Speaker 1: Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve camera.
Speaker 1: It's ready. Are you get in touch with technology? With
Speaker 1: tech Stuff from how stuff works dot com. Hello there, everybody,
Speaker 1: and welcome to tech stuff. My name is Chris Poulette,
Speaker 1: and I'm an editor here at how stuff works dot com.
Speaker 1: Sitting next to me, as usual, with a sunny disposition,
Speaker 1: is senior writer Jonathan Strickland. Hey there, and today, unfortunately,
Speaker 1: we have some serious things to talk about. Actually, we
Speaker 1: have some pretty scary stuff to talk about. This this
Speaker 1: I think is even scarier than our zombie computers and
Speaker 1: Halloween shows combined. Really, yeah, I think so. Okay, so
Speaker 1: we're gonna talk today about cyber war. Are It's not
Speaker 1: pirate war, cyber war cyber war, so we're all we're
Speaker 1: not talking about tron here um, nor are we talking
Speaker 1: about war games, both of which are awesome movies, so
Speaker 1: put them to the top of your Netflix que um. No,
Speaker 1: we're talking about using computers to either spy upon, or
Speaker 1: sabotage or otherwise inflict some sort of harm upon a nation. Um.
Speaker 1: And this can be done by one of a dozen
Speaker 1: different entities. That's the that's one of the scary things
Speaker 1: about cyber war? Is that all? Right? So in classic warfare,
Speaker 1: you know, usually you you would talk about two different
Speaker 1: nations or perhaps two different factions within a nation fighting
Speaker 1: one another. Pretty easy to identify who the parties involved are, right, normally, Yeah,
Speaker 1: because guys shooting at you, right, and normally they have,
Speaker 1: you know, uniforms of some kind on you know, not
Speaker 1: to shoot your own guy. Yeah, yeah, there's some there's
Speaker 1: some general little rules that make it easier to know
Speaker 1: which guys are the ones you're supposed to be shooting. Um.
Speaker 1: Cyber war is not quite that clean cut. But the
Speaker 1: problem with cyber war is that the attacks can come
Speaker 1: from anywhere. They can come from another country. They can
Speaker 1: come from patriots within another country that are acting on
Speaker 1: their own. That could come from essentially a mercenary, a
Speaker 1: hacker that's hired to do this sort of thing. Um.
Speaker 1: That could come from someone who's just trying to cause
Speaker 1: mischief and they don't have any other motives. Uh. So
Speaker 1: it's an attack that can come from another country, or
Speaker 1: that they can come from within the country that is
Speaker 1: being attacked. I mean, you know, you're talking about uh
Speaker 1: sort of a cyber terrorism in a way. Yeah. And
Speaker 1: as a matter of fact, hum, it could be somebody
Speaker 1: sitting in his jammie, is in his living room in
Speaker 1: the computer. You know, it doesn't need to be somebody out,
Speaker 1: you know, skulking around the streets or you know, somewhere
Speaker 1: in a foxhole. Heck, it could be someone parked in
Speaker 1: your driveway hacking into your WiFi. Good point. I mean,
Speaker 1: it's that's why we're talking about how scary this is.
Speaker 1: It's um and and on another level, it's also scary
Speaker 1: because it takes so little, relatively speaking to uh, to
Speaker 1: perform an effective cyber attack. Now, when you're talking about
Speaker 1: a traditional attack on from one nation on to another,
Speaker 1: you're talking about billions of dollars worth of of equipment,
Speaker 1: of of personnel. Uh, you know, the things that have
Speaker 1: to go behind a war machine. I mean, we're that's
Speaker 1: a huge investment. When you're talking about cyber attacks, you're
Speaker 1: talking about a computer and a computer connection. And you know,
Speaker 1: you might have a couple of other little bells and
Speaker 1: whistles to help you along, but you really you don't
Speaker 1: necessarily need it if you know what you're doing and
Speaker 1: you have the right software. So it's one of those things.
Speaker 1: Wherefore a very low small entrance fee, I guess you
Speaker 1: could say you could have a huge, huge impact. As
Speaker 1: a matter of fact, your computer could be used to
Speaker 1: carry out a cyber attack. Yes, if you've if you've
Speaker 1: installed some kind of malware like a virus or a
Speaker 1: worm that UH can turn your machine into a zombie.
Speaker 1: Someone else can direct your computer to UH to send
Speaker 1: email and a denial of service attack which basically floods
Speaker 1: UM floods computers with spam and other and other requests
Speaker 1: if you will for information. The thing is that doesn't
Speaker 1: require any cost on the part of on the part
Speaker 1: of the attack at all, because all the machines are
Speaker 1: essentially donated, you know, from somebody else, right and the
Speaker 1: And to make matters worse, UH, when when anyone in
Speaker 1: authority tries to trace the source of the attack, they
Speaker 1: might come to your computer and never find the person
Speaker 1: who actually infected your computer in the first place. So
Speaker 1: then you become the person of interest, the person who's
Speaker 1: under suspicion for committing an attack, and the whole time
Speaker 1: you were completely unaware. UM. Actually, that's another big, big
Speaker 1: issue with the cyber warfare problem. Even when you can
Speaker 1: detect an attack and trace it back, you can never
Speaker 1: be a sure that the last place you you trace
Speaker 1: it back to is in fact the original spot of
Speaker 1: the attack, because there are these you know, there's there
Speaker 1: are things like proxy sites, there are these zombie computers
Speaker 1: where there's always the possibility that there's one more link
Speaker 1: you haven't found yet that will take you back even further.
Speaker 1: So that's uh, you know, if you if you uh,
Speaker 1: if you were to detect, say an attack, and you say, well,
Speaker 1: we've traced it back to China, you can never be
Speaker 1: sure that that the Chinese government was behind it. It
Speaker 1: could have been patriots in China who had the same
Speaker 1: sort of goals as the government of China, but we're
Speaker 1: acting on their own. Or it could have even been
Speaker 1: a people in a totally different country that just managed
Speaker 1: to use proxy sites in China to fool you into
Speaker 1: thinking that's where the attack came from. So it's really insidious, um,
Speaker 1: And you might wonder, well, how how vulnerable are we
Speaker 1: to these sort of attacks? And I guess it really
Speaker 1: depends on which system you're talking about, because you know,
Speaker 1: the Internet is a network of networks, right right, So
Speaker 1: any given network or any given computer could be the
Speaker 1: weak spot, you know, and and there are just tons
Speaker 1: of computers as part of the Internet. You know, every
Speaker 1: time you were computer is hooked up for Internet access,
Speaker 1: you become part of this giant cloud. Um So. And
Speaker 1: then the really sophisticated crackers, those are the really nasty hackers.
Speaker 1: Those are the ones who can find ways to manipulate
Speaker 1: a network in ways that you know, most people don't
Speaker 1: think of, right And and to give you an idea
Speaker 1: of how vulnerable certain systems can be. Back in seven,
Speaker 1: there was a secret experiment the Department of Defense commissioned
Speaker 1: and it was called Eligible Receiver. I remember that. Yeah,
Speaker 1: this isn't This was a kind of an eye opener
Speaker 1: um Now, a lot of Eligible Receiver. A lot of
Speaker 1: that mission remains classified, so we don't know all the details.
Speaker 1: But what we do know is that part of the
Speaker 1: the experiment involved getting a group of hackers together, giving
Speaker 1: them some very basic computing hardware and software, and telling
Speaker 1: them to try and break their way into the Pentagon's
Speaker 1: computer system. And it took them three days using basic
Speaker 1: computers and basic software. Uh, three days. Just for regular hackers,
Speaker 1: these aren't necessarily the people who are who have a
Speaker 1: you know, an actual motive to break into the Pentagon,
Speaker 1: and the fact that they're part of an experiment. Right,
Speaker 1: it's not like they have a government breathing down their
Speaker 1: next saying we need access to this information. Uh. So
Speaker 1: that's that's pretty sobering to think that within three days
Speaker 1: one of the nation's most important computing systems was compromised,
Speaker 1: even though it was an inside job and an experiment. Right. Well,
Speaker 1: they there have been attempts to shore that up since then,
Speaker 1: and in fact, they conduct regular exercises in order to
Speaker 1: do that. In fact, there was one not that long ago.
Speaker 1: Every year they there are students from Army, Navy, Air Force,
Speaker 1: and the Coast Guarden Merchant Marine, as well as the
Speaker 1: Naval Postgraduate Academy and the Air Force Institute of Technology.
Speaker 1: And uh, basically it's it's uh undergrads were given the
Speaker 1: opportunity to defend themselves from an attack by the n
Speaker 1: s a UM and uh every year they undergo this experiment.
Speaker 1: And uh, the West Point held out the longest and
Speaker 1: they the Army got to defend their title. But they
Speaker 1: were using Lenox computers. But this is apparently a normal thing. Um.
Speaker 1: The Defense Department is only graduating eighties students a year
Speaker 1: from schools of cyber war in the United States. According
Speaker 1: to the New York Times article that I read about it,
Speaker 1: um and if you're wondering, this is the fifty seven
Speaker 1: Information aggress Or Squadron. They're based in Nellis Air Force Base,
Speaker 1: and they are they they are, they are. They make
Speaker 1: a point of doing this test every year, and um,
Speaker 1: you know they it's one of those things where they
Speaker 1: are making a conscious effort to attack and defend uh
Speaker 1: computer networks. And apparently the uh you know, the nerds
Speaker 1: are nerds everywhere, even at West Point um according to
Speaker 1: the way, according to the way the article was written,
Speaker 1: they get a little ribbing for being the geeks of
Speaker 1: the group. But even the you know, the the future
Speaker 1: officers that graduate from their know the importance of the
Speaker 1: computer network because that's one of the very first things
Speaker 1: they do. They're about to deploy these guys to Afghanistan,
Speaker 1: as a matter of fact, and the first thing they're
Speaker 1: gonna do is set up a secure internet connection, and
Speaker 1: they have to be ready to defend themselves against denial
Speaker 1: denial of service attacks and uh another attacks. So I mean,
Speaker 1: they're they're coming right out of the service academies with
Speaker 1: knowledge of how to attack and to protect UM computer
Speaker 1: networks military computer networks. Sure. UM. Usually we call those
Speaker 1: sort of exercises red team attacks UM, where a group
Speaker 1: is is designated to play the part of an UM
Speaker 1: adversary and that's the red team. And the Red team's
Speaker 1: job is to is to achieve their goals by whatever
Speaker 1: means necessary. So in other words, you know, you're not
Speaker 1: supposed to necessarily follow a certain protocol or rules. You're
Speaker 1: supposed to be inventive and creative and try and find
Speaker 1: new ways to to really compromise or defeat the other
Speaker 1: team and UM, because that's exactly what the enemy is
Speaker 1: going to do. You know, the enemy is not going
Speaker 1: to play by rules necessarily, especially if you're talking about
Speaker 1: enemies that you can't predict. I mean, they may not
Speaker 1: even be directly involved with any other government or or
Speaker 1: official agency. So UM. And and you know, we government
Speaker 1: websites and our government web servers and and systems aren't
Speaker 1: the only targets. One of the big targets in the
Speaker 1: United States, and it's been in the news quite a
Speaker 1: bit over the spring of two thousand nine is the
Speaker 1: electric grid and UH part of the problem with that
Speaker 1: is that systems like the electric grid and and some
Speaker 1: water and fuel systems are using UM using the software
Speaker 1: that that directly ties into hardware, and if you just
Speaker 1: change a few settings, you can cause catastrophic damage to
Speaker 1: the the equipment. UM. There was a video that was
Speaker 1: on CNN for a while where some uh, some electric
Speaker 1: utility experts showed that with just a couple of tweaks,
Speaker 1: you could completely destroy a generator by changing some settings
Speaker 1: through the computer system, and they essentially turned a generator
Speaker 1: into a pile of scrap metal. UM. Yeah, it was
Speaker 1: very sobering to me to see that, because not that
Speaker 1: long ago the news broke out that the United States
Speaker 1: Electric red certain parts of it. Anyway, UH has been
Speaker 1: under attack by some cyber spies over the last several years,
Speaker 1: and I don't really know who it is, right right right.
Speaker 1: They've traced them back mostly to China and Russia. But again, um,
Speaker 1: both China and Russia deny that they had anything to
Speaker 1: do with it. But I mean, of course, the thing
Speaker 1: is it, you know, those countries are are gradually becoming
Speaker 1: more and more uh, computer centric, and it you know,
Speaker 1: it could be anybody, It could be you know, it
Speaker 1: could it could be that they are directly involved um
Speaker 1: or it could be that it's groups of of individuals
Speaker 1: within those countries, or like we said, it could even
Speaker 1: be that the attacks are ultimately originating somewhere else, but
Speaker 1: we're only able to trace them back as far as
Speaker 1: Russia and China. So that's that's the other issue with
Speaker 1: the Internet is that it is a global entity, and
Speaker 1: so law enforcement officials only have so much authority to
Speaker 1: pursue cyber attacks. You know, they can cross over borders
Speaker 1: easily on the Internet, but law enforcement can't. They don't
Speaker 1: necessarily have the authority to pursue an investigation beyond the
Speaker 1: borders of you know, whatever their jurisdiction is. So that
Speaker 1: also makes life much more complicated when you're talking about
Speaker 1: fending off cyber warfare attacks. Yeah, you know, uh, it
Speaker 1: wasn't even that long ago that some countries were complaining
Speaker 1: of real cyber attacks launched on their inner infrastructure, like
Speaker 1: Estonia not too long ago, and uh they were blaming
Speaker 1: the Russians for that attack. But that was back in
Speaker 1: in two thousand seven, all those years ago. Yeah, all
Speaker 1: those both years ago. Yeah, well, you know they say
Speaker 1: that Internet time is sort of like dog years. It's
Speaker 1: about that would make it about fourteen years ago in internet,
Speaker 1: so I guess so, um yeah. And then of course
Speaker 1: there's the example of the Dalai Lama's office that the
Speaker 1: Tibetan office that was UH. They knew they were being watched.
Speaker 1: They were absolutely certain that their systems had been compromised UM,
Speaker 1: and they hired a Canadian firm to investigate. In the
Speaker 1: Canadian firm found that indeed, there there were programs installed
Speaker 1: upon the Dali lamas Uh computer systems, and that it
Speaker 1: appeared to be coming from an offshore island off the
Speaker 1: coast of a China. And the software even included UM
Speaker 1: controls that would allow people on the other end to
Speaker 1: activate audio and video software UM and hardware so that
Speaker 1: they could turn on if the computer had a webcam
Speaker 1: or a microphone, they could turn it on and turn
Speaker 1: it into a remote listening station, so they could actually
Speaker 1: spy on the goings on of these offices remotely. UM. So,
Speaker 1: I mean, this is a very real problem worldwide. It's
Speaker 1: not just something that we have to worry about in
Speaker 1: the United States or or you know, any other specific nation.
Speaker 1: It's it's pretty much if if you have computers, there's
Speaker 1: a good chance there's another party somewhere that's really interested
Speaker 1: in finding out what you know and what you don't
Speaker 1: know and what you're up to. Yea, And um there's
Speaker 1: there's even another component to it that I know we
Speaker 1: were gonna stick, uh mainly to talking about how you
Speaker 1: could use computers to launch computer attacks. But um, another
Speaker 1: facet of this that I think is interesting was sort
Speaker 1: of relates to a blog post I wrote in early
Speaker 1: April UM on the tech Stuff blog that that talked
Speaker 1: about the Moldovan pro democracy protesters and they weren't launching
Speaker 1: computer attacks, but what they were doing was using uh
Speaker 1: social networking sites like Twitter and Facebook to coordinate their
Speaker 1: efforts sort of like flash mobs. They could go ahead
Speaker 1: and use computer networks like those and uh text messaging
Speaker 1: to discuss where and when they were going to organize
Speaker 1: and meet and hold a demonstration. So that's um, I mean,
Speaker 1: that's you know, relying on the network staying up and
Speaker 1: rather than taking them down. But UM, I just it's
Speaker 1: just kind of funny because you know, you don't think
Speaker 1: of you think of Facebook and Twitter or something we
Speaker 1: use for fun or to to keep up with people
Speaker 1: and just another way that you can use them to Actually,
Speaker 1: I mean those could those could just as well have
Speaker 1: been used to hold a violent, you know attack on someone. Say,
Speaker 1: you know, meet at this corner at one forty in
Speaker 1: the afternoon. Uh, you know, and have everybody show up
Speaker 1: and start fighting. Well, if the law enforcement is unaware
Speaker 1: of it or the military forces are unaware of it,
Speaker 1: you know, that could be a devastating attack, and it
Speaker 1: could be used by virtually anybody. Sure, and uh, you know,
Speaker 1: the dangers of these attacks go beyond just damaging a
Speaker 1: network or shutting down a system. UM. One of the
Speaker 1: big fears that that a lot of security folks have
Speaker 1: is that what if you were to coordinate a physical
Speaker 1: attack with a cyber attack. So what if you were
Speaker 1: to target a major city and first you bring down
Speaker 1: the city's power grid through a cyber attack, and then
Speaker 1: you couple that with an actual physical attack link bombs
Speaker 1: or or whatever, and that UM together, that would cause
Speaker 1: a real panic because suddenly you have an entire population
Speaker 1: that that doesn't have access to UM information the way
Speaker 1: they normally would, and yet there is obviously chaos going on.
Speaker 1: And uh that that really is the true definition of terrorism. There,
Speaker 1: you're you're inspiring terror in the victim. UM. Now would
Speaker 1: this be nationwide? Probably not. For one thing, the electric
Speaker 1: grid is really much a pretty much a regional kind
Speaker 1: of thing. UM. But it's something that every region could
Speaker 1: theoretically be vulnerable to without the right security measures in place. Um. I. Now,
Speaker 1: that sort of attack obviously would have to come from
Speaker 1: a much more organized group. UM. It would have to
Speaker 1: come from a country or organization that had a strong
Speaker 1: financial backing to be able to fund the physical side
Speaker 1: of the attack. UM. So that that narrows down the
Speaker 1: list of possible suspects who could do that. But it's
Speaker 1: still within the realm of possibility. And it's one of
Speaker 1: those things that you know, keep security people up at night.
Speaker 1: Sure sure UM. And you know, I'm really not certain
Speaker 1: what we're going to be able to do short of
Speaker 1: pulling all the plugs um to make it an impost
Speaker 1: complete and utter impossibility that they could carry out those
Speaker 1: kinds of attacks, because UM, it's just going to require
Speaker 1: constant monitoring and searching for vulnerabilities. That's why the the
Speaker 1: efforts of those who are participating in those um those
Speaker 1: computer security uh war games. If you will. Um, they're
Speaker 1: they're so important because they're searching, they're actively searching for
Speaker 1: those vulnerabilities in the system and try, you know, to
Speaker 1: try to find ways to patch them up before they
Speaker 1: can be hacked into. But um, you know, I think
Speaker 1: that any time that you update those systems, you're going
Speaker 1: to open up new vulnerabilities and new problems. And you know,
Speaker 1: it's just one of those things where the people who
Speaker 1: whose job it is to pay attention to it are
Speaker 1: just going to have to stay constantly vigilant to prevent
Speaker 1: something like that from happening. And it is even more
Speaker 1: complicated when you think that, you know, not every system
Speaker 1: runs on the same software or operating system or whatever,
Speaker 1: so some of them are proprietary and uh and and
Speaker 1: so you might find something that works as a great
Speaker 1: security measure for one system, but it's not at all
Speaker 1: applicable to any other. So it is a huge challenge.
Speaker 1: I mean, well, what's the response to that. Do you
Speaker 1: go ahead and try and standardize everything so that hopefully
Speaker 1: the same measures will work across the board. Because if
Speaker 1: you do that and someone does find a vulnerability, suddenly
Speaker 1: they've got a vulnerability that works across all systems. Right, So,
Speaker 1: I mean it's a yeah, it's a double edged sword,
Speaker 1: and it's it's there are no easy answers. We've got
Speaker 1: people who are way smarter than I am working on this,
Speaker 1: UM and I wish them the best because this is
Speaker 1: this is scary stuff. Now. Are we all in danger
Speaker 1: of something like this happening anytime soon? I don't know.
Speaker 1: I don't know. I don't think so. I mean, I'm
Speaker 1: not I'm not staying up at night worrying the next
Speaker 1: day about that's going to be the day when the
Speaker 1: cyber war attack is going to happen. But it's I mean,
Speaker 1: it is possible. It's just not necessarily something that you
Speaker 1: know that I'm gonna have to worry about on a
Speaker 1: day to day basis. Well, the more systems come online
Speaker 1: UM in more places around the world, I think it's
Speaker 1: going to be it becomes sort of like you know,
Speaker 1: aerial assaults were after you know, that became a real
Speaker 1: possibility in the twentieth century. It's it's going to be
Speaker 1: something that a well planned military strategy is going to include.
Speaker 1: You've got your ground troops, you know, air, sea, and internet.
Speaker 1: Anything that can take down the computer network, the computer
Speaker 1: the communications network, the power grid all at one time.
Speaker 1: If you can do that, then you know you'll panic
Speaker 1: the citizenry, and that just gives you a better chance.
Speaker 1: I can pretty much guarantee that just about every modern
Speaker 1: nation in the world has some sort of plan like
Speaker 1: that in place. Um, and I can also guarantee that
Speaker 1: they're not going to share that because that kind of
Speaker 1: defeats the purpose of the plan. Yeah, but you know,
Speaker 1: my internet connection goes down plenty without anybody attacking it.
Speaker 1: So and I occasionally lose power if I sneeze too hard,
Speaker 1: so or maybe I blackout. It's one of the two
Speaker 1: either way. Alright, then I'm done. I'm yeah, that's all
Speaker 1: I have that divulge to the public. Now that we've
Speaker 1: scared the pants off of you, it's time for listener
Speaker 1: me fitness knows that scares the pants off me. And
Speaker 1: you know what, in retrospect, the alarm noise is probably
Speaker 1: not the most appropriate one to play the podcast holbably not.
Speaker 1: I apologize, folks, I should have picked something like Kittens
Speaker 1: Purring Kittens. Well, today's listener mail comes from Tom from Kansas.
Speaker 1: When I call a radio station to try and win
Speaker 1: a contest, would I have an advantage if I were
Speaker 1: closer to the radio station, or closer to a tower
Speaker 1: that's closest to the station. Sometimes when I call, I
Speaker 1: never get through. Who's getting through? And why? Um? Tom,
Speaker 1: I was getting through? No, Seriously, I used to have
Speaker 1: like the bat phone into the local radio station. I
Speaker 1: won so many tickets from that station that they actually
Speaker 1: had to say, Hey, how long has it been since
Speaker 1: the last time you won. I'd be like sixty two days,
Speaker 1: and your your policies is sixty hands them over? Um.
Speaker 1: Does it help if I could just see you doing that?
Speaker 1: Does it help if you're closer now? Does it help
Speaker 1: if the tower is closer. No, these signals are moving
Speaker 1: really really fast. Um. Otherwise you couldn't have a conversation
Speaker 1: normal time. Exactly. These signals are moving essentially at the
Speaker 1: speed of light, um, or close enough to it. Because
Speaker 1: if you if they weren't moving that fast, if when
Speaker 1: you spoke into the phone, the person on the other
Speaker 1: end would experience a really long delay and then they
Speaker 1: would hear you, and then they would speak, and you
Speaker 1: would hear a really long pause, and then you would
Speaker 1: hear them and then you'd speak. That's not how it happens.
Speaker 1: Conversations have happened in near real time, so we're talking
Speaker 1: about really really fast signals. Now, what is happening, Tom,
Speaker 1: is that the radio station has only so many incoming
Speaker 1: lines available. After that, you're going to get a busy
Speaker 1: signal and those lines are going to fill up pretty quickly,
Speaker 1: especially if the radio station has a large audience. Yeah,
Speaker 1: if you have a switchboard with with ten lines and
Speaker 1: switchboard two people are calling in, that means two sixty
Speaker 1: five people are getting a busy signal or an all
Speaker 1: circuits are busy recording, which is probably what you're hearing.
Speaker 1: And that's what I always heard when I called in,
Speaker 1: you know, until I worked for a very specific company
Speaker 1: that had a particular phone system. That's why I used
Speaker 1: to get to I don't know what it was about
Speaker 1: that phone system. I think it was nothing at all.
Speaker 1: I think it was just luck and coincidence. So I
Speaker 1: don't think it was I don't think there was any causation.
Speaker 1: There might have been correlation, but no causation um at
Speaker 1: any rate. Um. All I can say is keep trying.
Speaker 1: Lines are open, um. But yeah, if as soon as
Speaker 1: the line does go open, someone else is trying to call.
Speaker 1: It's going to fill up really quickly. It's really just,
Speaker 1: you know, kind of a crapshoot. All right then, all right, Tom,
Speaker 1: thanks for writing in. If any of you have any
Speaker 1: questions you'd like answered right in at tech stuff at
Speaker 1: how stuff works dot com. Remember, you can find out
Speaker 1: all about fun activities like cyber war at how stuff
Speaker 1: works dot com. Well, I was trying to, you know,
Speaker 1: lighten up the mood after that podcast, and we will
Speaker 1: talk to you again really soon for more on this
Speaker 1: and thousands of other topics. Does it how stuff works
Speaker 1: dot com And be sure to check out the new
Speaker 1: tech stuff blog now on the house stuff Works homepage,
Speaker 1: brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve camera.
Speaker 1: It's ready, are you