1 00:00:00,080 --> 00:00:03,760 Speaker 1: President Trump's Election Integrity Commission scored the first win and 2 00:00:03,800 --> 00:00:07,200 Speaker 1: the court fight over sensitive voter information the commission wants 3 00:00:07,200 --> 00:00:11,119 Speaker 1: from states. A DC federal judge has rejected a challenge 4 00:00:11,160 --> 00:00:13,760 Speaker 1: to the collection of the information and a demand that 5 00:00:13,800 --> 00:00:16,760 Speaker 1: the commission revealed how the data will be safeguarded by 6 00:00:16,800 --> 00:00:20,720 Speaker 1: the Electronic Privacy Information Center. Her decision will not be 7 00:00:20,760 --> 00:00:24,120 Speaker 1: the last word. There are lawsuits by other organizations, and 8 00:00:24,160 --> 00:00:27,480 Speaker 1: the states were not part of this lawsuit. At last count, 9 00:00:27,560 --> 00:00:30,680 Speaker 1: twenty states have said they'll provide only what is considered 10 00:00:30,760 --> 00:00:35,320 Speaker 1: public information by state law, while nineteen states, both Democratic 11 00:00:35,360 --> 00:00:39,000 Speaker 1: and Republican plus DC, have said they would provide nothing 12 00:00:39,040 --> 00:00:44,319 Speaker 1: at all. Here's Democratic Senator Amy Klobucher of Minnesota. They 13 00:00:44,320 --> 00:00:46,839 Speaker 1: have asked for the data of every state in the country, 14 00:00:46,880 --> 00:00:49,560 Speaker 1: every voter in the country. And that's why you see 15 00:00:49,560 --> 00:00:54,840 Speaker 1: objections from states, Democratic and Republican secretary of States throughout 16 00:00:54,920 --> 00:00:57,120 Speaker 1: the country. That's why I told them to go jump 17 00:00:57,160 --> 00:01:00,200 Speaker 1: in the lake. Our guests are David Becker of the 18 00:01:00,240 --> 00:01:03,440 Speaker 1: founder and executive director of the Center for Election Innovation 19 00:01:03,480 --> 00:01:06,400 Speaker 1: and Research and former director of the Elections Program at 20 00:01:06,400 --> 00:01:10,400 Speaker 1: the Pew Charitable Trusts, and Hans von Spakovsky, the manager 21 00:01:10,440 --> 00:01:13,839 Speaker 1: of the Election Law Reform Initiative at the Heritage Foundation 22 00:01:14,280 --> 00:01:19,240 Speaker 1: and a member of Trump's Advisory Commission on Election Integrity. David, 23 00:01:19,440 --> 00:01:23,440 Speaker 1: how did the judge reach her decision, particularly regarding the 24 00:01:23,480 --> 00:01:28,240 Speaker 1: infringement of privacy rights. Well, I think, um, some of 25 00:01:28,280 --> 00:01:33,200 Speaker 1: the statements made by m by the commission UH confirmed 26 00:01:33,200 --> 00:01:36,440 Speaker 1: that this is just a request, that there were some 27 00:01:36,520 --> 00:01:40,759 Speaker 1: options that UM, I think they might have been storing 28 00:01:40,800 --> 00:01:42,759 Speaker 1: the information in a way that at least the judge 29 00:01:42,800 --> 00:01:48,160 Speaker 1: seemed satisfied UH might be might sufficiently protect privacy rights. 30 00:01:48,160 --> 00:01:50,320 Speaker 1: I think there's still some questions out there with regard 31 00:01:50,320 --> 00:01:53,200 Speaker 1: to that. I think that given that it was just 32 00:01:53,280 --> 00:01:55,680 Speaker 1: a request, given that some of this information was public, 33 00:01:56,120 --> 00:01:58,320 Speaker 1: what she found at this point was there wasn't enough 34 00:01:58,800 --> 00:02:02,680 Speaker 1: evidence to grant a temporary restraining extraining order or a 35 00:02:02,680 --> 00:02:05,520 Speaker 1: pulmonary injunction, and found that at least at this point, 36 00:02:05,520 --> 00:02:08,200 Speaker 1: the plaintiffs were not likely to UM to win on 37 00:02:08,240 --> 00:02:10,480 Speaker 1: the merits. I think, you know, one of the things 38 00:02:10,480 --> 00:02:14,320 Speaker 1: that was was was heavily stressed in her opinion though, 39 00:02:14,720 --> 00:02:16,440 Speaker 1: was that this is only a request, that this is 40 00:02:16,440 --> 00:02:19,760 Speaker 1: not a demand for information. UM. So the positions of 41 00:02:19,840 --> 00:02:23,200 Speaker 1: the states had taken before this decision and after decision 42 00:02:23,360 --> 00:02:27,040 Speaker 1: remain the same, which is that, um, most states aren't 43 00:02:27,040 --> 00:02:32,160 Speaker 1: going to give information beyond that of what's publicly available. 44 00:02:32,200 --> 00:02:34,239 Speaker 1: In some cases, they're going to require the Commission to 45 00:02:34,280 --> 00:02:36,760 Speaker 1: actually pay for that information and go through the process, 46 00:02:36,800 --> 00:02:39,840 Speaker 1: which could cost thousands of dollars. And then there's another 47 00:02:39,919 --> 00:02:42,400 Speaker 1: question which we'll have to answer um at some point, 48 00:02:42,400 --> 00:02:44,480 Speaker 1: which is is this information going to be any of 49 00:02:44,560 --> 00:02:48,600 Speaker 1: any use at all to determine anything related to election integrity, which, 50 00:02:48,960 --> 00:02:52,600 Speaker 1: of course we can discuss Hans. There's a lot in there, 51 00:02:52,840 --> 00:02:54,480 Speaker 1: but let me just ask you to start with the 52 00:02:54,520 --> 00:02:59,080 Speaker 1: practical implications. What what does this opinion, this decision from 53 00:02:59,160 --> 00:03:02,680 Speaker 1: Judge Clarke tell give the Commission that it might not 54 00:03:02,680 --> 00:03:07,880 Speaker 1: not have had beforehand. Well, it was an obviously obviously 55 00:03:08,000 --> 00:03:10,400 Speaker 1: logical decision because if you look at the letter that 56 00:03:10,480 --> 00:03:13,320 Speaker 1: was sent out by the Commission, uh, they asked for 57 00:03:13,600 --> 00:03:17,600 Speaker 1: publicly available information. So the idea that somehow there was 58 00:03:17,639 --> 00:03:19,800 Speaker 1: going to be some huge invasion of privacy is just 59 00:03:19,880 --> 00:03:24,000 Speaker 1: not true. All of the states provide this very same information. 60 00:03:24,080 --> 00:03:25,880 Speaker 1: For example, I mean, if you go to the website 61 00:03:26,440 --> 00:03:29,799 Speaker 1: of the state Election Board of Virginia, and remember Terry mccallus, 62 00:03:29,800 --> 00:03:31,960 Speaker 1: the governor, was one of the people that was outraged 63 00:03:32,000 --> 00:03:35,240 Speaker 1: at this. You'll find that they have a couple of 64 00:03:35,280 --> 00:03:39,720 Speaker 1: pages where they talk about how UH they provide information 65 00:03:39,840 --> 00:03:46,600 Speaker 1: registered voters list UM, voting history, to political parties, candidates, UH, 66 00:03:46,720 --> 00:03:50,400 Speaker 1: nonprofit organizations, members of the public. So all the commission 67 00:03:50,480 --> 00:03:53,360 Speaker 1: was asking for was the same kind of publicly available 68 00:03:53,400 --> 00:03:57,520 Speaker 1: information that these states already provide basically to anyone who 69 00:03:57,520 --> 00:04:01,480 Speaker 1: walks in the door day it. Let's talk about some 70 00:04:01,520 --> 00:04:07,080 Speaker 1: of the information that was requested. Information like social Security numbers, 71 00:04:07,160 --> 00:04:13,000 Speaker 1: information like dates of birth, voter history, UM, even for 72 00:04:13,040 --> 00:04:19,680 Speaker 1: a military addresses of military Are all these things publicly available? 73 00:04:21,120 --> 00:04:25,480 Speaker 1: Absolutely not. And you know, I think Mr von Spakovski 74 00:04:25,560 --> 00:04:28,279 Speaker 1: is being a little sanguine about the availability of public 75 00:04:28,360 --> 00:04:33,680 Speaker 1: data in almost every state. Name address, political party affiliation, 76 00:04:33,920 --> 00:04:38,760 Speaker 1: sometimes UM, and voting history is available, often not all 77 00:04:38,800 --> 00:04:40,480 Speaker 1: the time, and not to all the people in the 78 00:04:40,520 --> 00:04:44,840 Speaker 1: general public. Sometimes it's restricted for use UM. It is 79 00:04:44,880 --> 00:04:48,440 Speaker 1: extremely rare for any state. I think I've only heard 80 00:04:48,480 --> 00:04:51,280 Speaker 1: of one possibly making social security numbers or even the 81 00:04:51,400 --> 00:04:54,600 Speaker 1: last four of social available, though that is specifically listed 82 00:04:54,600 --> 00:04:57,120 Speaker 1: in the letter and given that there are four spitting 83 00:04:57,120 --> 00:05:00,760 Speaker 1: secretaries of State on the on the Commission, all of 84 00:05:00,800 --> 00:05:03,480 Speaker 1: which all four of their states do not release Class 85 00:05:03,480 --> 00:05:06,760 Speaker 1: four of social security numbers. So presumably they knew that 86 00:05:06,760 --> 00:05:08,679 Speaker 1: at the time, even though they said they were asking 87 00:05:08,720 --> 00:05:12,760 Speaker 1: for publicly available information. It would be very very odd 88 00:05:12,800 --> 00:05:15,440 Speaker 1: to ask for social security information. In addition to that, 89 00:05:16,000 --> 00:05:19,120 Speaker 1: and I think the question about military status is highly 90 00:05:19,440 --> 00:05:23,520 Speaker 1: um problematic as well. Uh. You know, to give out 91 00:05:23,560 --> 00:05:27,520 Speaker 1: information including address name and address information and other identifying 92 00:05:27,560 --> 00:05:31,599 Speaker 1: information for every single registered voter who happens to serve 93 00:05:31,640 --> 00:05:35,400 Speaker 1: in our military, that does to me raise security concerns 94 00:05:35,400 --> 00:05:37,440 Speaker 1: to put it in one place like that, um, And 95 00:05:37,480 --> 00:05:40,640 Speaker 1: it's usually not something that's available publicly to just anyone 96 00:05:40,680 --> 00:05:43,400 Speaker 1: who who wants it, So most of the information they 97 00:05:43,440 --> 00:05:47,760 Speaker 1: specifically listed in the letter was not publicly available at 98 00:05:47,760 --> 00:05:50,279 Speaker 1: the time. We're talking to David Becker, the founder and 99 00:05:50,320 --> 00:05:53,480 Speaker 1: executive director of the Center for Election Innovation and Research, 100 00:05:53,880 --> 00:05:57,159 Speaker 1: and Hans von Spakovski, the manager of the Election Law 101 00:05:57,160 --> 00:06:00,680 Speaker 1: Reform Initiative at the Heritage Foundation and a member of 102 00:06:00,720 --> 00:06:05,560 Speaker 1: Trump's Advisory Commission on Election Integrity, about a DC federal 103 00:06:05,680 --> 00:06:10,880 Speaker 1: judge rejecting a challenge to the Election Integrity Commission's collection 104 00:06:11,160 --> 00:06:14,599 Speaker 1: of voter information. Hans, I want to give you a 105 00:06:14,680 --> 00:06:19,320 Speaker 1: chance to respond to David who said that very few states, 106 00:06:19,360 --> 00:06:24,240 Speaker 1: perhaps just one, allow give out social security the last 107 00:06:24,279 --> 00:06:27,120 Speaker 1: four digits of a social Security number and some of 108 00:06:27,120 --> 00:06:32,080 Speaker 1: the other information that your committee is asking for. Yeah, 109 00:06:32,120 --> 00:06:35,080 Speaker 1: but if you read the letter, it makes look, there's 110 00:06:35,080 --> 00:06:37,440 Speaker 1: a long list of information that the Commission would like 111 00:06:37,480 --> 00:06:40,920 Speaker 1: to have, because the more information it has, the better 112 00:06:41,200 --> 00:06:43,640 Speaker 1: and more accurate its research is going to be. But 113 00:06:44,120 --> 00:06:46,479 Speaker 1: at the end and of all that, it says only 114 00:06:46,480 --> 00:06:49,960 Speaker 1: to the extent that information is publicly available. So the 115 00:06:50,000 --> 00:06:52,279 Speaker 1: idea that again that the Commission was trying to get 116 00:06:52,320 --> 00:06:56,080 Speaker 1: some uh, you know, information that they shouldn't have, is 117 00:06:56,120 --> 00:07:00,360 Speaker 1: just wrong. And and as to the information about military voters, well, 118 00:07:00,400 --> 00:07:03,760 Speaker 1: if anybody had actually watched the first meeting of the 119 00:07:03,800 --> 00:07:06,479 Speaker 1: Commission last week, they would have understood why that was 120 00:07:06,520 --> 00:07:08,440 Speaker 1: being asked for. It's because if you look at the 121 00:07:08,560 --> 00:07:12,560 Speaker 1: latest report filed by the U. S. Election Assistance Commission 122 00:07:12,800 --> 00:07:16,600 Speaker 1: to Congress, which has information on voter registration and turn 123 00:07:16,680 --> 00:07:18,920 Speaker 1: out across the country in the last election, you'll find 124 00:07:18,960 --> 00:07:23,440 Speaker 1: that military voters, unfortunately who are overseas, have the highest 125 00:07:23,480 --> 00:07:28,000 Speaker 1: disenfranchisement rate of any voters UH, any group of voters. UH, 126 00:07:28,160 --> 00:07:31,880 Speaker 1: their ballots are often rejected at a much higher rate 127 00:07:32,160 --> 00:07:36,000 Speaker 1: their absentee ballots than other voters. And so getting information 128 00:07:36,200 --> 00:07:40,800 Speaker 1: on military voters, how many are registered, how many are voting, 129 00:07:40,880 --> 00:07:45,400 Speaker 1: is important UH to the ultimate task of the Commission, 130 00:07:45,400 --> 00:07:47,360 Speaker 1: which is to take a look at the American voting 131 00:07:47,400 --> 00:07:50,240 Speaker 1: and election system and see what can be done to 132 00:07:50,320 --> 00:07:57,280 Speaker 1: improve it. David um Donald Trump has tweeted, among other things, 133 00:07:58,200 --> 00:07:59,720 Speaker 1: as to the states that don't want to turn over 134 00:07:59,760 --> 00:08:03,040 Speaker 1: this information, one has to wonder what they're worried about. 135 00:08:03,880 --> 00:08:07,000 Speaker 1: Why not just turn over the information that is publicly 136 00:08:07,040 --> 00:08:11,920 Speaker 1: available and then make the case that this doesn't show 137 00:08:12,400 --> 00:08:17,520 Speaker 1: that voter fraud is a significant problem. Well, as someone 138 00:08:17,520 --> 00:08:21,960 Speaker 1: who has worked on data projects before, specifically with voter data, 139 00:08:22,160 --> 00:08:25,920 Speaker 1: and whenever there's personally identifiable information or personal data that's 140 00:08:25,960 --> 00:08:28,160 Speaker 1: being used, it's in common on those who are asking 141 00:08:28,200 --> 00:08:31,960 Speaker 1: for it to demonstrate that it's absolutely necessary because if 142 00:08:32,000 --> 00:08:34,920 Speaker 1: you put it in one place, it's a lot easier 143 00:08:34,920 --> 00:08:38,360 Speaker 1: for hackers to get at and to misuse, whereas right 144 00:08:38,400 --> 00:08:41,760 Speaker 1: now it's in at least fifty plus different places under 145 00:08:41,840 --> 00:08:44,600 Speaker 1: different security protocols, which makes it a lot more difficult 146 00:08:44,640 --> 00:08:47,480 Speaker 1: to get as far as the as far as the 147 00:08:47,480 --> 00:08:50,959 Speaker 1: public information, I think the question really should be turned around. 148 00:08:51,360 --> 00:08:53,880 Speaker 1: We've got to We've got a commission that's using taxpayer 149 00:08:53,880 --> 00:08:58,160 Speaker 1: money to investigate a question to which we already know 150 00:08:58,200 --> 00:09:00,400 Speaker 1: the answer, which is how much of a or fraud 151 00:09:00,400 --> 00:09:03,600 Speaker 1: exists in the United States. And the answer is it exists, 152 00:09:03,640 --> 00:09:07,320 Speaker 1: but it's extremely rare. Literally, Republican Secretary of State John 153 00:09:07,360 --> 00:09:09,640 Speaker 1: Houston of Ohio put out a release to in a 154 00:09:09,720 --> 00:09:13,200 Speaker 1: letter to the Commission that says exactly that the secretaries 155 00:09:13,200 --> 00:09:15,760 Speaker 1: of state the election if there both parties, have done 156 00:09:15,760 --> 00:09:18,360 Speaker 1: a remarkably good job of building checks and balances into 157 00:09:18,360 --> 00:09:21,280 Speaker 1: the system, preventing it in those rare cases where it happened, 158 00:09:21,400 --> 00:09:24,120 Speaker 1: discovering it, and prosecuting it. And this is why you 159 00:09:24,200 --> 00:09:28,280 Speaker 1: get UM people like Republican Secretary of State Delbert Hosen 160 00:09:28,320 --> 00:09:32,800 Speaker 1: from Mississippi UM who told the commission jump in the 161 00:09:32,800 --> 00:09:36,320 Speaker 1: gulf um. You have to demonstrate the need for private 162 00:09:36,520 --> 00:09:41,240 Speaker 1: personal information before you ask for it. And the Commission 163 00:09:41,320 --> 00:09:43,000 Speaker 1: still hasn't done that. They've held a meeting, and they 164 00:09:43,040 --> 00:09:45,200 Speaker 1: still haven't described exactly what they're going to do with 165 00:09:45,240 --> 00:09:47,400 Speaker 1: this data, how it's going to be used, how it's 166 00:09:47,440 --> 00:09:49,400 Speaker 1: going to be answered the question, and just as importantly, 167 00:09:49,600 --> 00:09:51,600 Speaker 1: who are the people who are going to analyze this 168 00:09:51,679 --> 00:09:54,719 Speaker 1: and what are their qualifications? Hans, Let me ask you 169 00:09:54,880 --> 00:09:59,599 Speaker 1: first about the security issue. We're now have this information. 170 00:09:59,760 --> 00:10:03,720 Speaker 1: It's going to go into database at the White House, 171 00:10:03,840 --> 00:10:07,240 Speaker 1: and that database is going to be UH staff by 172 00:10:07,240 --> 00:10:10,120 Speaker 1: an employee of the Vice President's office and the White 173 00:10:10,200 --> 00:10:16,880 Speaker 1: House Information Technology staff. Is there a problem with security? 174 00:10:16,880 --> 00:10:19,320 Speaker 1: A lot of different we know of all the different 175 00:10:19,400 --> 00:10:23,000 Speaker 1: kinds of hacks, and you've even had instances where someone 176 00:10:23,080 --> 00:10:26,200 Speaker 1: on your committee, I believe it was from Ohio, had 177 00:10:26,679 --> 00:10:30,959 Speaker 1: some of the by mistake put out publicly some information 178 00:10:31,080 --> 00:10:33,960 Speaker 1: on voters. So I mean there are there is a 179 00:10:34,040 --> 00:10:39,840 Speaker 1: lot of UH security risk, isn't there? Well, there's security 180 00:10:39,960 --> 00:10:43,480 Speaker 1: risks at all the different states, their security risks with 181 00:10:43,559 --> 00:10:46,360 Speaker 1: all of the members of the public, candidates and political 182 00:10:46,400 --> 00:10:50,520 Speaker 1: parties that these states routinely provide this information for their 183 00:10:50,600 --> 00:10:54,600 Speaker 1: security risks with all of the commercial data companies that 184 00:10:54,679 --> 00:10:59,479 Speaker 1: they routinely provide this information for companies like Catalyst um 185 00:10:59,520 --> 00:11:03,120 Speaker 1: airst Model, which take this data, reprocess it and then 186 00:11:03,200 --> 00:11:06,240 Speaker 1: sell it to political candidates and others to to run 187 00:11:06,280 --> 00:11:08,439 Speaker 1: their campaign. Certainly that's a risk, but but here it's 188 00:11:08,440 --> 00:11:12,000 Speaker 1: in one place. Here, it will be in one place. Well, 189 00:11:12,040 --> 00:11:16,200 Speaker 1: if you go to the website of the commercial data companies, uh, 190 00:11:16,240 --> 00:11:19,079 Speaker 1: it's all in one place also. And yet I don't 191 00:11:19,480 --> 00:11:22,440 Speaker 1: believe anyone has raised any concerns about the fact that 192 00:11:22,480 --> 00:11:26,400 Speaker 1: the States routinely sell this information to these commercial companies. 193 00:11:26,800 --> 00:11:29,000 Speaker 1: So I don't I just don't think that's an issue. Yet. 194 00:11:29,080 --> 00:11:31,560 Speaker 1: It's it's a risk, but the whole point of this 195 00:11:31,920 --> 00:11:33,800 Speaker 1: is to use this information to take a look at 196 00:11:33,840 --> 00:11:37,480 Speaker 1: the American political process and try to figure out what 197 00:11:37,559 --> 00:11:41,240 Speaker 1: kind of vulnerabilities there are that ought to be remedied. 198 00:11:41,280 --> 00:11:46,160 Speaker 1: It's not just to read the mission of the executive 199 00:11:46,240 --> 00:11:48,360 Speaker 1: order has read. The idea that it's only supposed to 200 00:11:48,360 --> 00:11:50,840 Speaker 1: look at voter fraud is simply not true. And again, 201 00:11:51,320 --> 00:11:54,680 Speaker 1: if you actually watch the first meeting, we discussed everything 202 00:11:55,200 --> 00:11:59,839 Speaker 1: from election integrity, two problems with voter registration systems, to 203 00:12:00,640 --> 00:12:03,480 Speaker 1: looking at the equipment that is being used. You know, 204 00:12:03,600 --> 00:12:07,440 Speaker 1: how far down is it in it's in its expected life. 205 00:12:07,600 --> 00:12:09,760 Speaker 1: Are the county's going to have the money to buy 206 00:12:09,800 --> 00:12:14,200 Speaker 1: a new equipment, To things like um the disenfranchisement rate 207 00:12:14,240 --> 00:12:16,880 Speaker 1: of military voters. One of the other questions that was 208 00:12:16,960 --> 00:12:18,920 Speaker 1: asked in the letter that went out that no one 209 00:12:19,000 --> 00:12:23,079 Speaker 1: mentions is we asked the states to send us information 210 00:12:23,160 --> 00:12:26,079 Speaker 1: about any attempts to I'm going to have people out 211 00:12:26,080 --> 00:12:27,480 Speaker 1: of the key, people out of the point. We're going 212 00:12:27,520 --> 00:12:29,679 Speaker 1: to have to leave it at that. Thank you both. 213 00:12:29,720 --> 00:12:32,640 Speaker 1: That's hand. Von Spakovsky is a manager of the Election 214 00:12:32,720 --> 00:12:35,880 Speaker 1: Law Reform Initiative at the Heritage Foundation, and David Becker 215 00:12:36,200 --> 00:12:38,720 Speaker 1: the founder and executive director of the Center for Election 216 00:12:38,800 --> 00:12:39,960 Speaker 1: Innovation and Research.