1 00:00:03,520 --> 00:00:07,280 Speaker 1: On this episode of News World. China's President Jijianping is 2 00:00:07,320 --> 00:00:09,760 Speaker 1: in Moscow this week in a three day visit with 3 00:00:09,840 --> 00:00:13,840 Speaker 1: Russian President Vladimir Putin. Many believed the intention of the 4 00:00:13,920 --> 00:00:18,080 Speaker 1: visit would be to begin peace discussions with Ukraine. Jijianping 5 00:00:18,239 --> 00:00:21,360 Speaker 1: is expected to present an agreement on economic cooperation between 6 00:00:21,360 --> 00:00:25,880 Speaker 1: the two countries worth billions of dollars. Chi's visit comes 7 00:00:25,920 --> 00:00:29,440 Speaker 1: just days after the International Criminal Court accused Putin of 8 00:00:29,480 --> 00:00:33,199 Speaker 1: war crimes on Friday. They alleged Putin was complicit in 9 00:00:33,240 --> 00:00:37,240 Speaker 1: the forced deportation of Ukrainian children from Russian occupied areas 10 00:00:37,240 --> 00:00:40,720 Speaker 1: of Ukraine. Here to talk about the Putin GI meeting 11 00:00:40,920 --> 00:00:45,000 Speaker 1: and Gie's long term plans. I'm really pleased to welcome 12 00:00:45,040 --> 00:00:49,000 Speaker 1: back two guests. George Beebe, director of Grand Strategy at 13 00:00:49,000 --> 00:00:53,960 Speaker 1: the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, and wayfun Jong, senior 14 00:00:54,040 --> 00:01:16,400 Speaker 1: research fellow at George Mason University's Mercadis Center. Listen, I 15 00:01:16,480 --> 00:01:18,200 Speaker 1: want to thank both of you for joining me again. 16 00:01:18,280 --> 00:01:21,080 Speaker 1: You're both so knowledgeable about this area. It's going to 17 00:01:21,120 --> 00:01:24,600 Speaker 1: be very very helpful. Thank you. Thank you for having me. Now, 18 00:01:24,880 --> 00:01:28,080 Speaker 1: I want to start with something that proceeds the visit 19 00:01:28,120 --> 00:01:31,040 Speaker 1: to Russia, and that is there were reports that there 20 00:01:31,040 --> 00:01:35,959 Speaker 1: were four different speeches last week in which Secretary General 21 00:01:36,080 --> 00:01:40,560 Speaker 1: Jijianping talked about the need to prepare for war. Is 22 00:01:40,600 --> 00:01:43,679 Speaker 1: this just an effort to sort of get the PLA mobilized, 23 00:01:43,800 --> 00:01:47,279 Speaker 1: or in your sense, does he really sense that things 24 00:01:47,280 --> 00:01:50,680 Speaker 1: are that dangerous and he really wants the country to 25 00:01:50,800 --> 00:01:53,440 Speaker 1: understand how close they are to be engaged in combat. 26 00:01:53,480 --> 00:01:55,880 Speaker 1: I'm letting you two decide who would like to jump 27 00:01:55,920 --> 00:02:00,360 Speaker 1: in first. I had an ongoing machine learning project that 28 00:02:00,440 --> 00:02:04,640 Speaker 1: the Polity Change Index, that tries to gauge what Beijing 29 00:02:05,120 --> 00:02:07,240 Speaker 1: is going to do based on what it's printing on 30 00:02:07,280 --> 00:02:11,519 Speaker 1: its national newspaper. And what we detected about two years 31 00:02:11,520 --> 00:02:15,200 Speaker 1: ago was already the effort to talk up the Chinese 32 00:02:15,240 --> 00:02:19,200 Speaker 1: military has already started. And it's never really clear what 33 00:02:19,280 --> 00:02:22,440 Speaker 1: the target is because the People's State is unlikely to 34 00:02:22,639 --> 00:02:26,000 Speaker 1: spell it out on the page. But it's possible that 35 00:02:26,160 --> 00:02:29,760 Speaker 1: Beijing is thinking more about Taiwan than really participating in 36 00:02:29,800 --> 00:02:32,799 Speaker 1: the Russian invasion of Ukraine. And so I don't see 37 00:02:32,840 --> 00:02:35,679 Speaker 1: that it's very surprising that Schiing Ping would you talk 38 00:02:35,760 --> 00:02:38,080 Speaker 1: up the military again, which is something he has done 39 00:02:38,440 --> 00:02:40,320 Speaker 1: in the last few years. I think it would be 40 00:02:40,320 --> 00:02:43,520 Speaker 1: a little bit leap to interpret that as China's intention 41 00:02:43,600 --> 00:02:47,000 Speaker 1: to more actively help the Russian invasion. I would agree 42 00:02:47,000 --> 00:02:50,480 Speaker 1: on that. I think right now China has some very 43 00:02:50,520 --> 00:02:56,360 Speaker 1: serious disincentives to involving itself directly in military support of Russia. 44 00:02:56,600 --> 00:03:00,960 Speaker 1: For one thing, it would completely alienate Europe, and the 45 00:03:01,000 --> 00:03:06,800 Speaker 1: Europeans remained a very important economic trade partner with China, 46 00:03:06,880 --> 00:03:10,440 Speaker 1: and in a time of growing economic uncertainty in the 47 00:03:10,480 --> 00:03:14,000 Speaker 1: world and in China itself, I think that's probably the 48 00:03:14,080 --> 00:03:17,400 Speaker 1: last thing that She Changping needs is some sort of 49 00:03:17,440 --> 00:03:22,560 Speaker 1: economic crisis with Europe, and it would certainly accelerate the 50 00:03:22,600 --> 00:03:26,320 Speaker 1: trade sanctions that the United States has put in place 51 00:03:27,080 --> 00:03:30,560 Speaker 1: itself with China. That's not a good thing from China's 52 00:03:30,560 --> 00:03:33,080 Speaker 1: point of view either. So I don't expect that the 53 00:03:33,160 --> 00:03:38,480 Speaker 1: Chinese are going to intervene militarily in the war anytime soon. Now. 54 00:03:38,800 --> 00:03:42,320 Speaker 1: If Russia looked to be in danger of actually losing 55 00:03:42,360 --> 00:03:44,880 Speaker 1: the war, that's a different matter, and I think the 56 00:03:44,960 --> 00:03:49,720 Speaker 1: Chinese might approach the decision differently in that context. But 57 00:03:49,800 --> 00:03:51,839 Speaker 1: we're not there yet, and I don't think there's any 58 00:03:51,880 --> 00:03:54,600 Speaker 1: reason that the Chinese believe that the Russians are close 59 00:03:54,640 --> 00:03:57,240 Speaker 1: to losing. I hadn't realized that Ji and Putin have 60 00:03:57,320 --> 00:04:01,000 Speaker 1: met forty times since she became the leader of China 61 00:04:01,040 --> 00:04:05,280 Speaker 1: in twenty twenty. I think almost no Americans realize how 62 00:04:06,280 --> 00:04:09,840 Speaker 1: constantly these two have been communicating. And as you may remember, 63 00:04:09,840 --> 00:04:13,080 Speaker 1: one of Henry Kushinger's ground rules was to always keep 64 00:04:13,160 --> 00:04:17,000 Speaker 1: China and Russia separate and to find some way that 65 00:04:17,160 --> 00:04:19,960 Speaker 1: we could triangulate. And it seems to me that that 66 00:04:20,120 --> 00:04:22,960 Speaker 1: is now totally out the window. How do you two 67 00:04:23,080 --> 00:04:27,440 Speaker 1: react to the whole notion that the relationship there apparently 68 00:04:27,520 --> 00:04:30,559 Speaker 1: is much closer than we think it is. I've been 69 00:04:30,600 --> 00:04:35,719 Speaker 1: following the Russia China relationship since the breakup of the 70 00:04:35,760 --> 00:04:40,320 Speaker 1: Soviet Union, back when Yeltsen was the President of Russia, 71 00:04:40,400 --> 00:04:44,520 Speaker 1: and the conventional wisdom in Washington all that time has 72 00:04:44,560 --> 00:04:50,400 Speaker 1: been there are serious impediments to close Russian Chinese relationship. 73 00:04:51,040 --> 00:04:55,200 Speaker 1: There's a lot of mistrust, a lot of suspicion, a 74 00:04:55,240 --> 00:04:58,080 Speaker 1: lot of things that prevent them from really getting close 75 00:04:58,120 --> 00:05:01,599 Speaker 1: with one another. And that has been our mantra year 76 00:05:01,640 --> 00:05:05,480 Speaker 1: after year after year, decade after decade. And during this 77 00:05:05,520 --> 00:05:10,440 Speaker 1: period they both have announced goals for their relationship, new 78 00:05:10,560 --> 00:05:16,680 Speaker 1: levels of bilateral trade, deeper support, deeper military cooperation, and 79 00:05:16,800 --> 00:05:22,560 Speaker 1: each time they've announced these ambitions, the Washington response has been, oh, well, 80 00:05:22,760 --> 00:05:26,680 Speaker 1: you know, that's completely unrealistic. And you'll look back from 81 00:05:26,720 --> 00:05:29,719 Speaker 1: the vantage point of today at what has happened, and 82 00:05:30,040 --> 00:05:33,120 Speaker 1: Russia and China have actually met all of these objectives 83 00:05:33,160 --> 00:05:36,719 Speaker 1: that they've said they're going to achieve in their bilateral relationship. 84 00:05:37,200 --> 00:05:40,640 Speaker 1: They've gone much farther and much faster than any of 85 00:05:40,640 --> 00:05:44,200 Speaker 1: the experts really anticipated. Here. Now, are we at a 86 00:05:44,279 --> 00:05:48,680 Speaker 1: full blown military alliance? No, I actually don't believe that 87 00:05:48,720 --> 00:05:53,120 Speaker 1: either country actually wants a treaty commitment to defend each other. 88 00:05:53,720 --> 00:05:56,960 Speaker 1: But I think we're in a situation where, in fact, 89 00:05:57,600 --> 00:06:01,280 Speaker 1: Russia and China have a much deep or partnership with 90 00:06:01,480 --> 00:06:06,640 Speaker 1: much greater geostrategic significance than anybody expected even ten years ago. 91 00:06:07,040 --> 00:06:11,640 Speaker 1: And that is a failure in my book of US geostrategy. 92 00:06:12,160 --> 00:06:15,760 Speaker 1: Henry Kissinger was right, Richard Nixon was right. The United 93 00:06:15,800 --> 00:06:19,039 Speaker 1: States ought to have better relations with Beijing and with 94 00:06:19,240 --> 00:06:22,839 Speaker 1: Moscow individually than they have with each other. But in fact, 95 00:06:22,839 --> 00:06:26,040 Speaker 1: what we've done is we've bumbled into a situation where 96 00:06:26,080 --> 00:06:30,839 Speaker 1: we have incentivized greater cooperation between Russia and China against 97 00:06:30,960 --> 00:06:35,000 Speaker 1: US against the United States than would have happened, I 98 00:06:35,040 --> 00:06:38,080 Speaker 1: believe if we had taken a different tack toward both countries. 99 00:06:38,520 --> 00:06:41,080 Speaker 1: So I think we really need to rethink how we're 100 00:06:41,080 --> 00:06:43,760 Speaker 1: approaching this. I agree with what John said. I would 101 00:06:43,760 --> 00:06:46,359 Speaker 1: also add to that, I mean, part of it is 102 00:06:46,440 --> 00:06:49,800 Speaker 1: to be expected in a sense that as the United 103 00:06:49,839 --> 00:06:53,800 Speaker 1: States works more closely with our allies, right, what do 104 00:06:53,839 --> 00:06:57,640 Speaker 1: we expect that China would naturally work more closely with Russia. 105 00:06:57,760 --> 00:07:01,919 Speaker 1: I would also caution that some of these close relationships 106 00:07:01,960 --> 00:07:05,039 Speaker 1: that we see might be really just for show for 107 00:07:05,200 --> 00:07:07,920 Speaker 1: the domestic audience, in a sense that if you think 108 00:07:07,920 --> 00:07:12,280 Speaker 1: about how the Communist Party justifies its dictatorship at home, 109 00:07:12,720 --> 00:07:17,680 Speaker 1: it always tries to prop up the image or fellow dictatorships. 110 00:07:17,880 --> 00:07:20,560 Speaker 1: So Russia, if you look at how it's talked about 111 00:07:20,600 --> 00:07:24,400 Speaker 1: in the People's stading, even when the relationship was not 112 00:07:24,520 --> 00:07:26,840 Speaker 1: as good, you wouldn't be able to tell from the 113 00:07:26,840 --> 00:07:31,040 Speaker 1: newspaper it's always very nice. And when another fellow dictatorship, 114 00:07:31,480 --> 00:07:34,720 Speaker 1: non democracy at least is doing very well, China would 115 00:07:34,720 --> 00:07:36,880 Speaker 1: try to talk it up very much. In the example 116 00:07:36,960 --> 00:07:39,680 Speaker 1: for that is Singapore. Right, So when Li Kuanyu was 117 00:07:39,760 --> 00:07:43,200 Speaker 1: saying something along the line of Asian values, democracy doesn't 118 00:07:43,240 --> 00:07:45,920 Speaker 1: work for us, and Beijing just took it and run 119 00:07:45,960 --> 00:07:48,760 Speaker 1: with it because it's a great talking point. Right, democracy 120 00:07:48,760 --> 00:07:51,480 Speaker 1: doesn't work for us, And look at how well performing 121 00:07:51,520 --> 00:07:54,960 Speaker 1: the Singaporean economy is. So from there you can see 122 00:07:55,000 --> 00:07:59,280 Speaker 1: it's impossible to conceive a scenario where Shijiping and Putting 123 00:08:00,200 --> 00:08:02,440 Speaker 1: think about each other as close friends, at least in 124 00:08:02,440 --> 00:08:05,560 Speaker 1: the public image for photoophs, I think we should sort 125 00:08:05,560 --> 00:08:08,880 Speaker 1: of tone our enthusiasm on that front to in terms 126 00:08:08,880 --> 00:08:11,400 Speaker 1: of interpreting how close they really are. Well, if you 127 00:08:11,480 --> 00:08:17,080 Speaker 1: take Russia's extraordinary scale geographically and they're raw materials, and 128 00:08:17,160 --> 00:08:20,840 Speaker 1: you take the size and momentum of the Chinese economy 129 00:08:20,840 --> 00:08:25,000 Speaker 1: and Chinese technological prowess, in some ways, they're kind of 130 00:08:25,080 --> 00:08:30,080 Speaker 1: perfectly matched to be much more powerful together than either 131 00:08:30,160 --> 00:08:32,640 Speaker 1: one of them is by themselves. I would also say 132 00:08:33,320 --> 00:08:37,240 Speaker 1: China is much more capable of helping Russia, but opportunity 133 00:08:37,280 --> 00:08:40,920 Speaker 1: costs if we think about possible Western sanctions, right, it's 134 00:08:40,960 --> 00:08:44,600 Speaker 1: also much higher. Now it's a matter of whether we 135 00:08:44,640 --> 00:08:48,360 Speaker 1: can actually exert the deterrence, for example, laying out what 136 00:08:48,480 --> 00:08:53,440 Speaker 1: the consequences will be if China actually actively engaged in 137 00:08:53,559 --> 00:08:56,920 Speaker 1: helping Russia. I don't think we have such an on ramp, 138 00:08:56,960 --> 00:09:00,160 Speaker 1: so to speak, for shoting Pin, yet with people like 139 00:09:00,200 --> 00:09:02,719 Speaker 1: to talk about off ran for Putin, I think we 140 00:09:02,720 --> 00:09:06,160 Speaker 1: should lay down more clearly the on ramp so that 141 00:09:06,280 --> 00:09:09,800 Speaker 1: a cheating pea would not be interesting in entertaining. Taking 142 00:09:09,800 --> 00:09:13,800 Speaker 1: it from an American standpoint, is it more important for 143 00:09:13,920 --> 00:09:17,360 Speaker 1: us to find a way to relate to China or 144 00:09:17,360 --> 00:09:19,960 Speaker 1: to relate to Russia. Let me take a stab at that. 145 00:09:20,320 --> 00:09:24,080 Speaker 1: I think that China is by far the more significant 146 00:09:24,760 --> 00:09:30,360 Speaker 1: challenge for the United States geopolitically. We've not actually had 147 00:09:30,880 --> 00:09:35,840 Speaker 1: a peer competitor in our history. The Soviet Union was 148 00:09:35,880 --> 00:09:40,199 Speaker 1: a peer military rival to some degree. You could argue 149 00:09:40,200 --> 00:09:43,800 Speaker 1: that it might have been a peer ideological rival, but 150 00:09:43,880 --> 00:09:48,360 Speaker 1: it was an economic dwarf during its history. It was 151 00:09:48,480 --> 00:09:52,160 Speaker 1: largely cut off from the world and not very interested 152 00:09:52,200 --> 00:09:56,320 Speaker 1: in integrating into the world economy. It was nowhere close 153 00:09:56,720 --> 00:10:00,640 Speaker 1: to an economy that could rival the United States. So 154 00:10:00,720 --> 00:10:05,520 Speaker 1: in that sense, it was a very imbalanced strategic competition 155 00:10:05,640 --> 00:10:09,440 Speaker 1: between the Soviet Union and United States. That's not the 156 00:10:09,480 --> 00:10:13,320 Speaker 1: case with China. China is a peer competitor of the 157 00:10:13,400 --> 00:10:17,840 Speaker 1: United States economically, and is I think, very close to 158 00:10:17,920 --> 00:10:22,920 Speaker 1: being a peer competitor militarily. And unfortunately, I think what's 159 00:10:22,960 --> 00:10:26,959 Speaker 1: happening is that China is beginning to be a peer 160 00:10:27,480 --> 00:10:31,640 Speaker 1: competitor when it comes to its diplomatic actions around the world, 161 00:10:32,200 --> 00:10:35,800 Speaker 1: in part because the United States has left a diplomatic 162 00:10:35,920 --> 00:10:39,800 Speaker 1: vacuum into which China could insert itself. And I think 163 00:10:39,840 --> 00:10:43,480 Speaker 1: that's a mistake, frankly, but the United States has not 164 00:10:43,640 --> 00:10:48,920 Speaker 1: had to deal with a peer competitor before. It's not 165 00:10:49,200 --> 00:10:55,000 Speaker 1: just a matter of outbuilding the Chinese military and out 166 00:10:55,040 --> 00:10:58,520 Speaker 1: competing the Chinese economically is going to be a complicated 167 00:10:58,600 --> 00:11:01,360 Speaker 1: thing because of the degree to which our economies are 168 00:11:01,400 --> 00:11:05,800 Speaker 1: integrated with one another, supply chains are integrated. There's a 169 00:11:05,920 --> 00:11:10,080 Speaker 1: mutual dependency there that complicates how we can deal with 170 00:11:10,120 --> 00:11:14,160 Speaker 1: the Chinese economically. So is it more important for us 171 00:11:14,200 --> 00:11:17,480 Speaker 1: to deal with China than with Russia? Absolutely it is. 172 00:11:17,800 --> 00:11:21,559 Speaker 1: Russia is nowhere near appear in any of these categories. 173 00:11:22,080 --> 00:11:27,920 Speaker 1: That said, China and Russia together are far more formidable 174 00:11:28,320 --> 00:11:31,920 Speaker 1: as a geostrategic rival than either one of them. Is separately. 175 00:11:32,160 --> 00:11:34,440 Speaker 1: So one thing I would say for sure is that 176 00:11:34,480 --> 00:11:40,560 Speaker 1: it's not in the American interest to perversely incentivize Russia 177 00:11:40,600 --> 00:11:43,080 Speaker 1: and China to work together against us. Now, are they 178 00:11:43,120 --> 00:11:46,720 Speaker 1: going to work together to some degree anyways? Yes, absolutely, 179 00:11:46,800 --> 00:11:50,920 Speaker 1: they both have mutual interests in cooperation. What we ought 180 00:11:50,960 --> 00:11:53,880 Speaker 1: to make sure of, though, is that that cooperation is 181 00:11:53,920 --> 00:11:57,240 Speaker 1: not directed against the United States to the degree that 182 00:11:57,320 --> 00:12:00,959 Speaker 1: we can avoid that, because that's what really threatens us. 183 00:12:01,240 --> 00:12:06,520 Speaker 1: But given Putin's deep belief that the collapse of the 184 00:12:06,559 --> 00:12:09,400 Speaker 1: Civil Union was the greatest tragedy of the twentieth century 185 00:12:09,800 --> 00:12:13,319 Speaker 1: and his background in the KGB, isn't it almost inevitable 186 00:12:13,840 --> 00:12:17,560 Speaker 1: that Russia will work against us much more so than China? 187 00:12:17,600 --> 00:12:21,200 Speaker 1: Will Well, I don't think that's true. Well, at least 188 00:12:21,240 --> 00:12:24,560 Speaker 1: it didn't have to be true. It's debatable whether we've 189 00:12:24,559 --> 00:12:28,280 Speaker 1: reached the point where it has become inevitable now because 190 00:12:28,280 --> 00:12:30,959 Speaker 1: of the way the United States has mishandled things and 191 00:12:31,080 --> 00:12:34,720 Speaker 1: because of the dynamic that has developed inside Russia itself. 192 00:12:35,440 --> 00:12:39,480 Speaker 1: But recall that when Putin first became president, he actually 193 00:12:39,480 --> 00:12:43,720 Speaker 1: proposed a deep strategic partnership with the United States. He 194 00:12:43,840 --> 00:12:48,200 Speaker 1: proposed that Russia should join NATO. He actually did an 195 00:12:48,200 --> 00:12:55,360 Speaker 1: awful lot to advance US Russian cooperation. He withdrew from 196 00:12:55,480 --> 00:12:59,040 Speaker 1: Cameron Bay, the naval base in Vietnam that the United 197 00:12:59,040 --> 00:13:03,160 Speaker 1: States had built in the Vietnam War era. He dismantled 198 00:13:03,240 --> 00:13:07,600 Speaker 1: Russia's intelligence collection facilities in Cuba to send US a 199 00:13:07,720 --> 00:13:10,240 Speaker 1: very clear signal about what he wanted in terms of 200 00:13:10,280 --> 00:13:14,520 Speaker 1: cooperation with the United States. He provided US intelligence in 201 00:13:14,559 --> 00:13:19,080 Speaker 1: Afghanistan that greatly helped our post nine to eleven efforts 202 00:13:19,120 --> 00:13:21,760 Speaker 1: to try to deal with the Taliban and Al Qaeda. 203 00:13:21,920 --> 00:13:25,080 Speaker 1: Now that changed over time, but it changed in part 204 00:13:25,160 --> 00:13:28,600 Speaker 1: because Putin developed the belief, and it was not an 205 00:13:28,720 --> 00:13:32,760 Speaker 1: entirely unfounded belief that the United States actually didn't want 206 00:13:32,760 --> 00:13:36,160 Speaker 1: a partnership, that we wanted to turn Russia into a 207 00:13:36,360 --> 00:13:41,840 Speaker 1: subordinate in ways that we're threatening to Putin's belief of 208 00:13:41,920 --> 00:13:44,720 Speaker 1: for Russia's internal stability and the role it ought to 209 00:13:44,720 --> 00:13:47,240 Speaker 1: be playing in the world. So his views of the 210 00:13:47,320 --> 00:13:52,760 Speaker 1: United States transformed quite radically from potential partner to a 211 00:13:52,920 --> 00:13:55,960 Speaker 1: deadly enemy. Now, part of that was Russia's fault, but 212 00:13:56,000 --> 00:13:58,199 Speaker 1: part of it was ours too, So I don't think 213 00:13:58,240 --> 00:14:01,160 Speaker 1: that it was inevitable where we wound up here. Wait then, 214 00:14:01,200 --> 00:14:03,720 Speaker 1: how do you see it? I see a similar trend, 215 00:14:04,000 --> 00:14:08,120 Speaker 1: surprisingly to what George was saying, but in China as well, 216 00:14:08,520 --> 00:14:11,000 Speaker 1: in a sense that China was much more open to 217 00:14:11,280 --> 00:14:16,120 Speaker 1: cooperation with the West, some form of partnership engagement with 218 00:14:16,240 --> 00:14:20,120 Speaker 1: the West, say up to mid two thousands, than it 219 00:14:20,240 --> 00:14:23,240 Speaker 1: is now. And the idea, if we think of Dung 220 00:14:23,320 --> 00:14:26,240 Speaker 1: Shopping's diplomatic strategy right is to lay low, you know, 221 00:14:26,280 --> 00:14:28,880 Speaker 1: to develop. And the reason is because there was much 222 00:14:28,920 --> 00:14:31,480 Speaker 1: more was at stake in terms of the potential to 223 00:14:31,520 --> 00:14:35,560 Speaker 1: grow the economy, not so much anymore. If you look 224 00:14:35,560 --> 00:14:38,320 Speaker 1: at how just even look at how China's attitude to 225 00:14:38,520 --> 00:14:41,560 Speaker 1: Hong Kong was. When John Jamin, you know, went to 226 00:14:41,680 --> 00:14:43,440 Speaker 1: Hong Kong to visit Hong Kong when he was the 227 00:14:43,480 --> 00:14:46,640 Speaker 1: former president, when he was the President of China, he 228 00:14:47,080 --> 00:14:50,720 Speaker 1: went to the residence of Le Kashing, the richest businessman 229 00:14:50,800 --> 00:14:53,280 Speaker 1: in Hong Kong, to have breakfast with him. And she 230 00:14:53,960 --> 00:14:56,400 Speaker 1: doesn't even bother to go to Hong Kong these days. 231 00:14:56,440 --> 00:14:59,920 Speaker 1: And that's all a consequence of the rising Chinese economy. 232 00:15:00,680 --> 00:15:03,280 Speaker 1: Because Hong Kong used to be about twenty percent of 233 00:15:03,320 --> 00:15:07,240 Speaker 1: the entire Chinese economy, right now. It's a dispensable part 234 00:15:07,280 --> 00:15:10,600 Speaker 1: of the entire thing, which also suggests that China now 235 00:15:10,760 --> 00:15:15,560 Speaker 1: is abandoning the kind of engagement foreign policy and pursuing 236 00:15:15,720 --> 00:15:19,400 Speaker 1: an in turn rather to pursue some more aggressive posture. 237 00:15:19,840 --> 00:15:22,440 Speaker 1: And so even if you look at China, it has 238 00:15:22,480 --> 00:15:27,600 Speaker 1: a similar evolution. Whether it's really interpreting the United States 239 00:15:27,600 --> 00:15:31,000 Speaker 1: as being less and less friendly towards China, it seems 240 00:15:31,000 --> 00:15:35,360 Speaker 1: to be that way, But even internally from internal calculation standpoint, 241 00:15:36,000 --> 00:15:38,320 Speaker 1: Beijing is more willing to be more aggressive now on 242 00:15:38,320 --> 00:15:40,800 Speaker 1: the international stage than it used to be. Is that 243 00:15:40,880 --> 00:15:45,040 Speaker 1: also a reflection of the degree to which Jiji Ping 244 00:15:45,120 --> 00:15:49,240 Speaker 1: has centralized power really to agree almost the rivals now 245 00:15:49,880 --> 00:15:53,440 Speaker 1: compared to the people who were presiding over the party 246 00:15:53,640 --> 00:15:56,680 Speaker 1: in the inter reading thirty years, it seems that there's 247 00:15:56,720 --> 00:16:00,320 Speaker 1: been a real tightening up of the tutilitarian state. Does 248 00:16:00,320 --> 00:16:06,200 Speaker 1: that seem exaggerated? Absolutely? It's not only politically, even economically 249 00:16:06,840 --> 00:16:10,720 Speaker 1: China is centralizing because say, if you think of the 250 00:16:10,800 --> 00:16:14,960 Speaker 1: actual power of the premiere of the Chinese government, legally speaking, 251 00:16:14,960 --> 00:16:17,400 Speaker 1: that's the head of the Chinese government, not the Chinese president. 252 00:16:17,720 --> 00:16:19,760 Speaker 1: But these days a prime minister doesn't really have a 253 00:16:19,800 --> 00:16:23,560 Speaker 1: say on a lot of economic issues. And another example 254 00:16:23,600 --> 00:16:25,800 Speaker 1: I would give is if you look at the reasons 255 00:16:25,840 --> 00:16:29,520 Speaker 1: really driving the Chinese economy to grow was the incentive 256 00:16:29,760 --> 00:16:33,080 Speaker 1: local governments have had. Right, they had been for many 257 00:16:33,120 --> 00:16:36,720 Speaker 1: years very passionate about selling land to the private sector 258 00:16:36,800 --> 00:16:39,000 Speaker 1: because they made a lot of money from that, right. 259 00:16:39,360 --> 00:16:42,880 Speaker 1: But now even that incentive was taken away and centralized 260 00:16:42,920 --> 00:16:46,800 Speaker 1: to Beijing. So if you think about economic aspects, the 261 00:16:46,840 --> 00:16:50,360 Speaker 1: fatal conceit, so to speak, it is very obvious in 262 00:16:50,680 --> 00:17:11,000 Speaker 1: Shijing pain. This International Criminal Court deciding that they're going 263 00:17:11,040 --> 00:17:14,000 Speaker 1: to go after Putin, isn't that almost an active insanity? 264 00:17:16,240 --> 00:17:20,000 Speaker 1: How can the court believe that it has any possibility 265 00:17:20,280 --> 00:17:25,719 Speaker 1: of doing anything with the head of the Russian government. Well, 266 00:17:25,760 --> 00:17:29,480 Speaker 1: you know, from a practical standpoint, I think you're absolutely right. 267 00:17:29,720 --> 00:17:33,240 Speaker 1: There's really no hope that Putin is going to wind 268 00:17:33,320 --> 00:17:38,040 Speaker 1: up in handcuffs standing before a judge at the International 269 00:17:38,040 --> 00:17:41,320 Speaker 1: Criminal Court. The only way that could happen is if 270 00:17:41,560 --> 00:17:45,200 Speaker 1: not only Russia is defeated militarily in Ukraine, but also 271 00:17:45,280 --> 00:17:49,680 Speaker 1: occupied militarily in some way, so that the occupiers would 272 00:17:49,680 --> 00:17:52,879 Speaker 1: actually take him into custody and haul him off to 273 00:17:52,960 --> 00:17:59,320 Speaker 1: the Netherlands, or alternatively, if some group in Russia that 274 00:17:59,440 --> 00:18:03,920 Speaker 1: is very row Western actually deposes him and takes power, 275 00:18:04,720 --> 00:18:09,200 Speaker 1: and the likelihood of that happening is quite small, not impossible, 276 00:18:09,280 --> 00:18:13,240 Speaker 1: but very remote at this point. So the notion that 277 00:18:13,280 --> 00:18:16,000 Speaker 1: Putin is going to find himself on trial for war 278 00:18:16,119 --> 00:18:19,960 Speaker 1: crimes is far fetched. That said, I think that what's 279 00:18:20,080 --> 00:18:22,560 Speaker 1: going on here is there's a belief on the part 280 00:18:22,600 --> 00:18:25,800 Speaker 1: of many in the West, including those in the ICC, 281 00:18:26,840 --> 00:18:32,000 Speaker 1: that moral authority matters a lot here, and that we 282 00:18:32,080 --> 00:18:37,160 Speaker 1: can wield that as a weapon to constrain, if not deter, 283 00:18:37,760 --> 00:18:42,200 Speaker 1: Putin from doing things that we find objectionable. I think 284 00:18:42,240 --> 00:18:45,040 Speaker 1: that that is a fanciful notion. This is a court, 285 00:18:45,119 --> 00:18:47,600 Speaker 1: by the way, which has one hundred and twenty three 286 00:18:47,760 --> 00:18:52,560 Speaker 1: countries belong to it, but not Russia, Ukraine, China, or 287 00:18:52,600 --> 00:18:57,919 Speaker 1: the United States, or Saudi Arabia or Iran or Israel 288 00:18:58,119 --> 00:19:02,119 Speaker 1: or many countries that matter, I think quite significantly in 289 00:19:02,119 --> 00:19:04,800 Speaker 1: the world are not party to this court. It's almost 290 00:19:04,880 --> 00:19:09,600 Speaker 1: like it's a gathering of the irrelevant. The irrelevant may 291 00:19:09,760 --> 00:19:13,240 Speaker 1: even have had backfire in terms of the ruling, because 292 00:19:13,800 --> 00:19:16,240 Speaker 1: had they not make that decision, Putin probably will not 293 00:19:16,320 --> 00:19:19,040 Speaker 1: have gone to the occupied region in Ukraine, right, it 294 00:19:19,359 --> 00:19:22,560 Speaker 1: just happened two days after Yeah. I think also from 295 00:19:22,600 --> 00:19:26,840 Speaker 1: a practical standpoint, if you believe that there's going to 296 00:19:26,920 --> 00:19:30,720 Speaker 1: have to be some negotiated end to the war in Ukraine, 297 00:19:31,280 --> 00:19:33,280 Speaker 1: that Russia is not going to be able to conquer 298 00:19:33,359 --> 00:19:36,720 Speaker 1: all of Ukrainian territory, and that Ukraine is not going 299 00:19:36,800 --> 00:19:39,840 Speaker 1: to be able to drive every last Russian out of 300 00:19:39,880 --> 00:19:43,080 Speaker 1: the Dawn Boss and out of Crimea, and then the end, 301 00:19:43,200 --> 00:19:45,199 Speaker 1: someone's going to have to sit down and make a 302 00:19:45,320 --> 00:19:49,520 Speaker 1: deal of some kind. As distasteful as that seems, this 303 00:19:49,680 --> 00:19:53,800 Speaker 1: ruling doesn't help. It deepens the conviction not only of 304 00:19:53,880 --> 00:19:58,439 Speaker 1: Putin but many other Russians that the West really is 305 00:19:58,520 --> 00:20:03,160 Speaker 1: all about crippling Russia, all about regime change and driving 306 00:20:03,240 --> 00:20:07,400 Speaker 1: Russia into second or third rate status in the world, 307 00:20:07,480 --> 00:20:11,000 Speaker 1: if not breaking up the Russian Federation altogether. That's not 308 00:20:11,040 --> 00:20:16,040 Speaker 1: a helpful perception for us to be stoking if in 309 00:20:16,119 --> 00:20:17,959 Speaker 1: the end we're going to have to sit down and 310 00:20:18,040 --> 00:20:20,440 Speaker 1: come to some sort of understanding. If you look at 311 00:20:20,480 --> 00:20:25,359 Speaker 1: where Putin has been, he sees himself surrounded by the West, 312 00:20:26,000 --> 00:20:30,280 Speaker 1: and the West gaining momentum, and this becomes almost a 313 00:20:30,280 --> 00:20:33,600 Speaker 1: fight for national survival in a way that I think 314 00:20:33,640 --> 00:20:36,639 Speaker 1: none of us can fully appreciate. But it leads to 315 00:20:36,680 --> 00:20:41,800 Speaker 1: the notion that the challenge you've got is for him 316 00:20:41,840 --> 00:20:43,920 Speaker 1: to now back down, Let's say, to go to the 317 00:20:43,960 --> 00:20:47,480 Speaker 1: status quo ante say he'd accept the lines that existed 318 00:20:47,520 --> 00:20:51,480 Speaker 1: before the war started, and for the Ukrainians to back 319 00:20:51,480 --> 00:20:53,160 Speaker 1: down and say, Okay, they're not going to be able 320 00:20:53,160 --> 00:20:56,640 Speaker 1: to liberate all of eastern Ukraine. That is a long 321 00:20:56,680 --> 00:21:01,439 Speaker 1: way emotionally from where people seem to be. Now, maybe 322 00:21:01,480 --> 00:21:03,560 Speaker 1: there's something I'm missing here, and now I'm open to 323 00:21:03,600 --> 00:21:06,760 Speaker 1: you two educating me. The more the Ukrainians think about it, 324 00:21:06,800 --> 00:21:09,840 Speaker 1: the more they want the whole country back, including Crimea. 325 00:21:10,000 --> 00:21:13,160 Speaker 1: The more Putent looks at it, He's got to have something. 326 00:21:13,840 --> 00:21:16,040 Speaker 1: It's not like you lose the election in Russia's like 327 00:21:16,080 --> 00:21:20,119 Speaker 1: you lose your life if you're putent. Dean Achiston, former 328 00:21:20,280 --> 00:21:22,800 Speaker 1: US Secretary of State, and his memoirs, talked about that 329 00:21:22,880 --> 00:21:27,000 Speaker 1: same phenomenon. He pointed out that when nations feel quartered 330 00:21:27,280 --> 00:21:31,919 Speaker 1: where their existence is threatened, they can do quite reckless things. 331 00:21:32,080 --> 00:21:34,119 Speaker 1: And I think that is in fact what's going on 332 00:21:34,160 --> 00:21:37,679 Speaker 1: with Russia right now. It's hard for Americans to appreciate 333 00:21:37,760 --> 00:21:41,240 Speaker 1: that the world looks much different from our perspective, and 334 00:21:41,280 --> 00:21:45,359 Speaker 1: it looks much different from Ukraine's perspective, but from Russia's perspective. 335 00:21:45,600 --> 00:21:49,360 Speaker 1: They believe that they're being cornered and that Russia's survival 336 00:21:49,480 --> 00:21:52,479 Speaker 1: is at stake, and they're willing to do things that 337 00:21:52,600 --> 00:21:57,320 Speaker 1: strike us is breathtakingly risky and reckless. That's a very 338 00:21:57,400 --> 00:22:00,680 Speaker 1: dangerous position for all of us to be in when 339 00:22:00,720 --> 00:22:04,720 Speaker 1: you're talking about the world's two largest nuclear powers. So 340 00:22:04,760 --> 00:22:07,679 Speaker 1: we need to handle this with a great degree of delicacy. 341 00:22:08,359 --> 00:22:11,160 Speaker 1: When it comes to the territorial issues, I think you're 342 00:22:11,160 --> 00:22:17,080 Speaker 1: absolutely right. Neither Ukraine nor Russia is willing to budge 343 00:22:17,200 --> 00:22:20,199 Speaker 1: on territory right now. They've got too much at stake, 344 00:22:20,920 --> 00:22:26,200 Speaker 1: and the politics domestically inside Russia and domestically inside Ukraine 345 00:22:26,560 --> 00:22:30,159 Speaker 1: don't allow for a lot of flexibility right now. To me, 346 00:22:30,720 --> 00:22:33,919 Speaker 1: what that points to is not that we throw up 347 00:22:33,920 --> 00:22:36,320 Speaker 1: our hands and say, well, there's nothing to be done here. 348 00:22:36,840 --> 00:22:38,159 Speaker 1: You know, they're just going to have to fight it 349 00:22:38,200 --> 00:22:41,280 Speaker 1: out and let's cross our fingers. This doesn't escalate into 350 00:22:41,280 --> 00:22:45,359 Speaker 1: a US Russian military confrontation. I think what it points 351 00:22:45,359 --> 00:22:47,720 Speaker 1: out is that the United States needs to be far 352 00:22:47,800 --> 00:22:51,479 Speaker 1: more active on another aspect of this war that is 353 00:22:51,520 --> 00:22:55,240 Speaker 1: central but has little to do with territory, and that 354 00:22:55,440 --> 00:23:01,160 Speaker 1: is Ukraine's geostrategic orientation. The Russians have argue for many, 355 00:23:01,240 --> 00:23:05,879 Speaker 1: many years that the possibility of Ukrainian membership in NATO 356 00:23:06,040 --> 00:23:10,360 Speaker 1: is a red line for Russia. That is simply something 357 00:23:10,400 --> 00:23:14,880 Speaker 1: that no Russian government can tolerate. And the United States 358 00:23:15,000 --> 00:23:18,080 Speaker 1: is responded to that by saying, you know, essentially too bad, 359 00:23:18,200 --> 00:23:20,359 Speaker 1: not up for discussion. Ukraine is going to be a 360 00:23:20,359 --> 00:23:24,320 Speaker 1: member of NATO and we are not going to engage 361 00:23:24,400 --> 00:23:27,320 Speaker 1: with Russia on this issue. I think that is going 362 00:23:27,359 --> 00:23:30,560 Speaker 1: to have to change. You're correct. If Putin is going 363 00:23:30,600 --> 00:23:33,640 Speaker 1: to reach a deal, he's going to need something significant 364 00:23:33,800 --> 00:23:36,399 Speaker 1: coming out of it, and if it can't be territory, 365 00:23:36,920 --> 00:23:39,120 Speaker 1: it's going to have to be something like that. Now, 366 00:23:39,760 --> 00:23:42,280 Speaker 1: is that a big concession for the United States? No? 367 00:23:42,760 --> 00:23:45,520 Speaker 1: Why do I say that? Because the United States has 368 00:23:45,600 --> 00:23:48,399 Speaker 1: proven that we are not willing to put boots on 369 00:23:48,440 --> 00:23:52,000 Speaker 1: the ground to defend Ukraine. It is simply too dangerous. 370 00:23:52,480 --> 00:23:56,560 Speaker 1: It is not something that is central to American national security. 371 00:23:56,600 --> 00:23:58,480 Speaker 1: And if we're not willing to put boots on the 372 00:23:58,480 --> 00:24:01,480 Speaker 1: ground to defend Ukraine. Why in the world are we 373 00:24:01,600 --> 00:24:04,639 Speaker 1: insistent that Ukraine must be a treatilly of the United 374 00:24:04,680 --> 00:24:07,560 Speaker 1: States with an Article five commitment for US to come 375 00:24:07,600 --> 00:24:11,600 Speaker 1: to Ukraine's defense. That is something that makes no sense. 376 00:24:12,200 --> 00:24:14,439 Speaker 1: So what we need to be doing is saying to 377 00:24:14,480 --> 00:24:17,879 Speaker 1: the Russians we are, in fact willing to talk about 378 00:24:18,200 --> 00:24:21,280 Speaker 1: Ukraine being in NATO. That is something that we are 379 00:24:21,359 --> 00:24:25,240 Speaker 1: willing to negotiate over. If we are, is that change 380 00:24:25,320 --> 00:24:31,040 Speaker 1: Putin's willingness to settle in some pragmatic way in this war. 381 00:24:31,320 --> 00:24:33,560 Speaker 1: I don't know, but I do know we haven't tried, 382 00:24:33,640 --> 00:24:35,880 Speaker 1: and I think we ought to. That's a very good point. 383 00:24:35,960 --> 00:24:41,040 Speaker 1: Also provides a justification for why Putin is unwilling to 384 00:24:41,119 --> 00:24:46,800 Speaker 1: leave Ukraine without any concessions, even non territorially, because a 385 00:24:46,920 --> 00:24:50,400 Speaker 1: country in the active conflict is not permitted to join 386 00:24:50,600 --> 00:24:53,920 Speaker 1: the NATO anyway. Right, So the long Putin drags on, 387 00:24:54,320 --> 00:24:57,439 Speaker 1: the less likely that Ukraine as it is could become 388 00:24:57,480 --> 00:25:00,680 Speaker 1: a member of NATO. I also wanted to circle back 389 00:25:00,680 --> 00:25:04,520 Speaker 1: to in terms of foreign policy, there's always a fine line, 390 00:25:04,560 --> 00:25:09,560 Speaker 1: but very blurred line between deterrence and provocation. Right, anything 391 00:25:09,560 --> 00:25:12,760 Speaker 1: you do. It could deter, but it could also provoke, 392 00:25:13,359 --> 00:25:16,760 Speaker 1: and so like the war crime sentence, I think it's 393 00:25:16,920 --> 00:25:21,200 Speaker 1: primarily provocation. There's nothing in the deterrence that we gain 394 00:25:21,280 --> 00:25:25,040 Speaker 1: all of it, which actually says a lot about how 395 00:25:25,080 --> 00:25:28,800 Speaker 1: careful we need to be in policymaking, because anything you do, 396 00:25:28,960 --> 00:25:31,919 Speaker 1: whether it's regarding China or Russia, is going to have both, 397 00:25:32,320 --> 00:25:35,920 Speaker 1: and it would be wise to select policies that has 398 00:25:36,040 --> 00:25:40,640 Speaker 1: more deterrence than provocation. We can just make policy as 399 00:25:40,680 --> 00:25:43,159 Speaker 1: we go and hoping everything would work well, or the 400 00:25:43,280 --> 00:25:45,720 Speaker 1: kitchen sink moredel will not work either, because sometimes you 401 00:25:45,720 --> 00:25:48,920 Speaker 1: would trigger too much provocation and that could be counterproductive. 402 00:25:49,200 --> 00:25:52,200 Speaker 1: I strongly agree with that. I think that's exactly right. 403 00:25:52,920 --> 00:25:57,280 Speaker 1: The belief that the more we do to deter, the 404 00:25:57,320 --> 00:26:01,120 Speaker 1: better off we are, and you can never do too 405 00:26:01,200 --> 00:26:04,960 Speaker 1: much to deter, I think is false. There is an 406 00:26:04,960 --> 00:26:11,640 Speaker 1: aspect of provocation. International relations theorists call this the security dilemma, 407 00:26:11,840 --> 00:26:18,200 Speaker 1: when one country's strength becomes so threatening to another country 408 00:26:18,240 --> 00:26:22,400 Speaker 1: that they feel compelled to take counteraction to protect their 409 00:26:22,400 --> 00:26:27,280 Speaker 1: own security. And I think we have not been sufficiently 410 00:26:27,359 --> 00:26:33,520 Speaker 1: sensitive to the security dilemma, to the provocations that in 411 00:26:33,720 --> 00:26:39,040 Speaker 1: expanding NATO in Europe might look like for Russia, and 412 00:26:39,080 --> 00:26:42,679 Speaker 1: we have I think the same kind of dilemma in 413 00:26:42,760 --> 00:26:46,800 Speaker 1: dealing with the Chinese. We have to make sure that 414 00:26:46,800 --> 00:26:54,040 Speaker 1: we're striking a sensible balance between strength and accommodation, between 415 00:26:54,119 --> 00:27:00,720 Speaker 1: diplomacy and deterrence. They need to work in complement entry ways. 416 00:27:01,119 --> 00:27:03,720 Speaker 1: And I think Nixon and Kissinger, to get back to 417 00:27:03,760 --> 00:27:07,440 Speaker 1: where we began, understood this well. To take your whole 418 00:27:07,480 --> 00:27:12,399 Speaker 1: point about being provocative with Ukraine and that in a 419 00:27:12,520 --> 00:27:16,640 Speaker 1: sense being a direct threat to Russia's sense of security. 420 00:27:16,880 --> 00:27:20,360 Speaker 1: Isn't that also true for the three Baltic States. I mean, 421 00:27:20,520 --> 00:27:23,960 Speaker 1: Estonia basically is almost the suburbs of Saint Petersburg. The 422 00:27:24,119 --> 00:27:27,840 Speaker 1: difficulty with the Baltic States is that, on the one hand, 423 00:27:28,000 --> 00:27:32,040 Speaker 1: they're very close to parts of Russia that matter a lot. 424 00:27:32,200 --> 00:27:35,440 Speaker 1: They're a hop skipping to jump away from Saint Petersburg, 425 00:27:36,000 --> 00:27:40,480 Speaker 1: and if you were to put large concentrations of American 426 00:27:40,560 --> 00:27:44,120 Speaker 1: military forces in the Baltic States, the Russians would find 427 00:27:44,160 --> 00:27:49,520 Speaker 1: that extraordinarily concerning. On the other hand, the Baltic States 428 00:27:49,520 --> 00:27:55,320 Speaker 1: are not like Ukraine. In the Russian Psyche. The Russians 429 00:27:55,560 --> 00:27:59,280 Speaker 1: have not tended to regard the Baltic States as some 430 00:27:59,320 --> 00:28:03,919 Speaker 1: sort of calal and historic can integral parts of Russia itself. 431 00:28:04,520 --> 00:28:08,439 Speaker 1: That's to some degree Russians look at the Baltic States 432 00:28:08,440 --> 00:28:12,560 Speaker 1: and think, you know, that's foreign territory. These are different, 433 00:28:12,720 --> 00:28:16,800 Speaker 1: they're not Slavic, you know, brethren. Ukraine is not regarded 434 00:28:16,840 --> 00:28:20,600 Speaker 1: the same way. The Russians look at Ukraine. And you 435 00:28:20,640 --> 00:28:23,640 Speaker 1: can argue whether they're justified in looking at this way 436 00:28:23,720 --> 00:28:26,480 Speaker 1: or not, but whether they're justified or not, they look 437 00:28:26,480 --> 00:28:29,560 Speaker 1: at Ukraine and they think that's brother territory, That's our 438 00:28:29,640 --> 00:28:32,080 Speaker 1: heart land. That's where the in a sense came from. 439 00:28:32,240 --> 00:28:37,040 Speaker 1: GM was much richer than Moscow, absolutely central to Russia's 440 00:28:37,119 --> 00:28:41,280 Speaker 1: history and culture. There's great degrees of intermarriage, there's a 441 00:28:41,320 --> 00:28:46,080 Speaker 1: shared history there, there's deep economic integration. It's an entirely 442 00:28:46,240 --> 00:28:50,520 Speaker 1: different situation from Russia's point of view. And so the 443 00:28:50,560 --> 00:28:54,520 Speaker 1: possibility of Ukrainian membership in NATO is just far different 444 00:28:54,600 --> 00:29:12,800 Speaker 1: than the Baltics membership in NATO. I want to mention 445 00:29:12,800 --> 00:29:15,400 Speaker 1: as an aside, I was talking last week with an 446 00:29:15,480 --> 00:29:20,080 Speaker 1: official from Taiwan who had a very different view than 447 00:29:20,560 --> 00:29:23,320 Speaker 1: I guess I would have expected, and that they said, 448 00:29:23,760 --> 00:29:26,400 Speaker 1: if you're taiwan Is right now and you're watching the 449 00:29:26,520 --> 00:29:31,560 Speaker 1: Ukrainian campaign. Your first reaction is not, you know this 450 00:29:31,600 --> 00:29:34,280 Speaker 1: means China won't do it. Your first reaction is, I 451 00:29:34,280 --> 00:29:37,360 Speaker 1: don't want my city to resemble what I'm seeing on television. 452 00:29:38,720 --> 00:29:42,040 Speaker 1: And it actually increases the desire to find a negotiated 453 00:29:42,080 --> 00:29:47,280 Speaker 1: solution because the communist Chinese don't actually have to invade 454 00:29:47,280 --> 00:29:51,960 Speaker 1: Taiwan to make it too painful to remain independent and 455 00:29:52,120 --> 00:29:54,720 Speaker 1: to change the whole equation. I was very struck that 456 00:29:55,440 --> 00:29:59,800 Speaker 1: from an American standpoint, we may completely misunderstand the cycle 457 00:30:00,000 --> 00:30:03,880 Speaker 1: magical impact of the Ukraine campaign on the people of 458 00:30:03,920 --> 00:30:07,240 Speaker 1: Taiwan and the political elites of Taiwan. I just share 459 00:30:07,280 --> 00:30:09,239 Speaker 1: that because this was a very serious version and they 460 00:30:09,240 --> 00:30:11,520 Speaker 1: were very worried and said there's gonna be a lot 461 00:30:11,560 --> 00:30:15,600 Speaker 1: bigger interest in finding a negotiated relationship after they look 462 00:30:15,640 --> 00:30:18,840 Speaker 1: at what's happened in Ukraine. I would say, that's very interesting, 463 00:30:18,960 --> 00:30:24,200 Speaker 1: mister speaker. I would hypothesize that it's because people have 464 00:30:24,400 --> 00:30:28,760 Speaker 1: short memory of history. It's seeing what Ukraine looks like 465 00:30:28,840 --> 00:30:32,480 Speaker 1: currently on television. It's very impressive. But Taiwan actually tried 466 00:30:32,520 --> 00:30:35,320 Speaker 1: that try the friendly relationship with China. It's up to 467 00:30:35,360 --> 00:30:39,120 Speaker 1: about mid two thousands under Komin Town was basically very 468 00:30:39,160 --> 00:30:42,760 Speaker 1: friendly with mainland. What happened back then was the Taiwanese 469 00:30:42,760 --> 00:30:46,800 Speaker 1: people quickly realize as the economy grew that people become 470 00:30:46,840 --> 00:30:48,800 Speaker 1: wealthier and they want it more freedom, and they want 471 00:30:48,800 --> 00:30:51,680 Speaker 1: it less and less of interference from mainland, and the 472 00:30:51,760 --> 00:30:55,360 Speaker 1: Chinese influence in Taiwan is very subtle, it's not explicit. 473 00:30:55,760 --> 00:30:59,680 Speaker 1: It's nevertheless trying to make Taiwan less free. During that 474 00:30:59,720 --> 00:31:02,320 Speaker 1: Thai period, that's what led to the rise of the 475 00:31:02,360 --> 00:31:06,280 Speaker 1: opposition party, the Green Party, that became more pro independence 476 00:31:06,360 --> 00:31:09,120 Speaker 1: to this date, right, and that's what actually drove taw 477 00:31:09,200 --> 00:31:11,720 Speaker 1: on to one of this. Now it's harder to make 478 00:31:11,760 --> 00:31:14,600 Speaker 1: them realize the alternative is something that you had tried 479 00:31:14,600 --> 00:31:16,800 Speaker 1: before and it did not work, and it would be 480 00:31:16,880 --> 00:31:19,480 Speaker 1: less and less likely to work going forward. Given the 481 00:31:19,560 --> 00:31:23,360 Speaker 1: current Chinese administration is very different from the Janjaman era, 482 00:31:23,480 --> 00:31:26,680 Speaker 1: which is more open to engagements, it's now much more 483 00:31:26,760 --> 00:31:30,520 Speaker 1: to tolitarium. I point out, the Taiwanese are not only 484 00:31:30,560 --> 00:31:33,280 Speaker 1: looking at what's going on in Ukraine. They have to 485 00:31:33,280 --> 00:31:35,760 Speaker 1: be looking at what has happened in Hong Kong too, 486 00:31:36,080 --> 00:31:38,600 Speaker 1: that I think presents a much different picture for them. 487 00:31:38,960 --> 00:31:41,720 Speaker 1: Both futures are bleak, but they've got to do strut 488 00:31:41,720 --> 00:31:43,560 Speaker 1: a way to have an independent future without a war. 489 00:31:44,160 --> 00:31:47,200 Speaker 1: Caving into Beijing would be horrible. On the other hand, 490 00:31:47,240 --> 00:31:50,200 Speaker 1: having Beijing decided to destroy Taiwan would be horrible. So 491 00:31:50,640 --> 00:31:53,480 Speaker 1: it's a balancing act there. I think it's very clever 492 00:31:53,920 --> 00:31:58,160 Speaker 1: that Jijianping is going to Moscow to try to negotiate 493 00:31:58,200 --> 00:32:00,440 Speaker 1: a piece. I mean, if you think about it, it's 494 00:32:00,440 --> 00:32:04,200 Speaker 1: probably the best possible position for him to appear in 495 00:32:04,800 --> 00:32:08,160 Speaker 1: the fact is that they did seem to create a 496 00:32:08,200 --> 00:32:12,960 Speaker 1: shocking relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and I think 497 00:32:13,000 --> 00:32:15,880 Speaker 1: nobody expected it. I don't know if anybody in Washington 498 00:32:16,200 --> 00:32:19,200 Speaker 1: who thought it was even possible. To what extent do 499 00:32:19,280 --> 00:32:23,840 Speaker 1: you see jiji and Ping and his system consciously and 500 00:32:24,040 --> 00:32:28,640 Speaker 1: effectively beginning to be a mediator of situations where the 501 00:32:28,760 --> 00:32:32,760 Speaker 1: United States has either failed or isn't even engaged. I 502 00:32:32,800 --> 00:32:36,840 Speaker 1: would actually argue that the peacemaking effort shitting Ping now, 503 00:32:36,880 --> 00:32:40,320 Speaker 1: it's exerting. It's really just the way he balanced the 504 00:32:40,360 --> 00:32:44,080 Speaker 1: two considerations, one being it doesn't want to Russia to fail, 505 00:32:44,240 --> 00:32:47,560 Speaker 1: but then it can't really help Russia that much, and 506 00:32:47,600 --> 00:32:50,120 Speaker 1: so that maybe you find a middle ground the status quo. 507 00:32:50,200 --> 00:32:52,040 Speaker 1: The Chinese are so used to it to offer some 508 00:32:52,080 --> 00:32:55,480 Speaker 1: sort of a statistical everybody stopped and think of what 509 00:32:55,560 --> 00:32:58,680 Speaker 1: it is now as the map going forward. And I 510 00:32:58,720 --> 00:33:01,160 Speaker 1: think that avoids the problem of having to help Russia 511 00:33:01,440 --> 00:33:04,040 Speaker 1: be the voice, the problem of Russia losing. That's what 512 00:33:04,240 --> 00:33:06,840 Speaker 1: I think. It's the compromise that Biging likes to see, 513 00:33:07,160 --> 00:33:11,320 Speaker 1: although obviously nobody's interesting taking that deal. I agree. I 514 00:33:11,360 --> 00:33:15,720 Speaker 1: think this is actually quite wise of China to try 515 00:33:15,720 --> 00:33:20,240 Speaker 1: to position itself as peacemaker here, in part because it 516 00:33:20,320 --> 00:33:24,560 Speaker 1: allows them to contrast their position to that of the 517 00:33:24,640 --> 00:33:29,280 Speaker 1: United States and portray the United States as the obstacle 518 00:33:29,560 --> 00:33:32,160 Speaker 1: to a settlement. Here is a country that actually wants 519 00:33:32,160 --> 00:33:36,840 Speaker 1: this war to continue. They've actually created a situation which 520 00:33:36,840 --> 00:33:42,640 Speaker 1: the United States has come out against potential ceasefire in Ukraine. Now, 521 00:33:43,000 --> 00:33:46,200 Speaker 1: is that going to change American positions on the war. No. 522 00:33:47,040 --> 00:33:50,880 Speaker 1: Is it likely to produce some sort of surprise agreement 523 00:33:50,960 --> 00:33:56,360 Speaker 1: between Russia and Ukraine anytime soon? No? But will it 524 00:33:56,440 --> 00:34:01,960 Speaker 1: advance China's standing with the global South. With what you 525 00:34:02,040 --> 00:34:05,560 Speaker 1: might call the swing states in the world as opposed 526 00:34:05,600 --> 00:34:09,439 Speaker 1: to Europe and the West. I would argue, yes, when 527 00:34:09,440 --> 00:34:13,240 Speaker 1: you look at the big chess game that's underway right now, 528 00:34:13,719 --> 00:34:16,960 Speaker 1: it's a brilliant move on the part of Beijing, and 529 00:34:17,120 --> 00:34:19,799 Speaker 1: one that I think the United States should rethink its 530 00:34:19,840 --> 00:34:23,040 Speaker 1: own position on this. I don't think it's in our 531 00:34:23,160 --> 00:34:27,120 Speaker 1: interest for a situation to evolve where China's talking to 532 00:34:27,160 --> 00:34:30,719 Speaker 1: both Ukraine and Russia about a potential settlement and the 533 00:34:30,840 --> 00:34:35,080 Speaker 1: United States is perceived as sitting on the sidelines playing spoiler. 534 00:34:35,960 --> 00:34:40,120 Speaker 1: I think the United States ought to engage itself diplomatically 535 00:34:40,160 --> 00:34:42,800 Speaker 1: on this war, trying to steer things toward a settlement, 536 00:34:43,440 --> 00:34:45,600 Speaker 1: both because I think it's in the US interest to 537 00:34:45,680 --> 00:34:51,240 Speaker 1: do so and because it erodes China's ability to portray 538 00:34:51,360 --> 00:34:54,080 Speaker 1: itself in this light. That's a very good point, Jaunt, 539 00:34:54,200 --> 00:34:58,320 Speaker 1: because if we think about China's foreign relations, doing COVID 540 00:34:58,640 --> 00:35:02,200 Speaker 1: lockdown basically is one existence for three years, right so 541 00:35:02,239 --> 00:35:05,440 Speaker 1: now when it reopens, it's going to crave for some 542 00:35:05,560 --> 00:35:09,880 Speaker 1: international engagement because sometimes that's used to justify the internal 543 00:35:09,920 --> 00:35:12,799 Speaker 1: authority is to look at the Chinese president is shaking 544 00:35:12,840 --> 00:35:15,759 Speaker 1: hand with the other world leaders and so I think 545 00:35:15,760 --> 00:35:18,040 Speaker 1: of it as like somebody who's a meat lover who's 546 00:35:18,080 --> 00:35:20,040 Speaker 1: going on a vegetarian diet for three months, and then 547 00:35:20,040 --> 00:35:21,759 Speaker 1: all of a suddenly all the dishes opened up and 548 00:35:21,840 --> 00:35:23,479 Speaker 1: they're going to grab the meat they like the most. 549 00:35:23,800 --> 00:35:27,400 Speaker 1: And the easiest target, like George said, is the global South, 550 00:35:27,920 --> 00:35:32,520 Speaker 1: fellow autocracies like Russia and targets that are easier to 551 00:35:32,800 --> 00:35:35,600 Speaker 1: resume some engagement with the US, and the barrier is 552 00:35:35,680 --> 00:35:38,160 Speaker 1: much higher. But I think both of you pointed out 553 00:35:38,239 --> 00:35:43,520 Speaker 1: is we need a much more historically aware and much 554 00:35:43,560 --> 00:35:50,240 Speaker 1: more subtle diplomatic capability and much more nuance strategic planning 555 00:35:51,080 --> 00:35:53,560 Speaker 1: than anything we're currently getting. This is not just comment 556 00:35:53,640 --> 00:35:57,000 Speaker 1: on the current administration, but in general, the American model 557 00:35:57,160 --> 00:36:00,480 Speaker 1: has been so shaped by World War One world War 558 00:36:00,520 --> 00:36:03,440 Speaker 1: two that we're pretty good at designing cold wars, but 559 00:36:03,520 --> 00:36:07,319 Speaker 1: were not necessarily very good at managing the complexity of 560 00:36:07,360 --> 00:36:10,560 Speaker 1: avoiding a cold war. And I gather both of you 561 00:36:10,680 --> 00:36:14,719 Speaker 1: have that sort of critique in mind. The economic analogy 562 00:36:15,239 --> 00:36:18,680 Speaker 1: would be what the great economist Thomas Soul said, there's 563 00:36:18,719 --> 00:36:21,319 Speaker 1: no solution, there's only trade offs, right, But if we 564 00:36:21,400 --> 00:36:24,360 Speaker 1: have the cold war mentality, it's easier the trade off easier. 565 00:36:24,400 --> 00:36:27,680 Speaker 1: You just go full bone containment because there's not much 566 00:36:27,719 --> 00:36:31,360 Speaker 1: economic consequence to think about. But it's the full bone 567 00:36:31,440 --> 00:36:33,960 Speaker 1: containment of China is not going to work because too 568 00:36:34,000 --> 00:36:36,480 Speaker 1: much is that state. We really have to weigh all 569 00:36:36,480 --> 00:36:39,959 Speaker 1: the benefits against the cost and find the best path 570 00:36:40,040 --> 00:36:43,840 Speaker 1: forward and deliberating. It's hard because it's not straightforward, and 571 00:36:44,120 --> 00:36:46,600 Speaker 1: I guess it's too cool for this town. I agree 572 00:36:46,600 --> 00:36:48,880 Speaker 1: with that, and I would add that during what you 573 00:36:48,960 --> 00:36:52,120 Speaker 1: might call the unipolar era, after the fall of the 574 00:36:52,200 --> 00:36:57,520 Speaker 1: Berlin Wall past thirty some years, the United States was 575 00:36:58,000 --> 00:37:01,879 Speaker 1: the world's hegement. We had peer or even near peer 576 00:37:02,000 --> 00:37:05,080 Speaker 1: rivals in the world. The United States didn't have to 577 00:37:05,120 --> 00:37:10,680 Speaker 1: engage in traditional give and take diplomacy. We could ultimately 578 00:37:10,760 --> 00:37:12,839 Speaker 1: tell a lot of countries, look, this is what you're 579 00:37:12,840 --> 00:37:15,040 Speaker 1: going to do, and if you don't like it, too bad, 580 00:37:15,120 --> 00:37:18,239 Speaker 1: because we can coerci you into doing it. And I 581 00:37:18,280 --> 00:37:23,120 Speaker 1: think our diplomatic muscles atrophied during that time. We to 582 00:37:23,320 --> 00:37:29,520 Speaker 1: some degree grew unfamiliar with traditional diplomacy, where you're going 583 00:37:29,560 --> 00:37:33,560 Speaker 1: to have to find some compromises, some give and take 584 00:37:34,120 --> 00:37:40,600 Speaker 1: to back your diplomatic positions. Yes, with military strength, Yes, 585 00:37:40,680 --> 00:37:44,399 Speaker 1: with economic leverage, but to do so in a way 586 00:37:44,480 --> 00:37:48,120 Speaker 1: that was not simply coercive, and that's something the United 587 00:37:48,120 --> 00:37:52,680 Speaker 1: States has to relearn, I think in this new multipolar world. 588 00:37:52,840 --> 00:37:54,400 Speaker 1: I want to thank you both. I think this has 589 00:37:54,440 --> 00:37:59,080 Speaker 1: been a fascinating conversation and certainly has evolved in several ways. 590 00:37:59,080 --> 00:38:02,280 Speaker 1: I would not have necessarily guests when we started, and 591 00:38:02,320 --> 00:38:05,880 Speaker 1: I really appreciate your help is not just understand China 592 00:38:05,880 --> 00:38:09,160 Speaker 1: and Russia Ukraine, but also this whole need for a 593 00:38:09,200 --> 00:38:14,439 Speaker 1: global process of rethinking and reacquiring the capability for long 594 00:38:14,560 --> 00:38:17,560 Speaker 1: term strategic planning and for being able to operate with 595 00:38:17,640 --> 00:38:21,000 Speaker 1: diplomatic subtly. So I'm very grateful to both of you 596 00:38:21,480 --> 00:38:23,680 Speaker 1: for taking this time to help educate all of us 597 00:38:24,120 --> 00:38:26,839 Speaker 1: about topics where you were both such experts. Thank you 598 00:38:26,960 --> 00:38:33,839 Speaker 1: very much, thank you, Thank you for having us. Thank 599 00:38:33,880 --> 00:38:36,840 Speaker 1: you to my guests, George Beebe and Waifang Zong. You 600 00:38:36,880 --> 00:38:39,000 Speaker 1: can learn more about the meeting between Jiuju and Ping 601 00:38:39,320 --> 00:38:43,359 Speaker 1: and Vladimir Putin on our show page at newtsworld dot com. 602 00:38:43,520 --> 00:38:46,920 Speaker 1: Nuts Wald is produced by Gingwich three sixty and iHeartMedia. 603 00:38:47,080 --> 00:38:51,480 Speaker 1: Our executive producer is Garnsey Slump. Our producer is Rebecca 604 00:38:51,560 --> 00:38:55,319 Speaker 1: Howe and our researcher is Rachel Peterson. The our work 605 00:38:55,360 --> 00:38:58,960 Speaker 1: for the show was created by Steve Penley. Special thanks 606 00:38:58,960 --> 00:39:01,279 Speaker 1: to the team at Gingwich three sixty. If you've been 607 00:39:01,360 --> 00:39:04,480 Speaker 1: enjoying Newtsworld, I hope you'll go to Apple Podcasts and 608 00:39:04,600 --> 00:39:07,080 Speaker 1: both rate us with five stars and give us a 609 00:39:07,120 --> 00:39:10,439 Speaker 1: review so others can learn what it's all about. Right now, 610 00:39:10,719 --> 00:39:13,239 Speaker 1: listeners of news World can sign up for my three 611 00:39:13,320 --> 00:39:17,560 Speaker 1: free weekly columns at gingwicht sixty dot com slash newsletter. 612 00:39:18,000 --> 00:39:20,280 Speaker 1: I'm newt Gangwig. This is news World.