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Speaker 1: Welcome to another episode of Odd Lots. I'm Tracy Alloway,

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Speaker 1: executive editor at Bloomberg Markets, and listeners, you're going to

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Speaker 1: be sad to hear that we've lost my co host,

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Speaker 1: Joe Eisenthal to the global elite. That is, as a

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Speaker 1: recording time. Joe is still at the World Economic Forum

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Speaker 1: meeting in Davos, mingling with people like Kevin Spacey and

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Speaker 1: Joe Biden and whoever else. But I'm happy to say

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Speaker 1: that here with me now is Luke Kawa, who is

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Speaker 1: Bloomberg Markets reporter and semi famous Canadian. Luke, we're both

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Speaker 1: Davos rejects today, right, Yes, Tracy, they tend not to

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Speaker 1: let riff raff like us in there. Yes, this is

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Speaker 1: very sad. Well, on that note, look, I thought for

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Speaker 1: this week's podcast it might be fun to go back

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Speaker 1: to five Davos is ago, by which I mean two

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Speaker 1: thousand eleven, when an analyst at a consultancy called Oliver

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Speaker 1: Wyman published a report while at the meeting in Switzerland,

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Speaker 1: and the report was called the Financial Crisis of two

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Speaker 1: thousand fifteen and Avoidable History. Oh what I miss? I

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Speaker 1: don't think we had a banking crisis in we definitely didn't,

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Speaker 1: and we're gonna talk some more about that. But I

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Speaker 1: think what the report was really really good at was

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Speaker 1: kind of predicting the commodities crash and the idea that

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Speaker 1: banks could have losses from bad energy loans, and in fact,

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Speaker 1: we just got through a bank earning season where we

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Speaker 1: did see a whole bunch of them setting aside more

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Speaker 1: money to cover these sorts of things. Can you what

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Speaker 1: my appetite a little give me a little sample of that?

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Speaker 1: Hop Yeah, I've got the report right here. Um, bear

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Speaker 1: in mind, once again, this is five years old. Now

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Speaker 1: here's a here's one thing it said. Based on favorable

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Speaker 1: demographic trends and continued liberalization, the growth story for emerging

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Speaker 1: markets was accepted by almost everyone. However, much of the

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Speaker 1: economic activity in these markets was buoyed by cheap money

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Speaker 1: being pumped into the system by Western central banks. Commodities

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Speaker 1: prices had acted as a sponge to soak up the

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Speaker 1: excess money supply, and commodities rich emerging economies were the

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Speaker 1: main beneficiaries. So pretty prescient, right, This was written in

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Speaker 1: two thousand eleven and not a week ago. Yeah. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: So I don't want to give the impression that everything

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Speaker 1: in this report has happened. There are some things that

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Speaker 1: it does get wrong, but it's looking pretty good. And

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Speaker 1: I want to bring in the author of the report,

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Speaker 1: who is a partner at Oliver Wyman. His name is

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Speaker 1: Barry Wilkinson, and he is the one who wrote this

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Speaker 1: very prescient thing some five years ago in another Snowy

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Speaker 1: Davos meeting. Hi, Berry, welcome to the show. Just give

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Speaker 1: us a bit of background about who you are and

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Speaker 1: what you do at Oliver Wyman. But I'm currently the

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Speaker 1: co head of Oliver Wyman's Finance and respractice. So I

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Speaker 1: guess my specialty is risk managements. I've been working at

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Speaker 1: the company twenty two years, so I got I've kind

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Speaker 1: of got deep specialties in a number of risk management topics,

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Speaker 1: credit risk, market risk. I work mainly with the big

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Speaker 1: investment banks at the moment, so I've kind of got

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Speaker 1: a specialties around the trading risk management side of things

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Speaker 1: as well. All right, So take us back to January

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Speaker 1: two thousand eleven and you publish this report to coincide

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Speaker 1: with Dabos. What made you decide to do this? Yeah, well,

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Speaker 1: I think I guess the main purpose of the report

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Speaker 1: was to encourage banks to focus more on stress testing,

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Speaker 1: and I think we've you know, we've seen since then, Um,

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Speaker 1: you know, a large wave of work around you know

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Speaker 1: CECR e B a e c B type stress testing.

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Speaker 1: I actually have that background in you know, go back

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Speaker 1: to my university days. I used to be sitting in

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Speaker 1: the lab building bridges testing stress testing heavy load latteral

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Speaker 1: in you know, trying to twist twist the bridge and

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Speaker 1: it basically boiled down to you know, could be could

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Speaker 1: the bridge with with strand you know a certain level

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Speaker 1: of stress. That was kind of what the whole points

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Speaker 1: of the exposs was. And was there any special reason

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Speaker 1: why you chose to release it at Davos. Yeah, well,

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Speaker 1: I mean I guess, um, we we we write these

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Speaker 1: annual reports. You may have seen we just released another

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Speaker 1: report more account around the fintech one this year. I

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Speaker 1: think it was a you know, we're in the post

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Speaker 1: crisis environment. The feeling I had at the time was,

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Speaker 1: you know, there were still lessons to be learned from

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Speaker 1: the from the previous crisis, and you know my sentiment was,

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Speaker 1: you know, I being in risponagement for such a long cude.

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Speaker 1: I've seen lots of crises come and go, and my

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Speaker 1: worry was that we were very quickly going to lose

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Speaker 1: the lessons learned from the previous crisis. And I wanted

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Speaker 1: to really get out there this idea that we should

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Speaker 1: constantly thinking ahead. It's not about thinking about chances of

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Speaker 1: being another crisis. Actually, there will be another crisis, you know,

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Speaker 1: in the next three or four or five years, and

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Speaker 1: therefore we should move to a mode of banning and quantifying,

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Speaker 1: quantifying the impact of potential crisis. Can you take us

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Speaker 1: back to two thousand eleven and for the uninitiated, just

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Speaker 1: you know, explain the basic thrust of your thesis. Yes, So,

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Speaker 1: I mean, I guess I was trying to get across

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Speaker 1: the idea of um, you know, so moving more towards

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Speaker 1: you know, stress testing as a risk management philosophy. And

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Speaker 1: then I I used a particular scenario as a way

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Speaker 1: of bringing the whole topic for life. So I thought

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Speaker 1: that I just you know, focused on the mechanics of

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Speaker 1: stress testing, it would have been acquired dry read. So

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Speaker 1: I I wrote a virtual history which was basically laying

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Speaker 1: out the scenario, taking us from two thousand eleven to

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Speaker 1: two thousand and fifteen, where I was talking about, you know,

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Speaker 1: the commodity price price bubble getting you further inflated by

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Speaker 1: loose monetary policy coming from you know, the western central banks. Um,

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Speaker 1: you know, the emerging markets countries, particularly the commodities producers,

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Speaker 1: feeling the benefit to that. And then at some point,

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Speaker 1: you know, people realizing that the narrative around you know,

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Speaker 1: China growing growing forever. Uh, you know, as China slowed,

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Speaker 1: we'd see the whole bubble burst. And I guess the

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Speaker 1: timing turned out to be quite um timely in terms

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Speaker 1: of last year that really started to happen. Well, So

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Speaker 1: I want to set the scene a little bit. So

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Speaker 1: this is early two thousand eleven or two years out

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Speaker 1: of the financial crisis. Markets have gone up, people are

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Speaker 1: feeling pretty good. You have all these politicians, executives, bankers

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Speaker 1: partying at Davos, and you're sat in a hotel room

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Speaker 1: predicting another financial crisis. What was the response. Yeah, I mean,

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Speaker 1: I wasn't the most popular person at the time with everyone. Actually,

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Speaker 1: I mean I'd say there were two camps. So I

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Speaker 1: give you two extreme examples. So, um, In one example,

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Speaker 1: I had a risk manager in a bank, you know,

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Speaker 1: coming with with her reports and saying, you know, asked

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Speaker 1: me to autograph it. So I think amongst the risk

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Speaker 1: management community it was a feeling that I was kind

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Speaker 1: of standing up for their you know, the need to

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Speaker 1: kind of point out potential risks, etcetera. At the other

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Speaker 1: end of the spectrum, I hear in Um, you know,

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Speaker 1: amongst commodity traders, people were talking about you know that

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Speaker 1: Bloody Wilkinson reports. So I think, you know that that

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Speaker 1: kind of naturally shows the tension you have in a bank,

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Speaker 1: that the risk managers are really focusing more on protecting

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Speaker 1: downside risks, worrying about the interests of depositors, of you know,

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Speaker 1: death holders, whereas the front office are more aligned with

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Speaker 1: the kind of shareholder interested in thinking more about upside potential.

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Speaker 1: I think that's a natural tension, which is good. I

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Speaker 1: just think the problem is sometimes it gets out of balance.

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Speaker 1: It can actually get out of balance in either direction.

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Speaker 1: You know, I guess pre crisis it was out of

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Speaker 1: balance in the direction of short term upside. Post crisis,

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Speaker 1: you might argue sometimes you know, the regulators are pulling

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Speaker 1: it too far in the other direction. But you know

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Speaker 1: that's that's I think that's a natural tension that needs

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Speaker 1: to be explored. Well, let's talk about commodities for a second, because,

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Speaker 1: as you've mentioned already, this is kind of um a

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Speaker 1: centerpiece of your report. And back in two thousand eleven,

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Speaker 1: the commodity space was booming. I mean, I think we

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Speaker 1: forget that now, but it was just going sort of

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Speaker 1: game busters. Why did you decide to focus on the

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Speaker 1: risks in the commodity space. Well, I think that's the

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Speaker 1: whole point. You know, whenever you're looking at the next crisis,

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Speaker 1: you should be looking at the current bubble. When any

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Speaker 1: time asset prices are rising a you know, a hundred

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Speaker 1: percent per anum or you know, I think oil prices

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Speaker 1: rose something like eight between you know, the low of

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Speaker 1: seventeen up two hundred and twenty bowls about or whatever.

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Speaker 1: So you know, when you start seeing that kind of

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Speaker 1: asset price appreciation, you know there may well be speculation underlying,

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Speaker 1: but there's normally an asset financing bubble behind it, and

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Speaker 1: you know, anything any kind of financing supporting the assumption

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Speaker 1: of ever increasing prices as always you know a recipe

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Speaker 1: for for debt problems later. So that was the you know,

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Speaker 1: if I was looking at potential issues. Now i'd be

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Speaker 1: looking at you know, London property, which is also seeing

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Speaker 1: you know, a lots of rapid increases, so predicting the

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Speaker 1: next prices. It's really looking at where people are making

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Speaker 1: a lot of money. Now really it's obviously a very

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Speaker 1: contrarian perspective, but it's there's no I think the idea

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Speaker 1: of you know, there'll be no point focusing on the

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Speaker 1: subprime market now as you're you know, just because that

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Speaker 1: was the previous crisis, you'd always been looking at the

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Speaker 1: net the next bubble. So we've we've brought up the

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Speaker 1: big thing that you really nailed in this report, that's

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Speaker 1: the commodity's downturn and that that whole bust. So but

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Speaker 1: give the opportunity to critique yourself a little. What do

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Speaker 1: you think you missed or what hasn't really played out

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Speaker 1: the way you expected it to? Yeah, so that's that's right.

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Speaker 1: So I think we've got to the stage now wherey

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Speaker 1: you know, China is sload. There is a talk of

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Speaker 1: a crisis centered around you know, the mining companies, commodities

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Speaker 1: producing nations. As we said in the poor what what

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Speaker 1: what we haven't seen or is a full blewn debt crisis,

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Speaker 1: and you know, I don't think we can call it

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Speaker 1: a financial crisis, which was the term we used in

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Speaker 1: the report. And so we see a you know, debt

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Speaker 1: coming into the equation. We've seen equity market corrections, we've

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Speaker 1: seen commodity prices corrections, that we haven't seen massive debt

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Speaker 1: restructuring or or bad loans. So so from my from

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Speaker 1: my view, I think it's only a matter of time

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Speaker 1: before that happens. You know, I think it's already coming

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Speaker 1: to light that there was a their amount of financing

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Speaker 1: you know, behind that. And the next next step for me,

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Speaker 1: I think is is to take it from macro level

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Speaker 1: of Brazil, Russia and you know, the commodities producing countries

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Speaker 1: having problems to the micro level of well, which countries,

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Speaker 1: companies and you know are most vulnerable and you know

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Speaker 1: which banks are ultimately holding which banks are exposed to

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Speaker 1: those threats, and you know, if there is any toxic

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Speaker 1: lending out there, who's holding it and are they well capitalized?

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Speaker 1: And I think that's um that really calls to, you know,

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Speaker 1: coming back full circle to as recommending more stress testing.

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Speaker 1: I think the US and European systems have now adopted

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Speaker 1: stress testing as a kind of institutional thing that they

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Speaker 1: were in every year. I think the emerging markets regulators,

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Speaker 1: you know, having had a less severe crisis this time around,

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Speaker 1: haven't really pushed through the same measures. So I think,

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Speaker 1: you know, I would be calling now for you know,

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Speaker 1: the emerging markets regulators to start taking a look at

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Speaker 1: their individual banking systems and you know, and looking at

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Speaker 1: individual institutions and running running stress tests along the lines

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Speaker 1: of further deterioration. Well, just on the banking point. One

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Speaker 1: other thing you kind of point out in the report

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Speaker 1: is this idea that a lot of risk has actually

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Speaker 1: been squeezed from the banking system into what's known as

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Speaker 1: the shadow banking system. So non deposit taking institutions, I

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Speaker 1: guess might be the standard definition, although some people would

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Speaker 1: disagree with me. Can you talk a little bit about

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Speaker 1: that thesis. Yeah, so I think that, you know, I

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Speaker 1: think broadly that hypothesis is played out. I think it's

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Speaker 1: quite difficult to buy back test, you know, some of

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Speaker 1: the cooking of the specific things we said, because it's

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Speaker 1: by its very nature, it's kind of lurking in the shadows,

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Speaker 1: and as we saw with the previous round, of shadow banking,

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Speaker 1: all these kind of siev light vehicles that were hidden

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Speaker 1: off balance sheet. Not a lot of people know about

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Speaker 1: these things until the crisis hits and then suddenly, you know,

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Speaker 1: bank has to reconsolidate this balance shee's activity. So there

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Speaker 1: may well be a new phase of that where it

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Speaker 1: could be the Chinese banks this time having to reconsolidate

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Speaker 1: you know, all of these trusts back onto their balance

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Speaker 1: sheet to you know, to save face or whatever. But um, yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's very difficult to say where where all that stuff

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Speaker 1: is currently lurking, but it's pretty clear, you know, the

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Speaker 1: banks have definitely been feeling the squeeze. So you know,

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Speaker 1: a lot of the big banks have gone from having

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Speaker 1: a you know, a two or three trillion dollar balance

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Speaker 1: sheet down to now you know, one and a half

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Speaker 1: trillion dollars. And at the same time, you know that

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Speaker 1: if you look at it's it's difficult to put numbers

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Speaker 1: around it. But any any report you look at that

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Speaker 1: you tend to see, you know, kind of growing shadow

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Speaker 1: banking liabilities at the same time, So I suspect there's

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Speaker 1: there's quite a lot out there. So it's five years

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Speaker 1: after you publish this report, have you been back to

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Speaker 1: DAVERS since then? I haven't. We go there every year.

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Speaker 1: It's usually the the author of of that year's report

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Speaker 1: who who goes in attends alongside you know, a couple

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Speaker 1: of our more senior guys. So, um, it's uh, I

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Speaker 1: haven't been back. I mean I have been thinking of

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Speaker 1: doing a kind of you know, a victory lab and

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Speaker 1: you report that you know I could do, but just

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Speaker 1: more of a you know, you know what maybe next

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Speaker 1: year is that some more more forward looking views on

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Speaker 1: on risk management and finance and all that. So what

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Speaker 1: are you looking at right now? What's next on the horizon? Yeah? Well, actually,

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Speaker 1: as I said, I think, you know, looking back um

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Speaker 1: on prior on the previous crisis is often not the

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Speaker 1: way to think. So if I'm it was looking at

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Speaker 1: the financial service industry. Now, what we've been focusing on

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Speaker 1: this in this new report is really that disruptive forces.

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Speaker 1: So you know, rather than it being a crisis that

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Speaker 1: hits the banking system next time, maybe it's the you know,

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Speaker 1: somebody coming in and completely disrupting the cost you know,

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Speaker 1: the cost structures of the banking system, and that could

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Speaker 1: be equally you know, equally deadly for some of the

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Speaker 1: banks if they're if they're not able to adapt that.

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Speaker 1: I think some of the things you mentioned in this

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Speaker 1: year's report is more around, um, you know, it's actually

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Speaker 1: the regulators are are actually helping the banks that create

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Speaker 1: you know, barriers at barriers of entry for for new players.

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Speaker 1: And if those barriers to entry were not there, you know,

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Speaker 1: finances the ultimate commodity in many ways, so you know,

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Speaker 1: it would all ultimately just be about who's got the

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Speaker 1: best technology and the best cost cost structure to deliver

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Speaker 1: that commodity. Um. But at the moment, having access to

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Speaker 1: the central bank, having access to deposit insurance just gives

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Speaker 1: you know, banks a massive, a massive advantage that they

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Speaker 1: will I think we'll preserve their positions for quite a while. Um.

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Speaker 1: But I think at some point, you know, we've seen

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Speaker 1: the payments part of things getting picked off. I think

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Speaker 1: at some point different parts of the value chain will

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Speaker 1: start to get eroded by these new players. I think

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Speaker 1: that's a big threat for the banks. Yeah. On that note,

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Speaker 1: I mean I have to say we have seen at

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Speaker 1: least one disruptive of fintech player, Lending Club, ask for

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Speaker 1: access to central bank facilities, which would it's pretty amazing

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Speaker 1: and would potentially put them on a more even footing

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Speaker 1: with banking competitors exactly. W I mean one way, one

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Speaker 1: direction you can take it is in the direction of

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Speaker 1: I think the most difficult bit to disrupt is that

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Speaker 1: there is a maturity transformation side of things. So in

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Speaker 1: order to play the maturity transformation trick, when you get

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Speaker 1: the run on your liabilities because you're playing the maturity

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Speaker 1: transformation trick, you know, if you can sayn into the

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Speaker 1: Central Bank access you you obviously can then weather a

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Speaker 1: few a few cycles and if you don't have access,

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Speaker 1: you can't. So we've been thinking about whether you could,

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Speaker 1: you know, the central Bank could set up some kind

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Speaker 1: of utility which kind of centralizes the maturity transformation aspect

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Speaker 1: of things and then allows people to tap into long

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Speaker 1: term sources of funding and then lending then just becomes

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Speaker 1: a commodity. And similarly, you know, investing in short term

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Speaker 1: liabilities as another commodity. So you'd have kind of the

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Speaker 1: money market funds type part of the value chain. You'd

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Speaker 1: have the pure lender, and then you'd have this money

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Speaker 1: money market money transformation utility sitting in the center. So

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Speaker 1: charity transformation comes back on the central bank anyway, you know,

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Speaker 1: during the crisis that maybe they should be managing it in

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Speaker 1: in the first place. So it's just a certainly it's

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Speaker 1: kind of a you know, utopian source of this poem,

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Speaker 1: But I think that's where you need to get to

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Speaker 1: if you really want to open up competition across you know,

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Speaker 1: the you know, the the core products of banking. And

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Speaker 1: to go back to two thousand eleven, one of the

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Speaker 1: lines from your report that really stood out to me

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Speaker 1: was the market was once again rewarding the riskiest strategies

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Speaker 1: in reference to to investors treatment of banks and the

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Speaker 1: around the two thousand and eleven period. And I want

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Speaker 1: to know, the market seem doesn't seem to be rewarding

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Speaker 1: much right now. What are the risky strategies out there

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Speaker 1: right now that you think the market's rewarding that it

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Speaker 1: might not be. Well, it's it's a lot more complicated now.

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Speaker 1: And I think in the days where you know, you

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Speaker 1: could basically create ahold of value just by increasing leverage

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Speaker 1: in your bank, um, you know, increasing leverages multiplies your

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Speaker 1: return on assets by your leverage and creates return on equity.

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Speaker 1: And then it was it was an actually and also

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Speaker 1: that leverage also gives makes it look like you're growing

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Speaker 1: as well, so you get all these massive p multiple.

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Speaker 1: In today's context, you have you know, regulators looking at

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Speaker 1: you thinking that you're two leverage and then suddenly forcing

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Speaker 1: you to raise capital, which it's never great for share prices.

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Speaker 1: So it's it's a lot more complicated. Um. I guess

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Speaker 1: the you know, the most successful strategies, which I wouldn't

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Speaker 1: necessarily condone, would be the ones where you can basically

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Speaker 1: take on more risk and more leverage and then you know,

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Speaker 1: but you know, outside of the purview of the regulators

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Speaker 1: who are coming in and trying to climb down on it.

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Speaker 1: So you know, I guess the risky strategies that might

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Speaker 1: be successful in the short term might be the ones

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Speaker 1: that are linked to the kind of the shadow banking

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Speaker 1: activities where you can actually take you know, take risk

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Speaker 1: off outside the radar of the regulators. But you know

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Speaker 1: again that that's a very short term as approach which

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Speaker 1: will unravel at some point. So yeah, I mean, I

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Speaker 1: think I think in general banks it's all about it's

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Speaker 1: all about costs at this point. I think the risk

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Speaker 1: is generally a commodity. You know, you generally get paid

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Speaker 1: for the risks risk. The more risk you take, more

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Speaker 1: return you gets pretty old cliche, but the I think

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Speaker 1: banks really need to differentiate themselves on costs at this point.

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Speaker 1: I think the trying to get back to the old

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Speaker 1: days of fifty two one leverage just isn't going to happen.

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Speaker 1: So that's not going to be the way of boosting

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Speaker 1: return and extually going forward. It's got to be, you know,

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Speaker 1: a leaner operation, alright, barrier. Last question, are you um

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Speaker 1: when you go back and look at this report, which

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Speaker 1: you know, does seem fairly prescient five years later, are

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Speaker 1: you proud of what you've done? Are you happy? Or

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Speaker 1: do you feel frustration that some of these eventualities are

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Speaker 1: actually playing out in the market even though there were

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Speaker 1: warnings about them. How do you actually feel about it now? Yeah? Well,

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Speaker 1: our I think the last line and the report was

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Speaker 1: that the you know this, the crisis are not avoidable.

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Speaker 1: We call it an avoidable his you, But the reality

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Speaker 1: is crises are not avoidable. You basically will get you

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Speaker 1: a business cycle continuing forever, and we'll we'll see financial

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Speaker 1: crisis every five or ten years. I think what we

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Speaker 1: what I would be proud of would be if I

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Speaker 1: had helped any any banks avoid being the victims of

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Speaker 1: the of the crisis, or whether we've helped you know,

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Speaker 1: regulators better prepare for the crisis this time around, and

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Speaker 1: you know, we will see the result of that, you know,

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Speaker 1: this time as effectively, what when I'm seeing is a

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Speaker 1: real stress test where there's an emerging markets crisis and

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Speaker 1: we're seeing we will see you know, who withstands that well.

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Speaker 1: And I guess the regulators that have helped their banks

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Speaker 1: prepare well and recapitalized, we'll see that those banks whether

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Speaker 1: the storm quite well are the ones that haven't you

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Speaker 1: may see some problems. So you know, as I was mentioned,

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Speaker 1: I think, you know, it wasn't popular with the commodities traders,

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Speaker 1: and I think a lot of banks withdrew quite heavily

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Speaker 1: out of commodities over the last few years prior to

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Speaker 1: the product quality crisis. So hopefully there have been some

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Speaker 1: aspect of those helping you know, banks um avoid some

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Speaker 1: of the losses that that that would wed otherwise be

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Speaker 1: happening now. So yeah, I guess I'm happy with with

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Speaker 1: the results. But you know, as I said, we haven't

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Speaker 1: we haven't seen this play out yet, so it'll be

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Speaker 1: interesting to see who the winners and losers are in

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Speaker 1: the actual, the actual crisis that happens now. All right,

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Speaker 1: on that cheerful note, Barry, thank you so much, Thanks guys,

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Speaker 1: Just all right, Luke, Well, I have a feeling that

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Speaker 1: Joe is going to be mad at us for going

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Speaker 1: really wonky in that discussion. But I enjoyed it. I

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Speaker 1: found it really interesting. What do you think I mean,

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Speaker 1: I certainly did to. One thing that would have been

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Speaker 1: nice to get to was Barry was really worried about

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Speaker 1: the treatment of of sovereigns. And you know, there's a

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Speaker 1: certain point to be made that financial crazies, and especially

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Speaker 1: the last one, it's it's a product of banks having

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Speaker 1: a lot of assets on their balance sheet that they

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Speaker 1: think are safe but aren't so. And he predicted that

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Speaker 1: kind of the the h q l A, that those

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Speaker 1: kind of moves would eventually end up in the same thing,

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Speaker 1: with highly indebted Western nations being forced to restructure. And

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Speaker 1: right now the markets saying that that's just not the case.

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Speaker 1: Market is very willing to lend forever to you know,

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Speaker 1: anyone with a printing press, and even European nations that

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Speaker 1: don't have them right. So instead of seeing a sovereign

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Speaker 1: debt crisis, if anything, we've seen almost the opposite, especially

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Speaker 1: as markets have sold off recently. UM. I guess the

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Speaker 1: other thing that I was thinking, you know, I don't

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Speaker 1: want listeners to come away thinking that consultancies are always geniuses. Um.

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Speaker 1: We've seen Oliver Wyman make poorer recommendations before, for instance,

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Speaker 1: telling ubs to go all in fixed income in two

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Speaker 1: thousand seven. That wasn't such a great recommendation. But I

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Speaker 1: think when people talk about this kind of stuff five

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Speaker 1: years before it happens, it does deserve some attention. So

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Speaker 1: I liked hearing about the reaction to the report in Davos,

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Speaker 1: how people felt about it at the time. The idea

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Speaker 1: that Commodo at these trainers were upset is kind of amusing. Now.

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Speaker 1: I didn't like to hear the idea that he thinks,

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Speaker 1: you know, it's just a matter of time before this

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Speaker 1: plays out. That doesn't exactly paint a great picture of

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Speaker 1: what we're in for and what we'll be writing about. No,

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Speaker 1: that's very true. Well, I think we should wrap it up.

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Speaker 1: Thank you Luke for joining me today. My pleasure, Hope

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Speaker 1: I followed the shoes. This is another episode of odd Lots.

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Speaker 1: Tune in next week for another one, potentially less scheeky

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Speaker 1: than this one. Joe should be back by then. I'm

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Speaker 1: Tracy Alloway, Executive editor of Bloomberg Markets. You can catch

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Speaker 1: me on Twitter at Tracy Alloway, and I'm Lukewa, reporter

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Speaker 1: at Bloomberg Markets. You can also catch me on Twitter

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Speaker 1: at l j Kewa. Joe and I are very proud

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Speaker 1: of our new podcast add Thoughts, but we are also

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Speaker 1: very proud of Bloomberg's other growing suite of original podcast

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Speaker 1: all designed to help you navigate the complexities of business,

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Speaker 1: financial markets, and the global economy. So in addition to

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Speaker 1: our own podcast, please don't miss Benchmark with Dan Moss,

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Speaker 1: Tory Stillwell and Aki Edo and informative jargon free look

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Speaker 1: at the inner workings of the global economy. Then there's

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Speaker 1: Deal of the Week with our M and A reporter

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Speaker 1: Alec Sherman, which is a breakdown of the biggest M

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Speaker 1: and A deals and gives you an inside peak at

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Speaker 1: corporate boardrooms. All three shows are available on iTunes, SoundCloud,

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Speaker 1: pocket Cast for Android, Bloomberg dot Com, and of course

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Speaker 1: the Bloomberg terminal