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Speaker 1: Welcome to Stuff you should know from house Stuff Works

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Speaker 1: dot com. Hey, and welcome to the podcast. I'm Josh

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Speaker 1: Clark with Charles W. Chuck Bryant and this is oh

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Speaker 1: Jerry and this is sufficient eight. Can you say it

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Speaker 1: in German? You speak German? Don't even drive me? That's

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Speaker 1: why did I? Ah, Stephen? Now can you do that

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Speaker 1: in a little girl voice? No? You always make me

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Speaker 1: play st poly girl. I'm tired of it. Save Polly Girl. Now.

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Speaker 1: This is apparently even younger than the sat Polly Girl.

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Speaker 1: It's like a little girl and it was alive little

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Speaker 1: girl who in the Swedish rhapsody number station it was

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Speaker 1: a young a little girl reading out numbers and letters

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Speaker 1: in German, which makes it even creepier. This is a

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Speaker 1: very neat subject, so kudos to you for tossing this

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Speaker 1: one out there. Well, I've been waiting for it to publish.

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Speaker 1: I've seen it in the calendar coming up and coming up.

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Speaker 1: I'm like, come on and published. And I think it

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Speaker 1: published on Friday Tuesday, right out of the oven. And uh,

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Speaker 1: we're talking about it just as they are completing their decline,

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Speaker 1: so we are on top of this. Well, I think

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Speaker 1: that well, we'll get into it. I think that's what

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Speaker 1: makes it even more interesting is that it's still happening,

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Speaker 1: all right. Numbers stations. Numbers stations. Yeah, like you said,

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Speaker 1: number both words are a little clumsy, um, and number

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Speaker 1: of stations are. We should just come out and say

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Speaker 1: they're short wave radio transmissions or transmitters, making really weird

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Speaker 1: baffling is the best word for it. Transmissions and have

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Speaker 1: been doing so apparently since at least World War one.

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Speaker 1: Oh really, Yeah. Supposedly the first mention of a numbers station,

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Speaker 1: uh came from a German magazine. In World War One

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Speaker 1: and World War Two they were in full swing, sure,

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Speaker 1: but apparently they somehow popped up first round world War one,

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Speaker 1: which makes them some of the earliest short wave transmissions

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Speaker 1: in the world, because shortwave radio didn't come around, at

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Speaker 1: least into commercial use until about World War One. Was

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Speaker 1: a few years before that, if you'll remember correct. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: that's why I didn't even think that that was possible.

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Speaker 1: But like you said, world War two was when they

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Speaker 1: were full swing. They really peaked in the Cold War, um,

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Speaker 1: and they've been dying out slowly ever since. But I

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Speaker 1: think one of the neatest things is they are still

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Speaker 1: if you have a short wave radio, you can tune

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Speaker 1: into a frequency and here be one to seven eight.

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Speaker 1: You know, it's it's usually like some sort of tone

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Speaker 1: we should mention to Jerry of the future. Yeah, you're

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Speaker 1: supposed to leave that beep in because it's part of

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Speaker 1: the numbers stations. Yeah, we beat Jerry to signal when

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Speaker 1: we want something edited. But yeah, number station. It's not

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Speaker 1: always a beat, but will just have some sort of

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Speaker 1: Sometimes it's a bit of a song, yeah, like this

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Speaker 1: Swedish Rhapsody or the Lincolnshire Poacher of British English Ukish

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Speaker 1: folk song and uh. And the reason um that they

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Speaker 1: the transmission starts off with a tone or a beep

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Speaker 1: or a song is so you can it alerts like

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Speaker 1: here comes the transmission to in your station hone and

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Speaker 1: make sure you get some good reception because the secret

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Speaker 1: code is about to be revealed. And that's exactly what

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Speaker 1: everyone is pretty much in consensus on that what comes

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Speaker 1: after this and what is broadcast over these numbers stations

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Speaker 1: are secret codes. Yeah. Again for the Swedish Rhapsody station. Um,

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Speaker 1: it is a little girl in speaking in German, reading

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Speaker 1: numbers and letters random seemingly random numbers and letters, and

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Speaker 1: then the transmission is over and that happens like or

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Speaker 1: it used to happen. That's a defunct numbers station now,

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Speaker 1: but it happened on a fairly regular schedule. There's other ones.

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Speaker 1: The atension station is a woman saying attension and then

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Speaker 1: reading Spanish numbers and then repeating them over and over

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Speaker 1: again and then going on to the next set. And everybody.

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Speaker 1: No one can say for certain, but virtually everyone in

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Speaker 1: the world, from Cecil Adams that's straight dope to the

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Speaker 1: head of the UK's Trade and Industry Agency say these

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Speaker 1: are secret transmissions for spies. The whole basis of them

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Speaker 1: was for espionage. Yeah. And the reason why everyone is

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Speaker 1: speculating that that is absolutely the case, which almost certainly

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Speaker 1: it's like we said, is because no government to this

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Speaker 1: day has come forward and admitted this or own this.

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Speaker 1: It is all still technically speculation because you cannot point

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Speaker 1: to a factual statement. The closest we've ever come is

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Speaker 1: they finally got someone from the United Kingdom of spokesperson.

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Speaker 1: That was the dude from the Trade Agency the exact

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Speaker 1: quotas people should not be mystified by them they're not,

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Speaker 1: shall we say, for public consumption. Yeah, and that's the

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Speaker 1: only thing on record that any government has ever spoke

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Speaker 1: about what these transmissions are. Right, So, the the idea

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Speaker 1: that they are government transitions are the reason we have

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Speaker 1: to speculate, because the government has never claimed them. On

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Speaker 1: the flip side, the reason everyone thinks that they are

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Speaker 1: government backed claimed Stein transmissions is because these are pirate

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Speaker 1: radio frequencies, pirate radio transmitters. Yeah. My first thing was like,

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Speaker 1: just find one of these and look it up and

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Speaker 1: find out what the deal is. Yeah, you would think.

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Speaker 1: So they're totally unlicensed. Um, nobody knows exactly where they

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Speaker 1: are illegal. Technically, yes, they're very illegal because they transmit

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Speaker 1: over air traffic control frequencies. Um, well that's a big one.

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Speaker 1: And no one investigates them. There's no investigation into these

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Speaker 1: number stations whatsoever. So the fact that the government won't

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Speaker 1: say anything about them, and the fact that the government

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Speaker 1: isn't investigating these very blatantly out in the open um

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Speaker 1: weird baffling transmissions suggests that yeah, everybody's right that these

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Speaker 1: are government backed transmissions used to communicate anonymously and in

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Speaker 1: one direction. Two spies embedded in foreign countries. Yeah. I

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Speaker 1: was about to call it a conversation, but it's really not.

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Speaker 1: It's a it's um. I think on the BBC documents

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Speaker 1: all they called it a monologue. You're just sending a

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Speaker 1: one way message. Um, all right, Right after this break,

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Speaker 1: we're gonna talk a little bit about short wave radio technology.

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Speaker 1: The secret key to sending these messages after this break,

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Speaker 1: all right, The key to this whole thing is sending

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Speaker 1: a short way Like you might think in this day

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Speaker 1: and age, why not just send a telefax? No, that's

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Speaker 1: send an email or you know, there's surely, surely there

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Speaker 1: are safer ways to send espionage, this information, highly classified

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Speaker 1: instructions to go kill the leader of a country, perhaps, right,

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Speaker 1: like if you want to activate Reggie Jackson to kill

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Speaker 1: Queen Elizabeth kill Norberg. Yeah, that's that's how would you

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Speaker 1: do it in this day and age? You think an

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Speaker 1: email would do it? No, And you want to know

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Speaker 1: who proves definitively that that is not safe for secure? Um? Who?

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Speaker 1: J Edward Snowden? Yeah there there. Um. If you use

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Speaker 1: a computer, you leave a trace. It's virtually impossible to

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Speaker 1: erase anything on a computer. If you think you have,

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Speaker 1: then you haven't. Plus, if you are, say emailing somebody,

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Speaker 1: you're transmitting what's supposed to be highly sensitive even encrypted

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Speaker 1: information over a network. That stuff can be captured, Like

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Speaker 1: go listen to ours an employer. Is your employer spying

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Speaker 1: on new episode? You? You can't do it like you

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Speaker 1: You can communicate like that, but you're leaving digital traces everywhere.

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Speaker 1: The beauty of the short wave radio transmission is that again,

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Speaker 1: it's anonymous and it's one directional. But if you get

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Speaker 1: caught with a short wave radio at least say back

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Speaker 1: in the sixties or the M and D s or something, yeah,

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Speaker 1: it wasn't weird. It didn't prove that you were a spy.

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Speaker 1: Yeah you've done. Just tune an into my too, my stories.

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Speaker 1: Just listening to the BBC World Service. Uh, short wave

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Speaker 1: energy radio energy. It's all determined by the power of

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Speaker 1: your transmitter. So if you've got a humongous transmitter, you

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Speaker 1: can send and it didn't need to be that big,

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Speaker 1: but you can send a message when we message to

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Speaker 1: the other side of the world. And the reason it

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Speaker 1: can travel across the planet is because it's bouncing off

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Speaker 1: of it literally is bouncing off the ionosphere of the

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Speaker 1: Earth or of well, yeah, of the Earth, uh, fifty

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Speaker 1: to three seventy five miles up above our surface. It's

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Speaker 1: in the upper atmosphere, and solar ionization creates an electrical

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Speaker 1: charge and that charge reflects that signal right back down

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Speaker 1: to Earth. It's called skywave or skip and skywave. And

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Speaker 1: that's why you can with a seemingly pretty simple piece

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Speaker 1: of equipment, I can send a message to of the

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Speaker 1: South Pacific. Yeah, from my bedroom. Well, I don't know

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Speaker 1: if i'd have one big enough for my my bedrooms

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Speaker 1: pretty big. I wanted to see how big these things

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Speaker 1: were actually, you know, like if they say a really

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Speaker 1: big ones to send them further and further, Like how

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Speaker 1: big do they get? They get very huge. They can

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Speaker 1: cover scores of acres a big shortwave antenna um, which

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Speaker 1: is why I can get very expensive So that's bigger

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Speaker 1: than my bedroom. You can also use ones that are

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Speaker 1: the size of your bedroom. And it depends not only

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Speaker 1: like you said, on the size of the transmitter, it

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Speaker 1: depends on the atmospheric conditions to Supposually, shortwave transmissions are

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Speaker 1: received best at sunrise and sunset, and no one's sure,

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Speaker 1: but it has to do with the ion sphere, and

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Speaker 1: because that's where the northern lights are happening, that's where

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Speaker 1: solar rays hit the hit the Earth's atmosphere and they

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Speaker 1: the atoms loose their electrons I believe, so they become

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Speaker 1: ions forming the ionosphere. And because this is constantly changing, UM,

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Speaker 1: you can't predict exactly how a short wave radio wave

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Speaker 1: will act, but you can kind of guess, well, this

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Speaker 1: time the Sun's least active or most active, whatever, it

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Speaker 1: has some impact on that sky. What's it called the sky?

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Speaker 1: What the skywave effect? So you can communicate with somebody

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Speaker 1: in a foreign country, right, and not only can it

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Speaker 1: not be tracked, it's very difficult to trace who sent that,

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Speaker 1: where that transmission is coming from, it's impossible to trace

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Speaker 1: who's receiving it. So you have no idea who in

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Speaker 1: your country is getting this, which means that you're broadcasting

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Speaker 1: to anybody and everybody who feels like listening to this.

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Speaker 1: UM a secret code, but the fact is, if you

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Speaker 1: use the right kind of secret code, no one can

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Speaker 1: crack it all. Right. That brings up an important point

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Speaker 1: because you would think also you can hack into the

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Speaker 1: most secure computer system on the planet if you're good

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Speaker 1: enough as a hacker, So how in the world could

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Speaker 1: sending a coded key like it's nineteen fifty five and

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Speaker 1: you're trying to get your Dakota ring you know from

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Speaker 1: the Red was Red Rider? No, No, that's way off. No,

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Speaker 1: what was it? It was fy No? No, no, I'm

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Speaker 1: talking about it in the Christmas Story. Yeah, it was

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Speaker 1: a little orphan that was the show. Yeah, I didn't

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Speaker 1: think it was. He didn't. He didn't care about pirates

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Speaker 1: and all that jazz pirates and smugglers and all that.

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Speaker 1: He listened to a little or Fanny and little I'll

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Speaker 1: take a word for it. I remember, now do you know?

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Speaker 1: But I'll take your word for it. Dude, I'm telling

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Speaker 1: you it's a little or Fanny was my hat. I

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Speaker 1: don't have a hat on right now, but I would

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Speaker 1: eat it if I if I were wrong. At any rate,

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Speaker 1: you're not a little Ralphie decoding the message from Little

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Speaker 1: or Fananny. But it is actually the most secure way

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Speaker 1: that you can send a secret message is by creating

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Speaker 1: a unique code that you know and have written down

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Speaker 1: on a piece of paper, and your buddy knows who

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Speaker 1: has it written down on a piece of paper. You

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Speaker 1: only use it once. That's the kind of the key here,

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Speaker 1: and then you destroy it afterward. That is still the

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Speaker 1: most it's unbreakable. So what it's called is a one

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Speaker 1: time pad, the old one time because you only use

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Speaker 1: it once, and it is old. It's from the nineteenth century. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: and it's still uncrackable. It is. And the reason why

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Speaker 1: it's uncrackable it is because you each have, like you said,

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Speaker 1: you each have a copy of this this code. But

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Speaker 1: it's randomly generated. Right, So let's say, um, you have

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Speaker 1: the sheet of paper and the other person has a

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Speaker 1: sheet of paper, and the sheet of paper says, it's

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Speaker 1: just like strings of random numbers, like four or five

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Speaker 1: numbers long, and it's just totally random and it just covers,

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Speaker 1: you know, several sheets of paper. Well, you guys start

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Speaker 1: at the same place, and when person transmitting the message

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Speaker 1: wants to encrypt it, they run their message. So say

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Speaker 1: you guys have agreed like zero is a, B is one,

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Speaker 1: C is two, etcetera. So you'd take that and you'd you,

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Speaker 1: I know, dude, is mind boggling. Like this is about

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Speaker 1: as simple as cryptology gets. And it makes me bleed

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Speaker 1: for my ears because all you have to do is

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Speaker 1: agree on what's what. You know, it could be anything, right,

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Speaker 1: So you're agreeing on what's what, But um, you also

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Speaker 1: have this randomly generated code key, right. So um, let's

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Speaker 1: say I want to say, what up, chuck. Let's W

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Speaker 1: H A T U P C h U c K.

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Speaker 1: So that's eleven letters, right. So if you have your

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Speaker 1: your key and you're encoding it, you would use these first,

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Speaker 1: the first eleven numbers to encode what's already encoded. So

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Speaker 1: the W who is say, says it's the number twenty two, right,

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Speaker 1: and then so on. So like there's a number assigned

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Speaker 1: to each letter, so you have that, and then you

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Speaker 1: run it through this code, this randomly generated code. So

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Speaker 1: you add that and then so you have, um, what

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Speaker 1: I say, twenty two and then um say, the first

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Speaker 1: letter or the first number of this code is seven,

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Speaker 1: so you have twenty nine. So that's what the little

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Speaker 1: German girl reads on the air two eighteen. It means

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Speaker 1: nothing to anyone else in the entire world except for

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Speaker 1: you and the person who has the other copy of

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Speaker 1: this code, since there's only two copies and you're only

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Speaker 1: using it once and you're gonna eat it afterwards. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: and the key is that it's randomly generated numbers. Then

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Speaker 1: it'll it's theoretically it will never be broken. Yeah, but

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Speaker 1: I mean that's just one example. You could You could

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Speaker 1: have five pre code rules to confuse someone trying to

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Speaker 1: crack this code. Yeah, and they don't even It's not

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Speaker 1: like the simplest code is this letter represents this number,

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Speaker 1: this number represents this letter. It gets more complex than that.

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Speaker 1: You could both have agreed upon a book you have

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Speaker 1: to kill a mockingbird. I've got to kill a mockingbird

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Speaker 1: for eight twelve thirteen four means go to page fourteen

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Speaker 1: means now you're really going to page thirteen, Ignore four,

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Speaker 1: then look at the twelfth line. Then look at the

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Speaker 1: eighth word on that page. Right. What a what a

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Speaker 1: one time pad would do is take that already agreed

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Speaker 1: upon code and encrypt it even further. Yeah. But the

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Speaker 1: point is it doesn't have to represent letters. It can

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Speaker 1: represent full words in a text that you've agreed upon.

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Speaker 1: And it's basically like thumbing through this book picking out

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Speaker 1: all these various words to make a sentence. Right. The

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Speaker 1: problem is that's its vulnerability as well, like to to

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Speaker 1: get a copy of the randomly generated key that's used

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Speaker 1: to encrypt this message. Right, Um, you have to have

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Speaker 1: some sort of contact with somebody, So that's one vulnerability

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Speaker 1: of it. The thing is is like, depending on how

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Speaker 1: long this is, as many numbers as there are, um

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Speaker 1: is as long as as many transmissions as you can transmit.

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Speaker 1: Does that make any sense? So so I said, what up, chuck,

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Speaker 1: that's eleven. That uses the first eleven numbers on this key.

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Speaker 1: But say there's fifty thou numbers on the key, Well,

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Speaker 1: we have a lot more messages we I can send

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Speaker 1: to you that that we're going through the pad. Eventually though,

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Speaker 1: we're going to use up this pad and we need

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Speaker 1: to meet again, so I can give you another randomly

279
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Speaker 1: generated key. That's the vulnerability of it. Well, the other

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00:18:02,400 --> 00:18:03,720
Speaker 1: well and not a fail safe. But the thing it

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Speaker 1: makes it even safer is a lot of times they

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Speaker 1: would send and presumably are still sending dummy messages, so

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Speaker 1: you don't even know if it's real to begin with.

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Speaker 1: And there are only so many person hours you can

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Speaker 1: dedicate as a government to code crackers, and they might

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Speaker 1: be working on a code that's not even real. You

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00:18:22,480 --> 00:18:26,080
Speaker 1: don't know what transmissions are are legit and that that

288
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Speaker 1: is a proposal by a group called ENIGMA. And we'll

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Speaker 1: talk about Enigma right after this message because they're pretty awesome.

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Speaker 1: So Chuck Um, we were talking about Enigma. I mentioned Enigma,

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Speaker 1: and ENIGMA is this group that of basically amateur radio people,

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Speaker 1: shortwave radio enthusiast. They really get into this. UM it's

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Speaker 1: a thing and they started This is pre pre internet days.

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Speaker 1: I think it was in the eighties, the late eighties

295
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Speaker 1: early nineties that ENIGMA first came around and kind of

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Speaker 1: coalesced an. ENIGMA stands for European Numbers Information Gathering and

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Speaker 1: Monitoring Association, and basically it was just a group of

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Speaker 1: these people who had all the spell enigma, yeah right,

299
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Speaker 1: who had all and I think they reverse engineer UM.

300
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Speaker 1: But they had all kind of started to talk or

301
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Speaker 1: find each other and say have you heard this weird

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00:19:22,160 --> 00:19:24,960
Speaker 1: transmission and they're like, yes, I've heard that one, and

303
00:19:25,080 --> 00:19:28,440
Speaker 1: you should. You should check out this frequency on Tuesday

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Speaker 1: nights at eight pm because it transmits this. And there

305
00:19:32,480 --> 00:19:35,600
Speaker 1: they suddenly realized there's this whole community of people out there.

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Speaker 1: So they set up a newsletter, they started in a

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Speaker 1: naming convention, and they started assigning, collecting, and assigning names

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Speaker 1: to these different things. So like uh E designated a

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00:19:47,640 --> 00:19:52,320
Speaker 1: an English speaking trans numbers station, um S was Slavic

310
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Speaker 1: v is various, which incumbani encapsulates everything from like French

311
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Speaker 1: to Spanish. And Enigma really took this thing and put

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00:20:01,119 --> 00:20:07,280
Speaker 1: it into understandable terms. And they are basically eavesdropping where

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Speaker 1: they were eavesdropping on the spy community. Are they not

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Speaker 1: doing that anymore? So? Enigma disbanded I think in two

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Speaker 1: thousand and then almost immediately another group came and said, well,

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Speaker 1: we're Enigma two thousand. We're going to carry this on.

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00:20:19,800 --> 00:20:22,800
Speaker 1: And that's pretty fortunate because they were around to um

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Speaker 1: put all this on the internet. Before it was like

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Speaker 1: you had to like subscribe to newsletters and have a

320
00:20:28,520 --> 00:20:30,639
Speaker 1: short wave radio. Now it's like you can just go

321
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Speaker 1: on the internet and and um listen to all sorts

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Speaker 1: of archives of these defunct UM number stations as well. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I mean they're creepy sounding. I don't like it's kind

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Speaker 1: of cool. I've got one for you. We've talked about

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00:20:43,000 --> 00:20:46,200
Speaker 1: it before. Do you remember the Yosemite SAM transmission. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I'm convinced that that's just a person having fun. Well,

327
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Speaker 1: let's play it. I like that one. I think it's

328
00:21:00,200 --> 00:21:06,200
Speaker 1: full of info. It's cool. It's coming from somewhere out

329
00:21:06,720 --> 00:21:11,000
Speaker 1: in Albuquerque in the desert in New Mexico, and it's

330
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Speaker 1: been going since what like two thousand four and um

331
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Speaker 1: what makes this one interesting is that it's not a code.

332
00:21:18,840 --> 00:21:22,760
Speaker 1: It's just Yosemite Sam saying that thing. Well, then it's

333
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Speaker 1: followed by that data burst, which they think is some

334
00:21:25,600 --> 00:21:28,800
Speaker 1: sort of compressed information. Yeah. See, I don't believe it.

335
00:21:28,880 --> 00:21:30,960
Speaker 1: I think this is a short wave enthusiast having a

336
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Speaker 1: good time. Well, he's been doing it like, it's pretty sophisticated.

337
00:21:35,440 --> 00:21:37,080
Speaker 1: It does it like over and over again, I think

338
00:21:37,119 --> 00:21:39,359
Speaker 1: for forty seconds and switches to the next frequency and

339
00:21:39,440 --> 00:21:43,359
Speaker 1: it just goes through the band on a then he's

340
00:21:43,400 --> 00:21:46,320
Speaker 1: got a computer doing it for him. Maybe if it

341
00:21:46,440 --> 00:21:48,680
Speaker 1: is just some dude, But either way, I like the

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00:21:48,800 --> 00:21:51,440
Speaker 1: use of you, Samity Sam. It's cool, but it's pretty

343
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Speaker 1: it's exemplar of um of it's a numbers station, of

344
00:21:56,240 --> 00:21:59,720
Speaker 1: a numbers transmission. There's something that indicates that this is

345
00:21:59,720 --> 00:22:03,800
Speaker 1: about to happen, and then there's the happening, the transmission

346
00:22:03,880 --> 00:22:07,280
Speaker 1: of the secret code. Whether it's digital in nature, or

347
00:22:07,280 --> 00:22:12,000
Speaker 1: whether it's spoken um, and then there it is ended

348
00:22:12,080 --> 00:22:14,960
Speaker 1: by you know, yossemity sam again or something like that.

349
00:22:15,720 --> 00:22:19,399
Speaker 1: It's saying, here's the beginning, here's the information, here's the end.

350
00:22:19,640 --> 00:22:23,280
Speaker 1: Now go kill Northburg. One of the other cool things

351
00:22:23,320 --> 00:22:26,119
Speaker 1: about this is and um, you know when we were

352
00:22:26,119 --> 00:22:29,560
Speaker 1: talking about truly there's better ways. And the government could

353
00:22:30,320 --> 00:22:35,240
Speaker 1: theoretically shut down the Internet, they could zapp satellite transmissions,

354
00:22:35,280 --> 00:22:39,040
Speaker 1: they could shut everything down. This is almost unstoppable. You

355
00:22:39,080 --> 00:22:42,480
Speaker 1: can't shut down short wave radio. I mean, I guess

356
00:22:42,520 --> 00:22:45,560
Speaker 1: you cut power maybe yeah, well no, suppose you know,

357
00:22:46,280 --> 00:22:49,520
Speaker 1: I mean yeah, and then I guess if people have

358
00:22:49,640 --> 00:22:52,960
Speaker 1: batteries though in their shortwave radio. Good point. The one

359
00:22:53,000 --> 00:22:56,560
Speaker 1: way to combat it is called jamming frequency jamming, and

360
00:22:56,680 --> 00:23:01,040
Speaker 1: basically it's just broadcasting on the same frequency that these

361
00:23:01,320 --> 00:23:05,240
Speaker 1: these other transmitters, the numbers stations are transmitting on. And

362
00:23:05,400 --> 00:23:08,879
Speaker 1: so if you're broadcasting within your country, you're probably going

363
00:23:08,960 --> 00:23:11,840
Speaker 1: to reach those. Shortwave radio is better than somebody on

364
00:23:11,920 --> 00:23:14,720
Speaker 1: the other side of the planet's transmission well, and so

365
00:23:15,600 --> 00:23:19,320
Speaker 1: apparently Russia spent billions or the Soviets spent billions of

366
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Speaker 1: dollars during the Cold War jamming frequencies from all sorts

367
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Speaker 1: of different transmissions, um, and they play things like the

368
00:23:27,440 --> 00:23:30,800
Speaker 1: sound of seagulls or random beeps or whatever. And it

369
00:23:30,960 --> 00:23:35,920
Speaker 1: was just to prevent people from transmitting into Russia. But

370
00:23:36,040 --> 00:23:39,480
Speaker 1: even with all of that money and technology mustard or

371
00:23:39,520 --> 00:23:43,440
Speaker 1: marshaled against it, they still weren't entirely successful. Like shortwave

372
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Speaker 1: radio transmissions get through. It's just too big to fight. Yeah,

373
00:23:48,160 --> 00:23:51,800
Speaker 1: you can't jam the entire frequency of all short waves,

374
00:23:52,280 --> 00:23:56,120
Speaker 1: like every single frequency. Um. If you have ever heard

375
00:23:56,200 --> 00:24:02,879
Speaker 1: the the Wilco remember Yankee Hotel Foxtrot that album that

376
00:24:03,160 --> 00:24:05,400
Speaker 1: was on the album at some point, I can't remember

377
00:24:05,400 --> 00:24:09,760
Speaker 1: which song it Yankee Hotel Foxtrot in a woman's voice

378
00:24:09,800 --> 00:24:13,160
Speaker 1: and that is a famous uh code. Was that from

379
00:24:13,200 --> 00:24:16,359
Speaker 1: the Content project? No, I don't think so, but we

380
00:24:16,400 --> 00:24:19,879
Speaker 1: should talk about that. For sure. That was a project.

381
00:24:19,960 --> 00:24:23,120
Speaker 1: And it was also I guess and the the wild

382
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Speaker 1: West days where you're talking about pre internet. If people

383
00:24:25,400 --> 00:24:27,920
Speaker 1: wanted to hear the stuff, some people got together and

384
00:24:28,040 --> 00:24:34,280
Speaker 1: put together a greatest it's sort of on CD with

385
00:24:34,400 --> 00:24:36,680
Speaker 1: a lot of accompanying material about what you're listening to,

386
00:24:36,920 --> 00:24:40,119
Speaker 1: and um, none of them obviously you can't break these codes.

387
00:24:40,520 --> 00:24:42,400
Speaker 1: That's the thing I find interesting is people sit around

388
00:24:42,440 --> 00:24:46,320
Speaker 1: listen to this stuff, but with no aim of cracking

389
00:24:46,359 --> 00:24:49,400
Speaker 1: the code. I think some people do attempt to crack

390
00:24:49,480 --> 00:24:52,159
Speaker 1: the code and it's impossible. Well, it's not impossible, and

391
00:24:52,280 --> 00:24:54,280
Speaker 1: we should say that with the reason why it's not

392
00:24:54,359 --> 00:24:57,760
Speaker 1: impossible is because if you're using a computer generated random number,

393
00:24:58,600 --> 00:25:01,960
Speaker 1: computer is not capable of truly of generating a truly

394
00:25:02,080 --> 00:25:06,000
Speaker 1: random number because computers run on algorithms, and algorithms are

395
00:25:06,080 --> 00:25:09,080
Speaker 1: designed to follow patterns, so they're just incapable of it.

396
00:25:09,480 --> 00:25:14,679
Speaker 1: So you could, especially today, a hacker could conceivably crack

397
00:25:15,040 --> 00:25:18,600
Speaker 1: one of these, especially old transmissions. But but you still

398
00:25:18,680 --> 00:25:21,840
Speaker 1: don't know what those numbers stand for. Even if you

399
00:25:21,920 --> 00:25:24,720
Speaker 1: find a pattern of numbers, right, there's still an agreed

400
00:25:24,800 --> 00:25:26,480
Speaker 1: upon thing that you would have to figure out, but

401
00:25:26,560 --> 00:25:30,840
Speaker 1: it would it makes it possible if you could crack

402
00:25:30,960 --> 00:25:34,080
Speaker 1: that one time pad key, then you have a real

403
00:25:34,240 --> 00:25:39,040
Speaker 1: chance at the deciphering the message itself. Well, yeah, if

404
00:25:39,080 --> 00:25:41,679
Speaker 1: you know what they stand for. But I still maintain

405
00:25:41,760 --> 00:25:46,240
Speaker 1: if only you and I know what those numbers represent,

406
00:25:46,960 --> 00:25:51,520
Speaker 1: to kill a mockingbird pages, Yeah exactly. Uh, well, you

407
00:25:51,600 --> 00:25:54,600
Speaker 1: were saying the Content Project thing. So it's a four

408
00:25:54,720 --> 00:25:58,840
Speaker 1: CD compilation and apparently I read an article from the

409
00:25:58,920 --> 00:26:01,000
Speaker 1: time when it came out, which is the nineties, and

410
00:26:01,000 --> 00:26:03,719
Speaker 1: it was like perfect timing because there was why two

411
00:26:03,840 --> 00:26:07,280
Speaker 1: K going on, there was Millennium angst, there was the

412
00:26:07,520 --> 00:26:12,080
Speaker 1: X Files, and this thing came out and Salon wrote

413
00:26:12,080 --> 00:26:14,440
Speaker 1: an article on it, and this guy who wrote it

414
00:26:14,600 --> 00:26:19,600
Speaker 1: was like a music concrete aficionada. So people appreciated it,

415
00:26:19,760 --> 00:26:22,520
Speaker 1: not just for the fact that it's like recordings of

416
00:26:22,640 --> 00:26:27,119
Speaker 1: real live um spy transmissions, but some people like the

417
00:26:27,359 --> 00:26:31,200
Speaker 1: kind of avant garde noise that it had going on

418
00:26:31,359 --> 00:26:36,199
Speaker 1: to And the Flaming Lips are currently planning an album

419
00:26:36,320 --> 00:26:43,879
Speaker 1: composed if nothing but Messages from Number Stations Number eight. Uh,

420
00:26:44,160 --> 00:26:47,320
Speaker 1: there's a movie that exists that I had never heard of,

421
00:26:47,760 --> 00:26:51,080
Speaker 1: called The Number Station. I hadn't heard of it either. Yeah,

422
00:26:51,119 --> 00:26:54,480
Speaker 1: I don't think it was released really. It said of

423
00:26:54,640 --> 00:26:57,680
Speaker 1: from two thousand thirteen, and like I know, most movies

424
00:26:57,720 --> 00:26:59,399
Speaker 1: that are released, it's it's it probably went straight to

425
00:26:59,520 --> 00:27:02,119
Speaker 1: video or some Then I watched the trailer to day

426
00:27:02,119 --> 00:27:07,200
Speaker 1: it's John cusack and uh Melin Ackerman, and you know

427
00:27:07,359 --> 00:27:10,159
Speaker 1: they work at a number station and he's to protect

428
00:27:10,200 --> 00:27:14,040
Speaker 1: the number station, but something bad happens and they're compromised,

429
00:27:14,480 --> 00:27:16,399
Speaker 1: and is who who he says he is? And is

430
00:27:16,520 --> 00:27:19,920
Speaker 1: she who she says she is? Who knows? You'll have

431
00:27:20,000 --> 00:27:24,879
Speaker 1: to that turkey to find out. Didn't look bad? Yeah,

432
00:27:25,920 --> 00:27:31,640
Speaker 1: sure it looked pretty bad. Sorry, John Cusack, Sorry John Cusack.

433
00:27:31,960 --> 00:27:36,000
Speaker 1: So the I think one of the most interesting things

434
00:27:36,080 --> 00:27:40,520
Speaker 1: about UM numbers stations is that, like you said, they

435
00:27:40,680 --> 00:27:44,360
Speaker 1: peaked during the Cold War right when the Berlin Wall fell,

436
00:27:44,440 --> 00:27:47,240
Speaker 1: and then in a few years after that the number

437
00:27:47,280 --> 00:27:50,679
Speaker 1: of transmissions supposedly just dropped off dramatically, although I did

438
00:27:50,760 --> 00:27:53,520
Speaker 1: see in at least one place that supposedly they increased,

439
00:27:53,560 --> 00:27:56,200
Speaker 1: but I didn't see that supported anywhere else. But the

440
00:27:56,320 --> 00:28:00,560
Speaker 1: idea that they're still around it all in two thousand fourteen,

441
00:28:00,760 --> 00:28:05,560
Speaker 1: that there are still numbers stations transmitting gibberish really says

442
00:28:05,600 --> 00:28:07,320
Speaker 1: a lot. So it says a couple of things, and

443
00:28:07,440 --> 00:28:10,680
Speaker 1: you've already mentioned one. It's possible they are just transmitting

444
00:28:10,680 --> 00:28:15,399
Speaker 1: gibberish to throw off anybody listening, UM, to basically just

445
00:28:15,520 --> 00:28:22,760
Speaker 1: kind of sap their resources, like keep them Ruski is busy. Um.

446
00:28:23,040 --> 00:28:25,720
Speaker 1: Another one is that they're keeping them going in case

447
00:28:25,880 --> 00:28:29,240
Speaker 1: they need to use them again. I think that's totally

448
00:28:29,280 --> 00:28:32,920
Speaker 1: the reason, in which case that's pretty smart, because that's

449
00:28:32,960 --> 00:28:35,520
Speaker 1: just you're not showing your hand, like where all of

450
00:28:35,560 --> 00:28:40,320
Speaker 1: a sudden u uh an inactive radio station suddenly starts

451
00:28:40,400 --> 00:28:43,240
Speaker 1: up again ind case activity and it's been doing the

452
00:28:43,320 --> 00:28:48,040
Speaker 1: same thing for ten years, and on year seven it

453
00:28:48,120 --> 00:28:51,480
Speaker 1: actually transmitted a real secret message, but it seemed just

454
00:28:51,680 --> 00:28:54,800
Speaker 1: like the everything else in those ten years. You're doing

455
00:28:54,840 --> 00:28:57,320
Speaker 1: some pretty good spycraft there, yeah, Or just to keep

456
00:28:57,400 --> 00:28:59,520
Speaker 1: that UM like you may not be actively using it,

457
00:28:59,600 --> 00:29:05,040
Speaker 1: but just to keep that um A method relevant. Like

458
00:29:05,280 --> 00:29:07,920
Speaker 1: you know, if you quit doing something, it's gonna die off.

459
00:29:08,000 --> 00:29:10,200
Speaker 1: No one's gonna know how to do it anymore. So

460
00:29:10,480 --> 00:29:14,080
Speaker 1: that you know, just keep those people working. And you

461
00:29:14,160 --> 00:29:16,720
Speaker 1: know they may may not even know if they're transmitting

462
00:29:16,840 --> 00:29:19,440
Speaker 1: real messages or not. I would guess if you're just

463
00:29:19,600 --> 00:29:21,720
Speaker 1: saying oh yeah, yeah, if you're just saying a a

464
00:29:21,760 --> 00:29:24,480
Speaker 1: sheet of paper and it's just yeah, in fact, that

465
00:29:24,560 --> 00:29:27,720
Speaker 1: maybe a pretty safe way to do things. It's like

466
00:29:27,840 --> 00:29:32,960
Speaker 1: the person with the nuclear key just a test. Who

467
00:29:33,080 --> 00:29:37,280
Speaker 1: knows gas we'll find out in UM. There are also

468
00:29:37,360 --> 00:29:39,680
Speaker 1: other theories that they are and I think some of

469
00:29:39,760 --> 00:29:44,400
Speaker 1: this does go on. Um, maybe drug runners using stuff

470
00:29:44,440 --> 00:29:46,600
Speaker 1: like this because some of them are less than professional.

471
00:29:47,600 --> 00:29:51,600
Speaker 1: Apparently the ones from Cuba or Cuba sorry Jerry, are

472
00:29:51,640 --> 00:29:56,200
Speaker 1: a little um uh comical. Well, they were renowned for

473
00:29:56,360 --> 00:29:59,200
Speaker 1: just having really bad slip ups, especially during the whole war,

474
00:29:59,400 --> 00:30:01,880
Speaker 1: like you'd hear people talking and laughing in the background,

475
00:30:02,080 --> 00:30:07,120
Speaker 1: or an accidental transmission of a radio station radio Havan

476
00:30:07,200 --> 00:30:09,120
Speaker 1: all right, Yeah, so they were kind of known for

477
00:30:09,400 --> 00:30:11,520
Speaker 1: for not being too skilled at it. But I imagine

478
00:30:11,520 --> 00:30:14,280
Speaker 1: the drug runners are the same. Yeah, it's virtually the

479
00:30:14,360 --> 00:30:16,880
Speaker 1: same thing. And I mean there's absolutely no reason why

480
00:30:17,120 --> 00:30:21,960
Speaker 1: drug runners couldn't have also couldn't also use this, Yeah,

481
00:30:22,320 --> 00:30:27,160
Speaker 1: alongside the espionage community too. Yeah, there's might be a

482
00:30:27,360 --> 00:30:30,200
Speaker 1: IS one, b IS two and they get the message

483
00:30:30,200 --> 00:30:33,719
Speaker 1: says chipment of Kilo's coming in Miami Beach tomorrow night. Right,

484
00:30:33,800 --> 00:30:40,400
Speaker 1: let's go get them kill one. I'm one, uh, But

485
00:30:40,520 --> 00:30:42,320
Speaker 1: I do think there may be a little bit of that.

486
00:30:42,400 --> 00:30:45,080
Speaker 1: I think it's a mixed bag of why they're still

487
00:30:45,120 --> 00:30:48,160
Speaker 1: being broadcast. I think there are enthusiasts that are probably

488
00:30:48,520 --> 00:30:52,680
Speaker 1: just doing their own thing for fun. Yeah, that'd be fun. Man,

489
00:30:53,000 --> 00:30:56,120
Speaker 1: if I was in in Guam and I could send

490
00:30:56,160 --> 00:30:58,600
Speaker 1: you a private message to be a short wave Oh yeah, yeah, yeah,

491
00:30:58,640 --> 00:31:00,280
Speaker 1: I thought you meant people who are just doing it,

492
00:31:00,360 --> 00:31:03,000
Speaker 1: just a mess with like the Enigma community or something.

493
00:31:03,000 --> 00:31:04,640
Speaker 1: I think that probably happens to I bet you it's

494
00:31:04,640 --> 00:31:07,120
Speaker 1: all kinds of things. Yeah, I'm sure you're right. Um,

495
00:31:07,240 --> 00:31:09,040
Speaker 1: there's one guy out there. And trust me, there have

496
00:31:09,280 --> 00:31:13,560
Speaker 1: been some some actual spies who have been busted in

497
00:31:13,720 --> 00:31:18,960
Speaker 1: this century, long after the Cold War, who had shortwave

498
00:31:19,360 --> 00:31:25,240
Speaker 1: radios and one time pads in their apartments or houses. Apparently,

499
00:31:25,640 --> 00:31:29,440
Speaker 1: in two thousand eleven in Germany, a couple who lived

500
00:31:29,440 --> 00:31:33,920
Speaker 1: there since and we're spying for the Russians were caught

501
00:31:34,440 --> 00:31:39,160
Speaker 1: in the act of receiving a numbers transmission in their

502
00:31:39,240 --> 00:31:42,480
Speaker 1: home when they were apprehended and busted for spying. I

503
00:31:42,520 --> 00:31:45,160
Speaker 1: can see that scene. He's got like one headphone up

504
00:31:45,240 --> 00:31:47,120
Speaker 1: and he's holding out with his hand and he's writing

505
00:31:47,200 --> 00:31:49,680
Speaker 1: something down in pencil and his wife's trying to eat

506
00:31:49,720 --> 00:31:55,360
Speaker 1: it really quick spit out. And in two thousand one

507
00:31:55,440 --> 00:31:57,880
Speaker 1: and A. Mantz worked for the U. S Civil Defension

508
00:31:58,160 --> 00:32:01,840
Speaker 1: Intelligence Agency and she was convicted of spying for Cuba.

509
00:32:02,600 --> 00:32:04,640
Speaker 1: And when they searched her home they found a short

510
00:32:04,680 --> 00:32:08,360
Speaker 1: wave radio and a code sheet and um, so yeah,

511
00:32:08,440 --> 00:32:11,120
Speaker 1: I mean that's it's still going on. Man, I think

512
00:32:11,120 --> 00:32:13,720
Speaker 1: it's pretty neat. Yeah, I do too, Like it's old

513
00:32:13,760 --> 00:32:21,640
Speaker 1: school but almost fool proof. Yeah. The big vulnerabilities getting

514
00:32:21,680 --> 00:32:26,120
Speaker 1: the random randomly generated key to the spy. Yeah. And

515
00:32:26,160 --> 00:32:28,120
Speaker 1: they also point out in the article who wrote this one?

516
00:32:28,120 --> 00:32:32,760
Speaker 1: By the way, uh Nathan Chandler. Um. Nathan points out

517
00:32:32,800 --> 00:32:36,440
Speaker 1: that these days, you're likely um, you're one timer might

518
00:32:36,480 --> 00:32:40,480
Speaker 1: be sent to you, maybe digitally somehow, but it's not

519
00:32:40,640 --> 00:32:45,000
Speaker 1: It doesn't like tip anyone off necessarily. Yeah, but not

520
00:32:45,120 --> 00:32:48,280
Speaker 1: quite sure how. Yeah, I would think if you're being watched,

521
00:32:48,800 --> 00:32:52,440
Speaker 1: then an email with a lot of random numbers might differ. Well,

522
00:32:52,480 --> 00:32:54,240
Speaker 1: it used to be they print them on that the

523
00:32:54,400 --> 00:32:56,880
Speaker 1: kind of paper that like dissolved quickly or burned and

524
00:32:57,000 --> 00:32:59,760
Speaker 1: left no ash or whatever. They were on such tiny

525
00:32:59,800 --> 00:33:03,520
Speaker 1: paper you had to use a really good magnifying like

526
00:33:03,800 --> 00:33:06,360
Speaker 1: lens to read it, and you could hide them in

527
00:33:06,440 --> 00:33:09,240
Speaker 1: like a walnut shell or something like that. Wow. Who

528
00:33:09,320 --> 00:33:12,960
Speaker 1: knows what they're doing now? Yeah, but they are doing something. Yeah,

529
00:33:13,480 --> 00:33:16,240
Speaker 1: I'd like to Uh. I thought about getting a short

530
00:33:16,440 --> 00:33:18,760
Speaker 1: I was a little bit inspired but then I thought,

531
00:33:18,800 --> 00:33:20,440
Speaker 1: oh man, I've got so many other things to do.

532
00:33:21,120 --> 00:33:22,760
Speaker 1: I don't know if I could do fall into that

533
00:33:22,920 --> 00:33:26,920
Speaker 1: rabbit hole. So that's numbers stations. If that piqued your interest,

534
00:33:27,200 --> 00:33:30,280
Speaker 1: just type in numbers stations into your favorite search engine

535
00:33:30,320 --> 00:33:32,920
Speaker 1: and it will lead you down the rabbit hole of

536
00:33:33,160 --> 00:33:35,560
Speaker 1: shortwave radio. Did you say rabbit holes? That where I

537
00:33:35,600 --> 00:33:38,440
Speaker 1: got that from? I said rabbit hole, But I didn't

538
00:33:38,600 --> 00:33:41,200
Speaker 1: invent it, no, I know, but it just popped up

539
00:33:41,240 --> 00:33:43,520
Speaker 1: in my head and it wasn't my own invention. And

540
00:33:43,600 --> 00:33:45,120
Speaker 1: I think if you have a short wave radio, you

541
00:33:45,200 --> 00:33:47,920
Speaker 1: probably tune into these anyway because you're just into that lifestyle.

542
00:33:48,040 --> 00:33:51,000
Speaker 1: But I think there's a website called spy numbers where

543
00:33:51,000 --> 00:33:53,479
Speaker 1: you can actually find the frequencies and just go right

544
00:33:53,520 --> 00:33:55,840
Speaker 1: there and you don't want to search for them. And

545
00:33:56,160 --> 00:33:58,400
Speaker 1: if you want to read this article, you can type

546
00:33:58,480 --> 00:34:02,040
Speaker 1: the words numbers station in the search part How stuff

547
00:34:02,080 --> 00:34:04,880
Speaker 1: works dot com. And since I said search parts, time

548
00:34:04,920 --> 00:34:09,239
Speaker 1: for listener mayo. I'm gonna call this a bit on

549
00:34:09,440 --> 00:34:13,480
Speaker 1: sushi um from someone in Japan. Hey, guys, and Jerry.

550
00:34:13,840 --> 00:34:16,799
Speaker 1: He expelled Jerry right as well. Man, it's Jerry's day.

551
00:34:17,360 --> 00:34:19,200
Speaker 1: I enjoyed the sushi episode quite a bit and have

552
00:34:19,320 --> 00:34:22,600
Speaker 1: something to add. As a result of modern food production

553
00:34:22,640 --> 00:34:24,440
Speaker 1: following World War Two in Japan and of course the

554
00:34:24,560 --> 00:34:27,840
Speaker 1: U S and elsewhere, the quality and traditional methods of

555
00:34:28,000 --> 00:34:31,640
Speaker 1: making Show You Miso and other Japanese food items sadly plummeted.

556
00:34:32,160 --> 00:34:35,000
Speaker 1: For example, miso can be fermented an aged a matter

557
00:34:35,080 --> 00:34:38,040
Speaker 1: of weeks with the use of temperature control tanks, where

558
00:34:38,120 --> 00:34:42,439
Speaker 1: traditional dark miso would age up to two years. Same

559
00:34:42,520 --> 00:34:46,320
Speaker 1: goes with other fermented products like Show You Mirren. No

560
00:34:46,480 --> 00:34:48,919
Speaker 1: longer at sweet rice cooking wine is practically sugar water.

561
00:34:49,440 --> 00:34:52,040
Speaker 1: Speaking of sugar, modern Japanese food wouldn't exist without it.

562
00:34:52,719 --> 00:34:57,760
Speaker 1: Uh Bumi boshi, the sour salty pickled plum is lousy

563
00:34:57,880 --> 00:35:00,680
Speaker 1: with artificial color, sugar and refined salt. They're still good.

564
00:35:00,840 --> 00:35:03,400
Speaker 1: As much as I loved I love Japanese food and culture,

565
00:35:03,400 --> 00:35:06,839
Speaker 1: it's quite heartbreaking to see these centuries of traditional food

566
00:35:06,880 --> 00:35:10,280
Speaker 1: processing supplanted by the Japanese version of a Twinkie chemically

567
00:35:10,320 --> 00:35:13,000
Speaker 1: made in process as an alternative. There are good quality

568
00:35:13,080 --> 00:35:18,000
Speaker 1: Japanese products to be had, particularly those imported from eating foods,

569
00:35:18,680 --> 00:35:21,400
Speaker 1: just high quality, organic and widely distributed Is this the

570
00:35:21,480 --> 00:35:24,399
Speaker 1: president of Eating Food? I don't know. Are they based

571
00:35:24,440 --> 00:35:29,360
Speaker 1: in Alameda, California? It sounds like yeah, uh, that is

572
00:35:29,400 --> 00:35:32,359
Speaker 1: from Lear in Alameda, California. UM. I meant to mention

573
00:35:32,440 --> 00:35:34,279
Speaker 1: that you. I had the worst sushi I've had in

574
00:35:34,360 --> 00:35:37,840
Speaker 1: my life the other day. I'm not gonna say it,

575
00:35:38,160 --> 00:35:40,640
Speaker 1: but I'm not going back. I'll tell you off air.

576
00:35:41,600 --> 00:35:43,239
Speaker 1: I don't think you wouldn't go there anyway, but um,

577
00:35:44,200 --> 00:35:50,200
Speaker 1: it was. The rice was gummy and really gummy to

578
00:35:50,360 --> 00:35:52,920
Speaker 1: the point where I ate it just because I was starving,

579
00:35:53,280 --> 00:35:55,600
Speaker 1: and I ate it really fast, and I was like, oh,

580
00:35:55,680 --> 00:35:57,359
Speaker 1: this kind of gummy. And then afterward I was like, man,

581
00:35:57,680 --> 00:36:01,040
Speaker 1: that was terrible. Yeah, did you say that to yourself?

582
00:36:01,120 --> 00:36:03,719
Speaker 1: And like you smiled in there? Your whole mouth was

583
00:36:03,920 --> 00:36:06,360
Speaker 1: coated and it was gross. Man, I was. I was

584
00:36:06,440 --> 00:36:08,960
Speaker 1: ticked off afterward after I paid the bill, uh and

585
00:36:09,160 --> 00:36:10,600
Speaker 1: complained the whole way home to Emily. I was like,

586
00:36:10,640 --> 00:36:13,560
Speaker 1: I really should have said something because that was like

587
00:36:13,760 --> 00:36:16,120
Speaker 1: they should have known, they shouldn't have served that rice. Well,

588
00:36:16,200 --> 00:36:18,400
Speaker 1: why didn't you say something? Because, like I said, I

589
00:36:18,480 --> 00:36:22,279
Speaker 1: just shoved it in my face hole and left and

590
00:36:22,400 --> 00:36:25,600
Speaker 1: complained afterwards, which is that's how I do things. Usually,

591
00:36:26,120 --> 00:36:27,480
Speaker 1: I don't like to make a scene. I just like

592
00:36:27,600 --> 00:36:32,359
Speaker 1: to play the martyr afterwards. I've talked about that gummy

593
00:36:32,400 --> 00:36:36,359
Speaker 1: sushi for two days. Yeah it was. Yeah, the fish

594
00:36:36,400 --> 00:36:38,840
Speaker 1: and stuff was good, but that rice was just very subar.

595
00:36:39,160 --> 00:36:41,680
Speaker 1: The should have known better. Well, tell me where it

596
00:36:41,760 --> 00:36:47,399
Speaker 1: is afterwards. Uh. If you want to, um, I guess

597
00:36:47,480 --> 00:36:55,160
Speaker 1: inadvertently or quietly clandestinely promote your business like Leard did

598
00:36:55,280 --> 00:36:59,800
Speaker 1: with his eating foods. Yeah. Um. You can tweet to

599
00:37:00,040 --> 00:37:02,440
Speaker 1: us at s y s K podcast. You can join

600
00:37:02,560 --> 00:37:04,759
Speaker 1: us on Facebook dot com, slash stuff you Should Know.

601
00:37:05,360 --> 00:37:09,200
Speaker 1: You can send us an email to stuff Podcast at

602
00:37:09,320 --> 00:37:12,120
Speaker 1: how stuff Works dot com, and as always, joined us

603
00:37:12,120 --> 00:37:14,279
Speaker 1: at our home on the web, Stuff you Should Know

604
00:37:14,520 --> 00:37:22,520
Speaker 1: dot com. For more on this and thousands of other topics,

605
00:37:22,800 --> 00:37:24,120
Speaker 1: is it how stuff Works dot com