1 00:00:01,320 --> 00:00:04,280 Speaker 1: Welcome to Stuff You Missed in History Class, a production 2 00:00:04,400 --> 00:00:14,720 Speaker 1: of iHeartRadio. Hello, and welcome to the podcast. I'm Tracy B. 3 00:00:14,840 --> 00:00:17,840 Speaker 1: Wilson and I'm Holly Frye. A few weeks ago, some 4 00:00:17,960 --> 00:00:21,600 Speaker 1: friends of mine were having a totally normal conversation about 5 00:00:21,640 --> 00:00:27,440 Speaker 1: the Demon Core, specifically about Demon Core memes. We did 6 00:00:27,480 --> 00:00:29,960 Speaker 1: an episode on the Demon Core in twenty twenty, and 7 00:00:30,000 --> 00:00:32,320 Speaker 1: we just ran that as a Saturday Classic. But in 8 00:00:32,360 --> 00:00:35,840 Speaker 1: case you missed it, this is a plutonium sphere made 9 00:00:35,880 --> 00:00:38,680 Speaker 1: for use in a nuclear weapon that went on to 10 00:00:38,680 --> 00:00:41,960 Speaker 1: be used in criticality experiments and it was involved in 11 00:00:42,080 --> 00:00:46,839 Speaker 1: two different fatal accidents. And one of those accidents, a 12 00:00:46,880 --> 00:00:51,280 Speaker 1: physicist was using a screwdriver to position a reflector so 13 00:00:51,320 --> 00:00:54,240 Speaker 1: that the sphere would stay just below criticality. And if 14 00:00:54,240 --> 00:00:58,760 Speaker 1: you're thinking that sounds like a bad idea, you're right. 15 00:01:00,080 --> 00:01:02,680 Speaker 1: In the course of this conversation, my friend Adrian, who 16 00:01:02,720 --> 00:01:06,080 Speaker 1: was the same Adrian who suggested an episode on the 17 00:01:06,080 --> 00:01:09,040 Speaker 1: Demon Core, said that she would love a deep dive 18 00:01:09,520 --> 00:01:13,679 Speaker 1: into the sl one reactor explosion. And that threw me 19 00:01:13,800 --> 00:01:16,080 Speaker 1: for a second because I thought we had talked about 20 00:01:16,120 --> 00:01:19,200 Speaker 1: it in that Demon Core episode at the end where 21 00:01:19,200 --> 00:01:23,480 Speaker 1: we talked about other nuclear incidents, and in reality, the 22 00:01:23,560 --> 00:01:27,000 Speaker 1: SL one got cut out of that episode because all 23 00:01:27,000 --> 00:01:29,679 Speaker 1: the other nuclear accidents we were talking about in that 24 00:01:29,760 --> 00:01:33,840 Speaker 1: episode it mostly involved people putting nuclear material into the 25 00:01:33,880 --> 00:01:37,720 Speaker 1: wrong containers, and the SL one explosion was a whole 26 00:01:37,720 --> 00:01:41,640 Speaker 1: other thing. It was the first, uh and I think 27 00:01:41,720 --> 00:01:48,560 Speaker 1: only deadly nuclear reactor disaster in the United States. There 28 00:01:48,600 --> 00:01:51,840 Speaker 1: have been other nuclear accidents that have have had casualties 29 00:01:51,920 --> 00:01:55,640 Speaker 1: involved in fatalities involved, but this one was due to 30 00:01:55,680 --> 00:01:59,400 Speaker 1: the reactor itself. So here is an early Christmas present 31 00:01:59,440 --> 00:02:05,080 Speaker 1: Adrian episode is for you. The Stationary Low power Plant 32 00:02:05,160 --> 00:02:08,800 Speaker 1: Number one or SL one was a small boiling water 33 00:02:08,880 --> 00:02:12,680 Speaker 1: reactor built at the National Reactor Testing Station, which is 34 00:02:12,720 --> 00:02:16,880 Speaker 1: now Idaho National Laboratory, about forty miles or sixty four 35 00:02:16,919 --> 00:02:21,760 Speaker 1: kilometers west of Idaho Falls, Idaho. The testing station was 36 00:02:21,880 --> 00:02:25,200 Speaker 1: established by the Atomic Energy Commission in nineteen forty nine 37 00:02:25,280 --> 00:02:30,440 Speaker 1: to research, build, and test various nuclear reactors. Because of 38 00:02:30,480 --> 00:02:33,480 Speaker 1: the nature of this work, the testing station was intentionally 39 00:02:33,480 --> 00:02:37,120 Speaker 1: built in a remote area, but close enough to cities 40 00:02:37,160 --> 00:02:39,639 Speaker 1: and towns that people moving to the area to work 41 00:02:39,639 --> 00:02:42,040 Speaker 1: at the facility would be able to find a place 42 00:02:42,080 --> 00:02:45,800 Speaker 1: to live. In the late nineteen fifties, the sl one 43 00:02:46,160 --> 00:02:49,960 Speaker 1: was considered one of the least exciting reactors at the 44 00:02:50,000 --> 00:02:54,720 Speaker 1: testing station. For comparison, one of the other prototypes developed 45 00:02:54,760 --> 00:02:59,359 Speaker 1: there was a submarine reactor designed for the USS Nautilus, 46 00:02:59,480 --> 00:03:04,400 Speaker 1: which was the Navy's first nuclear powered submarine. There was 47 00:03:04,440 --> 00:03:08,000 Speaker 1: also a project going on to develop a nuclear powered 48 00:03:08,240 --> 00:03:12,240 Speaker 1: jet aircraft. Both of those things sound very exciting, but 49 00:03:12,280 --> 00:03:17,320 Speaker 1: the sl ones focus was all about practicality, efficiency, and reliability. 50 00:03:18,280 --> 00:03:21,960 Speaker 1: It had been developed after a nineteen fifty five request 51 00:03:22,080 --> 00:03:25,840 Speaker 1: by the Department of Defense for a nuclear power plant 52 00:03:26,200 --> 00:03:30,680 Speaker 1: for the Defense Early Warning System, or the DO Line. 53 00:03:30,760 --> 00:03:33,919 Speaker 1: The DEW Line was a chain of isolated radar stations 54 00:03:33,960 --> 00:03:39,040 Speaker 1: about three thousand miles long from northwestern Alaska to southeastern Greenland, 55 00:03:39,360 --> 00:03:43,000 Speaker 1: about two hundred miles north of the Arctic Circle. It's 56 00:03:43,040 --> 00:03:46,040 Speaker 1: outside the scope of this episode, but the building, operation, 57 00:03:46,320 --> 00:03:49,320 Speaker 1: and the eventual cleanup of the Dow Line all had 58 00:03:49,440 --> 00:03:53,200 Speaker 1: and continue to have a massive impact on Inuit peoples 59 00:03:53,320 --> 00:03:57,560 Speaker 1: all across this region. Its legacy for those communities has 60 00:03:57,600 --> 00:04:02,880 Speaker 1: been described as mixed. The Dew Line created job opportunities, housing, 61 00:04:02,920 --> 00:04:06,960 Speaker 1: and infrastructure that wouldn't have existed otherwise, but none of 62 00:04:07,000 --> 00:04:10,080 Speaker 1: those were created with the needs of those communities in mind. 63 00:04:10,800 --> 00:04:12,720 Speaker 1: To some extent, the same could be said of the 64 00:04:12,800 --> 00:04:16,480 Speaker 1: National Reactor Testing Station, which was roughly the same distance 65 00:04:16,480 --> 00:04:20,839 Speaker 1: from the Fort Hall Reservation as from Idaho Falls. This 66 00:04:21,040 --> 00:04:24,279 Speaker 1: was during the Cold War, and crossing the Arctic was 67 00:04:24,320 --> 00:04:27,800 Speaker 1: the most direct way for Soviet aircraft or missiles to 68 00:04:27,920 --> 00:04:32,360 Speaker 1: potentially reach Canada or the United States, so the Dew Line, 69 00:04:32,480 --> 00:04:35,560 Speaker 1: as that early warning name suggests, was meant to provide 70 00:04:35,800 --> 00:04:39,560 Speaker 1: an early warning of such an attack. Construction on the 71 00:04:39,560 --> 00:04:42,400 Speaker 1: new line had started in nineteen fifty four. With the 72 00:04:42,520 --> 00:04:47,240 Speaker 1: radar stations getting power and heat from diesel generators. That 73 00:04:47,440 --> 00:04:50,640 Speaker 1: meant that the military had to keep those generators supplied 74 00:04:50,680 --> 00:04:55,000 Speaker 1: with fuel. The Army's criteria for a nuclear reactor to 75 00:04:55,080 --> 00:04:58,560 Speaker 1: replace those generators included that it had to be built 76 00:04:58,680 --> 00:05:02,359 Speaker 1: above ground with components that could be delivered to the 77 00:05:02,400 --> 00:05:05,400 Speaker 1: site by cargo plane. It had to be able to 78 00:05:05,440 --> 00:05:08,919 Speaker 1: withstand the extreme cold of the far North, and be 79 00:05:09,200 --> 00:05:12,920 Speaker 1: reliable and easy to maintain by a small team of people. 80 00:05:13,680 --> 00:05:16,520 Speaker 1: It also needed to run for at least three years 81 00:05:16,560 --> 00:05:21,120 Speaker 1: without refueling. The SL one was a three megawat reactor 82 00:05:21,400 --> 00:05:24,240 Speaker 1: designed for an output of two hundred kilowatts of net 83 00:05:24,279 --> 00:05:27,880 Speaker 1: electricity and four hundred kilowatts of energy in the form 84 00:05:27,920 --> 00:05:31,440 Speaker 1: of heat. This heat output would be important in the 85 00:05:31,560 --> 00:05:34,440 Speaker 1: Arctic environment, but it was also important at the testing 86 00:05:34,480 --> 00:05:37,719 Speaker 1: grounds in Idaho. On the night of the disaster, the 87 00:05:37,800 --> 00:05:42,039 Speaker 1: temperature was roughly eighteen degrees below zero fahrenheit or about 88 00:05:42,040 --> 00:05:46,160 Speaker 1: negative twenty eight celsius. The building the reactor was housed 89 00:05:46,200 --> 00:05:49,159 Speaker 1: in was not meant to contain radiation from a meltdown 90 00:05:49,320 --> 00:05:52,679 Speaker 1: or other disaster in the site because of its remote location, 91 00:05:53,279 --> 00:05:56,480 Speaker 1: which would also be true for the dow line. The 92 00:05:56,560 --> 00:06:00,520 Speaker 1: SL one's first five hundred hour test run started on 93 00:06:00,560 --> 00:06:04,839 Speaker 1: August eleventh, nineteen fifty eight. After this test run, it 94 00:06:04,960 --> 00:06:08,760 Speaker 1: was shut down for inspection, testing, maintenance, and to do 95 00:06:08,880 --> 00:06:13,400 Speaker 1: various adjustments. From that point, the reactor would typically run 96 00:06:13,440 --> 00:06:16,080 Speaker 1: for a period of one to six weeks, then it 97 00:06:16,080 --> 00:06:19,520 Speaker 1: would be shut down again for maintenance and testing. At 98 00:06:19,520 --> 00:06:22,920 Speaker 1: the same time, trainees would be going through both classroom 99 00:06:23,000 --> 00:06:26,720 Speaker 1: and practical training on the reactor, and if they passed 100 00:06:26,760 --> 00:06:30,400 Speaker 1: all of their various courses and assessments through this work, 101 00:06:30,440 --> 00:06:35,159 Speaker 1: they could be certified as reactor operators. This all sounds 102 00:06:35,160 --> 00:06:38,520 Speaker 1: fairly straightforward at least as straightforward as things can be 103 00:06:39,000 --> 00:06:43,120 Speaker 1: when you're talking about an experimental nuclear reactor prototype that's 104 00:06:43,240 --> 00:06:46,680 Speaker 1: also being used to train personnel, but there were a 105 00:06:46,760 --> 00:06:50,560 Speaker 1: number of issues. Initially, this reactor was the responsibility of 106 00:06:50,760 --> 00:06:55,400 Speaker 1: ARGON National Laboratory, but argun's role ended in early nineteen 107 00:06:55,480 --> 00:07:00,000 Speaker 1: fifty nine. At that point, a civilian contractor called combat 108 00:07:00,040 --> 00:07:04,240 Speaker 1: Rustan Engineering Incorporated took over, but didn't have policy and 109 00:07:04,320 --> 00:07:09,960 Speaker 1: procedure manuals written. When that takeover happened, the Army, Air Force, 110 00:07:10,000 --> 00:07:12,880 Speaker 1: and Navy were all sending people to be trained, and 111 00:07:12,920 --> 00:07:17,160 Speaker 1: there were various rivalries and power grabs going on among 112 00:07:17,200 --> 00:07:22,120 Speaker 1: the various military branches. The Atomic Energy Commission was also involved, 113 00:07:22,120 --> 00:07:26,480 Speaker 1: but had a fairly hands off role in theory. Military 114 00:07:26,520 --> 00:07:30,040 Speaker 1: personnel were handling the actual operation of the reactor with 115 00:07:30,160 --> 00:07:34,920 Speaker 1: on site supervision through combustion engineering, but reading through all 116 00:07:34,960 --> 00:07:38,680 Speaker 1: the overlapping responsibilities feels a little like looking at a 117 00:07:38,720 --> 00:07:42,880 Speaker 1: company org chart where someone theoretically has one boss but 118 00:07:43,080 --> 00:07:45,840 Speaker 1: also has a bunch of dotted lines to other people 119 00:07:45,920 --> 00:07:50,200 Speaker 1: and departments. Like a lot of developments during the Cold War, 120 00:07:50,760 --> 00:07:55,480 Speaker 1: including developments in the nuclear industry, things moved really quickly, 121 00:07:56,240 --> 00:08:00,120 Speaker 1: and technologies often went into use without a lot of testing, 122 00:08:00,720 --> 00:08:03,640 Speaker 1: since the Department of Defense wanted a reactor that could 123 00:08:03,760 --> 00:08:07,600 Speaker 1: run for at least three years without refueling. The sl 124 00:08:07,640 --> 00:08:12,640 Speaker 1: one was using burnable poisons to lower the core's reactivity 125 00:08:12,680 --> 00:08:16,160 Speaker 1: when it was new. This sort of stretched out how 126 00:08:16,240 --> 00:08:20,640 Speaker 1: long the fuel would last over time. These burnable poisons 127 00:08:20,640 --> 00:08:23,920 Speaker 1: were strips of boron alloys that were tack welded onto 128 00:08:23,960 --> 00:08:29,240 Speaker 1: the fuel assemblies. Soon, these fairly untested strips started warping 129 00:08:29,440 --> 00:08:33,280 Speaker 1: in between those welds, and borons started flaking off of 130 00:08:33,360 --> 00:08:37,080 Speaker 1: them and settling to the bottom of the reactor. Then 131 00:08:37,240 --> 00:08:42,320 Speaker 1: there were the control rods. Nuclear reactors run on fission reactions. 132 00:08:42,720 --> 00:08:45,880 Speaker 1: The fuel is an isotope whose atoms can split apart 133 00:08:46,080 --> 00:08:50,400 Speaker 1: when they absorb a neutron that produces two new atoms 134 00:08:50,480 --> 00:08:54,240 Speaker 1: along with heat and some more neutrons. Some of those 135 00:08:54,280 --> 00:08:57,560 Speaker 1: neutrons have the right amount of energy to split more atoms, 136 00:08:57,600 --> 00:09:01,199 Speaker 1: which continues the cycle. With the right number of neutrons. 137 00:09:01,240 --> 00:09:05,080 Speaker 1: This leads to a self sustaining or critical reaction. With 138 00:09:05,200 --> 00:09:09,400 Speaker 1: too many neutrons, the reaction can go supercritical, meaning that 139 00:09:09,480 --> 00:09:13,320 Speaker 1: it starts to escalate. Control rods absorb some of the 140 00:09:13,360 --> 00:09:17,800 Speaker 1: neutrons controlling the rate of the reaction. Most reactors have 141 00:09:17,960 --> 00:09:21,080 Speaker 1: numerous control rods that have to be adjusted in sequence 142 00:09:21,160 --> 00:09:25,280 Speaker 1: to start or stop a critical reaction. To cut down 143 00:09:25,280 --> 00:09:28,720 Speaker 1: on maintenance and make it easier to operate, The sl 144 00:09:28,760 --> 00:09:32,400 Speaker 1: one only had five, and one control rod could do 145 00:09:32,520 --> 00:09:36,680 Speaker 1: that all by itself. This was obviously risky, but at 146 00:09:36,840 --> 00:09:40,720 Speaker 1: first these five control rods seemed to work fairly well. 147 00:09:41,720 --> 00:09:44,880 Speaker 1: Over time, though, they developed what was described as a 148 00:09:44,920 --> 00:09:48,040 Speaker 1: stickiness and this is just what it sounds like. When 149 00:09:48,080 --> 00:09:50,920 Speaker 1: the rods needed to be raised or lowered, they might 150 00:09:51,040 --> 00:09:55,520 Speaker 1: get stuck. This only happened about two percent of the time, 151 00:09:55,880 --> 00:09:58,080 Speaker 1: but that meant over the life of the reactor it 152 00:09:58,160 --> 00:10:01,920 Speaker 1: happened about eighty time, and that is not great when 153 00:10:01,920 --> 00:10:04,719 Speaker 1: we are talking about the rods that are controlling a 154 00:10:04,800 --> 00:10:09,520 Speaker 1: nuclear reaction. There was also an emergency shut down procedure, 155 00:10:09,640 --> 00:10:12,439 Speaker 1: or a scram, in which the rods were all supposed 156 00:10:12,480 --> 00:10:17,120 Speaker 1: to drop into the reactor just by gravity. Forty six 157 00:10:17,280 --> 00:10:21,160 Speaker 1: times at least one rod failed to drop and it 158 00:10:21,240 --> 00:10:25,920 Speaker 1: had to be driven down using an electrical clutch. This 159 00:10:26,080 --> 00:10:30,240 Speaker 1: problem happened randomly, but it also seemed to be getting worse. 160 00:10:30,760 --> 00:10:35,240 Speaker 1: More than thirty of those recorded stickiness incidents happened just 161 00:10:35,400 --> 00:10:40,440 Speaker 1: in November and December of nineteen sixty. This stickiness seems 162 00:10:40,440 --> 00:10:43,200 Speaker 1: to have been connected to the burnable poisons in the 163 00:10:43,240 --> 00:10:46,800 Speaker 1: way that they were warping between the wells. On top 164 00:10:46,840 --> 00:10:49,319 Speaker 1: of that, the boron that was flaking off was affecting 165 00:10:49,400 --> 00:10:53,280 Speaker 1: the reactivity of the fuel in unpredictable ways, making it 166 00:10:53,320 --> 00:10:56,520 Speaker 1: hard to calculate exactly how far the rods needed to 167 00:10:56,559 --> 00:11:00,400 Speaker 1: move to control the reaction. And those flakes of boron 168 00:11:00,520 --> 00:11:03,439 Speaker 1: and other fore and matter were affecting the water seals 169 00:11:03,480 --> 00:11:07,280 Speaker 1: around the reactor's drive shafts, which also may have contributed 170 00:11:07,320 --> 00:11:12,239 Speaker 1: to the stickiness. Increasing water filtration seemed to help somewhat, 171 00:11:12,559 --> 00:11:16,120 Speaker 1: and on December twentieth, nineteen sixty, technicians were ordered to 172 00:11:16,240 --> 00:11:20,920 Speaker 1: quote perform a complete rod travel exercise at approximately four 173 00:11:20,920 --> 00:11:25,079 Speaker 1: hours after the start of each shift, meaning to manually 174 00:11:25,280 --> 00:11:28,000 Speaker 1: raise and lower each rod to try to keep it 175 00:11:28,080 --> 00:11:32,600 Speaker 1: moving smoothly. The SL one incident happened two weeks after 176 00:11:32,640 --> 00:11:35,600 Speaker 1: that order was given, and we'll have more after a 177 00:11:35,600 --> 00:11:49,200 Speaker 1: sponsor break. On December twenty third, nineteen sixty, the SL 178 00:11:49,280 --> 00:11:52,480 Speaker 1: one reactor was shut down for a holiday break, and 179 00:11:52,720 --> 00:11:56,760 Speaker 1: during that shutdown procedure, three of the control rods stuck 180 00:11:56,840 --> 00:12:00,920 Speaker 1: and had to be driven into the reactor. Bruz returned 181 00:12:00,960 --> 00:12:04,599 Speaker 1: on December twenty seventh to start on various maintenance tasks. 182 00:12:04,640 --> 00:12:08,920 Speaker 1: With the reactor still shut down. On January third, nineteen 183 00:12:09,000 --> 00:12:12,920 Speaker 1: sixty one, the night shift was tasked with restarting it. 184 00:12:13,720 --> 00:12:17,000 Speaker 1: The reactor was staffed around the clock in three eight 185 00:12:17,040 --> 00:12:21,120 Speaker 1: hour shifts, but the facility had minimal staffing during the night, 186 00:12:21,440 --> 00:12:24,800 Speaker 1: including the facility gate being left locked rather than being 187 00:12:24,880 --> 00:12:28,560 Speaker 1: staffed with a security guard. Three men were on duty 188 00:12:28,600 --> 00:12:32,280 Speaker 1: that night, Navy CB Richard C. Legg, known as Dick, 189 00:12:32,360 --> 00:12:36,400 Speaker 1: who was the shift supervisor, Army specialist John A. Burns 190 00:12:36,440 --> 00:12:41,040 Speaker 1: the third known as Jack, and Army Specialist Richard Leroy McKinley, 191 00:12:41,080 --> 00:12:44,400 Speaker 1: who was a trainee. All three of these men were 192 00:12:44,400 --> 00:12:47,400 Speaker 1: in their twenties. Since part of the point of this 193 00:12:47,480 --> 00:12:49,960 Speaker 1: project was to build a reactor that the Army could 194 00:12:50,040 --> 00:12:53,840 Speaker 1: maintain with minimal staffing in a remote area, none of 195 00:12:53,880 --> 00:12:58,560 Speaker 1: them had a background in nuclear engineering. Leg was experienced 196 00:12:58,679 --> 00:13:01,080 Speaker 1: in the procedure they were due, but this was the 197 00:13:01,120 --> 00:13:04,800 Speaker 1: first time he was doing it as a supervisor. The 198 00:13:04,960 --> 00:13:08,400 Speaker 1: US Atomic Energy Commission made a video brief after this 199 00:13:08,600 --> 00:13:12,640 Speaker 1: incident that gives us step by step recreation of how 200 00:13:12,760 --> 00:13:18,959 Speaker 1: technicians reconnected the reactor's rack and pinion system before restarting it. 201 00:13:20,480 --> 00:13:24,120 Speaker 1: I have no background in this field, but as a layperson, 202 00:13:24,200 --> 00:13:27,680 Speaker 1: it struck me as very fiddly and inexact as a 203 00:13:27,720 --> 00:13:31,040 Speaker 1: way to handle the control rods in a nuclear reactor. 204 00:13:32,600 --> 00:13:35,320 Speaker 1: I was not alone in this. I showed this video 205 00:13:35,400 --> 00:13:40,000 Speaker 1: to Adrian and she was like, what is happening? This 206 00:13:40,200 --> 00:13:43,560 Speaker 1: was a two man job. First they would lower a 207 00:13:43,640 --> 00:13:46,920 Speaker 1: shield plug and then opinion gear housing and then a 208 00:13:46,960 --> 00:13:50,760 Speaker 1: spring housing over the rack. Then they would insert a 209 00:13:50,800 --> 00:13:54,640 Speaker 1: handling tool into the spring housing and threaded onto the 210 00:13:54,720 --> 00:13:58,160 Speaker 1: rack like a screw. This handling tool was basically a 211 00:13:58,280 --> 00:14:02,640 Speaker 1: rod that they could grab onto. One person would pull 212 00:14:02,800 --> 00:14:05,280 Speaker 1: upward on that tool to lift the rack a few 213 00:14:05,320 --> 00:14:10,199 Speaker 1: inches while the other person tightened a sea clamp onto it. 214 00:14:10,760 --> 00:14:13,720 Speaker 1: Then they would lower it until it rested on that clamp, 215 00:14:14,160 --> 00:14:17,280 Speaker 1: Take the handling tool off, put a retaining washer and 216 00:14:17,320 --> 00:14:20,320 Speaker 1: a nut onto the rack, put the handling tool back 217 00:14:20,360 --> 00:14:24,160 Speaker 1: on again, and do a second lift, this time just 218 00:14:24,280 --> 00:14:26,640 Speaker 1: far enough to take the seaclamp off. This is like 219 00:14:27,160 --> 00:14:29,600 Speaker 1: the seaclamp that you would see at a hardware store 220 00:14:30,520 --> 00:14:32,720 Speaker 1: that you put on, you know, to hold maybe a 221 00:14:32,720 --> 00:14:34,800 Speaker 1: piece of board to the table, and you screw the 222 00:14:34,800 --> 00:14:39,520 Speaker 1: little thing at the bottom. Under normal circumstances, the washer 223 00:14:39,560 --> 00:14:42,560 Speaker 1: and nut would have connected the rack to a drive motor, 224 00:14:43,320 --> 00:14:46,560 Speaker 1: but for unclear reasons, while doing this process for the 225 00:14:46,600 --> 00:14:50,680 Speaker 1: central control, rod Burns suddenly raised it more than twenty 226 00:14:50,800 --> 00:14:55,120 Speaker 1: inches rather than the few inches that were required. This 227 00:14:55,280 --> 00:14:57,720 Speaker 1: was also farther than the distance that would have been 228 00:14:57,760 --> 00:15:01,640 Speaker 1: needed to start a critical reaction. This resulted in what 229 00:15:01,800 --> 00:15:05,440 Speaker 1: was known as a prompt criticality, that is, a supercritical 230 00:15:05,480 --> 00:15:09,320 Speaker 1: state that is caused only by the initial influx of 231 00:15:09,480 --> 00:15:14,120 Speaker 1: neutrons into the fuel, not involving any delayed neutrons that 232 00:15:14,160 --> 00:15:18,160 Speaker 1: are emitted later on in the fission process. This reaction 233 00:15:18,360 --> 00:15:22,680 Speaker 1: only took about four milliseconds, so it was almost instantaneous. 234 00:15:23,240 --> 00:15:27,360 Speaker 1: The power level surged to more than six thousand times 235 00:15:27,440 --> 00:15:32,000 Speaker 1: the reactor's rated output. The heat vaporized the water in 236 00:15:32,080 --> 00:15:36,040 Speaker 1: the reactor, which created a water hammer that blew inside 237 00:15:36,080 --> 00:15:40,040 Speaker 1: the top of the reactor housing, lifting the entire thing 238 00:15:40,360 --> 00:15:44,040 Speaker 1: about nine feet or two point seven meters off the ground. 239 00:15:45,520 --> 00:15:48,520 Speaker 1: While this reactor was considered to be small and lightweight. 240 00:15:48,720 --> 00:15:52,160 Speaker 1: It weighed twenty six thousand pounds, so this was a 241 00:15:52,360 --> 00:15:56,720 Speaker 1: massive amount of energy. About twenty percent of the reactor's 242 00:15:56,840 --> 00:16:00,960 Speaker 1: radioactive fuel melted, and the explosion for the fuel rods 243 00:16:00,960 --> 00:16:03,520 Speaker 1: away from one another and toward the walls of the 244 00:16:03,560 --> 00:16:08,080 Speaker 1: containment vessel. The other four control rods were still partly 245 00:16:08,200 --> 00:16:11,880 Speaker 1: or fully inserted into the core afterward, so the steam 246 00:16:11,920 --> 00:16:15,680 Speaker 1: explosion had cut off the critical reaction, but this wouldn't 247 00:16:15,680 --> 00:16:20,280 Speaker 1: be clear until much later. When this happened, alarms started 248 00:16:20,280 --> 00:16:23,520 Speaker 1: going off at the Atomic Energy Commission fire stations and 249 00:16:23,600 --> 00:16:28,120 Speaker 1: security headquarters, about ten miles east of the reactor. A 250 00:16:28,200 --> 00:16:32,120 Speaker 1: personnel radiation monitor about a mile away from the reactor 251 00:16:32,400 --> 00:16:36,720 Speaker 1: also alarmed, and a patrolman reported that all the needles 252 00:16:36,840 --> 00:16:39,520 Speaker 1: on this monitor were at their maximum reading and it 253 00:16:39,560 --> 00:16:43,520 Speaker 1: could not be reset. There had also been two false 254 00:16:43,600 --> 00:16:47,560 Speaker 1: alarms earlier in the day caused by a malfunctioning fire 255 00:16:47,600 --> 00:16:51,760 Speaker 1: detector in an auxiliary building, so while the first responders 256 00:16:51,840 --> 00:16:54,320 Speaker 1: did not know what was going on when they got 257 00:16:54,320 --> 00:16:57,800 Speaker 1: this alarm, they wouldn't have been surprised if it was 258 00:16:57,920 --> 00:17:02,840 Speaker 1: just another false alarm. When firefighters arrived, the outside of 259 00:17:02,880 --> 00:17:06,879 Speaker 1: the building seemed undamaged, and apart from some steam rising 260 00:17:06,920 --> 00:17:10,120 Speaker 1: above the roof, there didn't seem to be anything suspicious 261 00:17:10,160 --> 00:17:14,320 Speaker 1: going on. After security arrived and unlocked the gate, they 262 00:17:14,440 --> 00:17:18,200 Speaker 1: entered through the administration building with their regular fire protection gear, 263 00:17:18,680 --> 00:17:23,359 Speaker 1: self contained breathing systems, and radiation detectors. They didn't know 264 00:17:23,480 --> 00:17:26,320 Speaker 1: for sure how many people were inside the building, but 265 00:17:26,400 --> 00:17:29,119 Speaker 1: the coats, lunch pails, and cups of coffee in the 266 00:17:29,119 --> 00:17:33,360 Speaker 1: brake room suggested there might be three. But the firefighters 267 00:17:33,400 --> 00:17:36,480 Speaker 1: didn't see any other sign of anyone, and no one 268 00:17:36,600 --> 00:17:39,320 Speaker 1: answered when they called out or pounded on the door. 269 00:17:40,440 --> 00:17:43,560 Speaker 1: Radiation alarms were going off when they got into the building, 270 00:17:44,080 --> 00:17:47,679 Speaker 1: but at first the firefighter's own radiation detectors did not 271 00:17:47,880 --> 00:17:51,119 Speaker 1: show levels that would keep them from performing a search. 272 00:17:51,840 --> 00:17:54,639 Speaker 1: But when they got into the staircase that led up 273 00:17:54,680 --> 00:17:58,679 Speaker 1: to the reactor, their radiation detectors maxed out at the 274 00:17:58,760 --> 00:18:02,680 Speaker 1: highest possible reading, so suddenly that at first the firefighters 275 00:18:02,760 --> 00:18:06,720 Speaker 1: wondered if they were malfunctioning. They weren't, though it was 276 00:18:06,760 --> 00:18:09,479 Speaker 1: obvious that there was too much radiation for them to 277 00:18:09,520 --> 00:18:12,399 Speaker 1: just go into the stairwell with the gear that they had, 278 00:18:12,920 --> 00:18:15,320 Speaker 1: so they left the building and they waited for a 279 00:18:15,359 --> 00:18:20,080 Speaker 1: health physicist. A health physicist is somebody whose job is 280 00:18:20,119 --> 00:18:23,120 Speaker 1: to protect the safety of the people who work with radiation, 281 00:18:23,600 --> 00:18:26,920 Speaker 1: as well as the safety of their environment. A health 282 00:18:26,960 --> 00:18:30,159 Speaker 1: physicist arrived a little more than fifteen minutes after the 283 00:18:30,200 --> 00:18:34,199 Speaker 1: initial alarm and they all went inside, but once they 284 00:18:34,240 --> 00:18:37,680 Speaker 1: got to that stairway, the health physicist again had them 285 00:18:37,720 --> 00:18:41,560 Speaker 1: turned back. It was determined they needed more protective gear. 286 00:18:42,440 --> 00:18:45,879 Speaker 1: Not long after, two more health physicists arrived with anti 287 00:18:45,960 --> 00:18:51,199 Speaker 1: contamination gear, shoe covers, additional respirators and breathing systems, as 288 00:18:51,280 --> 00:18:55,120 Speaker 1: well as other equipment. By that point, the reactor room 289 00:18:55,200 --> 00:18:57,879 Speaker 1: up the stairs was the only place at the facility 290 00:18:58,080 --> 00:19:02,639 Speaker 1: where those three men could be even with protective gear. 291 00:19:03,160 --> 00:19:06,280 Speaker 1: Radiation levels in the building were so high that the 292 00:19:06,400 --> 00:19:09,480 Speaker 1: search had to be carried out in relays of only 293 00:19:09,600 --> 00:19:13,679 Speaker 1: about a minute each. The health physicist kept time with 294 00:19:13,720 --> 00:19:18,160 Speaker 1: a stopwatch. In addition to this strict time limit, conditions 295 00:19:18,160 --> 00:19:22,159 Speaker 1: inside were difficult to navigate. Once rescuers got up the 296 00:19:22,200 --> 00:19:25,480 Speaker 1: stairs and into the reactor room, the floor was wet 297 00:19:25,800 --> 00:19:28,840 Speaker 1: and it was covered with debris. Some of this debris 298 00:19:28,960 --> 00:19:32,720 Speaker 1: was compared to a lot of marbles, and their face 299 00:19:32,800 --> 00:19:36,840 Speaker 1: masks kept fogging over. Once they got into the reactor room, 300 00:19:37,040 --> 00:19:40,560 Speaker 1: firefighters spotted one man who was still breathing and another 301 00:19:40,560 --> 00:19:44,000 Speaker 1: who appeared to be dead. At first, they didn't know 302 00:19:44,000 --> 00:19:46,960 Speaker 1: who was who or where the third man was, but 303 00:19:47,040 --> 00:19:49,919 Speaker 1: the person who was still alive was later identified as 304 00:19:50,040 --> 00:19:54,480 Speaker 1: Richard McKinley, aged twenty seven. The initial priority was to 305 00:19:54,520 --> 00:19:58,240 Speaker 1: try to save his life. A team of five volunteers 306 00:19:58,240 --> 00:20:01,480 Speaker 1: went inside carrying a stretcher, two of them to try 307 00:20:01,480 --> 00:20:04,119 Speaker 1: to remove McKinley, and the other three to see if 308 00:20:04,119 --> 00:20:07,800 Speaker 1: they could figure out where the third man was. While 309 00:20:07,800 --> 00:20:10,760 Speaker 1: they did do kind of a relay to remove McKinley 310 00:20:10,800 --> 00:20:14,000 Speaker 1: from the scene, they still did not see any sign 311 00:20:14,119 --> 00:20:17,879 Speaker 1: of the third man. McKinley was taken to an ambulance, 312 00:20:17,960 --> 00:20:20,560 Speaker 1: which was then moved away from the road to keep 313 00:20:20,640 --> 00:20:25,920 Speaker 1: it from contaminating the road with radiation. McKinley did not survive, 314 00:20:26,040 --> 00:20:30,080 Speaker 1: though he was pronounced dead about two hours after the incident. 315 00:20:30,800 --> 00:20:34,520 Speaker 1: His body contaminated the ambulance with radiation, and it also 316 00:20:34,680 --> 00:20:37,639 Speaker 1: exposed the on call nurse who cared for him to 317 00:20:37,760 --> 00:20:42,080 Speaker 1: a large amount of radiation. The effort to rescue McKinley 318 00:20:42,119 --> 00:20:45,080 Speaker 1: had been carried out as fast as possible because he 319 00:20:45,160 --> 00:20:49,120 Speaker 1: was still alive, Rescuers took more time to plan out 320 00:20:49,119 --> 00:20:52,240 Speaker 1: how to remove the body that they'd seen, including sending 321 00:20:52,280 --> 00:20:56,040 Speaker 1: photographers into the room for ten seconds each to document 322 00:20:56,320 --> 00:21:00,760 Speaker 1: exactly where he was. It was during that process that 323 00:21:00,800 --> 00:21:03,119 Speaker 1: one of the team members happened to spot the body 324 00:21:03,160 --> 00:21:06,600 Speaker 1: of the third man, pinned to the ceiling by one 325 00:21:06,640 --> 00:21:10,960 Speaker 1: of the reactor's shield plugs. It was eventually determined that 326 00:21:11,040 --> 00:21:14,640 Speaker 1: the body on the floor was Jack Burn's age twenty two, 327 00:21:14,680 --> 00:21:17,080 Speaker 1: and that the body pinned to the ceiling was Dick 328 00:21:17,160 --> 00:21:21,600 Speaker 1: leg age twenty six. That determination was not made for 329 00:21:21,840 --> 00:21:24,000 Speaker 1: a little while, though, They did not know what was 330 00:21:24,000 --> 00:21:27,520 Speaker 1: happening at this point, so they and McKinley had all 331 00:21:27,600 --> 00:21:33,200 Speaker 1: experienced catastrophic and really gruesome injuries. Even though the sl 332 00:21:33,240 --> 00:21:37,119 Speaker 1: one had been built at the National Reactor Testing Station, 333 00:21:37,760 --> 00:21:42,520 Speaker 1: whose purpose was to build and test experimental nuclear reactors, 334 00:21:43,119 --> 00:21:46,080 Speaker 1: there was not really a plan for what to do 335 00:21:46,359 --> 00:21:52,600 Speaker 1: with highly radioactive bodies after an accident. Their bodies were 336 00:21:52,720 --> 00:21:56,920 Speaker 1: so heavily contaminated and the nearest morgues were far enough 337 00:21:56,920 --> 00:22:01,000 Speaker 1: away that drivers would have absorbed a a fatal dose 338 00:22:01,040 --> 00:22:05,240 Speaker 1: of radiation just trying to transport them there in that moment, 339 00:22:05,720 --> 00:22:09,200 Speaker 1: the vehicle itself would also be contaminated, and so would 340 00:22:09,280 --> 00:22:12,760 Speaker 1: the roads that it traveled on, and then so would 341 00:22:12,760 --> 00:22:16,159 Speaker 1: the morgue. Ultimately, a decision was made to turn the 342 00:22:16,200 --> 00:22:20,440 Speaker 1: decontamination room at the facility's on site chemical processing plant 343 00:22:20,840 --> 00:22:24,520 Speaker 1: into a temporary morgue, both to store the bodies and 344 00:22:24,800 --> 00:22:29,160 Speaker 1: decontaminate them as much as possible. They were transported there 345 00:22:29,200 --> 00:22:32,639 Speaker 1: in the same ambulance where McKinley had died, draped in 346 00:22:32,760 --> 00:22:35,680 Speaker 1: lead blankets with lead aprons draped over the back of 347 00:22:35,720 --> 00:22:40,000 Speaker 1: the driver's seat. Once there, they went through decontamination as 348 00:22:40,040 --> 00:22:44,760 Speaker 1: well as autopsies. During this process, the autopsy team discovered 349 00:22:44,800 --> 00:22:49,040 Speaker 1: that all three men had been wrongly identified. The correct 350 00:22:49,080 --> 00:22:52,800 Speaker 1: identification was based on their heights and weights and their tattoos, 351 00:22:53,400 --> 00:22:57,840 Speaker 1: because their faces were unrecognizable. As the team had been 352 00:22:57,880 --> 00:23:01,000 Speaker 1: figuring out what to do with these bodies, figuring out 353 00:23:01,040 --> 00:23:05,200 Speaker 1: to take them to this temporary morgue, McKinley's clothes had 354 00:23:05,320 --> 00:23:10,040 Speaker 1: frozen solid in the sub zero temperatures. It was hoped 355 00:23:10,080 --> 00:23:13,240 Speaker 1: that removing his clothing would also remove some of the 356 00:23:13,359 --> 00:23:17,240 Speaker 1: radioactive contamination surrounding him, which would then make it safer 357 00:23:17,280 --> 00:23:19,840 Speaker 1: for the people transporting his body. To get to the 358 00:23:19,880 --> 00:23:23,920 Speaker 1: temporary morgue with him, a team was given cutting tools 359 00:23:24,359 --> 00:23:26,280 Speaker 1: and a minute to try to get him out of 360 00:23:26,320 --> 00:23:29,359 Speaker 1: his clothes. This wound up taking about a minute in 361 00:23:29,440 --> 00:23:32,679 Speaker 1: seventeen seconds, and unfortunately it did not actually do that 362 00:23:32,800 --> 00:23:36,720 Speaker 1: much to lower the radiation levels. Leg's body did not 363 00:23:36,880 --> 00:23:39,960 Speaker 1: arrive at this temporary morgue until well after the disaster, 364 00:23:40,240 --> 00:23:43,000 Speaker 1: because first the recovery team had to figure out how 365 00:23:43,000 --> 00:23:46,760 Speaker 1: to safely retrieve him. He remained where he was pinned 366 00:23:46,760 --> 00:23:50,560 Speaker 1: to the ceiling for six days. Although the reactor core 367 00:23:50,680 --> 00:23:53,879 Speaker 1: was no longer critical, the area above the reactor had 368 00:23:53,920 --> 00:23:57,879 Speaker 1: the highest radiation levels in the entire building. There were 369 00:23:57,920 --> 00:24:00,520 Speaker 1: also concerns that the shield plug hole holding him in 370 00:24:00,560 --> 00:24:05,240 Speaker 1: place might fall, hit the core and start another nuclear reaction. 371 00:24:06,640 --> 00:24:10,919 Speaker 1: More photographers were sent in in thirty second shifts to 372 00:24:11,119 --> 00:24:15,160 Speaker 1: document exactly where Leg was and what else was happening 373 00:24:15,240 --> 00:24:17,520 Speaker 1: in the room so that the team could work out 374 00:24:17,520 --> 00:24:21,120 Speaker 1: a plan. There were a couple of different attempts at 375 00:24:21,119 --> 00:24:25,160 Speaker 1: this and in the end, on January ninth, eight men 376 00:24:25,359 --> 00:24:29,600 Speaker 1: working in two man relays spent sixty five seconds each 377 00:24:30,240 --> 00:24:33,600 Speaker 1: dropping his body onto a stretcher and then carrying that 378 00:24:33,720 --> 00:24:36,880 Speaker 1: stretcher out of the building. Even though it was very 379 00:24:36,960 --> 00:24:39,600 Speaker 1: warm in the room where he was his body had 380 00:24:39,640 --> 00:24:42,760 Speaker 1: not started to decompose while it was pinned there, because 381 00:24:42,800 --> 00:24:46,280 Speaker 1: the radiation had killed all of the microorganisms that are 382 00:24:46,280 --> 00:24:49,560 Speaker 1: involved in that process. The same was also true of 383 00:24:49,600 --> 00:24:52,000 Speaker 1: the two other men, which meant that while there was 384 00:24:52,040 --> 00:24:55,000 Speaker 1: no safe way to involve their bodies, there also was 385 00:24:55,040 --> 00:24:58,399 Speaker 1: no need to the Department of Defense coordinated with the 386 00:24:58,400 --> 00:25:01,960 Speaker 1: men's families on their burial wishes. The bodies were wrapped 387 00:25:01,960 --> 00:25:05,520 Speaker 1: in plastic and lead and placed in hermetically sealed, lead 388 00:25:05,560 --> 00:25:10,080 Speaker 1: lined coffins. Then military cargo planes transported them to the 389 00:25:10,119 --> 00:25:13,320 Speaker 1: towns where they were going to be buried. Burns and 390 00:25:13,440 --> 00:25:17,520 Speaker 1: leg were buried in private cemeteries, and McKinley was buried 391 00:25:17,560 --> 00:25:22,360 Speaker 1: at Arlington National Cemetery. Even with all these steps, there 392 00:25:22,400 --> 00:25:26,360 Speaker 1: were still low levels of radiation surrounding the men's caskets, 393 00:25:26,680 --> 00:25:29,760 Speaker 1: not enough to harm anyone through a brief exposure, but 394 00:25:29,960 --> 00:25:34,400 Speaker 1: enough that precautions needed to be taken. Hell physicists traveled 395 00:25:34,400 --> 00:25:37,199 Speaker 1: with each of the bodies to monitor the radiation levels 396 00:25:37,560 --> 00:25:40,200 Speaker 1: and to provide guidance on how to keep everyone who 397 00:25:40,240 --> 00:25:44,919 Speaker 1: was exposed to the caskets safe. At the cemetery's crews 398 00:25:45,040 --> 00:25:49,840 Speaker 1: dug larger than normal graves They poured concrete into the bottoms, 399 00:25:50,240 --> 00:25:54,080 Speaker 1: and then they placed the caskets onto those concrete slabs 400 00:25:54,119 --> 00:25:58,000 Speaker 1: before filling the rest of the grave with concrete. The 401 00:25:58,040 --> 00:26:01,200 Speaker 1: men's families were allowed to be present at the graveside, 402 00:26:01,240 --> 00:26:03,680 Speaker 1: but only a few people could be there for each 403 00:26:03,720 --> 00:26:06,520 Speaker 1: of them, and they were also kept at a distance 404 00:26:06,640 --> 00:26:11,320 Speaker 1: during very brief services Because of all the time required 405 00:26:11,359 --> 00:26:15,600 Speaker 1: to retrieve Leg's body and to carry out decontamination and autopsies. 406 00:26:16,080 --> 00:26:19,320 Speaker 1: More than twenty days passed between the accident and when 407 00:26:19,320 --> 00:26:23,560 Speaker 1: the men's bodies were transported for their burials. During that time, 408 00:26:23,640 --> 00:26:26,639 Speaker 1: authorities were also working to verify the status of the 409 00:26:26,680 --> 00:26:29,840 Speaker 1: reactor core and confirm whether it was at risk of 410 00:26:29,880 --> 00:26:33,240 Speaker 1: going critical again. We will get to the efforts to 411 00:26:33,280 --> 00:26:36,399 Speaker 1: clean up the SL one site after another sponsor break 412 00:26:46,000 --> 00:26:50,040 Speaker 1: on May twenty third, nineteen sixty one, officials started the 413 00:26:50,080 --> 00:26:53,920 Speaker 1: process of trying to determine the cause of the explosion 414 00:26:54,080 --> 00:26:57,479 Speaker 1: at the SL one reactor, as well as removing the 415 00:26:57,520 --> 00:27:03,280 Speaker 1: reactor core, decontaminating the area, and destroying the building. They 416 00:27:03,280 --> 00:27:07,240 Speaker 1: also wanted to decontaminate the surrounding area so that usable 417 00:27:07,280 --> 00:27:11,440 Speaker 1: buildings could be put back into service. We've really been 418 00:27:11,480 --> 00:27:14,960 Speaker 1: focused on the reactor, but there were eight other support 419 00:27:15,000 --> 00:27:19,200 Speaker 1: facilities there, plus a water storage tank, fuel storage tanks, 420 00:27:19,320 --> 00:27:25,000 Speaker 1: an electrical substation, water and sewer systems, and other infrastructure 421 00:27:25,040 --> 00:27:29,480 Speaker 1: in all of that had to be decontaminated. This involved 422 00:27:29,480 --> 00:27:34,120 Speaker 1: steps like scrubbing everything to remove radioactive dust and residue, 423 00:27:34,840 --> 00:27:40,080 Speaker 1: painting surfaces or covering them in concrete, and destroying things 424 00:27:40,160 --> 00:27:45,040 Speaker 1: that could not be adequately treated. This was an enormous project, 425 00:27:45,280 --> 00:27:48,639 Speaker 1: with more than eight hundred people involved. One reason that 426 00:27:48,720 --> 00:27:50,960 Speaker 1: it took so many people was that the area around 427 00:27:50,960 --> 00:27:54,720 Speaker 1: the reactor was still so highly radioactive, and some of 428 00:27:54,760 --> 00:28:00,119 Speaker 1: it was highly hazardous, like vacuuming up radioactive dust in 429 00:28:00,160 --> 00:28:02,399 Speaker 1: just a couple of minutes. People who carried out this 430 00:28:02,520 --> 00:28:06,240 Speaker 1: type of work encountered the maximum amount of radiation that 431 00:28:06,280 --> 00:28:09,240 Speaker 1: they were allowed to be exposed to for an entire quarter, 432 00:28:10,000 --> 00:28:12,439 Speaker 1: So a lot of people cycled through the cleanup effort, 433 00:28:12,680 --> 00:28:15,400 Speaker 1: reaching that quarterly maximum in only a minute or two 434 00:28:15,400 --> 00:28:18,560 Speaker 1: of work, and then having to take three months before 435 00:28:18,600 --> 00:28:24,080 Speaker 1: coming back. Radiation exposures were measured with instruments and tracked 436 00:28:24,080 --> 00:28:28,159 Speaker 1: with film badges. Because there was a limited number of 437 00:28:28,320 --> 00:28:31,320 Speaker 1: health physicists and they all needed to continue to be 438 00:28:31,359 --> 00:28:35,240 Speaker 1: able to work, they typically kept time on people's relays 439 00:28:35,280 --> 00:28:38,560 Speaker 1: to do their work outside of the danger zone, and 440 00:28:38,600 --> 00:28:40,600 Speaker 1: then they would do something like bang on a piece 441 00:28:40,640 --> 00:28:43,920 Speaker 1: of metal when the worker's time was up. Some of 442 00:28:43,960 --> 00:28:47,560 Speaker 1: this work was also undertaken remotely because of the extreme 443 00:28:47,640 --> 00:28:53,120 Speaker 1: hazards involved, including removing the reactor core. Like the removal 444 00:28:53,160 --> 00:28:57,600 Speaker 1: of Leg's body, this required extensive planning and photographic documentation 445 00:28:57,720 --> 00:29:01,280 Speaker 1: of the site. This time, much of the photography work 446 00:29:01,360 --> 00:29:05,880 Speaker 1: involved remotely operated cameras built to with stand radiation, which 447 00:29:05,920 --> 00:29:09,240 Speaker 1: were able to take pictures down into the reactor structure. 448 00:29:10,200 --> 00:29:12,680 Speaker 1: Crews then built a mock up of the building to 449 00:29:12,760 --> 00:29:15,760 Speaker 1: work out how to remove the core using a crane 450 00:29:15,800 --> 00:29:20,720 Speaker 1: that was built on site. The cleanup process took eighteen months, 451 00:29:20,800 --> 00:29:24,600 Speaker 1: with General Electric Corporation being contracted for the cleanup and 452 00:29:24,680 --> 00:29:28,120 Speaker 1: removal of the reactor vessel. Kind of a side note, 453 00:29:28,160 --> 00:29:31,800 Speaker 1: they had personnel available for this because that nuclear jet 454 00:29:31,880 --> 00:29:36,160 Speaker 1: project we mentioned earlier had been scrapped, in part because 455 00:29:36,200 --> 00:29:39,040 Speaker 1: the shielding necessary for the reactor would have made the 456 00:29:39,120 --> 00:29:44,360 Speaker 1: aircraft too heavy to fly. Moving contaminated material to an 457 00:29:44,400 --> 00:29:49,760 Speaker 1: existing nuclear waste disposal facility would have created additional hazards 458 00:29:49,960 --> 00:29:53,960 Speaker 1: basically carrying highly radioactive material a long way away and 459 00:29:54,080 --> 00:29:58,239 Speaker 1: contaminating everything it encountered in the process, so most of 460 00:29:58,280 --> 00:30:02,240 Speaker 1: what could not be salvaged was buried there on site. 461 00:30:02,400 --> 00:30:06,960 Speaker 1: Ninety nine thousand cubic feet of contaminated material were buried 462 00:30:07,040 --> 00:30:11,000 Speaker 1: between eight and fourteen feet deep, with soil and vegetation 463 00:30:11,200 --> 00:30:15,640 Speaker 1: also added to cover all of this area because additional 464 00:30:15,680 --> 00:30:19,960 Speaker 1: precautions were possible during this cleanup process. The people who 465 00:30:20,000 --> 00:30:23,080 Speaker 1: were exposed to the highest doses of radiation were mainly 466 00:30:23,120 --> 00:30:26,360 Speaker 1: the first responders who had arrived on the scene immediately 467 00:30:26,400 --> 00:30:29,440 Speaker 1: after the accident and the people who were there during 468 00:30:29,480 --> 00:30:34,600 Speaker 1: the first week before Leg's body was recovered. Decontamination trailers 469 00:30:34,640 --> 00:30:36,760 Speaker 1: were brought to the site for workers, where they had 470 00:30:36,840 --> 00:30:40,920 Speaker 1: to go through a process of intensive scrubbing. The very 471 00:30:40,960 --> 00:30:43,480 Speaker 1: first responders to arrive on the scene had to take 472 00:30:43,560 --> 00:30:47,120 Speaker 1: additional steps for their hands because they didn't have special 473 00:30:47,120 --> 00:30:49,800 Speaker 1: gloves to wear and thought it was more important to 474 00:30:49,880 --> 00:30:54,680 Speaker 1: try to save McKinley's life. Across the Board, reports on 475 00:30:54,760 --> 00:30:58,160 Speaker 1: this accident from official sources that came out within the 476 00:30:58,200 --> 00:31:02,600 Speaker 1: first few years after it happened, and described these responders 477 00:31:02,680 --> 00:31:07,920 Speaker 1: as not being negatively affected by their radiation exposures. Nobody 478 00:31:07,960 --> 00:31:12,560 Speaker 1: showed clinical symptoms of radiation sickness at the time, nobody 479 00:31:12,600 --> 00:31:16,320 Speaker 1: had to be hospitalized after their work on recovery or cleanup, 480 00:31:16,520 --> 00:31:20,520 Speaker 1: but there's really not a lot of documentation on whether 481 00:31:20,680 --> 00:31:25,520 Speaker 1: those radiation exposures affected their health later on. Some of 482 00:31:25,560 --> 00:31:29,360 Speaker 1: the people who responded to this accident later died of cancer, 483 00:31:29,600 --> 00:31:34,520 Speaker 1: including multiple miloma, and it's possible, but not conclusively proven, 484 00:31:34,720 --> 00:31:40,040 Speaker 1: that this radiation exposure was a contributing factor. Official documents 485 00:31:40,120 --> 00:31:43,120 Speaker 1: also focus on the idea that radiation exposure in the 486 00:31:43,200 --> 00:31:48,520 Speaker 1: surrounding areas was minimal. The phrase quote very little contamination 487 00:31:48,800 --> 00:31:52,480 Speaker 1: above background levels shows up in a lot of documents, 488 00:31:53,120 --> 00:31:56,600 Speaker 1: but clouds of radioactive gas and particles did make their 489 00:31:56,640 --> 00:31:59,800 Speaker 1: way to surrounding communities in the hours and days after 490 00:31:59,880 --> 00:32:05,520 Speaker 1: that the explosion, including different isotopes of radioactive iodine. There 491 00:32:05,640 --> 00:32:09,720 Speaker 1: was ongoing monitoring of the nearby environment for radiation after 492 00:32:09,720 --> 00:32:14,680 Speaker 1: this accident, including periodically checking the roads for any radioactive 493 00:32:14,680 --> 00:32:17,680 Speaker 1: contaminants that had been carried out on the tires of 494 00:32:17,840 --> 00:32:21,480 Speaker 1: vehicles that were used at the site. We've already talked 495 00:32:21,480 --> 00:32:24,960 Speaker 1: about a number of holes in the National Reactor Testing 496 00:32:25,000 --> 00:32:30,000 Speaker 1: Station's emergency plans that became really obvious during this incident, 497 00:32:30,240 --> 00:32:33,400 Speaker 1: like not already having a plan for how to handle 498 00:32:33,480 --> 00:32:38,040 Speaker 1: contaminated bodies. So this led to a whole examination of 499 00:32:38,080 --> 00:32:42,240 Speaker 1: all of these procedures. The National Reactor Testing Station also 500 00:32:42,480 --> 00:32:46,560 Speaker 1: surveyed the forty seven licensed reactors in the United States 501 00:32:46,600 --> 00:32:51,480 Speaker 1: to evaluate their safety and their emergency shutdown procedures. It 502 00:32:51,600 --> 00:32:55,040 Speaker 1: was already known that the sl one's use of only 503 00:32:55,200 --> 00:33:00,440 Speaker 1: five control rods was a risk, but after this requireedirements 504 00:33:00,480 --> 00:33:03,280 Speaker 1: to keep reactors from being able to go critical with 505 00:33:03,320 --> 00:33:06,800 Speaker 1: the removal of only one control rod, became known as 506 00:33:06,880 --> 00:33:12,520 Speaker 1: the one stuck rod rule. In the aftermath of this accident, unions, 507 00:33:12,560 --> 00:33:17,520 Speaker 1: including United Auto Workers also advocated for better worker protections 508 00:33:17,520 --> 00:33:20,760 Speaker 1: at nuclear facilities. There was also a move to have 509 00:33:20,840 --> 00:33:25,160 Speaker 1: these kinds of reactor operations overseen by highly trained nuclear 510 00:33:25,200 --> 00:33:29,480 Speaker 1: mechanics supervised by a nuclear engineer, who were expected to 511 00:33:29,480 --> 00:33:33,840 Speaker 1: follow extremely detailed, step by step procedures to the letter. 512 00:33:35,120 --> 00:33:38,160 Speaker 1: After all this cleanup work, the remaining facilities that the 513 00:33:38,160 --> 00:33:41,640 Speaker 1: building were approved for use on June twenty second, nineteen 514 00:33:41,760 --> 00:33:46,200 Speaker 1: sixty two. Rather than building another reactor there, the site 515 00:33:46,320 --> 00:33:49,640 Speaker 1: was used to house welding shops. These shops were closed 516 00:33:49,680 --> 00:33:53,160 Speaker 1: down in nineteen eighty four, and funds for dismantling them 517 00:33:53,200 --> 00:33:57,160 Speaker 1: were approved in nineteen ninety three. At that point, much 518 00:33:57,200 --> 00:34:01,720 Speaker 1: of the site still showed signs of low level radioactive contamination, 519 00:34:01,920 --> 00:34:06,400 Speaker 1: so there was another round of decontamination and processing. The 520 00:34:06,480 --> 00:34:10,200 Speaker 1: effort to fully decontaminate and decommission the site took more 521 00:34:10,239 --> 00:34:13,920 Speaker 1: than thirty eight thousand man hours over twenty one months. 522 00:34:14,680 --> 00:34:17,360 Speaker 1: The EBA surveyed the site for safety twice in the 523 00:34:17,400 --> 00:34:21,359 Speaker 1: early two thousands. Although the Army continued to use other 524 00:34:21,520 --> 00:34:26,000 Speaker 1: smaller nuclear reactors after this incident, the SL one project 525 00:34:26,160 --> 00:34:30,040 Speaker 1: was scrapped. The radar sites that the dow Line continued 526 00:34:30,080 --> 00:34:34,200 Speaker 1: to be powered using diesel or electric generators. The dew 527 00:34:34,280 --> 00:34:37,600 Speaker 1: Line was deactivated in the nineteen eighties and replaced with 528 00:34:37,640 --> 00:34:40,960 Speaker 1: the North Warning System, and cleanup of some of those 529 00:34:41,000 --> 00:34:45,520 Speaker 1: earlier de line sites is still ongoing. We haven't really 530 00:34:45,520 --> 00:34:49,480 Speaker 1: talked about exactly what caused the SL One incident because 531 00:34:49,480 --> 00:34:53,759 Speaker 1: there are still questions. More than sixty years later. Initially, 532 00:34:54,040 --> 00:34:57,759 Speaker 1: when the men's bodies were misidentified, people thought McKinley, who 533 00:34:57,840 --> 00:35:00,640 Speaker 1: was a trainee, had been lifting the control and had 534 00:35:00,719 --> 00:35:04,320 Speaker 1: just simply made a mistake, but Burns, who was really 535 00:35:04,360 --> 00:35:08,160 Speaker 1: the one moving the control rod, was more experienced. One 536 00:35:08,280 --> 00:35:11,760 Speaker 1: possible conclusion was that the control rod had become stuck, 537 00:35:12,160 --> 00:35:15,440 Speaker 1: and that when Burns broke through that stickiness, he accidentally 538 00:35:15,480 --> 00:35:19,640 Speaker 1: moved the rod much farther than was necessary. Officials built 539 00:35:19,640 --> 00:35:21,880 Speaker 1: a mock up of the reactor and carried out a 540 00:35:21,920 --> 00:35:25,480 Speaker 1: bunch of experiments to see if this explanation even made sense, 541 00:35:26,360 --> 00:35:28,759 Speaker 1: and they concluded that it was possible for one man 542 00:35:28,840 --> 00:35:30,759 Speaker 1: to lift the control rod in a way that would 543 00:35:30,760 --> 00:35:33,760 Speaker 1: have caused the explosion, but that it was not likely 544 00:35:33,920 --> 00:35:35,840 Speaker 1: to have been the result of trying to free a 545 00:35:35,880 --> 00:35:40,319 Speaker 1: stuck control rod. Another possibility was that this was an 546 00:35:40,480 --> 00:35:44,880 Speaker 1: error on Leg's part as a supervisor. As we said earlier, 547 00:35:45,200 --> 00:35:47,800 Speaker 1: three days before, the reactor had been shut down for 548 00:35:47,880 --> 00:35:51,040 Speaker 1: the holiday and maintenance break crews had been ordered to 549 00:35:51,200 --> 00:35:55,840 Speaker 1: undertake a quote complete rod travel exercise about four hours 550 00:35:55,880 --> 00:35:59,359 Speaker 1: after the start of every shift. Although the men working 551 00:35:59,440 --> 00:36:02,640 Speaker 1: at the reactor had repeatedly been told not to raise 552 00:36:02,719 --> 00:36:06,040 Speaker 1: the rod more than four inches while reconnecting it. They 553 00:36:06,080 --> 00:36:11,080 Speaker 1: had never been told why. So it's possible that Leg 554 00:36:11,239 --> 00:36:14,399 Speaker 1: was trying to do two things at once, doing this 555 00:36:14,560 --> 00:36:18,319 Speaker 1: travel exercise while also working on restarting the reactor, and 556 00:36:18,320 --> 00:36:21,799 Speaker 1: that he just didn't realize what the consequences would be 557 00:36:21,800 --> 00:36:23,759 Speaker 1: because he was not a nuclear engineer and had not 558 00:36:23,800 --> 00:36:28,160 Speaker 1: been trained on that. Another possibility also puts some of 559 00:36:28,200 --> 00:36:32,080 Speaker 1: the blame on Leg. He had a reputation for horseplay 560 00:36:32,239 --> 00:36:35,520 Speaker 1: and being a practical joker, and there's speculation that he 561 00:36:35,760 --> 00:36:40,280 Speaker 1: startled or grabbed Burns at a critical moment while Burns 562 00:36:40,360 --> 00:36:42,840 Speaker 1: was lifting that control ride, and that Burns kind of 563 00:36:43,239 --> 00:36:47,040 Speaker 1: yanked it up in response. And then there are rumors 564 00:36:47,160 --> 00:36:50,719 Speaker 1: about the men's personal lives. One which seems to have 565 00:36:50,760 --> 00:36:55,080 Speaker 1: been completely unsubstantiated was that Burns was having an affair 566 00:36:55,160 --> 00:36:59,319 Speaker 1: with Leg's wife. This is briefly alluded to in one 567 00:36:59,400 --> 00:37:02,800 Speaker 1: report of this incident, but nowhere else, and it seems 568 00:37:02,840 --> 00:37:08,000 Speaker 1: to be entirely speculative. Although both men's wives flatly denied it, 569 00:37:08,000 --> 00:37:11,040 Speaker 1: it was something that Leg's wife continued to be questioned 570 00:37:11,080 --> 00:37:15,200 Speaker 1: about for years after this was over. There's more to 571 00:37:15,280 --> 00:37:18,680 Speaker 1: back up the idea that Burns and Leg might just 572 00:37:18,840 --> 00:37:23,280 Speaker 1: not have gotten along. In May of nineteen sixty, Leg 573 00:37:23,400 --> 00:37:26,440 Speaker 1: and Burns had been at the same bachelor party, and 574 00:37:26,560 --> 00:37:31,239 Speaker 1: after a night of carousing, Burns, who was married, allegedly 575 00:37:31,360 --> 00:37:35,560 Speaker 1: had an encounter with a sex worker. Afterward, Leg and 576 00:37:35,640 --> 00:37:39,880 Speaker 1: Burns reportedly got into a fistfight. It is not clear 577 00:37:39,920 --> 00:37:42,319 Speaker 1: whether that is related to the sex worker or not. 578 00:37:43,800 --> 00:37:47,440 Speaker 1: Leg and Burns had gone through their initial training together, 579 00:37:47,560 --> 00:37:50,560 Speaker 1: but then Leg had been promoted and Burns had not, 580 00:37:51,080 --> 00:37:54,600 Speaker 1: on the grounds that his commanding officers thought he wasn't ready. 581 00:37:55,280 --> 00:37:57,440 Speaker 1: One of the reasons he wasn't ready being that he 582 00:37:57,480 --> 00:38:01,640 Speaker 1: would get visibly angry and throw thing when he was upset, 583 00:38:02,280 --> 00:38:07,080 Speaker 1: and Leg reportedly also had anger management issues. Before the 584 00:38:07,120 --> 00:38:10,279 Speaker 1: holiday break, his supervisor told him that they would be 585 00:38:10,320 --> 00:38:14,239 Speaker 1: having a meeting on January fourth to discuss a possible transfer, 586 00:38:14,640 --> 00:38:17,760 Speaker 1: in part because Leg had been caught falsifying a time 587 00:38:17,840 --> 00:38:21,839 Speaker 1: card for a friend. After being informed of this, Leg 588 00:38:22,000 --> 00:38:26,920 Speaker 1: challenged his commanding officer to a fistfight. Burns had been 589 00:38:26,920 --> 00:38:30,239 Speaker 1: transferred onto Leg's shift to replace the friend with the 590 00:38:30,239 --> 00:38:33,640 Speaker 1: falsified time card, and it's possible that he was also 591 00:38:33,800 --> 00:38:38,120 Speaker 1: angry about both the transfer and about being supervised by Leg, 592 00:38:38,800 --> 00:38:42,040 Speaker 1: but again this is all speculation and we really don't know. 593 00:38:43,120 --> 00:38:47,560 Speaker 1: Burns was also apparently having problems in his marriage. In 594 00:38:47,600 --> 00:38:50,080 Speaker 1: addition to being in the military, he was having to 595 00:38:50,120 --> 00:38:52,879 Speaker 1: work part time at a gas station just to make 596 00:38:53,040 --> 00:38:57,040 Speaker 1: ends meet. His marriage seems to have become increasingly rocky, 597 00:38:57,239 --> 00:39:00,040 Speaker 1: in part because he just was not around much, so 598 00:39:00,120 --> 00:39:02,839 Speaker 1: his wife was having to manage their household and raise 599 00:39:02,920 --> 00:39:06,560 Speaker 1: their child mostly on her own. They'd had a series 600 00:39:06,600 --> 00:39:09,320 Speaker 1: of arguments, and apparently she called him at work on 601 00:39:09,360 --> 00:39:11,800 Speaker 1: the night of January third to say that she wanted 602 00:39:11,840 --> 00:39:15,600 Speaker 1: a divorce. She tried to call him again later that evening, 603 00:39:15,960 --> 00:39:20,000 Speaker 1: reportedly because she had reconsidered, but then she couldn't reach him. 604 00:39:20,239 --> 00:39:24,040 Speaker 1: So there's this idea that Burns was distraught over the 605 00:39:24,040 --> 00:39:27,560 Speaker 1: state of his marriage and maybe was also angry at Leg, 606 00:39:27,719 --> 00:39:30,320 Speaker 1: and that he pulled the control rod out on purpose. 607 00:39:31,360 --> 00:39:35,640 Speaker 1: But this is again really speculative, and some sources conclude 608 00:39:35,640 --> 00:39:39,000 Speaker 1: that this is all rumor that was intentionally spread to 609 00:39:39,080 --> 00:39:42,160 Speaker 1: distract from the fact that the sl one reactor, with 610 00:39:42,200 --> 00:39:45,800 Speaker 1: its boron flakes and sticky control rods and a design 611 00:39:45,920 --> 00:39:48,920 Speaker 1: that could go super critical with only one rod removed, 612 00:39:49,320 --> 00:39:53,319 Speaker 1: was inherently and unacceptably unsafe, and that it should have 613 00:39:53,360 --> 00:39:58,120 Speaker 1: been taken out of commission before this accident even happened. Also, 614 00:39:58,640 --> 00:40:02,000 Speaker 1: if all these personal details are true, it seems like 615 00:40:02,040 --> 00:40:05,080 Speaker 1: a massive oversight on the part of the commanding officers 616 00:40:05,360 --> 00:40:08,440 Speaker 1: to have assigned one man known for a volatile temper 617 00:40:08,800 --> 00:40:12,279 Speaker 1: and another known for horseplay to work overnight shifts on 618 00:40:12,320 --> 00:40:17,520 Speaker 1: a nuclear reactor, accompanied only by a trainee. So that's 619 00:40:18,360 --> 00:40:24,960 Speaker 1: the sl one reactor. We'll talk about various things more 620 00:40:25,040 --> 00:40:29,319 Speaker 1: on Friday. I have listener mail. It's from Elizabeth. It's 621 00:40:29,360 --> 00:40:31,239 Speaker 1: on a topic we've already talked about, but I liked 622 00:40:31,239 --> 00:40:35,760 Speaker 1: this email also, so I'm reading it to. Elizabeth wrote, Hi, ladies, 623 00:40:36,120 --> 00:40:39,480 Speaker 1: You've probably gotten plenty of responses telling you this already. 624 00:40:39,600 --> 00:40:42,240 Speaker 1: But in the behind the scenes Friday episode, when Tracy 625 00:40:42,400 --> 00:40:44,560 Speaker 1: mentioned reading a book where a kid copied a key 626 00:40:44,960 --> 00:40:47,520 Speaker 1: by making an impression and then carving a copy of 627 00:40:47,520 --> 00:40:49,600 Speaker 1: it out of wood, I knew instantly what she was 628 00:40:49,600 --> 00:40:52,279 Speaker 1: talking about. It was a story in the Great Brain 629 00:40:52,400 --> 00:40:55,319 Speaker 1: series by John D. Fitzgerald, a collection of books about 630 00:40:55,360 --> 00:40:57,799 Speaker 1: a family around the turn of the century, where one 631 00:40:57,840 --> 00:41:02,040 Speaker 1: of the boys, the Great Brain, is always figuring something 632 00:41:02,160 --> 00:41:05,919 Speaker 1: out and or coming up with some scheme. The kid 633 00:41:05,960 --> 00:41:09,200 Speaker 1: is kind of like Sherlock Holmes crossed with P. T. Barnum. 634 00:41:09,640 --> 00:41:12,240 Speaker 1: I remember one story where they go to a carnival 635 00:41:12,320 --> 00:41:16,040 Speaker 1: side show featuring a mind reader, and the Great Brain 636 00:41:16,120 --> 00:41:19,080 Speaker 1: figures out how he's doing it and then proceeds to 637 00:41:19,320 --> 00:41:22,720 Speaker 1: fleece the neighborhood kids by putting on his own version 638 00:41:22,760 --> 00:41:25,960 Speaker 1: of the show. The specific story you mentioned is I'm 639 00:41:25,960 --> 00:41:28,560 Speaker 1: pretty sure from the Great Brain at the Academy, if 640 00:41:28,560 --> 00:41:32,239 Speaker 1: I'm remembering right, he uses the key he ends up 641 00:41:32,239 --> 00:41:35,440 Speaker 1: making to sneak out of the school, go to a 642 00:41:35,480 --> 00:41:38,319 Speaker 1: nearby store to buy candy, and then bring it back 643 00:41:38,360 --> 00:41:40,719 Speaker 1: to sell it a huge markup to the other students. 644 00:41:41,239 --> 00:41:42,960 Speaker 1: I love the books when I was a kid, but 645 00:41:43,040 --> 00:41:45,120 Speaker 1: I haven't looked at them for a year, so I 646 00:41:45,160 --> 00:41:47,919 Speaker 1: can't swear to the quality. But hearing Tracy talk about 647 00:41:47,920 --> 00:41:50,759 Speaker 1: it brought back some fond memories. Thanks so much for 648 00:41:50,840 --> 00:41:52,640 Speaker 1: all you do. I've been a dedicated fan of a 649 00:41:52,680 --> 00:41:56,960 Speaker 1: show for years. Best wishes, Elizabeth. Thank you for this email. Elizabeth, 650 00:41:57,920 --> 00:42:00,200 Speaker 1: one hundred percent. That is the plot that I remember 651 00:42:00,320 --> 00:42:03,520 Speaker 1: from the book that I was trying to reconstruct from memory. 652 00:42:04,280 --> 00:42:08,399 Speaker 1: I also have not tried to go back to these books, 653 00:42:08,520 --> 00:42:11,880 Speaker 1: and they were written, if I recall correctly, in like 654 00:42:12,000 --> 00:42:15,440 Speaker 1: the mid twentieth century. So I would say if anybody 655 00:42:15,520 --> 00:42:20,120 Speaker 1: is thinking of going to check them out based on 656 00:42:20,440 --> 00:42:23,560 Speaker 1: them sounding interesting in our discussions of this on the show, 657 00:42:23,760 --> 00:42:26,440 Speaker 1: I would say, it's probably a safe bet you're going 658 00:42:26,520 --> 00:42:30,320 Speaker 1: to find ideas that are outdated at best at this point. 659 00:42:31,440 --> 00:42:34,520 Speaker 1: But again I have not gone to look. I for 660 00:42:34,560 --> 00:42:38,120 Speaker 1: sure have revisited childhood favorites much much later in my 661 00:42:38,160 --> 00:42:42,720 Speaker 1: life and been like, yikes. Either yikes at the time 662 00:42:42,960 --> 00:42:48,200 Speaker 1: and I didn't realize it, or yikes. The conversation we 663 00:42:48,239 --> 00:42:50,799 Speaker 1: have about these ideas is totally different now. Some of 664 00:42:50,840 --> 00:42:54,880 Speaker 1: those sometimes tho's the same thing, honestly. So if you 665 00:42:54,880 --> 00:42:56,520 Speaker 1: would like to send us a note, we're at History 666 00:42:56,560 --> 00:43:00,480 Speaker 1: Podcasts at iHeartRadio dot com, and you can also subscribe 667 00:43:00,480 --> 00:43:04,000 Speaker 1: to our show on the iHeartRadio app or anywhere else 668 00:43:04,040 --> 00:43:11,520 Speaker 1: you'd like to get your podcasts. Stuff you missed in 669 00:43:11,600 --> 00:43:15,279 Speaker 1: History Class is a production of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts 670 00:43:15,320 --> 00:43:19,480 Speaker 1: from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever 671 00:43:19,520 --> 00:43:21,040 Speaker 1: you listen to your favorite shows.