1 00:00:00,200 --> 00:00:03,120 Speaker 1: Welcome to Worst Year Ever, a production of I Heart 2 00:00:03,240 --> 00:00:25,200 Speaker 1: Radio Together Everything, So don't don't hey, no, no, no, no, 3 00:00:25,520 --> 00:00:30,160 Speaker 1: leave it all, leave it in. Welcome to the Year Ever? 4 00:00:31,800 --> 00:00:38,000 Speaker 1: Am I right? Am I right? Isn't it bad? Yeah? 5 00:00:38,360 --> 00:00:40,360 Speaker 1: It's not great. I think we just lost a lot 6 00:00:40,400 --> 00:00:43,519 Speaker 1: of listeners. It's not the best year ever, which is 7 00:00:43,560 --> 00:00:47,159 Speaker 1: what this podcast would be called if this year wasn't terrible. 8 00:00:48,680 --> 00:00:50,760 Speaker 1: You know what the best year ever podcast would be 9 00:00:50,880 --> 00:00:55,360 Speaker 1: is like I feel like like three maybe that's one 10 00:00:55,400 --> 00:00:59,360 Speaker 1: of the mid Simpsons was really comment like just just 11 00:00:59,600 --> 00:01:03,160 Speaker 1: hit whatever year the Mono Rail episode came out, and 12 00:01:03,240 --> 00:01:07,319 Speaker 1: that's got to be the best year ever. Um, just 13 00:01:07,360 --> 00:01:10,240 Speaker 1: like everybody sort of pretending like everything like everything's fine. 14 00:01:10,800 --> 00:01:12,960 Speaker 1: R I p R. Mentioned, everyone's going to tell us 15 00:01:14,000 --> 00:01:18,840 Speaker 1: everything that was fine. Phil Phil Hartman was still on 16 00:01:18,840 --> 00:01:25,120 Speaker 1: The Simpsons, so we had no problems. Yeah yeah, but 17 00:01:25,200 --> 00:01:29,480 Speaker 1: that's not this year. The year is and there is 18 00:01:29,560 --> 00:01:33,000 Speaker 1: no but it's just as bad and there's no Phil 19 00:01:33,040 --> 00:01:39,280 Speaker 1: Harmon left. And today we have a Hodgepodge news smorgas 20 00:01:39,360 --> 00:01:45,520 Speaker 1: board for your earballs. Yes, sucker up, slip it down, 21 00:01:46,360 --> 00:01:50,960 Speaker 1: just just guzzle, guzzle this hot, thirsty load of news 22 00:01:51,400 --> 00:01:54,360 Speaker 1: as it is it as it burbles down your throat, 23 00:01:54,520 --> 00:01:56,600 Speaker 1: maybe gets backed up into your nose a little bit, 24 00:01:57,160 --> 00:02:01,640 Speaker 1: regurgitate it. Yeah, we're one pump suff news into your 25 00:02:01,680 --> 00:02:08,880 Speaker 1: cream and then spit it into your baby birds mouths. Okay, 26 00:02:09,880 --> 00:02:16,880 Speaker 1: is this not the whole show? It's not. Um, let's 27 00:02:16,880 --> 00:02:21,840 Speaker 1: start off light. There's never anything like uh COVID. We'll 28 00:02:21,880 --> 00:02:25,160 Speaker 1: start off by talking about COVID and lightly lightly talking 29 00:02:25,200 --> 00:02:30,840 Speaker 1: about it. The new the new variant, which Delta heard confirmed, 30 00:02:30,880 --> 00:02:33,680 Speaker 1: is up here in Oregon. Now it's everywhere, I think 31 00:02:33,720 --> 00:02:38,600 Speaker 1: in Los Angeles. Yeah, that's anywhere strain in a lot 32 00:02:38,639 --> 00:02:41,240 Speaker 1: of places. How do they decide the names of these things? 33 00:02:41,240 --> 00:02:43,200 Speaker 1: How do they decided to Delta? Because I feel like 34 00:02:43,240 --> 00:02:45,680 Speaker 1: that's just bad pr for the airline, Like, what's the 35 00:02:46,080 --> 00:02:50,960 Speaker 1: like have nothing to do with if you're going variant. 36 00:02:52,240 --> 00:02:55,040 Speaker 1: If you were going to name a deadly plague variant 37 00:02:55,120 --> 00:02:58,000 Speaker 1: after an airline, you would go with Spirit. That's what 38 00:02:58,000 --> 00:03:02,960 Speaker 1: I'm saying. The Spirit variant is tearing through the American Southeast, 39 00:03:03,320 --> 00:03:09,880 Speaker 1: um or like Virgin Atlantic, Yeah, the Virgin Nobody wants 40 00:03:09,919 --> 00:03:18,160 Speaker 1: to catch that. Um sorry, I got the Branson started 41 00:03:18,200 --> 00:03:21,040 Speaker 1: naming me on the gates and the bezos. There there 42 00:03:21,080 --> 00:03:23,920 Speaker 1: was a better branding for the coronavirus that would have 43 00:03:23,919 --> 00:03:29,080 Speaker 1: made people uh more wary of I mean it hurt 44 00:03:28,360 --> 00:03:34,560 Speaker 1: so Corona beer. Did you say dirty martinis? What did 45 00:03:34,560 --> 00:03:39,120 Speaker 1: you start skirting health mandates and things like sure, yeah, 46 00:03:40,720 --> 00:03:45,120 Speaker 1: whatever you just said that could Yeah, I don't know, 47 00:03:45,200 --> 00:03:47,600 Speaker 1: I got nothing. Um. The main thing I want to 48 00:03:47,600 --> 00:03:50,280 Speaker 1: start off by saying is that if you're vaccinated, you've 49 00:03:50,320 --> 00:03:54,880 Speaker 1: got very good protection against it. That hasn't changed, um 50 00:03:54,920 --> 00:03:57,080 Speaker 1: as far as they can tell. Yeah, that seems still 51 00:03:57,800 --> 00:04:03,680 Speaker 1: true and so but there's a real risk, of course, 52 00:04:03,920 --> 00:04:08,240 Speaker 1: as always to those of us who have chosen to 53 00:04:08,480 --> 00:04:14,200 Speaker 1: remain unvaccinated, which is about half Yeah, the country, we're 54 00:04:14,240 --> 00:04:21,240 Speaker 1: about uh people vaccinated at this point. And it's almost 55 00:04:21,240 --> 00:04:25,000 Speaker 1: the same as Biden's new approval rating. That really is 56 00:04:25,040 --> 00:04:29,360 Speaker 1: new approval rating. Well, you know these are the ship 57 00:04:29,440 --> 00:04:31,960 Speaker 1: fluctuates all the time, like it's not, but yes, the 58 00:04:32,000 --> 00:04:36,279 Speaker 1: most well one of the most recent, so the one 59 00:04:36,320 --> 00:04:38,680 Speaker 1: of the new because like there's a bunch of different ones. 60 00:04:38,760 --> 00:04:41,880 Speaker 1: One was doubt, Like he's dropped points among Democrats and 61 00:04:42,000 --> 00:04:45,520 Speaker 1: risen like eight points among Republicans, which is bizarre, but 62 00:04:45,560 --> 00:04:48,400 Speaker 1: he's overall doubt he was. According to that one pole, 63 00:04:48,960 --> 00:04:51,400 Speaker 1: well we should probably maybe we can do this next week. 64 00:04:51,440 --> 00:04:55,480 Speaker 1: We should probably do a comprehensive look at um how 65 00:04:55,520 --> 00:04:58,120 Speaker 1: he's how he's doing in the polls and one Americans like, 66 00:04:58,600 --> 00:05:00,320 Speaker 1: we do we get in this space. No US are 67 00:05:00,360 --> 00:05:03,480 Speaker 1: fans of Joe Biden. Some of us actively despise him. 68 00:05:03,640 --> 00:05:06,800 Speaker 1: Most of us actively despise him. I don't know. We're 69 00:05:06,880 --> 00:05:09,480 Speaker 1: not wild about the administration, but I do think it's 70 00:05:09,480 --> 00:05:11,560 Speaker 1: important from time to time to take like a step 71 00:05:11,560 --> 00:05:15,000 Speaker 1: back and be like, Okay, how is the country actually 72 00:05:15,000 --> 00:05:17,919 Speaker 1: reacting to his plans, Like what's popular, what's unpopular? What 73 00:05:17,960 --> 00:05:20,599 Speaker 1: do people like? Yeah, we need to do that prepare 74 00:05:20,760 --> 00:05:22,560 Speaker 1: for the day that we are eventually out of our 75 00:05:22,640 --> 00:05:26,880 Speaker 1: cubes and able to treport people in person. But yeah, 76 00:05:26,960 --> 00:05:30,520 Speaker 1: I agree with you theine. There was a recent poll 77 00:05:30,560 --> 00:05:33,440 Speaker 1: that showed him down quite a bit, which isn't super weird. 78 00:05:33,480 --> 00:05:35,400 Speaker 1: You know, it's what happens with presidents, right, you know, 79 00:05:35,480 --> 00:05:37,440 Speaker 1: you have your your kind of honeymoon period, which Trump 80 00:05:37,440 --> 00:05:39,880 Speaker 1: didn't get, and that was weird Biden did. He was 81 00:05:39,920 --> 00:05:43,240 Speaker 1: pretty popular for a while and now, you know, not abnormal, 82 00:05:43,320 --> 00:05:47,360 Speaker 1: it doesn't look But yeah, I mean we're six months 83 00:05:47,360 --> 00:05:51,280 Speaker 1: in five months in its presidency. He's not he's not 84 00:05:51,360 --> 00:05:54,479 Speaker 1: benefiting from the whole. Thank god Trump is out anymore. Really, 85 00:05:54,600 --> 00:05:59,320 Speaker 1: you know, yeah, just in general, these variants are something 86 00:05:59,480 --> 00:06:03,280 Speaker 1: for us to be aware of and um wary of, 87 00:06:03,800 --> 00:06:06,280 Speaker 1: but not to act in fear. I guess, is my 88 00:06:07,200 --> 00:06:09,760 Speaker 1: what do we have to say about this? I think 89 00:06:09,760 --> 00:06:13,679 Speaker 1: that's fair. I think that Um it's get like you said, 90 00:06:14,200 --> 00:06:20,839 Speaker 1: if you're vaccinated, Ah, that's good, continue to be vaccinated. Yeah, 91 00:06:20,920 --> 00:06:24,640 Speaker 1: take more vaccines, steal as many vaccines. Feel whatever hospital 92 00:06:24,720 --> 00:06:26,520 Speaker 1: is near you. You know, you want to get a 93 00:06:26,520 --> 00:06:28,800 Speaker 1: car with a big metal front grill and just drive 94 00:06:28,839 --> 00:06:31,240 Speaker 1: it through the side and and heist as many of 95 00:06:31,240 --> 00:06:33,440 Speaker 1: that and then drink all of them as fast as 96 00:06:33,440 --> 00:06:35,279 Speaker 1: you can tend the building is like a group of 97 00:06:35,279 --> 00:06:39,320 Speaker 1: protesters and just plow through it. Yes, yes, there's no 98 00:06:39,400 --> 00:06:44,920 Speaker 1: hard I mean uh and uh. You know, it doesn't 99 00:06:44,960 --> 00:06:48,160 Speaker 1: matter which vaccine or what is for. It doesn't need 100 00:06:48,200 --> 00:06:53,600 Speaker 1: to be a COVID vaccine, any any vaccine will help. 101 00:06:54,600 --> 00:06:58,119 Speaker 1: Just drink straight smallpox. It works the same. That's break 102 00:06:58,200 --> 00:07:01,159 Speaker 1: into a level three bio hazard lab and just drink 103 00:07:01,240 --> 00:07:06,640 Speaker 1: anything you find. It will make you stronger. Um. But 104 00:07:08,040 --> 00:07:11,520 Speaker 1: I guess, seriously, it's something to be concerned about because 105 00:07:11,680 --> 00:07:15,320 Speaker 1: it is a stronger variant is worse and people even 106 00:07:15,360 --> 00:07:21,200 Speaker 1: today there's a big uptick in COVID, particularly in the South, UM, 107 00:07:21,280 --> 00:07:25,400 Speaker 1: where a lot of people are not getting vaccinated. Yeah, 108 00:07:25,520 --> 00:07:29,920 Speaker 1: I mean I think that what do we have your Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, 109 00:07:29,920 --> 00:07:34,720 Speaker 1: and Wyoming have fully vaccinated less than of residents. And 110 00:07:34,720 --> 00:07:37,840 Speaker 1: that is definitely what we're going to start seeing the 111 00:07:37,960 --> 00:07:42,239 Speaker 1: surges at this point in the communities. I mean, of course, yeah, 112 00:07:42,280 --> 00:07:47,440 Speaker 1: of course. UM. And like you know, I remember just 113 00:07:47,520 --> 00:07:52,240 Speaker 1: a few what was a few weeks ago when UH 114 00:07:52,400 --> 00:07:56,920 Speaker 1: Texas had zero deaths one day, UM, and that was 115 00:07:57,240 --> 00:08:00,160 Speaker 1: there was like a thirty six hour news cycle or 116 00:08:00,200 --> 00:08:04,960 Speaker 1: every like UH Texas official and people in the media 117 00:08:05,040 --> 00:08:07,400 Speaker 1: were like they did it, look see it was good 118 00:08:07,440 --> 00:08:09,840 Speaker 1: to open up and so on. But obviously like the 119 00:08:09,920 --> 00:08:14,080 Speaker 1: next day there were deaths. Um. That's not how this works. 120 00:08:14,200 --> 00:08:18,680 Speaker 1: It's not we did at zero today, we were done. UM. 121 00:08:19,120 --> 00:08:23,200 Speaker 1: And it changes quickly. I mean, here's this is from CNN. 122 00:08:24,600 --> 00:08:28,600 Speaker 1: UM the delta variant made up about ten percent of 123 00:08:28,680 --> 00:08:31,600 Speaker 1: cases that were tested three or four weeks ago. As 124 00:08:31,640 --> 00:08:35,640 Speaker 1: of last week, it appeared to be. So that's how 125 00:08:35,679 --> 00:08:38,439 Speaker 1: things change. We know, we lived through the last year 126 00:08:38,480 --> 00:08:43,160 Speaker 1: and a half. Um, but you know this, this is 127 00:08:43,880 --> 00:08:47,480 Speaker 1: the only way that we were gonna vanquished COVID was 128 00:08:47,600 --> 00:08:51,640 Speaker 1: by getting everybody on the same page. You know, I 129 00:08:51,679 --> 00:08:55,080 Speaker 1: guess wasn't going to happen, But it's not happening. Yeah, 130 00:08:56,040 --> 00:09:00,560 Speaker 1: on the same page about whether or not murdering unarmed 131 00:09:00,600 --> 00:09:06,360 Speaker 1: people is bad. Yeah. We're definitely not getting a consensus 132 00:09:06,440 --> 00:09:11,319 Speaker 1: on literally anything, pardon with the exception of whether or 133 00:09:11,400 --> 00:09:13,680 Speaker 1: not pot should be legal, which is why it's so baffling. 134 00:09:13,720 --> 00:09:15,840 Speaker 1: No one's done that yet. But anyway, should we have 135 00:09:16,200 --> 00:09:19,760 Speaker 1: named it like the demo virus or the democratic something? No, 136 00:09:19,920 --> 00:09:23,720 Speaker 1: that the antifa virus that work, whatever it is, Like, 137 00:09:23,760 --> 00:09:27,760 Speaker 1: we should have named it virus, the critical race theory 138 00:09:27,880 --> 00:09:33,160 Speaker 1: virus me to get vaccinated against the socialist virus. You know, 139 00:09:33,360 --> 00:09:39,199 Speaker 1: maybe something like that would be better. Comy comy virus. Yeah. Um, 140 00:09:39,320 --> 00:09:41,120 Speaker 1: that wouldn't have worked because they think, like, oh I 141 00:09:41,240 --> 00:09:45,840 Speaker 1: gotta I don't even know, nothing would happen. Um. No, 142 00:09:46,559 --> 00:09:48,520 Speaker 1: So I think the point, the real point is get vaccinated. 143 00:09:48,520 --> 00:09:53,080 Speaker 1: If you can get vaccinated, if you can you know 144 00:09:53,120 --> 00:09:55,880 Speaker 1: what I'm going to add to that, get vaccinated if 145 00:09:55,920 --> 00:10:02,719 Speaker 1: you can. Yeah, you know what what vaccinated if you can? 146 00:10:02,960 --> 00:10:05,960 Speaker 1: Should we talk about something else? Um? So I on 147 00:10:06,000 --> 00:10:08,000 Speaker 1: the subject of vaccines, I didn't want to bring this up. 148 00:10:08,040 --> 00:10:11,640 Speaker 1: This was from I believe late last week or a 149 00:10:11,679 --> 00:10:17,679 Speaker 1: few days ago, Palcinians canceled this deal vaccine swap they 150 00:10:17,679 --> 00:10:23,400 Speaker 1: had put together with Israel, where they would basically Israel 151 00:10:23,440 --> 00:10:26,040 Speaker 1: would give them a bunch of vaccines now and then 152 00:10:26,120 --> 00:10:29,760 Speaker 1: later in the year Alisin would give Israel. Uh. I 153 00:10:29,800 --> 00:10:32,520 Speaker 1: believe it was the equivalent number of vaccines or a 154 00:10:32,600 --> 00:10:37,120 Speaker 1: very similar number. And it was. This whole story was 155 00:10:37,160 --> 00:10:41,280 Speaker 1: sort of framed as like, look, thank god Placinians hated, hate, 156 00:10:41,400 --> 00:10:45,760 Speaker 1: hate do so much that they don't want their their vaccines. Um. 157 00:10:45,840 --> 00:10:50,160 Speaker 1: And obviously, uh, equating uh Jewish people with Israel is 158 00:10:50,200 --> 00:10:54,440 Speaker 1: not uh the best thing to do. And it's not 159 00:10:54,480 --> 00:10:59,440 Speaker 1: because they hate Israel. It's because the vaccines we were expired. 160 00:11:00,160 --> 00:11:06,280 Speaker 1: UM they expired that month. Uh. There was the deal 161 00:11:06,520 --> 00:11:10,640 Speaker 1: was basically saying that they would the vaccines would expire 162 00:11:11,040 --> 00:11:15,280 Speaker 1: in July or August UM, and they expired in June. 163 00:11:15,880 --> 00:11:20,640 Speaker 1: And that means they're not as strong worthless, but it's 164 00:11:20,640 --> 00:11:24,080 Speaker 1: not not they're not like worthless worthless, but they're definitely 165 00:11:24,080 --> 00:11:25,760 Speaker 1: not as effective and they're still like they're still doing 166 00:11:26,000 --> 00:11:30,520 Speaker 1: uh studies on the effective is the problem that if 167 00:11:30,520 --> 00:11:32,520 Speaker 1: it's a lot less effective, you get these people and 168 00:11:32,559 --> 00:11:35,880 Speaker 1: they think they're vaccinated and they stopped taking precautions, and yeah, 169 00:11:35,960 --> 00:11:38,400 Speaker 1: there's a lot of reasons to be concerned. It's not 170 00:11:38,520 --> 00:11:43,000 Speaker 1: a they're so racist they won't take Israeli vaccine. Yeah, 171 00:11:43,280 --> 00:11:45,760 Speaker 1: the framing of that, it's just been very wild and 172 00:11:46,000 --> 00:11:50,520 Speaker 1: reading like oh they were they're expired. Well that makes sense. Um. 173 00:11:50,559 --> 00:11:52,840 Speaker 1: And I just saw a lot of people even point 174 00:11:52,880 --> 00:11:54,720 Speaker 1: out like, well it's inspired in June. That means they 175 00:11:54,720 --> 00:11:56,560 Speaker 1: can still use it, like they've got They've got a 176 00:11:56,559 --> 00:11:59,440 Speaker 1: couple of weeks to still use it. Um. I don't 177 00:11:59,440 --> 00:12:02,720 Speaker 1: know if anybody else knows this, but the fis are vaccine. 178 00:12:02,840 --> 00:12:05,160 Speaker 1: You take a dose and then you take a second 179 00:12:05,160 --> 00:12:10,120 Speaker 1: dose three weeks later. Um. It's not even like, oh 180 00:12:10,200 --> 00:12:12,240 Speaker 1: they got they got a bunch of one dose Johnson 181 00:12:12,240 --> 00:12:14,319 Speaker 1: and Johnson's they got. They like they got. They have 182 00:12:14,360 --> 00:12:16,120 Speaker 1: to work hard to get them out in time, but 183 00:12:16,160 --> 00:12:18,680 Speaker 1: they can still do it. Um. Which also is like 184 00:12:18,840 --> 00:12:24,280 Speaker 1: unreasonable if you know, um, this was earlier this year, 185 00:12:24,400 --> 00:12:27,240 Speaker 1: I do not know, some ridiculous to me as if 186 00:12:28,160 --> 00:12:31,719 Speaker 1: as if the Israeli government didn't know that their vaccines 187 00:12:31,800 --> 00:12:34,240 Speaker 1: that they were going to give away expired in June, 188 00:12:34,520 --> 00:12:38,439 Speaker 1: you know of course, or if what and then it 189 00:12:38,480 --> 00:12:42,720 Speaker 1: can be framed as you know there yeah yeah, but 190 00:12:42,800 --> 00:12:48,480 Speaker 1: also um yeah, just give them non expired vaccines. They 191 00:12:48,520 --> 00:12:52,920 Speaker 1: did vaccinate about a hundred thousand Palsinian day workers in 192 00:12:53,000 --> 00:12:57,760 Speaker 1: Israel earlier, so that was nice. Yeah, it's nice of 193 00:12:57,840 --> 00:13:02,000 Speaker 1: the occupying force to do that. Kind of benevolent populations 194 00:13:02,000 --> 00:13:05,000 Speaker 1: they're occupying. Um anyways, that was the thing on my radar, 195 00:13:05,120 --> 00:13:08,599 Speaker 1: and it was you know, like this was the appropriate 196 00:13:08,640 --> 00:13:11,520 Speaker 1: time to bring it up, as we talked about COVID 197 00:13:11,880 --> 00:13:15,120 Speaker 1: before we moved on to other things. So I just 198 00:13:15,200 --> 00:13:17,720 Speaker 1: want to commend you for piping up. Thank you so much. 199 00:13:17,760 --> 00:13:19,560 Speaker 1: We wanted to start light, so we started with COVID. 200 00:13:19,679 --> 00:13:25,320 Speaker 1: So yeah, yeah, yeah, there's I mean, there's a couple 201 00:13:25,400 --> 00:13:29,199 Speaker 1: of nice things that have happened recently. Uh, law wise, 202 00:13:30,000 --> 00:13:34,120 Speaker 1: the Supreme Court just ruled on um a case involved 203 00:13:34,120 --> 00:13:36,280 Speaker 1: in the n c a A, which is like student 204 00:13:36,320 --> 00:13:39,320 Speaker 1: athletes and they're called student athletes because if you call 205 00:13:39,400 --> 00:13:41,840 Speaker 1: them student athletes, you don't have to pay them, and 206 00:13:41,880 --> 00:13:44,840 Speaker 1: you can also make them ineligible to receive certain kinds 207 00:13:44,960 --> 00:13:48,240 Speaker 1: of like scholarships and compensation and whatnot. Like there's a 208 00:13:48,240 --> 00:13:51,080 Speaker 1: bunch of ways you can fuck them over, um if 209 00:13:51,120 --> 00:13:53,679 Speaker 1: they're if they're student athletes, and you can also make 210 00:13:53,720 --> 00:13:56,440 Speaker 1: millions of dollars off of them. Um. And they don't 211 00:13:56,520 --> 00:13:59,240 Speaker 1: get any real compensation other than you know, some some 212 00:13:59,280 --> 00:14:02,080 Speaker 1: of them get free at uccasions or whatnot. Um. But 213 00:14:02,240 --> 00:14:05,360 Speaker 1: they don't get money, and they often damage their brains 214 00:14:05,400 --> 00:14:11,280 Speaker 1: and bodies playing, for example, football, a sport which kills you. UM. 215 00:14:11,320 --> 00:14:13,160 Speaker 1: So this is bad. And there was a case in 216 00:14:13,200 --> 00:14:18,240 Speaker 1: the Supreme Court UM that was relating on um like 217 00:14:18,280 --> 00:14:20,560 Speaker 1: whether or not the n c A was violating antitrust 218 00:14:20,640 --> 00:14:23,640 Speaker 1: law by placing limits on education related benefits that schools 219 00:14:23,640 --> 00:14:27,680 Speaker 1: can provide to athletes. UM. And they basically ruled the 220 00:14:27,760 --> 00:14:29,960 Speaker 1: n c a A was was being a motherfucker. And 221 00:14:30,000 --> 00:14:33,120 Speaker 1: now schools are open to provide their athletes with a 222 00:14:33,160 --> 00:14:35,840 Speaker 1: lot more compensation as long as it's connected in some 223 00:14:35,920 --> 00:14:39,840 Speaker 1: way to their education. Um. Just as Brett Kavanaugh not 224 00:14:39,960 --> 00:14:45,240 Speaker 1: a what do you mean, like what kind of compensation 225 00:14:45,280 --> 00:14:47,280 Speaker 1: as related because a lot of them do get full 226 00:14:47,360 --> 00:14:51,200 Speaker 1: ride scholarships and you know lots it's more that, which 227 00:14:51,400 --> 00:14:55,640 Speaker 1: is like, you know, significant amount, but it's yeah, it's 228 00:14:55,680 --> 00:14:58,400 Speaker 1: more that right now, and see A rules restrict any 229 00:14:58,480 --> 00:15:02,320 Speaker 1: kind of compensation, including direc payment UM for what they're doing, 230 00:15:02,480 --> 00:15:05,680 Speaker 1: you know, as athletes. UM. And particularly the big deal 231 00:15:05,800 --> 00:15:09,600 Speaker 1: is the restrictions on direct payments UM, because these people 232 00:15:09,640 --> 00:15:12,400 Speaker 1: are making the schools millions of dollars UM. And the 233 00:15:12,480 --> 00:15:16,120 Speaker 1: decision that Gore such offered UM basically said hey, you 234 00:15:16,160 --> 00:15:19,680 Speaker 1: can't do that thereat you are actually violating antitrust law 235 00:15:19,720 --> 00:15:23,760 Speaker 1: by saying schools cannot pay their athletes directly basically, I 236 00:15:23,760 --> 00:15:26,040 Speaker 1: mean the the the the exact wording of his of 237 00:15:26,160 --> 00:15:28,680 Speaker 1: his decision, which is pretty good I think, is UM. 238 00:15:28,720 --> 00:15:30,320 Speaker 1: The n c A is not above the law. The 239 00:15:30,400 --> 00:15:32,800 Speaker 1: n c A couches its arguments for not paying student 240 00:15:32,840 --> 00:15:35,880 Speaker 1: athletes in innocuous labels, but the labels cannot disguise the 241 00:15:35,880 --> 00:15:38,520 Speaker 1: reality the n c a's business model would be flatly 242 00:15:38,520 --> 00:15:41,680 Speaker 1: illegal in almost any other industry in America. Basically, the 243 00:15:41,760 --> 00:15:46,200 Speaker 1: core of the issue is these kids are playing sports 244 00:15:46,200 --> 00:15:48,360 Speaker 1: at a near professional level and they are. It is 245 00:15:48,400 --> 00:15:51,440 Speaker 1: a multimillion dollar industry, and the n c a A 246 00:15:51,520 --> 00:15:54,560 Speaker 1: says you cannot pay the people who make that industry possible, 247 00:15:54,640 --> 00:15:56,600 Speaker 1: and that would be illegal in any other business. The 248 00:15:56,680 --> 00:15:58,520 Speaker 1: n c AS argument up until now as well, there's 249 00:15:58,560 --> 00:16:01,360 Speaker 1: students and so they're getting like a scholarship, so we 250 00:16:01,400 --> 00:16:03,200 Speaker 1: don't like we not not only do we not have 251 00:16:03,280 --> 00:16:05,160 Speaker 1: to pay them, we are making it so that you 252 00:16:05,280 --> 00:16:07,800 Speaker 1: cannot pay them. Our rules make you're you're not allowed 253 00:16:07,840 --> 00:16:10,480 Speaker 1: to pay these athletes. And the decision is saying like, no, 254 00:16:10,560 --> 00:16:13,080 Speaker 1: you can't fucking do that. Um, which is potentially a 255 00:16:13,160 --> 00:16:15,920 Speaker 1: huge deal and has we don't entirely know all this 256 00:16:15,960 --> 00:16:17,640 Speaker 1: is going to shake out. I'm sure there's going to 257 00:16:17,680 --> 00:16:21,280 Speaker 1: be further cases on different aspects of this, but like, yeah, 258 00:16:21,400 --> 00:16:25,040 Speaker 1: this has the potential to blow up the whole system. Yeah, 259 00:16:25,240 --> 00:16:28,120 Speaker 1: and look, I think I have a lot to learn 260 00:16:28,160 --> 00:16:29,760 Speaker 1: about it, and I want you I was starting to 261 00:16:29,800 --> 00:16:33,000 Speaker 1: dig into this a little bit before, and on the 262 00:16:33,880 --> 00:16:36,360 Speaker 1: on the face it's like, yeah, you know this, these 263 00:16:36,400 --> 00:16:39,560 Speaker 1: schools are making a lot of money off of these athletes, 264 00:16:40,240 --> 00:16:44,680 Speaker 1: and you know they should be paid. But the counter 265 00:16:45,000 --> 00:16:47,640 Speaker 1: the flip side of what I'm seeing and I'm sure 266 00:16:47,680 --> 00:16:51,200 Speaker 1: I'll get some pushback from people. Again, I'm learning and 267 00:16:51,720 --> 00:16:54,160 Speaker 1: trying to educate myself about all of this, and like 268 00:16:54,200 --> 00:16:58,680 Speaker 1: you said that more stuff that unfolds is, um, how 269 00:16:58,720 --> 00:17:04,960 Speaker 1: that affects a college at sitions, resources and recruitment. Um. 270 00:17:05,000 --> 00:17:09,080 Speaker 1: And if money gets spent on getting the best athletes, 271 00:17:09,119 --> 00:17:15,320 Speaker 1: how does that affect other programs women's athletes, women's sports programs, uh, 272 00:17:15,400 --> 00:17:18,159 Speaker 1: tying up funding and having to folks be all on 273 00:17:18,359 --> 00:17:24,240 Speaker 1: the mail. Um, you know, teams that bring in more income. Um. 274 00:17:24,359 --> 00:17:27,720 Speaker 1: So there are some things in here that I am 275 00:17:27,760 --> 00:17:34,720 Speaker 1: curious to learn more about. But also you know, I understand, 276 00:17:34,800 --> 00:17:37,919 Speaker 1: I see, I see the benefits. To me, the issue is, 277 00:17:37,960 --> 00:17:40,760 Speaker 1: I don't care about sports. I've never watched college sports. 278 00:17:40,800 --> 00:17:44,159 Speaker 1: I don't I don't like them. Um. But it's a 279 00:17:44,200 --> 00:17:47,119 Speaker 1: pretty egregious issue, especially considered. Like the biggest part to 280 00:17:47,160 --> 00:17:50,399 Speaker 1: me is that like, yeah, often their their education is 281 00:17:50,440 --> 00:17:55,400 Speaker 1: paid for. But um, these kids are taking on permanent 282 00:17:55,440 --> 00:17:58,960 Speaker 1: injuries and they are making the small group of people 283 00:17:59,200 --> 00:18:03,320 Speaker 1: multi million airs and they aren't being compensated, and a 284 00:18:03,320 --> 00:18:06,720 Speaker 1: lot of them leave college not you know, I think 285 00:18:06,760 --> 00:18:10,119 Speaker 1: it's most of them don't not go on to become 286 00:18:10,119 --> 00:18:16,720 Speaker 1: professional players, and so they're leaving with permanent and continuous 287 00:18:16,800 --> 00:18:21,119 Speaker 1: medical bills. UM. And let's not pretend like even if 288 00:18:21,119 --> 00:18:23,879 Speaker 1: they're getting a full right scholarship, a lot of these 289 00:18:23,920 --> 00:18:27,320 Speaker 1: institutions are are having people there to focus on sports, 290 00:18:27,359 --> 00:18:30,639 Speaker 1: so the education isn't necessarily the most important part of 291 00:18:30,680 --> 00:18:32,840 Speaker 1: the college. It's not like you're leaving like with a 292 00:18:32,880 --> 00:18:38,240 Speaker 1: whole set of skills outside of let's say basketball. Yeah, 293 00:18:38,440 --> 00:18:40,320 Speaker 1: it's one of those things. As far as you know, 294 00:18:40,359 --> 00:18:42,560 Speaker 1: the injustices we talk about a lot of the time 295 00:18:42,600 --> 00:18:45,440 Speaker 1: where it's like, you know, problems of climate change, of 296 00:18:45,480 --> 00:18:49,359 Speaker 1: like restrictions on immigration, all these like really massive and 297 00:18:49,520 --> 00:18:53,399 Speaker 1: systemically brutal issues. It is a smaller fry issue than that, 298 00:18:53,480 --> 00:18:56,640 Speaker 1: but it's it's horribly unethical the way that student athletes 299 00:18:56,680 --> 00:18:59,480 Speaker 1: have been treated for decades by the n c a A. 300 00:18:59,640 --> 00:19:05,400 Speaker 1: And and this is like a pretty good decision, it seems, Yeah, 301 00:19:05,520 --> 00:19:08,080 Speaker 1: that's nice. Feed any of the athletes unless they were 302 00:19:08,119 --> 00:19:15,800 Speaker 1: in season. It's ridiculous. They have all sorts of dumb limitations. Yeah, 303 00:19:15,840 --> 00:19:18,639 Speaker 1: but yeah, so you know, I think it's good. I 304 00:19:18,680 --> 00:19:22,960 Speaker 1: am concerned about the effects of this on UM other 305 00:19:23,119 --> 00:19:33,840 Speaker 1: sports programs and what happens. But I think good, hey people, people, Hey, everybody, everything. 306 00:19:34,040 --> 00:19:38,920 Speaker 1: And speaking of that, why don't you shout out some 307 00:19:38,920 --> 00:19:53,440 Speaker 1: some of those shillings to these sponsors as for ears everything, 308 00:19:56,440 --> 00:20:05,040 Speaker 1: hand suckers. Shall we talk bitches? Domestic terrorism, Robert, you 309 00:20:05,080 --> 00:20:08,320 Speaker 1: pitched this idea. I love domestic terrorism, so I'm a 310 00:20:08,400 --> 00:20:16,040 Speaker 1: huge domestic you know terrorism stand it. Yeah, basically, so 311 00:20:16,680 --> 00:20:19,880 Speaker 1: if you remember what five months ago, when um, those 312 00:20:19,880 --> 00:20:22,720 Speaker 1: people tried to overthrow the government by attacking the capital 313 00:20:22,760 --> 00:20:25,240 Speaker 1: in a mob, it was kind of a thing. You 314 00:20:25,320 --> 00:20:29,600 Speaker 1: might have caught that story. Um, everyone was you know, 315 00:20:29,840 --> 00:20:32,080 Speaker 1: it got a lot of people up in arms who 316 00:20:32,080 --> 00:20:34,800 Speaker 1: had not been as concerned with right wing extremism. But 317 00:20:34,800 --> 00:20:40,280 Speaker 1: it also like the thing that any organization is going 318 00:20:40,320 --> 00:20:42,720 Speaker 1: to do in a situation like that. And by organization, 319 00:20:42,760 --> 00:20:45,040 Speaker 1: I'm talking about like the Department of Justice in you know, 320 00:20:45,080 --> 00:20:48,320 Speaker 1: specifically branches of it, like the FBI. They're they're going 321 00:20:48,400 --> 00:20:50,600 Speaker 1: to be like, well, we could have caught this if 322 00:20:50,640 --> 00:20:53,880 Speaker 1: we had more power. And some of the things they've 323 00:20:53,880 --> 00:20:55,600 Speaker 1: been talking about is like more ability to kind of 324 00:20:55,600 --> 00:20:59,560 Speaker 1: monitor social media. There's some legal restrictions there for them, um, 325 00:20:59,600 --> 00:21:01,679 Speaker 1: but also of some of it is just like you know, 326 00:21:01,720 --> 00:21:05,000 Speaker 1: they want more money. Um, they want the ability to 327 00:21:05,080 --> 00:21:08,480 Speaker 1: go after you know, um, to fund and to kind 328 00:21:08,520 --> 00:21:11,040 Speaker 1: of like go after a broader swath of people. And 329 00:21:11,080 --> 00:21:14,199 Speaker 1: this is always like framed as what we need to 330 00:21:14,200 --> 00:21:17,320 Speaker 1: deal This would have let us solve the problem that 331 00:21:17,320 --> 00:21:22,359 Speaker 1: that happened that got away from us. And I think, yeah, 332 00:21:22,760 --> 00:21:25,320 Speaker 1: I published the day before the attack a list of 333 00:21:25,359 --> 00:21:27,560 Speaker 1: people talking about all the things they were going to 334 00:21:27,600 --> 00:21:29,320 Speaker 1: do that was like point by point all of the 335 00:21:29,359 --> 00:21:32,920 Speaker 1: things that happened on the sixth, Um they have access 336 00:21:32,960 --> 00:21:37,879 Speaker 1: to to to all of that information to um. The problem, 337 00:21:37,880 --> 00:21:39,960 Speaker 1: as a number of us were saying, is that like well, 338 00:21:40,680 --> 00:21:42,760 Speaker 1: because obviously I think that when a group of people 339 00:21:42,760 --> 00:21:45,960 Speaker 1: try to force a dictatorship on the country, um, they 340 00:21:45,960 --> 00:21:49,800 Speaker 1: should be uh penalized for that. I'm not I'm not 341 00:21:49,880 --> 00:21:56,439 Speaker 1: against penalizing them. No, Like I don't know, you know, 342 00:21:56,520 --> 00:21:59,160 Speaker 1: in ancient Rome, they had these rocks that they threw 343 00:21:59,200 --> 00:22:03,560 Speaker 1: people off of they committed treason. Um anyway, I'm off 344 00:22:04,880 --> 00:22:12,000 Speaker 1: but Mount Rushmore. Yeah, I want to be clear here 345 00:22:12,280 --> 00:22:14,680 Speaker 1: because people are, oh, you're being you know, hypocritical because 346 00:22:14,720 --> 00:22:18,800 Speaker 1: you don't you know, your prison abolitionist. Yes, I'm also 347 00:22:18,840 --> 00:22:22,280 Speaker 1: saying within the context of the situation that we're in. 348 00:22:22,359 --> 00:22:24,920 Speaker 1: You have to use the tools as they presently exist 349 00:22:25,040 --> 00:22:27,080 Speaker 1: in our in the system that we live under. I'm 350 00:22:27,119 --> 00:22:30,200 Speaker 1: sorry you didn't say anything about imprisoning them. You said 351 00:22:30,200 --> 00:22:32,320 Speaker 1: throw them off of a rock. So I do think 352 00:22:32,320 --> 00:22:35,920 Speaker 1: we should throw some of them off of rocks. But specifically, yeah, 353 00:22:36,400 --> 00:22:38,800 Speaker 1: point taking, yes, working within the system that we have, 354 00:22:38,920 --> 00:22:42,119 Speaker 1: working with within the system that we have, the d 355 00:22:42,280 --> 00:22:46,480 Speaker 1: o J has the power um and these people were 356 00:22:46,520 --> 00:22:50,320 Speaker 1: committing crimes that are defined crimes. They are able to 357 00:22:50,400 --> 00:22:53,439 Speaker 1: prosecute these people. They are able to catch these people, 358 00:22:53,760 --> 00:22:57,000 Speaker 1: and they had, I believe, the powers necessary and the 359 00:22:57,000 --> 00:22:59,879 Speaker 1: funding necessary to have stopped this if they had had 360 00:22:59,880 --> 00:23:02,240 Speaker 1: the ship more on the ball. They don't need anything extra. 361 00:23:02,800 --> 00:23:05,960 Speaker 1: There didn't need to be more money. There didn't need 362 00:23:06,000 --> 00:23:08,640 Speaker 1: to be more powers. There didn't need to be even 363 00:23:08,680 --> 00:23:10,439 Speaker 1: a new plan. There need to be a willingness to 364 00:23:10,680 --> 00:23:13,359 Speaker 1: it was always illegal to try to break into the 365 00:23:13,400 --> 00:23:18,560 Speaker 1: capital and murder elected leaders. You don't need anything. They 366 00:23:18,600 --> 00:23:23,080 Speaker 1: just need to get their ship together. But well they 367 00:23:23,119 --> 00:23:29,320 Speaker 1: could have just not opened up those Uh, just don't 368 00:23:29,359 --> 00:23:32,159 Speaker 1: let them in. If the if the Capitol police that 369 00:23:32,240 --> 00:23:34,320 Speaker 1: day had used as much force as the Portland police 370 00:23:34,440 --> 00:23:36,560 Speaker 1: used whenever someone hoocked a water bottle, those people never 371 00:23:36,600 --> 00:23:41,360 Speaker 1: would have gotten inside. UM, but they didn't. And anyway, 372 00:23:41,480 --> 00:23:44,760 Speaker 1: so Biden has ordered ordered pretty much right after that, 373 00:23:44,840 --> 00:23:48,800 Speaker 1: a review of how federal agencies A dressed domestic extremism, 374 00:23:48,840 --> 00:23:51,879 Speaker 1: and they put out a new strategy document um and, 375 00:23:51,920 --> 00:23:54,320 Speaker 1: as a number of us had predicted, UM. The document, 376 00:23:54,359 --> 00:23:56,040 Speaker 1: while it does focus on some of the things we 377 00:23:56,040 --> 00:23:57,600 Speaker 1: saw in the sixth and some of the right wing 378 00:23:57,680 --> 00:23:59,359 Speaker 1: stuff that people like me have been yelling about for 379 00:23:59,400 --> 00:24:02,399 Speaker 1: a while, it's also clearly geared towards giving the government 380 00:24:02,400 --> 00:24:04,639 Speaker 1: a lot more power to funk with the left UM 381 00:24:04,720 --> 00:24:07,280 Speaker 1: who you will. You might note didn't try to institute 382 00:24:07,280 --> 00:24:10,679 Speaker 1: a dictatorship UM in January of this year. UM and 383 00:24:10,760 --> 00:24:13,320 Speaker 1: hasn't been shooting up houses of worships for years, and 384 00:24:13,359 --> 00:24:16,399 Speaker 1: hasn't been setting off bombs in American cities for years. 385 00:24:16,840 --> 00:24:20,080 Speaker 1: UM has in general been when they do uh illegal 386 00:24:20,080 --> 00:24:23,320 Speaker 1: acts like fucking up windows and spray painting ship which 387 00:24:23,320 --> 00:24:31,000 Speaker 1: you might recognize as not terrorism. UM, by my yes, 388 00:24:33,480 --> 00:24:37,320 Speaker 1: when ISIS took over mosle and spray painted graffiti on 389 00:24:37,359 --> 00:24:41,800 Speaker 1: the walls, UH, that was the real problem with isis 390 00:24:41,880 --> 00:24:46,800 Speaker 1: crime against humanity. Yeah, so the new strategy. The goal 391 00:24:47,000 --> 00:24:50,240 Speaker 1: here is to like coordinate efforts across the government. Um 392 00:24:50,280 --> 00:24:53,280 Speaker 1: in an outline's for priorities improving information sharing among law 393 00:24:53,320 --> 00:24:57,239 Speaker 1: enforcement agencies, which if you remember nine eleven, that was 394 00:24:57,280 --> 00:24:58,919 Speaker 1: the big one of the big things they said like 395 00:24:58,920 --> 00:25:01,040 Speaker 1: why nine eleven slipped pass? And it's like, oh, there's 396 00:25:01,040 --> 00:25:05,359 Speaker 1: not enough information sharing between agencies, right, And it is 397 00:25:05,680 --> 00:25:09,400 Speaker 1: again I have my ideological hat that I can put 398 00:25:09,440 --> 00:25:10,879 Speaker 1: on when I talk about stuff like this in the 399 00:25:10,880 --> 00:25:12,320 Speaker 1: way I think things should go. I also have my 400 00:25:12,359 --> 00:25:15,359 Speaker 1: hat as somebody who is a researcher in this field, 401 00:25:15,560 --> 00:25:19,960 Speaker 1: who has had its like interfaced with the government on this, 402 00:25:20,040 --> 00:25:24,560 Speaker 1: who has sources and who has like done consultations and 403 00:25:24,560 --> 00:25:27,520 Speaker 1: whatnot on this. So I'm I'm taking that head on now, 404 00:25:27,520 --> 00:25:29,400 Speaker 1: and I'm talking about the structure of how of how 405 00:25:29,440 --> 00:25:34,000 Speaker 1: these systems work. Um, there's there's some like one of 406 00:25:34,000 --> 00:25:37,320 Speaker 1: the reasons why information sharing across different agencies is often 407 00:25:37,520 --> 00:25:41,800 Speaker 1: shitty is just very simple competition, Right. These agencies are 408 00:25:41,920 --> 00:25:45,719 Speaker 1: competing for funds, these agencies are in some cases competing 409 00:25:45,760 --> 00:25:49,000 Speaker 1: for good manpower. There's a lot of like, um, you know, 410 00:25:49,240 --> 00:25:52,560 Speaker 1: bad faith or bad feelings over like you know which 411 00:25:52,560 --> 00:25:55,520 Speaker 1: agency winds up in charge when multiple agencies are involved 412 00:25:55,560 --> 00:25:57,199 Speaker 1: in a situation. Right, That's why a lot of other 413 00:25:57,240 --> 00:26:00,520 Speaker 1: law enforcement agencies, that federal agencies even don't really the FBI, 414 00:26:00,600 --> 00:26:02,600 Speaker 1: and why the FBI doesn't like them, especially since the 415 00:26:02,640 --> 00:26:05,280 Speaker 1: FBI is also like a watch, like it is supposed 416 00:26:05,280 --> 00:26:09,800 Speaker 1: to police other law enforcement agencies. So there's it's not 417 00:26:09,960 --> 00:26:11,800 Speaker 1: like I think a lot of times people tend to 418 00:26:11,840 --> 00:26:15,080 Speaker 1: look at the whole federal law enforcement apparatus as kind 419 00:26:15,080 --> 00:26:17,280 Speaker 1: of one unified thing, and it's not. There's quite a 420 00:26:17,320 --> 00:26:20,320 Speaker 1: lot of competition, and so it is true that they're 421 00:26:20,359 --> 00:26:22,720 Speaker 1: one of the problems when you're we're talking about from 422 00:26:22,760 --> 00:26:25,520 Speaker 1: a a standpoint of how effective these agencies can be 423 00:26:25,560 --> 00:26:27,720 Speaker 1: at their given tasks. One of the things that is 424 00:26:27,760 --> 00:26:30,000 Speaker 1: continually a problem and was a problem in two thousand 425 00:26:30,080 --> 00:26:33,440 Speaker 1: one and and did contribute to why nine eleven was successful, 426 00:26:33,480 --> 00:26:36,400 Speaker 1: is that there's shitty information sharing between them. Right, There's 427 00:26:36,400 --> 00:26:38,760 Speaker 1: other reasons. It's not just competition. There's reasons of like 428 00:26:39,000 --> 00:26:40,840 Speaker 1: what are you allowed to share and like what sort 429 00:26:40,840 --> 00:26:43,280 Speaker 1: of different systems are in place for Like there's there's 430 00:26:43,280 --> 00:26:45,359 Speaker 1: a bunch of just sort of structural stuff, right, like, 431 00:26:45,920 --> 00:26:50,080 Speaker 1: so I'm not surprised to see that on here. Um, 432 00:26:50,119 --> 00:26:53,040 Speaker 1: there's obviously concerns because like, what does it mean about 433 00:26:53,359 --> 00:26:55,880 Speaker 1: what kind of we We never really know what kind 434 00:26:55,920 --> 00:26:59,040 Speaker 1: of information is being gathered about the average citizen by 435 00:26:59,119 --> 00:27:01,479 Speaker 1: law enforcement. Right. We all remember when like Snowdon came 436 00:27:01,520 --> 00:27:03,880 Speaker 1: out with his leaks and a bunch was revealed about 437 00:27:03,880 --> 00:27:05,520 Speaker 1: what the n s A had been doing. So I 438 00:27:06,080 --> 00:27:08,960 Speaker 1: anyway that that that it's not surprising to see that 439 00:27:09,000 --> 00:27:11,720 Speaker 1: on there. You should always be concerned when you hear 440 00:27:11,840 --> 00:27:14,080 Speaker 1: that kind of language. I also think it is kind 441 00:27:14,119 --> 00:27:18,320 Speaker 1: of a cheap excuse because again, it's not like you 442 00:27:18,440 --> 00:27:21,199 Speaker 1: needed a great deal of information sharing for the Capitol 443 00:27:21,200 --> 00:27:23,480 Speaker 1: Police to know what was being planned because I found 444 00:27:23,520 --> 00:27:25,760 Speaker 1: it out. And you may notice I am not a 445 00:27:25,760 --> 00:27:31,159 Speaker 1: federal law enforcement agency. I'm I'm a guy with Google. 446 00:27:31,359 --> 00:27:37,080 Speaker 1: Like that's all I used to find out this Google. Yeah, 447 00:27:37,119 --> 00:27:40,280 Speaker 1: it's not I mean they do, um, I know, I 448 00:27:40,320 --> 00:27:44,040 Speaker 1: know yea. So the other priority was preventing recruitment by 449 00:27:44,040 --> 00:27:47,840 Speaker 1: extremist groups. Again, you know, when when Islamic terror was 450 00:27:47,840 --> 00:27:49,560 Speaker 1: the big boogeyman, they would talk about this a lot. 451 00:27:49,600 --> 00:27:51,439 Speaker 1: They're they're never good at it. I don't think they 452 00:27:51,440 --> 00:27:53,359 Speaker 1: ever will be good at it. I don't think they're 453 00:27:53,480 --> 00:27:57,240 Speaker 1: capable of being good at it because they fundamentally don't 454 00:27:57,320 --> 00:28:00,600 Speaker 1: understand in a lot of cases, what why these groups 455 00:28:01,200 --> 00:28:03,800 Speaker 1: what recruitment means. There's still I think a lot of 456 00:28:03,840 --> 00:28:06,480 Speaker 1: this idea that it is. It's very direct. It's the 457 00:28:06,480 --> 00:28:09,520 Speaker 1: way that you would have, like, you know, the way 458 00:28:09,920 --> 00:28:12,960 Speaker 1: people tended to think it worked back right after nine eleven, 459 00:28:12,960 --> 00:28:16,359 Speaker 1: where you've got these centralized organizations like recruiting people to 460 00:28:16,359 --> 00:28:18,600 Speaker 1: carry out centralized attacks, and that's not how a lot 461 00:28:18,920 --> 00:28:22,000 Speaker 1: of domestic extremism works now. It's it's stochastic. You know, 462 00:28:22,359 --> 00:28:25,200 Speaker 1: there are people within these agencies who do understand that. 463 00:28:25,640 --> 00:28:28,560 Speaker 1: I don't think they have a lot of power. But 464 00:28:28,600 --> 00:28:30,800 Speaker 1: also it's a question of I don't I don't know 465 00:28:30,840 --> 00:28:32,760 Speaker 1: how they could with all of the resources they have. 466 00:28:32,880 --> 00:28:36,200 Speaker 1: I don't know how you actually, as the FBI or whatever, 467 00:28:36,880 --> 00:28:39,600 Speaker 1: could stop the kind of recruitment that exists, because how 468 00:28:39,600 --> 00:28:44,760 Speaker 1: do you stop people from winding up falling down these 469 00:28:44,760 --> 00:28:47,000 Speaker 1: internet rabbit holes that lead them to believe the white 470 00:28:47,040 --> 00:28:50,840 Speaker 1: races being genocided and they should shoot up a mosque? Right? Like? What? 471 00:28:51,080 --> 00:28:53,400 Speaker 1: How what does prevention of that look? Like no one 472 00:28:53,520 --> 00:28:59,040 Speaker 1: really knows. There are theories people have possible task, but 473 00:28:59,120 --> 00:29:01,440 Speaker 1: I don't think that there's a blanket answer for one way, 474 00:29:01,600 --> 00:29:05,600 Speaker 1: one thing or another in the community. It depends on this. Yeah, 475 00:29:05,720 --> 00:29:09,000 Speaker 1: and it's it's to be honest again, and I am talking. 476 00:29:09,080 --> 00:29:11,600 Speaker 1: I'm saying, we're talking right now because we're talking about 477 00:29:11,640 --> 00:29:13,640 Speaker 1: how these agencies are looking at things, how the government 478 00:29:13,640 --> 00:29:15,320 Speaker 1: is looking at things from a perspective of if you 479 00:29:15,360 --> 00:29:17,680 Speaker 1: believe there should be federal law enforcement, right, if you 480 00:29:17,720 --> 00:29:21,160 Speaker 1: believe these organizations should exist, is there anything they can 481 00:29:21,160 --> 00:29:23,520 Speaker 1: do to stop that kind of recruiting. I don't actually 482 00:29:23,520 --> 00:29:26,040 Speaker 1: know that there is, um because I tend to think 483 00:29:26,080 --> 00:29:28,240 Speaker 1: most of the problems that lead these groups to be 484 00:29:28,280 --> 00:29:30,440 Speaker 1: able to recruit, that lead to this kind of propaganda 485 00:29:30,440 --> 00:29:33,440 Speaker 1: having an impact are structural problems in our society that 486 00:29:33,520 --> 00:29:36,880 Speaker 1: make people vulnerable to these kinds of messages. And no 487 00:29:36,920 --> 00:29:38,640 Speaker 1: matter how much power you give the FBI, they're never 488 00:29:38,680 --> 00:29:40,080 Speaker 1: going to be able to deal with that unless you 489 00:29:40,120 --> 00:29:42,680 Speaker 1: give the FBI the power to give everyone in healthcare, 490 00:29:42,920 --> 00:29:47,880 Speaker 1: which happen. Not only do they not have the power 491 00:29:47,920 --> 00:29:50,840 Speaker 1: to do that, they wouldn't want to do that. Yeah, 492 00:29:50,880 --> 00:29:53,840 Speaker 1: they wouldn't want to do that obvious. Yes, I don't 493 00:29:53,880 --> 00:29:55,720 Speaker 1: think they can do that. I think, yes, of course 494 00:29:55,760 --> 00:29:58,200 Speaker 1: they want to prevent recruitment. I don't think even if 495 00:29:58,240 --> 00:30:01,960 Speaker 1: they understand fully and there are individuals within these organizations 496 00:30:01,960 --> 00:30:04,200 Speaker 1: who do have a good understanding of how this recruitment works, 497 00:30:04,360 --> 00:30:05,880 Speaker 1: but I don't think there's anything they can do to 498 00:30:05,920 --> 00:30:09,959 Speaker 1: really stop it. Um, then you have investigating these groups, 499 00:30:10,000 --> 00:30:11,880 Speaker 1: you know, the groups doing the recruiting, and confronting the 500 00:30:11,880 --> 00:30:15,560 Speaker 1: long standing drivers of domestic terrorism racism and bigotry. I 501 00:30:15,600 --> 00:30:18,000 Speaker 1: am happy to see that put in there. It's the 502 00:30:18,040 --> 00:30:20,600 Speaker 1: most direct statement you kind of see in this document 503 00:30:21,160 --> 00:30:24,280 Speaker 1: stating that the primary drivers of domestic terrorism are racism 504 00:30:24,280 --> 00:30:27,720 Speaker 1: and bigotry. Now, there's some waffling later on about what 505 00:30:27,920 --> 00:30:30,239 Speaker 1: kind of racism and what kind of bigotry which is 506 00:30:30,280 --> 00:30:36,280 Speaker 1: a problem. Um that said, Um, again, you're you're looking 507 00:30:36,320 --> 00:30:39,959 Speaker 1: at another thing that federal law enforcement can't confront racism 508 00:30:40,000 --> 00:30:43,440 Speaker 1: and bigotry as as problems like the FBI again will 509 00:30:43,440 --> 00:30:46,000 Speaker 1: never be able to have there not be bigotry. That's 510 00:30:46,000 --> 00:30:52,760 Speaker 1: not number one. Never what they've been able to do. YEA, yes, 511 00:30:52,800 --> 00:30:57,720 Speaker 1: it is, including the FBI has released some of actually 512 00:30:57,800 --> 00:30:59,680 Speaker 1: some of the better reports we have about the extent 513 00:30:59,760 --> 00:31:03,840 Speaker 1: of supremacist infiltration of local law enforcement. Staton and local 514 00:31:03,920 --> 00:31:07,520 Speaker 1: law enforcement are FBI reports, so they're very aware of 515 00:31:07,560 --> 00:31:10,000 Speaker 1: the problem within law enforcement. I think they're less aware 516 00:31:10,000 --> 00:31:13,480 Speaker 1: of the problem within the FBI. But also again you 517 00:31:13,560 --> 00:31:15,960 Speaker 1: can you can write reports on it, which I guess 518 00:31:16,040 --> 00:31:19,280 Speaker 1: is again it's good that there's some sort of watchdog 519 00:31:19,320 --> 00:31:21,680 Speaker 1: for the police writing this ship they don't have a 520 00:31:21,720 --> 00:31:24,800 Speaker 1: great record of doing anything about it, you know, like 521 00:31:24,840 --> 00:31:28,240 Speaker 1: they don't have a great record of actually stopping for example, 522 00:31:28,280 --> 00:31:29,960 Speaker 1: they can write a bunch of reports saying, hey, there's 523 00:31:30,000 --> 00:31:34,040 Speaker 1: a shipload of white supremacists and local police less you know, 524 00:31:34,160 --> 00:31:36,440 Speaker 1: right now, the city of Portland is in like contempt 525 00:31:36,520 --> 00:31:40,320 Speaker 1: of federal law enforcement because, um, they're violating federal law 526 00:31:40,440 --> 00:31:44,040 Speaker 1: with all of the use of force against particularly UH 527 00:31:44,120 --> 00:31:48,840 Speaker 1: mentally uh ill people and UH and houseless people. Um, 528 00:31:48,840 --> 00:31:50,840 Speaker 1: and they're in a bunch of trouble, and the federal 529 00:31:50,880 --> 00:31:53,000 Speaker 1: government has been threatening them because they have not brought 530 00:31:53,080 --> 00:31:54,960 Speaker 1: up to state that like years ago they were like 531 00:31:55,040 --> 00:31:56,600 Speaker 1: they were told you need to do these things, and 532 00:31:56,640 --> 00:31:59,160 Speaker 1: they did none of them. And they're basically just saying, 533 00:31:59,240 --> 00:32:01,080 Speaker 1: what are you gonna do? Fire all of the cops 534 00:32:01,160 --> 00:32:04,120 Speaker 1: in Portland, and so far the FEDS have been like, 535 00:32:04,440 --> 00:32:07,120 Speaker 1: I don't know what we're gonna do. Like so again, 536 00:32:10,200 --> 00:32:11,960 Speaker 1: they say these are all the things that we need 537 00:32:12,000 --> 00:32:15,280 Speaker 1: to do, and I guess, broadly speaking, they're not wrong. Yes, 538 00:32:15,320 --> 00:32:18,520 Speaker 1: if you want to stop domestic terrorism, you prevent uh 539 00:32:19,080 --> 00:32:22,800 Speaker 1: recruitment by extremist groups, you investigate the groups, You confront 540 00:32:22,960 --> 00:32:25,680 Speaker 1: the things that drive domestic terrorism, which is racism and bigotry. 541 00:32:25,840 --> 00:32:27,800 Speaker 1: I don't think federal law enforcement can do any of that. 542 00:32:28,320 --> 00:32:29,880 Speaker 1: I don't think they have that power. I think even 543 00:32:29,880 --> 00:32:32,480 Speaker 1: in the best case scenario, right, they just can't. It's 544 00:32:32,520 --> 00:32:36,320 Speaker 1: just not the they're they're not able to do that. 545 00:32:36,400 --> 00:32:38,640 Speaker 1: They're pretty good at I mean they're not even They're 546 00:32:38,640 --> 00:32:40,920 Speaker 1: not even great. They're not even as good as you 547 00:32:40,920 --> 00:32:43,400 Speaker 1: want to at. Like for example, on the sixth, somebody 548 00:32:43,440 --> 00:32:45,360 Speaker 1: was placing pipe bombs outside the d n C and 549 00:32:45,400 --> 00:32:48,440 Speaker 1: the RNC headquarters. They didn't catch that guy, and I'm 550 00:32:48,440 --> 00:32:51,320 Speaker 1: pretty sure that guy's a fed UM former or current 551 00:32:51,480 --> 00:32:54,960 Speaker 1: because from the footage that we have, the individual knew 552 00:32:55,000 --> 00:32:58,800 Speaker 1: how to address themselves in order to not be visible. UM. 553 00:32:58,920 --> 00:33:01,480 Speaker 1: They constructed function in weapons and more to the point, 554 00:33:01,480 --> 00:33:03,920 Speaker 1: they knew exactly where the cameras were, and they made 555 00:33:03,920 --> 00:33:05,440 Speaker 1: sure that they were not filmed in a way that 556 00:33:05,440 --> 00:33:07,760 Speaker 1: would possibly give them away. They were very very smart 557 00:33:07,760 --> 00:33:11,160 Speaker 1: about that. They have not been caught. They have somebody 558 00:33:11,200 --> 00:33:13,760 Speaker 1: that um I said, if they're not a fed, they 559 00:33:13,800 --> 00:33:16,920 Speaker 1: have are connected to them to have information. And there's 560 00:33:16,960 --> 00:33:19,320 Speaker 1: a very probably a purposeful reason why they have not 561 00:33:19,440 --> 00:33:23,160 Speaker 1: been caught. Whoever that was was very competent. So again, 562 00:33:23,200 --> 00:33:25,200 Speaker 1: if they can't catch that, how are they going to 563 00:33:25,240 --> 00:33:29,320 Speaker 1: deal with like structural problems in American society? You know, 564 00:33:30,440 --> 00:33:33,720 Speaker 1: they can't. They won't. So with everything I've just said, 565 00:33:33,800 --> 00:33:35,840 Speaker 1: you understand why. I think it's kind of silly that 566 00:33:36,320 --> 00:33:39,640 Speaker 1: based on these things that federal law enforcement largely cannot 567 00:33:39,720 --> 00:33:44,240 Speaker 1: possibly do in the most ideal world. Um, the administration 568 00:33:44,240 --> 00:33:46,440 Speaker 1: has requested a hundred million dollars in additional funds to 569 00:33:46,480 --> 00:33:49,080 Speaker 1: hire prosecutors, investigators, and analysts. I don't think that's going 570 00:33:49,120 --> 00:33:52,800 Speaker 1: to help. UM. Maybe the analysts, well, you know, having 571 00:33:52,800 --> 00:33:55,960 Speaker 1: more analysts people who are like, you know, looking at 572 00:33:56,120 --> 00:33:59,520 Speaker 1: chatter online and stuff. I don't know how fucking tapped 573 00:33:59,520 --> 00:34:01,600 Speaker 1: those dudes where I'm sure some of it has been 574 00:34:01,640 --> 00:34:04,000 Speaker 1: a problem, like the Trump administration was very loath to 575 00:34:04,040 --> 00:34:07,160 Speaker 1: have people investigating this stuff, so that that is one 576 00:34:07,160 --> 00:34:09,799 Speaker 1: of more things that that might have some impact. You know, 577 00:34:09,920 --> 00:34:12,480 Speaker 1: they can do some stuff there. Yeah, if you're if 578 00:34:12,480 --> 00:34:14,560 Speaker 1: you and if you're monitoring like social media, there's a 579 00:34:14,560 --> 00:34:17,880 Speaker 1: lot of discernment you need to know like this person 580 00:34:18,040 --> 00:34:20,279 Speaker 1: just like ship posting or is like this is a 581 00:34:20,320 --> 00:34:24,239 Speaker 1: serious thing, like what is Yeah, and like being you know, 582 00:34:24,440 --> 00:34:29,000 Speaker 1: aware of all those communities. Um. And again, to the 583 00:34:29,040 --> 00:34:33,800 Speaker 1: extent that I have in the past, like lectured members 584 00:34:33,840 --> 00:34:37,239 Speaker 1: of these you know, organizations, That's the stuff I lecture about. 585 00:34:37,239 --> 00:34:39,120 Speaker 1: It's not like techniques. I'm not saying, like here's how 586 00:34:39,120 --> 00:34:40,880 Speaker 1: you track, because I number one, I'm not good at that. 587 00:34:41,239 --> 00:34:43,759 Speaker 1: I'm trying to explain like ship posting. I'm trying to 588 00:34:43,800 --> 00:34:46,160 Speaker 1: explain like the way people fall down rabbit holes and 589 00:34:46,200 --> 00:34:51,720 Speaker 1: get pilled, and like how stochastic terrorism works, um, because 590 00:34:51,760 --> 00:34:53,839 Speaker 1: that is one area where I do think it can 591 00:34:53,880 --> 00:34:56,640 Speaker 1: be useful. So I'm not saying there's absolutely nothing again 592 00:34:57,120 --> 00:35:00,600 Speaker 1: talking about you. We're not going to tear down this system, right, 593 00:35:00,760 --> 00:35:03,040 Speaker 1: certainly Joe Biden is not. So how is there a 594 00:35:03,080 --> 00:35:05,080 Speaker 1: way the system can be made that actually might reduce 595 00:35:05,120 --> 00:35:07,279 Speaker 1: the number of people who get murdered in this way, 596 00:35:07,400 --> 00:35:10,000 Speaker 1: that is something that can help. Is a hundred million 597 00:35:10,040 --> 00:35:11,759 Speaker 1: dollars needed? I don't know. I don't think so. I 598 00:35:11,760 --> 00:35:13,440 Speaker 1: think most of this, I think there's very little that 599 00:35:13,480 --> 00:35:18,040 Speaker 1: will actually be done that will have an effect. Um. Yeah, well, 600 00:35:18,080 --> 00:35:19,799 Speaker 1: and if it does have an effect, it's probably just 601 00:35:19,840 --> 00:35:24,680 Speaker 1: going to be like very civil civil liberties. And that's 602 00:35:24,680 --> 00:35:26,719 Speaker 1: where I wanted to get to because part of this 603 00:35:26,800 --> 00:35:31,080 Speaker 1: is also in these reports, in all of this, this 604 00:35:31,400 --> 00:35:34,759 Speaker 1: these plans and this ship that's coming out, there's a 605 00:35:34,840 --> 00:35:40,520 Speaker 1: huge risk for organizers at protesters. You're very right, and 606 00:35:40,560 --> 00:35:42,880 Speaker 1: I think we'll get to that, um, because that is 607 00:35:42,880 --> 00:35:46,200 Speaker 1: my primary concern. Um. I have concerns that, like, for example, 608 00:35:46,719 --> 00:35:49,640 Speaker 1: at some point, a bunch of fucking seventeen year olds 609 00:35:49,680 --> 00:35:52,120 Speaker 1: breaking Starbucks windows are going to get wrapped up with 610 00:35:52,239 --> 00:35:55,560 Speaker 1: terrorism charges and stuff like that has happened before the 611 00:35:55,640 --> 00:35:59,399 Speaker 1: Green scare was people who were like like fucking up 612 00:35:59,440 --> 00:36:03,320 Speaker 1: logging equipment and ship and doing what in a normal 613 00:36:03,360 --> 00:36:06,800 Speaker 1: world would it most be kind of mild to moderate 614 00:36:06,880 --> 00:36:14,719 Speaker 1: property destruction getting twenty year terrorism sentences. Um. Because because 615 00:36:14,760 --> 00:36:17,640 Speaker 1: the government was really scared of of the Green movement 616 00:36:17,680 --> 00:36:21,680 Speaker 1: you know of of people taking direct action, um, because 617 00:36:21,719 --> 00:36:24,920 Speaker 1: the people who fund the government are scared of that. Um. 618 00:36:25,040 --> 00:36:27,879 Speaker 1: And then you get you know that you start having 619 00:36:27,960 --> 00:36:33,040 Speaker 1: people being surveilled and surveillance being put on. Yeah, even 620 00:36:33,080 --> 00:36:36,280 Speaker 1: like old old lady who is at the capital riot, 621 00:36:37,040 --> 00:36:40,160 Speaker 1: like you're like gonna, you know, go like we have 622 00:36:40,200 --> 00:36:41,880 Speaker 1: to feel like that happened to be there as opposed 623 00:36:41,880 --> 00:36:43,719 Speaker 1: to like your example of the person who said, like 624 00:36:43,719 --> 00:36:47,120 Speaker 1: pipe bombs in these places? Yeah, and like where that 625 00:36:47,160 --> 00:36:51,319 Speaker 1: focus goes. Um, we have to take a break, but 626 00:36:51,360 --> 00:36:53,480 Speaker 1: then we'll come back and we'll keep talking about this. 627 00:36:53,760 --> 00:37:03,240 Speaker 1: Sound good. You know who will not set off pipe bomb? Well, 628 00:37:03,960 --> 00:37:06,960 Speaker 1: no they will not because Raytheon has access to Katie, 629 00:37:07,040 --> 00:37:10,440 Speaker 1: have you heard the good news about Hexagen? I have not. 630 00:37:11,680 --> 00:37:13,719 Speaker 1: Now your standard pipe bomb you're gonna be making out 631 00:37:13,719 --> 00:37:17,239 Speaker 1: of probably like smokeless powder or something. Right, basically gunpowder 632 00:37:17,280 --> 00:37:21,680 Speaker 1: makes a big boom. Hexagen, Oh, Katie, Hexagen is like 633 00:37:22,239 --> 00:37:25,440 Speaker 1: if if if the black powder in a normal pipe 634 00:37:25,440 --> 00:37:29,880 Speaker 1: bomb is like a cool like like a Corona beer. Hexagen, 635 00:37:30,200 --> 00:37:33,239 Speaker 1: you're talking like one fifty one rum and that's what 636 00:37:33,400 --> 00:37:37,200 Speaker 1: Raytheon And with hexagen, a pipe bomb you can take 637 00:37:37,239 --> 00:37:39,160 Speaker 1: out the front of a school bus. Hexogen. You make 638 00:37:39,200 --> 00:37:42,200 Speaker 1: sure that school bus is in the atmosphere. You know, 639 00:37:42,280 --> 00:37:47,480 Speaker 1: that's the beauty of Hexagen. So listeners, you know, do 640 00:37:47,600 --> 00:37:51,120 Speaker 1: the right thing the next time you're creating illegal terrorism 641 00:37:51,160 --> 00:38:05,480 Speaker 1: devices and go with raytheon. Well, forget everything. We're back 642 00:38:05,520 --> 00:38:09,560 Speaker 1: and we're talking about domestic terrorism. My favorite kind of 643 00:38:09,680 --> 00:38:14,000 Speaker 1: terrorism of the terrorisms, absolutely the best terrorism. I mean, 644 00:38:14,200 --> 00:38:19,280 Speaker 1: in my opinion. You know, international terrorism is such a 645 00:38:19,360 --> 00:38:23,680 Speaker 1: real drag, I know, and and kind of ghost right, yeah, 646 00:38:23,680 --> 00:38:26,000 Speaker 1: a little bit out of out of season. Right, nobody's 647 00:38:26,040 --> 00:38:29,440 Speaker 1: doing international terrorism anymore. We're all going domestic. Baby. I 648 00:38:29,480 --> 00:38:33,120 Speaker 1: think that the term that the internet influencers are using 649 00:38:33,200 --> 00:38:37,080 Speaker 1: is choog. Yeah, yeah, I mean it's one of those things, 650 00:38:37,160 --> 00:38:40,400 Speaker 1: Katie Cody. You know, we're all more concerned about the 651 00:38:40,440 --> 00:38:43,680 Speaker 1: climate these days. Right, We're shopping local, we're using local 652 00:38:43,719 --> 00:38:46,160 Speaker 1: farms to get our produce, and our terrorism should be 653 00:38:46,200 --> 00:38:49,640 Speaker 1: local too, you know, that's just better for everybody. Yeah, 654 00:38:49,760 --> 00:38:55,520 Speaker 1: keep it local, keep it local, shop local, bomb local, Jesus, Okay, 655 00:38:56,840 --> 00:39:04,600 Speaker 1: we terrorism guidelines here. Yeah. One of the things that 656 00:39:04,640 --> 00:39:07,439 Speaker 1: concerns me most about this is that UM seventy seven 657 00:39:07,440 --> 00:39:11,799 Speaker 1: million dollars through a Homeland security grant program is going 658 00:39:11,840 --> 00:39:14,400 Speaker 1: to state and local partners to protect against and respond 659 00:39:14,440 --> 00:39:19,440 Speaker 1: to domestic violent extremism. UM. This is potentially potentially a 660 00:39:19,480 --> 00:39:23,319 Speaker 1: significant issue because they really go out of their way 661 00:39:23,360 --> 00:39:26,000 Speaker 1: to both sides every terrorism thing. So they talk about 662 00:39:26,160 --> 00:39:30,080 Speaker 1: the threat of pro pro life extremists who murder a 663 00:39:30,160 --> 00:39:32,840 Speaker 1: murder a significant number of people and who regularly carry 664 00:39:32,840 --> 00:39:36,040 Speaker 1: out legal attacks um, and then also mentioned pro choice 665 00:39:36,040 --> 00:39:38,400 Speaker 1: extremists as being a problem which you may recognize is 666 00:39:38,440 --> 00:39:42,960 Speaker 1: not a thing, um, a pro choice terrorist attack. Oh, 667 00:39:43,000 --> 00:39:45,560 Speaker 1: I just love to find people on both sides and 668 00:39:45,680 --> 00:39:52,279 Speaker 1: the bad people on both sides. Yeah, uh, something like 669 00:39:52,920 --> 00:39:59,000 Speaker 1: before talking like talking about like far right terrorism and 670 00:39:59,040 --> 00:40:05,600 Speaker 1: then go to the people who oppose those people and 671 00:40:05,640 --> 00:40:11,120 Speaker 1: who are actively yeah, resisting the people. Yes, maybe maybe 672 00:40:11,160 --> 00:40:16,600 Speaker 1: these organizations should just fund antifa and um yeah take over. 673 00:40:17,719 --> 00:40:19,400 Speaker 1: So one of the things that's a concern to me, 674 00:40:19,600 --> 00:40:20,680 Speaker 1: I mean one of the so one of the things 675 00:40:20,719 --> 00:40:22,680 Speaker 1: that's good about this, if I'm going to be fair, 676 00:40:22,760 --> 00:40:26,000 Speaker 1: is that at multiple points it talks about it makes 677 00:40:26,000 --> 00:40:29,520 Speaker 1: it very clear that they that white supremacists are the 678 00:40:29,560 --> 00:40:34,560 Speaker 1: primary threat. UM. There's a line specifically pose an elevated 679 00:40:34,600 --> 00:40:37,560 Speaker 1: threat to our country one with racially and or ethnically 680 00:40:37,640 --> 00:40:40,719 Speaker 1: motivated violent extremists, and specifically those who espouse the superiority 681 00:40:40,760 --> 00:40:42,959 Speaker 1: of the white race in the anti government militia, violent 682 00:40:43,000 --> 00:40:47,080 Speaker 1: extremists posing the most lethal threat. Pretty good line, um, 683 00:40:47,239 --> 00:40:52,279 Speaker 1: pretty reasonable statement. There's another that says, um, the their 684 00:40:52,320 --> 00:40:54,880 Speaker 1: insistence on violence can at times be explicit, it can 685 00:40:54,920 --> 00:40:57,480 Speaker 1: at times be less explicit. Lurking in ideology is rooted 686 00:40:57,520 --> 00:40:59,680 Speaker 1: in a perception of the superiority of the white race 687 00:40:59,719 --> 00:41:01,719 Speaker 1: that call for violence and further into perverse int a 688 00:41:01,760 --> 00:41:06,040 Speaker 1: Borran notions of racial purity or cleansing. Um. But then 689 00:41:06,080 --> 00:41:07,880 Speaker 1: it goes right down to saying that a key component 690 00:41:07,880 --> 00:41:09,880 Speaker 1: of the threat comes from anti government or anti authority 691 00:41:09,920 --> 00:41:15,640 Speaker 1: of violent extremists. This significant component today militious. Yeah, that's 692 00:41:15,640 --> 00:41:18,880 Speaker 1: so they're they're they're looping in militias which have carried 693 00:41:18,920 --> 00:41:21,279 Speaker 1: out carried out a couple of different terrorist attacks. Last year. 694 00:41:21,480 --> 00:41:24,279 Speaker 1: The militia movement brought us the Oklahoma City bombing. Um, 695 00:41:24,360 --> 00:41:28,839 Speaker 1: and the militia militias are specifically named in the Constitution. Yes, 696 00:41:28,880 --> 00:41:30,640 Speaker 1: and you do have a you do also like that 697 00:41:30,760 --> 00:41:32,680 Speaker 1: is also a concern right, Like it is one of 698 00:41:32,680 --> 00:41:35,120 Speaker 1: those things. I mean, I guess most particularly liberals, I 699 00:41:35,200 --> 00:41:38,320 Speaker 1: think that militia should be illegal. But it's always a concern. 700 00:41:38,440 --> 00:41:40,480 Speaker 1: I think people don't like, you have a right to 701 00:41:40,560 --> 00:41:42,680 Speaker 1: be in a militia, which is not like again, a 702 00:41:42,680 --> 00:41:44,480 Speaker 1: lot of my work has been dealing with the militia 703 00:41:44,520 --> 00:41:46,600 Speaker 1: movement because it's a problem. But like, you have a 704 00:41:46,600 --> 00:41:50,280 Speaker 1: constitutional right to be in a militia. That's there's no 705 00:41:50,560 --> 00:41:54,640 Speaker 1: legal artists there right there, right, they're very clear right 706 00:41:54,760 --> 00:42:01,919 Speaker 1: to our guns. Yeah, well we get lated militia. But yeah, yes, 707 00:42:02,000 --> 00:42:04,000 Speaker 1: of course there's there is debate about like how that, 708 00:42:04,080 --> 00:42:06,040 Speaker 1: but you do have a right to be in a militia. Um, 709 00:42:06,040 --> 00:42:07,600 Speaker 1: you don't have a right to attempt to co adapt 710 00:42:07,600 --> 00:42:12,560 Speaker 1: the governor of Minnesota, Um, I'm the constitutions throw this 711 00:42:12,640 --> 00:42:18,279 Speaker 1: out that the birth of this nation was allegedly, uh 712 00:42:19,160 --> 00:42:24,400 Speaker 1: explicitly anti authoritarian. Yeah again right like it. And that 713 00:42:24,400 --> 00:42:27,600 Speaker 1: that's what concerns me because immediately after they talk about militias, 714 00:42:27,600 --> 00:42:31,720 Speaker 1: they talk about um anarchist, violent extremists who violently opposed 715 00:42:31,760 --> 00:42:35,359 Speaker 1: all forms of capitalism, corporate globalization, and government institutions which 716 00:42:35,360 --> 00:42:38,200 Speaker 1: they perceive as harmful to society. And that is listed 717 00:42:38,200 --> 00:42:41,000 Speaker 1: as a threat right above sovereign citizen violent extremists who 718 00:42:41,000 --> 00:42:43,640 Speaker 1: have killed more cops than any other group of extremists 719 00:42:44,360 --> 00:42:48,200 Speaker 1: um and in fact, repeatedly, when police themselves are question 720 00:42:48,280 --> 00:42:50,840 Speaker 1: over who scares the most, sovereign citizens always top the 721 00:42:50,880 --> 00:42:53,360 Speaker 1: list because they, especially during traffic stoff, they shoot a 722 00:42:53,400 --> 00:42:56,760 Speaker 1: buckload of cops. It happens a bunch, um. You may notice, 723 00:42:56,880 --> 00:43:00,240 Speaker 1: no anarchist like Portland's We've had a lot of people 724 00:43:00,400 --> 00:43:02,960 Speaker 1: throw ship at cops. We've had even a couple of malatabs. 725 00:43:03,360 --> 00:43:05,640 Speaker 1: Not a single Portland police officer has been killed or 726 00:43:05,680 --> 00:43:09,600 Speaker 1: severely injured. Um. Because for whatever criticisms you want to 727 00:43:09,640 --> 00:43:12,560 Speaker 1: make of the anarchist movement here, they don't want to 728 00:43:12,640 --> 00:43:16,960 Speaker 1: murder people, whereas like four cops were killed by boogaloo 729 00:43:17,000 --> 00:43:24,000 Speaker 1: types last year. Yeah yeah no, it's uh, like I'm 730 00:43:24,040 --> 00:43:26,520 Speaker 1: you know, it's important always be skeptical of this kind 731 00:43:26,520 --> 00:43:31,480 Speaker 1: of thing in general, um and giving an these organizations 732 00:43:31,600 --> 00:43:36,439 Speaker 1: more power um and validation. The shift over the past 733 00:43:36,480 --> 00:43:40,440 Speaker 1: like four years or so of after after Trump of 734 00:43:40,480 --> 00:43:42,720 Speaker 1: being like we fucking love the FBI, Now we freaking 735 00:43:42,719 --> 00:43:46,160 Speaker 1: love the FBI, the CIA. We've fucking shower me with 736 00:43:46,239 --> 00:43:50,160 Speaker 1: whatever Um, that's an issue. But but then like to 737 00:43:50,200 --> 00:43:53,600 Speaker 1: see it like they're they're just like explicitly being like, well, yeah, no, 738 00:43:53,640 --> 00:43:57,360 Speaker 1: we're going after everybody. Anybody goes like capitalism or authority, 739 00:43:57,480 --> 00:44:00,960 Speaker 1: like all these kind of stuff. It's there permission to 740 00:44:00,960 --> 00:44:04,600 Speaker 1: crack down on anything and everything. Yeah, it's it's a mix. Yeah. 741 00:44:04,640 --> 00:44:06,480 Speaker 1: I think what it is is it's it's at the 742 00:44:06,560 --> 00:44:09,360 Speaker 1: highest level, it's cravenness and a desire not to be 743 00:44:09,400 --> 00:44:11,799 Speaker 1: seen as playing sides and not to make the right 744 00:44:11,840 --> 00:44:16,120 Speaker 1: wing angry. And at the level of implementation, what that 745 00:44:16,200 --> 00:44:18,960 Speaker 1: means is it's created a justification to crack down on 746 00:44:19,000 --> 00:44:23,719 Speaker 1: the left. Um, that's what I think we're seeing. Yeah. 747 00:44:23,760 --> 00:44:26,560 Speaker 1: But but to an extent it doesn't because seventy seven 748 00:44:26,560 --> 00:44:29,240 Speaker 1: million dollars of this funding is going to local programs 749 00:44:29,239 --> 00:44:31,400 Speaker 1: to combat violent extremism, and all of that effort is 750 00:44:31,440 --> 00:44:32,839 Speaker 1: going to be focused on the left. They don't give 751 00:44:32,840 --> 00:44:37,120 Speaker 1: a shit about the Proud Boys. You know, I've watched it, um, 752 00:44:37,160 --> 00:44:39,640 Speaker 1: and that is concerning UM. One of the good things 753 00:44:39,640 --> 00:44:42,839 Speaker 1: here is that they list in voluntary celibate violent extremism 754 00:44:42,880 --> 00:44:45,640 Speaker 1: as a problem UM as a is a lethal problem, 755 00:44:45,680 --> 00:44:48,000 Speaker 1: which it absolutely is one of the biggest drivers of 756 00:44:48,120 --> 00:44:52,000 Speaker 1: deadly domestic terrorism attacks in recent past. The problem with 757 00:44:52,040 --> 00:44:55,240 Speaker 1: that is that they list it um alongside other domestic 758 00:44:55,320 --> 00:44:58,839 Speaker 1: terrorists motivated by violence, like other single issue ideologies, which 759 00:44:58,920 --> 00:45:03,000 Speaker 1: they list abortion, which if they're saying pro life, yes, 760 00:45:03,080 --> 00:45:06,160 Speaker 1: that is an equivalent threat. They also list animal rights 761 00:45:06,160 --> 00:45:11,440 Speaker 1: and environmental single issue extremists, which don't murder people. Certainly 762 00:45:11,520 --> 00:45:12,960 Speaker 1: not and nearly there have been I think maybe a 763 00:45:12,960 --> 00:45:15,640 Speaker 1: couple of accidental injuries and deaths, but like not nearly 764 00:45:15,640 --> 00:45:20,440 Speaker 1: the same thing. It's not. Yeah, you know, environmental activists 765 00:45:20,480 --> 00:45:29,600 Speaker 1: are planting busses into crowds. Yeah, exactly. I'm sure that 766 00:45:30,520 --> 00:45:33,239 Speaker 1: you're like, maybe something accidental has happened, but yeah, that's 767 00:45:33,239 --> 00:45:37,960 Speaker 1: not the ideology of how to affect change that group. 768 00:45:38,239 --> 00:45:41,080 Speaker 1: Concerned that the Sunrise Movement will start bombing people, That's 769 00:45:41,080 --> 00:45:43,480 Speaker 1: what I got to keep an eye on the Sunrise movement. 770 00:45:45,000 --> 00:45:47,719 Speaker 1: So yeah, I kind of right alongside this big high 771 00:45:47,760 --> 00:45:52,200 Speaker 1: level government report. The Foundations for Defensive Democracies report released 772 00:45:52,239 --> 00:45:55,319 Speaker 1: two dueling reports and domestic extremism, one of them on 773 00:45:55,360 --> 00:45:58,680 Speaker 1: the far right and white supremacists, and one titled Behind 774 00:45:58,719 --> 00:46:01,920 Speaker 1: the Black Block on anti fascists and anarchists. Now, the 775 00:46:02,040 --> 00:46:04,319 Speaker 1: f d D is a ship organization. They're a right 776 00:46:04,320 --> 00:46:08,879 Speaker 1: wing think tank. What's funny about this is there they 777 00:46:08,880 --> 00:46:12,760 Speaker 1: cite my research pretty extensively in the in the report 778 00:46:14,160 --> 00:46:17,160 Speaker 1: the Block, No No No, in the report on white 779 00:46:17,160 --> 00:46:20,279 Speaker 1: on white supremacists, they cite a significant amount of my 780 00:46:20,320 --> 00:46:23,480 Speaker 1: work and some other people at Bellycats work. Um. Their 781 00:46:23,480 --> 00:46:25,920 Speaker 1: report on behind the Black Block is just it's complete 782 00:46:25,920 --> 00:46:30,440 Speaker 1: fucking nonsense. Um. For like, so for one thing, at 783 00:46:30,480 --> 00:46:33,120 Speaker 1: one point in this report they talk about how online 784 00:46:33,160 --> 00:46:37,839 Speaker 1: ideologies right like kind of the expressions of violence that 785 00:46:37,840 --> 00:46:41,359 Speaker 1: that people make before doing a physical attack can lead 786 00:46:41,400 --> 00:46:44,000 Speaker 1: to physical violence. And there are two examples of that 787 00:46:44,080 --> 00:46:46,680 Speaker 1: are the christ Church shooting, right, which is a fine 788 00:46:46,719 --> 00:46:50,719 Speaker 1: example of of of like ideology and rhetoric leading someone 789 00:46:50,719 --> 00:46:53,920 Speaker 1: to carry out a fatal attack. Um. They equivocate that 790 00:46:54,440 --> 00:46:58,719 Speaker 1: to a guy breaking windows on a police car. Um. 791 00:46:58,760 --> 00:47:00,840 Speaker 1: They mentioned them in the same as two examples of 792 00:47:00,880 --> 00:47:02,920 Speaker 1: the same thing. And you may notice a window is 793 00:47:02,960 --> 00:47:06,720 Speaker 1: not fifty people being shot to death. UM. I would 794 00:47:06,719 --> 00:47:11,680 Speaker 1: call that ridiculous and and even blatantly offensive. The report 795 00:47:11,800 --> 00:47:14,600 Speaker 1: includes as examples of left wing terrorism and arson attack 796 00:47:14,640 --> 00:47:17,319 Speaker 1: on a police station in Portland I was physically there. 797 00:47:17,360 --> 00:47:20,040 Speaker 1: I watched that quote unquote attack go down. And what 798 00:47:20,080 --> 00:47:23,280 Speaker 1: happened was somebody dragged a trash can fire and shoved 799 00:47:23,280 --> 00:47:26,600 Speaker 1: it against the plywood of a beauty salon that was 800 00:47:26,640 --> 00:47:29,160 Speaker 1: attached to a police station, and then thirty members of 801 00:47:29,160 --> 00:47:32,279 Speaker 1: the crowd put the fire out. Um. I wouldn't call 802 00:47:32,320 --> 00:47:34,720 Speaker 1: it an arson attack. I guess you could. You can argue, 803 00:47:34,760 --> 00:47:37,200 Speaker 1: and one person it has gotten convicted of arson for that. 804 00:47:37,239 --> 00:47:40,680 Speaker 1: But what actually happened was the crowd stopped the fire. Um. 805 00:47:40,719 --> 00:47:43,640 Speaker 1: And furthermore, no significant damage was done, no life's were 806 00:47:43,640 --> 00:47:47,359 Speaker 1: ever threatened. It is interesting, as our researcher Garrison points out, 807 00:47:47,440 --> 00:47:50,000 Speaker 1: that they do not mention the Third Precinct in Minneapolis 808 00:47:50,080 --> 00:47:53,200 Speaker 1: being burnt down. Um, possibly because they know that most 809 00:47:53,239 --> 00:47:55,560 Speaker 1: Americans can think that that was a more or less 810 00:47:55,600 --> 00:47:59,120 Speaker 1: righteous attack um and utterly justified, and they know what 811 00:47:59,200 --> 00:48:04,719 Speaker 1: makes them look bad. Um And yeah, and then yeah, 812 00:48:05,120 --> 00:48:07,600 Speaker 1: it is weird, right, because all that happened at that 813 00:48:07,600 --> 00:48:10,960 Speaker 1: Portland attect was literally some plywood got charted, like literally, 814 00:48:11,000 --> 00:48:13,120 Speaker 1: some plywood got charged. That's the extent of the damage. 815 00:48:13,120 --> 00:48:18,520 Speaker 1: Whereas the Third Precinct is gone. Yeah, yes, yes, yes, yeah, 816 00:48:19,600 --> 00:48:23,280 Speaker 1: it's pretty it's pretty blatant. Yeah. Did you guys see 817 00:48:23,880 --> 00:48:30,880 Speaker 1: uh this this new piece from Ken Cliftonstein on the Intercept. Yeah, 818 00:48:31,160 --> 00:48:36,920 Speaker 1: US military training documents say socialists represent terrorist ideology. Basically, 819 00:48:37,560 --> 00:48:42,080 Speaker 1: there was a section in the training document called study Questions, 820 00:48:42,560 --> 00:48:46,960 Speaker 1: and the question was anarchists, socialists, and neo Nazis represent 821 00:48:47,160 --> 00:48:53,200 Speaker 1: which terrorist ideological category? The answer was political terrorists, and 822 00:48:53,400 --> 00:48:59,520 Speaker 1: I would say none, none, and then political maybe would fail. 823 00:49:00,000 --> 00:49:05,000 Speaker 1: I would fail. Um. Shocking and frustrating thing to come 824 00:49:05,040 --> 00:49:07,440 Speaker 1: out at the same time, not shocking. Yeah, you know 825 00:49:07,480 --> 00:49:12,160 Speaker 1: what I hat about, like the terrorist organization Democratic Socialists 826 00:49:12,160 --> 00:49:18,040 Speaker 1: of America when they stop people with busted tailights and 827 00:49:18,320 --> 00:49:21,839 Speaker 1: uh and replace those busted tailights for people, um so 828 00:49:21,880 --> 00:49:26,520 Speaker 1: that they don't get pulled over, yeahs and um all 829 00:49:26,560 --> 00:49:31,240 Speaker 1: their mutual aid they do, and helping the homeless camps 830 00:49:31,320 --> 00:49:34,560 Speaker 1: not get sued by police in l A and anyway, 831 00:49:34,680 --> 00:49:39,480 Speaker 1: it's I I uh in mixes just that that's how 832 00:49:39,520 --> 00:49:45,719 Speaker 1: we're training people. That's how we're um indoctrinating. Uh you know, yeah, no, 833 00:49:45,760 --> 00:49:51,319 Speaker 1: it's this is uh, it's so disgusting actually, um too, 834 00:49:51,680 --> 00:49:56,319 Speaker 1: like even mentioned those two things, like together with Neo 835 00:49:56,440 --> 00:50:02,800 Speaker 1: Nazis neo Nazis um. Um. You know. And and another 836 00:50:02,840 --> 00:50:05,280 Speaker 1: thing that a point that Ken makes in this document 837 00:50:06,719 --> 00:50:12,480 Speaker 1: is that, you know, during the Trump administration, you know, 838 00:50:12,600 --> 00:50:17,480 Speaker 1: Democrats expressed a lot of concern uh, you know that 839 00:50:17,600 --> 00:50:22,600 Speaker 1: national security, it was targeting groups on the left. But 840 00:50:23,080 --> 00:50:26,120 Speaker 1: all of those concerns and all of that conversation has 841 00:50:26,160 --> 00:50:28,440 Speaker 1: kind of gone away. You know, the media stopped covering 842 00:50:28,440 --> 00:50:32,200 Speaker 1: it from that angle um. That that that pressure is 843 00:50:32,239 --> 00:50:35,640 Speaker 1: coming off now that Biden is in office, um, and 844 00:50:35,680 --> 00:50:38,560 Speaker 1: that angle um conveniently at a time when all of 845 00:50:38,560 --> 00:50:45,600 Speaker 1: this stuff was coming forward. I don't know, bothers me. Yeah, 846 00:50:45,880 --> 00:50:49,640 Speaker 1: it's not great. A lot of real bad signs. Um. 847 00:50:49,800 --> 00:50:52,160 Speaker 1: One cool thing that happened recently, because I do want 848 00:50:52,160 --> 00:50:54,280 Speaker 1: to end this section on a cool thing, is in Portland, 849 00:50:54,400 --> 00:50:56,399 Speaker 1: the mayor and police just announced that they're no longer 850 00:50:56,400 --> 00:51:00,319 Speaker 1: going to pull people over from minor traffic and fractions. Awesome, uh, 851 00:51:00,360 --> 00:51:03,040 Speaker 1: And they're going to reduce the circumstances under which they 852 00:51:03,040 --> 00:51:06,799 Speaker 1: can search cars, specifically in order to not funk with 853 00:51:08,040 --> 00:51:11,399 Speaker 1: black people as much. Like that was the stated reason 854 00:51:11,440 --> 00:51:14,120 Speaker 1: why they're doing it, because they recognize that those kind 855 00:51:14,120 --> 00:51:16,880 Speaker 1: of searches unfairly impact that segment of the population. So 856 00:51:17,440 --> 00:51:20,120 Speaker 1: it's actualization that A doesn't need to do the till 857 00:51:20,200 --> 00:51:25,080 Speaker 1: I think anymore. Yeah, hopefully, Um. I mean, we'll see 858 00:51:25,080 --> 00:51:27,600 Speaker 1: how it actually works in implementation. But it is one 859 00:51:27,640 --> 00:51:30,120 Speaker 1: of those things I was hugely surprised to hear it. 860 00:51:30,760 --> 00:51:33,200 Speaker 1: And if it's the thing like, if I was going 861 00:51:33,239 --> 00:51:35,480 Speaker 1: to be asked like, what was the number one change 862 00:51:35,520 --> 00:51:37,880 Speaker 1: I could make that isn't taking away their guns to 863 00:51:37,920 --> 00:51:41,040 Speaker 1: make cops less dangers, This would be it is reducing 864 00:51:41,040 --> 00:51:42,920 Speaker 1: because really, most of what you could do, if you're 865 00:51:42,920 --> 00:51:45,239 Speaker 1: gonna have cops to make them safer is reduce the 866 00:51:45,320 --> 00:51:47,319 Speaker 1: amount of interactions they have with the public. And nothing 867 00:51:47,360 --> 00:51:52,839 Speaker 1: does that more than stopping count stories people losing their 868 00:51:52,840 --> 00:51:58,520 Speaker 1: lives are being unfairly incarcerated over being pulled over, or 869 00:51:58,800 --> 00:52:04,480 Speaker 1: you know, cops profiling and using some traffic as an 870 00:52:04,480 --> 00:52:09,920 Speaker 1: excuse to function up uh and you know, like I 871 00:52:09,960 --> 00:52:13,439 Speaker 1: don't get a car freshmener hanging from your rear view 872 00:52:13,480 --> 00:52:18,000 Speaker 1: mirror for example. Any who, that is a positive note 873 00:52:18,040 --> 00:52:20,479 Speaker 1: to end this on. And I guess the episode because 874 00:52:20,480 --> 00:52:22,319 Speaker 1: I'm looking at it and we're kind of out of 875 00:52:22,360 --> 00:52:29,440 Speaker 1: time here. Mm hmmm. Do you think the UH Congress 876 00:52:29,520 --> 00:52:33,839 Speaker 1: is going to pass the People Act. No, I don't 877 00:52:33,880 --> 00:52:36,279 Speaker 1: think anything is going to be done to protect voting rights. 878 00:52:37,040 --> 00:52:39,279 Speaker 1: I don't think anything is going to be done at all. 879 00:52:40,280 --> 00:52:44,399 Speaker 1: And then we'll lose the mid terms. Fun, Yeah, it's 880 00:52:44,440 --> 00:52:48,960 Speaker 1: gonna be rad Um. I don't know. Uh, should we 881 00:52:49,000 --> 00:52:51,520 Speaker 1: talk about the fucking New York City MARYL Race for 882 00:52:51,560 --> 00:52:56,600 Speaker 1: a little bit? Sure, it's happening. How boy Yang has 883 00:52:56,640 --> 00:52:59,000 Speaker 1: really I'm feeling bad that we were at one point 884 00:52:59,040 --> 00:53:05,440 Speaker 1: optimistic about Yang being a positive force for political discussion. Um, 885 00:53:05,480 --> 00:53:11,359 Speaker 1: he's because boy, howdy, he has not been unin not 886 00:53:11,480 --> 00:53:15,440 Speaker 1: been he's I mean, well, they're doing ranked choice voting, right, 887 00:53:15,480 --> 00:53:18,680 Speaker 1: they're doing ranked choice voting. Um, that's exciting. That's the 888 00:53:18,719 --> 00:53:20,839 Speaker 1: first time that they've been doing that. So we will 889 00:53:20,880 --> 00:53:23,480 Speaker 1: see how that works out. But apparently from a lot 890 00:53:23,480 --> 00:53:24,840 Speaker 1: of I don't have it in front of me, but 891 00:53:24,880 --> 00:53:29,320 Speaker 1: the polling and the data suggests that a lot of people, um, 892 00:53:29,360 --> 00:53:35,239 Speaker 1: particularly uh minority groups have expressed a desire to not 893 00:53:35,840 --> 00:53:39,560 Speaker 1: choose multiple options and to just go with their picks. 894 00:53:39,600 --> 00:53:42,640 Speaker 1: So we'll see. We'll see actually how this works out 895 00:53:42,640 --> 00:53:46,000 Speaker 1: in implementation. Um, but it is it is a bit 896 00:53:46,120 --> 00:53:50,840 Speaker 1: of a toss up right now. Um, I mean they're 897 00:53:50,880 --> 00:53:53,640 Speaker 1: there are no good mayors ever, So there are no 898 00:53:53,680 --> 00:53:57,600 Speaker 1: good mayors ever. I mean sometimes towns elect dogs to 899 00:53:57,640 --> 00:54:00,520 Speaker 1: be the mayor, and I think actually that should be 900 00:54:00,560 --> 00:54:02,720 Speaker 1: the only kind of mayor. If all of our mayors 901 00:54:02,719 --> 00:54:05,520 Speaker 1: were dogs, I would not have problems with any of 902 00:54:05,560 --> 00:54:07,840 Speaker 1: the mayors. Visit a place that had the had a 903 00:54:07,880 --> 00:54:13,200 Speaker 1: cat mayor and uh in Idle Wild, California, they've got 904 00:54:13,480 --> 00:54:16,279 Speaker 1: a dog mayor. Yeah. See, these are all good, these 905 00:54:16,280 --> 00:54:20,160 Speaker 1: are all good ideas for mayors. Yeah, I'm not two 906 00:54:20,200 --> 00:54:26,160 Speaker 1: thrilled with anybody in the race, um, except for I 907 00:54:26,200 --> 00:54:30,640 Speaker 1: guess Maya Wiley, but she doesn't have you know, she's 908 00:54:30,680 --> 00:54:32,960 Speaker 1: better than the other. She also has not come out 909 00:54:33,000 --> 00:54:36,920 Speaker 1: of pro defund the police, but she has committed to 910 00:54:37,400 --> 00:54:42,520 Speaker 1: taking a lot of money away from the NYPD. Um, 911 00:54:42,600 --> 00:54:46,120 Speaker 1: but we already did that. And yeah, that's why crime 912 00:54:46,239 --> 00:54:50,960 Speaker 1: is up everywhere, not just in New York. But it's 913 00:54:50,960 --> 00:54:55,040 Speaker 1: all based in New York, you know. Yeah. But yeah, 914 00:54:55,080 --> 00:54:59,799 Speaker 1: the races is between Andrew Yang, Eric Adams, and Catherine Garcia. 915 00:55:00,080 --> 00:55:03,279 Speaker 1: Uh uh for the most part, and they're all you know, 916 00:55:03,360 --> 00:55:07,560 Speaker 1: Yang would and Catherine would call themselves democrats, but they're 917 00:55:07,560 --> 00:55:10,120 Speaker 1: a bit more centrist, and we also call himself in 918 00:55:10,120 --> 00:55:16,040 Speaker 1: New Yorker, right, I don't know about fad Ao. Um. Yeah, 919 00:55:16,320 --> 00:55:21,160 Speaker 1: but it's it's sounding like people are kind of rallying 920 00:55:21,200 --> 00:55:25,080 Speaker 1: around like Eric Adams might be a strong choice, but 921 00:55:25,120 --> 00:55:28,239 Speaker 1: he's problematic. Um. But we'll see, we'll see what happens. 922 00:55:28,440 --> 00:55:32,480 Speaker 1: He's a wild one. Yeah, yeah, we'll see. We'll see. 923 00:55:32,760 --> 00:55:35,640 Speaker 1: It's interesting because he's he's kind of getting so. Yang 924 00:55:35,719 --> 00:55:41,840 Speaker 1: and Catherine have started campaigning together, um as a strategy 925 00:55:41,920 --> 00:55:47,399 Speaker 1: for the ranked choice voting. You know, and uh, Eric 926 00:55:47,440 --> 00:55:54,680 Speaker 1: Adams has come out accused them of you know, not 927 00:55:54,800 --> 00:55:59,560 Speaker 1: wanting to have a black mayor, but you know, being 928 00:55:59,560 --> 00:56:05,319 Speaker 1: antime minorities. But Andrew Yang is is Asian. Anyway, it's 929 00:56:05,320 --> 00:56:07,960 Speaker 1: all a mess. We'll see. There's a better way to 930 00:56:08,040 --> 00:56:10,719 Speaker 1: end this section. I just not thrilled with any of 931 00:56:10,719 --> 00:56:13,359 Speaker 1: these candidates. We could uh end on some. I mean, 932 00:56:13,520 --> 00:56:17,640 Speaker 1: Eric Adams is not Yeah, you vote for wherever you 933 00:56:17,640 --> 00:56:22,240 Speaker 1: want to. What do you gotta do? Um? He plans 934 00:56:22,239 --> 00:56:26,520 Speaker 1: on retiring. We uh retires. He plans on moving to 935 00:56:26,560 --> 00:56:31,759 Speaker 1: the Golden Heights. Um, which is interesting when asked. Here's 936 00:56:31,760 --> 00:56:34,080 Speaker 1: a fun little quote that I'm just gonna read he's 937 00:56:34,080 --> 00:56:38,439 Speaker 1: asked about the best concert he's ever been to, Uh, 938 00:56:38,480 --> 00:56:42,000 Speaker 1: Curtis Mayfield at the Windate Concert Series. At that concert, 939 00:56:42,040 --> 00:56:44,480 Speaker 1: there was a rainstorm and the lights fell on Curtis 940 00:56:44,480 --> 00:56:47,840 Speaker 1: Mayfield and they actually paralyzed him at that concert. He 941 00:56:47,920 --> 00:56:49,800 Speaker 1: died a few years ago. But it was an amazing 942 00:56:49,840 --> 00:56:57,360 Speaker 1: concert before that happened. Just the favorite concert when oh man, 943 00:56:58,080 --> 00:57:00,919 Speaker 1: that's literally like the joke of out how was the play? 944 00:57:01,040 --> 00:57:09,880 Speaker 1: Mrs Lincoln Like, yeah, Adams is uh, you know, a 945 00:57:09,880 --> 00:57:15,440 Speaker 1: former police chief, police chief commissioner, um, and uh has 946 00:57:15,520 --> 00:57:20,800 Speaker 1: has said several problematic things in the past during his 947 00:57:20,800 --> 00:57:24,480 Speaker 1: his time is in the public, um, you know, racially 948 00:57:24,480 --> 00:57:28,120 Speaker 1: insensitive things. Um. So we'll see, we'll see what happens. 949 00:57:28,160 --> 00:57:32,040 Speaker 1: And he's a Republican, which is also you know, it's 950 00:57:32,080 --> 00:57:36,040 Speaker 1: wild that he's got such a big, you know, a 951 00:57:36,040 --> 00:57:38,520 Speaker 1: strong leg to stand on in this race when everyone 952 00:57:38,600 --> 00:57:42,520 Speaker 1: talks about how liberal New York City is. So those 953 00:57:42,520 --> 00:57:44,479 Speaker 1: are some things. Yeah, the left is not doing great 954 00:57:44,480 --> 00:57:47,240 Speaker 1: in New York right now. We'll see what happens in 955 00:57:47,240 --> 00:57:49,240 Speaker 1: the next couple of days. Well, they defunded the police 956 00:57:49,240 --> 00:57:52,960 Speaker 1: and then ye, like, I mean, what are you gonna get? 957 00:57:53,000 --> 00:57:55,200 Speaker 1: You know what are you gonna do ye? All right? 958 00:57:55,560 --> 00:57:58,240 Speaker 1: I think that does it for us today. That's gonna 959 00:57:58,280 --> 00:58:00,960 Speaker 1: do it for us here at the Worst Year Ever. 960 00:58:01,920 --> 00:58:06,840 Speaker 1: Um you know, in the next week, I suggest each 961 00:58:06,880 --> 00:58:10,960 Speaker 1: of you go out and um you know, buy some hexagen. 962 00:58:11,120 --> 00:58:13,560 Speaker 1: Just just start buying hexagen. Get as much of it 963 00:58:13,640 --> 00:58:16,200 Speaker 1: as you can. Put it under your your attic, in 964 00:58:16,240 --> 00:58:21,440 Speaker 1: your basement. Were on these lists, aren't we? Wherever you 965 00:58:21,520 --> 00:58:24,200 Speaker 1: keep a lot of dry wood to you know, really, 966 00:58:24,240 --> 00:58:26,520 Speaker 1: if you don't have hexagen, go out of oil soaked 967 00:58:26,600 --> 00:58:29,080 Speaker 1: rags and dry wood. Keep that, Keep that around the 968 00:58:29,160 --> 00:58:31,320 Speaker 1: edges of your of your ceiling, you know, make sure 969 00:58:31,360 --> 00:58:37,960 Speaker 1: you block windows with it. Um good stuff. Just be safe, alright, guys, 970 00:58:39,440 --> 00:58:53,120 Speaker 1: see you next week. So I tried. Worst Year Ever 971 00:58:53,240 --> 00:58:55,840 Speaker 1: is a production of I Heart Radio. For more podcasts 972 00:58:55,840 --> 00:58:58,080 Speaker 1: from my heart Radio, visit the i heart Radio app, 973 00:58:58,200 --> 00:59:01,360 Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you list into your favorite shows.