1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:04,680 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is 2 00:00:04,760 --> 00:00:09,080 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,200 --> 00:00:12,079 Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A 4 00:00:12,200 --> 00:00:25,800 Speaker 1: production of I Heart Radio. Hello, welcome back to the show. 5 00:00:25,920 --> 00:00:28,520 Speaker 1: My name is Matt, my name is Noel. They called 6 00:00:28,600 --> 00:00:31,760 Speaker 1: me Ben. We're joined as always with our super producer 7 00:00:31,920 --> 00:00:36,680 Speaker 1: Lexus code name Doc Holiday Jackson. Most importantly, you are you. 8 00:00:36,680 --> 00:00:40,080 Speaker 1: You are here, and that makes this stuff they don't 9 00:00:40,240 --> 00:00:43,400 Speaker 1: want you to know stop of the week, which means 10 00:00:43,440 --> 00:00:47,839 Speaker 1: it's time conspiracy realists for some strange news, and the 11 00:00:47,920 --> 00:00:52,200 Speaker 1: strange news segments just get curiouser and curious er. We're 12 00:00:52,280 --> 00:00:57,080 Speaker 1: finding more and more odd stuff with each passing day. 13 00:00:57,200 --> 00:01:00,000 Speaker 1: You should see our group chat actually, which were probably 14 00:01:00,080 --> 00:01:02,120 Speaker 1: won't publish. I don't think we should. What do you got? 15 00:01:02,320 --> 00:01:04,520 Speaker 1: Just a snippet, just a little taste of a screenshot. 16 00:01:05,280 --> 00:01:08,920 Speaker 1: Give the people what they want. Guys, Come on, well, 17 00:01:09,080 --> 00:01:11,720 Speaker 1: let's figure out if if that's something you all want, 18 00:01:11,840 --> 00:01:15,880 Speaker 1: let us let us know. We've got uh, we've got coups, 19 00:01:15,880 --> 00:01:18,800 Speaker 1: we've got the black market, we've got some uh, we've 20 00:01:18,840 --> 00:01:22,880 Speaker 1: got some hacking afoot in multiple cases. Uh, let's see 21 00:01:22,920 --> 00:01:26,280 Speaker 1: where do you, uh, where where do you guys want 22 00:01:26,280 --> 00:01:28,600 Speaker 1: to start? You know, No, Actually I was going to 23 00:01:28,680 --> 00:01:30,920 Speaker 1: shine in and say it being a little bit of 24 00:01:30,959 --> 00:01:34,479 Speaker 1: a grab baggy, updated kind of zeitgeist thing, I thought 25 00:01:34,480 --> 00:01:38,640 Speaker 1: maybe we could start with mine. Does that sound okay? Everyone? Yeah, yeah, yeah, 26 00:01:38,720 --> 00:01:41,399 Speaker 1: let's I think. I think COVID is on a lot 27 00:01:41,440 --> 00:01:43,160 Speaker 1: of it. It's on a lot of people's minds. I 28 00:01:43,200 --> 00:01:45,360 Speaker 1: think because of the holiday, and I think there's a 29 00:01:45,400 --> 00:01:48,080 Speaker 1: lot of hope that things were going to be better 30 00:01:48,440 --> 00:01:52,160 Speaker 1: by the holidays, because everybody's been really thirsting for that, 31 00:01:52,200 --> 00:01:55,040 Speaker 1: you know, personal touch and seeing family and going through 32 00:01:55,080 --> 00:01:57,440 Speaker 1: a lot to social social distance. It was hoping maybe 33 00:01:57,480 --> 00:02:00,160 Speaker 1: for a little payoff, but as it turns out out 34 00:02:00,320 --> 00:02:03,720 Speaker 1: that's not the way, uh it turned out. Um, we've 35 00:02:03,720 --> 00:02:08,040 Speaker 1: been seeing COVID cases spiking, hospitalization spiking across the country, 36 00:02:08,240 --> 00:02:11,240 Speaker 1: and also kind of just a general malaise associated with 37 00:02:11,280 --> 00:02:16,200 Speaker 1: the whole COVID experience situation understandably, so uh, thankfully, you know, 38 00:02:16,240 --> 00:02:18,320 Speaker 1: there is sort of a light at the end of 39 00:02:18,360 --> 00:02:21,400 Speaker 1: the tunnel, and that we've got these two vaccines that 40 00:02:21,440 --> 00:02:24,639 Speaker 1: are testing very positively, and um, we can talk a 41 00:02:24,680 --> 00:02:27,240 Speaker 1: little bit about this process too, about how they were 42 00:02:27,280 --> 00:02:28,960 Speaker 1: able to accelerate because I think there's a lot of 43 00:02:28,960 --> 00:02:32,200 Speaker 1: misconceptions around that. But it looks like they're already shipping. 44 00:02:32,200 --> 00:02:34,959 Speaker 1: I think I saw a story today, UM, a nurse 45 00:02:35,240 --> 00:02:39,240 Speaker 1: in somewhere in New York was given like the first 46 00:02:39,320 --> 00:02:44,800 Speaker 1: kind of televised injection of the Fightser covid vaccine, which 47 00:02:44,960 --> 00:02:49,680 Speaker 1: was tested and proven to be effective in I believe 48 00:02:49,760 --> 00:02:52,760 Speaker 1: fighting the disease and in nine like a little under 49 00:02:52,800 --> 00:02:55,400 Speaker 1: that in completely preventing it. But I think you need 50 00:02:55,440 --> 00:02:57,720 Speaker 1: two instances of it. I think that's really important that 51 00:02:57,760 --> 00:03:01,320 Speaker 1: you get the second dose of it. So understandably, there's 52 00:03:01,320 --> 00:03:04,680 Speaker 1: a lot of demand for this product. Uh, there's always 53 00:03:04,680 --> 00:03:07,080 Speaker 1: already a lot of competition in developing it, and now 54 00:03:07,120 --> 00:03:08,639 Speaker 1: we've got it. What is it Fightser? What was the 55 00:03:08,680 --> 00:03:11,520 Speaker 1: other company at ben Uh? There are a couple in 56 00:03:11,680 --> 00:03:15,760 Speaker 1: phase three trials. There's mad vaccine Jansen, as well as 57 00:03:15,800 --> 00:03:18,760 Speaker 1: astrosenic probably here all four of those in the news, 58 00:03:18,800 --> 00:03:21,960 Speaker 1: But right now Fiser is the only one that is CDC. 59 00:03:22,400 --> 00:03:24,720 Speaker 1: That's exactly right, um, And we can talk a little 60 00:03:24,720 --> 00:03:26,720 Speaker 1: bit about this before we even get into the story. 61 00:03:27,360 --> 00:03:31,840 Speaker 1: What they've done to my understanding, guys, UH, in fast 62 00:03:31,880 --> 00:03:35,480 Speaker 1: tracking This is not just like Willie Nilly fast tracking, 63 00:03:35,520 --> 00:03:38,400 Speaker 1: and there's it's a three step process in vetting these 64 00:03:38,440 --> 00:03:42,120 Speaker 1: types of medications, and I believe they got rid of 65 00:03:42,200 --> 00:03:46,400 Speaker 1: step two UM. Step three is all all of the 66 00:03:46,400 --> 00:03:51,080 Speaker 1: placebo effects studies studying for side effects. Obviously, we don't 67 00:03:51,120 --> 00:03:54,480 Speaker 1: have a long enough timeline to know any potential long 68 00:03:54,600 --> 00:03:56,920 Speaker 1: term side effects, but I think within the best of 69 00:03:56,960 --> 00:04:00,520 Speaker 1: their ability, or of the ability of any clinical trial els, 70 00:04:00,560 --> 00:04:02,760 Speaker 1: they're gonna find out if there are any immediate side 71 00:04:02,760 --> 00:04:04,960 Speaker 1: effects that that are to be worried about. I've been 72 00:04:04,960 --> 00:04:08,960 Speaker 1: seeing a couple of articles discussing the concern of it 73 00:04:09,040 --> 00:04:14,080 Speaker 1: causing UM facial paralysis on one side, but then there 74 00:04:14,160 --> 00:04:16,400 Speaker 1: was a kind of a clarification article that came up 75 00:04:16,680 --> 00:04:19,760 Speaker 1: after that that said that there was UM, it wasn't 76 00:04:19,880 --> 00:04:21,640 Speaker 1: directly linked to it, and I believe there were a 77 00:04:21,720 --> 00:04:25,320 Speaker 1: handful of deaths involved in the clinical trials, but then 78 00:04:25,440 --> 00:04:27,960 Speaker 1: those came back around and they weren't determined to not 79 00:04:28,080 --> 00:04:30,760 Speaker 1: be directly linked to it either, but they are watching 80 00:04:30,880 --> 00:04:36,200 Speaker 1: for the facial paralysis. So with all of this kind 81 00:04:36,200 --> 00:04:40,360 Speaker 1: of hustle to get this, you know, medication out UM 82 00:04:40,400 --> 00:04:43,640 Speaker 1: as quickly as possible and the holidays and all of that. Um, 83 00:04:43,760 --> 00:04:46,960 Speaker 1: I started looking into the idea of black market surrounding 84 00:04:47,520 --> 00:04:52,120 Speaker 1: not only the vaccine, but also looking back, you know, 85 00:04:52,160 --> 00:04:56,880 Speaker 1: into the big travel push that happened during um during Thanksgiving, 86 00:04:57,480 --> 00:05:01,680 Speaker 1: black market COVID test results. Uh. And I actually was 87 00:05:01,720 --> 00:05:04,120 Speaker 1: getting a haircut the other day and the person cutting 88 00:05:04,120 --> 00:05:07,160 Speaker 1: my hair mentioned that there that there were reports of 89 00:05:07,400 --> 00:05:14,720 Speaker 1: people buying forged, falsified negative COVID test results that they 90 00:05:14,720 --> 00:05:17,200 Speaker 1: could present at you know, check in or whatever at 91 00:05:17,200 --> 00:05:20,040 Speaker 1: the airport, because that is a requirement for for a 92 00:05:20,120 --> 00:05:23,000 Speaker 1: lot of airlines. Um and I found an article that 93 00:05:23,080 --> 00:05:25,720 Speaker 1: talked about that very thing. Uh, so let's we can 94 00:05:25,760 --> 00:05:27,960 Speaker 1: start there and then go into the vaccine stuff. Just 95 00:05:28,080 --> 00:05:30,440 Speaker 1: this is like, it's at basically a month old story. 96 00:05:30,440 --> 00:05:32,360 Speaker 1: That's why I wanted a caveata. But it's not something 97 00:05:32,360 --> 00:05:34,919 Speaker 1: we've discussed. I think it's interesting. So just to be clear, 98 00:05:35,040 --> 00:05:38,360 Speaker 1: this is somehow just a piece of paper that's being 99 00:05:38,360 --> 00:05:41,760 Speaker 1: generated and purchased that says you've got negative results. Well 100 00:05:42,000 --> 00:05:45,000 Speaker 1: that's the thing, guys. It's like when you go get 101 00:05:45,040 --> 00:05:48,960 Speaker 1: a COVID test, you get your results via text message 102 00:05:49,200 --> 00:05:51,400 Speaker 1: or like an email, And how hard is it The 103 00:05:51,480 --> 00:05:54,559 Speaker 1: screenshot that text message mattch the font and just change 104 00:05:54,600 --> 00:05:58,039 Speaker 1: the name and birthday associated with it. It's really nothing 105 00:05:58,279 --> 00:06:01,120 Speaker 1: much more advanced than that. And that's what this article 106 00:06:01,120 --> 00:06:04,920 Speaker 1: that I found on insider dot com um talked about, 107 00:06:04,960 --> 00:06:07,120 Speaker 1: and again it's from about a month ago, from November sixteenth, 108 00:06:07,160 --> 00:06:10,000 Speaker 1: talking about there's a thriving black market for fake COVID 109 00:06:10,120 --> 00:06:13,880 Speaker 1: night team tests and the travel industry is just beginning 110 00:06:13,880 --> 00:06:16,160 Speaker 1: to kind of get wise to it and cracked down. 111 00:06:16,440 --> 00:06:20,520 Speaker 1: But it really isn't anything much more advanced, um than 112 00:06:20,520 --> 00:06:23,560 Speaker 1: what I just described, because we don't really have the 113 00:06:23,560 --> 00:06:26,279 Speaker 1: infrastructure to That's also a question I have about like 114 00:06:26,279 --> 00:06:28,479 Speaker 1: the future of all this stuff. When there is a vaccine, 115 00:06:28,839 --> 00:06:30,560 Speaker 1: is are there we then going to have some kind 116 00:06:30,600 --> 00:06:34,520 Speaker 1: of like notarized credential like a passport, like some sort 117 00:06:34,520 --> 00:06:38,039 Speaker 1: of stamped document officially, you know, notarized that shows that 118 00:06:38,080 --> 00:06:41,640 Speaker 1: we got the vaccine or the will what what, or 119 00:06:41,800 --> 00:06:44,839 Speaker 1: or have a negative result or have the antibody. Right. Yeah, 120 00:06:44,920 --> 00:06:49,800 Speaker 1: So it's it's a longstanding thing, the idea of proven 121 00:06:50,600 --> 00:06:54,600 Speaker 1: paper documentation for vaccine for international travelers. So you could 122 00:06:54,600 --> 00:06:58,719 Speaker 1: just take that same admittedly outdated, i would say, archaic 123 00:06:58,800 --> 00:07:02,160 Speaker 1: system and transferred over. But with the push to be paperless, 124 00:07:02,560 --> 00:07:06,719 Speaker 1: what we would probably see is a all right, well, 125 00:07:06,760 --> 00:07:11,760 Speaker 1: we probably see is a government created website or monitoring 126 00:07:11,840 --> 00:07:15,680 Speaker 1: system that probably it's very expensive for Uncle Sam and 127 00:07:15,720 --> 00:07:19,000 Speaker 1: then probably has a ton of tech issues. But I 128 00:07:19,040 --> 00:07:22,440 Speaker 1: saw what I saw with the fake tests. The first 129 00:07:22,440 --> 00:07:25,680 Speaker 1: report I heard occurred in France at Charles de Gaul 130 00:07:26,000 --> 00:07:28,720 Speaker 1: and when they caught somebody who was selling them at 131 00:07:28,800 --> 00:07:31,920 Speaker 1: Charles de Gal where like seven people were arrested for 132 00:07:32,040 --> 00:07:36,920 Speaker 1: selling selling these fake certificates. So they were just forgers. Uh, 133 00:07:37,320 --> 00:07:40,120 Speaker 1: they didn't have to your point, they did not have 134 00:07:40,200 --> 00:07:43,440 Speaker 1: some kind of infrastructure. They just to fly, They needed 135 00:07:43,480 --> 00:07:46,720 Speaker 1: a piece of paper that said they were good to go. 136 00:07:47,040 --> 00:07:49,840 Speaker 1: These also costs from a hundred and eighty to three 137 00:07:49,840 --> 00:07:52,560 Speaker 1: and sixty bucks, So feel free to negotiate if you're 138 00:07:52,560 --> 00:07:54,880 Speaker 1: already going to be a horrible person. Yeah, And that's 139 00:07:54,880 --> 00:07:56,960 Speaker 1: sort of what it comes down to, isn't it. It's 140 00:07:57,000 --> 00:08:00,880 Speaker 1: it's essentially putting everyone else at risk so that you 141 00:08:00,920 --> 00:08:03,200 Speaker 1: can do whatever you want. And that's why I think 142 00:08:03,240 --> 00:08:05,520 Speaker 1: the whole politicization of a lot of this stuff is 143 00:08:05,560 --> 00:08:08,480 Speaker 1: so infuriating, because like the idea of wearing a mask 144 00:08:08,600 --> 00:08:10,680 Speaker 1: isn't even really for you as much as it is 145 00:08:10,720 --> 00:08:13,960 Speaker 1: for others, and to prevent the spread if you happen 146 00:08:14,040 --> 00:08:16,880 Speaker 1: to have it, and other for others just comfort level, 147 00:08:16,960 --> 00:08:19,560 Speaker 1: you know. So that's always kind of blown my mind. 148 00:08:19,600 --> 00:08:22,840 Speaker 1: That's become such a you know, hot button issue. But um, 149 00:08:22,880 --> 00:08:25,080 Speaker 1: it's true with this, Like like you said, Ben, it 150 00:08:25,160 --> 00:08:28,680 Speaker 1: literally was uh. You know, in this Insider article, someone 151 00:08:28,760 --> 00:08:31,760 Speaker 1: was talking about how everybody they know has a COVID test, 152 00:08:31,840 --> 00:08:34,600 Speaker 1: and it's almost like it's even easier than like faking 153 00:08:34,600 --> 00:08:37,160 Speaker 1: a urine test. Like let's say you have a job 154 00:08:37,240 --> 00:08:39,600 Speaker 1: that's trying to screen you for drugs, and you know 155 00:08:39,640 --> 00:08:42,960 Speaker 1: that you've smoked marijuana recently, which is the one that 156 00:08:42,960 --> 00:08:45,199 Speaker 1: stays in your system the longest. So you get your 157 00:08:45,200 --> 00:08:47,920 Speaker 1: friend to give you their their urine and you keep 158 00:08:47,960 --> 00:08:50,440 Speaker 1: it in like a bag tape to your leg or something. 159 00:08:50,559 --> 00:08:53,520 Speaker 1: So I've heard, um, but this is like that, but 160 00:08:53,559 --> 00:08:56,559 Speaker 1: even easier because with the urine, they take the temperature 161 00:08:56,600 --> 00:08:59,640 Speaker 1: of it. You know, there's things that they do safeguards 162 00:08:59,640 --> 00:09:02,480 Speaker 1: in play is at a clinic or a lab to 163 00:09:02,559 --> 00:09:05,120 Speaker 1: make sure you're not you know, giving them fake urine 164 00:09:05,160 --> 00:09:07,520 Speaker 1: or whatever. If somebody else's earin and with this, it's 165 00:09:07,520 --> 00:09:10,280 Speaker 1: so new that there just isn't UM, so it's kind 166 00:09:10,280 --> 00:09:11,880 Speaker 1: of mind blowe. I people would pay that much, like 167 00:09:11,920 --> 00:09:13,600 Speaker 1: you said, been between a hundred and eighty and three 168 00:09:13,679 --> 00:09:17,959 Speaker 1: hundred and sixty bucks according to the Associated Press. Have 169 00:09:18,120 --> 00:09:21,800 Speaker 1: you heard about the the proposals for a COVID nineteen 170 00:09:22,400 --> 00:09:25,720 Speaker 1: so called immunity passport. That's sort of I have not been, 171 00:09:25,760 --> 00:09:27,920 Speaker 1: but that seems to be the kind of thing we'd 172 00:09:27,960 --> 00:09:31,439 Speaker 1: be looking at that would be more official, more traceable, 173 00:09:31,640 --> 00:09:35,200 Speaker 1: some kind of database associated with it. You know, what 174 00:09:35,320 --> 00:09:37,560 Speaker 1: have you to tell us about it? I really don't 175 00:09:37,559 --> 00:09:39,520 Speaker 1: know anything. Where are you talking about Compass or is 176 00:09:39,520 --> 00:09:43,720 Speaker 1: this something different? Uh? There is? It could compass. There's 177 00:09:43,800 --> 00:09:49,280 Speaker 1: the one I know about is the International Air Transport Association. 178 00:09:49,840 --> 00:09:52,319 Speaker 1: This is all in the ideation stage. There's not an 179 00:09:52,320 --> 00:09:56,280 Speaker 1: actual passport yet. UM. But this this would be something 180 00:09:57,120 --> 00:10:00,679 Speaker 1: that would be considered a digital pass or to your 181 00:10:00,679 --> 00:10:05,079 Speaker 1: earlier point knell. And this would allow travelers I think 182 00:10:05,080 --> 00:10:07,920 Speaker 1: it would be opt in, but it would allow travelers 183 00:10:07,960 --> 00:10:11,840 Speaker 1: to share their vaccination status and test results with border 184 00:10:11,920 --> 00:10:15,440 Speaker 1: patrol via this app. So you would just have this 185 00:10:15,520 --> 00:10:19,160 Speaker 1: on your app. Uh. Security becomes a concern, but then also, 186 00:10:19,840 --> 00:10:22,400 Speaker 1: you know, even if you don't make this mandatory for 187 00:10:22,520 --> 00:10:27,560 Speaker 1: travelers as a law, airlines and uh cargo ships and 188 00:10:27,600 --> 00:10:30,880 Speaker 1: cruise ships can make it a de facto law because 189 00:10:30,920 --> 00:10:33,560 Speaker 1: they will just refuse to let you on if you 190 00:10:33,679 --> 00:10:37,560 Speaker 1: don't have a negative result, which I will say is 191 00:10:37,600 --> 00:10:40,320 Speaker 1: just my opinion. I think it's the right thing to do, 192 00:10:40,480 --> 00:10:42,319 Speaker 1: but a lot of people are worried about what they 193 00:10:42,320 --> 00:10:46,000 Speaker 1: see as overreach. I completely agree. But come on to 194 00:10:46,120 --> 00:10:48,200 Speaker 1: those people. They won't let you on if you have 195 00:10:48,240 --> 00:10:51,719 Speaker 1: the wrong size shaving gel, you know what I mean? Like, 196 00:10:52,040 --> 00:10:54,800 Speaker 1: how is this more egregious that than that? Or like 197 00:10:54,880 --> 00:10:58,440 Speaker 1: more of an invasion of privacy or or you know, uh, 198 00:10:58,679 --> 00:11:01,760 Speaker 1: screwing around with your civil produce? I think we're past 199 00:11:01,840 --> 00:11:04,080 Speaker 1: that when it comes to air travel, well it is. 200 00:11:04,200 --> 00:11:07,120 Speaker 1: You know, this the whole situation, as we've discussed before, 201 00:11:07,360 --> 00:11:14,040 Speaker 1: just brings up questions about healthcare, about your own health 202 00:11:14,120 --> 00:11:17,840 Speaker 1: and the information associated with it, and who should have 203 00:11:17,920 --> 00:11:22,920 Speaker 1: access to that information. And it's been widely commonly recognized 204 00:11:23,200 --> 00:11:26,480 Speaker 1: that nobody should have it besides healthcare practitioners, yourself and 205 00:11:26,480 --> 00:11:29,079 Speaker 1: anyone else that you specifically say can have access to 206 00:11:29,120 --> 00:11:33,040 Speaker 1: any of it, and a test like this falls under 207 00:11:33,080 --> 00:11:36,880 Speaker 1: that same criteria or it's the same kind of information. 208 00:11:37,720 --> 00:11:42,280 Speaker 1: It's just there's a there's a public need to know 209 00:11:42,679 --> 00:11:46,120 Speaker 1: whether you know that one tiny aspect about your health. 210 00:11:46,800 --> 00:11:50,560 Speaker 1: Uh So something like common Pass, which is something slightly different, 211 00:11:50,600 --> 00:11:53,400 Speaker 1: it would it was it would try, at least according 212 00:11:53,440 --> 00:11:57,400 Speaker 1: to their UM, the nonprofit that's trying to make Common 213 00:11:57,440 --> 00:12:00,000 Speaker 1: Pass a thing. Uh, they're saying they're trying to make 214 00:12:00,320 --> 00:12:04,679 Speaker 1: essentially a trust structure for individuals to be able to 215 00:12:04,679 --> 00:12:09,040 Speaker 1: share small bits of information about their health with, you know, 216 00:12:09,440 --> 00:12:12,160 Speaker 1: like the t s A and other organizations that are 217 00:12:12,160 --> 00:12:15,800 Speaker 1: trying to clear passengers for travel. UM. I don't know, 218 00:12:15,840 --> 00:12:17,880 Speaker 1: it's interesting. It's an interesting concept to be able to 219 00:12:17,960 --> 00:12:19,520 Speaker 1: have that an apple like you were talking about ben 220 00:12:19,760 --> 00:12:22,320 Speaker 1: where you could just flash it or just a QR 221 00:12:22,360 --> 00:12:26,400 Speaker 1: code or something that just specifically has that updated information 222 00:12:26,440 --> 00:12:30,600 Speaker 1: about your health and that's it, but it's verified. Yeah. Yeah, 223 00:12:30,679 --> 00:12:33,200 Speaker 1: but think about Okay, so think about this. Let's get 224 00:12:33,240 --> 00:12:37,320 Speaker 1: real dystopian and weird and depressing with it. So, first off, 225 00:12:37,720 --> 00:12:40,560 Speaker 1: we've had systems like this that just existed on paper, 226 00:12:40,600 --> 00:12:43,800 Speaker 1: which made them more difficult and arguably a little bit 227 00:12:43,800 --> 00:12:45,679 Speaker 1: more secure in some ways, like you have to get 228 00:12:45,760 --> 00:12:50,079 Speaker 1: polio vaccination or yellow fever vaccinations if you're going to 229 00:12:50,200 --> 00:12:53,960 Speaker 1: different parts of the world, often developing countries where those 230 00:12:54,000 --> 00:12:57,240 Speaker 1: diseases occur at a higher frequency. But the thing about 231 00:12:57,360 --> 00:13:00,720 Speaker 1: common pass is that it's rule lean out in a 232 00:13:00,840 --> 00:13:04,320 Speaker 1: couple of cities, right, and flights from a discrete number 233 00:13:04,360 --> 00:13:08,320 Speaker 1: of cities. At first, these solutions help, but they don't. 234 00:13:08,960 --> 00:13:12,000 Speaker 1: They gain the most benefits when they are at scale, 235 00:13:12,240 --> 00:13:16,240 Speaker 1: but every group hasn't. And what should be interesting to 236 00:13:16,280 --> 00:13:19,240 Speaker 1: a lot of people who recognize that now is that 237 00:13:19,280 --> 00:13:23,120 Speaker 1: there are multiple kind of brand name passes coming out. 238 00:13:23,160 --> 00:13:27,480 Speaker 1: Like another, the International Chamber of Commerce CEOC is developing 239 00:13:27,520 --> 00:13:31,120 Speaker 1: something they call the a O KA Pass. But anyway, 240 00:13:31,240 --> 00:13:34,520 Speaker 1: so their competitors out there already hopefully they can work together. 241 00:13:34,800 --> 00:13:37,680 Speaker 1: But the second thing is once this kind of thing 242 00:13:37,800 --> 00:13:41,360 Speaker 1: is accepted, once it's out there, uh, you can this 243 00:13:41,400 --> 00:13:44,320 Speaker 1: can be used to transmit all sorts of medical information 244 00:13:44,400 --> 00:13:48,920 Speaker 1: unless strong safeguards are in place, Like I I don't 245 00:13:48,960 --> 00:13:51,320 Speaker 1: think there's any I think this is a door that 246 00:13:51,400 --> 00:13:53,840 Speaker 1: does not close. I think we need it for COVID. 247 00:13:54,240 --> 00:13:58,000 Speaker 1: But I think the same technology again, uh, the same 248 00:13:58,040 --> 00:14:01,560 Speaker 1: thing that that warms you can burn you. You know, 249 00:14:01,800 --> 00:14:03,680 Speaker 1: it's the same it's the same slippery slope as that 250 00:14:03,840 --> 00:14:07,440 Speaker 1: ring uh dot com um database we talked about on 251 00:14:07,480 --> 00:14:10,360 Speaker 1: the last news episode, right where it's like, oh, on 252 00:14:10,400 --> 00:14:12,920 Speaker 1: the surface, yes, this is a good thing to help 253 00:14:12,920 --> 00:14:15,400 Speaker 1: protect our citizens and make sure the police knows if 254 00:14:15,400 --> 00:14:17,959 Speaker 1: the folks are in trouble. But then there's all kinds 255 00:14:18,000 --> 00:14:19,800 Speaker 1: of other things that can get rolled up into it 256 00:14:19,800 --> 00:14:23,040 Speaker 1: over time. And you know, it's just cliche to even say, 257 00:14:23,080 --> 00:14:25,160 Speaker 1: but it's like a slippery slope. And then obviously this 258 00:14:25,240 --> 00:14:30,479 Speaker 1: is too um. But another slippery slope is the implications 259 00:14:30,560 --> 00:14:36,880 Speaker 1: of how the black market enters into the actual vaccine. Okay, 260 00:14:37,120 --> 00:14:39,760 Speaker 1: I mean that's, you know, obvious. I don't think that 261 00:14:40,320 --> 00:14:42,360 Speaker 1: anyone's like, oh, it would never never occurred to me, 262 00:14:42,720 --> 00:14:46,040 Speaker 1: but yeah, I mean it's like the moment you have 263 00:14:46,160 --> 00:14:48,320 Speaker 1: something in high demand like that. We talked about it 264 00:14:48,400 --> 00:14:51,720 Speaker 1: with with oregan transplants all the time, We talked about 265 00:14:51,720 --> 00:14:54,360 Speaker 1: it with all kinds of commodities that are only available 266 00:14:54,360 --> 00:14:57,600 Speaker 1: in limited supply um, and that will be absolutely no 267 00:14:57,680 --> 00:15:01,920 Speaker 1: exception when it comes to COVID nineteen vaccines, because we 268 00:15:02,000 --> 00:15:04,320 Speaker 1: know that. I think there was even like talk where 269 00:15:04,320 --> 00:15:05,680 Speaker 1: it was going to get rolled out to the White 270 00:15:05,680 --> 00:15:08,400 Speaker 1: House very very quickly. Uh. And I think a lot 271 00:15:08,400 --> 00:15:10,880 Speaker 1: of people probably had a problem with that, considering how 272 00:15:10,920 --> 00:15:16,200 Speaker 1: many White House employees got COVID um from being not 273 00:15:16,480 --> 00:15:20,040 Speaker 1: super smart about social distancing, you know, politics aside. I 274 00:15:20,080 --> 00:15:24,120 Speaker 1: think we can at least agree that's pretty much a fact. Um, 275 00:15:24,200 --> 00:15:27,280 Speaker 1: So the idea of giving them I've even heard that 276 00:15:27,320 --> 00:15:29,960 Speaker 1: if you've had COVID before, which I have, I got 277 00:15:29,960 --> 00:15:31,280 Speaker 1: it earlier. I don't know if I've mentioned on the 278 00:15:31,280 --> 00:15:33,560 Speaker 1: show before, but early on I was in and I 279 00:15:33,640 --> 00:15:35,480 Speaker 1: was traveling and I got sick, and it was like 280 00:15:35,800 --> 00:15:38,360 Speaker 1: back in March, and then I got an antibody test recently, 281 00:15:38,360 --> 00:15:41,600 Speaker 1: and I did have it. So even though my instance 282 00:15:41,600 --> 00:15:44,320 Speaker 1: of having gotten it was way back in March, I 283 00:15:44,360 --> 00:15:46,560 Speaker 1: do still have the antibody apparently, or at least I didn't, 284 00:15:46,600 --> 00:15:48,520 Speaker 1: you know, um, however many months ago it was that 285 00:15:48,560 --> 00:15:50,720 Speaker 1: I got that test. I'm not supposed to try to 286 00:15:50,760 --> 00:15:54,160 Speaker 1: get the vaccine like for a long time. They are 287 00:15:54,200 --> 00:15:57,080 Speaker 1: asking people like me and anyone else out there who's 288 00:15:57,120 --> 00:15:59,840 Speaker 1: gotten it and and survived it to hold on and 289 00:16:00,040 --> 00:16:02,880 Speaker 1: not try to get it because you technically are in 290 00:16:02,960 --> 00:16:05,720 Speaker 1: better shape to be not immune because they're not saying 291 00:16:05,760 --> 00:16:08,160 Speaker 1: that they don't really even know that anybody makes you immune. 292 00:16:08,800 --> 00:16:14,640 Speaker 1: But um, this black market idea is fascinating because they're 293 00:16:14,640 --> 00:16:18,240 Speaker 1: giving its just healthcare workers first, understandably, But there's even 294 00:16:18,320 --> 00:16:21,720 Speaker 1: outside of the black market angle, the idea of being 295 00:16:21,960 --> 00:16:25,320 Speaker 1: a UM what's the word they use, guys, uh, critical 296 00:16:25,400 --> 00:16:30,080 Speaker 1: workers or there's there's a there's a term essential workers. 297 00:16:30,160 --> 00:16:36,400 Speaker 1: So apparently in Florida, the World Wrestling Entertainment Organization that 298 00:16:36,400 --> 00:16:39,240 Speaker 1: that's the one, not the wildlife one, the wrestling one, 299 00:16:39,800 --> 00:16:44,440 Speaker 1: um was deemed to be essential Uh. And the chairman 300 00:16:44,520 --> 00:16:48,080 Speaker 1: of w w E is Vince McMahon, who's really good 301 00:16:48,120 --> 00:16:52,120 Speaker 1: friends with Donald Trump and his wife Lynda McMahon actually 302 00:16:52,280 --> 00:16:56,680 Speaker 1: was on the U is the chair of a superpack 303 00:16:57,080 --> 00:17:00,240 Speaker 1: for for Trump. So take that do with the way 304 00:17:00,240 --> 00:17:03,240 Speaker 1: you will. But the idea of who is deemed essential workers, 305 00:17:03,280 --> 00:17:06,120 Speaker 1: even in and of itself, is a little slippery and political. 306 00:17:06,400 --> 00:17:11,120 Speaker 1: But um, once the vaccine rolls out, there's so much 307 00:17:11,160 --> 00:17:14,080 Speaker 1: possibility for it to get you know, uh, oh, a 308 00:17:14,119 --> 00:17:16,439 Speaker 1: bunch of doses fell off a truck, you know that 309 00:17:16,520 --> 00:17:20,120 Speaker 1: kind of story, or counterfeit doses sold to people in need. 310 00:17:21,040 --> 00:17:22,600 Speaker 1: You didn't even think about that one. That's that's like 311 00:17:22,800 --> 00:17:27,119 Speaker 1: a whole another bollow acts Also, I would add uh quickly, like, 312 00:17:27,240 --> 00:17:32,879 Speaker 1: regardless of your regardless of your own personal political leanings, folks, 313 00:17:33,160 --> 00:17:35,919 Speaker 1: it does make sense for world leaders to have early 314 00:17:35,960 --> 00:17:41,120 Speaker 1: access to a virus just for stability of government. Um. 315 00:17:41,560 --> 00:17:44,520 Speaker 1: And you know, as far as the w W E 316 00:17:44,600 --> 00:17:48,720 Speaker 1: not to knock on them, You're right, Maybe essential is 317 00:17:48,800 --> 00:17:52,240 Speaker 1: in the eye of the beholder. But also remember that 318 00:17:52,560 --> 00:17:57,399 Speaker 1: this country, the United States, did a brilliant and and 319 00:17:57,400 --> 00:18:02,560 Speaker 1: and and ruthless Marcavellian job of cauling people essential workers 320 00:18:02,760 --> 00:18:05,720 Speaker 1: and putting out nice commercials about them and not doing 321 00:18:05,760 --> 00:18:08,880 Speaker 1: a damn thing to help them, like other than what 322 00:18:09,680 --> 00:18:13,639 Speaker 1: Bucks wants. Like there's I I would be um. I 323 00:18:13,720 --> 00:18:17,480 Speaker 1: would be surprised if all of the people who are 324 00:18:17,520 --> 00:18:22,000 Speaker 1: described as essential, essential workers and a lot of that propaganda, 325 00:18:22,080 --> 00:18:25,120 Speaker 1: I would be surprised if they do get early access 326 00:18:25,160 --> 00:18:27,119 Speaker 1: to the vaccine. When the rubber hits the road, I 327 00:18:27,160 --> 00:18:29,760 Speaker 1: do think it's gonna be um. We'll see a lot 328 00:18:29,800 --> 00:18:34,520 Speaker 1: of medical personnel. Um. But one important point raised is 329 00:18:34,560 --> 00:18:37,679 Speaker 1: that Fiser I call it the double dose because you've 330 00:18:37,680 --> 00:18:41,240 Speaker 1: gotta get two shots, and that the interim between those 331 00:18:41,240 --> 00:18:43,560 Speaker 1: shots is gonna knock a lot of people who are 332 00:18:43,760 --> 00:18:47,960 Speaker 1: essential workers out of the game. Also, there's other loopholes 333 00:18:48,000 --> 00:18:49,840 Speaker 1: to consider. So, I mean the black market stuff, we 334 00:18:49,880 --> 00:18:52,320 Speaker 1: all know how that works. It basically just means folks 335 00:18:52,400 --> 00:18:57,400 Speaker 1: are circumventing the law either stealing, uh falsifying whatever, bootlegging, 336 00:18:57,920 --> 00:18:59,320 Speaker 1: and that could be a whole other thing. It could 337 00:18:59,359 --> 00:19:02,720 Speaker 1: actually kill peop. But let's just say those doses are real. 338 00:19:02,960 --> 00:19:07,160 Speaker 1: They're gotten in some nefarious way, but not necessarily because 339 00:19:07,160 --> 00:19:10,919 Speaker 1: they are actually uh perfectly legal. Ways to circumvent this 340 00:19:10,960 --> 00:19:12,879 Speaker 1: in the jump in line, and one of them is 341 00:19:12,920 --> 00:19:16,080 Speaker 1: by having like a pre existing condition like asthma or 342 00:19:16,160 --> 00:19:20,640 Speaker 1: high blood pressure, or even being a smoker, would consider 343 00:19:20,880 --> 00:19:24,560 Speaker 1: would be considered having like a mitigating factor that would 344 00:19:24,560 --> 00:19:27,119 Speaker 1: make you more high risk and could potentially bump you 345 00:19:27,200 --> 00:19:29,840 Speaker 1: up in the line. It's sort of like when people 346 00:19:29,880 --> 00:19:33,560 Speaker 1: were trying to get medical marijuana, and the easiest way 347 00:19:33,600 --> 00:19:35,880 Speaker 1: to do that is to go to your doctor and say, 348 00:19:35,920 --> 00:19:39,000 Speaker 1: I have described the symptoms of whatever it was that 349 00:19:39,040 --> 00:19:41,520 Speaker 1: you needed in order to get the thing. I think 350 00:19:41,520 --> 00:19:43,919 Speaker 1: we all know that that happens. You know, if if 351 00:19:43,960 --> 00:19:46,679 Speaker 1: people are like having mild anxiety and they know that 352 00:19:46,760 --> 00:19:49,040 Speaker 1: if they play it up a little bit, the doctor 353 00:19:49,080 --> 00:19:52,480 Speaker 1: will probably give them like xan X or something. You know. Um, 354 00:19:52,600 --> 00:19:55,800 Speaker 1: but this is an absolute thing that that that we 355 00:19:55,840 --> 00:19:58,200 Speaker 1: need to be thinking about the idea of people kind 356 00:19:58,200 --> 00:20:03,680 Speaker 1: of overplaying their medical risk factors in order to convince 357 00:20:03,720 --> 00:20:05,840 Speaker 1: the doctor to put them on that list. It's a 358 00:20:05,840 --> 00:20:07,840 Speaker 1: tough thing, and I'm not the right person to make 359 00:20:07,880 --> 00:20:10,719 Speaker 1: the decision about who is essential and not and who 360 00:20:10,760 --> 00:20:13,560 Speaker 1: gets the vaccine first, but I think anyone who's working 361 00:20:13,560 --> 00:20:16,440 Speaker 1: in any kind of health care capacity is all immediately 362 00:20:16,520 --> 00:20:21,280 Speaker 1: top of the list. Well, I mean, if we're if 363 00:20:21,320 --> 00:20:27,800 Speaker 1: we're choosing to send kids back to school, then yeah, um, 364 00:20:27,880 --> 00:20:31,920 Speaker 1: and then anyone who's again, anybody who's handling food, like 365 00:20:32,200 --> 00:20:35,400 Speaker 1: let's why not, why not let's do that. And then 366 00:20:35,440 --> 00:20:37,639 Speaker 1: after that, if we can, if we can eat drink 367 00:20:37,680 --> 00:20:41,480 Speaker 1: water and save people who are dying, then you know, 368 00:20:41,560 --> 00:20:43,840 Speaker 1: the rest of us, well, we'll get it eventually, we'll 369 00:20:43,840 --> 00:20:49,000 Speaker 1: get the vaccine. Actually, one thing I think everybody gets 370 00:20:49,320 --> 00:20:52,640 Speaker 1: after this is an injection of common sense. Like I 371 00:20:52,680 --> 00:20:56,640 Speaker 1: was just thinking about buffets, you guys, remember buffet's Why 372 00:20:56,720 --> 00:21:01,119 Speaker 1: why were we going to buffets? Even free? Uh? COVID 373 00:21:01,160 --> 00:21:03,400 Speaker 1: and then of course everyone's seen the memes where it's 374 00:21:03,400 --> 00:21:05,520 Speaker 1: like if you kiss a dog, if you kiss your 375 00:21:05,560 --> 00:21:08,760 Speaker 1: dog on the mouth, don't worry about what's in this vaccine, 376 00:21:08,800 --> 00:21:11,919 Speaker 1: et cetera. But there are there are serious concerns in 377 00:21:11,960 --> 00:21:14,879 Speaker 1: the black market. Is is a big one, and I 378 00:21:14,920 --> 00:21:17,159 Speaker 1: think one of the most important parts for me that 379 00:21:17,200 --> 00:21:20,560 Speaker 1: you bring up here all is that, uh, there are 380 00:21:20,760 --> 00:21:24,400 Speaker 1: legal ways to circumvent this system. At least in the US. 381 00:21:24,440 --> 00:21:28,360 Speaker 1: The health care system is world class if you are 382 00:21:28,440 --> 00:21:31,400 Speaker 1: well to do. It's designed to be that way. They're 383 00:21:31,400 --> 00:21:34,879 Speaker 1: not breaking the law in many cases by doing this, 384 00:21:34,960 --> 00:21:37,800 Speaker 1: So it's something to keep an eye on, regardless of 385 00:21:37,920 --> 00:21:42,600 Speaker 1: how you feel personally about the Fiser vaccine or the 386 00:21:42,720 --> 00:21:45,600 Speaker 1: other three that are on the way. I would just 387 00:21:46,280 --> 00:21:48,439 Speaker 1: I would pay attention, you know what I would do. 388 00:21:48,640 --> 00:21:50,880 Speaker 1: I don't think this counts is inside or info because 389 00:21:50,880 --> 00:21:53,680 Speaker 1: we're not experts on this, but I would be if 390 00:21:53,680 --> 00:21:56,400 Speaker 1: I were an investor, I would be very, very interested 391 00:21:56,720 --> 00:22:02,119 Speaker 1: in the medical monitoring technology, uh and biotech stocks because 392 00:22:02,119 --> 00:22:04,920 Speaker 1: they're they're gonna they're gonna zoom up, you know, maybe 393 00:22:04,960 --> 00:22:08,160 Speaker 1: as much as zoom stock, I don't know. Then I'll 394 00:22:08,200 --> 00:22:10,800 Speaker 1: add one last just little quote from a bioethicist from 395 00:22:10,880 --> 00:22:13,560 Speaker 1: n YU named Arthur Kaplan and to the point that 396 00:22:13,600 --> 00:22:16,680 Speaker 1: you just made ben about access to better health care. Um, 397 00:22:16,800 --> 00:22:18,800 Speaker 1: this is what he has to say about that some 398 00:22:18,880 --> 00:22:22,320 Speaker 1: of the richest investment firms have their own many health 399 00:22:22,400 --> 00:22:26,399 Speaker 1: systems so they can run vaccines through those doctors that 400 00:22:26,600 --> 00:22:29,960 Speaker 1: give the physicals and maintain the health of the executives 401 00:22:29,960 --> 00:22:32,840 Speaker 1: in the company. So to unpack that, it's basically like 402 00:22:32,880 --> 00:22:37,200 Speaker 1: almost just like the most exclusive and private of insurance 403 00:22:37,240 --> 00:22:40,600 Speaker 1: that's that's taking care of high level executives and who 404 00:22:40,680 --> 00:22:44,040 Speaker 1: it behooves to, you know, get the vaccine early. And 405 00:22:44,280 --> 00:22:46,720 Speaker 1: it's all at the you know, behest of these doctors 406 00:22:46,880 --> 00:22:48,600 Speaker 1: a lot of the time that are part of these 407 00:22:48,760 --> 00:22:52,560 Speaker 1: health systems. So it's interesting stuff. UM, a little scary. 408 00:22:52,600 --> 00:22:54,639 Speaker 1: I I know, if everyone will get get it who 409 00:22:54,720 --> 00:22:57,560 Speaker 1: wants it eventually really quickly before we wrap, How do 410 00:22:57,600 --> 00:23:01,199 Speaker 1: you guys feel about like the whole trust factor and 411 00:23:01,320 --> 00:23:04,199 Speaker 1: people even like being willing to take it or or 412 00:23:04,320 --> 00:23:06,679 Speaker 1: or refusing to take it, or the idea of that 413 00:23:06,760 --> 00:23:11,720 Speaker 1: being made mandatory for certain jobs, because that's different episode 414 00:23:11,840 --> 00:23:14,320 Speaker 1: has to be made for certain jobs. Don't understand the 415 00:23:14,359 --> 00:23:17,520 Speaker 1: controversy got it interested that I'm interested to have that episode. 416 00:23:17,520 --> 00:23:19,480 Speaker 1: What do you made? Made a huge mistake and started 417 00:23:19,520 --> 00:23:22,879 Speaker 1: watching the US version of Utopia. I've been trying to 418 00:23:22,880 --> 00:23:24,800 Speaker 1: watch the British version for a long time, but I 419 00:23:24,920 --> 00:23:27,639 Speaker 1: still can't get access to it. Somebody sent me some 420 00:23:27,920 --> 00:23:31,720 Speaker 1: blue rays. Uh, it just used express VPN man. Well, 421 00:23:31,720 --> 00:23:34,960 Speaker 1: it's just reignited. Yeah, well, it just reignited some of 422 00:23:35,000 --> 00:23:40,040 Speaker 1: my fears, some of my personal fears about mass vaccination, 423 00:23:40,320 --> 00:23:43,679 Speaker 1: even though I'm fully on board with understanding why they exist, 424 00:23:43,800 --> 00:23:47,000 Speaker 1: why there are things in them that have been harmful 425 00:23:47,040 --> 00:23:50,600 Speaker 1: in the past, Like didn't understand fully squaling and some 426 00:23:50,640 --> 00:23:53,199 Speaker 1: of these other additives to vaccines until we made that 427 00:23:53,240 --> 00:23:58,000 Speaker 1: episode that's the shark one, right, Yes, anything that seems 428 00:23:58,080 --> 00:24:02,160 Speaker 1: to cause them to be more effective as an outside 429 00:24:02,160 --> 00:24:06,080 Speaker 1: thing that kind of just jump starts your immune system. Um. Like, 430 00:24:07,359 --> 00:24:11,760 Speaker 1: I understand people's fears, um, but but I think if 431 00:24:11,840 --> 00:24:13,800 Speaker 1: you look, if you look closely enough the way we 432 00:24:13,840 --> 00:24:15,880 Speaker 1: did in that episode. And I can't remember the name 433 00:24:15,880 --> 00:24:18,359 Speaker 1: of that episode, but I'd recommend going back and listen 434 00:24:18,520 --> 00:24:22,400 Speaker 1: to some of our episodes on COVID and vaccinations, um, 435 00:24:22,440 --> 00:24:24,040 Speaker 1: just to get some more info and then do your 436 00:24:24,040 --> 00:24:27,439 Speaker 1: own research, and I would say there is stuff to 437 00:24:27,480 --> 00:24:31,720 Speaker 1: be slightly fearful of or fearful about, but it is 438 00:24:31,840 --> 00:24:35,880 Speaker 1: not it's not maybe to the level that you currently 439 00:24:35,920 --> 00:24:39,760 Speaker 1: fear field. Yeah, to be completely clear, what I don't see. 440 00:24:39,800 --> 00:24:43,080 Speaker 1: I don't see the controversy of people having to have 441 00:24:43,200 --> 00:24:47,159 Speaker 1: vaccinations for certain jobs in general. That just makes sense. 442 00:24:47,560 --> 00:24:50,080 Speaker 1: But I do understand, and I think we're very clear 443 00:24:50,119 --> 00:24:52,240 Speaker 1: about that. You know. Um, I think we did a 444 00:24:52,240 --> 00:24:54,800 Speaker 1: good job with that one, Matt, where we we said, 445 00:24:54,840 --> 00:24:58,040 Speaker 1: you know, like these fears about mass vaccination don't come 446 00:24:58,040 --> 00:25:00,560 Speaker 1: out of nowhere. It's not something somebody is made up. 447 00:25:00,840 --> 00:25:05,639 Speaker 1: There are historical additives that, uh, they give people pause, 448 00:25:05,800 --> 00:25:13,080 Speaker 1: Like I understand, and without spoiling utopia, Um I I 449 00:25:13,119 --> 00:25:15,679 Speaker 1: get it. I mean fiction is a mirror of fact. 450 00:25:15,840 --> 00:25:18,320 Speaker 1: That's all fiction will ever be. In some ways, it's 451 00:25:18,320 --> 00:25:21,679 Speaker 1: a conversation with reality. So so yeah, the thing is 452 00:25:21,680 --> 00:25:25,199 Speaker 1: there's a lot of missing information right now. Um, but 453 00:25:25,280 --> 00:25:27,520 Speaker 1: we want to hear your thoughts. Are you going to 454 00:25:27,520 --> 00:25:30,760 Speaker 1: get the shot? Did you get the fiser one? You 455 00:25:30,760 --> 00:25:32,760 Speaker 1: have to get both of them. Remember that first one 456 00:25:32,800 --> 00:25:34,440 Speaker 1: is not going to do deadly If you don't get 457 00:25:34,440 --> 00:25:38,840 Speaker 1: this the follow up, I get the combo. Yeah, and 458 00:25:38,840 --> 00:25:42,360 Speaker 1: and then you mentioned like some of them are not 459 00:25:42,440 --> 00:25:45,520 Speaker 1: gonna have to be kept at like sub zero temperature. 460 00:25:45,800 --> 00:25:48,840 Speaker 1: That's obviously like a positive in terms of transporting, in 461 00:25:48,920 --> 00:25:52,600 Speaker 1: terms of like the uh, logistics of getting them distributed. 462 00:25:52,600 --> 00:25:57,240 Speaker 1: But the Fiser one, the one that's closest, it does correct. Yeah, 463 00:25:57,280 --> 00:26:01,960 Speaker 1: that's that's correct. Uh, the five Eiser, the Fiser vaccine 464 00:26:01,960 --> 00:26:05,640 Speaker 1: needs to be stored at minus seventy degrees celsius. So 465 00:26:05,680 --> 00:26:09,480 Speaker 1: that's very tough for supply chains, especially in developing countries. 466 00:26:09,880 --> 00:26:11,560 Speaker 1: So doesn't that mean they're sort of shooting themselves in 467 00:26:11,600 --> 00:26:13,679 Speaker 1: the foot from the start, like the other ones are 468 00:26:13,680 --> 00:26:16,440 Speaker 1: going to supersede them, like if they're if they're easier 469 00:26:16,440 --> 00:26:18,560 Speaker 1: to transport or is it kind of like because it's 470 00:26:18,600 --> 00:26:22,479 Speaker 1: just sort of like a one these are I don't know, 471 00:26:22,840 --> 00:26:26,399 Speaker 1: imprecise questions. I'm just wondering like that that sort of 472 00:26:26,400 --> 00:26:30,280 Speaker 1: seems like a bug, you know, like a problem. Yeah, 473 00:26:30,280 --> 00:26:33,240 Speaker 1: they're in a race to save lives, so it's really 474 00:26:33,680 --> 00:26:36,600 Speaker 1: it's not a situation where you can say millions of 475 00:26:36,640 --> 00:26:39,600 Speaker 1: people are gonna die, but we want to make sure 476 00:26:39,640 --> 00:26:42,080 Speaker 1: this is at a more convenient temperature. I'm sure they're 477 00:26:42,119 --> 00:26:44,720 Speaker 1: working on something like that. But you know, the clock 478 00:26:44,760 --> 00:26:50,119 Speaker 1: immortality is taking faster than usual for some and speaking 479 00:26:50,119 --> 00:26:52,879 Speaker 1: of clocks, hours takes away. So we're gonna take a 480 00:26:52,960 --> 00:26:55,680 Speaker 1: quick break to your word from our sponsor, but we'll 481 00:26:55,680 --> 00:27:06,840 Speaker 1: be right back. And we have returned, but maybe we 482 00:27:06,880 --> 00:27:09,560 Speaker 1: haven't returned to the US. I mean we're returning to 483 00:27:09,720 --> 00:27:14,800 Speaker 1: Haiti where last year another person tried to launch a 484 00:27:14,840 --> 00:27:19,199 Speaker 1: coup in this country. Coup's don't get discussed super often 485 00:27:19,440 --> 00:27:23,560 Speaker 1: in the Western media, partially because historically Uncle Sam is 486 00:27:23,600 --> 00:27:27,440 Speaker 1: responsible for a lot of them through various proxies. Uh. 487 00:27:27,600 --> 00:27:33,119 Speaker 1: This one is different because the architect of the coup, 488 00:27:33,320 --> 00:27:38,720 Speaker 1: which was unsuccessful, was a former sergeant in the U. S. Marines. 489 00:27:39,320 --> 00:27:45,119 Speaker 1: Was born in Haiti and in April nineteen this marine 490 00:27:45,359 --> 00:27:50,639 Speaker 1: sergeant Jacquiss Eve's Sebastian Dodo so uh he he started 491 00:27:51,359 --> 00:27:57,000 Speaker 1: planning on going back to his homeland with a bunch 492 00:27:57,040 --> 00:28:03,080 Speaker 1: of firearms to start a military or militant group excuse me, 493 00:28:03,400 --> 00:28:08,240 Speaker 1: to overthrow the current government of Haiti and to become 494 00:28:08,560 --> 00:28:13,280 Speaker 1: the president. Almost year ago to the day, they arrived 495 00:28:13,320 --> 00:28:18,280 Speaker 1: at the airport in Port of Prince and they were 496 00:28:18,480 --> 00:28:22,560 Speaker 1: doctoring paperwork such that it seemed that he was a 497 00:28:22,600 --> 00:28:26,840 Speaker 1: marine colonel on orders, on legitimate orders to go there. 498 00:28:27,520 --> 00:28:31,920 Speaker 1: And he had a friend, a guy named t h 499 00:28:32,200 --> 00:28:34,879 Speaker 1: That's all we know so far, who would pretend to 500 00:28:34,920 --> 00:28:40,600 Speaker 1: be Drossels subordinate and they would like fill out paperwork 501 00:28:40,680 --> 00:28:45,440 Speaker 1: to transport these items. But everything that they said they 502 00:28:45,440 --> 00:28:48,000 Speaker 1: were transporting, and it was a lie. It was a 503 00:28:48,040 --> 00:28:55,080 Speaker 1: cover story because they were taking weapons, body arbor, rifle scopes, 504 00:28:55,880 --> 00:29:00,000 Speaker 1: and they almost got away with it too, but those 505 00:29:00,040 --> 00:29:03,680 Speaker 1: pesky folks at customs finally stopped him. And when they 506 00:29:03,720 --> 00:29:06,640 Speaker 1: stopped him, he said something very interesting. He checked his luggage. 507 00:29:06,720 --> 00:29:09,920 Speaker 1: He was detained and instead of calling for a lawyer, 508 00:29:10,560 --> 00:29:14,400 Speaker 1: instead of remaining silent, he waived all his rights. He 509 00:29:14,520 --> 00:29:17,960 Speaker 1: told the investigators he was traveling to Haiti to help 510 00:29:18,040 --> 00:29:21,239 Speaker 1: the Haitian people quote, defeat the thugs that have been 511 00:29:21,280 --> 00:29:25,240 Speaker 1: creating a little bit of part of the instability in Haiti. 512 00:29:26,120 --> 00:29:30,120 Speaker 1: This story is crazy, right, it's already, Um, it's already 513 00:29:30,160 --> 00:29:35,000 Speaker 1: an unfortunate thing. We saw a failed invasion of what 514 00:29:35,080 --> 00:29:39,920 Speaker 1: was Venezuela earlier this year. Do you guys remember that. Um. 515 00:29:39,960 --> 00:29:43,040 Speaker 1: We've seen a couple of other loan actors. But the 516 00:29:43,080 --> 00:29:46,040 Speaker 1: thing That's the most nuts about this is that this 517 00:29:46,120 --> 00:29:49,160 Speaker 1: is just the most recent example of a thing that 518 00:29:49,280 --> 00:29:52,160 Speaker 1: happens way more often than it gets reported. There's a 519 00:29:52,200 --> 00:29:57,680 Speaker 1: marine corporal named Toussain farah add who used to lie 520 00:29:57,760 --> 00:30:01,600 Speaker 1: to his bosses about missing drill periods. He would say 521 00:30:01,640 --> 00:30:04,720 Speaker 1: he had to travel outside the country, and what he 522 00:30:04,800 --> 00:30:07,880 Speaker 1: was actually doing he was doing that was returning to 523 00:30:07,960 --> 00:30:14,680 Speaker 1: Somalia where he worked for his father, Mohammed farah Add. Oh. Yeah, 524 00:30:14,720 --> 00:30:17,960 Speaker 1: the job he did for his father was to be 525 00:30:18,040 --> 00:30:21,040 Speaker 1: a general in his militia because his father is a warlord, 526 00:30:21,640 --> 00:30:25,160 Speaker 1: because of course he is. And this uh, the coup 527 00:30:25,200 --> 00:30:31,400 Speaker 1: actions instabilizing actions of a deed led to the deaths 528 00:30:31,440 --> 00:30:35,960 Speaker 1: of eighteen US service members in UH in an incident 529 00:30:36,040 --> 00:30:39,640 Speaker 1: that you may most easily remember from the film and 530 00:30:39,720 --> 00:30:46,640 Speaker 1: book Black Hawk Down. Yeah, this is nice, m yep, 531 00:30:46,840 --> 00:30:49,520 Speaker 1: spot on. Just so so we have a lot of 532 00:30:49,800 --> 00:30:54,200 Speaker 1: like we have multiple cases of people going out on 533 00:30:54,240 --> 00:30:58,480 Speaker 1: their own, going rogue and launching launching coups. Now is this, Matt, 534 00:30:58,560 --> 00:31:00,880 Speaker 1: you said, this is something you hadn't heard heard of, nol. 535 00:31:01,040 --> 00:31:03,480 Speaker 1: Was this familiar to you and at all? No, this 536 00:31:03,520 --> 00:31:06,480 Speaker 1: is all news to me. I just feel like it's 537 00:31:06,520 --> 00:31:09,720 Speaker 1: such a dangerous thing, but it also makes me feel 538 00:31:09,720 --> 00:31:12,200 Speaker 1: like people are so motivated, you know what I mean. 539 00:31:12,320 --> 00:31:14,960 Speaker 1: One time people are out here changing the world for 540 00:31:15,000 --> 00:31:17,280 Speaker 1: the better or the worst, and one time I legitimately 541 00:31:17,320 --> 00:31:19,240 Speaker 1: fell asleep. Try and put on a pair of pants 542 00:31:19,680 --> 00:31:23,920 Speaker 1: like this puts ambition into perspective. Um, but I just 543 00:31:24,040 --> 00:31:26,880 Speaker 1: I just want to know more about that. But you know, 544 00:31:27,080 --> 00:31:29,120 Speaker 1: we'll leave it there for now. It was a long 545 00:31:29,360 --> 00:31:32,440 Speaker 1: it was a long day. They weren't complicated pants either. 546 00:31:32,560 --> 00:31:35,280 Speaker 1: Is this the same two legs that humans would have? 547 00:31:35,880 --> 00:31:38,640 Speaker 1: But uh, but yeah, So the reason we know about 548 00:31:39,160 --> 00:31:44,719 Speaker 1: the reason we know about ourselves plan was that just recently, 549 00:31:44,920 --> 00:31:49,200 Speaker 1: just a few days ago, he was found guilty. There's 550 00:31:49,240 --> 00:31:52,320 Speaker 1: just last week. Actually he's found guilty this past thursday. 551 00:31:52,600 --> 00:31:56,880 Speaker 1: We're recording this on December four. Is convicted of five 552 00:31:57,440 --> 00:32:02,400 Speaker 1: various counts smuggling firearms, and of course it was acknowledged 553 00:32:02,440 --> 00:32:04,960 Speaker 1: that he was going in there to train up his 554 00:32:05,000 --> 00:32:10,840 Speaker 1: own secessionist group. The Justice Department said that he was 555 00:32:10,840 --> 00:32:16,280 Speaker 1: going to be sentenced during March of the maximum penalty 556 00:32:16,480 --> 00:32:20,000 Speaker 1: for getting caught planning a coup. At least in this situation, 557 00:32:20,160 --> 00:32:24,240 Speaker 1: if you're evaluating your options is twenty years in prison 558 00:32:24,520 --> 00:32:28,480 Speaker 1: and a two hundred and fifty thousand dollar five which 559 00:32:28,520 --> 00:32:31,520 Speaker 1: gave you know, this gave me a tangentially related question 560 00:32:31,560 --> 00:32:33,840 Speaker 1: I went to pass to you guys. Do you know 561 00:32:33,880 --> 00:32:36,600 Speaker 1: how when you see people convicted and they get the 562 00:32:36,680 --> 00:32:40,840 Speaker 1: maximum fine for something and it's like two fifty grand 563 00:32:41,000 --> 00:32:45,080 Speaker 1: or grand or something like that, if they're not well 564 00:32:45,160 --> 00:32:47,440 Speaker 1: to do, if they're not a burnie made off, how 565 00:32:47,480 --> 00:32:50,560 Speaker 1: do they pay that? Do their wages get garnished? Like? 566 00:32:50,680 --> 00:32:54,560 Speaker 1: What what happens? I'm sure that's what it would be. 567 00:32:54,640 --> 00:32:56,440 Speaker 1: There's an attempt to pay it off, and then I 568 00:32:56,480 --> 00:32:59,800 Speaker 1: don't know what pressures are able to be placed on 569 00:33:00,000 --> 00:33:04,200 Speaker 1: any individual who owes something like that. I just don't know. 570 00:33:04,280 --> 00:33:08,920 Speaker 1: I've never experienced that before. Yeah, legal beagles or legal badgers. 571 00:33:08,960 --> 00:33:11,520 Speaker 1: We should say in the audience, let let us know 572 00:33:11,720 --> 00:33:15,160 Speaker 1: how how that works, because it's something that's always I 573 00:33:15,160 --> 00:33:18,120 Speaker 1: haven't looked into, but but it always confused me. You know, 574 00:33:18,160 --> 00:33:22,040 Speaker 1: when you hear somebody get hit with a tremendous fine 575 00:33:22,320 --> 00:33:24,240 Speaker 1: and you know that they are not part of the 576 00:33:24,320 --> 00:33:27,160 Speaker 1: upper crust, so they probably can't pay it, you know, 577 00:33:27,560 --> 00:33:30,160 Speaker 1: just out of pocket. So I I guess they just 578 00:33:30,240 --> 00:33:34,040 Speaker 1: spend their lives with like some crippling debt. It's kind 579 00:33:34,040 --> 00:33:38,400 Speaker 1: of like student loans, right, but it's crime loans. But 580 00:33:38,600 --> 00:33:41,320 Speaker 1: then I just want to make sure. So the guy 581 00:33:41,360 --> 00:33:44,400 Speaker 1: in question took all this stuff, all these weapons over 582 00:33:44,440 --> 00:33:48,160 Speaker 1: to Haiti. It sounds like a bunch of handguns, mostly handguns, 583 00:33:48,160 --> 00:33:51,960 Speaker 1: a couple of rifles, some body armor and stuff. What. 584 00:33:52,160 --> 00:33:55,920 Speaker 1: He was not charged in Haiti for attempting a coup. 585 00:33:55,960 --> 00:33:58,720 Speaker 1: He was sent back to the US and charged here 586 00:33:59,160 --> 00:34:02,560 Speaker 1: or there. Yeah, yeah, he was because he was smuggling 587 00:34:02,600 --> 00:34:07,040 Speaker 1: guns from the US to r K d uh So, 588 00:34:07,040 --> 00:34:11,919 Speaker 1: So the US Justice Department came down on him because he, 589 00:34:12,520 --> 00:34:16,040 Speaker 1: according to Robert Higden, the U S Attorney for the 590 00:34:16,080 --> 00:34:21,800 Speaker 1: Eastern District of North Carolina, uh, he violated US firearms laws, 591 00:34:22,640 --> 00:34:27,440 Speaker 1: particularly in relation to export and licensing. And then he says, 592 00:34:27,440 --> 00:34:32,000 Speaker 1: just Bury's lead here quote. But it additionally post concerns 593 00:34:32,040 --> 00:34:36,280 Speaker 1: about our citizens unilaterally acting in relation to the government 594 00:34:36,280 --> 00:34:39,080 Speaker 1: of a foreign country, especially because he's a marine. He 595 00:34:39,120 --> 00:34:42,400 Speaker 1: has the training we talked about this earlier, right, he has. 596 00:34:42,480 --> 00:34:45,839 Speaker 1: He has the expertise and familiarity to teach people. He 597 00:34:45,880 --> 00:34:50,759 Speaker 1: once served as a marksman in Quantico and Uh, this 598 00:34:50,920 --> 00:34:53,720 Speaker 1: was this was the real deal. It makes you wonder 599 00:34:53,960 --> 00:34:58,799 Speaker 1: how many oh he was also a personating or rank 600 00:34:58,880 --> 00:35:02,080 Speaker 1: he did not earn durstaying your colonel, So how it 601 00:35:02,120 --> 00:35:06,960 Speaker 1: makes you wonder how many close call coups or coup 602 00:35:06,960 --> 00:35:11,480 Speaker 1: attempts we've had from these like lone Rangers, right like 603 00:35:11,520 --> 00:35:14,200 Speaker 1: the I don't know if we ever talked about do 604 00:35:14,320 --> 00:35:16,719 Speaker 1: we talked about the Venezuelan coup on this show. It 605 00:35:16,800 --> 00:35:22,799 Speaker 1: was called Operation Gideon. I know we mentioned it when 606 00:35:22,840 --> 00:35:24,920 Speaker 1: it came when what was happening, but I think it 607 00:35:25,000 --> 00:35:29,239 Speaker 1: was just in passing conversation. Yeah. Yeah, This one was 608 00:35:29,360 --> 00:35:33,880 Speaker 1: a partnership with an American private military company called silver 609 00:35:34,000 --> 00:35:38,480 Speaker 1: Core USA spelled like c O R P USA to 610 00:35:38,600 --> 00:35:43,880 Speaker 1: infiltrate Venezuela by sea and then forcibly removed Maduro from office, 611 00:35:43,920 --> 00:35:50,319 Speaker 1: so a coup. Apparently the problem is this happened in 612 00:35:50,360 --> 00:35:53,080 Speaker 1: May of this year, and apparently it was just a 613 00:35:53,160 --> 00:35:58,279 Speaker 1: real Uh, it was a real show because they had 614 00:35:58,400 --> 00:36:01,719 Speaker 1: little to do, chance to see cess. There was like 615 00:36:01,800 --> 00:36:05,880 Speaker 1: this kind of slapstick attempt to get these motor boats 616 00:36:06,480 --> 00:36:10,760 Speaker 1: into the area. They didn't. They had former Green Berets 617 00:36:10,800 --> 00:36:14,040 Speaker 1: serving as mercenaries and the green Berets must have just 618 00:36:14,120 --> 00:36:20,040 Speaker 1: been severely unimpressed with the whole operation. And you'll recall 619 00:36:20,120 --> 00:36:23,000 Speaker 1: there were some there were some rumors quickly buried in 620 00:36:23,160 --> 00:36:28,520 Speaker 1: US media of a tacit agreement between silver Core and 621 00:36:28,680 --> 00:36:33,120 Speaker 1: a couple of I believe it was private industry actors 622 00:36:33,160 --> 00:36:36,360 Speaker 1: and maybe some factions of the US government itself, but 623 00:36:36,440 --> 00:36:40,480 Speaker 1: no actual Uncle Sam stuff. Wow. So far, it does 624 00:36:40,600 --> 00:36:45,280 Speaker 1: make me think about some of these defense contracting companies 625 00:36:45,600 --> 00:36:50,359 Speaker 1: and some of the essentially mercenaries that end up in 626 00:36:50,719 --> 00:36:53,720 Speaker 1: war torn areas of the world, and you know, somewhere 627 00:36:53,760 --> 00:36:56,120 Speaker 1: a coverage of that in the past. And it also 628 00:36:56,160 --> 00:36:59,080 Speaker 1: makes me think about do you guys remember something called 629 00:36:59,239 --> 00:37:04,160 Speaker 1: Arrow Trade? Did you ever hear of that? That was 630 00:37:04,840 --> 00:37:07,800 Speaker 1: this was just a really similar thing that occurred. It 631 00:37:07,920 --> 00:37:10,040 Speaker 1: was a company in the United States, so Lord of 632 00:37:10,160 --> 00:37:12,000 Speaker 1: I think it has I think it was Haiti. Maybe 633 00:37:12,000 --> 00:37:16,680 Speaker 1: it's a different country, but where this company was essentially 634 00:37:16,719 --> 00:37:21,400 Speaker 1: training or or spending money to train and provide weapons 635 00:37:21,480 --> 00:37:27,040 Speaker 1: and materials for the Haitian military, I think or maybe, um, 636 00:37:27,360 --> 00:37:29,200 Speaker 1: maybe it was. Maybe it wasn't Haiti. Was it Haiti? 637 00:37:29,280 --> 00:37:33,440 Speaker 1: I don't know it. Yeah, it was a private company 638 00:37:33,680 --> 00:37:35,960 Speaker 1: like that this providing all this stuff, and they don't 639 00:37:35,960 --> 00:37:39,040 Speaker 1: They're not going through official channels. It's almost like it 640 00:37:39,040 --> 00:37:42,560 Speaker 1: reminds me of the CIA front companies and some of 641 00:37:42,600 --> 00:37:45,040 Speaker 1: the some of the work that we've looked at in 642 00:37:45,040 --> 00:37:47,239 Speaker 1: the past there where you use a front company or 643 00:37:47,239 --> 00:37:51,560 Speaker 1: a defense contractor to go in to a different country 644 00:37:51,600 --> 00:37:53,959 Speaker 1: and just operate under the radar or at least until 645 00:37:54,000 --> 00:37:57,479 Speaker 1: you're caught. Right. This also led me down a path 646 00:37:57,520 --> 00:38:01,359 Speaker 1: when I was looking at coup's resistance groups um and 647 00:38:01,960 --> 00:38:04,839 Speaker 1: and other insurrections movements. This let me down a path 648 00:38:04,880 --> 00:38:07,920 Speaker 1: that really disturbed me. First off, the long history of 649 00:38:08,040 --> 00:38:12,120 Speaker 1: US intervention in Haiti is an episode all its own. Uh. Secondly, 650 00:38:13,000 --> 00:38:16,760 Speaker 1: I've fell into a very disturbing rabbit hole on the 651 00:38:16,800 --> 00:38:21,040 Speaker 1: practice of like the phenomenon of child soldiers, how they 652 00:38:21,040 --> 00:38:24,919 Speaker 1: are recruited, how they are brainwashed, what happens in the aftermath, 653 00:38:25,400 --> 00:38:28,239 Speaker 1: and it's it's honestly, it's an episode that I feel 654 00:38:28,280 --> 00:38:31,800 Speaker 1: like we should do, but it's um it's immensely disturbing. 655 00:38:32,600 --> 00:38:35,080 Speaker 1: The idea of coup has always really fascinating to me 656 00:38:35,160 --> 00:38:39,800 Speaker 1: because oftentimes, you know, a coup will overthrow an illegitimate 657 00:38:40,000 --> 00:38:44,440 Speaker 1: or dangerous regime like that already maybe seized power via 658 00:38:44,560 --> 00:38:47,120 Speaker 1: a coup of their own, but it's defined as like 659 00:38:47,200 --> 00:38:53,240 Speaker 1: a typically illegal, unconstitutional act um by a political factions. 660 00:38:53,360 --> 00:38:55,480 Speaker 1: I'm interested to hear what you guys think about the 661 00:38:55,520 --> 00:38:59,040 Speaker 1: idea of coups. Are they inherently illegitimate or is it 662 00:38:59,120 --> 00:39:01,960 Speaker 1: just a fan see word for like an uprising or 663 00:39:02,000 --> 00:39:06,160 Speaker 1: a revolution. A lot of times it's an overthrow by 664 00:39:06,160 --> 00:39:08,719 Speaker 1: an outside actor, or at least spurred on by an 665 00:39:08,719 --> 00:39:11,840 Speaker 1: outside actor A lot of times, not always, but I 666 00:39:11,960 --> 00:39:14,400 Speaker 1: understand that. But I'm saying, is that is it a 667 00:39:14,440 --> 00:39:18,399 Speaker 1: specific word that refers to that or is it only 668 00:39:18,440 --> 00:39:21,120 Speaker 1: a word that's used when it's when when those conditions 669 00:39:21,160 --> 00:39:24,000 Speaker 1: are in play, or or could you consider a coup 670 00:39:24,480 --> 00:39:27,640 Speaker 1: to be a legitimate overthrow of a like is it 671 00:39:27,719 --> 00:39:30,759 Speaker 1: our coup and revolution ever interchangeable? Or are they like 672 00:39:31,280 --> 00:39:34,120 Speaker 1: you know, one person's coup is another person's revolution, that 673 00:39:34,200 --> 00:39:39,360 Speaker 1: kind of thing. Yeah, well, kudata translates the blow of state. 674 00:39:40,080 --> 00:39:45,279 Speaker 1: So all coup data are inherently technically illegal in the 675 00:39:45,320 --> 00:39:48,600 Speaker 1: country in which they occur because they're un constitutional. Those 676 00:39:48,640 --> 00:39:52,440 Speaker 1: constitutions will have, at least on paper, some legal mechanism 677 00:39:52,640 --> 00:39:56,640 Speaker 1: for the Uh, for the transfer power. Uh. This is 678 00:39:56,719 --> 00:39:58,800 Speaker 1: kind of silly. There's a lot of stuff in international 679 00:39:58,840 --> 00:40:02,520 Speaker 1: affairs that's kind of silly. But a lot of professors 680 00:40:02,560 --> 00:40:05,920 Speaker 1: and pundits will tell you that a coup is considered 681 00:40:06,040 --> 00:40:10,960 Speaker 1: successful when the group, the people who are in charge 682 00:40:10,960 --> 00:40:13,240 Speaker 1: of the coup, when they can hold power for about 683 00:40:13,280 --> 00:40:15,879 Speaker 1: a week, for seven days. For some reason, that's the rule. 684 00:40:16,120 --> 00:40:18,279 Speaker 1: They don't take it seriously on Thursday. But if you 685 00:40:18,320 --> 00:40:21,759 Speaker 1: make it the Friday, congratulations, you are the you are 686 00:40:21,800 --> 00:40:26,919 Speaker 1: the new Prime Minister of uh Matt Vania. Sorry, Matt, 687 00:40:27,680 --> 00:40:30,320 Speaker 1: it was just came to mind. I've been meaning to 688 00:40:30,360 --> 00:40:35,719 Speaker 1: step down for a while. So that's that's something that 689 00:40:35,760 --> 00:40:38,400 Speaker 1: I would love to dive into. Like the history of coup's, 690 00:40:38,520 --> 00:40:42,000 Speaker 1: I mean, the history of human governance is one written 691 00:40:42,000 --> 00:40:45,520 Speaker 1: in blood. It would be dishonest to phrase it any 692 00:40:45,520 --> 00:40:49,799 Speaker 1: other way. However, I'm telling you this child soldier thing 693 00:40:49,800 --> 00:40:52,600 Speaker 1: we have to look at very close to cults, and 694 00:40:52,640 --> 00:40:54,960 Speaker 1: it's not it's you know, I think a lot of 695 00:40:54,960 --> 00:40:58,719 Speaker 1: people in the West have some stereotype of this occurring 696 00:40:59,040 --> 00:41:04,040 Speaker 1: only in uh certain parts of the world, but it 697 00:41:04,160 --> 00:41:06,239 Speaker 1: also occurs in the Middle East, occurred in the US. 698 00:41:06,360 --> 00:41:08,839 Speaker 1: We had child soldiers in the Civil War, you know, 699 00:41:09,040 --> 00:41:12,840 Speaker 1: and we even romanticized the idea of kids lying about 700 00:41:12,880 --> 00:41:16,239 Speaker 1: their age to get into the military. Like there's these 701 00:41:16,239 --> 00:41:20,160 Speaker 1: are two vaguely related ideas, but I think they're they're 702 00:41:20,160 --> 00:41:22,320 Speaker 1: each on their own. We talked about this before, but 703 00:41:22,440 --> 00:41:25,879 Speaker 1: my wife has personal stories working with children, like young 704 00:41:26,040 --> 00:41:30,400 Speaker 1: kids who are gang members, who are actively using weapons 705 00:41:30,480 --> 00:41:34,360 Speaker 1: and you know, engaging in activities that are similar to 706 00:41:34,520 --> 00:41:39,000 Speaker 1: being a soldier, um if not the same thing fighting 707 00:41:39,640 --> 00:41:42,680 Speaker 1: a war. So I mean I think it's uh yeah, 708 00:41:42,680 --> 00:41:45,560 Speaker 1: this is definitely something worth our time and attention. So 709 00:41:45,640 --> 00:41:49,160 Speaker 1: I'm down. Ben awesome, Okay, I've got one one last 710 00:41:49,160 --> 00:41:52,799 Speaker 1: thing on this, uh as we move on. I you 711 00:41:53,040 --> 00:41:55,200 Speaker 1: may have if you are whether or not you're in 712 00:41:55,239 --> 00:41:57,759 Speaker 1: the U S. If you follow us domestic news, you 713 00:41:57,800 --> 00:42:01,640 Speaker 1: may have heard, uh some of recent actions of the 714 00:42:01,680 --> 00:42:05,759 Speaker 1: current administration described as a coup. I would very much 715 00:42:05,840 --> 00:42:08,600 Speaker 1: like to hear your thoughts on this, conspiracy realist. Just 716 00:42:08,760 --> 00:42:12,040 Speaker 1: hit us up conspiracy at iHeart media dot com. We 717 00:42:12,080 --> 00:42:13,480 Speaker 1: have our section at the end where we tell you 718 00:42:13,520 --> 00:42:16,400 Speaker 1: all the ways to contact us. But the question that 719 00:42:16,480 --> 00:42:19,600 Speaker 1: I have for this segment is, are the recent events 720 00:42:19,600 --> 00:42:23,080 Speaker 1: in the domestic sphere of the US. Do they or 721 00:42:23,120 --> 00:42:25,920 Speaker 1: do they not meet the threshold for what would be 722 00:42:25,960 --> 00:42:29,480 Speaker 1: described as an attempted to cope no judgment, let us 723 00:42:29,520 --> 00:42:33,239 Speaker 1: know yes or no and why. And with that, we're 724 00:42:33,280 --> 00:42:36,440 Speaker 1: gonna pause for one more word from our sponsor and 725 00:42:36,480 --> 00:42:46,440 Speaker 1: will return with more strange news. And we are back 726 00:42:46,719 --> 00:42:51,480 Speaker 1: and moving over to United States what let's call this 727 00:42:51,680 --> 00:42:56,680 Speaker 1: domestic cybersecurity news. UM. Many times on this show we 728 00:42:56,760 --> 00:43:01,200 Speaker 1: have spoken to you about hacking, an interesting term to 729 00:43:01,320 --> 00:43:07,560 Speaker 1: describe forms of espionage, forms of snooping around sometimes just 730 00:43:07,600 --> 00:43:10,920 Speaker 1: to see what can be achieved. And and that's my 731 00:43:10,960 --> 00:43:13,279 Speaker 1: son in the background. And depending on the aims of 732 00:43:13,360 --> 00:43:17,600 Speaker 1: someone who was equipped with the skills to breach networks 733 00:43:17,680 --> 00:43:21,280 Speaker 1: and get inside of you know, whether it's a single 734 00:43:21,280 --> 00:43:26,279 Speaker 1: computer or an entire network. UM. Who knows what the 735 00:43:26,360 --> 00:43:30,359 Speaker 1: aims are behind any group, but they there there can 736 00:43:30,400 --> 00:43:33,520 Speaker 1: be vast reasons for doing so. And today we're coming 737 00:43:33,520 --> 00:43:36,319 Speaker 1: to you with a story about a group that is 738 00:43:36,360 --> 00:43:40,880 Speaker 1: being described by the United States government as Russian government 739 00:43:40,960 --> 00:43:46,440 Speaker 1: hackers and actions that were taken against several United States 740 00:43:46,520 --> 00:43:51,560 Speaker 1: government agencies. So here's here is the Washington Post title 741 00:43:51,800 --> 00:43:54,840 Speaker 1: from the article Russian Government Hackers are behind a broad 742 00:43:55,040 --> 00:44:00,600 Speaker 1: espionage campaign that has compromised US agencies including Treasury and Commerce. 743 00:44:01,320 --> 00:44:04,920 Speaker 1: This was reported today December fourteenth, the day that we're 744 00:44:04,960 --> 00:44:09,719 Speaker 1: recording this episode. And according to this article, it is 745 00:44:09,760 --> 00:44:13,279 Speaker 1: saying that it was just coming to light. It's kind 746 00:44:13,280 --> 00:44:18,040 Speaker 1: of been known or it's information about this attack some 747 00:44:18,160 --> 00:44:20,200 Speaker 1: might call it, others just might call it a breach. 748 00:44:20,760 --> 00:44:24,440 Speaker 1: Um has been coming forth throughout the entire weekend this 749 00:44:24,520 --> 00:44:29,600 Speaker 1: past weekend, and there are several hackers that go by 750 00:44:30,080 --> 00:44:34,120 Speaker 1: nicknames that are supposedly behind this. One is a p 751 00:44:34,320 --> 00:44:39,040 Speaker 1: T twenty nine, also known as Cozy Bear. These are, um, 752 00:44:39,280 --> 00:44:41,960 Speaker 1: there's a group of hackers, not not just one, it's 753 00:44:42,000 --> 00:44:47,120 Speaker 1: like a collective essentially. Um. They are supposedly and again 754 00:44:47,239 --> 00:44:49,879 Speaker 1: it's tough to know just that it's reporting coming from 755 00:44:49,880 --> 00:44:52,680 Speaker 1: the United States and it's an attack on the United States. 756 00:44:52,680 --> 00:44:55,719 Speaker 1: Hard to know how much is real info, how much 757 00:44:55,840 --> 00:44:58,640 Speaker 1: is dis info on purpose, how much is being a 758 00:44:58,680 --> 00:45:02,800 Speaker 1: little more slanted because it's an US or them kind 759 00:45:02,840 --> 00:45:06,840 Speaker 1: of story. Um. But they're saying that this group is 760 00:45:06,920 --> 00:45:11,120 Speaker 1: part of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service UH also known as 761 00:45:11,160 --> 00:45:14,480 Speaker 1: the s VR, and they're saying that this group breached 762 00:45:14,520 --> 00:45:18,640 Speaker 1: email systems. That's the primary thing that occurred here. And 763 00:45:19,320 --> 00:45:21,840 Speaker 1: I guess the scary thing is that it's email systems 764 00:45:22,520 --> 00:45:27,520 Speaker 1: throughout a whole bunch of the United States infrastructure, of 765 00:45:27,560 --> 00:45:31,879 Speaker 1: the government infrastructure. Uh. And according to the Washington Post, 766 00:45:32,120 --> 00:45:35,400 Speaker 1: the Federal Bureau of Investigation here in the United States 767 00:45:35,440 --> 00:45:38,280 Speaker 1: is looking into this, and they say that the victims 768 00:45:38,280 --> 00:45:44,080 Speaker 1: have included government consulting, technology, telecom, oil and gas companies 769 00:45:44,120 --> 00:45:48,360 Speaker 1: in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. And 770 00:45:49,560 --> 00:45:52,120 Speaker 1: this is according to Oh, it's it's a group called 771 00:45:52,160 --> 00:45:55,520 Speaker 1: fire I. I can't remember if we've if we've mentioned 772 00:45:55,600 --> 00:45:58,279 Speaker 1: them before, but they are a firm that generally is 773 00:45:58,280 --> 00:46:02,360 Speaker 1: watching out for these kinds of a acts and uh, 774 00:46:02,560 --> 00:46:05,320 Speaker 1: they got they got breached, and they were one of 775 00:46:05,360 --> 00:46:07,920 Speaker 1: the first people to kind of raise a flag. UH. 776 00:46:07,960 --> 00:46:11,359 Speaker 1: And my understanding that it was a while ago when 777 00:46:11,360 --> 00:46:15,799 Speaker 1: they first uh said this. But then if you reach 778 00:46:15,840 --> 00:46:18,400 Speaker 1: out to Russia like the if you go to the 779 00:46:18,440 --> 00:46:23,560 Speaker 1: embassy in Washington, UH, they say the they call the 780 00:46:23,640 --> 00:46:28,000 Speaker 1: hacking reports baseless. They say the attacking the information space 781 00:46:28,040 --> 00:46:33,040 Speaker 1: contradict Russian foreign policy and national interests, and that Russia 782 00:46:33,080 --> 00:46:38,520 Speaker 1: does not conduct offensive operations in the cyber domain. Okay, 783 00:46:38,600 --> 00:46:41,759 Speaker 1: so it's just it's just motivated patriots acting on their 784 00:46:41,760 --> 00:46:46,200 Speaker 1: own just like uh, it's like China's China's hacker army. 785 00:46:46,040 --> 00:46:49,560 Speaker 1: I will say that the big difference here between this 786 00:46:49,680 --> 00:46:51,440 Speaker 1: and a lot of hacks is that this is not 787 00:46:51,560 --> 00:46:55,400 Speaker 1: just a hack for information. Also, the FBI said it 788 00:46:55,440 --> 00:46:57,720 Speaker 1: was a state level actor, but they did not officially 789 00:46:57,719 --> 00:47:00,600 Speaker 1: say it's Russia. They did not kind of like that 790 00:47:00,640 --> 00:47:03,279 Speaker 1: putin law where the laws for you know, anybody who 791 00:47:03,320 --> 00:47:06,319 Speaker 1: happens to have been president of Russia. They said it 792 00:47:06,360 --> 00:47:10,759 Speaker 1: was a state level thing, but they clearly think it's Russia. Uh. 793 00:47:11,480 --> 00:47:14,920 Speaker 1: The dangerous part here is the fire Eye hack is 794 00:47:15,000 --> 00:47:20,200 Speaker 1: not a hack for information. Primarily, they're not looking for 795 00:47:20,880 --> 00:47:24,840 Speaker 1: you know, uh, database codes. They're learning more creepy stuff 796 00:47:24,880 --> 00:47:28,400 Speaker 1: for later surveillance or sign or whatever. What they're what 797 00:47:28,560 --> 00:47:33,000 Speaker 1: they did was they stole the fire There's something Promethean 798 00:47:33,040 --> 00:47:36,000 Speaker 1: about this. It's like it's like, for a for very 799 00:47:36,040 --> 00:47:38,719 Speaker 1: basic they stole a tool kit. So it's like, for 800 00:47:38,920 --> 00:47:46,120 Speaker 1: very basic analogy of this or comparison, imagine someone robs 801 00:47:46,160 --> 00:47:48,439 Speaker 1: a guns store and they do it with a gun, 802 00:47:49,000 --> 00:47:51,520 Speaker 1: and they pull this off. And then when they robbed 803 00:47:51,520 --> 00:47:54,799 Speaker 1: the store. Uh, they might check the register, but what 804 00:47:54,880 --> 00:47:58,240 Speaker 1: they really want is more guns, more guns, more AMMO 805 00:47:58,360 --> 00:48:00,920 Speaker 1: that they can use, the more robberies. That's what happened 806 00:48:00,960 --> 00:48:05,320 Speaker 1: here because the stuff they're taking enables them to hack 807 00:48:05,360 --> 00:48:09,359 Speaker 1: into a bunch of other networks. Yeah, exactly so. So 808 00:48:09,400 --> 00:48:12,720 Speaker 1: this is a document that another group, Solar Winds UH, 809 00:48:12,760 --> 00:48:16,239 Speaker 1: filed with the Security Exchange Commission, and what they're saying 810 00:48:16,280 --> 00:48:20,440 Speaker 1: is that fewer than eighteen thousand, that's eighteen thousand of 811 00:48:20,520 --> 00:48:24,920 Speaker 1: its more than three hundred thousand customers were affected. And 812 00:48:24,960 --> 00:48:27,359 Speaker 1: but here's what Ben is why it's supported. What Ben 813 00:48:27,400 --> 00:48:30,960 Speaker 1: is saying, what these eighteen thousand people did was install 814 00:48:31,239 --> 00:48:35,360 Speaker 1: an update patch essentially to the software. And this update 815 00:48:35,400 --> 00:48:38,880 Speaker 1: patch was not like the certified one that should have 816 00:48:38,880 --> 00:48:41,880 Speaker 1: been coming from Solar Winds for you know, in the 817 00:48:42,239 --> 00:48:44,240 Speaker 1: like when you get an official update on your computer 818 00:48:44,320 --> 00:48:46,480 Speaker 1: or your Mac or your Winness machine or whatever it is. 819 00:48:46,760 --> 00:48:51,680 Speaker 1: This one was falsified and that enabled those eighteen thousand 820 00:48:52,400 --> 00:48:56,360 Speaker 1: machines to then be activated for the purposes of this group. 821 00:48:56,760 --> 00:48:58,520 Speaker 1: That's what Ben is saying, that they're like getting more 822 00:48:58,560 --> 00:49:01,839 Speaker 1: weapons essentially. Yeah, you're right, and thank you for that. 823 00:49:02,000 --> 00:49:05,160 Speaker 1: Thank you for that. Clarification, Matt I would say fire 824 00:49:05,239 --> 00:49:09,080 Speaker 1: Eye may not be familiar to a lot of our listeners, 825 00:49:09,200 --> 00:49:11,279 Speaker 1: especially if you're not in the tech space or in 826 00:49:11,320 --> 00:49:15,480 Speaker 1: the weird spy space, but UH, they are familiar with you. 827 00:49:16,320 --> 00:49:20,320 Speaker 1: Their clients include things like Equifax. They worked with Sony 828 00:49:20,400 --> 00:49:23,480 Speaker 1: when we did that very weird episode about the Sony 829 00:49:23,520 --> 00:49:29,520 Speaker 1: hack back in. They've also worked with UH several other places. 830 00:49:29,640 --> 00:49:34,239 Speaker 1: They worked with the State Department when UH another agencies 831 00:49:34,239 --> 00:49:41,399 Speaker 1: were breached in It's m It's messy because they have 832 00:49:42,800 --> 00:49:45,640 Speaker 1: what you could kind of say is the skeleton key. 833 00:49:45,760 --> 00:49:48,359 Speaker 1: Not quite, but their fingers are in a lot of 834 00:49:48,400 --> 00:49:53,040 Speaker 1: digital pies and someone has hijacked their hand. Yeah. Well, 835 00:49:53,080 --> 00:49:56,480 Speaker 1: I mean, well, these are products that are used by 836 00:49:56,719 --> 00:50:01,960 Speaker 1: critical organizations in the United States. Millar Terry like multiple branches, 837 00:50:02,200 --> 00:50:05,880 Speaker 1: the Pentagon, the State Department, Justice Department, NASA, the Executive 838 00:50:05,960 --> 00:50:09,600 Speaker 1: Office of the President, and the n s A like. 839 00:50:09,680 --> 00:50:12,880 Speaker 1: These are all people who use this software. These are 840 00:50:12,920 --> 00:50:15,840 Speaker 1: all groups that use this software. And they were able 841 00:50:16,880 --> 00:50:21,040 Speaker 1: whoever this was was able to hack into the update 842 00:50:21,120 --> 00:50:25,280 Speaker 1: server of this Solar Winds fire Eye thing and then 843 00:50:26,160 --> 00:50:30,160 Speaker 1: through that system jump into all these other machines and 844 00:50:30,200 --> 00:50:33,319 Speaker 1: the scariest thing is that, I mean, does anybody out 845 00:50:33,360 --> 00:50:37,000 Speaker 1: there use Microsoft Office three. That's one of the ways 846 00:50:37,560 --> 00:50:39,960 Speaker 1: they're calling it a vector in this that they were 847 00:50:39,960 --> 00:50:44,640 Speaker 1: able to carry out this attack by by using Microsoft Office. 848 00:50:46,120 --> 00:50:48,279 Speaker 1: It's a little scary. We don't know enough right now. 849 00:50:48,360 --> 00:50:51,440 Speaker 1: We just know that it's gone through. We nothing necessarily 850 00:50:51,560 --> 00:50:55,640 Speaker 1: has happened. There haven't been officially any consequences because of this, 851 00:50:55,719 --> 00:50:58,839 Speaker 1: at least there's no reporting on that yet. But it 852 00:50:59,000 --> 00:51:03,480 Speaker 1: is let's use the word troubling. Yeah, yeah, because we 853 00:51:03,520 --> 00:51:06,880 Speaker 1: don't know what happens next, do we. Uh. We also 854 00:51:07,040 --> 00:51:12,400 Speaker 1: don't know what the reporting filter is. Like, what I 855 00:51:12,440 --> 00:51:16,600 Speaker 1: mean by reporting filter is the ways in which government 856 00:51:16,600 --> 00:51:20,839 Speaker 1: agencies or companies choose to or choose not to disclose 857 00:51:20,920 --> 00:51:25,680 Speaker 1: information to end users citizens in the case of countries, 858 00:51:25,840 --> 00:51:29,160 Speaker 1: or you know, customers in the case of consumers. So 859 00:51:29,280 --> 00:51:33,040 Speaker 1: if you are the n Essay or you are fire 860 00:51:32,719 --> 00:51:35,239 Speaker 1: or you know, you're the FBI or something, and you 861 00:51:35,480 --> 00:51:41,120 Speaker 1: absolutely get rocked on something like this, then you know, 862 00:51:41,239 --> 00:51:43,839 Speaker 1: if you're a company, you would arguably do the same 863 00:51:43,880 --> 00:51:47,200 Speaker 1: for your government. But if your company, you do need 864 00:51:47,320 --> 00:51:51,120 Speaker 1: to tell your customers that, like with the Sony hack. 865 00:51:51,400 --> 00:51:53,319 Speaker 1: But the thing is when when you're when you're a 866 00:51:53,360 --> 00:51:58,360 Speaker 1: government agency, this whole other level of mind games comes 867 00:51:58,520 --> 00:52:03,080 Speaker 1: into play. What do we disclose? How much do we disclose? Right? 868 00:52:03,120 --> 00:52:05,759 Speaker 1: And when do we message it? How do we say 869 00:52:05,760 --> 00:52:08,279 Speaker 1: it happens? Like look at the way look at the 870 00:52:08,280 --> 00:52:12,040 Speaker 1: way Ron handled stucks Net, which is probably one of 871 00:52:12,080 --> 00:52:16,480 Speaker 1: the most famous hacking events of the past few years. 872 00:52:17,560 --> 00:52:19,960 Speaker 1: How do you report that because you want to maintain 873 00:52:20,120 --> 00:52:24,319 Speaker 1: your position? Uh, and you want I don't know, like 874 00:52:24,400 --> 00:52:27,440 Speaker 1: a lot of these things. Whenever you hear an anonymous 875 00:52:27,480 --> 00:52:30,480 Speaker 1: source familiar with the case or blah blah blah, that's 876 00:52:30,480 --> 00:52:32,440 Speaker 1: someone who doesn't want to go on record because or 877 00:52:32,440 --> 00:52:34,520 Speaker 1: they've been told not to go on record because they 878 00:52:34,560 --> 00:52:38,640 Speaker 1: don't want to escalate a possible conflict. But they were 879 00:52:38,680 --> 00:52:42,719 Speaker 1: totally green lit to say that these sources who are 880 00:52:42,719 --> 00:52:49,640 Speaker 1: close to the investigation. Yeah, dude, do you mean the FBI? Yeah, yeah, exactly. 881 00:52:49,960 --> 00:52:53,040 Speaker 1: And we're gonna see fallout, man, We're definitely, we're definitely 882 00:52:53,080 --> 00:52:56,480 Speaker 1: gonna see fallout, hopefully just the political kind and you know, 883 00:52:56,640 --> 00:53:01,480 Speaker 1: not the nuclear kind. Um. That's a really weird Gallows 884 00:53:01,560 --> 00:53:06,400 Speaker 1: humor joke. I'm sorry for that, everyone. Um, it's interesting stuff. 885 00:53:06,440 --> 00:53:09,160 Speaker 1: Because in this article from the Washington Post, they're going 886 00:53:09,200 --> 00:53:11,520 Speaker 1: back to the d n C and some of the hacking, 887 00:53:12,280 --> 00:53:15,560 Speaker 1: you know, alleged hacking that was occurring there back in 888 00:53:15,600 --> 00:53:18,399 Speaker 1: the day. Everyone remembers that we certainly talked about it. 889 00:53:18,880 --> 00:53:23,200 Speaker 1: Um and there's we're just gonna have to wait and 890 00:53:23,239 --> 00:53:30,680 Speaker 1: see essentially. Yeah, but this is from the article. Solar 891 00:53:30,719 --> 00:53:35,040 Speaker 1: Winds monitoring tool has extremely deep administrative access to a 892 00:53:35,120 --> 00:53:38,759 Speaker 1: network's core functions, which means that hacking the tool would 893 00:53:38,800 --> 00:53:43,240 Speaker 1: allow anyone they're saying the Russians to freely root around 894 00:53:43,440 --> 00:53:47,680 Speaker 1: victims systems. So who knows what they might find or 895 00:53:47,719 --> 00:53:51,960 Speaker 1: have found. Uh, we'll find out when something gets released 896 00:53:52,000 --> 00:53:55,200 Speaker 1: on I don't know where things get released on anymore. 897 00:53:55,280 --> 00:54:02,200 Speaker 1: Is someplace? Yeah, yeah, I would say of horse Facebook memes, right, yeah, 898 00:54:02,200 --> 00:54:06,000 Speaker 1: it'll be they'll post it on Facebook. Uh. I will say, 899 00:54:06,080 --> 00:54:11,520 Speaker 1: fire Eye did yesterday release an official statement about this. 900 00:54:12,280 --> 00:54:15,160 Speaker 1: You can find it if you just look at fire Eye, 901 00:54:15,680 --> 00:54:20,080 Speaker 1: uh statement solar wind or solar winds. They took the 902 00:54:20,200 --> 00:54:23,680 Speaker 1: solar wind supply chain in order to distribute this thing 903 00:54:23,719 --> 00:54:27,160 Speaker 1: called they called Sunburst. That's the name they're using fire 904 00:54:27,200 --> 00:54:32,200 Speaker 1: Eyes term for the malware. So I would be Yeah, 905 00:54:32,360 --> 00:54:35,560 Speaker 1: I would be hesitant to say that this is going 906 00:54:35,600 --> 00:54:38,840 Speaker 1: to be an easy fix on the fire eye side 907 00:54:39,080 --> 00:54:43,160 Speaker 1: or on the side of anybody who is compromised in 908 00:54:43,160 --> 00:54:47,600 Speaker 1: this regard. So it's uh like this, okay, the scariest 909 00:54:47,600 --> 00:54:51,400 Speaker 1: thing just to put a sunburst the bright point on 910 00:54:51,680 --> 00:54:54,359 Speaker 1: what Matt has said here. The reason you should be 911 00:54:54,400 --> 00:54:57,600 Speaker 1: freaked out about this, and not in a conspiratorial way. 912 00:54:57,640 --> 00:55:00,200 Speaker 1: You should be very freaked out right now is that 913 00:55:00,320 --> 00:55:04,640 Speaker 1: solar Winds. According to employees, solar wind software gives you 914 00:55:04,719 --> 00:55:08,320 Speaker 1: access to pretty much everything like think cis admit and system. 915 00:55:08,360 --> 00:55:12,319 Speaker 1: I'm administrator and it's used by the Pentagon and the 916 00:55:12,320 --> 00:55:15,080 Speaker 1: White House. From the sound of it, it reminds me 917 00:55:15,200 --> 00:55:17,279 Speaker 1: of something. I only know this through a couple of 918 00:55:17,320 --> 00:55:19,279 Speaker 1: friends of mine that are way better computers than me. 919 00:55:19,719 --> 00:55:22,760 Speaker 1: But there is something called root access, like with Max 920 00:55:22,880 --> 00:55:24,800 Speaker 1: in particular. I don't know if this translates to Windows 921 00:55:24,800 --> 00:55:28,200 Speaker 1: systems as well, but it's something you have to get through, 922 00:55:28,239 --> 00:55:30,800 Speaker 1: like the little terminal window that like where you actually 923 00:55:30,880 --> 00:55:33,440 Speaker 1: enter a keystroke commands to to get you know, to 924 00:55:33,560 --> 00:55:36,480 Speaker 1: navigate around the different folders and stuff. And root access 925 00:55:36,600 --> 00:55:40,080 Speaker 1: is like god level admin access that not only gives 926 00:55:40,080 --> 00:55:42,480 Speaker 1: you access to everything. It lets you gives you, you know, 927 00:55:42,480 --> 00:55:45,360 Speaker 1: the ability to wreak havoc on systems if you so choose, 928 00:55:45,520 --> 00:55:48,000 Speaker 1: like by deleting lines of code or you know, moving 929 00:55:48,000 --> 00:55:51,560 Speaker 1: things around or making things not function properly. Yeah. Root 930 00:55:51,640 --> 00:55:54,000 Speaker 1: access will be familiar to a lot of our friends 931 00:55:54,280 --> 00:55:56,520 Speaker 1: who have tried to take who have needed to take 932 00:55:57,160 --> 00:56:01,920 Speaker 1: uh mandatory bloatware off of the our cell phones, the shones. 933 00:56:03,640 --> 00:56:05,720 Speaker 1: I know, we talked about this, but it really didn't 934 00:56:05,800 --> 00:56:10,520 Speaker 1: dawn on me just until now that the updates that 935 00:56:10,600 --> 00:56:13,800 Speaker 1: went out that were compromised were released in March and June. 936 00:56:15,480 --> 00:56:17,319 Speaker 1: So they really have been active for a long time. 937 00:56:18,120 --> 00:56:20,600 Speaker 1: And it's interesting that they were in there prior to 938 00:56:20,719 --> 00:56:25,919 Speaker 1: the US presidential election. Um. But again, like I don't 939 00:56:26,000 --> 00:56:30,840 Speaker 1: think there's any I don't mean that as in these 940 00:56:30,880 --> 00:56:33,560 Speaker 1: this group influence the election in some way. It's just 941 00:56:33,840 --> 00:56:37,360 Speaker 1: they could probably monitor a lot of things that occurred 942 00:56:37,480 --> 00:56:42,239 Speaker 1: in communications that were happening around the election. Um. So 943 00:56:42,320 --> 00:56:46,399 Speaker 1: that's fascinating stuff like where your head's at, Matt, Um 944 00:56:46,480 --> 00:56:53,040 Speaker 1: So everybody's hacked. Uh, everybody's hacked. Everybody's got fake COVID tests. 945 00:56:53,640 --> 00:56:56,200 Speaker 1: What's the other way everybody's trying to overthrow a country. 946 00:56:56,760 --> 00:57:01,680 Speaker 1: That's that's strange. Use today o mon days. If there 947 00:57:01,719 --> 00:57:03,640 Speaker 1: we go. If you guys could be in charge of 948 00:57:03,640 --> 00:57:06,239 Speaker 1: a country, like be the ruler of a country? A 949 00:57:06,440 --> 00:57:09,200 Speaker 1: would you want to? And be which country? I'm just interested? 950 00:57:09,600 --> 00:57:11,960 Speaker 1: What do you guys? What would you aim for? You 951 00:57:11,960 --> 00:57:13,719 Speaker 1: want to like a big one or you want to know? Man, 952 00:57:13,760 --> 00:57:15,680 Speaker 1: it seems like a lot of trouble for not a 953 00:57:15,719 --> 00:57:19,880 Speaker 1: lot of payoff. Maybe I'm just not benevolent enough. I 954 00:57:19,920 --> 00:57:22,360 Speaker 1: mean maybe if I thought I could do some good, 955 00:57:22,560 --> 00:57:24,160 Speaker 1: I might do it, but I probably would just muck 956 00:57:24,160 --> 00:57:26,400 Speaker 1: it up even worse. You could be a monarch, No, 957 00:57:26,560 --> 00:57:28,960 Speaker 1: that's fair, but I'd probably let it go to my 958 00:57:28,960 --> 00:57:32,200 Speaker 1: head and become an absolute monster. I'm gonna bow out. 959 00:57:32,720 --> 00:57:36,479 Speaker 1: I would change my name to Joseph. I would go 960 00:57:37,920 --> 00:57:40,840 Speaker 1: just out in the middle of nowhere and start Eden's 961 00:57:40,920 --> 00:57:45,560 Speaker 1: gate Um, start Hope. It would be a Hope County, 962 00:57:45,960 --> 00:57:48,360 Speaker 1: That's what I would call it. And uh, is this 963 00:57:48,400 --> 00:57:52,000 Speaker 1: a fallout? Are you doing a fallout thing? Is this fallout? Nope, 964 00:57:52,040 --> 00:57:53,840 Speaker 1: it's not fall out, but it would just it would 965 00:57:54,400 --> 00:57:56,560 Speaker 1: definitely be That's what I would want to do, and 966 00:57:56,560 --> 00:58:00,920 Speaker 1: I'd want to have my son John his stir and 967 00:58:01,120 --> 00:58:04,200 Speaker 1: brother like be my second, third and fourth thing. Man, 968 00:58:04,440 --> 00:58:07,840 Speaker 1: that's what I would want to do. Wait, okay, no, no, 969 00:58:11,000 --> 00:58:13,400 Speaker 1: one day, Matt, I'm gonna get you one day. I'll 970 00:58:13,440 --> 00:58:16,880 Speaker 1: catch these references. One day I'm up to like seventy 971 00:58:17,200 --> 00:58:19,520 Speaker 1: percent humans, So I'm I'm gonna get there one day. 972 00:58:19,640 --> 00:58:21,240 Speaker 1: This is this is how you find out what old 973 00:58:21,320 --> 00:58:24,200 Speaker 1: video game Mats playing. Just listen to the weird references 974 00:58:24,240 --> 00:58:28,280 Speaker 1: and then type them into a search the New Vegas. Nope, 975 00:58:29,440 --> 00:58:31,120 Speaker 1: let's just move. Not a fall out at all, is 976 00:58:31,160 --> 00:58:34,680 Speaker 1: it do do? Let me say no, We'll just let 977 00:58:34,720 --> 00:58:37,760 Speaker 1: everybody right. This is your part of the game, folks. 978 00:58:38,280 --> 00:58:42,200 Speaker 1: So let us let us know what what game is 979 00:58:42,280 --> 00:58:45,880 Speaker 1: Matt playing currently. Let us know what country you would 980 00:58:46,040 --> 00:58:47,600 Speaker 1: like to be in charge of. If you're in charge 981 00:58:47,600 --> 00:58:50,400 Speaker 1: of a country, how you would do it. Let us 982 00:58:50,400 --> 00:58:53,439 Speaker 1: know what you think about what we covered with mass 983 00:58:53,560 --> 00:58:59,480 Speaker 1: vaccinations with uh fraudulent COVID results and whether or not 984 00:58:59,520 --> 00:59:02,440 Speaker 1: people should have to get a vaccine depending on their 985 00:59:02,520 --> 00:59:05,040 Speaker 1: job and so on. We try to make it easy 986 00:59:05,080 --> 00:59:07,560 Speaker 1: to find us. We're all over the internet. We're on Facebook, 987 00:59:07,600 --> 00:59:10,240 Speaker 1: we're on Instagram, we're on Twitter, you can find us 988 00:59:10,360 --> 00:59:14,200 Speaker 1: and our excellent mods on Here's where it gets crazy. 989 00:59:14,600 --> 00:59:18,040 Speaker 1: And if you don't sip the social needs, uh, you 990 00:59:18,080 --> 00:59:20,280 Speaker 1: can call us directly and you may end up on 991 00:59:20,280 --> 00:59:23,600 Speaker 1: the show. Sorry. Our number is one eight three three 992 00:59:24,040 --> 00:59:27,880 Speaker 1: st d w y t K. Leave that message. Let 993 00:59:27,920 --> 00:59:30,600 Speaker 1: us know if we can use your name and voice 994 00:59:30,760 --> 00:59:34,080 Speaker 1: on the listener mail, episodes or anywhere else. We will 995 00:59:34,200 --> 00:59:38,160 Speaker 1: attempt to use them if possible. And uh, yeah, please 996 00:59:38,240 --> 00:59:40,280 Speaker 1: leave your message. We we'd love to hear from you. 997 00:59:40,560 --> 00:59:43,200 Speaker 1: What else can you do? You can join our Facebook 998 00:59:43,200 --> 00:59:45,920 Speaker 1: group Here's where it gets crazy. That's fun. Just name 999 00:59:45,960 --> 00:59:48,720 Speaker 1: a name, any name will do some ref to something 1000 00:59:48,720 --> 00:59:50,920 Speaker 1: we've said on the show, or name of anyone involved 1001 00:59:50,920 --> 00:59:53,200 Speaker 1: in the show, and you are in to join in 1002 00:59:53,280 --> 00:59:57,600 Speaker 1: all of the conspiracy realist shenanigans there on Here's where 1003 00:59:57,600 --> 00:59:59,479 Speaker 1: it gets crazy. If you don't want to do that, 1004 00:59:59,600 --> 01:00:01,560 Speaker 1: you can and also, you know, get in touch with 1005 01:00:01,640 --> 01:00:03,720 Speaker 1: us sort of more of an old fashioned way, pre 1006 01:00:03,960 --> 01:00:06,160 Speaker 1: social media way. Anyway. You can send us a good 1007 01:00:06,160 --> 01:00:09,520 Speaker 1: old fashioned email where we are conspiracy at i heart 1008 01:00:09,640 --> 01:00:30,680 Speaker 1: radio dot com. 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