WEBVTT - The GE of Today

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to tech Stuff, a production of I Heart Radios,

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<v Speaker 1>How Stuff Works. Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with

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<v Speaker 1>How Stuff Works and I Heart Radio and I love

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<v Speaker 1>all things tech. And we have come to the end

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<v Speaker 1>of our journey covering the history of General Electric up

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<v Speaker 1>to today, and just a heads up, this episode is

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<v Speaker 1>going to focus a lot on the business side of

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<v Speaker 1>General Electric rather than the tech side of General Electric.

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<v Speaker 1>I could have ended the series with the last episode

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<v Speaker 1>as far as the technological innovations go. Now, that's not

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<v Speaker 1>to say GE hasn't continued to innovate in the post

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<v Speaker 1>Jack Welch era, but rather that the innovations the company

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<v Speaker 1>is most known for span the previous one hundred years

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<v Speaker 1>of its existence. The last twenty year is the most recent.

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<v Speaker 1>Twenty years have been more marked with controversy and business

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<v Speaker 1>practices and market issues, and I think it's important to

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<v Speaker 1>understand what's happened since two thousand one because g has

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<v Speaker 1>been such an incredibly important part of the modern technological landscape.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, that's one of the main companies that helped

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<v Speaker 1>spread the electrical infrastructure in the United States. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>without GE, it would have taken much longer for that

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<v Speaker 1>to have happened, and the world would be very different

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<v Speaker 1>today if GE had not existed. But in the last episode,

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<v Speaker 1>I told you guys about Jack Welch, the g E

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<v Speaker 1>CEO who pushed the company to incredible profitability, mainly by

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<v Speaker 1>selling off businesses where General Electric wasn't in first or

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<v Speaker 1>second place in the industry. He sold off more than

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<v Speaker 1>seventy of g S businesses just in his first two

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<v Speaker 1>years of being CEO. He also laid off more than

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<v Speaker 1>one hundred thousand employees, which earned him the nickname Neutron

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<v Speaker 1>Jack because like a neutron bomb, he eliminated people without

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<v Speaker 1>damaging the assets. And he also led efforts to acquire

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<v Speaker 1>financial institutions like banks and insurance companies in order to

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<v Speaker 1>launch this financial and insurance business, and that would end

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<v Speaker 1>up giving g E an enormous revenue boost. It would

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<v Speaker 1>become incredibly important for the company in the nineteen eighties

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<v Speaker 1>and beyond for different reasons. Now. One exception to Welch's

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<v Speaker 1>amazing victories was an acquisition of a securities firm called Kidder,

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<v Speaker 1>Peabody and Company, which was actually an even older company

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<v Speaker 1>than General Electric. If you looked at the origin for

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<v Speaker 1>Kidder Peabody and Company, that firm traced its history all

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<v Speaker 1>the way back to eighteen sixty five, more than a

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<v Speaker 1>decade before even the earliest of companies that formed General Electric.

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<v Speaker 1>Welch led the acquisition effort in nineteen six, but then

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<v Speaker 1>there were a series of scandals centered around insider trading

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<v Speaker 1>that brought a lot of suspicion and scrutiny on Kider

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<v Speaker 1>Peabodies business and therefore g E Capital the financial division

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<v Speaker 1>of General Electric, and a year after the acquisition, the

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<v Speaker 1>global stock markets crashed on October nineteenth seven and what

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<v Speaker 1>was called Black Monday. The combination of events convinced Welch

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<v Speaker 1>that he had made an error in judgment acquiring Kidder Peabody,

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<v Speaker 1>and it took several more years and more scandals centering

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<v Speaker 1>on Kidder Peabodies record keeping and allegations of reporting false profits,

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<v Speaker 1>but GE would eventually sell Kidder Peabody off at a

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<v Speaker 1>huge loss. Now that embarrassment aside, GE for the most

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<v Speaker 1>part did very well in the eighties and nineties. The

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<v Speaker 1>stock price for g E rose four thousand percent. Some

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<v Speaker 1>sources state that when you take all the factors into consideration,

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<v Speaker 1>it was more like five thousand two. Under Welch's command,

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<v Speaker 1>he put off his retirement in order to secure an

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<v Speaker 1>acquisition of Honeywell International. If you listen to my last episode,

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<v Speaker 1>you know that didn't go well. The European Commission denied

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<v Speaker 1>the merger for anti competitive reasons, and the man who

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<v Speaker 1>hated to lose, Jack Welch, had to go out on

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<v Speaker 1>a down note. But compared to GE, you could say

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<v Speaker 1>Jack Welch got off easy. Now, this episode will cover

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<v Speaker 1>what happened to General Electric since two thousand one, including

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<v Speaker 1>the events that would create massive problems for the huge company.

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<v Speaker 1>And there is ongoing disagreement as to whether most of

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<v Speaker 1>the blame should fall on Welch's successor, or if Welch

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<v Speaker 1>himself should shoulder some of that responsibility or some other party.

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<v Speaker 1>So what the heck actually happened? Well, first, let me

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<v Speaker 1>talk a little bit about g S stock, because that's

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<v Speaker 1>going to come back around later in this episode. A

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<v Speaker 1>few times. So, for years, g E paid out a

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<v Speaker 1>dividend on its stock. Not all companies do this, and

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<v Speaker 1>a dividend is a payment that a company makes to

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<v Speaker 1>distribute some of its revenue to its shareholders. So a

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<v Speaker 1>company makes money and then distributes some of that money

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<v Speaker 1>amongst the people who hold shares in the company. It's

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<v Speaker 1>usually not very much per share. In fact, it's typically

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<v Speaker 1>less than a dollar. Gees case, it was around thirty

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<v Speaker 1>one cents for a long time. In the US, there

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<v Speaker 1>are no rules about how frequently a company actually pays

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<v Speaker 1>out dividends. Most companies will do it quarterly, so you

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<v Speaker 1>would get one quarter of your dividend four times a year.

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<v Speaker 1>So if it was a dividend of forty cents, that

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<v Speaker 1>means every three months you would get a check for

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<v Speaker 1>ten cents for every share you own. So it's not

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<v Speaker 1>very much, but if you own a lot of shares,

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<v Speaker 1>it starts to add up. And besides distributing revenue, it's

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<v Speaker 1>also meant to incentivize shareholders to reinvest and buy more

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<v Speaker 1>shares of stock in that company. So the idea is, oh,

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<v Speaker 1>you got a dividend payout, it's enough for you to

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<v Speaker 1>buy another share in the company, so you spend that

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<v Speaker 1>dividend buying another share. That's the logic there. Well, when

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<v Speaker 1>Welch first took over g E stock wasn't doing so great,

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<v Speaker 1>it wasn't super high. A lot of investors thought of

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<v Speaker 1>the stocks as essentially a dividend payout and not much else.

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<v Speaker 1>So you wouldn't buy g E stocks with the idea

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<v Speaker 1>of selling them at a higher price later on the road.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, you weren't thinking, I'm gonna buy now, because

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<v Speaker 1>in five or ten years this stock is going to

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<v Speaker 1>be worth two or three times as much. You bought

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<v Speaker 1>g E stock because it paid out a dividend, so

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<v Speaker 1>it would take a long time, but you would eventually

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<v Speaker 1>make more money than you invested if that dividend were

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<v Speaker 1>to hold steady. Now, when Welch took over, the stock

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<v Speaker 1>price actually dipped a little bit after he had been

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<v Speaker 1>running GE for a year or two, But another year

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<v Speaker 1>later the entire stock market took a turn and it

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<v Speaker 1>started climb and value. This would be the beginning of

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<v Speaker 1>eighteen years of a climbing market, a bull market. In

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<v Speaker 1>other words, even with events like Black Monday in Night

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<v Speaker 1>seven taken into account, so you had moments where the

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<v Speaker 1>market was not bullish, where it was crashing, but it

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<v Speaker 1>would recover and then go back on its bullish route trajectory.

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<v Speaker 1>If you will now, collectively the SMP five hundred index

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<v Speaker 1>it would climb by two thousand and this was the

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<v Speaker 1>same time that we started seeing packages like four oh

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<v Speaker 1>one K plans replaced traditional retirement plans. Now that meant

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<v Speaker 1>that stock market performance would become far more important to

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<v Speaker 1>weigh more people. Like in the old days, it was

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<v Speaker 1>just people who traded in stocks, and largely it was

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of businesses that did that trading. Your average

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<v Speaker 1>person didn't play the stock market that much. But now

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<v Speaker 1>stuff like our retirement was tied directly into stock market performance.

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<v Speaker 1>So suddenly everybody was really really focusing on the stock market,

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<v Speaker 1>and it meant that it became far more important for

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<v Speaker 1>stocks to do well. See before the nineteen eighties, stock

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<v Speaker 1>market performance was you know, it was an indicator of

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<v Speaker 1>a company's overall health, but most people didn't consider it

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<v Speaker 1>the metric against which all companies should stand. You would

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<v Speaker 1>worry more about the company's profitability, how much revenue is

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<v Speaker 1>it bringing in, how much does it cost to do business,

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<v Speaker 1>and how much profit is the company making. The share

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<v Speaker 1>price wasn't as big a deal. That changed around the

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<v Speaker 1>same time that Welch took over at g E and

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<v Speaker 1>Welch's philosophy happened to match this general shift in how

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<v Speaker 1>businesses operated in the United States. Now. I don't say

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<v Speaker 1>this to diminish Welch's contributions or GEES performance, because the

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<v Speaker 1>company's own stock outperformed the general market significantly. But I

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<v Speaker 1>do also want to take the overall market performance into consideration,

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<v Speaker 1>because while I don't want to take any credit away,

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<v Speaker 1>I also don't want to give too much credit to

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<v Speaker 1>Welch and his impact beyond what it actually was. Anyway,

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<v Speaker 1>as the market improved, and as g S performance in

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<v Speaker 1>particular made its stock price rocket upwards, ge stocks were

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<v Speaker 1>seen as more than just a dividend payout. The company

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<v Speaker 1>continued to pay dividends, though, which again is going to

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<v Speaker 1>be important later. Those dividends were largely funded by the

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<v Speaker 1>incredible performance of g E Capital, that's the financial services

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<v Speaker 1>division of General Electric. In the last year of Welch's

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<v Speaker 1>tenure as CEO, GEES stock price did take several hits,

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<v Speaker 1>but then so did just about everybody else. In March

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<v Speaker 1>two thousand, the stock markets performance shifted. It was no

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<v Speaker 1>longer bullish. It was going into a bear market, so

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<v Speaker 1>instead of growing, it was receding. The Dot com bubble

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<v Speaker 1>had crashed, and that caused a bit of a stock

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<v Speaker 1>market crisis. Companies that were in the dot com in dustry,

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<v Speaker 1>obviously they suffered the most. Many of them just were

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<v Speaker 1>blinking out of existence after it became clear that those

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<v Speaker 1>companies had no way to deliver upon the promises that

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<v Speaker 1>they were making or to be able to justify the

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<v Speaker 1>crazy speculation that drove their stock prices into the stratosphere

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<v Speaker 1>before the companies had even figured out how to generate

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<v Speaker 1>ascent in revenue. But even companies like General Electric, which

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<v Speaker 1>were traditional, established, giant conglomerate companies, were affected by this

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<v Speaker 1>change in the market. Between March two thousand and when

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<v Speaker 1>Welch would hand over the CEO role to his successor,

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<v Speaker 1>Jeff Emilt, in early September two thousand one, the stock

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<v Speaker 1>price for GE had fallen by twenty four percent. Now

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<v Speaker 1>I point that out because often the simplified story about

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<v Speaker 1>what happened to GE was that Jack Welch stepped down

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<v Speaker 1>and Imilt fumbled the ball, that Emilt was a terrible

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<v Speaker 1>CEO and he could not follow Welch's lead. But in reality,

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<v Speaker 1>I think the story is far more nuanced, and we

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<v Speaker 1>have to remember that the market itself was changing during

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<v Speaker 1>this transition. It wasn't the case of Emilt being handed

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<v Speaker 1>a profitable company on a silver platter and nothing was

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<v Speaker 1>going wrong and he just messed it up from there. Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>He did make a ton of decisions that would not

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<v Speaker 1>turn out to be great for GE. So I don't

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<v Speaker 1>want to diminish his responsibility either. I just think it's

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<v Speaker 1>important for us to take all these factors into consideration. Okay.

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<v Speaker 1>So Welch stepped down on September six, two thousand one.

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<v Speaker 1>Emil took over on September seven, and four days later,

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<v Speaker 1>the United States was rocked by a series of terrorist

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<v Speaker 1>attacks that shook the country to its core. Those effects

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<v Speaker 1>were widespread. The tragedy touched thousands of people directly, tens

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<v Speaker 1>of thousands millions of people indirectly. It transformed the New

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<v Speaker 1>York City Escape permanently, and it caused disruption in the

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<v Speaker 1>markets as well. Wall Street made the decision to not

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<v Speaker 1>open the New York Stock Exchange the morning of September eleven,

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<v Speaker 1>two thousand one, fearing that the terrorist attacks would prompt

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<v Speaker 1>panic selling amongst shareholders, making a truly horrible situation even

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<v Speaker 1>more dire both the New York Stock Exchange and the

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<v Speaker 1>NASDAC would remain closed until September two thousand one. When

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<v Speaker 1>trading resumed, the market fell by nearly seven hundred points.

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<v Speaker 1>That was a decline of almost mobile actually more than

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<v Speaker 1>seven per cent, and that was just the first day

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<v Speaker 1>of trading. Losses actually continued throughout that week. I hate

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<v Speaker 1>even talking about this, but it is important in order

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<v Speaker 1>for us to understand ges story. At this stage in

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<v Speaker 1>the company's history, business philosophies had changed significantly in the

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<v Speaker 1>United States in the nineteen eighties and nineteen nineties. We

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<v Speaker 1>had created a new environment where share value was the

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<v Speaker 1>most important metric for a business, the company's stock price.

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<v Speaker 1>If the stock price was going up, that was good.

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<v Speaker 1>That was pretty much the end all be all. A

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<v Speaker 1>company wasn't thought of doing well unless it's stock price

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<v Speaker 1>was growing year over year, or at least the overall

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<v Speaker 1>value of the company when you take in at stock.

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<v Speaker 1>Because of course, companies can do things like stock splits

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<v Speaker 1>so that the price of an individual shriff stock goes down.

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<v Speaker 1>But because you've doubled the number of stocks or a

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<v Speaker 1>number of shares, I should say, out on the market,

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<v Speaker 1>the value of the company itself remains stable and can

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<v Speaker 1>continue to grow. This drove a lot of business decisions

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<v Speaker 1>that put shareholders above just about everything else in the company,

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<v Speaker 1>including customers. Now, in my opinion, it's one of the

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<v Speaker 1>biggest economic mistakes made in recent decades, as it has

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<v Speaker 1>created a world in which many company executives focus very

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<v Speaker 1>much on the short term to mid term gains as

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<v Speaker 1>opposed to long term strategies. So often I think companies

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<v Speaker 1>are making choices that hurt the company's chances to survive

0:14:06.920 --> 0:14:09.960
<v Speaker 1>in the long term, all in an effort to drive

0:14:10.000 --> 0:14:15.079
<v Speaker 1>that stock market price further up. Anyway, this disaster impacted

0:14:15.120 --> 0:14:19.280
<v Speaker 1>gees stock price along with countless other companies, and you

0:14:19.400 --> 0:14:23.440
<v Speaker 1>can't lay that blame on Emilt. It's not his fault

0:14:23.800 --> 0:14:28.160
<v Speaker 1>that this series of awful attacks happened four days after

0:14:28.240 --> 0:14:31.160
<v Speaker 1>he took control of the company. In the wake of

0:14:31.240 --> 0:14:35.560
<v Speaker 1>nine eleven, all airline operations in the United States stopped

0:14:35.680 --> 0:14:39.160
<v Speaker 1>for several days. That had a direct impact on gees business,

0:14:39.160 --> 0:14:42.080
<v Speaker 1>which included building stuff like jet engines for the airlines

0:14:42.520 --> 0:14:46.800
<v Speaker 1>and also leasing out parts for various companies. All of

0:14:46.800 --> 0:14:49.320
<v Speaker 1>that was put on hold. On top of that, gees

0:14:49.440 --> 0:14:53.560
<v Speaker 1>insurance business was suddenly inundated with claims which the company

0:14:53.640 --> 0:14:56.160
<v Speaker 1>had to make good on. For one thing, GE was

0:14:56.200 --> 0:14:59.920
<v Speaker 1>responsible for the insurance policy for the World Trade Center, which,

0:15:00.080 --> 0:15:03.080
<v Speaker 1>as I'm sure you all know, lost the two towers

0:15:03.360 --> 0:15:06.400
<v Speaker 1>that made the center iconic back in two thousand one

0:15:06.400 --> 0:15:09.600
<v Speaker 1>as a result of those attacks. Prior to September eleven,

0:15:10.080 --> 0:15:12.880
<v Speaker 1>it wasn't unusual for GE to lean a bit heavily

0:15:13.040 --> 0:15:17.400
<v Speaker 1>on GE capital to kind of smooth things over. The

0:15:17.440 --> 0:15:20.600
<v Speaker 1>branch was so profitable, that division of GE was so

0:15:20.720 --> 0:15:24.680
<v Speaker 1>profitable that could help conceal if another division weren't quite

0:15:24.880 --> 0:15:29.440
<v Speaker 1>doing so well. A lot of gees accounting practices have

0:15:29.680 --> 0:15:33.160
<v Speaker 1>over the years been called opaque, meaning that you might

0:15:33.280 --> 0:15:36.240
<v Speaker 1>get the end result of how well the overall company

0:15:36.320 --> 0:15:39.480
<v Speaker 1>is doing, but you might not know how it got there,

0:15:39.840 --> 0:15:42.720
<v Speaker 1>which divisions are doing well versus which ones are not.

0:15:43.280 --> 0:15:46.280
<v Speaker 1>The overall performance of the company was what mattered, right,

0:15:46.360 --> 0:15:49.960
<v Speaker 1>So who cares what's happening in the individual divisions. Well,

0:15:50.040 --> 0:15:52.800
<v Speaker 1>Emil would get to work selling off parts of GES

0:15:52.840 --> 0:15:55.960
<v Speaker 1>insurance business, though the company would still maintain some of

0:15:55.960 --> 0:15:58.960
<v Speaker 1>that business up to present day. I'll explain more about

0:15:59.000 --> 0:16:01.840
<v Speaker 1>that in a little bit. It and he also began

0:16:01.880 --> 0:16:06.080
<v Speaker 1>to look at possible acquisitions. So what things turn out, Well,

0:16:06.800 --> 0:16:12.240
<v Speaker 1>we'll find out. But spoiler alert, no they don't. But

0:16:12.320 --> 0:16:14.960
<v Speaker 1>before I get into that, let's take a quick break.

0:16:22.600 --> 0:16:24.920
<v Speaker 1>One thing I want to mention before I forget it

0:16:25.000 --> 0:16:29.000
<v Speaker 1>is that during Emilt's run as CEO of GE, there

0:16:29.080 --> 0:16:32.640
<v Speaker 1>was a particularly wasteful practice going on that would later

0:16:32.680 --> 0:16:35.520
<v Speaker 1>get a lot of media attention when it was made public.

0:16:36.080 --> 0:16:39.720
<v Speaker 1>Emilt traveled a lot. He would meet with various GE

0:16:39.880 --> 0:16:42.960
<v Speaker 1>executives and facilities all around the world, as well as

0:16:43.000 --> 0:16:47.720
<v Speaker 1>with other company and industry leaders and politicians. Particularly. He

0:16:47.720 --> 0:16:49.320
<v Speaker 1>would do this when he was on the lookout for

0:16:49.400 --> 0:16:52.880
<v Speaker 1>possible acquisitions, and he made a lot of those as

0:16:52.960 --> 0:16:55.720
<v Speaker 1>he was CEO of g E. Now, to hop over

0:16:55.800 --> 0:16:57.760
<v Speaker 1>to the other side of the world, he would take

0:16:57.840 --> 0:17:01.840
<v Speaker 1>one of the g E owned business jets. They had

0:17:02.000 --> 0:17:05.200
<v Speaker 1>six of them. But here's the curious thing. Every time

0:17:05.240 --> 0:17:08.600
<v Speaker 1>you would travel, there would be a second empty jet

0:17:08.960 --> 0:17:12.600
<v Speaker 1>that would follow along behind and stay at the same

0:17:12.640 --> 0:17:16.320
<v Speaker 1>airport and wait there. And then when Emilt would fly back,

0:17:16.880 --> 0:17:20.560
<v Speaker 1>so did the empty jet. Now the justification for that practice,

0:17:21.280 --> 0:17:25.119
<v Speaker 1>which again eventually became public, in which a jet carrying

0:17:25.240 --> 0:17:29.440
<v Speaker 1>only a crew no passengers would burn through fuel, it

0:17:29.440 --> 0:17:33.320
<v Speaker 1>would generate pollution. The justification was that Emilt was a

0:17:33.440 --> 0:17:38.199
<v Speaker 1>very important person on very important business and yes I

0:17:38.280 --> 0:17:43.359
<v Speaker 1>capitalized very important in my notes in this section. As such,

0:17:43.680 --> 0:17:47.320
<v Speaker 1>he couldn't be delayed by mechanical failures. His business was

0:17:47.359 --> 0:17:51.080
<v Speaker 1>far too important. So the empty jet was essentially a

0:17:51.119 --> 0:17:55.439
<v Speaker 1>backup transport in case his primary should experience a mechanical delay.

0:17:55.680 --> 0:17:59.920
<v Speaker 1>It was his just in case measure, a very expend

0:18:00.160 --> 0:18:04.240
<v Speaker 1>of wasteful measure. The company would actually stop that practice

0:18:04.280 --> 0:18:07.080
<v Speaker 1>in two thousand fourteen, which was a few years before

0:18:07.119 --> 0:18:10.880
<v Speaker 1>Emilt would be replaced as CEO. Spoiler alert, will get there,

0:18:11.160 --> 0:18:13.960
<v Speaker 1>all right, So back to the post two thousand one

0:18:14.080 --> 0:18:17.439
<v Speaker 1>g E. In two thousand two, GE would acquire a

0:18:17.480 --> 0:18:21.560
<v Speaker 1>business from a formerly huge company. That company was in Ron,

0:18:21.760 --> 0:18:24.280
<v Speaker 1>which went bankrupt in two thousand one after its own

0:18:24.520 --> 0:18:27.520
<v Speaker 1>massive scandal, which I'm not going to get into here.

0:18:27.600 --> 0:18:30.399
<v Speaker 1>It's outside the purview of this episode, but one of

0:18:30.440 --> 0:18:32.639
<v Speaker 1>the many parts of in Ron to go up on

0:18:32.720 --> 0:18:38.040
<v Speaker 1>the auction block after the bankruptcy was a wind power business.

0:18:38.520 --> 0:18:43.160
<v Speaker 1>Emilt was, in his own words, not enthusiastic about wind power.

0:18:43.560 --> 0:18:46.400
<v Speaker 1>He felt wind power wasn't profitable, and it was too

0:18:46.440 --> 0:18:49.960
<v Speaker 1>dependent upon subsidies, and those subsidies could disappear at any

0:18:49.960 --> 0:18:53.959
<v Speaker 1>time according to which way any government budget might be headed,

0:18:54.200 --> 0:18:56.359
<v Speaker 1>So there was no way to control that. If the

0:18:56.400 --> 0:18:59.920
<v Speaker 1>subsidies went away, you'd be saddled with a really expensive

0:19:00.040 --> 0:19:04.600
<v Speaker 1>of a nonprofitable business. But Emil gave the authority to

0:19:04.920 --> 0:19:08.000
<v Speaker 1>executives who really believed in that acquisition to go forward

0:19:08.040 --> 0:19:10.840
<v Speaker 1>with it, and they went and purchased the division. It

0:19:10.880 --> 0:19:14.840
<v Speaker 1>would end up becoming profitable and perhaps should have served

0:19:14.880 --> 0:19:17.760
<v Speaker 1>as a lesson for future emmilt and I'll get back

0:19:17.920 --> 0:19:20.280
<v Speaker 1>into what I mean about that in just a little bit.

0:19:20.640 --> 0:19:24.240
<v Speaker 1>In two thousand three, GE announced its intention to purchase

0:19:24.280 --> 0:19:28.680
<v Speaker 1>a majority stake in Universal Pictures. That was a company

0:19:28.720 --> 0:19:31.120
<v Speaker 1>that was under the control of another company called Vivendi,

0:19:31.200 --> 0:19:34.760
<v Speaker 1>a French company. In this deal, g E would acquire

0:19:34.880 --> 0:19:39.000
<v Speaker 1>eighty percent of Universal. Vivindi was going through kind of

0:19:39.000 --> 0:19:43.399
<v Speaker 1>a financial crisis at the time, so GE merged Universal

0:19:43.640 --> 0:19:48.199
<v Speaker 1>with NBC, creating NBC Universal, and the deal included several

0:19:48.320 --> 0:19:52.760
<v Speaker 1>cable television channels like Sci Fi Network, USA Network, as

0:19:52.760 --> 0:19:56.159
<v Speaker 1>well as the Universal Film Studio, the Universal Theme parks.

0:19:56.720 --> 0:19:59.720
<v Speaker 1>It did not include Universal Music that would remain completely

0:19:59.760 --> 0:20:03.240
<v Speaker 1>under Vendy's control, but lots of the other Universal properties

0:20:03.400 --> 0:20:07.000
<v Speaker 1>were part of this deal. Vivendi would have twenty control

0:20:07.040 --> 0:20:11.159
<v Speaker 1>of this and then UH you would have GE with

0:20:11.920 --> 0:20:16.280
<v Speaker 1>control and you got in BC Universal. G E would

0:20:16.280 --> 0:20:19.600
<v Speaker 1>not hold on to this property forever. G was acquiring

0:20:19.640 --> 0:20:21.960
<v Speaker 1>other companies as well at this time, adding them to

0:20:22.040 --> 0:20:26.720
<v Speaker 1>the various divisions of General Electric. GE. Healthcare was growing

0:20:26.760 --> 0:20:32.160
<v Speaker 1>with companies like UH Instrumentarium and Amersham Plc. Those were

0:20:32.160 --> 0:20:36.560
<v Speaker 1>being added as part of healthcare. G Capital was also

0:20:36.600 --> 0:20:40.560
<v Speaker 1>growing with similar acquisitions, including some subprime mortgage loan companies,

0:20:40.600 --> 0:20:42.560
<v Speaker 1>and we'll get into that in a bit. And G

0:20:42.880 --> 0:20:46.680
<v Speaker 1>would also build out its industrial, consumer and energy businesses

0:20:47.040 --> 0:20:50.520
<v Speaker 1>and made several acquisitions of companies in the oil industry,

0:20:50.880 --> 0:20:54.840
<v Speaker 1>also in banking and that old course of fossil fuels

0:20:54.880 --> 0:20:59.320
<v Speaker 1>in general, because he really believed that that was going

0:20:59.359 --> 0:21:03.879
<v Speaker 1>to be the mainstay for energy production or electricity production.

0:21:03.920 --> 0:21:06.840
<v Speaker 1>I guess I should say for the foreseeable future. Throughout

0:21:06.880 --> 0:21:10.520
<v Speaker 1>this time, GE Capital would remain the most profitable division

0:21:10.600 --> 0:21:13.280
<v Speaker 1>of General Electric, and so the company would lean more

0:21:13.359 --> 0:21:16.840
<v Speaker 1>heavily upon GE Capital in order to do things like

0:21:16.920 --> 0:21:21.360
<v Speaker 1>pay out that dividend to shareholders that set up GE

0:21:21.359 --> 0:21:24.680
<v Speaker 1>for disaster. Just a couple of years after GE purchased

0:21:24.960 --> 0:21:30.520
<v Speaker 1>subprime mortgage businesses, the world plunged into a global economic crisis,

0:21:30.560 --> 0:21:33.160
<v Speaker 1>which we often refer to as the two thousand eight

0:21:33.320 --> 0:21:38.280
<v Speaker 1>financial crisis, but really the crisis first started becoming apparent

0:21:38.359 --> 0:21:42.080
<v Speaker 1>in two thousand seven with the subprime mortgage market. So

0:21:42.119 --> 0:21:44.920
<v Speaker 1>what the heck is a subprime mortgage Well, the short

0:21:44.960 --> 0:21:50.000
<v Speaker 1>answer is it's an incredibly risky, predatory, and irresponsible market

0:21:50.040 --> 0:21:54.280
<v Speaker 1>practice that depends upon people who are some of the

0:21:54.280 --> 0:21:57.639
<v Speaker 1>most vulnerable folks out there. Maybe that's just me putting

0:21:57.640 --> 0:21:59.840
<v Speaker 1>my own bias on things, but it's hard for me

0:21:59.880 --> 0:22:02.320
<v Speaker 1>to see the whole concept as anything other than dumb

0:22:02.400 --> 0:22:05.359
<v Speaker 1>and harmful. But here's how it breaks down, all right.

0:22:05.359 --> 0:22:08.000
<v Speaker 1>So you know about credit scores, right, They're supposed to

0:22:08.000 --> 0:22:10.959
<v Speaker 1>represent how much of a risk or a lack of

0:22:11.080 --> 0:22:13.160
<v Speaker 1>risk a person is when it comes to paying off

0:22:13.200 --> 0:22:16.359
<v Speaker 1>debt like loans. So if you have a high credit score,

0:22:16.720 --> 0:22:19.480
<v Speaker 1>it means your history shows that you're diligent about paying

0:22:19.480 --> 0:22:22.359
<v Speaker 1>off debt and that you represent a low risk for

0:22:22.440 --> 0:22:25.160
<v Speaker 1>future loans. It does not mean that you've never had debt.

0:22:25.480 --> 0:22:27.200
<v Speaker 1>You want to have some debt, and then you want

0:22:27.200 --> 0:22:29.080
<v Speaker 1>to be able to pay it off because that's what

0:22:29.440 --> 0:22:31.359
<v Speaker 1>gets you that high credit score. But if you have

0:22:31.400 --> 0:22:34.040
<v Speaker 1>a low credit score, it means that, in the eyes

0:22:34.080 --> 0:22:36.720
<v Speaker 1>of a lender, you represent a risk. Maybe you have

0:22:36.760 --> 0:22:39.399
<v Speaker 1>a spotty employment history, maybe you have a lot of

0:22:39.400 --> 0:22:42.880
<v Speaker 1>outstanding debt, maybe you've missed some payments on some loans.

0:22:43.400 --> 0:22:45.760
<v Speaker 1>The purpose of these credit scores is to give lenders

0:22:45.840 --> 0:22:51.480
<v Speaker 1>enough information to make responsible loan agreements. Subprime lending involves

0:22:51.560 --> 0:22:55.800
<v Speaker 1>giving loans to high risk individuals, and typically you pair

0:22:55.840 --> 0:22:59.199
<v Speaker 1>this with really high interest rates and other restrictions in

0:22:59.280 --> 0:23:02.640
<v Speaker 1>order to mitigate the risk you incur when you give

0:23:02.720 --> 0:23:04.879
<v Speaker 1>a loan out to one of these people who have

0:23:04.960 --> 0:23:07.520
<v Speaker 1>a very low credit score. And so people who are

0:23:07.520 --> 0:23:10.640
<v Speaker 1>looking to buy homes or to take out other loans

0:23:11.000 --> 0:23:15.240
<v Speaker 1>were securing the money through financial institutions with these subprime

0:23:15.400 --> 0:23:21.040
<v Speaker 1>mortgages and subprime loans, but with incredibly punishing restrictions on

0:23:21.080 --> 0:23:24.080
<v Speaker 1>those loans, and surprise, surprise, a lot of folks found

0:23:24.080 --> 0:23:27.560
<v Speaker 1>it impossible to pay off that debt, and ultimately many

0:23:27.600 --> 0:23:30.520
<v Speaker 1>of the companies that were making those loans found themselves

0:23:30.520 --> 0:23:33.719
<v Speaker 1>in a hole that they had dug themselves and it

0:23:33.760 --> 0:23:37.199
<v Speaker 1>was too deep to climb out. Everyone was put in

0:23:37.240 --> 0:23:40.240
<v Speaker 1>an awful situation and it had a really big ripple effect.

0:23:40.680 --> 0:23:43.240
<v Speaker 1>Part of that ripple led to an investment bank called

0:23:43.320 --> 0:23:47.560
<v Speaker 1>Lemon Brothers collapsing in September of two thousand eight. Other

0:23:47.640 --> 0:23:51.399
<v Speaker 1>major financial institutions were in danger of following suit. The

0:23:51.480 --> 0:23:55.600
<v Speaker 1>whole thing was leading to a global economic collapse, with

0:23:55.680 --> 0:23:59.600
<v Speaker 1>the financial industry on the brink of total disaster. That's

0:23:59.600 --> 0:24:03.640
<v Speaker 1>when arious parties swooped in to rescue the situation, bailing

0:24:03.680 --> 0:24:07.280
<v Speaker 1>out banks that had over extended themselves. This in turn

0:24:07.400 --> 0:24:10.320
<v Speaker 1>ticked off a lot of folks who are directly affected

0:24:10.320 --> 0:24:12.840
<v Speaker 1>by this problem. These were people who had been evicted

0:24:12.880 --> 0:24:15.239
<v Speaker 1>from their homes because they weren't able to make their

0:24:15.280 --> 0:24:18.439
<v Speaker 1>mortgage payments, or people who were otherwise hurt by the

0:24:18.480 --> 0:24:22.160
<v Speaker 1>subprime mortgage crisis, either directly or indirectly. And it didn't

0:24:22.200 --> 0:24:24.800
<v Speaker 1>help that many of these people saw the bailouts as

0:24:24.800 --> 0:24:29.280
<v Speaker 1>being rewards for the same financial institutions that caused all

0:24:29.320 --> 0:24:32.760
<v Speaker 1>the misery in the first place. Well. Ge Capital was

0:24:32.880 --> 0:24:36.600
<v Speaker 1>one of those institutions, and it was hit hard by

0:24:36.640 --> 0:24:40.240
<v Speaker 1>the two thousand eight crisis worse because General Electric was

0:24:40.320 --> 0:24:44.119
<v Speaker 1>so dependent upon GE Capital for revenue, it put all

0:24:44.160 --> 0:24:47.520
<v Speaker 1>of General Electric at risk. To help whether the storm,

0:24:47.720 --> 0:24:50.480
<v Speaker 1>the company announced it would attempt to raise twelve billion

0:24:50.560 --> 0:24:55.480
<v Speaker 1>dollars through a common stock offering. Warren Buffett investor Extraordinaire,

0:24:55.760 --> 0:24:58.640
<v Speaker 1>also helped out by investing billions of dollars in GE

0:24:59.400 --> 0:25:02.520
<v Speaker 1>in retros. Fact, many analysts have said that GE was

0:25:02.560 --> 0:25:06.720
<v Speaker 1>playing an increasingly dangerous game since Welch had transformed GE

0:25:06.760 --> 0:25:10.440
<v Speaker 1>Capital from a small division that helped consumers get financing

0:25:10.520 --> 0:25:15.840
<v Speaker 1>to purchase big appliances like refrigerators into a global financial institution.

0:25:16.240 --> 0:25:22.040
<v Speaker 1>Gees more traditional divisions like it's lighting business, industrial equipment business,

0:25:22.440 --> 0:25:25.639
<v Speaker 1>medical equipment business, it's a via Asian businesses. All of

0:25:25.680 --> 0:25:29.280
<v Speaker 1>these secured for the company the respect of Wall Street

0:25:29.359 --> 0:25:33.520
<v Speaker 1>because they were dependable parts of GE. They could make

0:25:33.600 --> 0:25:37.200
<v Speaker 1>a dependable revenue, and they were traditional. They had a

0:25:37.240 --> 0:25:40.399
<v Speaker 1>long history with the company that gave the company a

0:25:40.400 --> 0:25:42.960
<v Speaker 1>lot of room to swing for the fences with GE

0:25:43.119 --> 0:25:46.719
<v Speaker 1>Capital and thus engage in more risky behaviors in an

0:25:46.720 --> 0:25:50.199
<v Speaker 1>effort to win big payoffs, drive that stock market price up,

0:25:50.240 --> 0:25:53.520
<v Speaker 1>and again pay out those dividends, and that risk was

0:25:53.600 --> 0:25:57.640
<v Speaker 1>somewhat necessary because of that changing climate of business, So

0:25:58.320 --> 0:26:01.639
<v Speaker 1>you had to grow year over years. Traditional businesses usually

0:26:01.680 --> 0:26:05.000
<v Speaker 1>had steady performance, and they did grow, but they grew slowly,

0:26:05.560 --> 0:26:08.119
<v Speaker 1>so that wasn't the kind of performance that would really

0:26:08.680 --> 0:26:13.960
<v Speaker 1>when you the the front cover of various business magazines,

0:26:14.440 --> 0:26:17.600
<v Speaker 1>you wanted to really go for it. So GE Capital

0:26:18.320 --> 0:26:22.320
<v Speaker 1>was that method. That was how GE was going to

0:26:22.440 --> 0:26:25.439
<v Speaker 1>be the leader. Then it became an anchor weighing the

0:26:25.480 --> 0:26:29.240
<v Speaker 1>company down in the wake of this financial crisis. EMIL

0:26:29.280 --> 0:26:32.320
<v Speaker 1>would start trying to sell off parts of g E Capital,

0:26:32.480 --> 0:26:36.160
<v Speaker 1>but it wasn't easy. Before Buffett rushed into help. GE

0:26:36.440 --> 0:26:40.480
<v Speaker 1>famously couldn't secure overnight loans to keep the business afloat.

0:26:40.800 --> 0:26:43.320
<v Speaker 1>Most investors felt it was far too risky to pour

0:26:43.400 --> 0:26:46.520
<v Speaker 1>money into General Electric, so the house that Jack built

0:26:46.600 --> 0:26:50.480
<v Speaker 1>was in danger of crashing to its foundations. Even with

0:26:50.600 --> 0:26:54.440
<v Speaker 1>the influx of investment cash, not to mention an incredible

0:26:54.560 --> 0:27:00.240
<v Speaker 1>one thirty nine billion dollars of federal government bailout money,

0:27:00.520 --> 0:27:03.840
<v Speaker 1>g was still struggling, and one thing barreling down at

0:27:03.840 --> 0:27:07.879
<v Speaker 1>the company was that dividend payout. The dividend made g

0:27:08.040 --> 0:27:11.680
<v Speaker 1>E stock one of the most popular stocks on the market.

0:27:11.800 --> 0:27:15.359
<v Speaker 1>Tons of people owned g E stock because it paid

0:27:15.359 --> 0:27:18.240
<v Speaker 1>out dividends, But paying how that dividend was going to

0:27:18.280 --> 0:27:20.720
<v Speaker 1>put a huge burden on the company. It just wasn't

0:27:20.720 --> 0:27:22.840
<v Speaker 1>going to have the cash to do it, so in

0:27:22.880 --> 0:27:26.320
<v Speaker 1>two thousand nine, EMIL decided to cut the dividend from

0:27:26.400 --> 0:27:30.000
<v Speaker 1>thirty one cents a share down to ten cents a share.

0:27:30.240 --> 0:27:32.800
<v Speaker 1>It would mark only the second time the company had

0:27:32.800 --> 0:27:36.440
<v Speaker 1>reduced its dividend payout. The first time had been during

0:27:36.480 --> 0:27:40.359
<v Speaker 1>the Great Depression and spoiler alert. It would not be

0:27:40.440 --> 0:27:43.480
<v Speaker 1>the last time they would have to cut the dividend. Also,

0:27:43.560 --> 0:27:46.639
<v Speaker 1>in two thousand nine, the company announced its intention to

0:27:46.680 --> 0:27:51.960
<v Speaker 1>sell off NBC Universal to cable provider Comcast. To do that,

0:27:52.240 --> 0:27:55.280
<v Speaker 1>it would first have to acquire the other twenty percent

0:27:55.560 --> 0:28:00.600
<v Speaker 1>of NBC Universal from Vivindy. They still had that air.

0:28:00.640 --> 0:28:03.480
<v Speaker 1>That process took some time, so it wasn't until two

0:28:03.520 --> 0:28:07.119
<v Speaker 1>thousand eleven that GE would sell off a majority stake

0:28:07.240 --> 0:28:11.040
<v Speaker 1>in NBC Universal to Comcast. At that time, GE would

0:28:11.040 --> 0:28:14.040
<v Speaker 1>still retain a forty nine percent share in the company,

0:28:14.080 --> 0:28:16.880
<v Speaker 1>although it did have the intention to sell the rest

0:28:16.960 --> 0:28:20.119
<v Speaker 1>of those shares off. A few years later, uh. This

0:28:20.119 --> 0:28:22.879
<v Speaker 1>would become a common plot element and a source of

0:28:22.960 --> 0:28:26.879
<v Speaker 1>jokes in the series thirty Rock, just as ges ownership

0:28:26.920 --> 0:28:30.400
<v Speaker 1>of NBC Universal had been a source for humor previously

0:28:30.480 --> 0:28:34.280
<v Speaker 1>in that series. Two years later, in Comcast would arrange

0:28:34.320 --> 0:28:37.800
<v Speaker 1>to purchase the entirety of NBC Universal from g E,

0:28:38.000 --> 0:28:39.800
<v Speaker 1>and g E would get out of the entertainment and

0:28:39.880 --> 0:28:42.240
<v Speaker 1>media business and it would use some of that money

0:28:42.280 --> 0:28:44.320
<v Speaker 1>to cover some of the debt that g E had

0:28:44.360 --> 0:28:48.640
<v Speaker 1>accrued following the two thousand eight financial crisis. The NBC

0:28:48.760 --> 0:28:51.960
<v Speaker 1>Universal deal was just one of several that GE pursued

0:28:52.000 --> 0:28:54.719
<v Speaker 1>in the first decade of the two thousand's The company

0:28:54.760 --> 0:28:57.320
<v Speaker 1>looked to sell off some of its businesses and divisions

0:28:57.360 --> 0:29:00.920
<v Speaker 1>in an effort to refocus on core strategy. G's Emilt

0:29:01.000 --> 0:29:05.040
<v Speaker 1>kept working on ways to extract GE from GE capital business,

0:29:05.920 --> 0:29:07.760
<v Speaker 1>and he didn't have a whole lot of success with it,

0:29:07.960 --> 0:29:10.400
<v Speaker 1>and he had his eyes set on another company to

0:29:10.520 --> 0:29:14.600
<v Speaker 1>try and turn gees prospects around. The company in question

0:29:14.960 --> 0:29:18.440
<v Speaker 1>was a French company that was making coal powered turbines.

0:29:18.680 --> 0:29:20.920
<v Speaker 1>In other words, it was a company that built stuff

0:29:21.000 --> 0:29:25.160
<v Speaker 1>for the energy electric industry electric utilities, right specifically for

0:29:25.240 --> 0:29:29.400
<v Speaker 1>fossil fuel based power companies. The name of this company

0:29:29.560 --> 0:29:33.080
<v Speaker 1>was Alstom A L S T O M. And as

0:29:33.080 --> 0:29:36.080
<v Speaker 1>it would turn out, the timing could not have been worse,

0:29:36.240 --> 0:29:40.240
<v Speaker 1>though it is arguable over whether or not that was predictable.

0:29:40.520 --> 0:29:43.760
<v Speaker 1>At that time, Emil was hoping that Alstom would become

0:29:43.800 --> 0:29:46.880
<v Speaker 1>a key component in g ees power division. He thought

0:29:46.880 --> 0:29:49.520
<v Speaker 1>that Ge could take this French company which had been

0:29:49.560 --> 0:29:54.560
<v Speaker 1>struggling financially, and used GES processes and practices to turn

0:29:54.640 --> 0:29:57.560
<v Speaker 1>Alstom around. Then he would use Alstom to meet the

0:29:57.600 --> 0:30:00.680
<v Speaker 1>electricity demands of clients all over the world at all

0:30:00.760 --> 0:30:05.520
<v Speaker 1>with fossil fuel based turbines. So what went wrong? Well,

0:30:05.520 --> 0:30:15.840
<v Speaker 1>I'll tell you after we take this quick break. Not

0:30:15.960 --> 0:30:20.160
<v Speaker 1>everyone at g was crazy about acquiring Alstom. Several executives

0:30:20.160 --> 0:30:23.000
<v Speaker 1>felt that the asking price was far too high, but

0:30:23.120 --> 0:30:26.680
<v Speaker 1>Emma was optimistic that Ge could take Alstom and turn

0:30:26.720 --> 0:30:29.640
<v Speaker 1>it into a profitable business. As it turns out, he

0:30:29.680 --> 0:30:31.680
<v Speaker 1>wouldn't get the chance to stick around long enough to

0:30:31.720 --> 0:30:35.480
<v Speaker 1>see how far Alstom would fall. But I'm not quite

0:30:35.520 --> 0:30:39.440
<v Speaker 1>there yet. Ge needed to do something. The company's oil

0:30:39.480 --> 0:30:43.000
<v Speaker 1>and gas services, which revolved around actually extracting oil. You know,

0:30:43.040 --> 0:30:45.320
<v Speaker 1>making the equipment that would be used for that sort

0:30:45.360 --> 0:30:48.440
<v Speaker 1>of stuff. Those were on the decline as energy prices

0:30:48.480 --> 0:30:52.280
<v Speaker 1>were collapsing. But the power division GE Power, the part

0:30:52.320 --> 0:30:55.280
<v Speaker 1>of g that actually produced equipment that was used to

0:30:55.400 --> 0:30:59.080
<v Speaker 1>generate electricity, that was still a reliable revenue source. In fact,

0:30:59.240 --> 0:31:02.520
<v Speaker 1>at that point was the largest source of revenue for GE,

0:31:03.120 --> 0:31:05.480
<v Speaker 1>and it had a high profit margin to boot. G

0:31:05.640 --> 0:31:08.320
<v Speaker 1>E made a lot of money from that particular division.

0:31:08.560 --> 0:31:10.120
<v Speaker 1>So if g E could do the same thing for

0:31:10.160 --> 0:31:13.440
<v Speaker 1>Alstom and turn things around, then in Emilt's mind, the

0:31:13.480 --> 0:31:16.640
<v Speaker 1>company would have a rock solid foundation from which to work.

0:31:17.120 --> 0:31:20.760
<v Speaker 1>But a few big factors would hamper the success of Alstom.

0:31:20.800 --> 0:31:23.400
<v Speaker 1>One was that there just wasn't as big a demand

0:31:23.440 --> 0:31:27.360
<v Speaker 1>for turbines as Emilt had anticipated. They got fewer orders

0:31:27.360 --> 0:31:29.560
<v Speaker 1>than what they were hoping for. In places like the

0:31:29.640 --> 0:31:33.960
<v Speaker 1>United States, power companies were improving efficiencies and so they

0:31:33.960 --> 0:31:36.240
<v Speaker 1>were able to do more with less. There wasn't as

0:31:36.240 --> 0:31:40.480
<v Speaker 1>big a demand to add additional infrastructure to meet consumer needs.

0:31:41.120 --> 0:31:44.480
<v Speaker 1>Then there was the fact that Alstom's employees were very

0:31:44.560 --> 0:31:48.280
<v Speaker 1>highly compensated, which was good for them but rough for GE,

0:31:48.880 --> 0:31:52.160
<v Speaker 1>and regulations in the EU meant that EMILT couldn't just

0:31:52.240 --> 0:31:55.600
<v Speaker 1>pull a Jack Welch and start laying off employees in

0:31:55.680 --> 0:31:59.200
<v Speaker 1>an effort to cut costs. EU had protections in place

0:31:59.240 --> 0:32:01.440
<v Speaker 1>to prevent that sort of thing, so you couldn't just

0:32:01.800 --> 0:32:04.720
<v Speaker 1>make the books look better by laying off a bunch

0:32:04.720 --> 0:32:07.520
<v Speaker 1>of people. And the EU also blocked one part of

0:32:07.560 --> 0:32:10.960
<v Speaker 1>the business from g E acquiring it. That was Alstom's

0:32:11.120 --> 0:32:14.959
<v Speaker 1>service business, their maintenance business that would have supplied revenue

0:32:14.960 --> 0:32:17.880
<v Speaker 1>as the company would provide maintenance services for its clients.

0:32:18.200 --> 0:32:21.040
<v Speaker 1>That was off limits. And the other major factor was

0:32:21.080 --> 0:32:24.560
<v Speaker 1>that the cost of building out renewable energy systems fell

0:32:24.800 --> 0:32:29.160
<v Speaker 1>drastically not long after GE completed the ten billion dollar

0:32:29.280 --> 0:32:33.280
<v Speaker 1>acquisition of Alstom in two thousand fifteen, so it looked

0:32:33.320 --> 0:32:37.560
<v Speaker 1>like the wrong bet right buying a very expensive fossil

0:32:37.720 --> 0:32:42.600
<v Speaker 1>fuel based company just as renewable energy prices were falling

0:32:42.640 --> 0:32:46.560
<v Speaker 1>to the point where they were uh they could compete

0:32:46.600 --> 0:32:50.360
<v Speaker 1>against fossil fuels. Now, around the same time that the

0:32:50.480 --> 0:32:54.120
<v Speaker 1>Alstom deal was starting to take shape, GE would spin

0:32:54.200 --> 0:32:57.560
<v Speaker 1>off its credit card business, which was part of GE Capital,

0:32:57.680 --> 0:33:01.720
<v Speaker 1>and it would become Synchrony Finance. Nchell and I'm guessing.

0:33:01.720 --> 0:33:03.480
<v Speaker 1>It filled a lot of folks at GE with a

0:33:03.520 --> 0:33:05.920
<v Speaker 1>bit of dismay to see that once it was free

0:33:05.960 --> 0:33:10.680
<v Speaker 1>of General Electric, this former division actually outperformed all expectations.

0:33:10.680 --> 0:33:13.000
<v Speaker 1>It did much better on its own than it did

0:33:13.040 --> 0:33:15.560
<v Speaker 1>as part of General Electric. On top of that, the

0:33:15.600 --> 0:33:19.160
<v Speaker 1>oil price crash pushed GE to merge its own oil

0:33:19.200 --> 0:33:22.719
<v Speaker 1>and gas division with a company called Baker Hughes, and

0:33:22.760 --> 0:33:26.600
<v Speaker 1>then g E got a majority ownership in the Baker

0:33:26.680 --> 0:33:30.040
<v Speaker 1>Hughes company became Baker Hughes, a g E company at

0:33:30.080 --> 0:33:33.800
<v Speaker 1>least for the time. Oh and two thousand fifteen, GE

0:33:33.800 --> 0:33:36.840
<v Speaker 1>formed a unit called GE Digital. G had been in

0:33:36.920 --> 0:33:40.320
<v Speaker 1>various digital products for a while, but marked the move

0:33:40.360 --> 0:33:44.000
<v Speaker 1>for the company to create an independent business unit. Most

0:33:44.040 --> 0:33:47.760
<v Speaker 1>of the unit's focus was on a software product called Predicts,

0:33:47.760 --> 0:33:51.040
<v Speaker 1>sort of a play on Prediction, and it was a

0:33:51.120 --> 0:33:54.600
<v Speaker 1>business to business product. It was meant to help big

0:33:54.640 --> 0:33:59.480
<v Speaker 1>companies like airlines identify strategies and manage assets. But over

0:33:59.560 --> 0:34:03.160
<v Speaker 1>time that unit would experience slow revenues and technical issues,

0:34:03.480 --> 0:34:06.520
<v Speaker 1>and in eighteen there was real serious talk of GE

0:34:06.720 --> 0:34:10.880
<v Speaker 1>potentially selling off the division entirely. That is yet to happen.

0:34:11.160 --> 0:34:14.919
<v Speaker 1>GE Digital still as part of GE, but GE did

0:34:15.000 --> 0:34:18.839
<v Speaker 1>do a few rounds of layoffs, so things have not

0:34:18.880 --> 0:34:22.000
<v Speaker 1>gone smoothly for that part of the company. Back to

0:34:22.080 --> 0:34:25.880
<v Speaker 1>gees leadership WOS. In October two thousand seventeen, GE announced

0:34:25.920 --> 0:34:29.040
<v Speaker 1>that Jeff Emilt would be stepping down as CEO, and

0:34:29.080 --> 0:34:31.640
<v Speaker 1>he had served in that role for about sixteen years.

0:34:32.120 --> 0:34:34.839
<v Speaker 1>The company's stock price was around a third of what

0:34:34.920 --> 0:34:37.760
<v Speaker 1>it had been when he took control. Emerald had spun

0:34:37.760 --> 0:34:42.360
<v Speaker 1>off numerous businesses over the years, including gees Plastics division

0:34:42.760 --> 0:34:45.440
<v Speaker 1>if you remember, that's the division that Jack Welch had

0:34:45.440 --> 0:34:50.240
<v Speaker 1>actually come to. He had also spun off the appliances business.

0:34:51.000 --> 0:34:53.680
<v Speaker 1>He's spun off the insurance business, or a lot of

0:34:53.680 --> 0:34:56.600
<v Speaker 1>it anyway, and more. And by that time much of

0:34:56.600 --> 0:35:00.440
<v Speaker 1>the upper leadership at g E got caught in a shacub.

0:35:00.520 --> 0:35:02.839
<v Speaker 1>There were members of the board who left, there were

0:35:02.840 --> 0:35:06.839
<v Speaker 1>other executive members who left, and investors, employees, and retirees

0:35:06.920 --> 0:35:09.839
<v Speaker 1>were all growing more and more unhappy. The company had

0:35:09.920 --> 0:35:13.600
<v Speaker 1>lost and estimated one hundred billion dollars worth of shareholder

0:35:13.640 --> 0:35:17.480
<v Speaker 1>wealth over the previous decade and a half. Critics stated

0:35:17.800 --> 0:35:21.280
<v Speaker 1>the Emilt had a habit of chasing after fads, investing

0:35:21.280 --> 0:35:24.439
<v Speaker 1>in businesses at the peak of their visibility and then

0:35:24.520 --> 0:35:27.080
<v Speaker 1>later selling them off for less than what g had

0:35:27.120 --> 0:35:29.319
<v Speaker 1>paid for them in the first place, And people said

0:35:29.320 --> 0:35:32.640
<v Speaker 1>the GE method was to buy high, sell low, which

0:35:32.640 --> 0:35:34.560
<v Speaker 1>in general is the opposite of what you want to do.

0:35:35.120 --> 0:35:38.600
<v Speaker 1>I think, oh no, not a business guy. Not every

0:35:38.640 --> 0:35:41.120
<v Speaker 1>deal Emilt made went sour. By the way, the in

0:35:41.280 --> 0:35:43.720
<v Speaker 1>Ron deal in which g took over that wind power

0:35:43.840 --> 0:35:48.000
<v Speaker 1>business ended up being very profitable, though again Emil initially

0:35:48.000 --> 0:35:52.120
<v Speaker 1>opposed that deal, and when GE sold off its plastics

0:35:52.160 --> 0:35:54.480
<v Speaker 1>division it was for a higher price than what a

0:35:54.480 --> 0:35:58.240
<v Speaker 1>lot of analysts expected. But generally speaking, the deals didn't

0:35:58.320 --> 0:36:02.719
<v Speaker 1>break in gees favor or imilts watch. Emeralt's successor was

0:36:02.800 --> 0:36:05.920
<v Speaker 1>John Flannery, who had up to that point headed up

0:36:06.000 --> 0:36:10.200
<v Speaker 1>gees healthcare business and had worked for GE for thirty years.

0:36:10.560 --> 0:36:13.400
<v Speaker 1>Flannery's goal was to build a strong core for g

0:36:13.560 --> 0:36:17.640
<v Speaker 1>E around its aviation business, its power business, and its

0:36:17.680 --> 0:36:20.920
<v Speaker 1>healthcare business, and there was talk of the possibility that

0:36:21.000 --> 0:36:25.440
<v Speaker 1>GE itself might break apart into several different companies. The

0:36:25.520 --> 0:36:29.000
<v Speaker 1>reaction to that idea kind of fell across the spectrum.

0:36:29.160 --> 0:36:31.880
<v Speaker 1>Some people saw it as a necessity if the various

0:36:31.920 --> 0:36:35.520
<v Speaker 1>parts of GE were to stabilize. Others saw it as

0:36:35.600 --> 0:36:38.239
<v Speaker 1>the end of a legacy, and they had a bit

0:36:38.280 --> 0:36:40.760
<v Speaker 1>of a point. One of the discussions was about possibly

0:36:40.840 --> 0:36:44.680
<v Speaker 1>selling off GES lightbulb business, that was the business that

0:36:44.880 --> 0:36:48.160
<v Speaker 1>started it all, really, all the way back in eight

0:36:48.520 --> 0:36:52.520
<v Speaker 1>seventy eight, and the Edison Electric Light Company. But innovation

0:36:52.560 --> 0:36:55.320
<v Speaker 1>could sometimes be a double edged sword. The move towards

0:36:55.520 --> 0:36:59.120
<v Speaker 1>l E ed lights, which can last for thousands of hours,

0:36:59.480 --> 0:37:01.759
<v Speaker 1>meant that there just wasn't as big a demand for

0:37:01.840 --> 0:37:04.080
<v Speaker 1>light bulbs anymore. Because if you don't have to worry

0:37:04.080 --> 0:37:07.040
<v Speaker 1>about the light bulb burning out on a regular basis,

0:37:07.360 --> 0:37:09.560
<v Speaker 1>there's not much call to buy new ones. You just

0:37:09.840 --> 0:37:12.960
<v Speaker 1>buy the LEDs. You might sell your house before you

0:37:13.040 --> 0:37:16.440
<v Speaker 1>ever have to change that light bulb. So lightbulb sales

0:37:16.480 --> 0:37:19.440
<v Speaker 1>were starting to drop. There just wasn't enough call for them.

0:37:19.480 --> 0:37:21.680
<v Speaker 1>I bet it made GE long for the days when

0:37:21.680 --> 0:37:25.440
<v Speaker 1>it had formed that secret lightbulb cartel in which companies

0:37:25.480 --> 0:37:27.640
<v Speaker 1>agreed to limit the useful life of a light bulb

0:37:27.719 --> 0:37:31.279
<v Speaker 1>through engineering. And things were rough for shareholders too. Since

0:37:31.400 --> 0:37:34.240
<v Speaker 1>GE had cut its dividend payouts a few years earlier,

0:37:34.520 --> 0:37:37.839
<v Speaker 1>the payouts had slowly increased again. They had grown up

0:37:37.880 --> 0:37:41.319
<v Speaker 1>to twenty four cents per share, so that was an improvement.

0:37:41.680 --> 0:37:44.160
<v Speaker 1>It was still below the thirty one cents that it

0:37:44.280 --> 0:37:47.600
<v Speaker 1>had been at its peak, but it was better. But

0:37:47.840 --> 0:37:52.080
<v Speaker 1>in late G had to cut the dividend again, that

0:37:52.160 --> 0:37:55.439
<v Speaker 1>time down to twelve cents, and then not too long

0:37:55.480 --> 0:37:58.399
<v Speaker 1>after that they were forced to do another cut. They

0:37:58.440 --> 0:38:01.279
<v Speaker 1>just realized that they're just wasn't enough money to cover

0:38:01.360 --> 0:38:04.440
<v Speaker 1>the dividend payout, so the dividend got cut down to

0:38:04.680 --> 0:38:08.759
<v Speaker 1>just one cent per share. It just didn't have the

0:38:08.800 --> 0:38:12.600
<v Speaker 1>money to cover the payments otherwise. In addition, G was

0:38:12.640 --> 0:38:16.279
<v Speaker 1>having to deal with an unexpected cost. The company had

0:38:16.320 --> 0:38:19.960
<v Speaker 1>not issued any long term care insurance policies since two

0:38:20.000 --> 0:38:22.880
<v Speaker 1>thousand six, and in fact, it had spun off almost

0:38:22.960 --> 0:38:27.000
<v Speaker 1>its entire insurance business with a company called gen Worth. However,

0:38:27.440 --> 0:38:30.800
<v Speaker 1>in order to make that deal happen, GE was forced

0:38:30.800 --> 0:38:35.040
<v Speaker 1>to agree to cover any losses from long term care insurance.

0:38:35.320 --> 0:38:38.839
<v Speaker 1>It was just seen as too great a financial risk otherwise,

0:38:39.200 --> 0:38:43.359
<v Speaker 1>so GE signed that agreement. Now, those long term care

0:38:43.440 --> 0:38:46.600
<v Speaker 1>agreements are policies that are meant to cover the elderly,

0:38:47.000 --> 0:38:49.920
<v Speaker 1>and it turned out that insurers not just a GE,

0:38:50.080 --> 0:38:55.080
<v Speaker 1>but across the industry had underestimated how long policy holders

0:38:55.160 --> 0:38:58.680
<v Speaker 1>would actually live, and the medical costs, including things like

0:38:58.800 --> 0:39:02.360
<v Speaker 1>nursing home fees, would tend to get higher as customers

0:39:02.400 --> 0:39:05.680
<v Speaker 1>got older. So as people lived longer, they were creating

0:39:05.760 --> 0:39:10.000
<v Speaker 1>a larger and larger drain on resources for these insurance companies.

0:39:10.480 --> 0:39:12.640
<v Speaker 1>Like if you looked at it from a financial perspective,

0:39:13.200 --> 0:39:16.400
<v Speaker 1>the person who was paying for the policy was getting

0:39:16.480 --> 0:39:19.480
<v Speaker 1>way more benefits out of it than they were paying

0:39:19.520 --> 0:39:23.680
<v Speaker 1>into it, and that was an issue. So this was

0:39:23.719 --> 0:39:26.880
<v Speaker 1>a huge cost for GE, and it's no wonder that

0:39:26.880 --> 0:39:29.400
<v Speaker 1>the company was continuing to try and find ways to

0:39:29.520 --> 0:39:33.080
<v Speaker 1>get completely out of the insurance business. Now. To meet

0:39:33.200 --> 0:39:38.160
<v Speaker 1>the obligation, Flannery had to redirect fifteen billion dollars of

0:39:38.280 --> 0:39:41.400
<v Speaker 1>GES wealth in two thousand eighteen just to cover the

0:39:41.400 --> 0:39:45.080
<v Speaker 1>obligations of that insurance policy stuff. And the company was

0:39:45.080 --> 0:39:47.320
<v Speaker 1>also hit with a seven and a half billion dollar

0:39:47.520 --> 0:39:51.400
<v Speaker 1>after tax charge, so things were really rough. Also in

0:39:51.440 --> 0:39:55.520
<v Speaker 1>two thousand eighteen, GE would leave the dal Jones Industrial Average.

0:39:55.840 --> 0:39:58.680
<v Speaker 1>If you listen to my previous episodes, you remember that

0:39:58.800 --> 0:40:02.440
<v Speaker 1>GE was one of the original companies listed on that

0:40:02.480 --> 0:40:05.399
<v Speaker 1>average when it was first created, and it was the

0:40:05.480 --> 0:40:09.279
<v Speaker 1>only company of that original list that still existed in

0:40:09.320 --> 0:40:11.799
<v Speaker 1>two thousand eighteen. It had been part of the Dow

0:40:11.880 --> 0:40:16.600
<v Speaker 1>Industrial Average for a hundred eleven years, but the performance

0:40:16.640 --> 0:40:19.840
<v Speaker 1>of the company, along with the perception that industrial companies

0:40:19.920 --> 0:40:24.080
<v Speaker 1>in general weren't really key indicators for overall market performance,

0:40:24.400 --> 0:40:27.480
<v Speaker 1>meant that those days were over, so in its place,

0:40:27.520 --> 0:40:30.480
<v Speaker 1>a different company would join the Dow. That was Walgreen's

0:40:30.560 --> 0:40:35.719
<v Speaker 1>Boots Alliance drug store chain company. Meanwhile, a problem with

0:40:35.800 --> 0:40:39.720
<v Speaker 1>gs most recent heavy duty gas turbines caused other issues

0:40:39.840 --> 0:40:42.960
<v Speaker 1>for General Electric. A utility in Texas had to shut

0:40:43.000 --> 0:40:47.239
<v Speaker 1>down two different power plants for repairs due to failures

0:40:47.280 --> 0:40:50.120
<v Speaker 1>with these new turbines. That news would end up hurting

0:40:50.160 --> 0:40:53.600
<v Speaker 1>GE power sales, which weren't doing super a great at

0:40:53.600 --> 0:40:57.799
<v Speaker 1>that moment. Already, Flannery's efforts were seen as insufficient by

0:40:57.800 --> 0:41:00.640
<v Speaker 1>the board of directors, and on October one, els and eighteen,

0:41:00.640 --> 0:41:04.040
<v Speaker 1>the company announced that Flannery had been removed from the

0:41:04.080 --> 0:41:08.200
<v Speaker 1>position of chairman and CEO, and the board appointed an outsider,

0:41:08.560 --> 0:41:12.240
<v Speaker 1>Lawrence Culp, to serve as the new chairman and CEO.

0:41:12.400 --> 0:41:16.319
<v Speaker 1>Flannery had been CEO for about fourteen months and then

0:41:16.360 --> 0:41:20.360
<v Speaker 1>he was out that would give Flannery the unenviable distinction

0:41:20.680 --> 0:41:24.520
<v Speaker 1>of having served the least amount of time as CEO

0:41:24.719 --> 0:41:27.600
<v Speaker 1>of all g e C e o s, at least

0:41:28.040 --> 0:41:31.919
<v Speaker 1>so far. Culp would be the third CEO to lead

0:41:31.960 --> 0:41:35.680
<v Speaker 1>the company since two thousand seventeen. The company Culp took

0:41:35.680 --> 0:41:39.759
<v Speaker 1>over was in turmoil and there were pending investigations into

0:41:39.800 --> 0:41:43.080
<v Speaker 1>g S accounting practices, which had for years, as I

0:41:43.080 --> 0:41:46.239
<v Speaker 1>said earlier, been described as opaque. It's polite way of

0:41:46.280 --> 0:41:48.520
<v Speaker 1>saying the company wasn't making it easy to see where

0:41:48.520 --> 0:41:50.560
<v Speaker 1>money was coming from or where it was going to.

0:41:51.400 --> 0:41:56.960
<v Speaker 1>GE had already settled sec charges in the past, but

0:41:57.360 --> 0:41:59.720
<v Speaker 1>there were others that sought to find out more about

0:41:59.719 --> 0:42:02.080
<v Speaker 1>the finances of the company. And then, of course there

0:42:02.120 --> 0:42:06.520
<v Speaker 1>was no recent report from Marcopolis, the guy who was

0:42:06.560 --> 0:42:09.200
<v Speaker 1>one of the early whistleblowers on Bernie made Off before

0:42:09.239 --> 0:42:12.080
<v Speaker 1>everyone was aware of the Ponzi scheme that made Off

0:42:12.120 --> 0:42:16.760
<v Speaker 1>was running. The Marcopolis report alleges that GE is essentially

0:42:16.840 --> 0:42:20.920
<v Speaker 1>robbing Peter to pay Paul, shifting cash around frantically to

0:42:21.040 --> 0:42:24.760
<v Speaker 1>fend off insolvency. It's kind of like a shell game

0:42:25.200 --> 0:42:28.560
<v Speaker 1>to trying to move money around fast enough so that

0:42:28.600 --> 0:42:32.279
<v Speaker 1>the company doesn't collapse. G E I should add, disputes

0:42:32.360 --> 0:42:35.880
<v Speaker 1>this report and says that the allegations are baseless and

0:42:35.920 --> 0:42:39.680
<v Speaker 1>it cannot be ignored that Marcopolis himself actually stands to

0:42:39.719 --> 0:42:43.200
<v Speaker 1>make a lot of money should GES stocks decline and value.

0:42:43.600 --> 0:42:47.360
<v Speaker 1>So you could argue there is a motive for Marcopolis

0:42:47.360 --> 0:42:50.759
<v Speaker 1>to try and drag ges name in the mud. Uh

0:42:51.160 --> 0:42:54.080
<v Speaker 1>So their valid arguments on either side about whether or

0:42:54.160 --> 0:42:57.239
<v Speaker 1>not this report is something you should pay attention to

0:42:57.680 --> 0:43:01.040
<v Speaker 1>or if it's something that has alter are your motivations

0:43:01.080 --> 0:43:05.719
<v Speaker 1>behind it. That being said, the fact that the Marcopolis

0:43:05.840 --> 0:43:08.160
<v Speaker 1>report came out doesn't change the fact that there were

0:43:08.200 --> 0:43:14.520
<v Speaker 1>already numerous investigations government investigations into g S businesses that

0:43:14.560 --> 0:43:19.160
<v Speaker 1>could end up hindering the company further. So there seems

0:43:19.200 --> 0:43:22.400
<v Speaker 1>to be smoke. There's just a question of is the

0:43:22.480 --> 0:43:25.640
<v Speaker 1>fire what Mark coupolists is saying or is it something else?

0:43:26.120 --> 0:43:29.040
<v Speaker 1>On top of all the problems the company faces, is

0:43:29.080 --> 0:43:33.800
<v Speaker 1>another external force that could really spell doom. Many financial

0:43:33.840 --> 0:43:38.680
<v Speaker 1>analysts say that signs point to another global recession. Already,

0:43:38.800 --> 0:43:42.400
<v Speaker 1>industries like manufacturing and freight are in a bit of

0:43:42.400 --> 0:43:47.200
<v Speaker 1>a slide, so a recession would greatly exacerbate General Electrics problems.

0:43:47.320 --> 0:43:50.600
<v Speaker 1>So are we seeing the end of days for a

0:43:50.600 --> 0:43:54.279
<v Speaker 1>company that helped launch the technological age? I don't know.

0:43:54.800 --> 0:43:57.239
<v Speaker 1>I don't feel great about it, but it is a

0:43:57.360 --> 0:44:00.960
<v Speaker 1>very large company. It's not like any of these things

0:44:01.239 --> 0:44:05.719
<v Speaker 1>is definitively the death knell for General Electric And there's

0:44:05.760 --> 0:44:07.520
<v Speaker 1>a lot of stuff that could happen. We could see

0:44:07.560 --> 0:44:11.480
<v Speaker 1>GE get broken up into smaller companies that individually are

0:44:11.520 --> 0:44:14.839
<v Speaker 1>able to succeed much better than they can collectively. All

0:44:14.880 --> 0:44:18.640
<v Speaker 1>of that remains to be seen. But it was fascinating

0:44:18.760 --> 0:44:24.160
<v Speaker 1>to learn more about this company's incredible, rich history. And UH.

0:44:24.239 --> 0:44:26.719
<v Speaker 1>I know that this last section was much lighter on

0:44:26.760 --> 0:44:29.040
<v Speaker 1>the tech side, as I said at the beginning, but

0:44:29.320 --> 0:44:31.400
<v Speaker 1>at the same time, I thought it was important for

0:44:31.480 --> 0:44:34.560
<v Speaker 1>us to understand how a company that had been so

0:44:34.680 --> 0:44:40.120
<v Speaker 1>instrumental in setting the tone for the technological age could

0:44:40.120 --> 0:44:46.080
<v Speaker 1>be facing extinction UH in two thousand nineteen. So here's

0:44:46.120 --> 0:44:50.680
<v Speaker 1>hoping that things turn around for GE, that the company

0:44:50.719 --> 0:44:55.440
<v Speaker 1>is able to reconcile all these accounting practices, that it

0:44:55.560 --> 0:45:00.680
<v Speaker 1>is able to deliver value to employees, to customers, to retirees,

0:45:01.239 --> 0:45:06.840
<v Speaker 1>and two shareholders not just two shareholders, and that wraps

0:45:06.920 --> 0:45:10.080
<v Speaker 1>up this episode. If you have suggestions for future topics

0:45:10.120 --> 0:45:12.960
<v Speaker 1>of tech stuff, whether it's a company, a technology, a

0:45:13.080 --> 0:45:17.359
<v Speaker 1>concept in tech, anything like that, let me know. Send

0:45:17.360 --> 0:45:20.080
<v Speaker 1>me an email the addresses tech stuff at how stuff

0:45:20.080 --> 0:45:23.000
<v Speaker 1>Works dot com or draw me a line on Facebook

0:45:23.080 --> 0:45:24.959
<v Speaker 1>or Twitter. The handle of both of those is text

0:45:25.000 --> 0:45:27.920
<v Speaker 1>Stuff hs W. You can also pop on over to

0:45:27.960 --> 0:45:31.120
<v Speaker 1>our website that's tech Stuff podcast dot com. You've got

0:45:31.120 --> 0:45:33.080
<v Speaker 1>to find a link to the archive of all of

0:45:33.120 --> 0:45:35.359
<v Speaker 1>our previous episodes there, so you can look up all

0:45:35.360 --> 0:45:38.760
<v Speaker 1>the different stuff we talked about, including the previous episodes

0:45:38.800 --> 0:45:41.319
<v Speaker 1>I did on g S History where Chris Pallette and

0:45:41.320 --> 0:45:43.399
<v Speaker 1>I sat down and talked about it. But the show

0:45:43.480 --> 0:45:45.320
<v Speaker 1>was very different back in those days. But if you

0:45:45.360 --> 0:45:47.799
<v Speaker 1>want to hear a different take on this same sort

0:45:47.800 --> 0:45:50.680
<v Speaker 1>of stuff, you can check that out. That one came out,

0:45:50.680 --> 0:45:54.279
<v Speaker 1>I believe in two thousand twelve. And don't forget we

0:45:54.320 --> 0:45:57.399
<v Speaker 1>also have a link to our online store where every

0:45:57.400 --> 0:45:59.840
<v Speaker 1>purchase you make goes to help the show, and we

0:46:00.080 --> 0:46:02.840
<v Speaker 1>greatly appreciate it and I will talk to you again

0:46:03.840 --> 0:46:10.759
<v Speaker 1>really soon. Y Text Stuff is a production of I

0:46:10.840 --> 0:46:13.840
<v Speaker 1>Heart Radio's How Stuff Works. For more podcasts from I

0:46:13.920 --> 0:46:17.520
<v Speaker 1>heart Radio, visit the i heart Radio app, Apple podcasts,

0:46:17.640 --> 0:46:19.640
<v Speaker 1>or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.