WEBVTT - Rerun: The GE of Today

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.

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<v Speaker 1>Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host,

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<v Speaker 1>Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with iHeart Radio, and

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<v Speaker 1>I love all things tech and it is time for

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<v Speaker 1>us to conclude the g E Saga. Now. These were

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<v Speaker 1>a series of episodes that originally published back in two

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<v Speaker 1>thousand nineteen. I did reruns this week because in case

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<v Speaker 1>you hadn't listened to any of the other ones, I'm

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<v Speaker 1>on vacation this week. I am. I am vacating. Actually,

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<v Speaker 1>as you listen to this, I'm probably getting ready to

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<v Speaker 1>head back to Atlanta. But yes, I was on vacation

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<v Speaker 1>and I didn't want to leave you without any episodes. So,

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<v Speaker 1>because GE recently announced it was going to split up

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<v Speaker 1>into three separate companies in the near future, I thought

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<v Speaker 1>it would be good to go back and review the

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<v Speaker 1>history of Ural Electric. It's a long and storied and

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<v Speaker 1>at times very bumpy history, and so we are going

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<v Speaker 1>to listen to the g E of today. Although keep

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<v Speaker 1>in mind the today in that title refers to two

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<v Speaker 1>thousand nineteen, because this episode originally published on September eleven, nineteen.

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<v Speaker 1>I hope you enjoy and I'll talk to you again,

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<v Speaker 1>really really soon, like next week when I'm back in

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<v Speaker 1>the office. We have come to the end of our

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<v Speaker 1>journey covering the history of General Electric up to today,

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<v Speaker 1>and just a heads up, this episode is going to

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<v Speaker 1>focus a lot on the business side of General Electric

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<v Speaker 1>rather than the tech side of General Electric. I could

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<v Speaker 1>have ended this series with the last episode as far

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<v Speaker 1>as the technological innovations go. And that's not to say

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<v Speaker 1>GE hasn't continued to innovate in the post Jack Welch era,

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<v Speaker 1>but rather that the innovations the company is most known

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<v Speaker 1>for span the previous one years of its existence. The

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<v Speaker 1>last twenty years, the most recent twenty years have been

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<v Speaker 1>more marked with controversy and business practices and market issues.

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<v Speaker 1>And I think it's important to understand what's happened since

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<v Speaker 1>two thousand one because GE has been such an incredibly

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<v Speaker 1>important part of the modern technological landscape. I mean, that's

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<v Speaker 1>one of the main companies that helped spread the electrical

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<v Speaker 1>infrastructure in the United States. You know, without GE, it

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<v Speaker 1>would have taken much longer for that to have happened,

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<v Speaker 1>and the world would be very different today if GE

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<v Speaker 1>had not existed. But in the last episode, I told

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<v Speaker 1>you guys about Jack Welch, the g E CEO who

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<v Speaker 1>pushed the company to incredible profitability, mainly by selling off

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<v Speaker 1>businesses where General Electric wasn't in first or second place

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<v Speaker 1>in the industry. He sold off more than seventy of

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<v Speaker 1>g S businesses just in his first two years of

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<v Speaker 1>being CEO. He also laid off more than one hundred

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<v Speaker 1>thousand employees, which earned him the nickname Neutron Jack, because

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<v Speaker 1>like a neutron bomb, he eliminated people without damaging the assets.

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<v Speaker 1>And he also led efforts to acquire financial institutions like

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<v Speaker 1>banks and insurance companies in order to launch this financial

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<v Speaker 1>and insurance business, and that would end up giving g

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<v Speaker 1>E an enormous revenue boost. It would become incredibly important

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<v Speaker 1>for the company in the nineteen eighties and beyond for

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<v Speaker 1>different reasons. Now. One exception to Welch's amazing victories was

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<v Speaker 1>an acquisition of a securities firm called Kidder, Peabody and Company,

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<v Speaker 1>which was actually an even older company than General Electric.

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<v Speaker 1>If you looked at the origin for Kidder, Peabody and Company,

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<v Speaker 1>that firm traced its history all the way back to

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<v Speaker 1>eighteen sixty five, more than a decade before even the

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<v Speaker 1>earliest of companies that formed General Electric. Welch led the

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<v Speaker 1>acquisition effort in nineteen six, But then there were a

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<v Speaker 1>series of scandals centered around insider trading that brought a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of suspicion and scrutiny on Kidder Peabodies business and

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<v Speaker 1>therefore GE Capital, the financial division of General Electric. And

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<v Speaker 1>a year after the acquisition, the global stock markets crashed

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<v Speaker 1>on October nineteenth, n seven and what was called Black Monday.

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<v Speaker 1>The combination of events convinced Welch that he had made

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<v Speaker 1>an error in judgment acquiring Kidder Peabody, and it took

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<v Speaker 1>several more years and more scandals centering on Kidder Peabodies

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<v Speaker 1>record keeping and allegations of reporting false profits, but GE

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<v Speaker 1>would eventually sell Kidder Peabody off at a huge loss.

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<v Speaker 1>Now that embarrassment aside, GE for the most part did

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<v Speaker 1>very well in the eighties and nineties. The stock price

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<v Speaker 1>for g E rose four thousand percent. Some sources state

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<v Speaker 1>that when you take all the factors into consideration, it

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<v Speaker 1>was more like five thousand two. Under Welch's command, he

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<v Speaker 1>put off his retirement in order to secure an acquisition

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<v Speaker 1>of Honeywell International. If you listen to my last episode,

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<v Speaker 1>you know that didn't go well. The European Commission denied

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<v Speaker 1>the merger for anti competitive reasons, and the man who

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<v Speaker 1>hated to lose, Jack Welch, had to go out on

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<v Speaker 1>a down note. But compared to GE, you could say

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<v Speaker 1>Jack Welch got off easy. Now, this episode will cover

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<v Speaker 1>what happened to General Electric since two thousand one, including

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<v Speaker 1>the events that would create massive problems for the huge company.

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<v Speaker 1>And there is ongoing disagreement as to whether most of

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<v Speaker 1>the blame should fall on Welch's successor, or if Welch

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<v Speaker 1>himself should shoulder some of that responsibility or some other party.

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<v Speaker 1>So what the heck actually happened? Well, first, let me

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<v Speaker 1>talk a little bit about g S stock, because that's

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<v Speaker 1>going to come back around later in this episode a

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<v Speaker 1>few times. So, for years, g E paid out a

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<v Speaker 1>dividend on its stock. Not all companies do this, and

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<v Speaker 1>a dividend is a payment that a company makes to

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<v Speaker 1>distribute some of its revenue to its shareholders. So a

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<v Speaker 1>company makes money and then distributes some of that money

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<v Speaker 1>amongst the people who hold shares in the company. It's

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<v Speaker 1>usually not very much per share. In fact, it's typically

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<v Speaker 1>less than a dollar. Ges case, it was around thirty

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<v Speaker 1>one cents for a long time. In the US, there

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<v Speaker 1>are no rules about how frequently a company actually pays

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<v Speaker 1>out dividends. Most companies will do it quarterly, so you

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<v Speaker 1>would get one quarter of your dividend four times a year.

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<v Speaker 1>So if it was a dividend of forty cents, that

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<v Speaker 1>means every three months you would get a check for

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<v Speaker 1>ten cents for every share you own. So it's not

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<v Speaker 1>very much, but if you own a lot of shares,

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<v Speaker 1>it starts to add up. And besides distributing revenue, it's

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<v Speaker 1>also meant to incentivize shareholders to reinvest and buy more

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<v Speaker 1>shares of stock in that company. So the idea is, oh,

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<v Speaker 1>you got a dividend payout, it's enough for you to

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<v Speaker 1>buy another share in the company, So you spend that

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<v Speaker 1>dividend buying another share. That's the logic there. Well, when

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<v Speaker 1>Welch first took over g E stock wasn't doing so great,

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<v Speaker 1>it wasn't super high. A lot of investors thought of

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<v Speaker 1>the stocks as essentially a dividend payout and not much else,

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<v Speaker 1>so you wouldn't buy g E stocks with the idea

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<v Speaker 1>of selling them at a higher price leader on the road.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, you weren't thinking, I'm gonna buy now, because

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<v Speaker 1>in five or ten years this stock is going to

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<v Speaker 1>be worth two or three times as much. You bought

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<v Speaker 1>g E stock because it paid out a dividend, So

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<v Speaker 1>it would take a long time, but you would eventually

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<v Speaker 1>make more money than you invested if that dividend were

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<v Speaker 1>to hold steady. Now, when Welch took over, the stock

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<v Speaker 1>price actually dipped a little bit after he had been

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<v Speaker 1>run ge for a year or two, but another year

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<v Speaker 1>later the entire stock market took a turn and it

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<v Speaker 1>started to climb in value. This would be the beginning

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<v Speaker 1>of eighteen years of a climbing market, a bull market

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<v Speaker 1>in other words, even with events like Black Monday in

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<v Speaker 1>Night seven taken into account, so you had moments where

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<v Speaker 1>the market was not bullish, where it was crashing, but

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<v Speaker 1>it would recover and then go back on its bullish

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<v Speaker 1>route trajectory. If you will now collectively the SMP five

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<v Speaker 1>hundred index, it would climb by two thousand and this

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<v Speaker 1>was the same time that we started seeing packages like

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<v Speaker 1>four oh one K plans replaced traditional retirement plans. Now

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<v Speaker 1>that meant that stock market performance would become far more

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<v Speaker 1>important to weigh more people. Like in the old days,

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<v Speaker 1>it was just people who traded in stocks, and largely

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<v Speaker 1>it was a lot of businesses that did that trading.

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<v Speaker 1>Your average person didn't play the stock market that much.

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<v Speaker 1>But now stuff like our retirement was tied directly into

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<v Speaker 1>stock market performance. So suddenly everybody was really really focusing

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<v Speaker 1>on the stock market, and it meant that it became

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<v Speaker 1>far more important for stocks to do well. See before

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<v Speaker 1>the nineteen eighties, stock market performance was you know, it

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<v Speaker 1>was an indicator of a company's overall health, but most

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<v Speaker 1>people didn't consider it the metric against which all companies

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<v Speaker 1>should stand. You would worry more about the company's profitability,

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<v Speaker 1>how much revenue is it bringing in, how much does

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<v Speaker 1>it cost to do business, and how much profit is

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<v Speaker 1>the company making. The share price wasn't as big a deal.

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<v Speaker 1>That changed around the same time that Welch took over

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<v Speaker 1>at GE, and Welch's philosophy happened to match this general

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<v Speaker 1>shift in how businesses operated in the United States. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>I don't say this to diminish Welch's contributions or GEES

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<v Speaker 1>performance because the company's own stock outperformed the general market significantly.

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<v Speaker 1>But I do also want to take the overall market

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<v Speaker 1>performance into consideration, because while I don't want to take

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<v Speaker 1>any credit away, I also don't want to give too

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<v Speaker 1>much credit to Welch and his impact beyond what it

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<v Speaker 1>actually was. Anyway, as the market improved, and as GEES

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<v Speaker 1>performance in particular made its stock price rocket upwards, ge

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<v Speaker 1>stocks were seen as more than just a dividend payout.

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<v Speaker 1>The company continued to pay dividends, though, which again is

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<v Speaker 1>going to be important later. Those dividends were largely funded

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<v Speaker 1>by the incredible performance of g E Capital, that's the

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<v Speaker 1>financial services division of General Electric. In the last year

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<v Speaker 1>of Welch's tenure as CEO, gees stock price did take

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<v Speaker 1>several hits, but then so did just about everybody else.

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<v Speaker 1>In March two thousand, the stock markets performance shifted. It

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<v Speaker 1>was no longer bullish. It was going into a bear market,

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<v Speaker 1>so instead of growing, it was receding. The dot com

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<v Speaker 1>bubble had crashed and that caused a bit of a

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<v Speaker 1>stock market crisis. Companies that were in the dot com

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<v Speaker 1>industry obviously they suffered the most. Many of them just

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<v Speaker 1>were blinking out of existence after it became clear that

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<v Speaker 1>those companies had no way to deliver upon the promises

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<v Speaker 1>that they were making or to be able to justify

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<v Speaker 1>the crazy speculation that drove their stock prices into the

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<v Speaker 1>stratosphere before the companies had even figured out how to

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<v Speaker 1>generate ascent in revenue. But even companies like General Electric,

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<v Speaker 1>which were traditional, established, giant conglomerate companies, were affected by

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<v Speaker 1>this change in the market. Between March two thousand and

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<v Speaker 1>when Welch would hand over the CEO role to his successor,

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<v Speaker 1>Jeff Emilt, in early September two thoe, the stock price

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<v Speaker 1>for g E had fallen by twenty four percent. Now

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<v Speaker 1>I point that out because often the simplified story about

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<v Speaker 1>what happened to GE was that Jack Welch stepped down

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<v Speaker 1>and Immolt fumbled the ball, that Emilt was a terrible

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<v Speaker 1>CEO and he could not follow Welch's lead. But in reality,

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<v Speaker 1>I think the story is far more nuanced, and we

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<v Speaker 1>have to remember that the market itself was changing during

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<v Speaker 1>this transition. It wasn't the case of Emilt being handed

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<v Speaker 1>a profitable company on a silver platter and nothing was

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<v Speaker 1>going wrong, and he just messed it up from there. Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>he did make a ton of decisions that would not

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<v Speaker 1>turn out to be great for Ge. So I don't

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<v Speaker 1>want to diminish his responsibility either. I just think it's

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<v Speaker 1>important for us to take all these factors into consideration. Okay.

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<v Speaker 1>So Welch stepped down on September six, two thousand one.

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<v Speaker 1>Emilt took over on September seven, and four days later,

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<v Speaker 1>the United States was rocked by a series of terrorist

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<v Speaker 1>attacks that shook the country to its core. Those effects

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<v Speaker 1>were widespread. The tragedy touched thousands of people directly, tens

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<v Speaker 1>of thousands millions of people indirectly. It transformed the New

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<v Speaker 1>York City Escape permanently, and it caused disruption in the

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<v Speaker 1>markets as well. Wall Street made the decision to not

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<v Speaker 1>open the New York Stock Exchange the morning of September eleven,

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<v Speaker 1>two thousand one, fearing that the terrorist attacks would prompt

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<v Speaker 1>panic selling amongst shareholders, making a truly horrible situation even

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<v Speaker 1>more dire. Both the New York Stock Exchange and the

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<v Speaker 1>NASDAC would remain closed until September two thousand one, when

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<v Speaker 1>trading resumed, The market fell by nearly seven hundred points.

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<v Speaker 1>That was a decline of almost mobile actually more than

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<v Speaker 1>seven percent, and that was just the first day of trading.

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<v Speaker 1>Losses actually continued throughout that week. I hate even talking

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<v Speaker 1>about this, but it is important in order for us

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<v Speaker 1>to understand ges story. At this stage in the company's history,

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<v Speaker 1>business philosophies had changed significantly in the United States in

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<v Speaker 1>the nineteen eighties and nine nineties. We had created a

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<v Speaker 1>new environment where share value was the most important metric

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<v Speaker 1>for a business, the company's stock price. If the stock

0:14:09.679 --> 0:14:13.199
<v Speaker 1>price was going up, that was good. That was pretty

0:14:13.280 --> 0:14:16.720
<v Speaker 1>much the end all be all. A company wasn't thought

0:14:16.720 --> 0:14:20.120
<v Speaker 1>of doing well unless its stock price was growing year

0:14:20.200 --> 0:14:23.240
<v Speaker 1>over year, or at least the overall value of the

0:14:23.280 --> 0:14:26.080
<v Speaker 1>company when you take in at stock. Because of course,

0:14:26.240 --> 0:14:29.280
<v Speaker 1>companies can do things like stock splits so that the

0:14:29.360 --> 0:14:32.720
<v Speaker 1>price of an individual shaff stock goes down, but because

0:14:32.760 --> 0:14:35.360
<v Speaker 1>you've doubled the number of stocks or a number of

0:14:35.400 --> 0:14:38.040
<v Speaker 1>shares i should say, out on the market, the value

0:14:38.040 --> 0:14:41.560
<v Speaker 1>of the company itself remains stable and can continue to grow.

0:14:42.200 --> 0:14:45.560
<v Speaker 1>This drove a lot of business decisions that put shareholders

0:14:45.640 --> 0:14:50.480
<v Speaker 1>above just about everything else in the company, including customers. Now,

0:14:50.520 --> 0:14:53.680
<v Speaker 1>in my opinion, It's one of the biggest economic mistakes

0:14:54.320 --> 0:14:57.760
<v Speaker 1>made in recent decades, as it has created a world

0:14:57.840 --> 0:15:01.880
<v Speaker 1>in which many company executives Phoe becus very much on

0:15:02.040 --> 0:15:05.680
<v Speaker 1>the short term to mid term gains as opposed to

0:15:05.840 --> 0:15:09.760
<v Speaker 1>long term strategies. So often I think companies are making

0:15:09.840 --> 0:15:13.760
<v Speaker 1>choices that hurt the company's chances to survive in the

0:15:13.840 --> 0:15:17.160
<v Speaker 1>long term, all in an effort to drive that stock

0:15:17.200 --> 0:15:22.640
<v Speaker 1>market price further up. Anyway, this disaster impacted gees stock

0:15:22.720 --> 0:15:26.720
<v Speaker 1>price along with countless other companies, and you can't lay

0:15:26.760 --> 0:15:31.000
<v Speaker 1>that blame on Emilt. It's not his fault that this

0:15:31.240 --> 0:15:35.320
<v Speaker 1>series of awful attacks happened four days after he took

0:15:35.480 --> 0:15:38.560
<v Speaker 1>control of the company. In the wake of nine eleven,

0:15:38.960 --> 0:15:43.200
<v Speaker 1>all airline operations in the United States stopped for several days.

0:15:43.520 --> 0:15:46.480
<v Speaker 1>That had a direct impact on gees business, which included

0:15:46.520 --> 0:15:49.720
<v Speaker 1>building stuff like jet engines for the airlines and also

0:15:50.000 --> 0:15:53.680
<v Speaker 1>leasing out parts for various companies. All of that was

0:15:53.720 --> 0:15:57.200
<v Speaker 1>put on hold. On top of that, gees insurance business

0:15:57.520 --> 0:16:00.200
<v Speaker 1>was suddenly inundated with claims which to come and he

0:16:00.320 --> 0:16:02.840
<v Speaker 1>had to make good on For one thing, ge was

0:16:02.880 --> 0:16:06.320
<v Speaker 1>responsible for the insurance policy for the World Trade Center,

0:16:06.360 --> 0:16:09.200
<v Speaker 1>which as I'm sure you all know lost the two

0:16:09.240 --> 0:16:12.880
<v Speaker 1>towers that made the center iconic back in two thousand

0:16:12.920 --> 0:16:16.280
<v Speaker 1>one as a result of those attacks. Prior to September eleven,

0:16:16.720 --> 0:16:19.560
<v Speaker 1>it wasn't unusual for ge to lean a bit heavily

0:16:19.680 --> 0:16:24.040
<v Speaker 1>on ge capital to kind of smooth things over. The

0:16:24.080 --> 0:16:27.280
<v Speaker 1>branch was so profitable, that division of ge was so

0:16:27.360 --> 0:16:31.320
<v Speaker 1>profitable that could help conceal if another division weren't quite

0:16:31.520 --> 0:16:36.080
<v Speaker 1>doing so well. A lot of gees accounting practices have

0:16:36.360 --> 0:16:39.840
<v Speaker 1>over the years been called opaque, meaning that you might

0:16:39.920 --> 0:16:42.920
<v Speaker 1>get the end result of how well the overall company

0:16:42.960 --> 0:16:46.160
<v Speaker 1>is doing, but you might not know how it got there,

0:16:46.480 --> 0:16:49.400
<v Speaker 1>which divisions are doing well versus which ones are not.

0:16:49.920 --> 0:16:52.920
<v Speaker 1>The overall performance of the company was what mattered, right,

0:16:53.000 --> 0:16:56.640
<v Speaker 1>so who cares what's happening in the individual divisions. Well,

0:16:56.680 --> 0:16:59.440
<v Speaker 1>Emil would get to work selling off parts of gees

0:16:59.520 --> 0:17:02.600
<v Speaker 1>insurance business, though the company would still maintain some of

0:17:02.640 --> 0:17:05.600
<v Speaker 1>that business up to present day. I'll explain more about

0:17:05.640 --> 0:17:08.600
<v Speaker 1>that in a little bit. And he also began to

0:17:08.640 --> 0:17:12.719
<v Speaker 1>look at possible acquisitions. So what things turn out well,

0:17:13.440 --> 0:17:18.919
<v Speaker 1>we'll find out. But spoiler alert, no they don't. But

0:17:19.000 --> 0:17:21.639
<v Speaker 1>before I get into that, let's take a quick break.

0:17:29.240 --> 0:17:31.600
<v Speaker 1>One thing I want to mention before I forget it

0:17:31.640 --> 0:17:35.680
<v Speaker 1>is that during Emilt's run as CEO of GE, there

0:17:35.720 --> 0:17:39.280
<v Speaker 1>was a particularly wasteful practice going on that would later

0:17:39.320 --> 0:17:42.160
<v Speaker 1>get a lot of media attention when it was made public.

0:17:42.760 --> 0:17:46.399
<v Speaker 1>Emilt traveled a lot. He would meet with various GE

0:17:46.560 --> 0:17:49.640
<v Speaker 1>executives and facilities all around the world, as well as

0:17:49.680 --> 0:17:54.359
<v Speaker 1>with other company and industry leaders and politicians. Particularly, he

0:17:54.400 --> 0:17:55.960
<v Speaker 1>would do this when he was on the lookout for

0:17:56.040 --> 0:17:59.560
<v Speaker 1>possible acquisitions, and he made a lot of those as

0:17:59.600 --> 0:18:02.119
<v Speaker 1>he was the EO of g E. Now, to hop

0:18:02.200 --> 0:18:04.120
<v Speaker 1>over to the other side of the world, he would

0:18:04.160 --> 0:18:08.240
<v Speaker 1>take one of the g E owned business jets. They

0:18:08.280 --> 0:18:11.680
<v Speaker 1>had six of them. But here's the curious thing. Every

0:18:11.680 --> 0:18:14.840
<v Speaker 1>time you would travel, there would be a second empty

0:18:14.960 --> 0:18:18.960
<v Speaker 1>jet that would follow along behind and stay at the

0:18:19.000 --> 0:18:22.400
<v Speaker 1>same airport and wait there. And then when Emilt would

0:18:22.440 --> 0:18:26.320
<v Speaker 1>fly back, so did the empty jet. Now the justification

0:18:26.400 --> 0:18:30.920
<v Speaker 1>for that practice, which again eventually became public, in which

0:18:30.920 --> 0:18:35.200
<v Speaker 1>a jet carrying only a crew no passengers, would burn

0:18:35.280 --> 0:18:38.639
<v Speaker 1>through fuel it would generate pollution. The justification was that

0:18:38.760 --> 0:18:43.880
<v Speaker 1>Emilt was a very important person on very important business

0:18:44.359 --> 0:18:47.919
<v Speaker 1>and yes, I capitalized very important in my notes in

0:18:47.960 --> 0:18:53.080
<v Speaker 1>this section. As such, he couldn't be delayed by mechanical failures.

0:18:53.280 --> 0:18:56.520
<v Speaker 1>His business was far too important. So the empty jet

0:18:57.040 --> 0:19:01.160
<v Speaker 1>was essentially a backup transport in cases Mary should experience

0:19:01.160 --> 0:19:04.680
<v Speaker 1>a mechanical delay. It was his just in case measure,

0:19:05.240 --> 0:19:10.200
<v Speaker 1>a very expensive, wasteful measure. The company would actually stop

0:19:10.320 --> 0:19:13.200
<v Speaker 1>that practice in two thousand fourteen, which was a few

0:19:13.240 --> 0:19:16.879
<v Speaker 1>years before Emilt would be replaced as CEO. Spoiler alert,

0:19:16.920 --> 0:19:19.639
<v Speaker 1>will get there, all right, So back to the post

0:19:19.760 --> 0:19:23.399
<v Speaker 1>two thousand one g E. In two thousand two, ge

0:19:23.400 --> 0:19:27.040
<v Speaker 1>would acquire a business from a formerly huge company. That

0:19:27.080 --> 0:19:30.000
<v Speaker 1>company was in Ron, which went bankrupt in two thousand

0:19:30.040 --> 0:19:33.280
<v Speaker 1>one after its own massive scandal, which I'm not going

0:19:33.320 --> 0:19:36.360
<v Speaker 1>to get into here it's outside the purview of this episode.

0:19:36.600 --> 0:19:38.680
<v Speaker 1>But one of the many parts of in Ron to

0:19:38.760 --> 0:19:42.760
<v Speaker 1>go up on the auction block after the bankruptcy was

0:19:42.920 --> 0:19:47.120
<v Speaker 1>a wind power business. Emilt was, in his own words,

0:19:47.359 --> 0:19:51.640
<v Speaker 1>not enthusiastic about wind power. He felt wind power wasn't

0:19:51.720 --> 0:19:55.000
<v Speaker 1>profitable and it was too dependent upon subsidies, and those

0:19:55.000 --> 0:19:58.280
<v Speaker 1>subsidies could disappear at any time, according to which way

0:19:58.400 --> 0:20:01.359
<v Speaker 1>any government budget might be headed. So there was no

0:20:01.400 --> 0:20:04.600
<v Speaker 1>way to control that. If the subsidies went away, you'd

0:20:04.600 --> 0:20:09.320
<v Speaker 1>be saddled with a really expensive and nonprofitable business. But

0:20:09.640 --> 0:20:13.119
<v Speaker 1>EMIL gave the authority to executives who really believed in

0:20:13.119 --> 0:20:15.880
<v Speaker 1>that acquisition to go forward with it, and they went

0:20:15.920 --> 0:20:19.080
<v Speaker 1>and purchased the division. It would end up becoming profitable

0:20:19.240 --> 0:20:22.840
<v Speaker 1>and perhaps should have served as a lesson for future

0:20:22.920 --> 0:20:25.639
<v Speaker 1>emilt And I'll get back into what I mean about

0:20:25.680 --> 0:20:28.240
<v Speaker 1>that in just a little bit. In two thousand three,

0:20:28.560 --> 0:20:32.119
<v Speaker 1>ge announced its intention to purchase a majority stake in

0:20:32.240 --> 0:20:35.960
<v Speaker 1>Universal Pictures. That was a company that was under the

0:20:36.000 --> 0:20:39.520
<v Speaker 1>control of another company called Vivendi, a French company. In

0:20:39.640 --> 0:20:43.639
<v Speaker 1>this deal, g E would acquire eighty percent of Universal.

0:20:44.200 --> 0:20:47.200
<v Speaker 1>Vivindi was going through kind of a financial crisis at

0:20:47.200 --> 0:20:51.640
<v Speaker 1>the time, so g E merged Universal with NBC, creating

0:20:51.920 --> 0:20:56.280
<v Speaker 1>NBC Universal and the deal included several cable television channels

0:20:56.320 --> 0:20:59.800
<v Speaker 1>like Sci Fi Network, USA Network, as well as the

0:20:59.840 --> 0:21:03.640
<v Speaker 1>un Reversal film studio the Universal Theme Parks. It did

0:21:03.680 --> 0:21:07.600
<v Speaker 1>not include Universal Music that would remain completely under Vivendi's control,

0:21:07.680 --> 0:21:10.520
<v Speaker 1>but lots of the other Universal properties were part of

0:21:10.560 --> 0:21:14.920
<v Speaker 1>this deal. Vivendi would have twenty control of this, and

0:21:14.960 --> 0:21:20.440
<v Speaker 1>then UH you would have GE with control and you

0:21:20.560 --> 0:21:24.480
<v Speaker 1>got INBC Universal. GE would not hold onto this property forever.

0:21:25.160 --> 0:21:27.960
<v Speaker 1>G was acquiring other companies as well at this time,

0:21:27.960 --> 0:21:31.600
<v Speaker 1>adding them to the various divisions of General Electric. GE

0:21:31.640 --> 0:21:38.080
<v Speaker 1>Healthcare was growing with companies like UH Instrumentarium and Amersham Plc.

0:21:38.440 --> 0:21:41.520
<v Speaker 1>Those were being added as part of g E Healthcare.

0:21:41.920 --> 0:21:45.399
<v Speaker 1>G Capital was also growing with similar acquisitions, including some

0:21:45.440 --> 0:21:48.159
<v Speaker 1>subprime mortgage loan companies, and we'll get into that in

0:21:48.200 --> 0:21:51.359
<v Speaker 1>a bit. And GE would also build out its industrial,

0:21:51.520 --> 0:21:55.840
<v Speaker 1>consumer and energy businesses and made several acquisitions of companies

0:21:55.880 --> 0:21:59.760
<v Speaker 1>in the oil industry, also in banking and that old

0:22:00.040 --> 0:22:03.920
<v Speaker 1>horse of fossil fuels in general, because he really believed

0:22:03.960 --> 0:22:08.439
<v Speaker 1>that that was going to be the mainstay for energy

0:22:08.480 --> 0:22:11.840
<v Speaker 1>production or electricity production. I guess I should say for

0:22:11.880 --> 0:22:15.600
<v Speaker 1>the foreseeable future. Throughout this time, GE Capital would remain

0:22:15.680 --> 0:22:18.760
<v Speaker 1>the most profitable division of General Electric, and so the

0:22:18.760 --> 0:22:22.760
<v Speaker 1>company would lean more heavily upon GE Capital in order

0:22:22.800 --> 0:22:26.160
<v Speaker 1>to do things like pay out that dividend to shareholders

0:22:26.760 --> 0:22:29.919
<v Speaker 1>that set up GE for disaster. Just a couple of

0:22:29.960 --> 0:22:34.480
<v Speaker 1>years after GE purchased subprime mortgage businesses, the world plunged

0:22:34.600 --> 0:22:38.359
<v Speaker 1>into a global economic crisis, which we often refer to

0:22:38.480 --> 0:22:41.919
<v Speaker 1>as the two thousand eight financial crisis, but really the

0:22:41.960 --> 0:22:46.480
<v Speaker 1>crisis first started becoming apparent in two thousand seven with

0:22:46.600 --> 0:22:49.639
<v Speaker 1>the subprime mortgage market. So what the heck is a

0:22:49.640 --> 0:22:55.120
<v Speaker 1>subprime mortgage Well, the short answer is it's an incredibly risky, predatory,

0:22:55.160 --> 0:23:00.240
<v Speaker 1>and irresponsible market practice that depends upon people who are

0:23:00.600 --> 0:23:03.640
<v Speaker 1>some of the most vulnerable folks out there. Maybe that's

0:23:03.680 --> 0:23:06.080
<v Speaker 1>just me putting my own bias on things, but it's

0:23:06.080 --> 0:23:08.080
<v Speaker 1>hard for me to see the whole concept as anything

0:23:08.080 --> 0:23:11.400
<v Speaker 1>other than dumb and harmful. But here's how it breaks down,

0:23:11.720 --> 0:23:14.160
<v Speaker 1>all right. So you know about credit scores, right, They're

0:23:14.200 --> 0:23:16.760
<v Speaker 1>supposed to represent how much of a risk or a

0:23:16.880 --> 0:23:19.359
<v Speaker 1>lack of risk a person is when it comes to

0:23:19.359 --> 0:23:21.960
<v Speaker 1>paying off debt like loans. So if you have a

0:23:22.040 --> 0:23:25.000
<v Speaker 1>high credit score, it means your history shows that you're

0:23:25.040 --> 0:23:28.199
<v Speaker 1>diligent about paying off debt and that you represent a

0:23:28.240 --> 0:23:30.760
<v Speaker 1>low risk for future loans. It does not mean that

0:23:30.800 --> 0:23:33.240
<v Speaker 1>you've never had debt. You want to have some debt

0:23:33.359 --> 0:23:34.560
<v Speaker 1>and then you want to be able to pay it

0:23:34.600 --> 0:23:37.480
<v Speaker 1>off because that's what gets you that high credit score.

0:23:37.640 --> 0:23:40.000
<v Speaker 1>But if you have a low credit score. It means

0:23:40.040 --> 0:23:42.600
<v Speaker 1>that in the eyes of a lender, you represent a risk.

0:23:42.880 --> 0:23:45.720
<v Speaker 1>Maybe you have a spotty employment history, maybe you have

0:23:45.760 --> 0:23:48.640
<v Speaker 1>a lot of outstanding debt, maybe you've missed some payments

0:23:48.680 --> 0:23:51.639
<v Speaker 1>on some loans. The purpose of these credit scores is

0:23:51.640 --> 0:23:55.800
<v Speaker 1>to give lenders enough information to make responsible loan agreements.

0:23:56.480 --> 0:24:00.600
<v Speaker 1>Subprime lending involves giving loans to high risk in individuals,

0:24:00.880 --> 0:24:04.600
<v Speaker 1>and typically you pair this with really high interest rates

0:24:04.720 --> 0:24:08.000
<v Speaker 1>and other restrictions in order to mitigate the risk you

0:24:08.080 --> 0:24:10.679
<v Speaker 1>incur when you give a loan out to one of

0:24:10.720 --> 0:24:13.359
<v Speaker 1>these people who have a very low credit score. And

0:24:13.400 --> 0:24:16.000
<v Speaker 1>so people who are looking to buy homes or to

0:24:16.119 --> 0:24:20.280
<v Speaker 1>take out other loans were securing the money through financial

0:24:20.280 --> 0:24:24.960
<v Speaker 1>institutions with these subprime mortgages and subprime loans, but with

0:24:25.200 --> 0:24:29.879
<v Speaker 1>incredibly punishing restrictions on those loans, and surprise, surprise, a

0:24:29.920 --> 0:24:32.760
<v Speaker 1>lot of folks found it impossible to pay off that debt,

0:24:33.160 --> 0:24:36.000
<v Speaker 1>and ultimately many of the companies that were making those

0:24:36.040 --> 0:24:39.120
<v Speaker 1>loans found themselves in a hole that they had dug

0:24:39.200 --> 0:24:43.159
<v Speaker 1>themselves and it was too deep to climb out. Everyone

0:24:43.320 --> 0:24:45.560
<v Speaker 1>was put in an awful situation and it had a

0:24:45.560 --> 0:24:48.720
<v Speaker 1>really big ripple effect. Part of that ripple led to

0:24:48.760 --> 0:24:52.840
<v Speaker 1>an investment bank called Lemon Brothers collapsing in September of

0:24:52.880 --> 0:24:56.439
<v Speaker 1>two thousand eight. Other major financial institutions were in danger

0:24:56.480 --> 0:25:00.040
<v Speaker 1>of following suit. The whole thing was leading to a

0:25:00.080 --> 0:25:04.080
<v Speaker 1>global economic collapse, with the financial industry on the brink

0:25:04.160 --> 0:25:08.280
<v Speaker 1>of total disaster. That's when various parties swooped in to

0:25:08.359 --> 0:25:12.800
<v Speaker 1>rescue the situation, bailing out banks that had overextended themselves.

0:25:13.200 --> 0:25:15.520
<v Speaker 1>This in turn ticked off a lot of folks who

0:25:15.560 --> 0:25:18.760
<v Speaker 1>are directly affected by this problem. These were people who

0:25:18.760 --> 0:25:21.360
<v Speaker 1>had been evicted from their homes because they weren't able

0:25:21.400 --> 0:25:24.360
<v Speaker 1>to make their mortgage payments, or people who are otherwise

0:25:24.440 --> 0:25:28.040
<v Speaker 1>hurt by the subprime mortgage crisis, either directly or indirectly.

0:25:28.280 --> 0:25:30.120
<v Speaker 1>And it didn't help that many of these people saw

0:25:30.240 --> 0:25:35.119
<v Speaker 1>the bailouts as being rewards for the same financial institutions

0:25:35.160 --> 0:25:38.040
<v Speaker 1>that caused all the misery in the first place. Well.

0:25:38.320 --> 0:25:41.960
<v Speaker 1>Ge Capital was one of those institutions, and it was

0:25:42.040 --> 0:25:46.000
<v Speaker 1>hit hard by the two thousand eight crisis. Worse, because

0:25:46.040 --> 0:25:49.600
<v Speaker 1>General Electric was so dependent upon ge Capital for revenue,

0:25:49.920 --> 0:25:53.280
<v Speaker 1>it put all of General Electric at risk. To help

0:25:53.320 --> 0:25:55.879
<v Speaker 1>whether the storm, the company announced it would attempt to

0:25:55.960 --> 0:26:00.080
<v Speaker 1>raise twelve billion dollars through a common stock offering or

0:26:00.119 --> 0:26:04.400
<v Speaker 1>in Buffett Investor Extraordinaire also helped out by investing billions

0:26:04.440 --> 0:26:08.520
<v Speaker 1>of dollars in GE. In retrospect, many analysts have said

0:26:08.560 --> 0:26:12.200
<v Speaker 1>that GE was playing an increasingly dangerous game since Welch

0:26:12.280 --> 0:26:15.639
<v Speaker 1>had transformed GE Capital from a small division that helped

0:26:15.640 --> 0:26:20.439
<v Speaker 1>consumers get financing to purchase big appliances like refrigerators, into

0:26:20.520 --> 0:26:25.399
<v Speaker 1>a global financial institution. Gees more traditional divisions like it's

0:26:25.520 --> 0:26:30.399
<v Speaker 1>lighting business, industrial equipment business, medical equipment business, it's a

0:26:30.480 --> 0:26:34.719
<v Speaker 1>via Asian businesses. All of these secured for the company

0:26:34.800 --> 0:26:37.800
<v Speaker 1>the respect of Wall Street because they were dependable parts

0:26:38.040 --> 0:26:42.320
<v Speaker 1>of GE. They could make a dependable revenue, and they

0:26:42.320 --> 0:26:45.760
<v Speaker 1>were traditional, They had a long history with the company

0:26:45.880 --> 0:26:48.159
<v Speaker 1>that gave the company a lot of room to swing

0:26:48.280 --> 0:26:51.560
<v Speaker 1>for the fences with GE Capital and thus engage in

0:26:51.640 --> 0:26:54.840
<v Speaker 1>more risky behaviors in an effort to win big payoffs,

0:26:55.200 --> 0:26:57.800
<v Speaker 1>drive that stock market price up, and again pay out

0:26:57.840 --> 0:27:02.240
<v Speaker 1>those dividends. And that risk was somewhat necessary because of

0:27:02.240 --> 0:27:05.640
<v Speaker 1>that changing climate of business. So you had to grow

0:27:05.720 --> 0:27:09.520
<v Speaker 1>year over years. Traditional businesses usually had steady performance and

0:27:09.560 --> 0:27:13.000
<v Speaker 1>they did grow, but they grew slowly, so that wasn't

0:27:13.040 --> 0:27:17.320
<v Speaker 1>the kind of performance that would really when you the

0:27:17.320 --> 0:27:21.679
<v Speaker 1>the front cover of various business magazines, you wanted to

0:27:21.720 --> 0:27:26.119
<v Speaker 1>really go for it. So GE Capital was that method.

0:27:26.240 --> 0:27:29.720
<v Speaker 1>That was how GE was going to be the leader.

0:27:30.240 --> 0:27:33.240
<v Speaker 1>Then it became an anchor weighing the company down in

0:27:33.280 --> 0:27:36.960
<v Speaker 1>the wake of this financial crisis. Emil would start trying

0:27:37.000 --> 0:27:40.560
<v Speaker 1>to sell off parts of GE Capital, but it wasn't easy.

0:27:40.600 --> 0:27:45.160
<v Speaker 1>Before Buffett rushed into help, GE famously couldn't secure overnight

0:27:45.240 --> 0:27:48.639
<v Speaker 1>loans to keep the business afloat. Most investors felt it

0:27:48.680 --> 0:27:51.600
<v Speaker 1>was far too risky to pour money into General Electric,

0:27:51.880 --> 0:27:54.159
<v Speaker 1>so the house that Jack built was in danger of

0:27:54.280 --> 0:27:59.200
<v Speaker 1>crashing to its foundations. Even with the influx of investment cash,

0:27:59.359 --> 0:28:04.520
<v Speaker 1>not to mention an incredible one thirty nine billion dollars

0:28:04.560 --> 0:28:09.000
<v Speaker 1>of federal government bailout money, GE was still struggling, and

0:28:09.040 --> 0:28:12.960
<v Speaker 1>one thing barreling down at the company was that dividend payout.

0:28:13.200 --> 0:28:15.840
<v Speaker 1>The dividend made g E stock one of the most

0:28:15.960 --> 0:28:20.280
<v Speaker 1>popular stocks on the market. Tons of people owned g

0:28:20.480 --> 0:28:24.040
<v Speaker 1>E stock because it paid out dividends, but paying out

0:28:24.040 --> 0:28:25.960
<v Speaker 1>that dividend was going to put a huge burden on

0:28:26.000 --> 0:28:28.320
<v Speaker 1>the company, It just wasn't going to have the cash

0:28:28.359 --> 0:28:31.480
<v Speaker 1>to do it, so in two thousand nine, Emil decided

0:28:31.520 --> 0:28:34.320
<v Speaker 1>to cut the dividend from thirty one cents a share

0:28:34.720 --> 0:28:37.800
<v Speaker 1>down to ten cents a share. It would mark only

0:28:37.840 --> 0:28:41.200
<v Speaker 1>the second time the company had reduced its dividend payout.

0:28:41.440 --> 0:28:44.760
<v Speaker 1>The first time had been during the Great Depression, and

0:28:44.880 --> 0:28:48.120
<v Speaker 1>spoiler alert, it would not be the last time they

0:28:48.160 --> 0:28:51.080
<v Speaker 1>would have to cut the dividend. Also, in two thousand nine,

0:28:51.280 --> 0:28:55.280
<v Speaker 1>the company announced its intention to sell off NBC Universal

0:28:55.720 --> 0:28:59.440
<v Speaker 1>to cable provider Comcast. To do that, it would first

0:28:59.480 --> 0:29:02.880
<v Speaker 1>have to a wire the other twenty percent of NBC

0:29:02.960 --> 0:29:08.000
<v Speaker 1>Universal from Vivendi they still had that share. That process

0:29:08.040 --> 0:29:10.960
<v Speaker 1>took some time, so it wasn't until two thousand eleven

0:29:11.240 --> 0:29:14.520
<v Speaker 1>that GE would sell off a majority stake in NBC

0:29:14.600 --> 0:29:18.280
<v Speaker 1>Universal to Comcast. At that time, GE would still retain

0:29:18.360 --> 0:29:21.440
<v Speaker 1>a forty nine share in the company, although it did

0:29:21.440 --> 0:29:24.280
<v Speaker 1>have the intention to sell the rest of those shares

0:29:24.320 --> 0:29:27.440
<v Speaker 1>off a few years later. Uh This would become a

0:29:27.440 --> 0:29:30.400
<v Speaker 1>common plot element and a source of jokes in the

0:29:30.520 --> 0:29:34.600
<v Speaker 1>series Thirty Rock, just as ges ownership of NBC Universal

0:29:34.680 --> 0:29:37.840
<v Speaker 1>had been a source for humor previously in that series.

0:29:38.240 --> 0:29:41.880
<v Speaker 1>Two years later in Comcast would arrange to purchase the

0:29:42.080 --> 0:29:45.000
<v Speaker 1>entirety of NBC Universal from g E, and g E

0:29:45.080 --> 0:29:47.720
<v Speaker 1>would get out of the entertainment and media business and

0:29:47.760 --> 0:29:49.640
<v Speaker 1>it would use some of that money to cover some

0:29:49.760 --> 0:29:52.520
<v Speaker 1>of the debt that GE had accrued following the two

0:29:52.520 --> 0:29:56.640
<v Speaker 1>thousand eight financial crisis. The NBC Universal deal was just

0:29:56.680 --> 0:29:59.680
<v Speaker 1>one of several that GE pursued in the first decade

0:29:59.680 --> 0:30:02.160
<v Speaker 1>of the two thousands. The company looked to sell off

0:30:02.200 --> 0:30:04.720
<v Speaker 1>some of its businesses and divisions in an effort to

0:30:04.880 --> 0:30:08.880
<v Speaker 1>refocus on core strategies. Emilt kept working on ways to

0:30:08.960 --> 0:30:12.800
<v Speaker 1>extract g E from g E capital business, and he

0:30:12.840 --> 0:30:14.680
<v Speaker 1>didn't have a whole lot of success with it, and

0:30:14.720 --> 0:30:17.400
<v Speaker 1>he had his eyes set on another company to try

0:30:17.440 --> 0:30:21.720
<v Speaker 1>and turn gees prospects around. The company in question was

0:30:21.800 --> 0:30:25.440
<v Speaker 1>a French company that was making coal powered turbines. In

0:30:25.480 --> 0:30:27.760
<v Speaker 1>other words, it was a company that built stuff for

0:30:27.880 --> 0:30:32.320
<v Speaker 1>the energy electric industry electric utilities, right specifically for fossil

0:30:32.360 --> 0:30:36.320
<v Speaker 1>fuel based power companies. The name of this company was

0:30:36.400 --> 0:30:39.800
<v Speaker 1>Alstom A L S T O M. And, as it

0:30:39.800 --> 0:30:42.720
<v Speaker 1>would turn out, the timing could not have been worse,

0:30:42.920 --> 0:30:46.880
<v Speaker 1>though it is arguable over whether or not that was predictable.

0:30:47.160 --> 0:30:50.440
<v Speaker 1>At that time, Emilt was hoping that Alston would become

0:30:50.440 --> 0:30:53.480
<v Speaker 1>a key component in g ees Power division. He thought

0:30:53.560 --> 0:30:56.200
<v Speaker 1>that GE could take this French company which had been

0:30:56.200 --> 0:31:00.400
<v Speaker 1>struggling financially and used GES processes and pra this is

0:31:00.640 --> 0:31:03.840
<v Speaker 1>to turn Alstom around. Then he would use Alstom to

0:31:03.880 --> 0:31:06.479
<v Speaker 1>meet the electricity demands of clients all over the world,

0:31:06.920 --> 0:31:12.160
<v Speaker 1>and all with fossil fuel based turbines. So what went wrong, Well,

0:31:12.160 --> 0:31:22.480
<v Speaker 1>I'll tell you after we take this quick break. Not

0:31:22.640 --> 0:31:26.840
<v Speaker 1>everyone at g was crazy about acquiring Alstom. Several executives

0:31:26.840 --> 0:31:29.640
<v Speaker 1>felt that the asking price was far too high, but

0:31:29.760 --> 0:31:33.040
<v Speaker 1>Emma was optimistic that g E could take Alstom and

0:31:33.120 --> 0:31:36.040
<v Speaker 1>turn it into a profitable business. As it turns out,

0:31:36.240 --> 0:31:38.240
<v Speaker 1>he wouldn't get the chance to stick around long enough

0:31:38.280 --> 0:31:41.800
<v Speaker 1>to see how far Allston would fall. But I'm not

0:31:41.880 --> 0:31:45.800
<v Speaker 1>quite there yet. GE needed to do something. The company's

0:31:45.840 --> 0:31:49.440
<v Speaker 1>oil and gas services, which revolved around actually extracting oil,

0:31:49.480 --> 0:31:51.640
<v Speaker 1>you know, making the equipment that would be used for

0:31:51.640 --> 0:31:54.160
<v Speaker 1>that sort of stuff. Those were on the decline as

0:31:54.280 --> 0:31:58.160
<v Speaker 1>energy prices were collapsing. But the power division, GE Power,

0:31:58.600 --> 0:32:01.480
<v Speaker 1>the part of GE that actually reduced equipment that was

0:32:01.600 --> 0:32:05.360
<v Speaker 1>used to generate electricity that was still a reliable revenue source.

0:32:05.400 --> 0:32:08.040
<v Speaker 1>In fact, at that point it was the largest source

0:32:08.120 --> 0:32:10.920
<v Speaker 1>of revenue for GE, and it had a high profit

0:32:10.960 --> 0:32:13.400
<v Speaker 1>margin to boot. G E made a lot of money

0:32:13.560 --> 0:32:16.120
<v Speaker 1>from that particular division. So if g E could do

0:32:16.160 --> 0:32:19.040
<v Speaker 1>the same thing for Alstom and turn things around, then

0:32:19.160 --> 0:32:21.680
<v Speaker 1>in Emilt's mind, the company would have a rock solid

0:32:21.720 --> 0:32:24.960
<v Speaker 1>foundation from which to work. But a few big factors

0:32:25.160 --> 0:32:28.680
<v Speaker 1>would hamper the success of Alstom. One was that there

0:32:28.720 --> 0:32:31.560
<v Speaker 1>just wasn't as big a demand for turbines as Emilt

0:32:31.640 --> 0:32:34.640
<v Speaker 1>had anticipated. They got fewer orders than what they were

0:32:34.640 --> 0:32:38.200
<v Speaker 1>hoping for. In places like the United States, power companies

0:32:38.240 --> 0:32:41.320
<v Speaker 1>were improving efficiencies and so they were able to do

0:32:41.400 --> 0:32:43.800
<v Speaker 1>more with less. There wasn't as big a demand to

0:32:43.960 --> 0:32:48.840
<v Speaker 1>add additional infrastructure to meet consumer needs. Then there was

0:32:48.880 --> 0:32:52.560
<v Speaker 1>the fact that Alstom's employees were very highly compensated, which

0:32:52.600 --> 0:32:56.360
<v Speaker 1>was good for them, but rough for GE. And regulations

0:32:56.360 --> 0:32:59.160
<v Speaker 1>in the EU meant that Emilt couldn't just pull a

0:32:59.320 --> 0:33:02.840
<v Speaker 1>jack well and start laying off employees in an effort

0:33:02.880 --> 0:33:06.360
<v Speaker 1>to cut costs. EU had protections in place to prevent

0:33:06.400 --> 0:33:08.760
<v Speaker 1>that sort of thing, so you couldn't just make the

0:33:09.480 --> 0:33:11.760
<v Speaker 1>books look better by laying off a bunch of people.

0:33:12.040 --> 0:33:14.880
<v Speaker 1>And the EU also blocked one part of the business

0:33:15.120 --> 0:33:18.920
<v Speaker 1>from GE acquiring it. That was Alstom's service business, their

0:33:18.960 --> 0:33:22.120
<v Speaker 1>maintenance business that would have supplied revenue as the company

0:33:22.120 --> 0:33:25.800
<v Speaker 1>would provide maintenance services for its clients. That was off limits.

0:33:26.280 --> 0:33:28.480
<v Speaker 1>And the other major factor was that the cost of

0:33:28.520 --> 0:33:33.440
<v Speaker 1>building out renewable energy systems fell drastically not long after

0:33:33.520 --> 0:33:37.520
<v Speaker 1>GE completed the ten billion dollar acquisition of Alstom in

0:33:37.560 --> 0:33:40.800
<v Speaker 1>two thousand fifteen, So it looked like the wrong bet

0:33:41.120 --> 0:33:46.560
<v Speaker 1>right buying a very expensive fossil fuel based company just

0:33:46.600 --> 0:33:50.440
<v Speaker 1>as renewable energy prices were falling to the point where

0:33:50.480 --> 0:33:55.200
<v Speaker 1>they were uh they could compete against fossil fuels. Now,

0:33:55.240 --> 0:33:58.720
<v Speaker 1>around the same time that the Alstom deal was starting

0:33:58.720 --> 0:34:02.400
<v Speaker 1>to take shape, GE would spin off its credit card business,

0:34:02.720 --> 0:34:05.040
<v Speaker 1>which was part of GE Capital, and it would become

0:34:05.240 --> 0:34:09.080
<v Speaker 1>Synchrony Financial. And I'm guessing it filled a lot of

0:34:09.120 --> 0:34:11.200
<v Speaker 1>folks at GE with a bit of dismay to see

0:34:11.239 --> 0:34:14.640
<v Speaker 1>that once it was free of General Electric, this former

0:34:14.719 --> 0:34:18.400
<v Speaker 1>division actually outperformed all expectations. It did much better on

0:34:18.440 --> 0:34:20.960
<v Speaker 1>its own than it did as part of General Electric.

0:34:21.239 --> 0:34:24.480
<v Speaker 1>On top of that, the oil price crash pushed GE

0:34:24.480 --> 0:34:27.279
<v Speaker 1>to merge its own oil and gas division with a

0:34:27.320 --> 0:34:31.280
<v Speaker 1>company called Baker Hughes, and then g E got a

0:34:31.320 --> 0:34:34.960
<v Speaker 1>majority ownership in the Baker Hughes company became Baker Hughes

0:34:35.080 --> 0:34:38.200
<v Speaker 1>a GE company, at least for the time. Oh and

0:34:38.320 --> 0:34:42.400
<v Speaker 1>two thousand fifteen, GE formed a unit called g E Digital.

0:34:42.719 --> 0:34:45.240
<v Speaker 1>G E had been in various digital products for a while,

0:34:45.280 --> 0:34:48.160
<v Speaker 1>but marked the move for the company to create an

0:34:48.200 --> 0:34:51.960
<v Speaker 1>independent business unit. Most of the unit's focus was on

0:34:52.000 --> 0:34:56.239
<v Speaker 1>a software product called Predicts, sort of a play on Prediction,

0:34:56.800 --> 0:34:59.880
<v Speaker 1>and it was a business to business product. It was

0:35:00.000 --> 0:35:04.560
<v Speaker 1>meant to help big companies like airlines identify strategies and

0:35:04.640 --> 0:35:08.080
<v Speaker 1>managed assets. But over time that unit would experience slow

0:35:08.160 --> 0:35:11.960
<v Speaker 1>revenues and technical issues, and in eighteen there was real

0:35:12.040 --> 0:35:15.960
<v Speaker 1>serious talk of GE potentially selling off the division entirely.

0:35:16.560 --> 0:35:19.920
<v Speaker 1>That is yet to happen. GE Digital still as part

0:35:19.960 --> 0:35:23.560
<v Speaker 1>of GE, but GE did do a few rounds of layoffs,

0:35:24.080 --> 0:35:27.200
<v Speaker 1>so things have not gone smoothly for that part of

0:35:27.239 --> 0:35:30.839
<v Speaker 1>the company. Back to GS leadership woes. In October two

0:35:30.840 --> 0:35:34.040
<v Speaker 1>thousand seventeen, GE announced that Jeff Emilt would be stepping

0:35:34.080 --> 0:35:36.799
<v Speaker 1>down as CEO, and he had served in that role

0:35:36.840 --> 0:35:40.840
<v Speaker 1>for about sixteen years. The company's stock price was around

0:35:40.840 --> 0:35:43.160
<v Speaker 1>a third of what it had been when he took control.

0:35:43.560 --> 0:35:47.480
<v Speaker 1>Emerald had spun off numerous businesses over the years, including

0:35:47.520 --> 0:35:51.239
<v Speaker 1>gees plastics division, if you remember, that's the division that

0:35:51.360 --> 0:35:55.239
<v Speaker 1>Jack Welch had actually come to. He had also spun

0:35:55.280 --> 0:35:59.720
<v Speaker 1>off the appliances business. He's spun off the insurance business,

0:35:59.840 --> 0:36:02.279
<v Speaker 1>or a lot of it anyway, and more. And by

0:36:02.320 --> 0:36:04.840
<v Speaker 1>that time much of the upper leadership at g E

0:36:05.640 --> 0:36:08.000
<v Speaker 1>got caught in a shake up. There were members of

0:36:08.040 --> 0:36:11.000
<v Speaker 1>the board who left, there were other executive members who left,

0:36:11.320 --> 0:36:14.640
<v Speaker 1>and investors, employees, and retirees were all growing more and

0:36:14.680 --> 0:36:18.040
<v Speaker 1>more unhappy. The company had lost and estimated one hundred

0:36:18.160 --> 0:36:22.360
<v Speaker 1>billion dollars worth of shareholder wealth over the previous decade

0:36:22.360 --> 0:36:25.680
<v Speaker 1>and a half. Critics stated the Emilt had a habit

0:36:25.719 --> 0:36:29.280
<v Speaker 1>of chasing after fads, investing in businesses at the peak

0:36:29.440 --> 0:36:32.279
<v Speaker 1>of their visibility and then later selling them off for

0:36:32.440 --> 0:36:34.520
<v Speaker 1>less than what g had paid for them in the

0:36:34.520 --> 0:36:37.040
<v Speaker 1>first place. And people said the ge method was to

0:36:37.120 --> 0:36:40.440
<v Speaker 1>buy high sell low, which in general is the opposite

0:36:40.440 --> 0:36:43.320
<v Speaker 1>of what you want to do. I think O don't. No,

0:36:43.400 --> 0:36:46.279
<v Speaker 1>I'm not a business guy. Not every deal Emilt made

0:36:46.280 --> 0:36:48.640
<v Speaker 1>went sour, by the way, the in Ron deal in

0:36:48.640 --> 0:36:51.520
<v Speaker 1>which g took over that wind power business ended up

0:36:51.520 --> 0:36:55.800
<v Speaker 1>being very profitable, though again Emilt initially opposed that deal,

0:36:56.440 --> 0:36:59.520
<v Speaker 1>and when GE sold off its plastics division it was

0:36:59.600 --> 0:37:02.600
<v Speaker 1>for a higher price than what a lot of analysts expected,

0:37:02.840 --> 0:37:06.400
<v Speaker 1>but generally speaking, the deals didn't break in gees favor

0:37:06.560 --> 0:37:10.879
<v Speaker 1>under Emilt's watch. Emeralt's successor was John Flannery, who had

0:37:10.960 --> 0:37:14.640
<v Speaker 1>up to that point headed up gees healthcare business and

0:37:14.719 --> 0:37:18.319
<v Speaker 1>had worked for GE for thirty years. Flannery's goal was

0:37:18.360 --> 0:37:22.440
<v Speaker 1>to build a strong core for GE around its aviation business,

0:37:22.440 --> 0:37:26.160
<v Speaker 1>its power business, and its healthcare business, and there was

0:37:26.239 --> 0:37:29.280
<v Speaker 1>talk of the possibility that GE itself might break apart

0:37:29.360 --> 0:37:34.200
<v Speaker 1>into several different companies. The reaction to that idea kind

0:37:34.200 --> 0:37:36.919
<v Speaker 1>of fell across the spectrum. Some people saw it as

0:37:36.960 --> 0:37:40.640
<v Speaker 1>a necessity if the various parts of GE were to stabilize.

0:37:41.000 --> 0:37:44.239
<v Speaker 1>Others saw it as the end of a legacy, and

0:37:44.400 --> 0:37:45.880
<v Speaker 1>they had a bit of a point. One of the

0:37:45.920 --> 0:37:50.400
<v Speaker 1>discussions was about possibly selling off ges lightbulb business that

0:37:50.520 --> 0:37:54.160
<v Speaker 1>was the business that started it all, really all the

0:37:54.160 --> 0:37:57.080
<v Speaker 1>way back in eight seventy eight and the Edison Electric

0:37:57.200 --> 0:38:00.880
<v Speaker 1>Light Company. But innovation could sometimes be a double edged sword.

0:38:01.239 --> 0:38:04.200
<v Speaker 1>The move towards l e ED lights, which can last

0:38:04.280 --> 0:38:07.640
<v Speaker 1>for thousands of hours, meant that there just wasn't as

0:38:07.680 --> 0:38:10.000
<v Speaker 1>big a demand for light bulbs anymore. Because if you

0:38:10.000 --> 0:38:12.719
<v Speaker 1>don't have to worry about the lightbulb burning out on

0:38:12.760 --> 0:38:15.879
<v Speaker 1>a regular basis, there's not much call to buy new ones.

0:38:15.960 --> 0:38:18.359
<v Speaker 1>You just buy the l e ed s. You might

0:38:18.440 --> 0:38:21.480
<v Speaker 1>sell your house before you ever have to change that lightbulb.

0:38:21.800 --> 0:38:24.680
<v Speaker 1>So lightbulb sales were starting to drop. There just wasn't

0:38:24.920 --> 0:38:27.640
<v Speaker 1>enough call for them. I bet it made GE long

0:38:27.719 --> 0:38:30.319
<v Speaker 1>for the days when it had formed that secret lightbulb

0:38:30.440 --> 0:38:33.640
<v Speaker 1>Cartel in which companies agreed to limit the useful life

0:38:33.680 --> 0:38:36.520
<v Speaker 1>of a lightbulb through engineering. And things were rough for

0:38:36.560 --> 0:38:40.000
<v Speaker 1>shareholders too. Since GE had cut its dividend payouts a

0:38:40.000 --> 0:38:43.759
<v Speaker 1>few years earlier, the payouts had slowly increased again. They

0:38:43.760 --> 0:38:46.879
<v Speaker 1>had grown up to twenty four cents per share, so

0:38:47.000 --> 0:38:49.560
<v Speaker 1>that was an improvement. It was still below the thirty

0:38:49.600 --> 0:38:52.160
<v Speaker 1>one cents that it it had been at its peak,

0:38:52.480 --> 0:38:57.160
<v Speaker 1>but it was better. But in late, G had to

0:38:57.200 --> 0:39:00.560
<v Speaker 1>cut the dividend again, that time down to twelve sense,

0:39:01.000 --> 0:39:03.680
<v Speaker 1>and then not too long after that they were forced

0:39:03.680 --> 0:39:06.520
<v Speaker 1>to do another cut. They just realized that there just

0:39:06.640 --> 0:39:09.640
<v Speaker 1>wasn't enough money to cover the dividend payout, so the

0:39:09.719 --> 0:39:13.520
<v Speaker 1>dividend got cut down to just one cent per share.

0:39:14.000 --> 0:39:17.120
<v Speaker 1>It just didn't have the money to cover the payments otherwise.

0:39:17.760 --> 0:39:21.760
<v Speaker 1>In addition, G was having to deal with an unexpected cost.

0:39:22.160 --> 0:39:25.560
<v Speaker 1>The company had not issued any long term care insurance

0:39:25.600 --> 0:39:28.399
<v Speaker 1>policies since two thousand six, and in fact, it had

0:39:28.400 --> 0:39:32.160
<v Speaker 1>spun off almost its entire insurance business with a company

0:39:32.160 --> 0:39:35.920
<v Speaker 1>called gen Worth. However, in order to make that deal happen,

0:39:36.560 --> 0:39:40.080
<v Speaker 1>GE was forced to agree to cover any losses from

0:39:40.160 --> 0:39:43.040
<v Speaker 1>long term care insurance. It was just seen as too

0:39:43.080 --> 0:39:48.960
<v Speaker 1>great a financial risk otherwise, so GE signed that agreement. Now,

0:39:49.000 --> 0:39:52.000
<v Speaker 1>those long term care agreements are policies that are meant

0:39:52.040 --> 0:39:55.560
<v Speaker 1>to cover the elderly, and it turned out that insures,

0:39:55.600 --> 0:39:58.520
<v Speaker 1>not just a g E, but across the industry, had

0:39:58.600 --> 0:40:03.480
<v Speaker 1>underestimated how long policy holders would actually live, and the

0:40:03.520 --> 0:40:07.399
<v Speaker 1>medical costs, including things like nursing home fees, would tend

0:40:07.440 --> 0:40:10.440
<v Speaker 1>to get higher as customers got older. So as people

0:40:10.520 --> 0:40:14.280
<v Speaker 1>lived longer, they were creating a larger and larger drain

0:40:14.440 --> 0:40:17.719
<v Speaker 1>on resources for these insurance companies. Like if you looked

0:40:17.760 --> 0:40:21.000
<v Speaker 1>at it from a financial perspective, the person who was

0:40:21.040 --> 0:40:24.399
<v Speaker 1>paying for the policy was getting way more benefits out

0:40:24.400 --> 0:40:28.319
<v Speaker 1>of it than they were paying into it, and that

0:40:28.440 --> 0:40:32.440
<v Speaker 1>was an issue. So this was a huge cost for GE,

0:40:32.600 --> 0:40:34.719
<v Speaker 1>and it's no wonder that the company was continuing to

0:40:34.760 --> 0:40:37.480
<v Speaker 1>try and find ways to get completely out of the

0:40:37.520 --> 0:40:41.440
<v Speaker 1>insurance business. Now. To meet the obligation, Flannery had to

0:40:41.480 --> 0:40:46.440
<v Speaker 1>redirect fifteen billion dollars of GES wealth in two thousand

0:40:46.480 --> 0:40:50.600
<v Speaker 1>eighteen just to cover the obligations of that insurance policy stuff.

0:40:51.120 --> 0:40:52.759
<v Speaker 1>And the company was also hit with a seven and

0:40:52.760 --> 0:40:56.680
<v Speaker 1>a half billion dollar after tax charge, so things were

0:40:56.719 --> 0:40:59.839
<v Speaker 1>really rough. Also in two thousand eighteen, GE would leave

0:41:00.120 --> 0:41:03.440
<v Speaker 1>the dal Jones Industrial Average. If you listen to my

0:41:03.480 --> 0:41:06.840
<v Speaker 1>previous episodes, you remember that GE was one of the

0:41:06.880 --> 0:41:10.960
<v Speaker 1>original companies listed on that average when it was first created,

0:41:11.360 --> 0:41:14.520
<v Speaker 1>and it was the only company of that original list

0:41:14.760 --> 0:41:17.560
<v Speaker 1>that still existed in two thousand eighteen. It had been

0:41:17.600 --> 0:41:21.880
<v Speaker 1>part of the Dow Industrial Average for a hundred eleven years.

0:41:22.440 --> 0:41:25.120
<v Speaker 1>But the performance of the company, along with the perception

0:41:25.160 --> 0:41:29.319
<v Speaker 1>that industrial companies in general weren't really key indicators for

0:41:29.360 --> 0:41:33.160
<v Speaker 1>overall market performance meant that those days were over, so

0:41:33.440 --> 0:41:35.799
<v Speaker 1>in its place, a different company would join the DOW.

0:41:36.000 --> 0:41:41.360
<v Speaker 1>That was Walgreen's Boots Alliance drug store chain company. Meanwhile,

0:41:41.760 --> 0:41:45.680
<v Speaker 1>a problem with most recent heavy duty gas turbines caused

0:41:45.719 --> 0:41:49.239
<v Speaker 1>other issues for General Electric. A utility in Texas had

0:41:49.239 --> 0:41:53.200
<v Speaker 1>to shut down two different power plants for repairs due

0:41:53.239 --> 0:41:56.239
<v Speaker 1>to failures with these new turbines. That news would end

0:41:56.320 --> 0:41:59.759
<v Speaker 1>up hurting GE power sales, which weren't doing super a

0:41:59.760 --> 0:42:03.480
<v Speaker 1>gray at that moment. Already, Flannery's efforts were seen as

0:42:03.560 --> 0:42:06.359
<v Speaker 1>insufficient by the board of directors, and on October one,

0:42:06.440 --> 0:42:09.560
<v Speaker 1>two thousand eighteen, the company announced that Flannery had been

0:42:09.560 --> 0:42:13.120
<v Speaker 1>removed from the position of chairman and CEO, and the

0:42:13.200 --> 0:42:17.200
<v Speaker 1>board appointed an outsider, Lawrence Culp, to serve as the

0:42:17.200 --> 0:42:21.040
<v Speaker 1>new chairman and CEO. Flannery had been CEO for about

0:42:21.080 --> 0:42:24.839
<v Speaker 1>fourteen months and then he was out. That would give

0:42:24.840 --> 0:42:29.280
<v Speaker 1>Flannery the unenviable distinction of having served the least amount

0:42:29.280 --> 0:42:32.960
<v Speaker 1>of time as CEO of all g e C e

0:42:33.160 --> 0:42:36.880
<v Speaker 1>O s, at least so far. Culp would be the

0:42:37.000 --> 0:42:40.640
<v Speaker 1>third CEO to lead the company since two thousand seventeen.

0:42:41.239 --> 0:42:44.640
<v Speaker 1>The company Culp took over, was in turmoil and there

0:42:44.640 --> 0:42:48.839
<v Speaker 1>were pending investigations into g S accounting practices, which had

0:42:48.880 --> 0:42:52.040
<v Speaker 1>for years, as I said earlier, been described as opaque.

0:42:52.200 --> 0:42:54.200
<v Speaker 1>It's polite way of saying the company wasn't making it

0:42:54.280 --> 0:42:56.600
<v Speaker 1>easy to see where money was coming from or where

0:42:56.600 --> 0:43:00.560
<v Speaker 1>it was going to. G E had already settled sec

0:43:01.880 --> 0:43:05.280
<v Speaker 1>charges in the past, but there were others that sought

0:43:05.320 --> 0:43:07.759
<v Speaker 1>to find out more about the finances of the company.

0:43:07.840 --> 0:43:12.080
<v Speaker 1>And then, of course there was no recent report from Marcopolis,

0:43:12.080 --> 0:43:14.759
<v Speaker 1>the guy who was one of the early whistleblowers on

0:43:14.800 --> 0:43:17.840
<v Speaker 1>Bernie made Off before everyone was aware of the Ponzi

0:43:17.880 --> 0:43:22.120
<v Speaker 1>scheme that made Off was running. The Marcopolis report alleges

0:43:22.160 --> 0:43:25.640
<v Speaker 1>that GE is essentially robbing Peter to pay Paul, shifting

0:43:25.840 --> 0:43:30.160
<v Speaker 1>cash around frantically to fend off insolvency. It's kind of

0:43:30.200 --> 0:43:33.840
<v Speaker 1>like a shell game to trying to move money around

0:43:34.040 --> 0:43:37.200
<v Speaker 1>fast enough so that the company doesn't collapse. G E,

0:43:37.400 --> 0:43:40.520
<v Speaker 1>I should add, disputes this report and says that the

0:43:40.560 --> 0:43:44.960
<v Speaker 1>allegations are baseless and it cannot be ignored that Marcopolis

0:43:45.040 --> 0:43:47.640
<v Speaker 1>himself actually stands to make a lot of money should

0:43:47.719 --> 0:43:51.799
<v Speaker 1>ges stocks decline and value. So you could argue there

0:43:51.920 --> 0:43:55.960
<v Speaker 1>is a motive for Marcopolis to try and drag ges

0:43:56.080 --> 0:43:59.279
<v Speaker 1>name in the mud. Uh So their valid arguments on

0:43:59.320 --> 0:44:02.600
<v Speaker 1>either side about whether or not this report is something

0:44:02.760 --> 0:44:05.680
<v Speaker 1>you should pay attention to or if it's something that

0:44:05.840 --> 0:44:11.560
<v Speaker 1>has ulterior motivations behind it. That being said, the fact

0:44:11.560 --> 0:44:14.319
<v Speaker 1>that the Marcopolist report came out doesn't change the fact

0:44:14.360 --> 0:44:19.600
<v Speaker 1>that there were already numerous investigations government investigations into g

0:44:20.000 --> 0:44:23.400
<v Speaker 1>S businesses that could end up hindering the company further.

0:44:23.840 --> 0:44:28.320
<v Speaker 1>So there seems to be smoke. There's just a question

0:44:28.360 --> 0:44:31.400
<v Speaker 1>of is the fire what Marcoupolists is saying or is

0:44:31.440 --> 0:44:34.480
<v Speaker 1>it something else? On top of all the problems the

0:44:34.480 --> 0:44:39.520
<v Speaker 1>company faces is another external force that could really spell doom.

0:44:39.560 --> 0:44:45.320
<v Speaker 1>Many financial analysts say that signs point to another global recession. Already,

0:44:45.440 --> 0:44:49.080
<v Speaker 1>industries like manufacturing and freight are in a bit of

0:44:49.080 --> 0:44:53.840
<v Speaker 1>a slide, so a recession would greatly exacerbate general electrics problems.

0:44:53.960 --> 0:44:57.239
<v Speaker 1>So are we seeing the end of days for a

0:44:57.280 --> 0:45:00.960
<v Speaker 1>company that helped launch the technological age? I don't know.

0:45:01.480 --> 0:45:03.920
<v Speaker 1>I don't feel great about it, but it is a

0:45:04.000 --> 0:45:07.640
<v Speaker 1>very large company. It's not like any of these things

0:45:07.880 --> 0:45:12.399
<v Speaker 1>is definitively the death knell for General Electric. And there's

0:45:12.400 --> 0:45:14.160
<v Speaker 1>a lot of stuff that could happen. We could see

0:45:14.200 --> 0:45:18.160
<v Speaker 1>GE get broken up into smaller companies that individually are

0:45:18.200 --> 0:45:21.520
<v Speaker 1>able to succeed much better than they can collectively. All

0:45:21.520 --> 0:45:25.279
<v Speaker 1>of that remains to be seen, but it was fascinating

0:45:25.400 --> 0:45:30.799
<v Speaker 1>to learn more about this company's incredible, rich history. And UH.

0:45:30.880 --> 0:45:33.400
<v Speaker 1>I know that this last section was much lighter on

0:45:33.400 --> 0:45:35.759
<v Speaker 1>the tech side, as I said at the beginning, but

0:45:35.960 --> 0:45:38.080
<v Speaker 1>at the same time, I thought it was important for

0:45:38.120 --> 0:45:41.200
<v Speaker 1>us to understand how a company that had been so

0:45:41.320 --> 0:45:46.760
<v Speaker 1>instrumental in setting the tone for the technological age could

0:45:46.760 --> 0:45:52.760
<v Speaker 1>be facing extinction UH in two thousand nineteen. So here's

0:45:52.760 --> 0:45:57.320
<v Speaker 1>hoping that things turn around for GE, that the company

0:45:57.360 --> 0:46:02.080
<v Speaker 1>is able to reconcile all these accounting practices, that it

0:46:02.239 --> 0:46:07.319
<v Speaker 1>is able to deliver value two employees to customers, to retirees,

0:46:07.880 --> 0:46:13.480
<v Speaker 1>and two shareholders, not just two shareholders. And that wraps

0:46:13.600 --> 0:46:16.760
<v Speaker 1>up this episode. If you have suggestions for future topics

0:46:16.760 --> 0:46:19.600
<v Speaker 1>of tech stuff, whether it's a company, a technology, a

0:46:19.719 --> 0:46:24.000
<v Speaker 1>concept in tech, anything like that, let me know send

0:46:24.000 --> 0:46:26.720
<v Speaker 1>me an email the addresses tech stuff at how stuff

0:46:26.719 --> 0:46:29.680
<v Speaker 1>works dot com, or draw me a line on Facebook

0:46:29.760 --> 0:46:31.600
<v Speaker 1>or Twitter. The handle of both of those is text

0:46:31.640 --> 0:46:34.600
<v Speaker 1>Stuff hs W. You can also pop on over to

0:46:34.600 --> 0:46:37.759
<v Speaker 1>our website that's tech stuff podcast dot com. You've got

0:46:37.760 --> 0:46:39.759
<v Speaker 1>to find a link to the archive of all of

0:46:39.760 --> 0:46:42.000
<v Speaker 1>our previous episodes there, so you can look up all

0:46:42.040 --> 0:46:45.440
<v Speaker 1>the different stuff we talked about, including the previous episodes

0:46:45.480 --> 0:46:47.960
<v Speaker 1>I did on g S History where Chris Pallette and

0:46:48.000 --> 0:46:50.040
<v Speaker 1>I sat down and talked about it. But the show

0:46:50.160 --> 0:46:52.000
<v Speaker 1>was very different back in those days. But if you

0:46:52.000 --> 0:46:54.439
<v Speaker 1>want to hear a different take on this same sort

0:46:54.480 --> 0:46:57.319
<v Speaker 1>of stuff, you can check that out. That one came out,

0:46:57.360 --> 0:47:00.960
<v Speaker 1>I believe in two thousand twelve. And don't forget. We

0:47:01.000 --> 0:47:04.040
<v Speaker 1>also have a link to our online store where every

0:47:04.080 --> 0:47:06.520
<v Speaker 1>purchase you make goes to help the show and we

0:47:06.719 --> 0:47:09.520
<v Speaker 1>greatly appreciate it, and I will talk to you again

0:47:10.480 --> 0:47:18.880
<v Speaker 1>really soon. Text Stuff is an I Heart Radio production.

0:47:19.120 --> 0:47:21.920
<v Speaker 1>For more podcasts from I Heart Radio, visit the i

0:47:22.040 --> 0:47:25.279
<v Speaker 1>Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to

0:47:25.320 --> 0:47:26.240
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