and you're sat in a hotel room
Speaker 1: predicting another financial crisis. What was the response. Yeah, I mean,
Speaker 1: I wasn't the most popular person at the time with everyone. Actually,
Speaker 1: I mean I'd say there were two camps. So I
Speaker 1: give you two extreme examples. So, um, In one example,
Speaker 1: I had a risk manager in a bank, you know,
Speaker 1: coming with with her reports and saying, you know, asked
Speaker 1: me to autograph it. So I think amongst the risk
Speaker 1: management community it was a feeling that I was kind
Speaker 1: of standing up for their you know, the need to
Speaker 1: kind of point out potential risks, etcetera. At the other
Speaker 1: end of the spectrum, I hear in Um, you know,
Speaker 1: amongst commodity traders, people were talking about you know that
Speaker 1: Bloody Wilkinson reports. So I think, you know that that
Speaker 1: kind of naturally shows the tension you have in a bank,
Speaker 1: that the risk managers are really focusing more on protecting
Speaker 1: downside risks, worrying about the interests of depositors, of you know,
Speaker 1: death holders, whereas the front office are more aligned with
Speaker 1: the kind of shareholder interested in thinking more about upside potential.
Speaker 1: I think that's a natural tension, which is good. I
Speaker 1: just think the problem is sometimes it gets out of balance.
Speaker 1: It can actually get out of balance in either direction.
Speaker 1: You know, I guess pre crisis it was out of
Speaker 1: balance in the direction of short term upside. Post crisis,
Speaker 1: you might argue sometimes you know, the regulators are pulling
Speaker 1: it too far in the other direction. But you know
Speaker 1: that's that's I think that's a natural tension that needs
Speaker 1: to be explored. Well, let's talk about commodities for a second, because,
Speaker 1: as you've mentioned already, this is kind of um a
Speaker 1: centerpiece of your report. And back in two thousand eleven,
Speaker 1: the commodity space was booming. I mean, I think we
Speaker 1: forget that now, but it was just going sort of
Speaker 1: game busters. Why did you decide to focus on the
Speaker 1: risks in the commodity space. Well, I think that's the
Speaker 1: whole point. You know, whenever you're looking at the next crisis,
Speaker 1: you should be looking at the current bubble. When any
Speaker 1: time asset prices are rising a you know, a hundred
Speaker 1: percent per anum or you know, I think oil prices
Speaker 1: rose something like eight between you know, the low of
Speaker 1: seventeen up two hundred and twenty bowls about or whatever.
Speaker 1: So you know, when you start seeing that kind of
Speaker 1: asset price appreciation, you know there may well be speculation underlying,
Speaker 1: but there's normally an asset financing bubble behind it, and
Speaker 1: you know, anything any kind of financing supporting the assumption
Speaker 1: of ever increasing prices as always you know a recipe
Speaker 1: for for debt problems later. So that was the you know,
Speaker 1: if I was looking at potential issues. Now i'd be
Speaker 1: looking at you know, London property, which is also seeing
Speaker 1: you know, a lots of rapid increases, so predicting the
Speaker 1: next prices. It's really looking at where people are making
Speaker 1: a lot of money. Now really it's obviously a very
Speaker 1: contrarian perspective, but it's there's no I think the idea
Speaker 1: of you know, there'll be no point focusing on the
Speaker 1: subprime market now as you're you know, just because that
Speaker 1: was the previous crisis, you'd always been looking at the
Speaker 1: net the next bubble. So we've we've brought up the
Speaker 1: big thing that you really nailed in this report, that's
Speaker 1: the commodity's downturn and that that whole bust. So but
Speaker 1: give the opportunity to critique yourself a little. What do
Speaker 1: you think you missed or what hasn't really played out
Speaker 1: the way you expected it to? Yeah, so that's that's right.
Speaker 1: So I think we've got to the stage now wherey
Speaker 1: you know, China is sload. There is a talk of
Speaker 1: a crisis centered around you know, the mining companies, commodities
Speaker 1: producing nations. As we said in the poor what what
Speaker 1: what we haven't seen or is a full blewn debt crisis,
Speaker 1: and you know, I don't think we can call it
Speaker 1: a financial crisis, which was the term we used in
Speaker 1: the report. And so we see a you know, debt
Speaker 1: coming into the equation. We've seen equity market corrections, we've
Speaker 1: seen commodity prices corrections, that we haven't seen massive debt
Speaker 1: restructuring or or bad loans. So so from my from
Speaker 1: my view, I think it's only a matter of time
Speaker 1: before that happens. You know, I think it's already coming
Speaker 1: to light that there was a their amount of financing
Speaker 1: you know, behind that. And the next next step for me,
Speaker 1: I think is is to take it from macro level
Speaker 1: of Brazil, Russia and you know, the commodities producing countries
Speaker 1: having problems to the micro level of well, which countries,
Speaker 1: companies and you know are most vulnerable and you know
Speaker 1: which banks are ultimately holding which banks are exposed to
Speaker 1: those threats, and you know, if there is any toxic
Speaker 1: lending out there, who's holding it and are they well capitalized?
Speaker 1: And I think that's um that really calls to, you know,
Speaker 1: coming back full circle to as recommending more stress testing.
Speaker 1: I think the US and European systems have now adopted
Speaker 1: stress testing as a kind of institutional thing that they
Speaker 1: were in every year. I think the emerging markets regulators,
Speaker 1: you know, having had a less severe crisis this time around,
Speaker 1: haven't really pushed through the same measures. So I think,
Speaker 1: you know, I would be calling now for you know,
Speaker 1: the emerging markets regulators to start taking a look at
Speaker 1: their individual banking systems and you know, and looking at
Speaker 1: individual institutions and running running stress tests along the lines
Speaker 1: of further deterioration. Well, just on the banking point. One
Speaker 1: other thing you kind of point out in the report
Speaker 1: is this idea that a lot of risk has actually
Speaker 1: been squeezed from the banking system into what's known as
Speaker 1: the shadow banking system. So non deposit taking institutions, I
Speaker 1: guess might be the standard definition, although some people would
Speaker 1: disagree with me. Can you talk a little bit about
Speaker 1: that thesis. Yeah, so I think that, you know, I
Speaker 1: think broadly that hypothesis is played out. I think it's
Speaker 1: quite difficult to buy back test, you know, some of
Speaker 1: the cooking of the specific things we said, because it's
Speaker 1: by its very nature, it's kind of lurking in the shadows,
Speaker 1: and as we saw with the previous round, of shadow banking,
Speaker 1: all these kind of siev light vehicles that were hidden
Speaker 1: off balance sheet. Not a lot of people know about
Speaker 1: these things until the crisis hits and then suddenly, you know,
Speaker 1: bank has to reconsolidate this balance shee's activity. So there
Speaker 1: may well be a new phase of that where it
Speaker 1: could be the Chinese banks this time having to reconsolidate
Speaker 1: you know, all of these trusts back onto their balance
Speaker 1: sheet to you know, to save face or whatever. But um, yeah,
Speaker 1: it's very difficult to say where where all that stuff
Speaker 1: is currently lurking, but it's pretty clear, you know, the
Speaker 1: banks have definitely been feeling the squeeze. So you know,
Speaker 1: a lot of the big banks have gone from having
Speaker 1: a you know, a two or three trillion dollar balance
Speaker 1: sheet down to now you know, one and a half
Speaker 1: trillion dollars. And at the same time, you know that
Speaker 1: if you look at it's it's difficult to put numbers
Speaker 1: around it. But any any report you look at that
Speaker 1: you tend to see, you know, kind of growing shadow
Speaker 1: banking liabilities at the same time, So I suspect there's
Speaker 1: there's quite a lot out there. So it's five years
Speaker 1: after you publish this report, have you been back to
Speaker 1: DAVERS since then? I haven't. We go there every year.
Speaker 1: It's usually the the author of of that year's report
Speaker 1: who who goes in attends alongside you know, a couple
Speaker 1: of our more senior guys. So, um, it's uh, I
Speaker 1: haven't been back. I mean I have been thinking of
Speaker 1: doing a kind of you know, a victory lab and
Speaker 1: you report that you know I could do, but just
Speaker 1: more of a you know, you know what maybe next
Speaker 1: year is that some more more forward looking views on
Speaker 1: on risk management and finance and all that. So what
Speaker 1: are you looking at right now? What's next on the horizon? Yeah? Well, actually,
Speaker 1: as I said, I think, you know, looking back um
Speaker 1: on prior on the previous crisis is often not the
Speaker 1: way to think. So if I'm it was looking at
Speaker 1: the financial service industry. Now, what we've been focusing on
Speaker 1: this in this new report is really that disruptive forces.
Speaker 1: So you know, rather than it being a crisis that
Speaker 1: hits the banking system next time, maybe it's the you know,
Speaker 1: somebody coming in and completely disrupting the cost you know,
Speaker 1: the cost structures of the banking system, and that could
Speaker 1: be equally you know, equally deadly for some of the
Speaker 1: banks if they're if they're not able to adapt that.
Speaker 1: I think some of the things you mentioned in this
Speaker 1: year's report is more around, um, you know, it's actually
Speaker 1: the regulators are are actually helping the banks that create
Speaker 1: you know, barriers at barriers of entry for for new players.
Speaker 1: And if those barriers to entry were not there, you know,
Speaker 1: finances the ultimate commodity in many ways, so you know,
Speaker 1: it would all ultimately just be about who's got the
Speaker 1: best technology and the best cost cost structure to deliver
Speaker 1: that commodity. Um. But at the moment, having access to
Speaker 1: the central bank, having access to deposit insurance just gives
Speaker 1: you know, banks a massive, a massive advantage that they
Speaker 1: will I think we'll preserve their positions for quite a while. Um.
Speaker 1: But I think at some point, you know, we've seen
Speaker 1: the payments part of things getting picked off. I think
Speaker 1: at some point different parts of the value chain will
Speaker 1: start to get eroded by these new players. I think
Speaker 1: that's a big threat for the banks. Yeah. On that note,
Speaker 1: I mean I have to say we have seen at
Speaker 1: least one disruptive of fintech player, Lending Club, ask for
Speaker 1: access to central bank facilities, which would it's pretty amazing
Speaker 1: and would potentially put them on a more even footing
Speaker 1: with banking competitors exactly. W I mean one way, one
Speaker 1: direction you can take it is in the direction of
Speaker 1: I think the most difficult bit to disrupt is that
Speaker 1: there is a maturity transformation side of things. So in
Speaker 1: order to play the maturity transformation trick, when you get
Speaker 1: the run on your liabilities because you're playing the maturity
Speaker 1: transformation trick, you know, if you can sayn into the
Speaker 1: Central Bank access you you obviously can then weather a
Speaker 1: few a few cycles and if you don't have access,
Speaker 1: you can't. So we've been thinking about whether you could,
Speaker 1: you know, the central Bank could set up some kind
Speaker 1: of utility which kind of centralizes the maturity transformation aspect
Speaker 1: of things and then allows people to tap into long
Speaker 1: term sources of funding and then lending then just becomes
Speaker 1: a commodity. And similarly, you know, investing in short term
Speaker 1: liabilities as another commodity. So you'd have kind of the
Speaker 1: money market funds type part of the value chain. You'd
Speaker 1: have the pure lender, and then you'd have this money
Speaker 1: money market money transformation utility sitting in the center. So
Speaker 1: charity transformation comes back on the central bank anyway, you know,
Speaker 1: during the crisis that maybe they should be managing it in
Speaker 1: in the first place. So it's just a certainly it's
Speaker 1: kind of a you know, utopian source of this poem,
Speaker 1: But I think that's where you need to get to
Speaker 1: if you really want to open up competition across you know,
Speaker 1: the you know, the the core products of banking. And
Speaker 1: to go back to two thousand eleven, one of the
Speaker 1: lines from your report that really stood out to me
Speaker 1: was the market was once again rewarding the riskiest strategies
Speaker 1: in reference to to investors treatment of banks and the
Speaker 1: around the two thousand and eleven period. And I want
Speaker 1: to know, the market seem doesn't seem to be rewarding
Speaker 1: much right now. What are the risky strategies out there
Speaker 1: right now that you think the market's rewarding that it
Speaker 1: might not be. Well, it's it's a lot more complicated now.
Speaker 1: And I think in the days where you know, you
Speaker 1: could basically create ahold of value just by increasing leverage
Speaker 1: in your bank, um, you know, increasing leverages multiplies your
Speaker 1: return on assets by your leverage and creates return on equity.
Speaker 1: And then it was it was an actually and also
Speaker 1: that leverage also gives makes it look like you're growing
Speaker 1: as well, so you get all these massive p multiple.
Speaker 1: In today's context, you have you know, regulators looking at
Speaker 1: you thinking that you're two leverage and then suddenly forcing
Speaker 1: you to raise capital, which it's never great for share prices.
Speaker 1: So it's it's a lot more complicated. Um. I guess
Speaker 1: the you know, the most successful strategies, which I wouldn't
Speaker 1: necessarily condone, would be the ones where you can basically
Speaker 1: take on more risk and more leverage and then you know,
Speaker 1: but you know, outside of the purview of the regulators
Speaker 1: who are coming in and trying to climb down on it.
Speaker 1: So you know, I guess the risky strategies that might
Speaker 1: be successful in the short term might be the ones
Speaker 1: that are linked to the kind of the shadow banking
Speaker 1: activities where you can actually take you know, take risk
Speaker 1: off outside the radar of the regulators. But you know
Speaker 1: again that that's a very short term as approach which
Speaker 1: will unravel at some point. So yeah, I mean, I
Speaker 1: think I think in general banks it's all about it's
Speaker 1: all about costs at this point. I think the risk
Speaker 1: is generally a commodity. You know, you generally get paid
Speaker 1: for the risks risk. The more risk you take, more
Speaker 1: return you gets pretty old cliche, but the I think
Speaker 1: banks really need to differentiate themselves on costs at this point.
Speaker 1: I think the trying to get back to the old
Speaker 1: days of fifty two one leverage just isn't going to happen.
Speaker 1: So that's not going to be the way of boosting
Speaker 1: return and extually going forward. It's got to be, you know,
Speaker 1: a leaner operation, alright, barrier. Last question, are you um
Speaker 1: when you go back and look at this report, which
Speaker 1: you know, does seem fairly prescient five years later, are
Speaker 1: you proud of what you've done? Are you happy? Or
Speaker 1: do you feel frustration that some of these eventualities are
Speaker 1: actually playing out in the market even though there were
Speaker 1: warnings about them. How do you actually feel about it now? Yeah? Well,
Speaker 1: our I think the last line and the report was
Speaker 1: that the you know this, the crisis are not avoidable.
Speaker 1: We call it an avoidable his you, But the reality
Speaker 1: is crises are not avoidable. You basically will get you
Speaker 1: a business cycle continuing forever, and we'll we'll see financial
Speaker 1: crisis every five or ten years. I think what we
Speaker 1: what I would be proud of would be if I
Speaker 1: had helped any any banks avoid being the victims of
Speaker 1: the of the crisis, or whether we've helped you know,
Speaker 1: regulators better prepare for the crisis this time around, and
Speaker 1: you know, we will see the result of that, you know,
Speaker 1: this time as effectively, what when I'm seeing is a
Speaker 1: real stress test where there's an emerging markets crisis and
Speaker 1: we're seeing we will see you know, who withstands that well.
Speaker 1: And I guess the regulators that have helped their banks
Speaker 1: prepare well and recapitalized, we'll see that those banks whether
Speaker 1: the storm quite well are the ones that haven't you
Speaker 1: may see some problems. So you know, as I was mentioned,
Speaker 1: I think, you know, it wasn't popular with the commodities traders,
Speaker 1: and I think a lot of banks withdrew quite heavily
Speaker 1: out of commodities over the last few years prior to
Speaker 1: the product quality crisis. So hopefully there have been some
Speaker 1: aspect of those helping you know, banks um avoid some
Speaker 1: of the losses that that that would wed otherwise be
Speaker 1: happening now. So yeah, I guess I'm happy with with
Speaker 1: the results. But you know, as I said, we haven't
Speaker 1: we haven't seen this play out yet, so it'll be
Speaker 1: interesting to see who the winners and losers are in
Speaker 1: the actual, the actual crisis that happens now. All right,
Speaker 1: on that cheerful note, Barry, thank you so much, Thanks guys,
Speaker 1: Just all right, Luke, Well, I have a feeling that
Speaker 1: Joe is going to be mad at us for going
Speaker 1: really wonky in that discussion. But I enjoyed it. I
Speaker 1: found it really interesting. What do you think I mean,
Speaker 1: I certainly did to. One thing that would have been
Speaker 1: nice to get to was Barry was really worried about
Speaker 1: the treatment of of sovereigns. And you know, there's a
Speaker 1: certain point to be made that financial crazies, and especially
Speaker 1: the last one, it's it's a product of banks having
Speaker 1: a lot of assets on their balance sheet that they
Speaker 1: think are safe but aren't so. And he predicted that
Speaker 1: kind of the the h q l A, that those
Speaker 1: kind of moves would eventually end up in the same thing,
Speaker 1: with highly indebted Western nations being forced to restructure. And
Speaker 1: right now the markets saying that that's just not the case.
Speaker 1: Market is very willing to lend forever to you know,
Speaker 1: anyone with a printing press, and even European nations that
Speaker 1: don't have them right. So instead of seeing a sovereign
Speaker 1: debt crisis, if anything, we've seen almost the opposite, especially
Speaker 1: as markets have sold off recently. UM. I guess the
Speaker 1: other thing that I was thinking, you know, I don't
Speaker 1: want listeners to come away thinking that consultancies are always geniuses. Um.
Speaker 1: We've seen Oliver Wyman make poorer recommendations before, for instance,
Speaker 1: telling ubs to go all in fixed income in two
Speaker 1: thousand seven. That wasn't such a great recommendation. But I
Speaker 1: think when people talk about this kind of stuff five
Speaker 1: years before it happens, it does deserve some attention. So
Speaker 1: I liked hearing about the reaction to the report in Davos,
Speaker 1: how people felt about it at the time. The idea
Speaker 1: that Commodo at these trainers were upset is kind of amusing. Now.
Speaker 1: I didn't like to hear the idea that he thinks,
Speaker 1: you know, it's just a matter of time before this
Speaker 1: plays out. That doesn't exactly paint a great picture of
Speaker 1: what we're in for and what we'll be writing about. No,
Speaker 1: that's very true. Well, I think we should wrap it up.
Speaker 1: Thank you Luke for joining me today. My pleasure, Hope
Speaker 1: I followed the shoes. This is another episode of odd Lots.
Speaker 1: Tune in next week for another one, potentially less scheeky
Speaker 1: than this one. Joe should be back by then. I'm
Speaker 1: Tracy Alloway, Executive editor of Bloomberg Markets. You can catch
Speaker 1: me on Twitter at Tracy Alloway, and I'm Lukewa, reporter
Speaker 1: at Bloomberg Markets. You can also catch me on Twitter
Speaker 1: at l j Kewa. Joe and I are very proud
Speaker 1: of our new podcast add Thoughts, but we are also
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