WEBVTT - What is a Numbers Station?

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to Stuff you should know from house Stuff Works

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<v Speaker 1>dot com. Hey, and welcome to the podcast. I'm Josh

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<v Speaker 1>Clark with Charles W. Chuck Bryant and this is oh

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<v Speaker 1>Jerry and this is sufficient eight. Can you say it

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<v Speaker 1>in German? You speak German? Don't even drive me? That's

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<v Speaker 1>why did I? Ah, Stephen? Now can you do that

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<v Speaker 1>in a little girl voice? No? You always make me

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<v Speaker 1>play st poly girl. I'm tired of it. Save Polly Girl. Now.

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<v Speaker 1>This is apparently even younger than the sat Polly Girl.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like a little girl and it was alive little

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<v Speaker 1>girl who in the Swedish rhapsody number station it was

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<v Speaker 1>a young a little girl reading out numbers and letters

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<v Speaker 1>in German, which makes it even creepier. This is a

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<v Speaker 1>very neat subject, so kudos to you for tossing this

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<v Speaker 1>one out there. Well, I've been waiting for it to publish.

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<v Speaker 1>I've seen it in the calendar coming up and coming up.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm like, come on and published. And I think it

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<v Speaker 1>published on Friday Tuesday, right out of the oven. And uh,

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<v Speaker 1>we're talking about it just as they are completing their decline,

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<v Speaker 1>so we are on top of this. Well, I think

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<v Speaker 1>that well, we'll get into it. I think that's what

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<v Speaker 1>makes it even more interesting is that it's still happening,

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<v Speaker 1>all right. Numbers stations. Numbers stations. Yeah, like you said,

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<v Speaker 1>number both words are a little clumsy, um, and number

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<v Speaker 1>of stations are. We should just come out and say

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<v Speaker 1>they're short wave radio transmissions or transmitters, making really weird

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<v Speaker 1>baffling is the best word for it. Transmissions and have

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<v Speaker 1>been doing so apparently since at least World War one.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh really, Yeah. Supposedly the first mention of a numbers station,

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<v Speaker 1>uh came from a German magazine. In World War One

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<v Speaker 1>and World War Two they were in full swing, sure,

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<v Speaker 1>but apparently they somehow popped up first round world War one,

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<v Speaker 1>which makes them some of the earliest short wave transmissions

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<v Speaker 1>in the world, because shortwave radio didn't come around, at

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<v Speaker 1>least into commercial use until about World War One. Was

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<v Speaker 1>a few years before that, if you'll remember correct. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>that's why I didn't even think that that was possible.

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<v Speaker 1>But like you said, world War two was when they

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<v Speaker 1>were full swing. They really peaked in the Cold War, um,

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<v Speaker 1>and they've been dying out slowly ever since. But I

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<v Speaker 1>think one of the neatest things is they are still

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<v Speaker 1>if you have a short wave radio, you can tune

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<v Speaker 1>into a frequency and here be one to seven eight.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, it's it's usually like some sort of tone

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<v Speaker 1>we should mention to Jerry of the future. Yeah, you're

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<v Speaker 1>supposed to leave that beep in because it's part of

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<v Speaker 1>the numbers stations. Yeah, we beat Jerry to signal when

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<v Speaker 1>we want something edited. But yeah, number station. It's not

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<v Speaker 1>always a beat, but will just have some sort of

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<v Speaker 1>Sometimes it's a bit of a song, yeah, like this

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<v Speaker 1>Swedish Rhapsody or the Lincolnshire Poacher of British English Ukish

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<v Speaker 1>folk song and uh. And the reason um that they

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<v Speaker 1>the transmission starts off with a tone or a beep

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<v Speaker 1>or a song is so you can it alerts like

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<v Speaker 1>here comes the transmission to in your station hone and

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<v Speaker 1>make sure you get some good reception because the secret

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<v Speaker 1>code is about to be revealed. And that's exactly what

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<v Speaker 1>everyone is pretty much in consensus on that what comes

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<v Speaker 1>after this and what is broadcast over these numbers stations

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<v Speaker 1>are secret codes. Yeah. Again for the Swedish Rhapsody station. Um,

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<v Speaker 1>it is a little girl in speaking in German, reading

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<v Speaker 1>numbers and letters random seemingly random numbers and letters, and

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<v Speaker 1>then the transmission is over and that happens like or

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<v Speaker 1>it used to happen. That's a defunct numbers station now,

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<v Speaker 1>but it happened on a fairly regular schedule. There's other ones.

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<v Speaker 1>The atension station is a woman saying attension and then

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<v Speaker 1>reading Spanish numbers and then repeating them over and over

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<v Speaker 1>again and then going on to the next set. And everybody.

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<v Speaker 1>No one can say for certain, but virtually everyone in

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<v Speaker 1>the world, from Cecil Adams that's straight dope to the

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<v Speaker 1>head of the UK's Trade and Industry Agency say these

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<v Speaker 1>are secret transmissions for spies. The whole basis of them

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<v Speaker 1>was for espionage. Yeah. And the reason why everyone is

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<v Speaker 1>speculating that that is absolutely the case, which almost certainly

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<v Speaker 1>it's like we said, is because no government to this

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<v Speaker 1>day has come forward and admitted this or own this.

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<v Speaker 1>It is all still technically speculation because you cannot point

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<v Speaker 1>to a factual statement. The closest we've ever come is

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<v Speaker 1>they finally got someone from the United Kingdom of spokesperson.

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<v Speaker 1>That was the dude from the Trade Agency the exact

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<v Speaker 1>quotas people should not be mystified by them they're not,

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<v Speaker 1>shall we say, for public consumption. Yeah, and that's the

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<v Speaker 1>only thing on record that any government has ever spoke

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<v Speaker 1>about what these transmissions are. Right, So, the the idea

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<v Speaker 1>that they are government transitions are the reason we have

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<v Speaker 1>to speculate, because the government has never claimed them. On

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<v Speaker 1>the flip side, the reason everyone thinks that they are

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<v Speaker 1>government backed claimed Stein transmissions is because these are pirate

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<v Speaker 1>radio frequencies, pirate radio transmitters. Yeah. My first thing was like,

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<v Speaker 1>just find one of these and look it up and

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<v Speaker 1>find out what the deal is. Yeah, you would think.

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<v Speaker 1>So they're totally unlicensed. Um, nobody knows exactly where they

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<v Speaker 1>are illegal. Technically, yes, they're very illegal because they transmit

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<v Speaker 1>over air traffic control frequencies. Um, well that's a big one.

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<v Speaker 1>And no one investigates them. There's no investigation into these

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<v Speaker 1>number stations whatsoever. So the fact that the government won't

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<v Speaker 1>say anything about them, and the fact that the government

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<v Speaker 1>isn't investigating these very blatantly out in the open um

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<v Speaker 1>weird baffling transmissions suggests that yeah, everybody's right that these

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<v Speaker 1>are government backed transmissions used to communicate anonymously and in

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<v Speaker 1>one direction. Two spies embedded in foreign countries. Yeah. I

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<v Speaker 1>was about to call it a conversation, but it's really not.

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<v Speaker 1>It's a it's um. I think on the BBC documents

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<v Speaker 1>all they called it a monologue. You're just sending a

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<v Speaker 1>one way message. Um, all right, Right after this break,

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<v Speaker 1>we're gonna talk a little bit about short wave radio technology.

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<v Speaker 1>The secret key to sending these messages after this break,

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<v Speaker 1>all right, The key to this whole thing is sending

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<v Speaker 1>a short way Like you might think in this day

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<v Speaker 1>and age, why not just send a telefax? No, that's

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<v Speaker 1>send an email or you know, there's surely, surely there

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<v Speaker 1>are safer ways to send espionage, this information, highly classified

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<v Speaker 1>instructions to go kill the leader of a country, perhaps, right,

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<v Speaker 1>like if you want to activate Reggie Jackson to kill

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<v Speaker 1>Queen Elizabeth kill Norberg. Yeah, that's that's how would you

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<v Speaker 1>do it in this day and age? You think an

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<v Speaker 1>email would do it? No, And you want to know

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<v Speaker 1>who proves definitively that that is not safe for secure? Um? Who?

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<v Speaker 1>J Edward Snowden? Yeah there there. Um. If you use

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<v Speaker 1>a computer, you leave a trace. It's virtually impossible to

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<v Speaker 1>erase anything on a computer. If you think you have,

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<v Speaker 1>then you haven't. Plus, if you are, say emailing somebody,

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<v Speaker 1>you're transmitting what's supposed to be highly sensitive even encrypted

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<v Speaker 1>information over a network. That stuff can be captured, Like

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<v Speaker 1>go listen to ours an employer. Is your employer spying

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<v Speaker 1>on new episode? You? You can't do it like you

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<v Speaker 1>You can communicate like that, but you're leaving digital traces everywhere.

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<v Speaker 1>The beauty of the short wave radio transmission is that again,

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<v Speaker 1>it's anonymous and it's one directional. But if you get

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<v Speaker 1>caught with a short wave radio at least say back

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<v Speaker 1>in the sixties or the M and D s or something, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>it wasn't weird. It didn't prove that you were a spy.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah you've done. Just tune an into my too, my stories.

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<v Speaker 1>Just listening to the BBC World Service. Uh, short wave

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<v Speaker 1>energy radio energy. It's all determined by the power of

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<v Speaker 1>your transmitter. So if you've got a humongous transmitter, you

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<v Speaker 1>can send and it didn't need to be that big,

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<v Speaker 1>but you can send a message when we message to

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<v Speaker 1>the other side of the world. And the reason it

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<v Speaker 1>can travel across the planet is because it's bouncing off

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<v Speaker 1>of it literally is bouncing off the ionosphere of the

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<v Speaker 1>Earth or of well, yeah, of the Earth, uh, fifty

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<v Speaker 1>to three seventy five miles up above our surface. It's

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<v Speaker 1>in the upper atmosphere, and solar ionization creates an electrical

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<v Speaker 1>charge and that charge reflects that signal right back down

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<v Speaker 1>to Earth. It's called skywave or skip and skywave. And

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<v Speaker 1>that's why you can with a seemingly pretty simple piece

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<v Speaker 1>of equipment, I can send a message to of the

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<v Speaker 1>South Pacific. Yeah, from my bedroom. Well, I don't know

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<v Speaker 1>if i'd have one big enough for my my bedrooms

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<v Speaker 1>pretty big. I wanted to see how big these things

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<v Speaker 1>were actually, you know, like if they say a really

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<v Speaker 1>big ones to send them further and further, Like how

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<v Speaker 1>big do they get? They get very huge. They can

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<v Speaker 1>cover scores of acres a big shortwave antenna um, which

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<v Speaker 1>is why I can get very expensive So that's bigger

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<v Speaker 1>than my bedroom. You can also use ones that are

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<v Speaker 1>the size of your bedroom. And it depends not only

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<v Speaker 1>like you said, on the size of the transmitter, it

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<v Speaker 1>depends on the atmospheric conditions to Supposually, shortwave transmissions are

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<v Speaker 1>received best at sunrise and sunset, and no one's sure,

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<v Speaker 1>but it has to do with the ion sphere, and

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<v Speaker 1>because that's where the northern lights are happening, that's where

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<v Speaker 1>solar rays hit the hit the Earth's atmosphere and they

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<v Speaker 1>the atoms loose their electrons I believe, so they become

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<v Speaker 1>ions forming the ionosphere. And because this is constantly changing, UM,

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<v Speaker 1>you can't predict exactly how a short wave radio wave

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<v Speaker 1>will act, but you can kind of guess, well, this

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<v Speaker 1>time the Sun's least active or most active, whatever, it

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<v Speaker 1>has some impact on that sky. What's it called the sky?

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<v Speaker 1>What the skywave effect? So you can communicate with somebody

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<v Speaker 1>in a foreign country, right, and not only can it

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<v Speaker 1>not be tracked, it's very difficult to trace who sent that,

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<v Speaker 1>where that transmission is coming from, it's impossible to trace

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<v Speaker 1>who's receiving it. So you have no idea who in

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<v Speaker 1>your country is getting this, which means that you're broadcasting

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<v Speaker 1>to anybody and everybody who feels like listening to this.

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<v Speaker 1>UM a secret code, but the fact is, if you

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<v Speaker 1>use the right kind of secret code, no one can

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<v Speaker 1>crack it all. Right. That brings up an important point

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<v Speaker 1>because you would think also you can hack into the

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<v Speaker 1>most secure computer system on the planet if you're good

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<v Speaker 1>enough as a hacker, So how in the world could

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<v Speaker 1>sending a coded key like it's nineteen fifty five and

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<v Speaker 1>you're trying to get your Dakota ring you know from

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<v Speaker 1>the Red was Red Rider? No, No, that's way off. No,

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<v Speaker 1>what was it? It was fy No? No, no, I'm

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<v Speaker 1>talking about it in the Christmas Story. Yeah, it was

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<v Speaker 1>a little orphan that was the show. Yeah, I didn't

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<v Speaker 1>think it was. He didn't. He didn't care about pirates

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<v Speaker 1>and all that jazz pirates and smugglers and all that.

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<v Speaker 1>He listened to a little or Fanny and little I'll

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<v Speaker 1>take a word for it. I remember, now do you know?

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<v Speaker 1>But I'll take your word for it. Dude, I'm telling

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<v Speaker 1>you it's a little or Fanny was my hat. I

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<v Speaker 1>don't have a hat on right now, but I would

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<v Speaker 1>eat it if I if I were wrong. At any rate,

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<v Speaker 1>you're not a little Ralphie decoding the message from Little

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<v Speaker 1>or Fananny. But it is actually the most secure way

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<v Speaker 1>that you can send a secret message is by creating

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<v Speaker 1>a unique code that you know and have written down

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<v Speaker 1>on a piece of paper, and your buddy knows who

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<v Speaker 1>has it written down on a piece of paper. You

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<v Speaker 1>only use it once. That's the kind of the key here,

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<v Speaker 1>and then you destroy it afterward. That is still the

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<v Speaker 1>most it's unbreakable. So what it's called is a one

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<v Speaker 1>time pad, the old one time because you only use

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<v Speaker 1>it once, and it is old. It's from the nineteenth century. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>and it's still uncrackable. It is. And the reason why

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<v Speaker 1>it's uncrackable it is because you each have, like you said,

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<v Speaker 1>you each have a copy of this this code. But

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<v Speaker 1>it's randomly generated. Right, So let's say, um, you have

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<v Speaker 1>the sheet of paper and the other person has a

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<v Speaker 1>sheet of paper, and the sheet of paper says, it's

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<v Speaker 1>just like strings of random numbers, like four or five

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<v Speaker 1>numbers long, and it's just totally random and it just covers,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, several sheets of paper. Well, you guys start

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<v Speaker 1>at the same place, and when person transmitting the message

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<v Speaker 1>wants to encrypt it, they run their message. So say

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<v Speaker 1>you guys have agreed like zero is a, B is one,

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<v Speaker 1>C is two, etcetera. So you'd take that and you'd you,

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<v Speaker 1>I know, dude, is mind boggling. Like this is about

0:14:19.960 --> 0:14:23.360
<v Speaker 1>as simple as cryptology gets. And it makes me bleed

0:14:23.480 --> 0:14:24.960
<v Speaker 1>for my ears because all you have to do is

0:14:25.000 --> 0:14:28.400
<v Speaker 1>agree on what's what. You know, it could be anything, right,

0:14:28.520 --> 0:14:31.440
<v Speaker 1>So you're agreeing on what's what, But um, you also

0:14:31.600 --> 0:14:36.360
<v Speaker 1>have this randomly generated code key, right. So um, let's

0:14:36.400 --> 0:14:40.120
<v Speaker 1>say I want to say, what up, chuck. Let's W

0:14:40.560 --> 0:14:44.360
<v Speaker 1>H A T U P C h U c K.

0:14:45.200 --> 0:14:48.200
<v Speaker 1>So that's eleven letters, right. So if you have your

0:14:48.640 --> 0:14:53.320
<v Speaker 1>your key and you're encoding it, you would use these first,

0:14:53.720 --> 0:14:58.840
<v Speaker 1>the first eleven numbers to encode what's already encoded. So

0:14:59.280 --> 0:15:08.160
<v Speaker 1>the W who is say, says it's the number twenty two, right,

0:15:08.280 --> 0:15:10.720
<v Speaker 1>and then so on. So like there's a number assigned

0:15:10.760 --> 0:15:13.640
<v Speaker 1>to each letter, so you have that, and then you

0:15:13.800 --> 0:15:17.600
<v Speaker 1>run it through this code, this randomly generated code. So

0:15:17.760 --> 0:15:22.080
<v Speaker 1>you add that and then so you have, um, what

0:15:22.200 --> 0:15:25.560
<v Speaker 1>I say, twenty two and then um say, the first

0:15:25.720 --> 0:15:28.280
<v Speaker 1>letter or the first number of this code is seven,

0:15:28.680 --> 0:15:31.360
<v Speaker 1>so you have twenty nine. So that's what the little

0:15:31.440 --> 0:15:39.800
<v Speaker 1>German girl reads on the air two eighteen. It means

0:15:40.200 --> 0:15:43.280
<v Speaker 1>nothing to anyone else in the entire world except for

0:15:43.360 --> 0:15:47.360
<v Speaker 1>you and the person who has the other copy of

0:15:47.480 --> 0:15:50.920
<v Speaker 1>this code, since there's only two copies and you're only

0:15:51.040 --> 0:15:53.240
<v Speaker 1>using it once and you're gonna eat it afterwards. Yeah,

0:15:53.680 --> 0:15:59.120
<v Speaker 1>and the key is that it's randomly generated numbers. Then

0:15:59.720 --> 0:16:02.800
<v Speaker 1>it'll it's theoretically it will never be broken. Yeah, but

0:16:02.960 --> 0:16:06.600
<v Speaker 1>I mean that's just one example. You could You could

0:16:06.640 --> 0:16:13.720
<v Speaker 1>have five pre code rules to confuse someone trying to

0:16:13.760 --> 0:16:16.840
<v Speaker 1>crack this code. Yeah, and they don't even It's not

0:16:17.040 --> 0:16:20.000
<v Speaker 1>like the simplest code is this letter represents this number,

0:16:20.320 --> 0:16:23.400
<v Speaker 1>this number represents this letter. It gets more complex than that.

0:16:23.760 --> 0:16:27.320
<v Speaker 1>You could both have agreed upon a book you have

0:16:27.440 --> 0:16:29.760
<v Speaker 1>to kill a mockingbird. I've got to kill a mockingbird

0:16:30.800 --> 0:16:36.840
<v Speaker 1>for eight twelve thirteen four means go to page fourteen

0:16:36.960 --> 0:16:40.200
<v Speaker 1>means now you're really going to page thirteen, Ignore four,

0:16:40.880 --> 0:16:43.120
<v Speaker 1>then look at the twelfth line. Then look at the

0:16:43.200 --> 0:16:46.200
<v Speaker 1>eighth word on that page. Right. What a what a

0:16:46.320 --> 0:16:49.200
<v Speaker 1>one time pad would do is take that already agreed

0:16:49.280 --> 0:16:52.960
<v Speaker 1>upon code and encrypt it even further. Yeah. But the

0:16:53.000 --> 0:16:55.200
<v Speaker 1>point is it doesn't have to represent letters. It can

0:16:55.320 --> 0:16:59.120
<v Speaker 1>represent full words in a text that you've agreed upon.

0:16:59.640 --> 0:17:02.520
<v Speaker 1>And it's basically like thumbing through this book picking out

0:17:02.560 --> 0:17:04.960
<v Speaker 1>all these various words to make a sentence. Right. The

0:17:05.080 --> 0:17:08.560
<v Speaker 1>problem is that's its vulnerability as well, like to to

0:17:08.760 --> 0:17:13.120
<v Speaker 1>get a copy of the randomly generated key that's used

0:17:13.160 --> 0:17:17.240
<v Speaker 1>to encrypt this message. Right, Um, you have to have

0:17:17.400 --> 0:17:20.919
<v Speaker 1>some sort of contact with somebody, So that's one vulnerability

0:17:21.000 --> 0:17:23.600
<v Speaker 1>of it. The thing is is like, depending on how

0:17:23.680 --> 0:17:27.200
<v Speaker 1>long this is, as many numbers as there are, um

0:17:28.080 --> 0:17:32.520
<v Speaker 1>is as long as as many transmissions as you can transmit.

0:17:33.040 --> 0:17:37.440
<v Speaker 1>Does that make any sense? So so I said, what up, chuck,

0:17:37.920 --> 0:17:41.760
<v Speaker 1>that's eleven. That uses the first eleven numbers on this key.

0:17:42.200 --> 0:17:45.000
<v Speaker 1>But say there's fifty thou numbers on the key, Well,

0:17:45.040 --> 0:17:47.200
<v Speaker 1>we have a lot more messages we I can send

0:17:47.280 --> 0:17:51.240
<v Speaker 1>to you that that we're going through the pad. Eventually though,

0:17:51.880 --> 0:17:53.720
<v Speaker 1>we're going to use up this pad and we need

0:17:53.800 --> 0:17:55.920
<v Speaker 1>to meet again, so I can give you another randomly

0:17:55.960 --> 0:18:01.080
<v Speaker 1>generated key. That's the vulnerability of it. Well, the other

0:18:02.400 --> 0:18:03.720
<v Speaker 1>well and not a fail safe. But the thing it

0:18:03.760 --> 0:18:05.800
<v Speaker 1>makes it even safer is a lot of times they

0:18:05.840 --> 0:18:10.240
<v Speaker 1>would send and presumably are still sending dummy messages, so

0:18:10.359 --> 0:18:12.159
<v Speaker 1>you don't even know if it's real to begin with.

0:18:12.680 --> 0:18:15.760
<v Speaker 1>And there are only so many person hours you can

0:18:15.840 --> 0:18:19.959
<v Speaker 1>dedicate as a government to code crackers, and they might

0:18:20.040 --> 0:18:22.440
<v Speaker 1>be working on a code that's not even real. You

0:18:22.480 --> 0:18:26.080
<v Speaker 1>don't know what transmissions are are legit and that that

0:18:26.560 --> 0:18:29.360
<v Speaker 1>is a proposal by a group called ENIGMA. And we'll

0:18:29.400 --> 0:18:32.439
<v Speaker 1>talk about Enigma right after this message because they're pretty awesome.

0:18:35.720 --> 0:18:39.679
<v Speaker 1>So Chuck Um, we were talking about Enigma. I mentioned Enigma,

0:18:39.840 --> 0:18:45.480
<v Speaker 1>and ENIGMA is this group that of basically amateur radio people,

0:18:46.080 --> 0:18:51.040
<v Speaker 1>shortwave radio enthusiast. They really get into this. UM it's

0:18:51.080 --> 0:18:54.440
<v Speaker 1>a thing and they started This is pre pre internet days.

0:18:54.960 --> 0:18:57.280
<v Speaker 1>I think it was in the eighties, the late eighties

0:18:57.320 --> 0:19:00.639
<v Speaker 1>early nineties that ENIGMA first came around and kind of

0:19:00.960 --> 0:19:05.200
<v Speaker 1>coalesced an. ENIGMA stands for European Numbers Information Gathering and

0:19:05.320 --> 0:19:08.440
<v Speaker 1>Monitoring Association, and basically it was just a group of

0:19:08.600 --> 0:19:11.320
<v Speaker 1>these people who had all the spell enigma, yeah right,

0:19:11.560 --> 0:19:15.000
<v Speaker 1>who had all and I think they reverse engineer UM.

0:19:15.240 --> 0:19:18.440
<v Speaker 1>But they had all kind of started to talk or

0:19:18.560 --> 0:19:22.040
<v Speaker 1>find each other and say have you heard this weird

0:19:22.160 --> 0:19:24.960
<v Speaker 1>transmission and they're like, yes, I've heard that one, and

0:19:25.080 --> 0:19:28.440
<v Speaker 1>you should. You should check out this frequency on Tuesday

0:19:28.560 --> 0:19:32.400
<v Speaker 1>nights at eight pm because it transmits this. And there

0:19:32.480 --> 0:19:35.600
<v Speaker 1>they suddenly realized there's this whole community of people out there.

0:19:35.840 --> 0:19:38.359
<v Speaker 1>So they set up a newsletter, they started in a

0:19:38.520 --> 0:19:43.119
<v Speaker 1>naming convention, and they started assigning, collecting, and assigning names

0:19:43.160 --> 0:19:47.280
<v Speaker 1>to these different things. So like uh E designated a

0:19:47.640 --> 0:19:52.320
<v Speaker 1>an English speaking trans numbers station, um S was Slavic

0:19:52.520 --> 0:19:56.000
<v Speaker 1>v is various, which incumbani encapsulates everything from like French

0:19:56.160 --> 0:20:01.040
<v Speaker 1>to Spanish. And Enigma really took this thing and put

0:20:01.119 --> 0:20:07.280
<v Speaker 1>it into understandable terms. And they are basically eavesdropping where

0:20:07.320 --> 0:20:11.480
<v Speaker 1>they were eavesdropping on the spy community. Are they not

0:20:11.560 --> 0:20:14.239
<v Speaker 1>doing that anymore? So? Enigma disbanded I think in two

0:20:14.320 --> 0:20:17.320
<v Speaker 1>thousand and then almost immediately another group came and said, well,

0:20:17.320 --> 0:20:19.200
<v Speaker 1>we're Enigma two thousand. We're going to carry this on.

0:20:19.800 --> 0:20:22.800
<v Speaker 1>And that's pretty fortunate because they were around to um

0:20:23.040 --> 0:20:25.560
<v Speaker 1>put all this on the internet. Before it was like

0:20:25.680 --> 0:20:28.440
<v Speaker 1>you had to like subscribe to newsletters and have a

0:20:28.520 --> 0:20:30.639
<v Speaker 1>short wave radio. Now it's like you can just go

0:20:30.760 --> 0:20:33.880
<v Speaker 1>on the internet and and um listen to all sorts

0:20:33.920 --> 0:20:38.160
<v Speaker 1>of archives of these defunct UM number stations as well. Yeah,

0:20:38.240 --> 0:20:40.600
<v Speaker 1>I mean they're creepy sounding. I don't like it's kind

0:20:40.600 --> 0:20:42.960
<v Speaker 1>of cool. I've got one for you. We've talked about

0:20:43.000 --> 0:20:46.200
<v Speaker 1>it before. Do you remember the Yosemite SAM transmission. Yeah,

0:20:46.240 --> 0:20:49.800
<v Speaker 1>I'm convinced that that's just a person having fun. Well,

0:20:49.880 --> 0:21:00.159
<v Speaker 1>let's play it. I like that one. I think it's

0:21:00.200 --> 0:21:06.200
<v Speaker 1>full of info. It's cool. It's coming from somewhere out

0:21:06.720 --> 0:21:11.000
<v Speaker 1>in Albuquerque in the desert in New Mexico, and it's

0:21:11.040 --> 0:21:15.080
<v Speaker 1>been going since what like two thousand four and um

0:21:15.359 --> 0:21:18.119
<v Speaker 1>what makes this one interesting is that it's not a code.

0:21:18.840 --> 0:21:22.760
<v Speaker 1>It's just Yosemite Sam saying that thing. Well, then it's

0:21:22.760 --> 0:21:25.480
<v Speaker 1>followed by that data burst, which they think is some

0:21:25.600 --> 0:21:28.800
<v Speaker 1>sort of compressed information. Yeah. See, I don't believe it.

0:21:28.880 --> 0:21:30.960
<v Speaker 1>I think this is a short wave enthusiast having a

0:21:31.000 --> 0:21:34.959
<v Speaker 1>good time. Well, he's been doing it like, it's pretty sophisticated.

0:21:35.440 --> 0:21:37.080
<v Speaker 1>It does it like over and over again, I think

0:21:37.119 --> 0:21:39.359
<v Speaker 1>for forty seconds and switches to the next frequency and

0:21:39.440 --> 0:21:43.359
<v Speaker 1>it just goes through the band on a then he's

0:21:43.400 --> 0:21:46.320
<v Speaker 1>got a computer doing it for him. Maybe if it

0:21:46.440 --> 0:21:48.680
<v Speaker 1>is just some dude, But either way, I like the

0:21:48.800 --> 0:21:51.440
<v Speaker 1>use of you, Samity Sam. It's cool, but it's pretty

0:21:51.520 --> 0:21:56.159
<v Speaker 1>it's exemplar of um of it's a numbers station, of

0:21:56.240 --> 0:21:59.720
<v Speaker 1>a numbers transmission. There's something that indicates that this is

0:21:59.720 --> 0:22:03.800
<v Speaker 1>about to happen, and then there's the happening, the transmission

0:22:03.880 --> 0:22:07.280
<v Speaker 1>of the secret code. Whether it's digital in nature, or

0:22:07.280 --> 0:22:12.000
<v Speaker 1>whether it's spoken um, and then there it is ended

0:22:12.080 --> 0:22:14.960
<v Speaker 1>by you know, yossemity sam again or something like that.

0:22:15.720 --> 0:22:19.399
<v Speaker 1>It's saying, here's the beginning, here's the information, here's the end.

0:22:19.640 --> 0:22:23.280
<v Speaker 1>Now go kill Northburg. One of the other cool things

0:22:23.320 --> 0:22:26.119
<v Speaker 1>about this is and um, you know when we were

0:22:26.119 --> 0:22:29.560
<v Speaker 1>talking about truly there's better ways. And the government could

0:22:30.320 --> 0:22:35.240
<v Speaker 1>theoretically shut down the Internet, they could zapp satellite transmissions,

0:22:35.280 --> 0:22:39.040
<v Speaker 1>they could shut everything down. This is almost unstoppable. You

0:22:39.080 --> 0:22:42.480
<v Speaker 1>can't shut down short wave radio. I mean, I guess

0:22:42.520 --> 0:22:45.560
<v Speaker 1>you cut power maybe yeah, well no, suppose you know,

0:22:46.280 --> 0:22:49.520
<v Speaker 1>I mean yeah, and then I guess if people have

0:22:49.640 --> 0:22:52.960
<v Speaker 1>batteries though in their shortwave radio. Good point. The one

0:22:53.000 --> 0:22:56.560
<v Speaker 1>way to combat it is called jamming frequency jamming, and

0:22:56.680 --> 0:23:01.040
<v Speaker 1>basically it's just broadcasting on the same frequency that these

0:23:01.320 --> 0:23:05.240
<v Speaker 1>these other transmitters, the numbers stations are transmitting on. And

0:23:05.400 --> 0:23:08.879
<v Speaker 1>so if you're broadcasting within your country, you're probably going

0:23:08.960 --> 0:23:11.840
<v Speaker 1>to reach those. Shortwave radio is better than somebody on

0:23:11.920 --> 0:23:14.720
<v Speaker 1>the other side of the planet's transmission well, and so

0:23:15.600 --> 0:23:19.320
<v Speaker 1>apparently Russia spent billions or the Soviets spent billions of

0:23:19.400 --> 0:23:23.480
<v Speaker 1>dollars during the Cold War jamming frequencies from all sorts

0:23:23.520 --> 0:23:27.359
<v Speaker 1>of different transmissions, um, and they play things like the

0:23:27.440 --> 0:23:30.800
<v Speaker 1>sound of seagulls or random beeps or whatever. And it

0:23:30.960 --> 0:23:35.920
<v Speaker 1>was just to prevent people from transmitting into Russia. But

0:23:36.040 --> 0:23:39.480
<v Speaker 1>even with all of that money and technology mustard or

0:23:39.520 --> 0:23:43.440
<v Speaker 1>marshaled against it, they still weren't entirely successful. Like shortwave

0:23:43.520 --> 0:23:48.040
<v Speaker 1>radio transmissions get through. It's just too big to fight. Yeah,

0:23:48.160 --> 0:23:51.800
<v Speaker 1>you can't jam the entire frequency of all short waves,

0:23:52.280 --> 0:23:56.120
<v Speaker 1>like every single frequency. Um. If you have ever heard

0:23:56.200 --> 0:24:02.879
<v Speaker 1>the the Wilco remember Yankee Hotel Foxtrot that album that

0:24:03.160 --> 0:24:05.400
<v Speaker 1>was on the album at some point, I can't remember

0:24:05.400 --> 0:24:09.760
<v Speaker 1>which song it Yankee Hotel Foxtrot in a woman's voice

0:24:09.800 --> 0:24:13.160
<v Speaker 1>and that is a famous uh code. Was that from

0:24:13.200 --> 0:24:16.359
<v Speaker 1>the Content project? No, I don't think so, but we

0:24:16.400 --> 0:24:19.879
<v Speaker 1>should talk about that. For sure. That was a project.

0:24:19.960 --> 0:24:23.120
<v Speaker 1>And it was also I guess and the the wild

0:24:23.160 --> 0:24:25.359
<v Speaker 1>West days where you're talking about pre internet. If people

0:24:25.400 --> 0:24:27.920
<v Speaker 1>wanted to hear the stuff, some people got together and

0:24:28.040 --> 0:24:34.280
<v Speaker 1>put together a greatest it's sort of on CD with

0:24:34.400 --> 0:24:36.680
<v Speaker 1>a lot of accompanying material about what you're listening to,

0:24:36.920 --> 0:24:40.119
<v Speaker 1>and um, none of them obviously you can't break these codes.

0:24:40.520 --> 0:24:42.400
<v Speaker 1>That's the thing I find interesting is people sit around

0:24:42.440 --> 0:24:46.320
<v Speaker 1>listen to this stuff, but with no aim of cracking

0:24:46.359 --> 0:24:49.400
<v Speaker 1>the code. I think some people do attempt to crack

0:24:49.480 --> 0:24:52.159
<v Speaker 1>the code and it's impossible. Well, it's not impossible, and

0:24:52.280 --> 0:24:54.280
<v Speaker 1>we should say that with the reason why it's not

0:24:54.359 --> 0:24:57.760
<v Speaker 1>impossible is because if you're using a computer generated random number,

0:24:58.600 --> 0:25:01.960
<v Speaker 1>computer is not capable of truly of generating a truly

0:25:02.080 --> 0:25:06.000
<v Speaker 1>random number because computers run on algorithms, and algorithms are

0:25:06.080 --> 0:25:09.080
<v Speaker 1>designed to follow patterns, so they're just incapable of it.

0:25:09.480 --> 0:25:14.679
<v Speaker 1>So you could, especially today, a hacker could conceivably crack

0:25:15.040 --> 0:25:18.600
<v Speaker 1>one of these, especially old transmissions. But but you still

0:25:18.680 --> 0:25:21.840
<v Speaker 1>don't know what those numbers stand for. Even if you

0:25:21.920 --> 0:25:24.720
<v Speaker 1>find a pattern of numbers, right, there's still an agreed

0:25:24.800 --> 0:25:26.480
<v Speaker 1>upon thing that you would have to figure out, but

0:25:26.560 --> 0:25:30.840
<v Speaker 1>it would it makes it possible if you could crack

0:25:30.960 --> 0:25:34.080
<v Speaker 1>that one time pad key, then you have a real

0:25:34.240 --> 0:25:39.040
<v Speaker 1>chance at the deciphering the message itself. Well, yeah, if

0:25:39.080 --> 0:25:41.679
<v Speaker 1>you know what they stand for. But I still maintain

0:25:41.760 --> 0:25:46.240
<v Speaker 1>if only you and I know what those numbers represent,

0:25:46.960 --> 0:25:51.520
<v Speaker 1>to kill a mockingbird pages, Yeah exactly. Uh, well, you

0:25:51.600 --> 0:25:54.600
<v Speaker 1>were saying the Content Project thing. So it's a four

0:25:54.720 --> 0:25:58.840
<v Speaker 1>CD compilation and apparently I read an article from the

0:25:58.920 --> 0:26:01.000
<v Speaker 1>time when it came out, which is the nineties, and

0:26:01.000 --> 0:26:03.719
<v Speaker 1>it was like perfect timing because there was why two

0:26:03.840 --> 0:26:07.280
<v Speaker 1>K going on, there was Millennium angst, there was the

0:26:07.520 --> 0:26:12.080
<v Speaker 1>X Files, and this thing came out and Salon wrote

0:26:12.080 --> 0:26:14.440
<v Speaker 1>an article on it, and this guy who wrote it

0:26:14.600 --> 0:26:19.600
<v Speaker 1>was like a music concrete aficionada. So people appreciated it,

0:26:19.760 --> 0:26:22.520
<v Speaker 1>not just for the fact that it's like recordings of

0:26:22.640 --> 0:26:27.119
<v Speaker 1>real live um spy transmissions, but some people like the

0:26:27.359 --> 0:26:31.200
<v Speaker 1>kind of avant garde noise that it had going on

0:26:31.359 --> 0:26:36.199
<v Speaker 1>to And the Flaming Lips are currently planning an album

0:26:36.320 --> 0:26:43.879
<v Speaker 1>composed if nothing but Messages from Number Stations Number eight. Uh,

0:26:44.160 --> 0:26:47.320
<v Speaker 1>there's a movie that exists that I had never heard of,

0:26:47.760 --> 0:26:51.080
<v Speaker 1>called The Number Station. I hadn't heard of it either. Yeah,

0:26:51.119 --> 0:26:54.480
<v Speaker 1>I don't think it was released really. It said of

0:26:54.640 --> 0:26:57.680
<v Speaker 1>from two thousand thirteen, and like I know, most movies

0:26:57.720 --> 0:26:59.399
<v Speaker 1>that are released, it's it's it probably went straight to

0:26:59.520 --> 0:27:02.119
<v Speaker 1>video or some Then I watched the trailer to day

0:27:02.119 --> 0:27:07.200
<v Speaker 1>it's John cusack and uh Melin Ackerman, and you know

0:27:07.359 --> 0:27:10.159
<v Speaker 1>they work at a number station and he's to protect

0:27:10.200 --> 0:27:14.040
<v Speaker 1>the number station, but something bad happens and they're compromised,

0:27:14.480 --> 0:27:16.399
<v Speaker 1>and is who who he says he is? And is

0:27:16.520 --> 0:27:19.920
<v Speaker 1>she who she says she is? Who knows? You'll have

0:27:20.000 --> 0:27:24.879
<v Speaker 1>to that turkey to find out. Didn't look bad? Yeah,

0:27:25.920 --> 0:27:31.640
<v Speaker 1>sure it looked pretty bad. Sorry, John Cusack, Sorry John Cusack.

0:27:31.960 --> 0:27:36.000
<v Speaker 1>So the I think one of the most interesting things

0:27:36.080 --> 0:27:40.520
<v Speaker 1>about UM numbers stations is that, like you said, they

0:27:40.680 --> 0:27:44.360
<v Speaker 1>peaked during the Cold War right when the Berlin Wall fell,

0:27:44.440 --> 0:27:47.240
<v Speaker 1>and then in a few years after that the number

0:27:47.280 --> 0:27:50.679
<v Speaker 1>of transmissions supposedly just dropped off dramatically, although I did

0:27:50.760 --> 0:27:53.520
<v Speaker 1>see in at least one place that supposedly they increased,

0:27:53.560 --> 0:27:56.200
<v Speaker 1>but I didn't see that supported anywhere else. But the

0:27:56.320 --> 0:28:00.560
<v Speaker 1>idea that they're still around it all in two thousand fourteen,

0:28:00.760 --> 0:28:05.560
<v Speaker 1>that there are still numbers stations transmitting gibberish really says

0:28:05.600 --> 0:28:07.320
<v Speaker 1>a lot. So it says a couple of things, and

0:28:07.440 --> 0:28:10.680
<v Speaker 1>you've already mentioned one. It's possible they are just transmitting

0:28:10.680 --> 0:28:15.399
<v Speaker 1>gibberish to throw off anybody listening, UM, to basically just

0:28:15.520 --> 0:28:22.760
<v Speaker 1>kind of sap their resources, like keep them Ruski is busy. Um.

0:28:23.040 --> 0:28:25.720
<v Speaker 1>Another one is that they're keeping them going in case

0:28:25.880 --> 0:28:29.240
<v Speaker 1>they need to use them again. I think that's totally

0:28:29.280 --> 0:28:32.920
<v Speaker 1>the reason, in which case that's pretty smart, because that's

0:28:32.960 --> 0:28:35.520
<v Speaker 1>just you're not showing your hand, like where all of

0:28:35.560 --> 0:28:40.320
<v Speaker 1>a sudden u uh an inactive radio station suddenly starts

0:28:40.400 --> 0:28:43.240
<v Speaker 1>up again ind case activity and it's been doing the

0:28:43.320 --> 0:28:48.040
<v Speaker 1>same thing for ten years, and on year seven it

0:28:48.120 --> 0:28:51.480
<v Speaker 1>actually transmitted a real secret message, but it seemed just

0:28:51.680 --> 0:28:54.800
<v Speaker 1>like the everything else in those ten years. You're doing

0:28:54.840 --> 0:28:57.320
<v Speaker 1>some pretty good spycraft there, yeah, Or just to keep

0:28:57.400 --> 0:28:59.520
<v Speaker 1>that UM like you may not be actively using it,

0:28:59.600 --> 0:29:05.040
<v Speaker 1>but just to keep that um A method relevant. Like

0:29:05.280 --> 0:29:07.920
<v Speaker 1>you know, if you quit doing something, it's gonna die off.

0:29:08.000 --> 0:29:10.200
<v Speaker 1>No one's gonna know how to do it anymore. So

0:29:10.480 --> 0:29:14.080
<v Speaker 1>that you know, just keep those people working. And you

0:29:14.160 --> 0:29:16.720
<v Speaker 1>know they may may not even know if they're transmitting

0:29:16.840 --> 0:29:19.440
<v Speaker 1>real messages or not. I would guess if you're just

0:29:19.600 --> 0:29:21.720
<v Speaker 1>saying oh yeah, yeah, if you're just saying a a

0:29:21.760 --> 0:29:24.480
<v Speaker 1>sheet of paper and it's just yeah, in fact, that

0:29:24.560 --> 0:29:27.720
<v Speaker 1>maybe a pretty safe way to do things. It's like

0:29:27.840 --> 0:29:32.960
<v Speaker 1>the person with the nuclear key just a test. Who

0:29:33.080 --> 0:29:37.280
<v Speaker 1>knows gas we'll find out in UM. There are also

0:29:37.360 --> 0:29:39.680
<v Speaker 1>other theories that they are and I think some of

0:29:39.760 --> 0:29:44.400
<v Speaker 1>this does go on. Um, maybe drug runners using stuff

0:29:44.440 --> 0:29:46.600
<v Speaker 1>like this because some of them are less than professional.

0:29:47.600 --> 0:29:51.600
<v Speaker 1>Apparently the ones from Cuba or Cuba sorry Jerry, are

0:29:51.640 --> 0:29:56.200
<v Speaker 1>a little um uh comical. Well, they were renowned for

0:29:56.360 --> 0:29:59.200
<v Speaker 1>just having really bad slip ups, especially during the whole war,

0:29:59.400 --> 0:30:01.880
<v Speaker 1>like you'd hear people talking and laughing in the background,

0:30:02.080 --> 0:30:07.120
<v Speaker 1>or an accidental transmission of a radio station radio Havan

0:30:07.200 --> 0:30:09.120
<v Speaker 1>all right, Yeah, so they were kind of known for

0:30:09.400 --> 0:30:11.520
<v Speaker 1>for not being too skilled at it. But I imagine

0:30:11.520 --> 0:30:14.280
<v Speaker 1>the drug runners are the same. Yeah, it's virtually the

0:30:14.360 --> 0:30:16.880
<v Speaker 1>same thing. And I mean there's absolutely no reason why

0:30:17.120 --> 0:30:21.960
<v Speaker 1>drug runners couldn't have also couldn't also use this, Yeah,

0:30:22.320 --> 0:30:27.160
<v Speaker 1>alongside the espionage community too. Yeah, there's might be a

0:30:27.360 --> 0:30:30.200
<v Speaker 1>IS one, b IS two and they get the message

0:30:30.200 --> 0:30:33.719
<v Speaker 1>says chipment of Kilo's coming in Miami Beach tomorrow night. Right,

0:30:33.800 --> 0:30:40.400
<v Speaker 1>let's go get them kill one. I'm one, uh, But

0:30:40.520 --> 0:30:42.320
<v Speaker 1>I do think there may be a little bit of that.

0:30:42.400 --> 0:30:45.080
<v Speaker 1>I think it's a mixed bag of why they're still

0:30:45.120 --> 0:30:48.160
<v Speaker 1>being broadcast. I think there are enthusiasts that are probably

0:30:48.520 --> 0:30:52.680
<v Speaker 1>just doing their own thing for fun. Yeah, that'd be fun. Man,

0:30:53.000 --> 0:30:56.120
<v Speaker 1>if I was in in Guam and I could send

0:30:56.160 --> 0:30:58.600
<v Speaker 1>you a private message to be a short wave Oh yeah, yeah, yeah,

0:30:58.640 --> 0:31:00.280
<v Speaker 1>I thought you meant people who are just doing it,

0:31:00.360 --> 0:31:03.000
<v Speaker 1>just a mess with like the Enigma community or something.

0:31:03.000 --> 0:31:04.640
<v Speaker 1>I think that probably happens to I bet you it's

0:31:04.640 --> 0:31:07.120
<v Speaker 1>all kinds of things. Yeah, I'm sure you're right. Um,

0:31:07.240 --> 0:31:09.040
<v Speaker 1>there's one guy out there. And trust me, there have

0:31:09.280 --> 0:31:13.560
<v Speaker 1>been some some actual spies who have been busted in

0:31:13.720 --> 0:31:18.960
<v Speaker 1>this century, long after the Cold War, who had shortwave

0:31:19.360 --> 0:31:25.240
<v Speaker 1>radios and one time pads in their apartments or houses. Apparently,

0:31:25.640 --> 0:31:29.440
<v Speaker 1>in two thousand eleven in Germany, a couple who lived

0:31:29.440 --> 0:31:33.920
<v Speaker 1>there since and we're spying for the Russians were caught

0:31:34.440 --> 0:31:39.160
<v Speaker 1>in the act of receiving a numbers transmission in their

0:31:39.240 --> 0:31:42.480
<v Speaker 1>home when they were apprehended and busted for spying. I

0:31:42.520 --> 0:31:45.160
<v Speaker 1>can see that scene. He's got like one headphone up

0:31:45.240 --> 0:31:47.120
<v Speaker 1>and he's holding out with his hand and he's writing

0:31:47.200 --> 0:31:49.680
<v Speaker 1>something down in pencil and his wife's trying to eat

0:31:49.720 --> 0:31:55.360
<v Speaker 1>it really quick spit out. And in two thousand one

0:31:55.440 --> 0:31:57.880
<v Speaker 1>and A. Mantz worked for the U. S Civil Defension

0:31:58.160 --> 0:32:01.840
<v Speaker 1>Intelligence Agency and she was convicted of spying for Cuba.

0:32:02.600 --> 0:32:04.640
<v Speaker 1>And when they searched her home they found a short

0:32:04.680 --> 0:32:08.360
<v Speaker 1>wave radio and a code sheet and um, so yeah,

0:32:08.440 --> 0:32:11.120
<v Speaker 1>I mean that's it's still going on. Man, I think

0:32:11.120 --> 0:32:13.720
<v Speaker 1>it's pretty neat. Yeah, I do too, Like it's old

0:32:13.760 --> 0:32:21.640
<v Speaker 1>school but almost fool proof. Yeah. The big vulnerabilities getting

0:32:21.680 --> 0:32:26.120
<v Speaker 1>the random randomly generated key to the spy. Yeah. And

0:32:26.160 --> 0:32:28.120
<v Speaker 1>they also point out in the article who wrote this one?

0:32:28.120 --> 0:32:32.760
<v Speaker 1>By the way, uh Nathan Chandler. Um. Nathan points out

0:32:32.800 --> 0:32:36.440
<v Speaker 1>that these days, you're likely um, you're one timer might

0:32:36.480 --> 0:32:40.480
<v Speaker 1>be sent to you, maybe digitally somehow, but it's not

0:32:40.640 --> 0:32:45.000
<v Speaker 1>It doesn't like tip anyone off necessarily. Yeah, but not

0:32:45.120 --> 0:32:48.280
<v Speaker 1>quite sure how. Yeah, I would think if you're being watched,

0:32:48.800 --> 0:32:52.440
<v Speaker 1>then an email with a lot of random numbers might differ. Well,

0:32:52.480 --> 0:32:54.240
<v Speaker 1>it used to be they print them on that the

0:32:54.400 --> 0:32:56.880
<v Speaker 1>kind of paper that like dissolved quickly or burned and

0:32:57.000 --> 0:32:59.760
<v Speaker 1>left no ash or whatever. They were on such tiny

0:32:59.800 --> 0:33:03.520
<v Speaker 1>paper you had to use a really good magnifying like

0:33:03.800 --> 0:33:06.360
<v Speaker 1>lens to read it, and you could hide them in

0:33:06.440 --> 0:33:09.240
<v Speaker 1>like a walnut shell or something like that. Wow. Who

0:33:09.320 --> 0:33:12.960
<v Speaker 1>knows what they're doing now? Yeah, but they are doing something. Yeah,

0:33:13.480 --> 0:33:16.240
<v Speaker 1>I'd like to Uh. I thought about getting a short

0:33:16.440 --> 0:33:18.760
<v Speaker 1>I was a little bit inspired but then I thought,

0:33:18.800 --> 0:33:20.440
<v Speaker 1>oh man, I've got so many other things to do.

0:33:21.120 --> 0:33:22.760
<v Speaker 1>I don't know if I could do fall into that

0:33:22.920 --> 0:33:26.920
<v Speaker 1>rabbit hole. So that's numbers stations. If that piqued your interest,

0:33:27.200 --> 0:33:30.280
<v Speaker 1>just type in numbers stations into your favorite search engine

0:33:30.320 --> 0:33:32.920
<v Speaker 1>and it will lead you down the rabbit hole of

0:33:33.160 --> 0:33:35.560
<v Speaker 1>shortwave radio. Did you say rabbit holes? That where I

0:33:35.600 --> 0:33:38.440
<v Speaker 1>got that from? I said rabbit hole, But I didn't

0:33:38.600 --> 0:33:41.200
<v Speaker 1>invent it, no, I know, but it just popped up

0:33:41.240 --> 0:33:43.520
<v Speaker 1>in my head and it wasn't my own invention. And

0:33:43.600 --> 0:33:45.120
<v Speaker 1>I think if you have a short wave radio, you

0:33:45.200 --> 0:33:47.920
<v Speaker 1>probably tune into these anyway because you're just into that lifestyle.

0:33:48.040 --> 0:33:51.000
<v Speaker 1>But I think there's a website called spy numbers where

0:33:51.000 --> 0:33:53.479
<v Speaker 1>you can actually find the frequencies and just go right

0:33:53.520 --> 0:33:55.840
<v Speaker 1>there and you don't want to search for them. And

0:33:56.160 --> 0:33:58.400
<v Speaker 1>if you want to read this article, you can type

0:33:58.480 --> 0:34:02.040
<v Speaker 1>the words numbers station in the search part How stuff

0:34:02.080 --> 0:34:04.880
<v Speaker 1>works dot com. And since I said search parts, time

0:34:04.920 --> 0:34:09.239
<v Speaker 1>for listener mayo. I'm gonna call this a bit on

0:34:09.440 --> 0:34:13.480
<v Speaker 1>sushi um from someone in Japan. Hey, guys, and Jerry.

0:34:13.840 --> 0:34:16.799
<v Speaker 1>He expelled Jerry right as well. Man, it's Jerry's day.

0:34:17.360 --> 0:34:19.200
<v Speaker 1>I enjoyed the sushi episode quite a bit and have

0:34:19.320 --> 0:34:22.600
<v Speaker 1>something to add. As a result of modern food production

0:34:22.640 --> 0:34:24.440
<v Speaker 1>following World War Two in Japan and of course the

0:34:24.560 --> 0:34:27.840
<v Speaker 1>U S and elsewhere, the quality and traditional methods of

0:34:28.000 --> 0:34:31.640
<v Speaker 1>making Show You Miso and other Japanese food items sadly plummeted.

0:34:32.160 --> 0:34:35.000
<v Speaker 1>For example, miso can be fermented an aged a matter

0:34:35.080 --> 0:34:38.040
<v Speaker 1>of weeks with the use of temperature control tanks, where

0:34:38.120 --> 0:34:42.439
<v Speaker 1>traditional dark miso would age up to two years. Same

0:34:42.520 --> 0:34:46.320
<v Speaker 1>goes with other fermented products like Show You Mirren. No

0:34:46.480 --> 0:34:48.919
<v Speaker 1>longer at sweet rice cooking wine is practically sugar water.

0:34:49.440 --> 0:34:52.040
<v Speaker 1>Speaking of sugar, modern Japanese food wouldn't exist without it.

0:34:52.719 --> 0:34:57.760
<v Speaker 1>Uh Bumi boshi, the sour salty pickled plum is lousy

0:34:57.880 --> 0:35:00.680
<v Speaker 1>with artificial color, sugar and refined salt. They're still good.

0:35:00.840 --> 0:35:03.400
<v Speaker 1>As much as I loved I love Japanese food and culture,

0:35:03.400 --> 0:35:06.839
<v Speaker 1>it's quite heartbreaking to see these centuries of traditional food

0:35:06.880 --> 0:35:10.280
<v Speaker 1>processing supplanted by the Japanese version of a Twinkie chemically

0:35:10.320 --> 0:35:13.000
<v Speaker 1>made in process as an alternative. There are good quality

0:35:13.080 --> 0:35:18.000
<v Speaker 1>Japanese products to be had, particularly those imported from eating foods,

0:35:18.680 --> 0:35:21.400
<v Speaker 1>just high quality, organic and widely distributed Is this the

0:35:21.480 --> 0:35:24.399
<v Speaker 1>president of Eating Food? I don't know. Are they based

0:35:24.440 --> 0:35:29.360
<v Speaker 1>in Alameda, California? It sounds like yeah, uh, that is

0:35:29.400 --> 0:35:32.359
<v Speaker 1>from Lear in Alameda, California. UM. I meant to mention

0:35:32.440 --> 0:35:34.279
<v Speaker 1>that you. I had the worst sushi I've had in

0:35:34.360 --> 0:35:37.840
<v Speaker 1>my life the other day. I'm not gonna say it,

0:35:38.160 --> 0:35:40.640
<v Speaker 1>but I'm not going back. I'll tell you off air.

0:35:41.600 --> 0:35:43.239
<v Speaker 1>I don't think you wouldn't go there anyway, but um,

0:35:44.200 --> 0:35:50.200
<v Speaker 1>it was. The rice was gummy and really gummy to

0:35:50.360 --> 0:35:52.920
<v Speaker 1>the point where I ate it just because I was starving,

0:35:53.280 --> 0:35:55.600
<v Speaker 1>and I ate it really fast, and I was like, oh,

0:35:55.680 --> 0:35:57.359
<v Speaker 1>this kind of gummy. And then afterward I was like, man,

0:35:57.680 --> 0:36:01.040
<v Speaker 1>that was terrible. Yeah, did you say that to yourself?

0:36:01.120 --> 0:36:03.719
<v Speaker 1>And like you smiled in there? Your whole mouth was

0:36:03.920 --> 0:36:06.360
<v Speaker 1>coated and it was gross. Man, I was. I was

0:36:06.440 --> 0:36:08.960
<v Speaker 1>ticked off afterward after I paid the bill, uh and

0:36:09.160 --> 0:36:10.600
<v Speaker 1>complained the whole way home to Emily. I was like,

0:36:10.640 --> 0:36:13.560
<v Speaker 1>I really should have said something because that was like

0:36:13.760 --> 0:36:16.120
<v Speaker 1>they should have known, they shouldn't have served that rice. Well,

0:36:16.200 --> 0:36:18.400
<v Speaker 1>why didn't you say something? Because, like I said, I

0:36:18.480 --> 0:36:22.279
<v Speaker 1>just shoved it in my face hole and left and

0:36:22.400 --> 0:36:25.600
<v Speaker 1>complained afterwards, which is that's how I do things. Usually,

0:36:26.120 --> 0:36:27.480
<v Speaker 1>I don't like to make a scene. I just like

0:36:27.600 --> 0:36:32.359
<v Speaker 1>to play the martyr afterwards. I've talked about that gummy

0:36:32.400 --> 0:36:36.359
<v Speaker 1>sushi for two days. Yeah it was. Yeah, the fish

0:36:36.400 --> 0:36:38.840
<v Speaker 1>and stuff was good, but that rice was just very subar.

0:36:39.160 --> 0:36:41.680
<v Speaker 1>The should have known better. Well, tell me where it

0:36:41.760 --> 0:36:47.399
<v Speaker 1>is afterwards. Uh. If you want to, um, I guess

0:36:47.480 --> 0:36:55.160
<v Speaker 1>inadvertently or quietly clandestinely promote your business like Leard did

0:36:55.280 --> 0:36:59.800
<v Speaker 1>with his eating foods. Yeah. Um. You can tweet to

0:37:00.040 --> 0:37:02.440
<v Speaker 1>us at s y s K podcast. You can join

0:37:02.560 --> 0:37:04.759
<v Speaker 1>us on Facebook dot com, slash stuff you Should Know.

0:37:05.360 --> 0:37:09.200
<v Speaker 1>You can send us an email to stuff Podcast at

0:37:09.320 --> 0:37:12.120
<v Speaker 1>how stuff Works dot com, and as always, joined us

0:37:12.120 --> 0:37:14.279
<v Speaker 1>at our home on the web, Stuff you Should Know

0:37:14.520 --> 0:37:22.520
<v Speaker 1>dot com. For more on this and thousands of other topics,

0:37:22.800 --> 0:37:24.120
<v Speaker 1>is it how stuff Works dot com