1 00:00:01,000 --> 00:00:04,320 Speaker 1: From UFOs two, Ghosts and government cover ups. History is 2 00:00:04,400 --> 00:00:08,000 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:08,080 --> 00:00:15,840 Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to now. Hello, 4 00:00:15,920 --> 00:00:18,000 Speaker 1: welcome back to the show. My name is Matt and 5 00:00:18,040 --> 00:00:20,759 Speaker 1: I'm Ben. And this is stuff they don't want you 6 00:00:20,920 --> 00:00:24,239 Speaker 1: to know. And today, like every day, here, it's stuff 7 00:00:24,239 --> 00:00:27,960 Speaker 1: they don't want you to know. We're tackling something pretty grim, 8 00:00:28,120 --> 00:00:31,240 Speaker 1: little grim. Yeah, but it's the thing. It's a thing 9 00:00:31,280 --> 00:00:33,600 Speaker 1: that people should know about. When you say, Matt, agreed, 10 00:00:34,000 --> 00:00:36,000 Speaker 1: and that's what we're gonna do. We're gonna tell you 11 00:00:36,040 --> 00:00:39,000 Speaker 1: the things you should know that they don't want you 12 00:00:39,080 --> 00:00:41,200 Speaker 1: to know about. There we go, do we get close 13 00:00:41,240 --> 00:00:45,080 Speaker 1: to copyright? Josh and Truck are gonna bust in here 14 00:00:45,080 --> 00:00:49,279 Speaker 1: in a second. Now. It's it's interesting, you know, just 15 00:00:49,320 --> 00:00:51,800 Speaker 1: before you and I went on air, we were talking 16 00:00:51,840 --> 00:00:56,520 Speaker 1: about this book of surrealist games, which which I just 17 00:00:56,560 --> 00:00:58,760 Speaker 1: got in the mail earlier, and a lot of it 18 00:00:58,840 --> 00:01:02,880 Speaker 1: is writing prompts or different ways to draw things. The 19 00:01:02,960 --> 00:01:05,639 Speaker 1: idea is to get a new perspective and to get 20 00:01:06,000 --> 00:01:10,640 Speaker 1: out of your head. And speaking of fantastic segues, I 21 00:01:10,680 --> 00:01:13,600 Speaker 1: will bring this back later. I mentioned for a reason. Uh, 22 00:01:13,720 --> 00:01:16,800 Speaker 1: what are we talking about today, Matt. We're asking the question, 23 00:01:17,600 --> 00:01:23,640 Speaker 1: is someone really assassinating scientists and inventors, and for you 24 00:01:23,840 --> 00:01:26,560 Speaker 1: ladies and gentlemen out there in the audience, the answer 25 00:01:26,760 --> 00:01:31,000 Speaker 1: will probably be. Of course, given the span of human history, 26 00:01:31,440 --> 00:01:37,960 Speaker 1: numerous people have been killed for a multitude of reasons. Um. 27 00:01:39,000 --> 00:01:41,360 Speaker 1: But we have to be very careful at the offset 28 00:01:41,680 --> 00:01:44,759 Speaker 1: not to start thinking of this in terms of good 29 00:01:44,760 --> 00:01:48,000 Speaker 1: guys and bad guys. Now, it's more complicated than that. 30 00:01:48,440 --> 00:01:50,800 Speaker 1: It turns out that there really aren't any good or 31 00:01:50,840 --> 00:01:55,240 Speaker 1: bad guys. There are competing interests, right, Yeah, just like 32 00:01:55,360 --> 00:01:57,720 Speaker 1: nation states don't have friends, they have interests that may 33 00:01:57,800 --> 00:02:00,880 Speaker 1: or may not align. Um. So, the reason I mentioned 34 00:02:01,160 --> 00:02:04,440 Speaker 1: the perspective, the importance of perspective, which is explored in 35 00:02:04,480 --> 00:02:09,240 Speaker 1: this book of surrealist games, uh, which spoiler alert I 36 00:02:09,240 --> 00:02:14,519 Speaker 1: haven't read completely, is that there are different perspectives upon 37 00:02:14,639 --> 00:02:20,120 Speaker 1: what constitutes an assassination or a murder. So, what what 38 00:02:20,360 --> 00:02:23,240 Speaker 1: is what what's the dif? Dif what's what's the difference 39 00:02:23,320 --> 00:02:27,160 Speaker 1: your assassination and murder? Okay, So an assassination is a 40 00:02:27,240 --> 00:02:31,200 Speaker 1: type of murder. It's you kind of have to look 41 00:02:31,240 --> 00:02:35,880 Speaker 1: at the motivation. So if it's for impersonal reasons, if 42 00:02:35,880 --> 00:02:40,520 Speaker 1: you're looking at political or financial gain, if say this 43 00:02:40,600 --> 00:02:44,480 Speaker 1: person X is killed, or if it's a high profile 44 00:02:44,639 --> 00:02:48,400 Speaker 1: person like a world leader, or let's say a scientist, 45 00:02:48,400 --> 00:02:51,040 Speaker 1: an expert in their field, someone who is an heir 46 00:02:51,200 --> 00:02:54,840 Speaker 1: to some kind of massive fortune, or even an inventor, 47 00:02:55,240 --> 00:02:58,680 Speaker 1: somebody who has technology that isn't out in the public 48 00:02:58,720 --> 00:03:01,560 Speaker 1: hands yet, but this person is how it works. That 49 00:03:01,639 --> 00:03:04,640 Speaker 1: could be considered an assassination. We'll see a few of 50 00:03:04,680 --> 00:03:07,639 Speaker 1: those two. And murder, on the other hand, then would 51 00:03:07,680 --> 00:03:11,799 Speaker 1: be in this perspective. Murders that are not assassinations are 52 00:03:11,800 --> 00:03:15,200 Speaker 1: often things like crimes of passion, or they're motivated by 53 00:03:15,560 --> 00:03:19,800 Speaker 1: lower level personal gains small amount of money, social obligations 54 00:03:19,840 --> 00:03:23,920 Speaker 1: you know, like you're joining a gang, or emotional motivations jealousy, anger, 55 00:03:24,200 --> 00:03:26,760 Speaker 1: all the hits. Yeah, So the implication of the word 56 00:03:26,800 --> 00:03:31,520 Speaker 1: assassination is that the person involved in the killing is 57 00:03:31,560 --> 00:03:36,720 Speaker 1: motivated by trying to maintain the status quo of some situation, 58 00:03:36,960 --> 00:03:40,920 Speaker 1: or to advance their personal position or perhaps their country's position, 59 00:03:41,640 --> 00:03:45,920 Speaker 1: um or even to perhaps overturn an entire system. Oh yeah, 60 00:03:45,920 --> 00:03:52,240 Speaker 1: like when the Black Hand assassinated Franz Ferdinand right triggering 61 00:03:52,320 --> 00:03:56,200 Speaker 1: the World War UM or another example of maintaining a 62 00:03:56,320 --> 00:04:00,240 Speaker 1: status quo. For those of us who believe that not 63 00:04:00,360 --> 00:04:02,400 Speaker 1: everything was on the up and up about the JFK 64 00:04:02,680 --> 00:04:09,440 Speaker 1: RFK murders, assassinate somebody thinks that wasn't just yeah, really 65 00:04:09,560 --> 00:04:15,280 Speaker 1: too long gun guys who didn't know each other and 66 00:04:15,400 --> 00:04:20,000 Speaker 1: just coincidentally decided to Yeah, anyway, some research. Yeah, that's 67 00:04:20,000 --> 00:04:23,200 Speaker 1: a different show. Maybe. But if if you believe in that, 68 00:04:23,520 --> 00:04:27,520 Speaker 1: then you probably believe that the Kennedy's were murdered to 69 00:04:27,720 --> 00:04:31,919 Speaker 1: maintain a status quo or advanced the position and influence 70 00:04:31,920 --> 00:04:36,040 Speaker 1: of the people involved in it. So with that's a 71 00:04:36,080 --> 00:04:38,680 Speaker 1: different story, as we said, and I'm getting a little 72 00:04:38,720 --> 00:04:42,400 Speaker 1: derailed here, but it is correct to say then that 73 00:04:42,640 --> 00:04:48,279 Speaker 1: UM forces have assassinated, not just murdered scientists. So it 74 00:04:48,320 --> 00:04:51,880 Speaker 1: goes back to the perspective, the killing, the motivation. They're 75 00:04:51,880 --> 00:04:56,359 Speaker 1: not stabbing these people or shooting them for you know, 76 00:04:56,440 --> 00:04:59,679 Speaker 1: twenty three dollars and some change in their lab coat, 77 00:05:00,000 --> 00:05:02,480 Speaker 1: which is so stereotypical. I'm I'm not saying they walk 78 00:05:02,520 --> 00:05:05,560 Speaker 1: around a lab because but they'd be easier to spot. Yeah, 79 00:05:05,560 --> 00:05:09,640 Speaker 1: it would be easier spot. But whoever has killed these 80 00:05:09,640 --> 00:05:14,600 Speaker 1: people has assassinated them, uh, usually related to their work, right, 81 00:05:15,480 --> 00:05:21,559 Speaker 1: And here's the thing, it's tough to know exactly who 82 00:05:21,720 --> 00:05:26,120 Speaker 1: is doing the assassinating. Who are they It's really tough 83 00:05:26,160 --> 00:05:28,160 Speaker 1: to know because in a lot of cases there's not 84 00:05:28,760 --> 00:05:31,479 Speaker 1: solid proof that's just pointing you in the direction of 85 00:05:31,520 --> 00:05:34,080 Speaker 1: one person or the other because they're, like we said, 86 00:05:34,120 --> 00:05:38,440 Speaker 1: competing interests in this one area. And let's say a 87 00:05:38,520 --> 00:05:43,240 Speaker 1: scientist in Iran gets assassinated, just as one example, there 88 00:05:43,240 --> 00:05:47,080 Speaker 1: are a lot of groups that would potentially want to 89 00:05:47,120 --> 00:05:51,600 Speaker 1: not have the Iranian nuclear weapons program continue on. So 90 00:05:51,720 --> 00:05:54,279 Speaker 1: who do you point the finger at when there are 91 00:05:54,720 --> 00:05:57,720 Speaker 1: there's a whole group of people you could be looking at, 92 00:05:57,960 --> 00:06:00,960 Speaker 1: And in Iran they wouldn't even say it's a weapon program, 93 00:06:01,080 --> 00:06:04,080 Speaker 1: just an energy sure, just an energy program. Yeah right, 94 00:06:04,120 --> 00:06:07,560 Speaker 1: that's that's true. So we know that the alleged perpetrators are, 95 00:06:08,160 --> 00:06:13,039 Speaker 1: at least as far as we can tell, most often governments. 96 00:06:13,080 --> 00:06:19,159 Speaker 1: So the United States, USSR, Israel, North Korea, China, Singapore, Germany, 97 00:06:19,520 --> 00:06:23,479 Speaker 1: South Africa got in the game. And then uh, the 98 00:06:23,520 --> 00:06:27,080 Speaker 1: other group of play of course, which you and I 99 00:06:27,120 --> 00:06:29,200 Speaker 1: have argued before on the show might be the new 100 00:06:29,279 --> 00:06:32,920 Speaker 1: nation state is the corporation? So of corporations also been 101 00:06:33,000 --> 00:06:38,520 Speaker 1: killing inventors and have they been killing scientists? Um, we've 102 00:06:38,560 --> 00:06:40,679 Speaker 1: got the outline here, right, We've got the big picture. 103 00:06:40,720 --> 00:06:44,279 Speaker 1: But what are some actual examples? All right, let's just 104 00:06:44,400 --> 00:06:48,080 Speaker 1: jump right in. So one would be Daniel McFarland More. 105 00:06:48,960 --> 00:06:52,480 Speaker 1: He was an inventor and he created the More lamp, 106 00:06:52,520 --> 00:06:56,400 Speaker 1: which was the first really commercially viable light source that 107 00:06:56,520 --> 00:07:01,440 Speaker 1: was based on gas. And he was by another rival 108 00:07:01,520 --> 00:07:05,600 Speaker 1: inventor in nineteen thirty six. So that's just another example 109 00:07:05,720 --> 00:07:10,640 Speaker 1: where competing interest in his field decided it would be 110 00:07:10,640 --> 00:07:14,960 Speaker 1: better if he wasn't there. Yeah, and it continues because 111 00:07:15,320 --> 00:07:19,680 Speaker 1: another example will be Gerald Bull, Canadian engineer. And this 112 00:07:19,760 --> 00:07:22,400 Speaker 1: is really interesting story, Matt. This. I want to do 113 00:07:22,440 --> 00:07:27,720 Speaker 1: an episode or series on Project Babylon. This this pretty 114 00:07:27,760 --> 00:07:30,280 Speaker 1: recent and you actually hit me to this a few 115 00:07:30,360 --> 00:07:32,760 Speaker 1: years back. I only been doing this for a while, 116 00:07:33,680 --> 00:07:35,320 Speaker 1: but you hit me to this a few years back. 117 00:07:35,680 --> 00:07:40,840 Speaker 1: Gerald Bull, longrange artillery inventor. This guy just loved building guns, 118 00:07:41,280 --> 00:07:45,160 Speaker 1: bigger and bigger and bigger guns. Uh. The actual technical 119 00:07:45,240 --> 00:07:48,840 Speaker 1: term for these would be super guns. And Project Babylon 120 00:07:49,320 --> 00:07:51,600 Speaker 1: was a super gun that he was building for the 121 00:07:51,640 --> 00:07:57,880 Speaker 1: Iraqi government. He was assassinated in Belgium in nine And 122 00:07:57,920 --> 00:08:01,040 Speaker 1: then going back to how murky it can be to 123 00:08:01,200 --> 00:08:04,880 Speaker 1: trace the killers. Uh, the guesses for this are all 124 00:08:04,960 --> 00:08:08,880 Speaker 1: over the place. So they said, maybe Iran did it, 125 00:08:08,960 --> 00:08:12,000 Speaker 1: and that that makes sense because Iran and Iraq, of 126 00:08:12,040 --> 00:08:17,920 Speaker 1: course we're not allies. Especially that Yeah, maybe Israel did it, um, 127 00:08:17,960 --> 00:08:21,920 Speaker 1: which makes sense because Iraq and Israel and not particularly allies. 128 00:08:22,200 --> 00:08:24,720 Speaker 1: Maybe the CIA or m I six, who they get 129 00:08:24,760 --> 00:08:30,120 Speaker 1: brought up in almost every assassination stories were fined. Maybe Chilean, Syrian, 130 00:08:30,280 --> 00:08:33,320 Speaker 1: or South African governments or hey, even the Iraqi government 131 00:08:33,640 --> 00:08:38,360 Speaker 1: could have been behind the assassination. So it is clear 132 00:08:38,960 --> 00:08:44,920 Speaker 1: that he was not murdered for some sort of personal reason, 133 00:08:45,400 --> 00:08:49,679 Speaker 1: but that he was assassinated due to his unique knowledge 134 00:08:50,120 --> 00:08:54,320 Speaker 1: about this gigantic long range artillery. Yeah, and and he's 135 00:08:54,480 --> 00:08:58,199 Speaker 1: had been making and inventing these weapons for a long time, 136 00:08:58,280 --> 00:09:01,439 Speaker 1: so anyone who was on the other end of one 137 00:09:01,480 --> 00:09:04,640 Speaker 1: of his weapons, any one of those governments, may have 138 00:09:04,679 --> 00:09:08,200 Speaker 1: been a culprit. That's a really good point. So another 139 00:09:08,240 --> 00:09:10,800 Speaker 1: person is Stanley Meyer, And we did a whole episode 140 00:09:10,800 --> 00:09:13,880 Speaker 1: on this highly recommend you check out the video series 141 00:09:13,960 --> 00:09:17,360 Speaker 1: on Mr. Meyer. He died in nine. He was the 142 00:09:17,400 --> 00:09:21,679 Speaker 1: inventor of this water powered fuel cell alleged water power 143 00:09:21,760 --> 00:09:26,280 Speaker 1: or fuel cell um. His brother we talked about this, 144 00:09:26,360 --> 00:09:32,640 Speaker 1: but his brother thinks that Stanley was poisoned while they 145 00:09:32,640 --> 00:09:34,160 Speaker 1: were about to eat because they were going to go 146 00:09:34,280 --> 00:09:38,960 Speaker 1: meet a couple of Belgian investors, and I guess Stanley 147 00:09:39,120 --> 00:09:42,760 Speaker 1: ran out of the cafe or the restaurant they were 148 00:09:42,760 --> 00:09:45,640 Speaker 1: in and complained that he was choking. He thought he 149 00:09:45,640 --> 00:09:49,360 Speaker 1: had been poisoned, and he died. And this please yeah, 150 00:09:49,520 --> 00:09:51,840 Speaker 1: check out this episode if you get a chance, because 151 00:09:52,760 --> 00:09:56,360 Speaker 1: we found a lot of interesting stuff there. Now you 152 00:09:56,400 --> 00:09:59,520 Speaker 1: will also find quite a few people saying that the 153 00:09:59,559 --> 00:10:04,079 Speaker 1: water our fuel cell has been soundly debunked. And then 154 00:10:04,120 --> 00:10:06,480 Speaker 1: on the other side, his friends and family are saying 155 00:10:06,480 --> 00:10:09,959 Speaker 1: that he grew increasingly paranoid and that he was increasingly 156 00:10:10,040 --> 00:10:13,240 Speaker 1: convinced that the powers that be, whomever they might be, 157 00:10:14,120 --> 00:10:19,160 Speaker 1: were after him to suppress his invention. It's really interesting 158 00:10:19,200 --> 00:10:20,800 Speaker 1: his story to me. I don't mean to pause too 159 00:10:20,880 --> 00:10:24,000 Speaker 1: long here, but I can imagine that even if his 160 00:10:24,160 --> 00:10:27,440 Speaker 1: fuel cell car water fuel cell car didn't work the 161 00:10:27,480 --> 00:10:30,000 Speaker 1: way that he thought it worked if he thought it 162 00:10:30,040 --> 00:10:32,120 Speaker 1: worked the way it did, and it would be this 163 00:10:32,200 --> 00:10:35,320 Speaker 1: huge game changer, and it would be I can see 164 00:10:35,320 --> 00:10:39,160 Speaker 1: how he could create a ton of the suspicion and 165 00:10:39,200 --> 00:10:42,199 Speaker 1: the paranoia in his own mind by thinking that it 166 00:10:42,280 --> 00:10:46,360 Speaker 1: was this new thing that everyone's gonna want. But what 167 00:10:46,480 --> 00:10:49,320 Speaker 1: if it was right? What if it was We do 168 00:10:49,520 --> 00:10:54,680 Speaker 1: know that, of course, inventions really can be suppressed in 169 00:10:54,720 --> 00:10:57,400 Speaker 1: the United States legally, which is probably still one of 170 00:10:57,440 --> 00:11:00,560 Speaker 1: the most frightening things we've learned on this show. But 171 00:11:01,280 --> 00:11:06,240 Speaker 1: inventors are not the only subjects of assassination based on 172 00:11:06,280 --> 00:11:08,640 Speaker 1: their knowledge. As a matter of fact, we have a 173 00:11:08,840 --> 00:11:14,720 Speaker 1: much more concrete record and clear timeline of scientists who 174 00:11:14,720 --> 00:11:19,120 Speaker 1: have been assassinated. That's right. We can look at David 175 00:11:19,200 --> 00:11:23,679 Speaker 1: Joseph Webster, who was an anthropologist and a social activist 176 00:11:23,679 --> 00:11:27,920 Speaker 1: who was murdered by assassin's working for South Africa's Civil 177 00:11:28,040 --> 00:11:31,200 Speaker 1: Cooperation Bureau, and they think this is due to his 178 00:11:31,280 --> 00:11:36,440 Speaker 1: political activism of i e. His the anti apartheid movement 179 00:11:36,559 --> 00:11:40,880 Speaker 1: in nine Yeah, and what's interesting about the South African 180 00:11:40,920 --> 00:11:45,400 Speaker 1: cases is that with the post apartheid government, um, we 181 00:11:45,559 --> 00:11:48,880 Speaker 1: are now able to learn a lot of the dirty 182 00:11:49,000 --> 00:11:53,280 Speaker 1: secrets of apartheid era South Africa that we would never 183 00:11:53,400 --> 00:11:56,760 Speaker 1: have known otherwise. And that's also a reason that a 184 00:11:56,960 --> 00:11:59,719 Speaker 1: lot of secrets about the U s s R came out, 185 00:11:59,760 --> 00:12:03,160 Speaker 1: because once a government is defunct, Uh, then all of 186 00:12:03,200 --> 00:12:07,959 Speaker 1: a sudden transparency becomes a little bit easier, more plausible. Um. 187 00:12:08,160 --> 00:12:12,400 Speaker 1: You can argue, of course that governments who have continually 188 00:12:12,480 --> 00:12:15,720 Speaker 1: covered up their stuff have a whole walking closet of 189 00:12:15,760 --> 00:12:19,280 Speaker 1: skeletons just waiting to waiting to see the light of day, 190 00:12:19,480 --> 00:12:22,040 Speaker 1: and maybe an underground bunker full. I mean, you know, 191 00:12:22,080 --> 00:12:26,319 Speaker 1: if that's way better? Yes, uh so, Uh, this name 192 00:12:26,360 --> 00:12:31,840 Speaker 1: I'll probably mispronounce here. Yah L Mashad, an Egyptian nuclear 193 00:12:31,880 --> 00:12:35,719 Speaker 1: scientist who was in charge of the Iraqi nuclear program, 194 00:12:36,160 --> 00:12:40,600 Speaker 1: was killed in Paris in Now you can take a 195 00:12:40,640 --> 00:12:45,280 Speaker 1: wild guest who's generally blamed for that one, right, let's 196 00:12:45,400 --> 00:12:52,120 Speaker 1: say ding ding ding day, Yeah, and blue ribbon to 197 00:12:52,440 --> 00:12:57,959 Speaker 1: our contestant, Matt Frederick, because yeah, because it's in a row, 198 00:12:58,120 --> 00:13:00,920 Speaker 1: it's it's a nuclear program in the Middle East that 199 00:13:01,080 --> 00:13:05,280 Speaker 1: is not Israel's top secret nuclear program. Excuse me, finger, 200 00:13:05,600 --> 00:13:11,120 Speaker 1: it's around top secret. Yeah, um, mordecaiva unum, never gonna 201 00:13:11,160 --> 00:13:13,040 Speaker 1: get out of a a man. I turned around and Chandler 202 00:13:13,120 --> 00:13:14,880 Speaker 1: was staring at me, and I honestly was a little 203 00:13:14,880 --> 00:13:18,360 Speaker 1: scared for a minute. Yeah that's uh, our producer, predator 204 00:13:18,520 --> 00:13:23,840 Speaker 1: Chandler out there mining some stuff for an upcoming episode hopefully. 205 00:13:24,160 --> 00:13:26,120 Speaker 1: And let's pause for a moment to give a shout 206 00:13:26,120 --> 00:13:29,120 Speaker 1: out to our super producer Noel. Oh, he's in the 207 00:13:29,160 --> 00:13:33,120 Speaker 1: house again running the boards. Everything that you guys like 208 00:13:34,600 --> 00:13:38,520 Speaker 1: sound wise. I didn't see him dance. He's not gonna 209 00:13:38,559 --> 00:13:41,559 Speaker 1: do it again. But everything you guys like sound wise 210 00:13:41,600 --> 00:13:43,280 Speaker 1: comes from Noel, so we do always want to thank 211 00:13:43,360 --> 00:13:46,920 Speaker 1: him in the course of the show. And uh, moving 212 00:13:46,960 --> 00:13:51,679 Speaker 1: on back to the killing of scientists. Yeah, yeah, Unfortunately, 213 00:13:52,160 --> 00:13:55,720 Speaker 1: sometimes sometimes we have to make it a little lighter 214 00:13:55,760 --> 00:14:01,080 Speaker 1: for ourselves because it gets it gets pretty down when 215 00:14:01,080 --> 00:14:03,040 Speaker 1: we look at these things. Ben and I think we 216 00:14:03,120 --> 00:14:06,400 Speaker 1: have to lift our spirits somehow. Yeah, it can, It 217 00:14:06,440 --> 00:14:09,720 Speaker 1: can get pretty heavy. I'm speaking of heavy though. I 218 00:14:09,760 --> 00:14:11,959 Speaker 1: have a question for you about this next guy. I 219 00:14:12,040 --> 00:14:15,040 Speaker 1: want to see if you think this is a murder 220 00:14:15,160 --> 00:14:19,880 Speaker 1: or an assassination. A guy named Ernest Gibbons, an entomologist 221 00:14:20,320 --> 00:14:24,720 Speaker 1: in two while he was in Uganda research and tropical disease. 222 00:14:25,120 --> 00:14:30,120 Speaker 1: He was killed via spear by tribesmen who thought that 223 00:14:30,200 --> 00:14:36,600 Speaker 1: he would use their blood samples for witchcraft. Interesting, so 224 00:14:37,040 --> 00:14:44,080 Speaker 1: we've got them on the assassination list because technically it's 225 00:14:44,120 --> 00:14:47,840 Speaker 1: a murder to maintain a status quo. Yeah, they killed 226 00:14:47,920 --> 00:14:51,400 Speaker 1: him because they're afraid of his position right right, or 227 00:14:51,480 --> 00:14:56,160 Speaker 1: their life or defense defense and from their perspective, going 228 00:14:56,200 --> 00:14:59,520 Speaker 1: back to shifting perspectives, it surely was an active defense. 229 00:15:00,240 --> 00:15:04,400 Speaker 1: And I mean all of the terrible things that so 230 00:15:04,440 --> 00:15:09,600 Speaker 1: many Europeans were doing in Africa in the forties. Um, 231 00:15:09,600 --> 00:15:12,080 Speaker 1: it's it's tough to make that tough to make that col. 232 00:15:12,120 --> 00:15:16,240 Speaker 1: I mean, of course, they should not have killed him, 233 00:15:15,360 --> 00:15:18,800 Speaker 1: and if, especially if this guy sounds like he was 234 00:15:19,640 --> 00:15:24,080 Speaker 1: researching tropical disease with an eye towards curing it, right, 235 00:15:24,160 --> 00:15:27,880 Speaker 1: not weaponizing it, which again is another podcast we should 236 00:15:27,880 --> 00:15:32,200 Speaker 1: do later the scientists out their weaponizing diseases. But let's 237 00:15:32,200 --> 00:15:33,960 Speaker 1: move on. I just want to hear what you guys 238 00:15:34,000 --> 00:15:37,040 Speaker 1: think if that is that a murder and assassination. Okay, 239 00:15:37,160 --> 00:15:42,160 Speaker 1: let's look at PIM fourteen and I'm probably spelled in incorrectly. 240 00:15:42,280 --> 00:15:45,240 Speaker 1: P I M f O R t U y N. 241 00:15:45,640 --> 00:15:50,240 Speaker 1: He was a Dutch sociologist and a politician. He was, Um, 242 00:15:50,560 --> 00:15:52,240 Speaker 1: I don't know how to put this nicely, he was 243 00:15:52,360 --> 00:15:57,600 Speaker 1: rather anti Muslim. Uh, should I say he was kind 244 00:15:57,640 --> 00:16:00,000 Speaker 1: of racist? He was kind of racist. Yeah, I feel 245 00:16:00,000 --> 00:16:02,800 Speaker 1: like that's fair, at least that's what it seems from 246 00:16:02,840 --> 00:16:06,840 Speaker 1: my opinion. Anyway, he was assassinated because of those political 247 00:16:06,920 --> 00:16:11,680 Speaker 1: views and because of those uh strongly held notions right 248 00:16:11,840 --> 00:16:17,800 Speaker 1: anti immigration, and he was reacting to the what what 249 00:16:17,920 --> 00:16:22,920 Speaker 1: he saw as the erosion of traditional Dutch culture. And 250 00:16:22,960 --> 00:16:25,440 Speaker 1: you know, that's one of the reasons that Anders Bravick 251 00:16:25,880 --> 00:16:30,080 Speaker 1: Uh committed the mass murder of those children. And there's 252 00:16:30,120 --> 00:16:34,080 Speaker 1: a there's a rise in this sort of sentiment in Europe, 253 00:16:34,160 --> 00:16:38,720 Speaker 1: or rather we should say a resurgence or modern modern iteration. 254 00:16:39,920 --> 00:16:45,880 Speaker 1: And then, of course we should mention the numerous scientists 255 00:16:46,640 --> 00:16:50,080 Speaker 1: in history who have been killed as part of a 256 00:16:50,280 --> 00:16:53,960 Speaker 1: mass murder. We've got here on the outline scientists who 257 00:16:54,000 --> 00:16:59,960 Speaker 1: died in Nazi concentration camps. Um. Of course, many really 258 00:17:00,160 --> 00:17:04,280 Speaker 1: and scientists died in concentration camps. Uh. There were also 259 00:17:05,040 --> 00:17:08,840 Speaker 1: prominent people who died in the massacre and Rwanda, and 260 00:17:09,560 --> 00:17:14,760 Speaker 1: one of another stark example of widespread I would say 261 00:17:14,800 --> 00:17:21,000 Speaker 1: assassination of scientists occurs in Cambodia under the rule of 262 00:17:21,119 --> 00:17:25,199 Speaker 1: pol Pot. Yeah, and uh, I don't know if you 263 00:17:25,240 --> 00:17:28,080 Speaker 1: know this we've talked about before. Uh did I ever 264 00:17:28,160 --> 00:17:31,560 Speaker 1: tell you pol Pot's real name, his birth name, Saloth 265 00:17:31,720 --> 00:17:36,520 Speaker 1: Sar Salath. Yeah, just a bit of trivia. And we 266 00:17:36,560 --> 00:17:42,440 Speaker 1: haven't dug into the history of Cambodia, but we would 267 00:17:42,520 --> 00:17:45,560 Speaker 1: like to examine it in another podcast. If that's something 268 00:17:45,600 --> 00:17:50,080 Speaker 1: you're interested in, just let us know. And it holds up. Unfortunately, 269 00:17:50,720 --> 00:17:53,920 Speaker 1: it's often treated as a as a cliche or a platitude, 270 00:17:54,080 --> 00:17:56,480 Speaker 1: at least in English. I don't know. I don't want 271 00:17:56,480 --> 00:18:00,280 Speaker 1: to assume everybody's native language is English listening, but we 272 00:18:00,320 --> 00:18:05,080 Speaker 1: often say, you know, power corrupts and absolute power corrupts. Absolutely. 273 00:18:06,240 --> 00:18:10,840 Speaker 1: Often things are only cliches because they are so true. 274 00:18:11,520 --> 00:18:15,280 Speaker 1: And uh. In in this case with with the Isis 275 00:18:15,400 --> 00:18:18,520 Speaker 1: video that we had done recently, we found that that 276 00:18:18,680 --> 00:18:22,639 Speaker 1: was also UM. Then it also obeyed that rule the 277 00:18:22,680 --> 00:18:27,040 Speaker 1: development of that group, which was ongoing and which UM. 278 00:18:27,080 --> 00:18:29,919 Speaker 1: It's very strange for us to do podcasts on things 279 00:18:29,960 --> 00:18:34,119 Speaker 1: that are still underway. You know, our series, we don't 280 00:18:34,119 --> 00:18:38,359 Speaker 1: know exactly what is going to happen in the Middle East. 281 00:18:38,480 --> 00:18:41,920 Speaker 1: And again I would ask you guys, ladies and gentlemen 282 00:18:42,240 --> 00:18:45,960 Speaker 1: to check out our video on Isis and let us 283 00:18:46,040 --> 00:18:50,679 Speaker 1: know what you believe the future of this group is. 284 00:18:50,720 --> 00:18:54,240 Speaker 1: Because it goes without saying, but I'll say it that 285 00:18:54,359 --> 00:19:00,080 Speaker 1: it's enormously controversial and complicated and complicated and does not 286 00:19:00,280 --> 00:19:04,280 Speaker 1: have the approval of the Muslim world at large. So 287 00:19:05,560 --> 00:19:07,600 Speaker 1: please do check that. We've also heard a lot of 288 00:19:07,640 --> 00:19:10,880 Speaker 1: theories about who actually controls them, which is what our 289 00:19:10,960 --> 00:19:15,440 Speaker 1: video is about. Is it a Western group UH funding 290 00:19:15,480 --> 00:19:19,240 Speaker 1: these people? Is it a a Middle Eastern group that 291 00:19:19,760 --> 00:19:22,359 Speaker 1: has a problem with Shia, because I believe Isais is 292 00:19:22,440 --> 00:19:26,280 Speaker 1: Sunni Um. And speaking of the Middle East, now we 293 00:19:26,359 --> 00:19:28,840 Speaker 1: go to the thing that inspired a lot of our 294 00:19:28,960 --> 00:19:33,600 Speaker 1: series on scientists assassinations. A little bit of context the 295 00:19:33,680 --> 00:19:36,760 Speaker 1: quickened dirty first, for anyone who hasn't seen our video 296 00:19:36,840 --> 00:19:40,800 Speaker 1: or does not know about this. For a number of years, 297 00:19:41,000 --> 00:19:45,840 Speaker 1: as you have probably heard, Iran and the Western world 298 00:19:46,000 --> 00:19:50,639 Speaker 1: have been at a near state of war. You have 299 00:19:50,760 --> 00:19:56,159 Speaker 1: probably heard hawks in both the United States, Europe Israel 300 00:19:56,240 --> 00:20:00,480 Speaker 1: as well UH saying that Iran is closer and closer 301 00:20:00,800 --> 00:20:05,639 Speaker 1: to achieving a nuclear weapon and becoming a nuclear power 302 00:20:05,840 --> 00:20:10,359 Speaker 1: is in most cases a point of no return for 303 00:20:11,040 --> 00:20:14,520 Speaker 1: the world order, and it changes things. Yeah, because now 304 00:20:14,560 --> 00:20:17,840 Speaker 1: you're a real threat and you can't get bullied quite 305 00:20:17,880 --> 00:20:22,360 Speaker 1: as much, and you're also extremely dangerous. Right, and nuclear 306 00:20:22,400 --> 00:20:25,200 Speaker 1: power is considered, at least under a deterrence theory, the 307 00:20:25,320 --> 00:20:30,760 Speaker 1: ultimate stay out of my affairs kind of weapon. UH. 308 00:20:30,840 --> 00:20:35,320 Speaker 1: In some cases, UH countries have gotten close to this 309 00:20:35,520 --> 00:20:40,320 Speaker 1: and then been coerced or coaxed into UH stopping their 310 00:20:40,400 --> 00:20:45,200 Speaker 1: nuclear programs. But Iran maintains that it has a right 311 00:20:45,640 --> 00:20:50,280 Speaker 1: to nuclear energy and they they say that it's energy 312 00:20:50,320 --> 00:20:54,200 Speaker 1: and not weaponry. The problem is that the same processes 313 00:20:54,359 --> 00:20:58,600 Speaker 1: used to refine nuclear material to make a nuclear power 314 00:20:58,640 --> 00:21:02,359 Speaker 1: plant are the same processes that can be used to 315 00:21:02,480 --> 00:21:07,800 Speaker 1: create nuclear weapons. UH. It's a dangerous line. It's a 316 00:21:07,880 --> 00:21:12,680 Speaker 1: dangerous line, and it's UM it's a It's an interesting 317 00:21:12,680 --> 00:21:16,359 Speaker 1: thing because going back to perspective, the Western perspective is 318 00:21:16,400 --> 00:21:20,760 Speaker 1: often that if Iran achieves nuclear power game over man, 319 00:21:20,800 --> 00:21:25,320 Speaker 1: to quote aliens, UH, there will simply be a nuclear war. 320 00:21:25,880 --> 00:21:32,960 Speaker 1: And in other perspectives and non Western perspectives, UH, the 321 00:21:32,960 --> 00:21:36,040 Speaker 1: the constraints and the demands made by the West against 322 00:21:36,119 --> 00:21:40,160 Speaker 1: Iran are seen as trying to push her on into 323 00:21:40,200 --> 00:21:45,679 Speaker 1: a war because uh, the West and the sunny empires 324 00:21:45,680 --> 00:21:48,720 Speaker 1: of the Middle East do not want the Shia to 325 00:21:48,840 --> 00:21:53,560 Speaker 1: atrieve regional hegemony, right, and they control that straight up 326 00:21:53,600 --> 00:21:57,400 Speaker 1: hor moves, I believe where all the oil comes from. So, 327 00:21:57,880 --> 00:22:02,000 Speaker 1: like we said, it's tremendously complicated the model. No, it's 328 00:22:02,000 --> 00:22:06,400 Speaker 1: totally fine. There's just there's so many competing interests out there, 329 00:22:06,520 --> 00:22:09,520 Speaker 1: and then a whole a whole other set of competing 330 00:22:09,560 --> 00:22:12,439 Speaker 1: interests in the Western world that are all looking and 331 00:22:12,480 --> 00:22:14,520 Speaker 1: trying to figure out the chest pieces of what's going 332 00:22:14,560 --> 00:22:17,080 Speaker 1: on over there. And then when you have, you know, 333 00:22:18,400 --> 00:22:21,920 Speaker 1: a fairly small country like Iran that has this developing 334 00:22:21,960 --> 00:22:27,800 Speaker 1: technology that could lead to uh, either disastrous results or 335 00:22:28,119 --> 00:22:30,920 Speaker 1: just be a thorn in the side of anybody who 336 00:22:30,920 --> 00:22:36,600 Speaker 1: wants to manipulate the area. Right. Yeah, So at some point, 337 00:22:38,240 --> 00:22:45,800 Speaker 1: a few years back, the governing powers of UM some country, right, 338 00:22:45,800 --> 00:22:48,359 Speaker 1: because still no one is quite sure who this is 339 00:22:48,560 --> 00:22:52,760 Speaker 1: or no one's admitting it. At some point a group 340 00:22:52,880 --> 00:22:57,280 Speaker 1: of very powerful people said, you know, this paperwork has 341 00:22:57,359 --> 00:23:00,240 Speaker 1: taken a while, and uh, I don't have to for 342 00:23:00,280 --> 00:23:03,520 Speaker 1: the u N to vote on stuff. So let's just 343 00:23:03,760 --> 00:23:06,879 Speaker 1: start killing the people who are in charge of the 344 00:23:07,000 --> 00:23:10,520 Speaker 1: nuclear program. Now, you know, it doesn't matter if you 345 00:23:10,560 --> 00:23:13,560 Speaker 1: think it was a good decision or bad decision, if 346 00:23:13,600 --> 00:23:17,639 Speaker 1: you're if you're pro or anti either side. The fact 347 00:23:17,640 --> 00:23:20,359 Speaker 1: of the matter is that this happened. Somebody is killing 348 00:23:20,359 --> 00:23:23,640 Speaker 1: these people. It happened in a dark room, quiet conversation 349 00:23:23,880 --> 00:23:26,200 Speaker 1: between two people. Maybe it happened out in the open 350 00:23:26,240 --> 00:23:29,080 Speaker 1: somewhere because it was harder to attract or listen to. 351 00:23:29,400 --> 00:23:32,800 Speaker 1: But it happened, right, And we know what happened because 352 00:23:33,000 --> 00:23:35,640 Speaker 1: we have just in this show, we have no less 353 00:23:35,680 --> 00:23:40,120 Speaker 1: than five examples of when this happened. So let's look 354 00:23:40,160 --> 00:23:44,560 Speaker 1: at Majid Sharrari, a nuclear engineer who was assassinated in 355 00:23:44,600 --> 00:23:48,840 Speaker 1: two thousand ten. Uh, there were some unidentified assailants who 356 00:23:48,880 --> 00:23:54,120 Speaker 1: wrote up on motorcycles and attached bombs to this person's 357 00:23:54,160 --> 00:23:57,400 Speaker 1: car and they detonated it from a distance. They rode 358 00:23:57,400 --> 00:23:59,480 Speaker 1: away and detonated the bombs that they just stuck to 359 00:23:59,520 --> 00:24:03,520 Speaker 1: the sides of the cars. And Iran initially and I 360 00:24:03,560 --> 00:24:08,080 Speaker 1: believe still currently blames Massaud for this. And then for 361 00:24:08,160 --> 00:24:13,320 Speaker 1: another example, we have our this year hosting port I'm 362 00:24:13,359 --> 00:24:17,199 Speaker 1: mispronouncing this name, but uh. This was a scientist and 363 00:24:17,240 --> 00:24:22,320 Speaker 1: professor of electromagnetism died in two thousand and seven. According 364 00:24:22,359 --> 00:24:28,520 Speaker 1: to Stratford, which is a privately run intelligence analysts corporation, 365 00:24:29,760 --> 00:24:35,360 Speaker 1: this scientist was killed either via gassing or radioactive poisoning, 366 00:24:35,600 --> 00:24:39,320 Speaker 1: and this was also blamed on the United States and 367 00:24:39,520 --> 00:24:45,800 Speaker 1: or Israel. However, Massad sources denied these allegations, which means 368 00:24:45,840 --> 00:24:51,399 Speaker 1: that it is possible that this scientist asphyxiated due to 369 00:24:51,440 --> 00:24:55,960 Speaker 1: gas fumes while asleep. However, to me that doesn't hold water. 370 00:24:56,640 --> 00:25:01,679 Speaker 1: Given the studies and the p fashional biography or the 371 00:25:01,760 --> 00:25:06,760 Speaker 1: CV of this person, I'm fairly certain hasting Poor was assassinated. 372 00:25:07,640 --> 00:25:11,960 Speaker 1: Then there's Massoud Ali Mohammady. He was a quantum field 373 00:25:12,000 --> 00:25:16,120 Speaker 1: theorist and an elementary particle physicist. In two thousand and ten, 374 00:25:16,359 --> 00:25:21,760 Speaker 1: he died because his motorcycle was apparently booby trapped and 375 00:25:22,040 --> 00:25:25,639 Speaker 1: it exploded and he died in the explosion, and Iran 376 00:25:25,720 --> 00:25:29,200 Speaker 1: demanded the extradition of a couple of these Tondar members. 377 00:25:30,160 --> 00:25:34,720 Speaker 1: They're an expatriate association based in the US, and they're 378 00:25:34,760 --> 00:25:37,880 Speaker 1: often thought of Iran as a terrorist group. And it's 379 00:25:37,920 --> 00:25:40,439 Speaker 1: good that we're recording this now because we had a 380 00:25:40,520 --> 00:25:43,560 Speaker 1: video that came out explaining some of the nature of 381 00:25:43,720 --> 00:25:49,440 Speaker 1: proxies in in these kinds of dirty wars or clandestine 382 00:25:49,640 --> 00:25:54,720 Speaker 1: assassination wars. And yeah, so who's Tondar. Tondar is a 383 00:25:54,960 --> 00:26:00,159 Speaker 1: group based in the United States of Iranian Americans or 384 00:26:00,200 --> 00:26:06,600 Speaker 1: originally Iranian nationals who left uh either in response to 385 00:26:07,280 --> 00:26:13,080 Speaker 1: the uh increasingly strict policies of Iran post revolution, or 386 00:26:13,119 --> 00:26:17,280 Speaker 1: in response to the revolution. So they are not U 387 00:26:18,320 --> 00:26:21,679 Speaker 1: was that they they're not friends of the of the 388 00:26:21,800 --> 00:26:27,359 Speaker 1: current government. And in Iran they are treated as a 389 00:26:27,520 --> 00:26:30,760 Speaker 1: terrorist group, right, but in the United States they are not. 390 00:26:30,880 --> 00:26:35,080 Speaker 1: They're thought of as an expatriot organization. And we see 391 00:26:35,119 --> 00:26:38,040 Speaker 1: that happening often, you know, and thinking the video, we 392 00:26:38,160 --> 00:26:41,480 Speaker 1: mentioned m e K and we mentioned Hill Bellah and 393 00:26:42,040 --> 00:26:45,800 Speaker 1: the other groups that are terrorists to some countries and 394 00:26:45,880 --> 00:26:51,560 Speaker 1: not terrorists in other countries. Moving on number four, darush 395 00:26:51,720 --> 00:26:56,439 Speaker 1: raisianajad uh this is again my mispronunciation. I apologized all 396 00:26:56,480 --> 00:27:01,440 Speaker 1: Farsi speakers. Uh This was an engineering student assassinated by 397 00:27:01,520 --> 00:27:05,919 Speaker 1: gunmen in two thousand eleven. Uh Uran also blames this 398 00:27:05,960 --> 00:27:11,960 Speaker 1: on massade because uh Daryosh's research was on high voltage switches, 399 00:27:12,160 --> 00:27:17,119 Speaker 1: which would be a crucial component in the nuclear technology 400 00:27:17,400 --> 00:27:21,440 Speaker 1: that the country was and is pursuing. Last on our list, 401 00:27:21,480 --> 00:27:24,760 Speaker 1: we have Mustafa Mati Roshan, who was a nuclear scientist 402 00:27:24,840 --> 00:27:29,680 Speaker 1: and a professor and apparently he died by an explosive 403 00:27:30,080 --> 00:27:34,920 Speaker 1: and two thousand twelve. So these are just five examples 404 00:27:35,200 --> 00:27:41,879 Speaker 1: of assassinations that we know occurred. This doesn't mean that 405 00:27:42,440 --> 00:27:45,080 Speaker 1: these are the only ones by any means, and it 406 00:27:45,160 --> 00:27:50,159 Speaker 1: certainly doesn't mean that Uranian scientists are the only people 407 00:27:50,359 --> 00:27:57,600 Speaker 1: being assassinated. We're not trying to vilify any country because frankly, 408 00:27:58,320 --> 00:28:02,720 Speaker 1: a lot of these countries are using clandestine means when 409 00:28:02,800 --> 00:28:06,040 Speaker 1: the official channels don't work. And we didn't put anything 410 00:28:06,040 --> 00:28:09,199 Speaker 1: in here about the corporations. But Matt, you remember the 411 00:28:09,240 --> 00:28:15,159 Speaker 1: guy who allegedly died by hanging himself in Singapore and 412 00:28:15,200 --> 00:28:22,520 Speaker 1: he was working with some electronics, some uh my conductors, right, yeah, 413 00:28:22,560 --> 00:28:26,160 Speaker 1: the name escapes me now. But the police in Singapore 414 00:28:26,720 --> 00:28:29,639 Speaker 1: did not even investigate the crime scene, which the family 415 00:28:29,640 --> 00:28:33,200 Speaker 1: found out about when they flew to Singapore. They're convinced 416 00:28:33,240 --> 00:28:36,679 Speaker 1: that he was murdered, uh possibly to keep the secret 417 00:28:37,000 --> 00:28:42,080 Speaker 1: of his research because he was a US national working 418 00:28:42,120 --> 00:28:49,920 Speaker 1: for a foreign company. And there's this entire underbelly, or 419 00:28:50,000 --> 00:29:00,880 Speaker 1: this entire unreported segment of of suspiciously convenient deaths that 420 00:29:00,880 --> 00:29:04,320 Speaker 1: that just runs through so much of the rarefied world 421 00:29:04,360 --> 00:29:07,400 Speaker 1: of high tech expertise, and it's frightening. Well, it's really 422 00:29:07,440 --> 00:29:11,640 Speaker 1: frightening because if if you die in a certain way 423 00:29:12,040 --> 00:29:15,640 Speaker 1: that doesn't look suspicious, even sometimes if it looks a 424 00:29:15,640 --> 00:29:19,760 Speaker 1: little suspicious, Yeah, like you end up in a bag. Yeah, 425 00:29:19,880 --> 00:29:27,160 Speaker 1: that's that's locked. Let's say from the outside, in a bathtub. Uh. Oh, 426 00:29:27,240 --> 00:29:29,440 Speaker 1: I believe we mentioned him in the video. Yeah, sorry, 427 00:29:29,440 --> 00:29:31,640 Speaker 1: you go really go back and watch our video if 428 00:29:31,680 --> 00:29:34,480 Speaker 1: you get the chance. It's not very long. You'll enjoy it, 429 00:29:34,680 --> 00:29:36,960 Speaker 1: and it'll scare you. Well, I'll set you down a 430 00:29:37,040 --> 00:29:40,680 Speaker 1: rabbit hole, that's for sure. So one of the last 431 00:29:40,720 --> 00:29:42,120 Speaker 1: things that we talked about, this is one of my 432 00:29:42,160 --> 00:29:45,120 Speaker 1: favorite parts of the show, Matt, is that now we 433 00:29:45,280 --> 00:29:50,600 Speaker 1: can speak speculatively, we can talk about our opinions, and 434 00:29:50,680 --> 00:29:54,800 Speaker 1: let's be very careful to differentiate our opinions from the facts. 435 00:29:54,840 --> 00:30:01,200 Speaker 1: We talked about the facts earlier. So with these allegations, right, 436 00:30:01,240 --> 00:30:04,520 Speaker 1: because we still have to call them allegations in most 437 00:30:04,600 --> 00:30:07,479 Speaker 1: cases since they have them have been proven. You know, 438 00:30:07,560 --> 00:30:12,560 Speaker 1: no intelligence agency has been prosecuted for these murders, nor 439 00:30:12,600 --> 00:30:16,720 Speaker 1: have any operatives. Right, let's talk pros and cons. So 440 00:30:18,160 --> 00:30:22,000 Speaker 1: there's a reason that these people are are being assassinated, 441 00:30:22,120 --> 00:30:25,600 Speaker 1: and the governing powers of the people who are carrying 442 00:30:25,600 --> 00:30:30,560 Speaker 1: out these assassinations clearly believe that it is worth it 443 00:30:30,840 --> 00:30:35,760 Speaker 1: to murder assassinate someone. Let's try and find these silver 444 00:30:35,840 --> 00:30:40,800 Speaker 1: lining here. If there is anything, the biggest thing would 445 00:30:40,840 --> 00:30:43,760 Speaker 1: be there. Perhaps there is a reason that some of 446 00:30:43,800 --> 00:30:46,640 Speaker 1: these people have been killed, and it's because the people 447 00:30:46,640 --> 00:30:50,880 Speaker 1: who killed them believe that by killing them, they will 448 00:30:50,920 --> 00:30:55,160 Speaker 1: be saving hundreds, if not thousands, or millions of others. 449 00:30:56,360 --> 00:31:01,120 Speaker 1: Let's say, for instance, the around Ian scientists. Perhaps there's 450 00:31:01,160 --> 00:31:04,800 Speaker 1: a person, let's I'm just this is all my opinion 451 00:31:05,640 --> 00:31:10,760 Speaker 1: somewhere I don't know, hanging out CIA headquarters who decided 452 00:31:10,800 --> 00:31:12,600 Speaker 1: where these are the guys we need to take out 453 00:31:12,720 --> 00:31:16,080 Speaker 1: so that a nuclear weapon won't happen in Iran. So 454 00:31:16,160 --> 00:31:20,840 Speaker 1: the idea being that, the idea of being that it's 455 00:31:20,960 --> 00:31:28,200 Speaker 1: ultimately better or even morally superior to take a few 456 00:31:28,280 --> 00:31:32,080 Speaker 1: lives in order to save possibly thousands, right, possibly, it's 457 00:31:32,080 --> 00:31:34,920 Speaker 1: a big if. Right, even even even if you're trying 458 00:31:34,960 --> 00:31:37,600 Speaker 1: to go positive with it, it's a huge if, because 459 00:31:39,000 --> 00:31:42,360 Speaker 1: who's to say what even if a weapon system did 460 00:31:42,720 --> 00:31:45,200 Speaker 1: happen there, who's to say what's going to happen. You 461 00:31:45,520 --> 00:31:48,280 Speaker 1: can't see the future. Well maybe the CIA can, and 462 00:31:48,320 --> 00:31:51,800 Speaker 1: I just don't know about it. Uh, highly doubt that though. 463 00:31:52,240 --> 00:31:55,520 Speaker 1: Well there, you know, we can also talk about some 464 00:31:55,680 --> 00:32:00,120 Speaker 1: of the the clear cons for this sort of ing. 465 00:32:01,440 --> 00:32:07,840 Speaker 1: Assassinating someone by any measure of the of the international 466 00:32:07,960 --> 00:32:14,440 Speaker 1: norms is it's against the law. It's eight shades of illegal, 467 00:32:14,680 --> 00:32:18,120 Speaker 1: you know, And uh, I guess I should have fifty 468 00:32:18,160 --> 00:32:22,760 Speaker 1: shades of illegal. A topical joke, it's already if you don't, 469 00:32:22,920 --> 00:32:25,000 Speaker 1: oh yeah, well it's too late at the dies cast. 470 00:32:25,160 --> 00:32:29,160 Speaker 1: But but the point is that this sort of thing 471 00:32:30,240 --> 00:32:36,920 Speaker 1: also clearly, clearly and perhaps irrevocably damages relationships between countries. 472 00:32:37,000 --> 00:32:43,000 Speaker 1: Already tense situations begin to deteriorate. Uh, spycraft is crazy. 473 00:32:43,080 --> 00:32:46,520 Speaker 1: And you know, at some point we have to ask ourselves, 474 00:32:47,640 --> 00:32:51,800 Speaker 1: we as as human beings, have to ask ourselves, is 475 00:32:51,800 --> 00:32:57,400 Speaker 1: is spycraft generally over the long term of benefit to 476 00:32:57,440 --> 00:33:00,880 Speaker 1: the world or is it of short term benefit, uh 477 00:33:00,920 --> 00:33:03,920 Speaker 1: to a small group of people to the status quote 478 00:33:04,400 --> 00:33:07,200 Speaker 1: right to the status quote. Now, you know, we've we've 479 00:33:07,240 --> 00:33:10,640 Speaker 1: all heard the stories about the Cold War and the extensive, 480 00:33:10,720 --> 00:33:15,120 Speaker 1: crazy amount of spine that went on there, and it 481 00:33:15,200 --> 00:33:21,240 Speaker 1: seemed that the USSR and the United States were constantly 482 00:33:22,640 --> 00:33:26,640 Speaker 1: uh putting out their own propaganda and and neck and 483 00:33:26,720 --> 00:33:30,880 Speaker 1: neck in some races, but then also started believing their 484 00:33:30,920 --> 00:33:35,400 Speaker 1: own propaganda. I I just wonder, I just wonder what 485 00:33:35,520 --> 00:33:39,400 Speaker 1: this means for the future of science. Yeah, well, I 486 00:33:39,440 --> 00:33:42,880 Speaker 1: think it creates a lot of suspicion and paranoia in 487 00:33:42,920 --> 00:33:46,680 Speaker 1: those fields, and it's gonna make it's gonna make at 488 00:33:46,720 --> 00:33:50,800 Speaker 1: least high priority science that's happening much more secretive. And 489 00:33:50,840 --> 00:33:52,840 Speaker 1: that's scary because that's not what it's supposed to be. 490 00:33:53,800 --> 00:33:56,800 Speaker 1: Big science is supposed to be public and shared. And 491 00:33:57,480 --> 00:33:59,400 Speaker 1: you know, it's like we talked about with patents a 492 00:33:59,440 --> 00:34:02,720 Speaker 1: while ago, what what the patent system does to science? 493 00:34:02,800 --> 00:34:06,760 Speaker 1: Because now I, as the inventor or the scientist, I 494 00:34:06,840 --> 00:34:09,480 Speaker 1: want to reap the rewards rather than you know, spread 495 00:34:09,480 --> 00:34:13,480 Speaker 1: them out amongst humanity. Yeah, I was. I was thinking 496 00:34:13,600 --> 00:34:16,480 Speaker 1: the same thing too, because you know right now, uh, 497 00:34:17,160 --> 00:34:23,400 Speaker 1: various countries have sanctions systems against one another, right Uh. 498 00:34:23,440 --> 00:34:29,000 Speaker 1: The there's sanctions systems against North Korea, which are primarily 499 00:34:29,040 --> 00:34:31,880 Speaker 1: intended to punish the elite, who are the only people 500 00:34:31,880 --> 00:34:35,360 Speaker 1: who really have access to those sorts of luxury goods. 501 00:34:35,400 --> 00:34:39,680 Speaker 1: But then there there's sanctions against um Iran as well, 502 00:34:40,440 --> 00:34:44,000 Speaker 1: and there's this huge debate in the international sphere over 503 00:34:44,040 --> 00:34:46,560 Speaker 1: whether or not sanctions work. But one of my concerns is, 504 00:34:46,560 --> 00:34:51,200 Speaker 1: what if education starts becoming good that can be sanctioned. 505 00:34:51,560 --> 00:34:54,200 Speaker 1: You know, what if what if you're bright student and 506 00:34:54,320 --> 00:34:58,560 Speaker 1: you cannot go to the best university for your field 507 00:34:59,000 --> 00:35:01,480 Speaker 1: because it happens to be in France, or it happens 508 00:35:01,480 --> 00:35:04,440 Speaker 1: to be in you know, it happens to be Harvard 509 00:35:04,520 --> 00:35:11,239 Speaker 1: or something that's disturbing. I I hope that never happens. Um. Sorry, Ben, 510 00:35:11,239 --> 00:35:14,920 Speaker 1: you're freaking me out, because you know, education is one 511 00:35:14,920 --> 00:35:17,919 Speaker 1: of those things that's so under it's such an under 512 00:35:18,000 --> 00:35:21,439 Speaker 1: priority or a non priority, it seems to be from 513 00:35:21,480 --> 00:35:23,960 Speaker 1: a public standpoint, at least here in the US. And 514 00:35:24,040 --> 00:35:28,400 Speaker 1: we're arriving at this point, this crossroads met where it 515 00:35:28,600 --> 00:35:32,840 Speaker 1: is possible that education in the future will be free 516 00:35:32,920 --> 00:35:36,399 Speaker 1: will be a universal human right. And I know even 517 00:35:36,440 --> 00:35:39,399 Speaker 1: just the phrase human rights can just on its own 518 00:35:39,800 --> 00:35:44,200 Speaker 1: set people's certain people's hair on end. But you know, 519 00:35:44,239 --> 00:35:46,360 Speaker 1: if you look at it, we're we're moving into a 520 00:35:46,400 --> 00:35:49,560 Speaker 1: world where the cost of information is so cheap that 521 00:35:49,800 --> 00:35:53,560 Speaker 1: people are able to just with an Internet connection. Uh 522 00:35:53,680 --> 00:35:57,960 Speaker 1: directly learned from some of the smartest folks in the world. 523 00:35:58,080 --> 00:36:02,640 Speaker 1: And what if, in the injured of national security people 524 00:36:02,719 --> 00:36:07,560 Speaker 1: begin to lose access to that information. I'm always I'm 525 00:36:07,600 --> 00:36:11,759 Speaker 1: always very skeptical, and I have been increasingly skeptical of 526 00:36:11,920 --> 00:36:15,799 Speaker 1: national security as a reason for things. Yeah, I think 527 00:36:15,840 --> 00:36:19,399 Speaker 1: you should be. It's been abused a lot. I wish 528 00:36:19,440 --> 00:36:21,839 Speaker 1: I could just claim national security in my personal life, 529 00:36:21,840 --> 00:36:26,640 Speaker 1: you know what I mean? Personal security? Maybe I'm oh, 530 00:36:26,680 --> 00:36:29,600 Speaker 1: it's gonna be National's got to be an offense issue. Yeah, 531 00:36:30,280 --> 00:36:33,000 Speaker 1: I'm sorry, I can't go to work next week? Why 532 00:36:33,440 --> 00:36:36,239 Speaker 1: national security? I shouldn't even be talking to you about this. 533 00:36:37,200 --> 00:36:40,239 Speaker 1: Just cover for me. You know it would work for you, Ben, 534 00:36:40,480 --> 00:36:42,680 Speaker 1: Would it work work for you? I think it would 535 00:36:42,680 --> 00:36:45,760 Speaker 1: have worked more for you. I wouldn't think twice if 536 00:36:46,120 --> 00:36:50,520 Speaker 1: if Jerry told me, hey, look, Ben's not here. National security? 537 00:36:50,800 --> 00:36:53,440 Speaker 1: Is it the new base that you can tag in 538 00:36:53,520 --> 00:36:56,520 Speaker 1: conversation is okay, So I don't want to get us 539 00:36:56,560 --> 00:36:59,200 Speaker 1: too off base map. But I wanted to talk about 540 00:36:59,239 --> 00:37:01,120 Speaker 1: this on the air because I thought the listeners would 541 00:37:01,200 --> 00:37:05,160 Speaker 1: like it, and I think it might answer some conversation 542 00:37:05,239 --> 00:37:08,440 Speaker 1: JU and I have been having for a long time. 543 00:37:08,680 --> 00:37:13,360 Speaker 1: I was thinking about the term conspiracy theory, and you 544 00:37:13,400 --> 00:37:15,520 Speaker 1: and I have you know, kicked this round all the 545 00:37:15,520 --> 00:37:20,640 Speaker 1: time because often used as an insult, right, So why 546 00:37:21,000 --> 00:37:25,399 Speaker 1: when people hear the phrase conspiracy theory will they throw 547 00:37:25,520 --> 00:37:32,040 Speaker 1: out completely reasonable stuff like banks cooperating with drug cartels, which, 548 00:37:32,360 --> 00:37:38,040 Speaker 1: excuse my hiccup, we scooped the Daily Show on right. 549 00:37:38,760 --> 00:37:41,040 Speaker 1: Huge fans, if you're listening to our show, thank you, 550 00:37:41,640 --> 00:37:46,240 Speaker 1: But we we really did find that often that phrase 551 00:37:46,400 --> 00:37:55,040 Speaker 1: alone was enough to completely um, what's a good word everything? Yeah, negate, 552 00:37:55,200 --> 00:37:59,720 Speaker 1: any any evidence anything like that, And people who prized 553 00:37:59,760 --> 00:38:04,600 Speaker 1: them elves as critical thinkers stopped thinking critically or even 554 00:38:04,600 --> 00:38:08,640 Speaker 1: skeptically when they heard the phrase conspiracy theory. They just went, oh, well, 555 00:38:08,640 --> 00:38:14,880 Speaker 1: that's total bs. So I finally figured out a theory 556 00:38:14,960 --> 00:38:17,040 Speaker 1: about what this is, or I should say I found 557 00:38:17,040 --> 00:38:19,759 Speaker 1: a book by someone who figured it out. Uh, There's 558 00:38:19,760 --> 00:38:23,000 Speaker 1: an author named Robert J. Lifton who wrote a book 559 00:38:23,040 --> 00:38:27,400 Speaker 1: called Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism. And in 560 00:38:27,600 --> 00:38:32,440 Speaker 1: the Psychology of Totalism he brings up a very interesting idea, 561 00:38:33,120 --> 00:38:38,520 Speaker 1: the thought terminating cliche. It's a cliche that is commonly 562 00:38:38,640 --> 00:38:43,240 Speaker 1: used phrase that you hear that will quell this cognitive 563 00:38:43,800 --> 00:38:50,600 Speaker 1: dissonance or justify fallacious logic, or just dismiss any opposing viewpoints. 564 00:38:51,080 --> 00:38:54,440 Speaker 1: So you know, on the Internet, when someone says, hey, 565 00:38:54,680 --> 00:38:57,439 Speaker 1: you guys, stop picking on that person, and then someone 566 00:38:57,480 --> 00:39:01,240 Speaker 1: else goes, oh, is your white nighting? Right? White nighting 567 00:39:01,280 --> 00:39:05,000 Speaker 1: would be a thought terminating cliche there, because then all 568 00:39:05,040 --> 00:39:08,520 Speaker 1: of a sudden has all these connotations of like everything 569 00:39:08,520 --> 00:39:11,719 Speaker 1: that the prior person said now is looked at under 570 00:39:11,719 --> 00:39:14,560 Speaker 1: this light. Yeah, it doesn't matter. It doesn't matter because 571 00:39:14,600 --> 00:39:18,360 Speaker 1: of you and what you are, and everybody knows because 572 00:39:18,400 --> 00:39:22,879 Speaker 1: of this special word or phrase. And so what what 573 00:39:22,920 --> 00:39:26,120 Speaker 1: I'm finding is that going back to this, I know, 574 00:39:26,200 --> 00:39:27,959 Speaker 1: we walked a long way for this one, but going 575 00:39:28,000 --> 00:39:31,239 Speaker 1: back to it, national security is turning into a thought 576 00:39:31,360 --> 00:39:35,120 Speaker 1: terminating cliche, turning into man, I think it's been there. Well, 577 00:39:35,120 --> 00:39:38,480 Speaker 1: it's valid in certain contexts, you know, sure, it's valid. 578 00:39:39,000 --> 00:39:43,000 Speaker 1: Conspiracy theory is super valid in certain contexts. That's true. 579 00:39:43,160 --> 00:39:46,000 Speaker 1: I just you know, like, what's an example of national security? 580 00:39:46,440 --> 00:39:51,600 Speaker 1: I don't want people to be able to take warheads 581 00:39:51,600 --> 00:39:54,960 Speaker 1: on planes on commercial flights. You know that is a 582 00:39:55,000 --> 00:39:58,560 Speaker 1: matter of national security. It sure is. Uh. And T 583 00:39:58,800 --> 00:40:03,280 Speaker 1: s A. If you're listening, good luck, guys, UH, because 584 00:40:03,280 --> 00:40:06,760 Speaker 1: I don't think you know, I personally don't have highest 585 00:40:06,760 --> 00:40:10,960 Speaker 1: opinion with the T s A. Yeah, well we can 586 00:40:10,960 --> 00:40:13,480 Speaker 1: get into that and the T s A and security 587 00:40:13,520 --> 00:40:16,880 Speaker 1: theater and we can talk about that later. Security theater. 588 00:40:17,440 --> 00:40:21,520 Speaker 1: I like that phrase. Um, it's not mine, but it's true. 589 00:40:21,600 --> 00:40:23,440 Speaker 1: I'm gonna I'm gonna look it up. And I'm sorry 590 00:40:23,440 --> 00:40:27,080 Speaker 1: if that was too much of a tangent. It happens, man, 591 00:40:27,200 --> 00:40:33,040 Speaker 1: cliche happens us. Conspiracy theorists go on tangents more and more. 592 00:40:33,080 --> 00:40:36,800 Speaker 1: I think the term conspiracy realist or critical thinking is acting. 593 00:40:36,920 --> 00:40:39,600 Speaker 1: That's it, conspiracy realist. And I don't know if someone's 594 00:40:40,040 --> 00:40:42,759 Speaker 1: really coined that phrase or not, but I like it. 595 00:40:42,800 --> 00:40:44,880 Speaker 1: All right, we called it then unless someone else has 596 00:40:44,920 --> 00:40:46,839 Speaker 1: done it. You heard it here first, Matt and Ben 597 00:40:46,880 --> 00:40:51,960 Speaker 1: called dibbs. I mean, who can own a phrase? That's 598 00:40:52,000 --> 00:40:54,720 Speaker 1: that's weird. Yeah, we'll just put it on a T shirt. 599 00:40:54,760 --> 00:40:58,239 Speaker 1: Maybe that'll be enough. Um, But we'd also like to 600 00:40:58,400 --> 00:41:04,200 Speaker 1: hear your opinions about these assassinations of scientists. Is it? 601 00:41:04,280 --> 00:41:08,400 Speaker 1: Is it correct? Is it? Is it morally justifiable to 602 00:41:08,719 --> 00:41:13,120 Speaker 1: assassinate someone who would, for all intents and purposes, count 603 00:41:13,160 --> 00:41:17,960 Speaker 1: as a civilian right? And are there other cases of 604 00:41:18,000 --> 00:41:22,480 Speaker 1: inventors or scientists being assassinated that you want us and 605 00:41:22,640 --> 00:41:25,440 Speaker 1: the rest of your fellow listeners to know about. Uh? 606 00:41:25,560 --> 00:41:30,160 Speaker 1: If so, uh, let us know. And just to emphasize 607 00:41:30,480 --> 00:41:33,880 Speaker 1: how important listener mail is to us, we have a 608 00:41:33,960 --> 00:41:43,600 Speaker 1: listener mail uh today. Excellent, let's get to it. We 609 00:41:43,719 --> 00:41:47,880 Speaker 1: got this message from Greg s. He says, Hey, guys, 610 00:41:48,040 --> 00:41:49,839 Speaker 1: I've been watching you for some time and I thought 611 00:41:49,880 --> 00:41:53,080 Speaker 1: i'd take some time in first congratulating you on all 612 00:41:53,120 --> 00:41:55,719 Speaker 1: your success. I know it's hard to get things going, 613 00:41:56,080 --> 00:41:58,640 Speaker 1: but you all did it, and I hope the best 614 00:41:58,680 --> 00:42:01,000 Speaker 1: success for you in the future. The reason why I'm 615 00:42:01,000 --> 00:42:02,719 Speaker 1: taking some time just to talk to you today is 616 00:42:02,760 --> 00:42:06,120 Speaker 1: because I really like for you to dive into the 617 00:42:06,160 --> 00:42:09,480 Speaker 1: new pope and tie in the idea of him being 618 00:42:09,480 --> 00:42:12,480 Speaker 1: a Jesuit. And of course knowing what a Jesuit really 619 00:42:12,560 --> 00:42:16,440 Speaker 1: stands for and what they have been doing since the beginning. 620 00:42:16,880 --> 00:42:19,200 Speaker 1: I think you'll find a lot of major wars and 621 00:42:19,320 --> 00:42:24,719 Speaker 1: collapses or starters from Jesuits. I hope this intrigues you 622 00:42:24,960 --> 00:42:27,640 Speaker 1: to find out more or just to inform people a 623 00:42:27,680 --> 00:42:33,880 Speaker 1: little on what Jesuits are. Interesting. Greg, I don't know, 624 00:42:33,960 --> 00:42:36,600 Speaker 1: is it feels a little touch you to me this 625 00:42:36,680 --> 00:42:40,640 Speaker 1: subject already? Well, we can definitely look at the history 626 00:42:40,680 --> 00:42:43,600 Speaker 1: of Jesuits because I'll be honest, other than Jesuit schools, 627 00:42:43,680 --> 00:42:48,799 Speaker 1: I don't know very much about the the organization. Um 628 00:42:49,000 --> 00:42:53,200 Speaker 1: and I do know that the the new Pope is 629 00:42:53,360 --> 00:42:57,759 Speaker 1: a Jesuit, right, Uh. I would be really interested to 630 00:42:57,840 --> 00:43:01,320 Speaker 1: dig in here and see what we find. So, Greg, 631 00:43:02,040 --> 00:43:05,600 Speaker 1: thank you so much for writing to us, and we 632 00:43:06,960 --> 00:43:08,400 Speaker 1: you know what, I'm gonna take you up on it. 633 00:43:08,440 --> 00:43:10,480 Speaker 1: I'm gonna I'm gonna look into this. Yeah, we'll at 634 00:43:10,560 --> 00:43:14,200 Speaker 1: least do some some digging, right, because there's there are 635 00:43:14,239 --> 00:43:18,719 Speaker 1: always so many skeletons, they're just under the surface, especially 636 00:43:18,719 --> 00:43:23,040 Speaker 1: a very old organizations. So, Greg, you say that a 637 00:43:23,040 --> 00:43:30,200 Speaker 1: lot of major wars and collapses come from Jesuit organization. Yeah, 638 00:43:30,239 --> 00:43:32,600 Speaker 1: let's see what's up with that? Man? Figure it out? Star? Well, 639 00:43:32,600 --> 00:43:36,000 Speaker 1: thank you so much DJ Logic for writing in. So yeah, 640 00:43:36,040 --> 00:43:39,040 Speaker 1: if you again, if you have any ideas for a 641 00:43:39,080 --> 00:43:41,640 Speaker 1: show topic, send it to us. You can find us 642 00:43:41,680 --> 00:43:44,520 Speaker 1: on Facebook. We're conspiracy stuff there. You can find us 643 00:43:44,520 --> 00:43:48,200 Speaker 1: on Twitter. We're at conspiracy stuff. And you should go 644 00:43:48,200 --> 00:43:49,920 Speaker 1: to our website stuff they don't want you to know 645 00:43:50,040 --> 00:43:52,360 Speaker 1: dot com. I love just telling you guys all the 646 00:43:52,400 --> 00:43:54,759 Speaker 1: places that you can find us every week. I'm sure 647 00:43:54,760 --> 00:43:57,439 Speaker 1: you're getting sick of this or you just turn it off. Yeah, 648 00:43:57,600 --> 00:44:00,319 Speaker 1: I hope people don't get sick of it. I mean, 649 00:44:00,360 --> 00:44:03,399 Speaker 1: we still have other stuff that we squeeze in at 650 00:44:04,040 --> 00:44:07,560 Speaker 1: some episodes, right, uh. And the website is pretty cool. 651 00:44:07,680 --> 00:44:11,080 Speaker 1: You can find all of our audio stuff there. Um. 652 00:44:11,200 --> 00:44:14,880 Speaker 1: We ask people recently on Twitter if you wanted to 653 00:44:15,719 --> 00:44:18,280 Speaker 1: read a blog if we should start doing that again, 654 00:44:18,400 --> 00:44:22,880 Speaker 1: So let us know we can. We can always start 655 00:44:23,000 --> 00:44:25,200 Speaker 1: that up, but we want to make sure it's something 656 00:44:25,280 --> 00:44:30,080 Speaker 1: people feel like reading. Yeah, exactly. Oh hey guess what what. 657 00:44:30,480 --> 00:44:33,520 Speaker 1: There's one last way you can contact us. It's kind 658 00:44:33,520 --> 00:44:35,279 Speaker 1: of out of fashion, it's kind of old woman. It 659 00:44:35,360 --> 00:44:37,960 Speaker 1: is easy, what is it? You can write us an 660 00:44:37,960 --> 00:44:46,239 Speaker 1: email We are conspiracy at how stuff works dot com. 661 00:44:46,280 --> 00:44:49,760 Speaker 1: For more on this topic and other unexplained phenomenon, visit 662 00:44:49,840 --> 00:44:53,720 Speaker 1: test tube dot com slash conspiracy stuff. You can also 663 00:44:53,760 --> 00:44:57,240 Speaker 1: get in touch on Twitter at the handle at conspiracy stuff.