1 00:00:00,400 --> 00:00:04,840 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers. Since government conspiracies, history is 2 00:00:04,920 --> 00:00:09,240 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events, you can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,360 --> 00:00:20,360 Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. Welcome 4 00:00:20,360 --> 00:00:22,000 Speaker 1: back to the show. My name is Matt, my name 5 00:00:22,040 --> 00:00:24,480 Speaker 1: is Noel. I'm Ben. You are you that makes this 6 00:00:24,560 --> 00:00:27,600 Speaker 1: stuff they don't want you to know? But not the 7 00:00:27,680 --> 00:00:30,600 Speaker 1: average episode of stuff they don't want you to know? 8 00:00:30,720 --> 00:00:33,240 Speaker 1: Isn't that right? Guess we've got a little added value 9 00:00:33,280 --> 00:00:37,199 Speaker 1: here in this particular pair of episodes. This is this 10 00:00:37,240 --> 00:00:40,839 Speaker 1: our first ever two partner Uh No, I don't think so. 11 00:00:41,080 --> 00:00:43,720 Speaker 1: I know we've we split DARPA up into two and 12 00:00:43,720 --> 00:00:46,239 Speaker 1: there were a couple other ones that we well, this 13 00:00:46,280 --> 00:00:50,280 Speaker 1: is definitely our first ever two part interview episode. It's 14 00:00:50,360 --> 00:00:54,720 Speaker 1: true about the same thing. So, by way of explanation, 15 00:00:54,840 --> 00:00:58,080 Speaker 1: ladies and gentlemen, you have heard Matt Nolan I refer 16 00:00:58,240 --> 00:01:02,200 Speaker 1: to uh or allude to various adventures that we've taken 17 00:01:02,280 --> 00:01:04,479 Speaker 1: or new things that we said we're coming or we're 18 00:01:04,560 --> 00:01:07,920 Speaker 1: on the way. We get around, we get around and uh, 19 00:01:08,080 --> 00:01:12,800 Speaker 1: this time we got around too. Uh. We got around 20 00:01:12,800 --> 00:01:16,200 Speaker 1: to a part of the world, at least socially speaking, 21 00:01:16,240 --> 00:01:20,240 Speaker 1: that we haven't really explored into much depth, and that 22 00:01:20,440 --> 00:01:29,720 Speaker 1: was a it concerned a tale that is stranger than fiction. 23 00:01:30,160 --> 00:01:36,080 Speaker 1: So you've heard of undercover operations, right, Like, what what 24 00:01:36,240 --> 00:01:40,920 Speaker 1: exactly is an undercover operation? It's pretty simple. One person 25 00:01:41,080 --> 00:01:44,919 Speaker 1: who is usually in law enforcement in some way, pretends 26 00:01:45,040 --> 00:01:49,560 Speaker 1: to be let's say, uh, a nefarious gang member from 27 00:01:49,600 --> 00:01:51,720 Speaker 1: a different part of town or new to town. But 28 00:01:51,840 --> 00:01:54,760 Speaker 1: I'm in all this bad stuff like I I like 29 00:01:54,880 --> 00:01:58,600 Speaker 1: to let's say, launder money or maybe deal drugs, maybe 30 00:01:58,600 --> 00:02:01,360 Speaker 1: torture kittens. Yeah, do one of those things get in 31 00:02:01,400 --> 00:02:04,520 Speaker 1: with a crew like low level maybe something like that. 32 00:02:04,600 --> 00:02:06,440 Speaker 1: And that's a distinction that we need to make right 33 00:02:06,520 --> 00:02:11,440 Speaker 1: up front. There are certainly different kinds of undercover operations. 34 00:02:11,480 --> 00:02:15,320 Speaker 1: Some might just be for a particular sting where you 35 00:02:15,360 --> 00:02:18,400 Speaker 1: have a cop posing as as one of these various 36 00:02:18,400 --> 00:02:21,760 Speaker 1: types you mentioned. But what we're talking about today is 37 00:02:21,919 --> 00:02:26,400 Speaker 1: long term, deep undercover operations, which is a whole another 38 00:02:26,480 --> 00:02:30,360 Speaker 1: ball game, a very dangerous one indeed. So just to 39 00:02:30,440 --> 00:02:34,280 Speaker 1: illustrate the difference pretty quickly, one of the rules has 40 00:02:34,320 --> 00:02:37,239 Speaker 1: always keep things as close to the truth as possible 41 00:02:37,280 --> 00:02:41,800 Speaker 1: so you don't compromise your actual identity. So Matt Frederick, 42 00:02:41,880 --> 00:02:44,720 Speaker 1: then for instance, if is there, okay, if we make 43 00:02:44,760 --> 00:02:48,640 Speaker 1: you street level, sure, okay. So Matt Frederick then is 44 00:02:49,040 --> 00:02:54,280 Speaker 1: assigned to do some street level infiltration of maybe someone's 45 00:02:54,320 --> 00:02:57,720 Speaker 1: selling what's a drug? Well, I have to go in 46 00:02:57,720 --> 00:03:02,280 Speaker 1: and infiltrate stringer bells like low level crew. So I've 47 00:03:02,280 --> 00:03:05,840 Speaker 1: got again get in with the the group who's selling 48 00:03:05,919 --> 00:03:09,839 Speaker 1: drugs out of the apartment. Yeah. So okay, so you 49 00:03:10,280 --> 00:03:16,400 Speaker 1: become Matt Frederick is gone and replaced by Murdoch Farnsworth. 50 00:03:18,320 --> 00:03:22,480 Speaker 1: That name I've ever heard of my life, Murdoch Farnsworth. 51 00:03:22,560 --> 00:03:26,960 Speaker 1: I think people just call your Murdoch. Murdoch Farnsworth has 52 00:03:27,000 --> 00:03:30,079 Speaker 1: a c I or an informant who comes along with 53 00:03:30,200 --> 00:03:32,960 Speaker 1: him to vouch for him from their days in an 54 00:03:33,200 --> 00:03:37,560 Speaker 1: outlaw biker gang or something. Right, And the weird thing 55 00:03:37,680 --> 00:03:41,480 Speaker 1: is that at some points, uh, Murdoch is going to 56 00:03:41,560 --> 00:03:44,760 Speaker 1: have to do things that Matt Frederick would never do, 57 00:03:45,080 --> 00:03:48,760 Speaker 1: you know, properly sample a drug at some point, possibly 58 00:03:48,800 --> 00:03:52,960 Speaker 1: because there's a lot of the streets order people might stuff, yeah, 59 00:03:53,080 --> 00:03:57,000 Speaker 1: other illegal stuff, aiding a bets uh crimes, maybe rough 60 00:03:57,080 --> 00:04:00,000 Speaker 1: someone up to to show that you are Murdoch. Possible 61 00:04:00,160 --> 00:04:04,080 Speaker 1: even witness a murder that you could have prevented. Possibly 62 00:04:04,480 --> 00:04:07,920 Speaker 1: possibly not, because you know, I'm a little squeamish, and 63 00:04:07,960 --> 00:04:11,360 Speaker 1: the line blurs. And this line is even blurrier if 64 00:04:11,400 --> 00:04:15,960 Speaker 1: we take, for instance, uh, Noel Brown, and while Matt 65 00:04:16,000 --> 00:04:19,919 Speaker 1: Frederick is working at the street level operation, let's say 66 00:04:20,520 --> 00:04:26,320 Speaker 1: Noel Brown is infiltrating a human trafficking ring. This is 67 00:04:26,360 --> 00:04:31,120 Speaker 1: even stickier human trafficking ring because let's see he changes 68 00:04:31,160 --> 00:04:36,400 Speaker 1: his name. What's his name now, Matt Nicholas Barnaby, Yes, 69 00:04:36,760 --> 00:04:41,320 Speaker 1: Nicholas Barnaby, two first names, Nick Nicholas Barnaby, a well 70 00:04:41,360 --> 00:04:46,880 Speaker 1: old money, wealthy philanthropist who has and philanderer who has 71 00:04:46,960 --> 00:04:49,720 Speaker 1: decided that the only people you could trust in this 72 00:04:49,800 --> 00:04:54,960 Speaker 1: world are people that you own. And so he is infiltrating. Uh. 73 00:04:55,000 --> 00:04:59,560 Speaker 1: Sadly this is true because of Hartsfield Airport here in Atlanta. 74 00:04:59,680 --> 00:05:03,560 Speaker 1: It is a hub for human trafficking, so is you. 75 00:05:03,560 --> 00:05:07,839 Speaker 1: You would see, hopefully, ladies and gentlemen, how this undercover 76 00:05:08,400 --> 00:05:12,159 Speaker 1: steing kind of stuff can happen as an little set 77 00:05:12,200 --> 00:05:14,560 Speaker 1: for variety of recents. So we've got Murdoch on there 78 00:05:14,760 --> 00:05:18,120 Speaker 1: for maybe a few months, right, pulling everyone you can 79 00:05:18,600 --> 00:05:22,520 Speaker 1: maybe nab somebody, maybe the maybe there's something political where 80 00:05:22,520 --> 00:05:24,560 Speaker 1: you're involved, where they say, okay, now we need the 81 00:05:24,600 --> 00:05:28,360 Speaker 1: Bust because someone's coming up for election, which unfortunately happens. 82 00:05:28,560 --> 00:05:32,360 Speaker 1: But in the other case, we we have Mr Barnaby. 83 00:05:32,440 --> 00:05:35,600 Speaker 1: I am like embedded in this world. Yeah, yeah, I 84 00:05:35,640 --> 00:05:38,200 Speaker 1: am make I am playing the long game. I am 85 00:05:38,240 --> 00:05:42,200 Speaker 1: making connections, meeting people above those connections, and doing everything 86 00:05:42,240 --> 00:05:44,200 Speaker 1: in my power to make it as high up the 87 00:05:44,279 --> 00:05:46,839 Speaker 1: chain as possible so that I can turn those people 88 00:05:46,839 --> 00:05:50,200 Speaker 1: into my um the people that I answered to. And 89 00:05:50,279 --> 00:05:55,400 Speaker 1: should you, should either of you survive, Uh, this strange 90 00:05:55,880 --> 00:06:00,240 Speaker 1: and terrifying thing is that neither of you will will 91 00:06:00,360 --> 00:06:04,440 Speaker 1: be able to live fully return to your natural life 92 00:06:04,760 --> 00:06:09,240 Speaker 1: because there will always be concerns for your safety. Right. 93 00:06:09,440 --> 00:06:14,000 Speaker 1: What's going to happen when uh, the foreign connection for 94 00:06:14,080 --> 00:06:21,160 Speaker 1: whatever drug empire Murdoch Bust learns that Murdoch Farnsworth is fictitious, 95 00:06:22,320 --> 00:06:25,719 Speaker 1: but someone who looks a lot like them lives in 96 00:06:25,800 --> 00:06:29,440 Speaker 1: the same area. Sure, even if we successfully put people 97 00:06:29,480 --> 00:06:33,080 Speaker 1: away for years, maybe even a life sentence for twenty years, 98 00:06:33,480 --> 00:06:36,480 Speaker 1: in the future, those people will be out of jail. Well, 99 00:06:36,520 --> 00:06:39,160 Speaker 1: not only that, I mean if watching shows like oz 100 00:06:39,240 --> 00:06:42,200 Speaker 1: or you know the Sopranos teaches you anything, it's that 101 00:06:42,560 --> 00:06:44,599 Speaker 1: being in prison is not the end all be all. 102 00:06:44,640 --> 00:06:47,640 Speaker 1: You still have associates on the outside that you can 103 00:06:47,680 --> 00:06:51,479 Speaker 1: communicate with quite easily, especially if you're uh, you know, 104 00:06:51,600 --> 00:06:54,560 Speaker 1: a big player, and in that scene, you are protected 105 00:06:54,839 --> 00:06:58,320 Speaker 1: and you are surrounded by your people in prison, and 106 00:06:58,360 --> 00:07:00,640 Speaker 1: it's very easy to get a mess of gilt to 107 00:07:00,720 --> 00:07:03,400 Speaker 1: put out a hit, even from prison. So why are 108 00:07:03,400 --> 00:07:07,520 Speaker 1: we beating around the bush with all of this fantasy. Yes, 109 00:07:07,680 --> 00:07:12,120 Speaker 1: excellent question. Perhaps we're more painting the background of the 110 00:07:12,160 --> 00:07:20,480 Speaker 1: picture of today's topic, which is undercover policing, which which 111 00:07:20,640 --> 00:07:25,160 Speaker 1: is uh, these sting operations, these long term embedded things, 112 00:07:25,520 --> 00:07:29,560 Speaker 1: Ladies and gentlemen, Matt and Noel and I spoke with 113 00:07:29,920 --> 00:07:33,840 Speaker 1: someone who has done this in real life, and uh, 114 00:07:34,040 --> 00:07:36,800 Speaker 1: during the course of our interview, we've got a first 115 00:07:36,880 --> 00:07:42,559 Speaker 1: hand look at how these how these operations occur, both 116 00:07:42,560 --> 00:07:44,680 Speaker 1: of the good and the bad. And we do want 117 00:07:44,680 --> 00:07:49,800 Speaker 1: you to know that, due to security concerns, we have 118 00:07:50,040 --> 00:07:54,440 Speaker 1: had to mask this person's voice. Uh. This man's name 119 00:07:54,800 --> 00:07:58,560 Speaker 1: is Robert Maser. Now, last Friday, Ben and Alan I 120 00:07:58,600 --> 00:08:02,080 Speaker 1: got to go and see a film, The Infiltrator, which 121 00:08:02,480 --> 00:08:05,160 Speaker 1: is based on the book that this man, Robert Maser 122 00:08:05,240 --> 00:08:12,920 Speaker 1: wrote about his time infiltrating the the Medine cartel in Colombia. Now, 123 00:08:13,960 --> 00:08:17,480 Speaker 1: this show is going to focus a lot on that 124 00:08:17,520 --> 00:08:21,320 Speaker 1: film and what we saw and the experiences, because it 125 00:08:21,520 --> 00:08:24,720 Speaker 1: is based on what this guy actually did, and you're 126 00:08:24,760 --> 00:08:26,920 Speaker 1: going to see as we get into some of these questions, 127 00:08:27,280 --> 00:08:31,400 Speaker 1: he's kind of separating what became the film as opposed 128 00:08:31,400 --> 00:08:33,560 Speaker 1: to what was, you know, his real life and what 129 00:08:33,640 --> 00:08:36,440 Speaker 1: he experienced. Fascinating in and of itself, because it's how 130 00:08:36,480 --> 00:08:38,800 Speaker 1: cool was it to be able to talk to the 131 00:08:38,920 --> 00:08:43,480 Speaker 1: subject of a biopic like this and say, hey, so, 132 00:08:43,520 --> 00:08:45,840 Speaker 1: what's up with that scene where you had to go 133 00:08:45,920 --> 00:08:48,880 Speaker 1: into the Santa Ria Temple and um, you know, be 134 00:08:49,320 --> 00:08:52,400 Speaker 1: kind of given a test by you know, this practitioner 135 00:08:52,559 --> 00:08:56,160 Speaker 1: Padrino exactly, and you know what, how did that really 136 00:08:56,200 --> 00:08:58,000 Speaker 1: go down? This is a question that you will hear. 137 00:08:58,160 --> 00:09:00,079 Speaker 1: And just just to give you a little context the 138 00:09:00,160 --> 00:09:01,920 Speaker 1: scene that happened in the movie where this band is 139 00:09:01,920 --> 00:09:06,440 Speaker 1: being vetted by these high level drug officials spoiler it's 140 00:09:06,440 --> 00:09:08,240 Speaker 1: a little bit of a spoiler alert, But I just 141 00:09:08,240 --> 00:09:11,920 Speaker 1: wanted to give you a sense of how cool it 142 00:09:11,960 --> 00:09:14,200 Speaker 1: was to be able to separate what happened in the 143 00:09:14,200 --> 00:09:16,440 Speaker 1: film with what happened in real in the actual operation, 144 00:09:16,520 --> 00:09:18,080 Speaker 1: the course of the operation, and there's a lot of 145 00:09:18,080 --> 00:09:20,560 Speaker 1: moments like that. It's a great film. I really would 146 00:09:20,600 --> 00:09:22,600 Speaker 1: recommend it. It was a lot. It reminded me kind 147 00:09:22,640 --> 00:09:25,160 Speaker 1: of had the the feel of Good Fellas in a 148 00:09:25,200 --> 00:09:30,160 Speaker 1: way that kind of really dynamic, interesting kind of um 149 00:09:30,440 --> 00:09:33,520 Speaker 1: ensemble cast. And it was very funny. It moves very 150 00:09:33,600 --> 00:09:36,640 Speaker 1: quickly and it doesn't pull any punches. It really gives 151 00:09:36,640 --> 00:09:40,120 Speaker 1: you a sense there's no glorification of either what this 152 00:09:40,160 --> 00:09:42,640 Speaker 1: man is doing, because he has to do some pretty 153 00:09:42,640 --> 00:09:46,800 Speaker 1: intense stuff in the name of his operation and getting 154 00:09:46,800 --> 00:09:49,760 Speaker 1: it done. And then of course you see the havoc 155 00:09:49,880 --> 00:09:54,800 Speaker 1: that drugs and drug violence and smuggling and money laundering 156 00:09:55,200 --> 00:10:00,760 Speaker 1: can wreak on people's lives. So Robert Maser began something 157 00:10:00,880 --> 00:10:05,520 Speaker 1: called Operation ce Chase, and with a team at its 158 00:10:05,520 --> 00:10:10,280 Speaker 1: height hundreds and hundreds of people. Uh, he and his 159 00:10:10,400 --> 00:10:15,520 Speaker 1: group did something extraordinary at the time, which is they 160 00:10:15,559 --> 00:10:22,960 Speaker 1: began to follow the financial footprints rather than the narcotic footprints, 161 00:10:22,960 --> 00:10:28,040 Speaker 1: by which we mean they didn't just start chasing cocaine 162 00:10:28,040 --> 00:10:30,560 Speaker 1: shipments from c I s or whatever or can you 163 00:10:30,559 --> 00:10:35,600 Speaker 1: know informants. What they started doing was finding out what 164 00:10:35,760 --> 00:10:39,640 Speaker 1: banks handled, what money, where it went, how it changed hands. 165 00:10:40,200 --> 00:10:44,320 Speaker 1: And over the course of this he became Bob Maser, 166 00:10:44,400 --> 00:10:49,400 Speaker 1: became somebody named Bob Mussela. We were given the opportunity 167 00:10:49,400 --> 00:10:52,160 Speaker 1: to interview Mr Maser because of his involved in this movie. 168 00:10:52,480 --> 00:10:54,280 Speaker 1: Um An agency reached out to us and asked if 169 00:10:54,280 --> 00:10:56,560 Speaker 1: we were interested in speaking with him, and it was 170 00:10:56,600 --> 00:10:58,840 Speaker 1: something we just could not pass up. And while the 171 00:10:58,840 --> 00:11:01,360 Speaker 1: infiltrator did not sponsor this episode, we do have a 172 00:11:01,400 --> 00:11:03,640 Speaker 1: sponsor and we're going to get to that now and 173 00:11:03,679 --> 00:11:16,560 Speaker 1: then get right into the interview with Mr Maser. So, 174 00:11:16,800 --> 00:11:21,240 Speaker 1: first things first, Mr Maser, how satisfied are you with 175 00:11:21,440 --> 00:11:27,240 Speaker 1: the adaptation of the story? Well, you know, um, and 176 00:11:27,320 --> 00:11:30,120 Speaker 1: I'm not say that. You know, it's very difficult for 177 00:11:30,120 --> 00:11:32,720 Speaker 1: me to compare because we're talking apples and oranges, you know, 178 00:11:32,720 --> 00:11:35,880 Speaker 1: those films for entertainment. UM. And my book is my 179 00:11:36,200 --> 00:11:39,000 Speaker 1: attempt to tell my version of the truth. And I 180 00:11:39,080 --> 00:11:41,680 Speaker 1: say it that way because you know, this was no 181 00:11:41,760 --> 00:11:44,880 Speaker 1: individual effort. This was a team effort by about two 182 00:11:45,240 --> 00:11:47,280 Speaker 1: and fifty At the height of the operation, about two 183 00:11:47,679 --> 00:11:50,800 Speaker 1: fifty people, so and I think if you asked each 184 00:11:50,800 --> 00:11:54,559 Speaker 1: of them to write a book, you'd probably have some variations. 185 00:11:54,600 --> 00:11:57,280 Speaker 1: And it's not because anyone's not being truthful, just because 186 00:11:57,640 --> 00:12:01,439 Speaker 1: they have their own perspectives. And this for me, Um, 187 00:12:01,480 --> 00:12:05,200 Speaker 1: you know, I think that the film adaptation certainly brings 188 00:12:05,240 --> 00:12:10,240 Speaker 1: across a lot of the the issues that need to 189 00:12:10,240 --> 00:12:12,680 Speaker 1: be brought across. And of course when they want to 190 00:12:12,720 --> 00:12:15,079 Speaker 1: go from point to point B if it took me 191 00:12:15,800 --> 00:12:18,240 Speaker 1: five steps to do it, they just obviously can't do 192 00:12:18,280 --> 00:12:22,000 Speaker 1: it in d medium. But um, they get to the 193 00:12:22,160 --> 00:12:26,080 Speaker 1: end point. And I think deliver um the type of 194 00:12:26,880 --> 00:12:31,600 Speaker 1: end result on a given topic, like the the relationship 195 00:12:31,640 --> 00:12:36,880 Speaker 1: between let's say the me Brian Cranston and Benjamin Bratt 196 00:12:37,720 --> 00:12:40,200 Speaker 1: in the film. You know, some of the things that 197 00:12:40,320 --> 00:12:44,679 Speaker 1: are in there that are that build to helping the 198 00:12:44,720 --> 00:12:49,960 Speaker 1: movie goer to recognize that this is um beyond just 199 00:12:50,320 --> 00:12:54,120 Speaker 1: an undercover agent and a bad guy dealing together and 200 00:12:54,120 --> 00:12:58,359 Speaker 1: and being an undercover agent causes you to have to 201 00:12:57,920 --> 00:13:03,160 Speaker 1: to build some bonds with with a person. Um is different. 202 00:13:04,400 --> 00:13:07,080 Speaker 1: It happened a little bit differently with me, but the 203 00:13:07,200 --> 00:13:09,800 Speaker 1: end result is still the same. You you still had 204 00:13:09,840 --> 00:13:12,560 Speaker 1: a recognition by both characters that you got to know 205 00:13:12,600 --> 00:13:14,719 Speaker 1: each other over a period of time, and that that 206 00:13:14,880 --> 00:13:20,520 Speaker 1: involves much more than just um the give clinical contact 207 00:13:20,600 --> 00:13:24,640 Speaker 1: as undercover agent and bad guy. If if, if I'm 208 00:13:24,679 --> 00:13:27,560 Speaker 1: getting through on that, It's so fascinating to me. This 209 00:13:27,640 --> 00:13:29,679 Speaker 1: is known by the way UM watching this film and 210 00:13:30,080 --> 00:13:32,439 Speaker 1: thinking of it in kind of a meta sense where 211 00:13:32,480 --> 00:13:35,600 Speaker 1: you know, clearly we're watching this very excellent character actor 212 00:13:35,679 --> 00:13:38,840 Speaker 1: Brian Cranston play this role of a man that is 213 00:13:38,920 --> 00:13:42,200 Speaker 1: essentially being a character actor and playing a role and 214 00:13:42,280 --> 00:13:45,839 Speaker 1: having to disappear into a part um. I just find 215 00:13:45,880 --> 00:13:48,800 Speaker 1: that very fascinating. I'm just wondering if that aspect of 216 00:13:48,800 --> 00:13:52,679 Speaker 1: it felt, did it ring true to you? Just the 217 00:13:52,120 --> 00:13:56,480 Speaker 1: the need to completely disappear into these covert characters that 218 00:13:56,520 --> 00:14:00,200 Speaker 1: you're essentially creating. Yeah, you know. And And to bring 219 00:14:00,320 --> 00:14:04,360 Speaker 1: up a good point about character, because the character that 220 00:14:04,440 --> 00:14:07,760 Speaker 1: I created, because when I was trained to be a 221 00:14:07,760 --> 00:14:11,760 Speaker 1: long term undercover agents and I was an agent traditional 222 00:14:12,160 --> 00:14:15,040 Speaker 1: in a traditional sense for fourteen years before I went 223 00:14:15,080 --> 00:14:19,239 Speaker 1: through the undercover school and then began to develop um 224 00:14:19,400 --> 00:14:23,360 Speaker 1: the undercover identity of Robert Mosella. But one of the 225 00:14:23,400 --> 00:14:25,360 Speaker 1: things that was taught to me right from the very 226 00:14:25,360 --> 00:14:29,080 Speaker 1: beginning UM. It was that I really needed to build 227 00:14:29,640 --> 00:14:31,960 Speaker 1: a persona that would put me in a position to 228 00:14:32,640 --> 00:14:36,800 Speaker 1: lie the least so because it's so hard to keep 229 00:14:36,840 --> 00:14:41,800 Speaker 1: track over years period of time if you're not naturally 230 00:14:41,840 --> 00:14:43,880 Speaker 1: working within your own skin and so to speak. So 231 00:14:44,120 --> 00:14:48,480 Speaker 1: I'm originally from New York. I have previously before working 232 00:14:48,480 --> 00:14:51,120 Speaker 1: for law enforcement, I worked at a bank, and then 233 00:14:51,160 --> 00:14:55,560 Speaker 1: I worked in a brokerage firm, and I UM. I 234 00:14:55,760 --> 00:14:59,920 Speaker 1: have some of the family experiences that I lived in 235 00:15:00,000 --> 00:15:02,880 Speaker 1: the neighborhood and was in around some people who were 236 00:15:03,600 --> 00:15:06,000 Speaker 1: UM certainly connected to another part of the world. And 237 00:15:06,120 --> 00:15:09,720 Speaker 1: I then I became connected with UM and and so 238 00:15:09,960 --> 00:15:13,800 Speaker 1: I had a sense of what Italian American organized crime 239 00:15:13,920 --> 00:15:18,040 Speaker 1: was about, and and so I didn't really have to 240 00:15:18,720 --> 00:15:20,880 Speaker 1: That's that's what Bob Mascella had in him too. Bob 241 00:15:20,880 --> 00:15:24,360 Speaker 1: Masell I was was a guy who had my My 242 00:15:24,440 --> 00:15:28,120 Speaker 1: degree was in business administration finance, and I had a 243 00:15:28,120 --> 00:15:31,960 Speaker 1: heavy emphasis in accounting, and and so was Bob Macella. 244 00:15:32,080 --> 00:15:36,160 Speaker 1: He was a guy who uh knew how to deal 245 00:15:36,200 --> 00:15:38,960 Speaker 1: in the business world and had a financial background. Then 246 00:15:39,160 --> 00:15:43,000 Speaker 1: was from the New York area and had these connections 247 00:15:43,040 --> 00:15:46,520 Speaker 1: with organized crime, and so a lot of that stuff 248 00:15:46,600 --> 00:15:49,080 Speaker 1: is stuff that I was very very comfortable with. I 249 00:15:49,480 --> 00:15:52,760 Speaker 1: didn't create a persona where you know, I would turn 250 00:15:52,760 --> 00:15:55,080 Speaker 1: on a switch and now I was this big, flamboyant 251 00:15:55,120 --> 00:15:59,720 Speaker 1: guy that, UM, that was a completely different person My personality, 252 00:15:59,800 --> 00:16:03,240 Speaker 1: I think, UM, that I portrayed was probably similar to 253 00:16:03,320 --> 00:16:07,640 Speaker 1: what UM, my real personality is. I think you know, 254 00:16:07,680 --> 00:16:11,360 Speaker 1: at least what I would hear back from the traffickers 255 00:16:11,440 --> 00:16:14,120 Speaker 1: about why they were interested in doing business with me, 256 00:16:14,160 --> 00:16:18,120 Speaker 1: It was because I was stable, I was I knew 257 00:16:18,160 --> 00:16:20,600 Speaker 1: about the things that they didn't know about in the 258 00:16:20,640 --> 00:16:26,720 Speaker 1: financial markets. I was cautious, UM, I was low key. UM. 259 00:16:26,840 --> 00:16:29,720 Speaker 1: All of those things were very important to them. And 260 00:16:30,000 --> 00:16:31,960 Speaker 1: all of those things, those things were really a part 261 00:16:32,000 --> 00:16:36,000 Speaker 1: about Masor. And this this is a this is a 262 00:16:36,040 --> 00:16:41,560 Speaker 1: fascinating aspect of the story because, as you say, being 263 00:16:41,720 --> 00:16:46,960 Speaker 1: in someone else's skin for the duration of this operation 264 00:16:47,640 --> 00:16:52,080 Speaker 1: that the operation specifically cited is called c chase. And 265 00:16:52,680 --> 00:16:56,800 Speaker 1: one thing that really impacted us and impacts our audience 266 00:16:56,800 --> 00:17:02,400 Speaker 1: as well, is the recognition of just how long term 267 00:17:02,440 --> 00:17:06,360 Speaker 1: this operation became. Could could you tell us in our 268 00:17:06,400 --> 00:17:09,719 Speaker 1: audience a little bit about the origin or the genesis 269 00:17:09,880 --> 00:17:16,919 Speaker 1: of C Chase and Bob Masella sure well, having worked 270 00:17:17,200 --> 00:17:23,080 Speaker 1: on a multi agency task force that's whose principal responsibility 271 00:17:23,240 --> 00:17:29,399 Speaker 1: was attempting to identify the commanding control of the cartels 272 00:17:29,600 --> 00:17:34,680 Speaker 1: as well as identifying the problem the money launderers who 273 00:17:34,680 --> 00:17:38,440 Speaker 1: were servicing the commanding control. UM. We had been using 274 00:17:38,680 --> 00:17:43,400 Speaker 1: search warrant's wire taps, historical witnesses, that type of thing, 275 00:17:43,440 --> 00:17:47,480 Speaker 1: and came to the conclusion um, and I was really 276 00:17:48,520 --> 00:17:52,479 Speaker 1: blessed with working with the leadership that was willing to 277 00:17:52,600 --> 00:17:57,280 Speaker 1: hear out the idea of this plan. Um. UM. My 278 00:17:57,400 --> 00:18:00,240 Speaker 1: view was, and it was shared by a few of 279 00:18:00,280 --> 00:18:03,240 Speaker 1: my colleagues, that the best way to accomplish our goal 280 00:18:03,480 --> 00:18:08,200 Speaker 1: was to infiltrate their money wandering systems, and that that 281 00:18:08,320 --> 00:18:11,680 Speaker 1: was embraced. So that got me through the undercover schools. 282 00:18:11,680 --> 00:18:15,760 Speaker 1: That got me through then about eighteen months of time 283 00:18:15,840 --> 00:18:20,840 Speaker 1: where we put together the undercover front and that was 284 00:18:20,840 --> 00:18:26,240 Speaker 1: put together with the help of several informants and concerned citizens. Um. 285 00:18:26,359 --> 00:18:29,359 Speaker 1: There were two guys that were informants of mine who 286 00:18:29,400 --> 00:18:33,879 Speaker 1: were um we would call them in in the underworld, 287 00:18:34,040 --> 00:18:37,280 Speaker 1: knock around guys. They didn't work for any one particular crew, 288 00:18:37,400 --> 00:18:41,360 Speaker 1: but they were certainly part of a family and um, 289 00:18:41,560 --> 00:18:47,639 Speaker 1: they they they they're under their Their organized crime contacts 290 00:18:47,800 --> 00:18:51,879 Speaker 1: enabled us to be able to use certain businesses. Actually, 291 00:18:51,920 --> 00:18:55,159 Speaker 1: both those guys played the roles in the undercover operation. 292 00:18:55,320 --> 00:18:57,639 Speaker 1: From time to time I would bring them in in 293 00:18:57,800 --> 00:19:00,879 Speaker 1: cameos as my cousins. And one of guys used to 294 00:19:00,960 --> 00:19:04,840 Speaker 1: be a bodyguard for a capo in a crime family. 295 00:19:05,000 --> 00:19:07,399 Speaker 1: And you can't. I mean he would walk in a 296 00:19:07,480 --> 00:19:10,439 Speaker 1: room and people would look at him and nobody had 297 00:19:10,480 --> 00:19:14,680 Speaker 1: to say anything. They immediately recognized what he was really 298 00:19:14,680 --> 00:19:17,560 Speaker 1: all about, very much like the dominic figure in the 299 00:19:17,600 --> 00:19:23,320 Speaker 1: movie UM that is played by Joe Gillen. And Uh. 300 00:19:23,480 --> 00:19:26,840 Speaker 1: The other guy was much more polished and had some 301 00:19:26,960 --> 00:19:30,119 Speaker 1: Wall Street contacts and um, and then we also had 302 00:19:30,119 --> 00:19:34,440 Speaker 1: an informant from Columbia. And then I had a couple 303 00:19:34,480 --> 00:19:38,560 Speaker 1: of lifelong friends of mine who were bankers and brokers 304 00:19:38,680 --> 00:19:45,760 Speaker 1: who enabled me to establish accounts at various institutions. UM. 305 00:19:46,119 --> 00:19:48,239 Speaker 1: This took about an eighteen month period of time, and 306 00:19:48,440 --> 00:19:52,160 Speaker 1: as I emerged from that, I was embedded in real 307 00:19:52,200 --> 00:19:55,600 Speaker 1: businesses a finance company, a mortgage brokerage business. We had 308 00:19:55,640 --> 00:19:59,480 Speaker 1: a air shorter service with a private jet, a jewelry 309 00:19:59,520 --> 00:20:02,760 Speaker 1: chain with thirty locations on the East coast, and even 310 00:20:02,760 --> 00:20:05,280 Speaker 1: a brokerage firm with a seat on the New York 311 00:20:05,280 --> 00:20:07,520 Speaker 1: Stock Exchange. So I didn't have to be the best 312 00:20:07,560 --> 00:20:10,360 Speaker 1: undercover agent in the world. I was less with leadership 313 00:20:10,400 --> 00:20:13,520 Speaker 1: that gave me the latitude to put that together. And 314 00:20:13,520 --> 00:20:19,000 Speaker 1: then UM, we were waiting for a unique opportunity to 315 00:20:19,200 --> 00:20:22,240 Speaker 1: use the trojan horse that was built and lo and 316 00:20:22,280 --> 00:20:26,120 Speaker 1: behold my gentleman who became my partner and is now 317 00:20:26,160 --> 00:20:28,800 Speaker 1: a brother to me, Amir Obray who played by John 318 00:20:28,840 --> 00:20:34,240 Speaker 1: Leguizambo in the movie. UM had an informant who had 319 00:20:34,280 --> 00:20:38,120 Speaker 1: made connections with a money broker, that money broker being 320 00:20:38,200 --> 00:20:44,000 Speaker 1: someone who personally knew members of the Ochoa family who 321 00:20:44,000 --> 00:20:47,800 Speaker 1: were sitting on a Median kartel and who was trying 322 00:20:47,840 --> 00:20:50,840 Speaker 1: to get himself well established in the money landering business. 323 00:20:51,600 --> 00:20:55,960 Speaker 1: So with with that opportunity, we engaged the Trojan horse 324 00:20:56,000 --> 00:20:59,640 Speaker 1: and marched into the Median cartel. And it took about 325 00:20:59,680 --> 00:21:04,320 Speaker 1: two years to get to the end. UM, and and 326 00:21:04,480 --> 00:21:07,680 Speaker 1: believe me, along the way, we were very lucky. Um. 327 00:21:07,800 --> 00:21:10,000 Speaker 1: Sometimes they say it's better to be lucky than good, 328 00:21:10,040 --> 00:21:14,320 Speaker 1: and I'm proof of that. Uh. The good things that 329 00:21:14,480 --> 00:21:19,920 Speaker 1: happened along the way. For example, UM, the people in 330 00:21:19,960 --> 00:21:24,080 Speaker 1: the cartel wanted me to pay out in dollar accounts, 331 00:21:24,080 --> 00:21:26,560 Speaker 1: but they preferred that they beat dollar accounts established in 332 00:21:26,640 --> 00:21:30,679 Speaker 1: institutions in Panama. For obvious reasons, accessed by US law 333 00:21:30,760 --> 00:21:34,680 Speaker 1: enforcement was more restricted. So I needed to open that up. 334 00:21:34,680 --> 00:21:38,879 Speaker 1: And I had just happened to be driving through downtown 335 00:21:39,000 --> 00:21:42,480 Speaker 1: Tampa and noticed this big bull sign. That's that Bank 336 00:21:42,520 --> 00:21:45,600 Speaker 1: of Credit and Commerce International b c C I and 337 00:21:45,840 --> 00:21:49,600 Speaker 1: assumed that they must have the ability to help you 338 00:21:50,560 --> 00:21:53,679 Speaker 1: bank in in their foreign locations. I didn't really know 339 00:21:53,800 --> 00:21:57,480 Speaker 1: much about the bank, so I called and like anyone 340 00:21:57,520 --> 00:22:01,080 Speaker 1: else who approaches an international inc. That has a private 341 00:22:01,119 --> 00:22:05,280 Speaker 1: client division, UM, I was asked to provide a resume, 342 00:22:05,960 --> 00:22:10,600 Speaker 1: copies of bank statements, UM, copies of I needed references 343 00:22:10,640 --> 00:22:13,000 Speaker 1: in the bank and business world. UM. I had all 344 00:22:13,080 --> 00:22:15,400 Speaker 1: that stuff. I needed to have a million dollars at 345 00:22:16,119 --> 00:22:19,639 Speaker 1: that I could potentially they could manage. All of that 346 00:22:19,760 --> 00:22:22,840 Speaker 1: was verifiable and UM. And I was invited to have 347 00:22:22,880 --> 00:22:25,159 Speaker 1: a meeting at the bank. And I mean, here's an 348 00:22:25,160 --> 00:22:28,119 Speaker 1: example of lucky instead of good. UM. I go in 349 00:22:28,280 --> 00:22:32,679 Speaker 1: and I sit down, and UM, the guy asked me 350 00:22:32,720 --> 00:22:35,000 Speaker 1: what it is I'm looking for. And I explained, well, 351 00:22:35,040 --> 00:22:37,560 Speaker 1: you know, most of my clients are from Medie in 352 00:22:37,640 --> 00:22:41,520 Speaker 1: Columbia and they have businesses, they have business activity here 353 00:22:41,520 --> 00:22:44,960 Speaker 1: in the United States that generates a huge, huge amount 354 00:22:45,000 --> 00:22:47,520 Speaker 1: of capital and it's my responsibility to help them to 355 00:22:47,800 --> 00:22:51,920 Speaker 1: move that money in a very discreet and quiet way. 356 00:22:51,960 --> 00:22:55,080 Speaker 1: And um and I didn't get much past all of that, 357 00:22:55,200 --> 00:22:58,119 Speaker 1: and the guy said to me, what do you do 358 00:22:58,160 --> 00:22:59,640 Speaker 1: You think you'll have a need because I was telling 359 00:22:59,640 --> 00:23:01,840 Speaker 1: them about moving money in from Panama to buy real 360 00:23:01,960 --> 00:23:04,120 Speaker 1: estate in the US. And he said, you think you'll 361 00:23:04,119 --> 00:23:06,520 Speaker 1: have a need to move it in the other direction 362 00:23:06,560 --> 00:23:10,840 Speaker 1: And I said, well, yeah, there's no doubt about that. 363 00:23:10,920 --> 00:23:13,679 Speaker 1: And then they broke into this discussion about well, I 364 00:23:13,680 --> 00:23:15,760 Speaker 1: know what you're talking about. That's the black money market. 365 00:23:15,840 --> 00:23:18,840 Speaker 1: And we have clients like you that have sensitive clients 366 00:23:18,920 --> 00:23:22,560 Speaker 1: and and we were helping them to open accounts and 367 00:23:22,640 --> 00:23:25,240 Speaker 1: grand came and until this treaty was signed with the 368 00:23:25,320 --> 00:23:28,240 Speaker 1: US government. Um, and I knew the treaty. The treaty 369 00:23:28,320 --> 00:23:30,959 Speaker 1: had to do with turning bank records over in drug cases. 370 00:23:31,600 --> 00:23:34,560 Speaker 1: And he said, you know, but we're now we're recommending Panama. 371 00:23:35,000 --> 00:23:38,080 Speaker 1: And ultimately he drifted into saying, well, you know, you've 372 00:23:38,080 --> 00:23:40,040 Speaker 1: got to be careful when the stupid people get caught, 373 00:23:40,080 --> 00:23:42,440 Speaker 1: get yourself involved in cash businesses. You've got to cover 374 00:23:42,920 --> 00:23:45,320 Speaker 1: to take in the cash. And I left that meeting 375 00:23:46,200 --> 00:23:50,280 Speaker 1: and went contacted my office and said, you're not not 376 00:23:50,280 --> 00:23:52,080 Speaker 1: going to believe the meeting I just had. This is 377 00:23:52,160 --> 00:23:54,679 Speaker 1: like every red flag I've ever been taught in my 378 00:23:54,920 --> 00:23:59,320 Speaker 1: entire government career, uh to look for. And this is 379 00:23:59,359 --> 00:24:01,760 Speaker 1: not an endo vidual bank are looking to do something 380 00:24:02,640 --> 00:24:06,000 Speaker 1: against management. This is this sounds like an institutional plan 381 00:24:06,680 --> 00:24:10,040 Speaker 1: and lo and behold. Over probably a year and a 382 00:24:10,080 --> 00:24:14,640 Speaker 1: half period of time, I was able to uh get 383 00:24:14,640 --> 00:24:19,520 Speaker 1: the evidence through discussions with more than a dozen senior 384 00:24:19,640 --> 00:24:23,000 Speaker 1: bank officials at that bank about the bank's institutional plan 385 00:24:23,119 --> 00:24:27,080 Speaker 1: to market the underworld. Um, that sounds like an easy 386 00:24:27,119 --> 00:24:32,040 Speaker 1: thing to do and was. But but it was amazing. 387 00:24:32,440 --> 00:24:35,600 Speaker 1: How lucky breaks, you know. I guess some people say 388 00:24:36,040 --> 00:24:39,879 Speaker 1: luck is just being well planned for the opportunity when 389 00:24:39,960 --> 00:24:44,639 Speaker 1: it comes by. And the opportunity came. Um again, really 390 00:24:44,720 --> 00:24:47,280 Speaker 1: when we opened up an account in Panama and one 391 00:24:47,320 --> 00:24:50,919 Speaker 1: of the checks written by one of the bad guys, 392 00:24:50,960 --> 00:24:52,720 Speaker 1: because I would just signed the checks one of the 393 00:24:52,760 --> 00:24:57,600 Speaker 1: checks written by the bad guys, um was filled out improperly. 394 00:24:57,760 --> 00:25:00,919 Speaker 1: It was supposed to be for let's just for example, 395 00:25:00,960 --> 00:25:02,679 Speaker 1: say say a hundred and three thousand, and then it 396 00:25:02,760 --> 00:25:05,520 Speaker 1: was written in words a hundred three thousand, in numbers 397 00:25:05,760 --> 00:25:09,479 Speaker 1: a hundred three thousand, five hundred. And so the officer 398 00:25:09,600 --> 00:25:13,600 Speaker 1: assigned to my account in Panama called me and said 399 00:25:14,040 --> 00:25:16,199 Speaker 1: what amounts should be honor? And I said, well, you 400 00:25:16,280 --> 00:25:18,440 Speaker 1: probably know I can't answer that. I'll have to call 401 00:25:18,640 --> 00:25:21,080 Speaker 1: Columbia and I'll call you back. And I did, and 402 00:25:21,080 --> 00:25:24,040 Speaker 1: I explained what the amount was to pay, and he 403 00:25:24,119 --> 00:25:26,040 Speaker 1: said to me, Um, you know we need to meet 404 00:25:26,080 --> 00:25:29,840 Speaker 1: because you're gonna get caught. And uh, there's a lot 405 00:25:29,920 --> 00:25:33,400 Speaker 1: better way to do what you're doing. And so there 406 00:25:33,480 --> 00:25:36,800 Speaker 1: was no doubt in my mind that the people managing 407 00:25:36,800 --> 00:25:39,199 Speaker 1: my account in Panama could tell, just from the movements 408 00:25:39,200 --> 00:25:44,159 Speaker 1: and the accounts, that we were marketing Narco dollars on 409 00:25:44,240 --> 00:25:49,040 Speaker 1: the black money market. And because of that mistake, back 410 00:25:49,080 --> 00:25:51,600 Speaker 1: up flushed out. He came to Miami, we sat down. 411 00:25:51,880 --> 00:25:55,760 Speaker 1: Of course, all these conversations were being recorded, and um, 412 00:25:55,960 --> 00:25:59,880 Speaker 1: he explained how it is that I could better laundered 413 00:26:00,040 --> 00:26:02,760 Speaker 1: UG money. And then and then I said to him, well, 414 00:26:02,800 --> 00:26:04,400 Speaker 1: it's great, you're getting back on a plane and going 415 00:26:04,440 --> 00:26:08,080 Speaker 1: back to Panama. Um, I'm here in Florida. And if 416 00:26:08,080 --> 00:26:10,200 Speaker 1: there's a problem and I need to see someone quickly, 417 00:26:10,760 --> 00:26:13,399 Speaker 1: are there any people in your Miami office that are 418 00:26:13,440 --> 00:26:16,800 Speaker 1: on your team handling these kinds of sensitive accounts. And 419 00:26:16,840 --> 00:26:19,080 Speaker 1: at that stage she said yes, and there were two people, 420 00:26:19,119 --> 00:26:22,080 Speaker 1: and he named them. And when I called back to 421 00:26:22,119 --> 00:26:24,040 Speaker 1: the office and explained that one of them was a 422 00:26:24,080 --> 00:26:27,879 Speaker 1: fellow named Amada One, all the bills and whistles between 423 00:26:27,880 --> 00:26:30,520 Speaker 1: Florida and Washington went off because that was a financial 424 00:26:30,560 --> 00:26:35,399 Speaker 1: advisor that UM the US government was eager to try 425 00:26:35,440 --> 00:26:40,040 Speaker 1: to pin down. He was managing, UM the illicit fortune 426 00:26:40,080 --> 00:26:43,320 Speaker 1: of Manuel Noriega. And so when you know, we went 427 00:26:43,359 --> 00:26:46,800 Speaker 1: from there to Paris, to London, to the Bahamas, UM 428 00:26:46,880 --> 00:26:50,320 Speaker 1: and UM. Eventually we got to the end of the 429 00:26:50,440 --> 00:26:52,199 Speaker 1: end of the story. But it was pretty well proven 430 00:26:52,560 --> 00:26:56,320 Speaker 1: that the bank was marketing the underworld anybody with money 431 00:26:56,359 --> 00:27:00,040 Speaker 1: that was seeking secrecy from governments, and the bank of 432 00:27:00,080 --> 00:27:03,119 Speaker 1: it in Commerce International was at this time one of 433 00:27:03,240 --> 00:27:05,959 Speaker 1: the ten biggest banks in the world. Is that correct, 434 00:27:07,040 --> 00:27:09,480 Speaker 1: seventh largest privately held anchor the world. At the time 435 00:27:09,520 --> 00:27:13,560 Speaker 1: of their assets were I think about nineteen billion dollars. 436 00:27:13,920 --> 00:27:16,440 Speaker 1: They were in seventy two countries, more than five seven 437 00:27:16,440 --> 00:27:22,960 Speaker 1: branches UM. As we substantiated later. There their clients included, um, 438 00:27:23,040 --> 00:27:29,399 Speaker 1: not just arms dealers and terrorists and drug traffickers and tactivators, UM, 439 00:27:29,440 --> 00:27:34,160 Speaker 1: but also UM some of the bigger politicians in the world, 440 00:27:34,160 --> 00:27:43,119 Speaker 1: and the intelligence community as well. You guys, you know 441 00:27:43,160 --> 00:27:45,960 Speaker 1: what I hate more than anything. I'll tell you. It's compromising. 442 00:27:46,000 --> 00:27:48,560 Speaker 1: It's the worst. I do not play well with others. 443 00:27:48,600 --> 00:27:53,119 Speaker 1: I hate compromise, and so therefore I will not compromise 444 00:27:53,119 --> 00:27:56,480 Speaker 1: when it comes to my shave, even though I don't 445 00:27:56,520 --> 00:27:59,920 Speaker 1: actually shave. If I did, though, I would use Harry's. 446 00:28:00,359 --> 00:28:02,679 Speaker 1: For far too long, you've either paid too much for 447 00:28:02,720 --> 00:28:05,520 Speaker 1: a comfortable shave, you've settled for a low price but 448 00:28:05,760 --> 00:28:09,439 Speaker 1: low quality razor. Not with Harry's, my friends, Harry's offers 449 00:28:09,440 --> 00:28:12,400 Speaker 1: something you've never had before, a great shave at a 450 00:28:12,400 --> 00:28:15,200 Speaker 1: fair price. For real. Harry's makes its own a high 451 00:28:15,240 --> 00:28:18,600 Speaker 1: quality razors. Uh. It cuts out the middleman and ships 452 00:28:18,640 --> 00:28:21,480 Speaker 1: them directly to you. Forget this, half the price of 453 00:28:21,520 --> 00:28:24,159 Speaker 1: the leading brands. You've got a good shave a good price. 454 00:28:24,359 --> 00:28:26,720 Speaker 1: It's simple. You get the best of both with Harry's. 455 00:28:26,760 --> 00:28:29,320 Speaker 1: And we've actually used these, that's right. I don't not 456 00:28:29,359 --> 00:28:31,840 Speaker 1: blowing smoke, guys. I used it on my neck this morning. 457 00:28:31,880 --> 00:28:34,080 Speaker 1: The blades last for a while. They've lasted since we 458 00:28:34,160 --> 00:28:37,199 Speaker 1: got them, what it's been several weeks and absolutely and 459 00:28:37,280 --> 00:28:39,920 Speaker 1: I you know, with the stuff that Harry sent to us, 460 00:28:39,960 --> 00:28:43,920 Speaker 1: we also got some little uh coutrement, you know, some 461 00:28:44,320 --> 00:28:48,280 Speaker 1: shave gel, some cooling lotion, and a face wash. And 462 00:28:48,320 --> 00:28:50,960 Speaker 1: I used that face wash every single day. It's got 463 00:28:50,960 --> 00:28:54,080 Speaker 1: the little gritty things into its minty. Yeah, exactly. It's 464 00:28:54,160 --> 00:28:56,200 Speaker 1: very mentally, but it has those little grit things in 465 00:28:56,240 --> 00:28:57,880 Speaker 1: it that kind of make you really feel like you're 466 00:28:57,880 --> 00:28:59,800 Speaker 1: getting your scrub on. I do that, you know, I 467 00:28:59,800 --> 00:29:02,880 Speaker 1: don't have to shave to enjoy a nice clean face. 468 00:29:03,280 --> 00:29:06,160 Speaker 1: Harry's starter set is called the Truman. That's the thing 469 00:29:06,200 --> 00:29:08,440 Speaker 1: that we were checking out earlier. It's a great option 470 00:29:08,520 --> 00:29:12,120 Speaker 1: for new customers. It's an amazing deal for just fifteen bucks. 471 00:29:12,160 --> 00:29:14,960 Speaker 1: You guys, you get a razor handle, moisturizing shave cream, 472 00:29:15,440 --> 00:29:20,080 Speaker 1: three of Harry's five blade German engineered razors, plus there's 473 00:29:20,120 --> 00:29:23,120 Speaker 1: a special offer for you, just for checking out this show. 474 00:29:23,240 --> 00:29:26,120 Speaker 1: Harry's will give you five dollars off your first purchase 475 00:29:26,280 --> 00:29:29,160 Speaker 1: if you use the promo code conspiracy stuff. Hey, that 476 00:29:29,200 --> 00:29:31,320 Speaker 1: sounds like us. So if you go to Harry's dot 477 00:29:31,360 --> 00:29:34,080 Speaker 1: com right now, look for the Truman set, that's h 478 00:29:34,200 --> 00:29:37,200 Speaker 1: A R R Y s dot com. Enter the code 479 00:29:37,320 --> 00:29:40,440 Speaker 1: conspiracy stuff at check out and you'll get five bucks 480 00:29:40,440 --> 00:29:42,840 Speaker 1: off and you're going to support the show by doing it. 481 00:29:43,040 --> 00:29:46,360 Speaker 1: So stop all that compromising, Stop letting people push you around, 482 00:29:46,560 --> 00:29:50,959 Speaker 1: stop letting these razor big wigs tell you how to shave. 483 00:29:51,280 --> 00:29:59,800 Speaker 1: You need to give Harry's a try today. I actually 484 00:29:59,800 --> 00:30:03,320 Speaker 1: want to clarify something um as as as your relationship 485 00:30:03,360 --> 00:30:04,840 Speaker 1: with these folks in the film, At least as it 486 00:30:04,880 --> 00:30:07,400 Speaker 1: was portraying, the film progressed and you had to earn 487 00:30:07,440 --> 00:30:10,360 Speaker 1: their trust and and get their business and close the deal. 488 00:30:10,720 --> 00:30:12,680 Speaker 1: It seemed to me that there was more going on 489 00:30:12,760 --> 00:30:15,120 Speaker 1: than just moving money around. That you needed to show 490 00:30:15,160 --> 00:30:17,360 Speaker 1: them that you could actually grow their money. Is that 491 00:30:17,400 --> 00:30:20,760 Speaker 1: accurate or did I miss misinterpret that? Well, I had to. 492 00:30:21,000 --> 00:30:23,600 Speaker 1: I had to be able to show that their money 493 00:30:23,600 --> 00:30:26,720 Speaker 1: would be secure. I had to be able to, as 494 00:30:26,760 --> 00:30:32,520 Speaker 1: they put we need guarantees, you know, people with illicit fortunes, 495 00:30:33,360 --> 00:30:36,719 Speaker 1: unlike what I think some people suggest that they may 496 00:30:36,760 --> 00:30:40,440 Speaker 1: have tried to trick a bank into laundry money. UM. 497 00:30:40,560 --> 00:30:44,400 Speaker 1: We never tricked anybody, and and my my clients in 498 00:30:44,480 --> 00:30:48,320 Speaker 1: the cortetail never tried to trick anybody. UM. It was 499 00:30:49,280 --> 00:30:56,000 Speaker 1: something that required UH, an agreement and an acceptance of responsibility, 500 00:30:56,120 --> 00:30:59,480 Speaker 1: knowing full well that the consequences of lost funds could 501 00:30:59,480 --> 00:31:05,280 Speaker 1: be your lie UM. So I was trying to get 502 00:31:05,320 --> 00:31:08,920 Speaker 1: them too, and I think to a degree succeeded to 503 00:31:09,000 --> 00:31:12,800 Speaker 1: get them. Not just to wander money through my accounts. 504 00:31:12,840 --> 00:31:16,920 Speaker 1: That doesn't really accomplish much. After you've wandered money for 505 00:31:16,960 --> 00:31:20,960 Speaker 1: the same guy a couple of times, you know, if 506 00:31:21,000 --> 00:31:23,720 Speaker 1: you continue to wander money for the same person and 507 00:31:23,760 --> 00:31:26,280 Speaker 1: the money is going into the same place, all you're 508 00:31:26,280 --> 00:31:31,680 Speaker 1: doing is facilitating crime. Um. And so the mantra by 509 00:31:31,760 --> 00:31:36,120 Speaker 1: what we we move forward was if you're not meeting 510 00:31:36,120 --> 00:31:39,000 Speaker 1: any new bad guys and you're not uncovering any new crime, 511 00:31:39,160 --> 00:31:42,120 Speaker 1: we could shut down. We should shut down. UM. And 512 00:31:42,160 --> 00:31:45,320 Speaker 1: so we were always on the move of trying to 513 00:31:45,320 --> 00:31:47,600 Speaker 1: to do just that, and we were also on the 514 00:31:47,640 --> 00:31:50,920 Speaker 1: move to try to get them to keep money with 515 00:31:51,000 --> 00:31:53,920 Speaker 1: us as long as we could, because if we get 516 00:31:53,960 --> 00:31:57,360 Speaker 1: them to use us to invest their funds will have 517 00:31:57,440 --> 00:32:00,760 Speaker 1: more disease at the end, but even more important play 518 00:32:00,920 --> 00:32:04,120 Speaker 1: and clearly more important play in order to be able 519 00:32:04,120 --> 00:32:07,880 Speaker 1: to have the responsibility to invest funds for someone, in 520 00:32:07,920 --> 00:32:10,480 Speaker 1: all likelihood you're going to be able to force a 521 00:32:10,560 --> 00:32:13,240 Speaker 1: meeting with the beneficial owner of the funds. And that's 522 00:32:13,280 --> 00:32:15,880 Speaker 1: really what it was all about, getting past all these 523 00:32:15,960 --> 00:32:20,240 Speaker 1: middlemen and trying to deal directly with the type of people, 524 00:32:20,320 --> 00:32:25,800 Speaker 1: as Benjamin Bratt portrayed, who were major players within the cartel, 525 00:32:26,400 --> 00:32:31,800 Speaker 1: so you know, the investment um angle. Although it was 526 00:32:31,880 --> 00:32:35,600 Speaker 1: nice to get investments to manage with a technique to 527 00:32:35,720 --> 00:32:40,240 Speaker 1: be able to meet people of responsibility important an authority 528 00:32:40,240 --> 00:32:44,320 Speaker 1: within the cartel. I have to ask about that Sentaia 529 00:32:44,440 --> 00:32:47,760 Speaker 1: scene that was so compelling the way it was portrayed 530 00:32:47,760 --> 00:32:49,200 Speaker 1: in the film. That was just as a life or 531 00:32:49,240 --> 00:32:52,320 Speaker 1: death situation that you know, from where we set was 532 00:32:52,360 --> 00:32:55,200 Speaker 1: tied to you know, what some might call superstition. Um, 533 00:32:55,240 --> 00:32:59,840 Speaker 1: what was walking into that situation like, well, nobody got 534 00:32:59,840 --> 00:33:03,680 Speaker 1: to sitting next to me, but I you know, it 535 00:33:03,800 --> 00:33:08,160 Speaker 1: was pretty controversial. Um, I was dealing with a guy 536 00:33:08,360 --> 00:33:13,480 Speaker 1: who his wife was related to Gotta Rivera, one of 537 00:33:13,520 --> 00:33:18,360 Speaker 1: the members out of the cartel, and I think it 538 00:33:18,440 --> 00:33:23,040 Speaker 1: was his wife was a niece and he was a 539 00:33:23,120 --> 00:33:28,680 Speaker 1: practicing uh he was practicing somebody. And as I got 540 00:33:28,720 --> 00:33:32,400 Speaker 1: to know him some, he said, you know, I'm very 541 00:33:32,400 --> 00:33:36,040 Speaker 1: interested in doing business with you, but I need to 542 00:33:36,080 --> 00:33:44,280 Speaker 1: make sure that my Padrino, my priest um, believes in you. 543 00:33:44,840 --> 00:33:47,920 Speaker 1: And so i'd like him, I'd like you to come 544 00:33:47,960 --> 00:33:52,920 Speaker 1: to Miami and we'll go visit, uh the Santero, and 545 00:33:52,960 --> 00:33:56,320 Speaker 1: will we'll see what he has to say. Well, some 546 00:33:56,360 --> 00:34:00,400 Speaker 1: people back in the office thought that was kind of 547 00:34:00,400 --> 00:34:04,000 Speaker 1: way too risky that if the guy, for whatever reason 548 00:34:04,920 --> 00:34:07,760 Speaker 1: said no, didn't matter how good we were what we did, 549 00:34:07,880 --> 00:34:10,719 Speaker 1: you know we were going to lose the relationship. Um. 550 00:34:10,760 --> 00:34:12,880 Speaker 1: But I knew we weren't going to get a relationship 551 00:34:12,920 --> 00:34:15,000 Speaker 1: with him if we didn't do it. So you have 552 00:34:15,040 --> 00:34:18,320 Speaker 1: to lose really so Um. It was in an area 553 00:34:18,320 --> 00:34:23,839 Speaker 1: called Sweetwater in Miami. Um, very low, I would say, 554 00:34:23,920 --> 00:34:28,239 Speaker 1: low blue collar at best kind of area. Um. The 555 00:34:28,360 --> 00:34:32,360 Speaker 1: house itself had burglar bars on it, so once you 556 00:34:32,400 --> 00:34:33,880 Speaker 1: were in, you were in a bird cage. It couldn't 557 00:34:33,880 --> 00:34:40,319 Speaker 1: get out. Um I went there with him. He went 558 00:34:40,360 --> 00:34:43,880 Speaker 1: into the room with the priest. The room was just 559 00:34:43,960 --> 00:34:47,920 Speaker 1: like a bedroom with a wooden floor. Um. And I 560 00:34:47,960 --> 00:34:50,799 Speaker 1: could see, I mean, there was an altar there. Um. 561 00:34:50,960 --> 00:34:54,560 Speaker 1: I could see the end candels and statues and all 562 00:34:54,560 --> 00:34:56,600 Speaker 1: that kind of stuff. And I could see that there 563 00:34:56,640 --> 00:34:59,680 Speaker 1: had been sacrifices there. There's dry blood on the floor 564 00:34:59,719 --> 00:35:03,319 Speaker 1: and you know, checking parts and stuff like that. And um, 565 00:35:04,680 --> 00:35:09,319 Speaker 1: so I came into the room and he wasn't The 566 00:35:09,360 --> 00:35:14,279 Speaker 1: guy wasn't a big, imposing, muscular guy like the guy 567 00:35:14,719 --> 00:35:16,920 Speaker 1: in the film. But it's important to show that because 568 00:35:16,920 --> 00:35:19,279 Speaker 1: he had a lot of power. And you know, that's 569 00:35:19,280 --> 00:35:21,520 Speaker 1: the kind of thing that I think, you know, you 570 00:35:21,560 --> 00:35:23,360 Speaker 1: need to appreciate as a movie go or when you 571 00:35:23,360 --> 00:35:26,680 Speaker 1: look at that, when you see that guy you in 572 00:35:26,760 --> 00:35:29,799 Speaker 1: the movie, you know he's powerful. You could tell from 573 00:35:29,800 --> 00:35:31,960 Speaker 1: his body style. Well, the guy that I dealt with 574 00:35:32,160 --> 00:35:36,319 Speaker 1: wasn't like that. He was much much slighter. But all 575 00:35:36,320 --> 00:35:40,359 Speaker 1: he did was come and embraced me and turned back 576 00:35:40,360 --> 00:35:42,920 Speaker 1: to the altar. And then he came back to me, 577 00:35:44,360 --> 00:35:47,279 Speaker 1: held my hands and asked me to step outside, and 578 00:35:47,360 --> 00:35:50,479 Speaker 1: I did, and then he brought a trafficker in there 579 00:35:50,840 --> 00:35:54,799 Speaker 1: and and then I waited outside and when he came out, 580 00:35:54,960 --> 00:35:58,320 Speaker 1: the trafficker came out. He was all smiles and hugged 581 00:35:58,320 --> 00:36:01,359 Speaker 1: me and said, you know, Drino says you're a good 582 00:36:01,400 --> 00:36:04,560 Speaker 1: and honorable man and that I should do business with you. 583 00:36:04,680 --> 00:36:07,560 Speaker 1: So we will. And and what I told that story 584 00:36:07,640 --> 00:36:09,239 Speaker 1: to the people in the office, some of them kind 585 00:36:09,239 --> 00:36:11,200 Speaker 1: of chuckled because they said, well, do you know the 586 00:36:11,200 --> 00:36:13,879 Speaker 1: the priest wasn't that wrong. You're you are a good 587 00:36:13,920 --> 00:36:17,120 Speaker 1: and honorable guy. It's just that you're not You're just 588 00:36:17,239 --> 00:36:20,040 Speaker 1: not a money loannder, really a money loaned or so, 589 00:36:20,560 --> 00:36:22,719 Speaker 1: you know. I don't know whether there's much to them 590 00:36:23,239 --> 00:36:25,560 Speaker 1: or not. But it worked for them and it worked 591 00:36:25,560 --> 00:36:30,040 Speaker 1: for me. Yeah, and it's uh, that was one of 592 00:36:30,080 --> 00:36:34,520 Speaker 1: the scenes that really that really stayed with us. And 593 00:36:34,640 --> 00:36:38,080 Speaker 1: also the it seems like one of the most important 594 00:36:38,160 --> 00:36:42,400 Speaker 1: currencies involved in this operation was trust. Was earning the 595 00:36:42,440 --> 00:36:45,200 Speaker 1: trust of these people through as you said, uh, the 596 00:36:45,440 --> 00:36:52,120 Speaker 1: personality traits that they prized, the stability, consistency, reliability, and 597 00:36:53,040 --> 00:36:58,400 Speaker 1: when when we were looking at this this larger network 598 00:36:59,239 --> 00:37:04,080 Speaker 1: from Bank of Credit and Commerce International, Uh, one thing 599 00:37:04,120 --> 00:37:06,879 Speaker 1: that we noticed that a lot of our audience, we'll 600 00:37:06,960 --> 00:37:12,080 Speaker 1: have questions about is the nuts and bolts of converting 601 00:37:12,200 --> 00:37:16,080 Speaker 1: drug money into something that appeared to be legitimate and 602 00:37:16,200 --> 00:37:21,239 Speaker 1: ultimately what happened to the funds and the assets that 603 00:37:21,280 --> 00:37:24,959 Speaker 1: were seized at the conclusion of operations. C Chase. Well, 604 00:37:25,040 --> 00:37:27,719 Speaker 1: you know, as far as laundering goes, it's like snowflakes. 605 00:37:27,840 --> 00:37:30,279 Speaker 1: I mean, there's so many different ways in which you 606 00:37:30,280 --> 00:37:33,640 Speaker 1: can do it. Um, very few are alike. But there 607 00:37:33,640 --> 00:37:36,719 Speaker 1: are some fundamental issues. I mean, you've got suitcases and 608 00:37:36,840 --> 00:37:38,520 Speaker 1: boxes full of cash, and you need to get it 609 00:37:38,560 --> 00:37:40,759 Speaker 1: into the financial system so that you can make a 610 00:37:40,800 --> 00:37:44,279 Speaker 1: payout um and either a wire transfer or a check. 611 00:37:45,440 --> 00:37:47,600 Speaker 1: So what bcc I was doing at the time, and 612 00:37:47,640 --> 00:37:51,920 Speaker 1: it's something that continues to happen today. You know, I've 613 00:37:52,000 --> 00:37:57,520 Speaker 1: read the deferred prostitution agreements and and the toothless indiamonds 614 00:37:57,600 --> 00:37:59,799 Speaker 1: that have been brought against banks in the in the 615 00:38:00,080 --> 00:38:03,360 Speaker 1: in path I say toothless indictments because if you're indicted 616 00:38:03,360 --> 00:38:06,399 Speaker 1: and you're a bank, you should lose your license. But 617 00:38:06,640 --> 00:38:10,240 Speaker 1: that doesn't happen. Um. One indictments are returned against banks 618 00:38:10,239 --> 00:38:13,800 Speaker 1: these days. Um they wind up paying a fine and 619 00:38:14,120 --> 00:38:16,160 Speaker 1: um not a whole lot of people go to jail 620 00:38:16,239 --> 00:38:20,520 Speaker 1: and and life goes on. But when you if you 621 00:38:20,560 --> 00:38:23,040 Speaker 1: look at those deferred prosecutions, there's a section in there 622 00:38:23,440 --> 00:38:27,760 Speaker 1: UM called a manner of Means by which the crime 623 00:38:27,840 --> 00:38:33,440 Speaker 1: of how they're committing a crime for an account holder 624 00:38:33,560 --> 00:38:36,279 Speaker 1: is done. And and I've looked at them, there's one 625 00:38:36,360 --> 00:38:40,040 Speaker 1: for well, they all have a lot of a very 626 00:38:40,160 --> 00:38:43,239 Speaker 1: very similar techniques that we're being used by d c 627 00:38:43,360 --> 00:38:45,919 Speaker 1: c I back in the day, or are clearly still 628 00:38:45,960 --> 00:38:50,000 Speaker 1: being used based upon my reading of the deferred prosecutions 629 00:38:50,000 --> 00:38:52,960 Speaker 1: in the last five or six years. But anyway, the 630 00:38:53,000 --> 00:38:54,919 Speaker 1: long and short of it is that number one, they 631 00:38:54,960 --> 00:38:57,680 Speaker 1: offered to take the cash from US and deposited into 632 00:38:57,719 --> 00:39:01,799 Speaker 1: their branches. But they they were very mindful at the 633 00:39:01,840 --> 00:39:05,000 Speaker 1: time to do that in the U. S branch needed 634 00:39:05,480 --> 00:39:10,400 Speaker 1: needed a very fine twist to it. So um I 635 00:39:10,520 --> 00:39:13,440 Speaker 1: was offered to take the money to the Bahamas. I 636 00:39:13,520 --> 00:39:15,360 Speaker 1: was offered to take the money to Uruguay. I was 637 00:39:15,400 --> 00:39:20,080 Speaker 1: offered to take the money to um Panama. Um I 638 00:39:20,120 --> 00:39:24,600 Speaker 1: do know that in other instances UH they were bringing 639 00:39:24,600 --> 00:39:27,680 Speaker 1: in cash in Miami, booking it in as though it 640 00:39:27,760 --> 00:39:31,000 Speaker 1: was cash shipped back from the Bahamas branch. UM and 641 00:39:31,040 --> 00:39:34,720 Speaker 1: being deposited in b C C I in Miami. UM. 642 00:39:34,760 --> 00:39:37,720 Speaker 1: But once you get the cash in the next step 643 00:39:37,880 --> 00:39:41,960 Speaker 1: was to take the capital and put it into a CD, 644 00:39:42,000 --> 00:39:45,480 Speaker 1: which was normally done in Luxembourg. UM. They had to 645 00:39:45,560 --> 00:39:49,480 Speaker 1: find form a lot of UM. They either had to 646 00:39:49,520 --> 00:39:52,319 Speaker 1: form or I needed to give another lawyer to form 647 00:39:52,400 --> 00:39:54,080 Speaker 1: one way or the other. The accounts needed to be 648 00:39:54,080 --> 00:39:56,439 Speaker 1: in the name of an offshore entity, and most often 649 00:39:56,480 --> 00:40:03,680 Speaker 1: those entities were in uh B v I, Panama, Gibraltar. UM. 650 00:40:04,000 --> 00:40:06,840 Speaker 1: Those are the want to Hong Kong. UM. So a 651 00:40:06,960 --> 00:40:09,239 Speaker 1: c D gets established. Let's use as an example, a 652 00:40:09,239 --> 00:40:12,360 Speaker 1: million dollars and it's a ninety days c D with 653 00:40:12,440 --> 00:40:16,960 Speaker 1: an automatic payout. UM. What they did then was they 654 00:40:17,000 --> 00:40:19,000 Speaker 1: would go to another part of the world and they 655 00:40:19,000 --> 00:40:23,040 Speaker 1: would open a facility, a lump facility UM. So a 656 00:40:23,120 --> 00:40:26,719 Speaker 1: totally different entity would be issued alone based upon in 657 00:40:26,760 --> 00:40:32,879 Speaker 1: the papers of the bank just the financial worthiness of 658 00:40:32,920 --> 00:40:36,600 Speaker 1: the and of the corporation. So there was an off 659 00:40:36,680 --> 00:40:40,560 Speaker 1: book loan against the capital. No auditor would be able 660 00:40:40,600 --> 00:40:43,759 Speaker 1: to link the two together. The loan proceeds were then 661 00:40:43,800 --> 00:40:47,120 Speaker 1: moved to yet a third, fourth, and fifth farm jurisdiction. 662 00:40:47,160 --> 00:40:49,439 Speaker 1: And the reason for that is any time the US 663 00:40:49,520 --> 00:40:51,879 Speaker 1: government or any government wants to try to get bank 664 00:40:51,960 --> 00:40:54,200 Speaker 1: records in a jurisdiction, they've got to go through the 665 00:40:54,239 --> 00:40:57,640 Speaker 1: legal process. That takes a very very long period of time. 666 00:40:58,120 --> 00:41:04,200 Speaker 1: If you've got a ring of Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, France 667 00:41:04,440 --> 00:41:08,600 Speaker 1: and Panama that you've got to get get through UM. 668 00:41:08,760 --> 00:41:13,280 Speaker 1: The theory is that it will take him fifteen years 669 00:41:13,280 --> 00:41:15,800 Speaker 1: to get through all that stuff. So now the money 670 00:41:15,960 --> 00:41:19,239 Speaker 1: it leads the loan facility, it winds up going to Panama. 671 00:41:19,680 --> 00:41:25,400 Speaker 1: UH was at that stage put into a checking account 672 00:41:25,880 --> 00:41:29,560 Speaker 1: and then based upon UM. Their preference was based upon 673 00:41:29,840 --> 00:41:34,360 Speaker 1: oral instructions. Payouts would be made to different accounts and 674 00:41:35,000 --> 00:41:37,200 Speaker 1: parts of the world that we're controlled by the cartel. 675 00:41:37,960 --> 00:41:39,920 Speaker 1: Of course, their accounts were opened up in the name 676 00:41:39,920 --> 00:41:43,520 Speaker 1: of nominees UM and then those would be moved through 677 00:41:43,560 --> 00:41:46,560 Speaker 1: other accounts. So you know, there was a long, long 678 00:41:46,640 --> 00:41:50,440 Speaker 1: line of of bridges that had to be crossed before 679 00:41:50,440 --> 00:41:52,880 Speaker 1: you could ever work your way back to the original 680 00:41:52,920 --> 00:42:04,239 Speaker 1: cash deposit. And that is the first hand history of 681 00:42:04,320 --> 00:42:09,719 Speaker 1: operations see Chase from the Inside. We will be returning 682 00:42:09,840 --> 00:42:14,160 Speaker 1: next week with part two of our interview with Mr Maser, 683 00:42:14,440 --> 00:42:21,120 Speaker 1: wherein he details the present and the future of banks 684 00:42:21,200 --> 00:42:25,080 Speaker 1: that practice money laundry in one way or another, and 685 00:42:25,280 --> 00:42:28,840 Speaker 1: what if any consequences befall those organizations. Not to be 686 00:42:28,880 --> 00:42:30,840 Speaker 1: too much of a tease here, but we get into 687 00:42:30,920 --> 00:42:34,920 Speaker 1: some really interesting territory, including Mr Maser's perspective on the 688 00:42:34,960 --> 00:42:39,160 Speaker 1: War on drugs as a whole, on things like marijuana legalization, 689 00:42:39,200 --> 00:42:42,040 Speaker 1: where we're heading as a country in that direction. And 690 00:42:42,239 --> 00:42:44,399 Speaker 1: this is an authority on this stuff, and he's got 691 00:42:44,400 --> 00:42:46,879 Speaker 1: some really interesting things to say, so look forward to that. 692 00:42:47,400 --> 00:42:50,360 Speaker 1: But first, I feel like we would say but first, 693 00:42:50,480 --> 00:42:53,520 Speaker 1: very often as we're setting this stuff up. But first, 694 00:42:53,800 --> 00:42:55,439 Speaker 1: this is the part of the show where we would 695 00:42:55,480 --> 00:42:59,480 Speaker 1: typically do a shout out corner. However, we're going to 696 00:42:59,520 --> 00:43:02,879 Speaker 1: do something different today. We're going to have an in 697 00:43:02,920 --> 00:43:08,120 Speaker 1: the news segment because something popped up recently, probably on 698 00:43:08,160 --> 00:43:11,960 Speaker 1: your news feeds, if you participate in social media, maybe 699 00:43:12,000 --> 00:43:15,920 Speaker 1: you have seen a bunch of people walking around, staring 700 00:43:16,080 --> 00:43:21,000 Speaker 1: at their phones even more so than usual, running into walls, 701 00:43:21,120 --> 00:43:25,320 Speaker 1: perhaps tripping over park benches, stopping cars in the street, 702 00:43:25,840 --> 00:43:29,120 Speaker 1: any number of bizarro scenarios. No, my friends, it is 703 00:43:29,160 --> 00:43:33,080 Speaker 1: not the zombie apocalypse. It is, in fact, the gaming craze. 704 00:43:33,640 --> 00:43:39,080 Speaker 1: Dare I say of our generation app wise, Pokemon Go, 705 00:43:40,080 --> 00:43:42,920 Speaker 1: Pokemon Go. I'm looking forward to it, honestly, I mean, 706 00:43:42,960 --> 00:43:45,920 Speaker 1: I'm I'm into that stuff. So you know, so, uh what, 707 00:43:45,920 --> 00:43:50,239 Speaker 1: what the blue blazes? What the smala Shenanigans? What the 708 00:43:50,239 --> 00:43:52,359 Speaker 1: heck is Pokemon Go? If you never heard of it 709 00:43:52,480 --> 00:43:55,200 Speaker 1: or played it before, which would be rather astounding if 710 00:43:55,239 --> 00:43:57,200 Speaker 1: this is the first time you're hearing about it. But 711 00:43:57,320 --> 00:43:59,759 Speaker 1: it's an augmented reality game. It's an app that you 712 00:43:59,800 --> 00:44:04,080 Speaker 1: get on your smart device and it uses your geo 713 00:44:04,400 --> 00:44:09,040 Speaker 1: location as well as a lot of other information that's 714 00:44:09,400 --> 00:44:14,000 Speaker 1: there resides within your phone, your accounts, your Google account. Uh, 715 00:44:14,160 --> 00:44:16,439 Speaker 1: just to know exactly where you are, where you're going, 716 00:44:16,640 --> 00:44:20,319 Speaker 1: where the Pokemon exists around you in the real world. Matt, 717 00:44:20,360 --> 00:44:23,359 Speaker 1: You've got to catch them all. It's you take take 718 00:44:23,440 --> 00:44:27,320 Speaker 1: my information, Just give me Pokemon. Just put a Squirtle 719 00:44:27,440 --> 00:44:30,840 Speaker 1: in my kitchen. That's all I ever wanted. That's true. 720 00:44:30,920 --> 00:44:34,520 Speaker 1: You said that the day we met you, Like, I 721 00:44:34,560 --> 00:44:36,640 Speaker 1: just want I could just have a squirtl in my kitchen. 722 00:44:36,960 --> 00:44:39,480 Speaker 1: I will be happy, man. But seriously, no, I have 723 00:44:39,520 --> 00:44:41,839 Speaker 1: a seven year old which is my excuse for playing 724 00:44:41,880 --> 00:44:47,520 Speaker 1: the game. You know exactly now. Honestly, it's a it's 725 00:44:47,520 --> 00:44:50,600 Speaker 1: a it's a very thin um disguise for the fact 726 00:44:50,640 --> 00:44:51,840 Speaker 1: that I am a bit of a nerd for this 727 00:44:51,880 --> 00:44:53,839 Speaker 1: kind of stuff as well. But yeah, we played it, 728 00:44:53,960 --> 00:44:56,160 Speaker 1: and it's it's it's it's one of these situations we've 729 00:44:56,160 --> 00:44:58,400 Speaker 1: talked about in the past with privacy, with buying and 730 00:44:58,440 --> 00:45:01,839 Speaker 1: selling of your personal inform nation you submit to it, 731 00:45:02,000 --> 00:45:04,840 Speaker 1: you know, on Facebook. It's like, I want my news feed, 732 00:45:04,840 --> 00:45:06,279 Speaker 1: I want to be able to have all this great 733 00:45:06,320 --> 00:45:08,839 Speaker 1: free stuff take my information. I know that's a very 734 00:45:08,880 --> 00:45:11,680 Speaker 1: odd opinion to have be being on a conspiracy podcast, 735 00:45:11,719 --> 00:45:14,640 Speaker 1: but I really am just like, just just have it. 736 00:45:14,640 --> 00:45:17,160 Speaker 1: It's fine, you're gonna take it anyway. But one of 737 00:45:17,200 --> 00:45:22,080 Speaker 1: the concerns also would be it's similar to the secondhand 738 00:45:22,160 --> 00:45:26,600 Speaker 1: smoking argument, because when people are walking around, so you 739 00:45:26,680 --> 00:45:30,960 Speaker 1: think about Google Earth, for instance, Google Earth did second 740 00:45:31,040 --> 00:45:37,600 Speaker 1: hand compromising of people, possibly in terms of the information 741 00:45:37,640 --> 00:45:40,520 Speaker 1: that was available on you know, street view things like that, 742 00:45:40,920 --> 00:45:44,239 Speaker 1: but still that's a public place. The street is a 743 00:45:44,320 --> 00:45:49,239 Speaker 1: public domain sort of situation. One thing that Google and 744 00:45:49,440 --> 00:45:53,680 Speaker 1: other companies of this nature couldn't do as easily is 745 00:45:53,760 --> 00:45:57,799 Speaker 1: get into buildings, have a Google floor view. Right. But 746 00:45:58,000 --> 00:46:02,919 Speaker 1: now this stuff that's been captured on camera every time 747 00:46:03,000 --> 00:46:09,120 Speaker 1: somebody chases a char rezard or whatever it is going somewhere, right, 748 00:46:09,360 --> 00:46:12,560 Speaker 1: So the second hand smoke in this situation would be, 749 00:46:12,640 --> 00:46:16,040 Speaker 1: let's say one of our coworkers. Name a co worker 750 00:46:16,840 --> 00:46:20,360 Speaker 1: who wouldn't like this. Jonathan Strickland, he would love this. 751 00:46:22,120 --> 00:46:25,200 Speaker 1: Scott Benjamin. Scott Benjamin. Yeah, Scott Benjamin, the man with 752 00:46:25,320 --> 00:46:29,680 Speaker 1: no Gmail address by the way, he okay, So Scott Benjamin, 753 00:46:30,560 --> 00:46:34,440 Speaker 1: one of the co hosts of our vehicle show Car Stuff. 754 00:46:34,920 --> 00:46:39,400 Speaker 1: Scott Benjamin would probably never sign on to compromise the 755 00:46:39,400 --> 00:46:43,480 Speaker 1: information on on his phone or in whatever accounts he 756 00:46:43,520 --> 00:46:47,000 Speaker 1: has floating out there in the cloud. However, if say 757 00:46:47,120 --> 00:46:53,360 Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland is walking around hunting Pokemon, then the camera 758 00:46:53,480 --> 00:46:57,600 Speaker 1: feed and the audio feed that his app is using 759 00:46:58,040 --> 00:47:02,080 Speaker 1: could easily capture got Benjamin sits here during this time 760 00:47:02,080 --> 00:47:04,200 Speaker 1: of day to this time of day. Now, of course, 761 00:47:04,320 --> 00:47:09,840 Speaker 1: that's a somewhat of an extremist view that someone would 762 00:47:10,360 --> 00:47:14,400 Speaker 1: care where a single person sits for a few hours 763 00:47:14,440 --> 00:47:18,759 Speaker 1: every day, but it's generated a lot of concern, and 764 00:47:18,800 --> 00:47:21,120 Speaker 1: we'd like to give a shout out to a couple 765 00:47:21,120 --> 00:47:25,359 Speaker 1: of folks in particular who sent some information about this 766 00:47:25,400 --> 00:47:28,640 Speaker 1: our way or asked about it. Yes, and Nicole Harris 767 00:47:28,680 --> 00:47:31,640 Speaker 1: and Rob Phillips both were they had they were on 768 00:47:31,680 --> 00:47:33,720 Speaker 1: the cusp. They knew what was going on, and they 769 00:47:33,880 --> 00:47:35,920 Speaker 1: reached out to us immediately and said that we should 770 00:47:35,920 --> 00:47:39,240 Speaker 1: cover this. And there it actually was referencing a pretty 771 00:47:39,239 --> 00:47:43,320 Speaker 1: cool article on black Bag, which is Gawker's kind of 772 00:47:43,360 --> 00:47:47,279 Speaker 1: conspiracy type blog. And um, the most interesting thing from 773 00:47:47,320 --> 00:47:51,280 Speaker 1: this article to me is the fact that the company 774 00:47:51,320 --> 00:47:54,839 Speaker 1: that developed Pokemon go as a company called Neantic, which 775 00:47:54,880 --> 00:47:57,960 Speaker 1: was founded by a guy named John Hanker. I think 776 00:47:57,960 --> 00:48:00,440 Speaker 1: I'm pronouncing that right, might just be hank Um. And 777 00:48:00,520 --> 00:48:05,160 Speaker 1: he also founded a company called Keyhole that specializes in 778 00:48:05,320 --> 00:48:13,319 Speaker 1: geo positioning location software. Now Google Earth uses key Holes technology. 779 00:48:13,400 --> 00:48:16,760 Speaker 1: As far as I'm aware, they absorbed Keyhole and likely 780 00:48:17,120 --> 00:48:19,960 Speaker 1: folded some of the research and technology that company had 781 00:48:19,960 --> 00:48:23,279 Speaker 1: done into Google Earth. But there's one more step, and 782 00:48:23,640 --> 00:48:27,080 Speaker 1: longtime listeners you might recognize this next one. That's right, 783 00:48:27,160 --> 00:48:31,920 Speaker 1: Keyhole got a pretty sizeable amount of funding from a 784 00:48:31,960 --> 00:48:34,920 Speaker 1: firm called in q Tel. This is a firm that 785 00:48:34,960 --> 00:48:37,640 Speaker 1: we have mentioned several times on this show, and we 786 00:48:37,760 --> 00:48:42,839 Speaker 1: talked about the FBI and other front agencies or front 787 00:48:42,840 --> 00:48:47,160 Speaker 1: companies that agencies use UH to put forward new technologies, 788 00:48:47,200 --> 00:48:50,480 Speaker 1: emerging technologies. They'll get money from places like in q 789 00:48:50,640 --> 00:48:56,000 Speaker 1: Tel injected into let's say, other company that's looking into GEO, 790 00:48:56,040 --> 00:48:59,239 Speaker 1: you know, GPS technology, and then they're like, hey, now 791 00:48:59,360 --> 00:49:02,640 Speaker 1: we've got a hour that we created from this soil. 792 00:49:02,920 --> 00:49:05,799 Speaker 1: And here's the thing. I'm joking mainly when I say 793 00:49:05,880 --> 00:49:08,600 Speaker 1: I'm being a bit nihilistic and saying give me my squirtle, 794 00:49:08,719 --> 00:49:11,840 Speaker 1: take my information. I'm fine with it. I don't really 795 00:49:11,880 --> 00:49:14,719 Speaker 1: feel that way exactly. I just kind of feel like 796 00:49:14,800 --> 00:49:20,000 Speaker 1: we are living in a situation where we are being monitored, 797 00:49:20,320 --> 00:49:22,759 Speaker 1: and it's almost like either do you live in fear 798 00:49:22,800 --> 00:49:24,400 Speaker 1: and panic all the time or you just kind of 799 00:49:24,440 --> 00:49:26,440 Speaker 1: accept it and move on with your life and you know, 800 00:49:26,600 --> 00:49:29,480 Speaker 1: enjoy the free stuff that that allows you. Or are 801 00:49:29,480 --> 00:49:31,840 Speaker 1: those the only two choices? Maybe not, And that's a 802 00:49:31,880 --> 00:49:34,480 Speaker 1: good point, Matt. But what this makes me think of 803 00:49:34,680 --> 00:49:37,280 Speaker 1: is um There was a great interview with Edward Snowden 804 00:49:37,719 --> 00:49:40,840 Speaker 1: on Vice recently where he was showing you how to 805 00:49:41,239 --> 00:49:44,360 Speaker 1: disconnect the cameras in your iPhone and all of the 806 00:49:44,400 --> 00:49:46,439 Speaker 1: microphones and kind of showing you where the different chips 807 00:49:46,440 --> 00:49:49,160 Speaker 1: were and all this stuff. And he made a wonderful 808 00:49:49,200 --> 00:49:52,360 Speaker 1: point where he was sort of like, yeah, I mean, now, okay, 809 00:49:52,920 --> 00:49:56,279 Speaker 1: really it's not super nefarious what's being done with this information. 810 00:49:56,560 --> 00:50:00,319 Speaker 1: You know, no one is being um monitor heard in 811 00:50:00,360 --> 00:50:03,759 Speaker 1: any kind of nefarious way, no one is being targeted 812 00:50:04,040 --> 00:50:06,239 Speaker 1: because of any of this stuff. It's just the technology 813 00:50:06,280 --> 00:50:08,800 Speaker 1: is there. But what happens if we have a regime 814 00:50:08,920 --> 00:50:11,120 Speaker 1: change where all of a sudden we're in more of 815 00:50:11,160 --> 00:50:15,040 Speaker 1: a totalitarian system and all of a sudden the man 816 00:50:15,160 --> 00:50:18,680 Speaker 1: or woman in charge flips the switch and decides to 817 00:50:18,800 --> 00:50:22,000 Speaker 1: really start using this against us, right, And also it 818 00:50:22,000 --> 00:50:26,000 Speaker 1: could be something a little more insidious, a progression by degree. 819 00:50:26,520 --> 00:50:31,240 Speaker 1: So for instance, what if instead of a switch being flipped, 820 00:50:31,560 --> 00:50:36,240 Speaker 1: it becomes a matter of insurance rates changing for someone. 821 00:50:36,719 --> 00:50:41,960 Speaker 1: Because the privacy agreement in Pokemon Go does explicitly allow 822 00:50:42,080 --> 00:50:44,400 Speaker 1: the selling of this data or the transmission of this 823 00:50:44,520 --> 00:50:48,719 Speaker 1: data to a third party, it's basically, uh, we'll do 824 00:50:48,760 --> 00:50:52,799 Speaker 1: what we want and good luck finding a squirrel sort 825 00:50:52,800 --> 00:50:56,400 Speaker 1: of agreement. So this does mean that if if if 826 00:50:56,440 --> 00:51:01,240 Speaker 1: they wished, the makers of Pokemon Go could uh take 827 00:51:01,400 --> 00:51:06,680 Speaker 1: your geolocation data. Let's say you're at Let's say you 828 00:51:06,719 --> 00:51:11,920 Speaker 1: are always at some crazy place. What what's a crazy 829 00:51:11,960 --> 00:51:18,560 Speaker 1: place to be? Crazy Town, Crazy Atlanta. Isn't there a 830 00:51:18,600 --> 00:51:21,319 Speaker 1: restaurant called Crazy? Let's say you're at a place called 831 00:51:21,360 --> 00:51:25,760 Speaker 1: crazy Atlanta Town and it's a known drug den and uh, 832 00:51:25,880 --> 00:51:30,440 Speaker 1: your information about that is is sent out and maybe 833 00:51:30,520 --> 00:51:34,279 Speaker 1: your car insurance folks say, well, statistically, because we know 834 00:51:34,640 --> 00:51:38,560 Speaker 1: that this person is a Crazy Atlanta Town, the notorious 835 00:51:38,640 --> 00:51:42,040 Speaker 1: drug den bar, then their insurance rate is going to 836 00:51:42,120 --> 00:51:44,760 Speaker 1: go up because we can't say that they're taking drugs 837 00:51:44,760 --> 00:51:48,040 Speaker 1: and driving or whatever. But they're there for two hours 838 00:51:48,080 --> 00:51:53,359 Speaker 1: between one and uh between one and three am every night, 839 00:51:54,040 --> 00:51:57,560 Speaker 1: and they're driving home after that. So this, I mean, 840 00:51:57,880 --> 00:52:04,720 Speaker 1: is this substantiated? I don't think so. Is it possible? Yes? 841 00:52:04,960 --> 00:52:08,480 Speaker 1: But is it probable? That's a whole another bag of badgers. 842 00:52:08,520 --> 00:52:10,719 Speaker 1: So we want to know what you guys think. Is 843 00:52:10,760 --> 00:52:14,000 Speaker 1: Pokemon Go is an example of a r that's just 844 00:52:14,080 --> 00:52:17,280 Speaker 1: a game changer, teaching us the capabilities of this amazing 845 00:52:17,320 --> 00:52:21,800 Speaker 1: technology we hold, or is it something a little bit 846 00:52:21,880 --> 00:52:27,400 Speaker 1: more perfidious? Is it something a little bit disingenuous? Uh? 847 00:52:27,440 --> 00:52:30,160 Speaker 1: And do you play Pokemon Go. Also, what do you 848 00:52:30,200 --> 00:52:32,759 Speaker 1: think about all the stuff that Robert Mazer was talking 849 00:52:32,800 --> 00:52:37,200 Speaker 1: about in in this interview about banks and just taking money, 850 00:52:37,719 --> 00:52:42,720 Speaker 1: just taking billions of dollars of drug dealers money and 851 00:52:42,840 --> 00:52:46,359 Speaker 1: just converting it because they make a huge profit and 852 00:52:46,440 --> 00:52:49,080 Speaker 1: they don't really get in trouble for it. Yes, let 853 00:52:49,200 --> 00:52:52,920 Speaker 1: us know what you think about all of the above. 854 00:52:53,040 --> 00:52:55,279 Speaker 1: You can find us on Facebook and Twitter, where we 855 00:52:55,320 --> 00:52:59,480 Speaker 1: are conspiracy Stuff. You can also find us on Instagram 856 00:52:59,520 --> 00:53:05,080 Speaker 1: speaking of privacy violations and conspiracy stuff show. If you 857 00:53:05,080 --> 00:53:06,600 Speaker 1: don't feel like messing with any of that stuff, you 858 00:53:06,640 --> 00:53:09,080 Speaker 1: can just send us a good old fashioned email. We 859 00:53:09,120 --> 00:53:31,120 Speaker 1: are conspiracy at how stuff works dot com.