1 00:00:07,120 --> 00:00:19,360 Speaker 1: Ah beat Force. If it doesn't work, you're just not 2 00:00:19,680 --> 00:00:24,880 Speaker 1: using enough. You're listening to software a Gradio special operations, 3 00:00:24,920 --> 00:00:58,160 Speaker 1: military news and straight talk with the guys and the community. 4 00:01:00,080 --> 00:01:13,680 Speaker 1: Yea software Radio on Time on Target. We have Andrew J. 5 00:01:13,840 --> 00:01:16,880 Speaker 1: Polski or I know it's say Andy Polsky in studio, 6 00:01:17,040 --> 00:01:21,080 Speaker 1: author of Elusive Victories, The American Presidency at War. Although 7 00:01:21,360 --> 00:01:23,360 Speaker 1: you're not really out of the book tour promoting this 8 00:01:23,480 --> 00:01:26,880 Speaker 1: because it came out, but it's a book that's extremely 9 00:01:26,920 --> 00:01:31,280 Speaker 1: relevant today. Um Andy earned his PhD from Princeton University, 10 00:01:31,600 --> 00:01:35,679 Speaker 1: political science professor at Hunter College and Cooney's Graduate Center. 11 00:01:36,200 --> 00:01:40,240 Speaker 1: Also authored The Rise of the Therapeutic State. And this 12 00:01:40,319 --> 00:01:45,039 Speaker 1: book although as I said, from very relevant today. Yeah, 13 00:01:45,040 --> 00:01:47,199 Speaker 1: then in some ways that's unfortunate because it just means 14 00:01:47,200 --> 00:01:49,880 Speaker 1: that the wars I was writing about in are still 15 00:01:49,880 --> 00:01:55,000 Speaker 1: going on. Yeah. I mean it's incredibly important, and I 16 00:01:55,320 --> 00:01:57,200 Speaker 1: think maybe that's where we should focus on today, is 17 00:01:57,240 --> 00:01:59,400 Speaker 1: the global War on terror. Because you chose a number 18 00:01:59,480 --> 00:02:03,520 Speaker 1: of president American presidents who were serving during times of war, 19 00:02:03,920 --> 00:02:07,280 Speaker 1: going back to Abraham Lincoln, but you also profiled George W. 20 00:02:07,440 --> 00:02:11,400 Speaker 1: Bush and Barack Obama's administration. But then the book came 21 00:02:11,400 --> 00:02:15,480 Speaker 1: out before the Donald Trump administration, So if you're willing 22 00:02:15,520 --> 00:02:17,359 Speaker 1: we talk a little bit about that as well, that's 23 00:02:17,400 --> 00:02:20,400 Speaker 1: as good a place to start as any. Sure. Um, 24 00:02:20,440 --> 00:02:22,040 Speaker 1: So I mean, do you want to tell us first off, 25 00:02:22,120 --> 00:02:24,800 Speaker 1: you know what the thrust of of your book, Elusive 26 00:02:24,880 --> 00:02:27,959 Speaker 1: Victories is. Sure? Well, the book the book emerged after 27 00:02:28,200 --> 00:02:31,440 Speaker 1: the American invasion of Iraq in two thousand three. Um, 28 00:02:31,480 --> 00:02:34,200 Speaker 1: I'm a political scientist. I've been teaching about the presidency 29 00:02:34,200 --> 00:02:37,519 Speaker 1: and political parties. It turned out people in political science 30 00:02:37,560 --> 00:02:40,640 Speaker 1: hadn't We're not writing about wartime presidents, and there we 31 00:02:40,639 --> 00:02:42,800 Speaker 1: were thrust into the middle of a war. So I 32 00:02:42,840 --> 00:02:45,440 Speaker 1: began to do research and writing on it. And I 33 00:02:45,520 --> 00:02:48,320 Speaker 1: came at it originally from what I would call a 34 00:02:48,440 --> 00:02:53,600 Speaker 1: traditional liberal skepticism about presidents and war powers, which is 35 00:02:53,639 --> 00:02:56,480 Speaker 1: that going back to Vietnam. Um, there have been people 36 00:02:56,480 --> 00:02:59,240 Speaker 1: who wrote then and this was the general view that 37 00:02:59,280 --> 00:03:02,320 Speaker 1: presidents had too many war powers, that they could get 38 00:03:02,360 --> 00:03:05,800 Speaker 1: America into conflicts and then make it impossible for Congress 39 00:03:05,880 --> 00:03:09,239 Speaker 1: to get us out of conflicts. Um. This was Arthur's 40 00:03:09,280 --> 00:03:13,200 Speaker 1: Sassenger Jr's thesis and the Imperial presidency, and he traced 41 00:03:13,240 --> 00:03:15,560 Speaker 1: all of the ways in which the powers of presidents 42 00:03:15,560 --> 00:03:20,760 Speaker 1: have increased over time to get the country into military conflicts. Okay, um, 43 00:03:20,800 --> 00:03:23,919 Speaker 1: But then as I looked more closely at it, I 44 00:03:23,960 --> 00:03:26,880 Speaker 1: came to see how actually how little power presidents have 45 00:03:27,600 --> 00:03:30,720 Speaker 1: to determine the outcomes of conflicts. And in fact, the 46 00:03:30,840 --> 00:03:32,880 Speaker 1: more powerful we make them in terms of having a 47 00:03:32,960 --> 00:03:36,800 Speaker 1: large standing military that they can deploy anywhere in the world, 48 00:03:37,400 --> 00:03:41,360 Speaker 1: and have in modern times done that, the worst the 49 00:03:41,360 --> 00:03:44,600 Speaker 1: results have been in military conflicts at Vieta in Vietnam 50 00:03:44,640 --> 00:03:48,000 Speaker 1: as an example, um Iraq was an example emerging as 51 00:03:48,000 --> 00:03:50,520 Speaker 1: an example at the time. So something was going on. 52 00:03:50,600 --> 00:03:55,160 Speaker 1: There were these supposedly all powerful presidents found themselves um 53 00:03:55,840 --> 00:03:58,080 Speaker 1: I would use it, and they weren't muscular, They became 54 00:03:58,160 --> 00:04:01,320 Speaker 1: muscle bound. They were actually not able to accomplish what 55 00:04:01,400 --> 00:04:03,640 Speaker 1: they wanted to accomplish. And that was really the start 56 00:04:03,640 --> 00:04:05,720 Speaker 1: of where the where where I was when I took 57 00:04:05,720 --> 00:04:07,560 Speaker 1: when I took on the book project to try and 58 00:04:07,600 --> 00:04:10,600 Speaker 1: figure out some of these puzzles about the relationship between 59 00:04:10,600 --> 00:04:15,480 Speaker 1: power and accomplishment a lack of accomplishment. Listening to your skepticism, 60 00:04:15,600 --> 00:04:18,320 Speaker 1: it sounds a little bit like the writings of John 61 00:04:18,400 --> 00:04:21,640 Speaker 1: Muir Scheimer or Stephen Walt, who expressed a lot of 62 00:04:21,640 --> 00:04:25,719 Speaker 1: skepticism about what the US government can realistically accomplish in 63 00:04:25,760 --> 00:04:30,000 Speaker 1: these overseas conflicts. I think that the Iraq or is 64 00:04:30,000 --> 00:04:34,479 Speaker 1: a really good example. George W. Bush essentially decides he 65 00:04:34,520 --> 00:04:38,560 Speaker 1: can take American military power anywhere he wants to. There's 66 00:04:38,600 --> 00:04:42,600 Speaker 1: no competing superpower in the early two thousand's, there's no 67 00:04:42,960 --> 00:04:45,479 Speaker 1: real restraint on what he can do. And the nine 68 00:04:45,520 --> 00:04:50,039 Speaker 1: eleven attack created this very these very permissive circumstances where 69 00:04:50,440 --> 00:04:53,160 Speaker 1: arguing that the war on terror would take us anywhere 70 00:04:53,240 --> 00:04:56,039 Speaker 1: that there were terrorists meant that he could pretty much 71 00:04:56,080 --> 00:04:58,680 Speaker 1: go with the U. S military where he wanted to. 72 00:04:58,760 --> 00:05:03,320 Speaker 1: And if it was Afghanistan, fine, But Afghanistan wasn't a 73 00:05:03,400 --> 00:05:06,480 Speaker 1: good setting to make a demonstration of what American power 74 00:05:06,520 --> 00:05:09,880 Speaker 1: could accomplish. Even if you rebuilt Afghanistan, it was in 75 00:05:09,920 --> 00:05:13,080 Speaker 1: an out of the way place. Iraq middle in the 76 00:05:13,160 --> 00:05:16,520 Speaker 1: center of the Middle East, a strategically vital area. My goodness. 77 00:05:16,520 --> 00:05:19,320 Speaker 1: If you can turn Iraq into a functioning liberal democracy, 78 00:05:19,839 --> 00:05:23,240 Speaker 1: the consequences across the Middle East would be enormous. That's 79 00:05:23,240 --> 00:05:25,760 Speaker 1: a very bold ambition to have at the start of 80 00:05:25,800 --> 00:05:29,360 Speaker 1: a conflict, very unrealistic in fact, But that was where 81 00:05:29,440 --> 00:05:33,920 Speaker 1: George Bush envisioned us going in two thousand three. Um. 82 00:05:34,000 --> 00:05:38,440 Speaker 1: So there's the lack of constraint um and the belief 83 00:05:38,520 --> 00:05:41,520 Speaker 1: that you could take us um and do with American 84 00:05:41,560 --> 00:05:45,200 Speaker 1: power just about anything you wanted to was a characteristic 85 00:05:45,320 --> 00:05:49,160 Speaker 1: of the Bush administration in its early phase. We've come 86 00:05:49,200 --> 00:05:51,480 Speaker 1: a long way since then. I think, even though we're 87 00:05:51,520 --> 00:05:55,640 Speaker 1: still embroiled in these conflicts, over time, the goals of 88 00:05:55,680 --> 00:05:58,599 Speaker 1: what we hope to accomplish, whether it was Afghanistan, Iraq, 89 00:05:59,200 --> 00:06:02,960 Speaker 1: or any place else, have become much more modest um 90 00:06:03,000 --> 00:06:05,960 Speaker 1: in reaction to our failure to achieve many of the 91 00:06:06,000 --> 00:06:08,560 Speaker 1: things we thought we might achieve in two thousand three. 92 00:06:09,000 --> 00:06:11,000 Speaker 1: Do you think the UH I want to ask you 93 00:06:11,040 --> 00:06:13,680 Speaker 1: about the a U m F, the Authorization for the 94 00:06:13,800 --> 00:06:16,440 Speaker 1: Use of Military force that came around after nine eleven. 95 00:06:16,720 --> 00:06:19,400 Speaker 1: Do you see that as a just a massive abuse 96 00:06:19,760 --> 00:06:23,680 Speaker 1: or potential abuse of presidential power or something that's inherently dangerous. 97 00:06:25,000 --> 00:06:30,159 Speaker 1: It's we've had open ended congressional resolutions that have pitched 98 00:06:30,240 --> 00:06:32,880 Speaker 1: us into that have allowed our empowered presidents to go 99 00:06:32,920 --> 00:06:37,120 Speaker 1: into conflicts. Presidents don't actually necessarily need them. I mean, 100 00:06:37,160 --> 00:06:40,600 Speaker 1: Harry Truman didn't get a declaration when he went into Korea. 101 00:06:40,720 --> 00:06:44,040 Speaker 1: He invoked the United Nations police powers and said that 102 00:06:44,080 --> 00:06:47,599 Speaker 1: was sufficient. But what Harry Truman taught presidents was it's 103 00:06:47,640 --> 00:06:50,920 Speaker 1: foolish to go into a military conflict without Congress being 104 00:06:50,960 --> 00:06:53,880 Speaker 1: behind you, because if things don't go well, you're out 105 00:06:53,920 --> 00:06:55,760 Speaker 1: on your own, all right. They don't own the war. 106 00:06:55,839 --> 00:06:58,160 Speaker 1: You own the war. So no one wants to make 107 00:06:58,200 --> 00:07:00,880 Speaker 1: the Truman mistake. Lyndon John and used the Tong Can 108 00:07:00,960 --> 00:07:05,000 Speaker 1: Golf Resolution again, and that's an open ended invitation for 109 00:07:05,520 --> 00:07:10,560 Speaker 1: to expand American military operations in Vietnam um. And he 110 00:07:10,680 --> 00:07:14,680 Speaker 1: used that so when and Congress in two thousand two, 111 00:07:14,720 --> 00:07:18,720 Speaker 1: when the resolution authorizing force was adopted by Congress, was 112 00:07:18,760 --> 00:07:23,040 Speaker 1: in a terrible position to say, no, you have nine 113 00:07:23,120 --> 00:07:27,520 Speaker 1: eleven still just a year behind you. It's in everybody's memory. 114 00:07:27,760 --> 00:07:30,200 Speaker 1: And then you have Democrats in two thousand two running 115 00:07:30,200 --> 00:07:34,960 Speaker 1: for reelection afraid of being soft on terrorism. Any of 116 00:07:34,960 --> 00:07:38,200 Speaker 1: them who were contemplating running for the presidency in two 117 00:07:38,240 --> 00:07:41,000 Speaker 1: thousand four wanted to be on record as being strong 118 00:07:41,040 --> 00:07:43,800 Speaker 1: on terrorism. So you have the John Kerry's and the 119 00:07:43,880 --> 00:07:46,920 Speaker 1: Hillary Clinton's of the world in the Senate voting for 120 00:07:46,960 --> 00:07:50,720 Speaker 1: this resolution, they soon feel that the war is going 121 00:07:50,760 --> 00:07:53,800 Speaker 1: badly and wanted to take an opposition position. But then 122 00:07:53,800 --> 00:07:56,760 Speaker 1: they are subject to the to the criticism that they're 123 00:07:56,840 --> 00:08:00,600 Speaker 1: changing their minds just because things are a little bit tough. UM. 124 00:08:00,640 --> 00:08:03,280 Speaker 1: I don't fault George. I think what George Bush did, 125 00:08:03,320 --> 00:08:05,640 Speaker 1: George W. Bush did in two thousand two was shrewd. 126 00:08:05,840 --> 00:08:08,200 Speaker 1: I think he wanted to get the country behind him. 127 00:08:08,280 --> 00:08:11,920 Speaker 1: His father had done so in the Gulf War, but 128 00:08:12,120 --> 00:08:16,400 Speaker 1: via much via very narrow margin. His His resolution to 129 00:08:16,560 --> 00:08:20,679 Speaker 1: authority to support the use of force in Congress passed 130 00:08:20,680 --> 00:08:24,320 Speaker 1: by just a few votes that many many people in Congress, 131 00:08:24,320 --> 00:08:27,280 Speaker 1: many Democrats in particular, wanted to give sanctions more time. 132 00:08:28,560 --> 00:08:32,560 Speaker 1: Push forty three wanted a wider mandate, and and he 133 00:08:32,600 --> 00:08:36,960 Speaker 1: took advantage of the timing to do that. Congress is 134 00:08:37,040 --> 00:08:40,240 Speaker 1: not an effective restraint on presidents when they are about 135 00:08:40,320 --> 00:08:43,000 Speaker 1: to send the United States into a military conflict. It 136 00:08:43,559 --> 00:08:47,559 Speaker 1: isn't um and that's that's not going to work very 137 00:08:47,559 --> 00:08:51,800 Speaker 1: well in the future. UM. I think when Obama talked 138 00:08:51,840 --> 00:08:55,560 Speaker 1: about getting a resolution to go into Syria, UM, what 139 00:08:55,679 --> 00:08:58,479 Speaker 1: he was really hoping was that the lack of congressional 140 00:08:58,559 --> 00:09:01,680 Speaker 1: enthusiasm would give him an excuse not to go into 141 00:09:01,720 --> 00:09:03,199 Speaker 1: a conflict. He didn't want that. You can try to 142 00:09:03,240 --> 00:09:05,920 Speaker 1: outsource it to the Brits at first, didn't they where 143 00:09:05,920 --> 00:09:07,640 Speaker 1: they were trying to see if the House of Parliament 144 00:09:07,640 --> 00:09:11,160 Speaker 1: would would authorize some sort of all the specifics. You 145 00:09:11,200 --> 00:09:14,000 Speaker 1: may be right about that, yeah, uh. And then I 146 00:09:14,480 --> 00:09:16,600 Speaker 1: think it failed there, and then I think partially as 147 00:09:16,600 --> 00:09:20,880 Speaker 1: a result, it failed here. Um. But yeah, Obama of 148 00:09:20,880 --> 00:09:23,000 Speaker 1: course came in and he campaigned on this idea that 149 00:09:23,120 --> 00:09:26,200 Speaker 1: Iraq was the bad war, in Afghanistan was the good war, 150 00:09:26,640 --> 00:09:27,959 Speaker 1: and he was going to get us out of Iraq, 151 00:09:28,040 --> 00:09:31,560 Speaker 1: which he did. Um. You talk a little bit about that, 152 00:09:31,600 --> 00:09:34,920 Speaker 1: and I think, of course we have hindsight now. And 153 00:09:34,840 --> 00:09:37,360 Speaker 1: and I was deployed to Iraq in two thousand nine 154 00:09:37,880 --> 00:09:41,319 Speaker 1: with special forces. When we were the mandate was to 155 00:09:41,360 --> 00:09:44,319 Speaker 1: wind things down to transition authority over to the Iraqis. 156 00:09:44,440 --> 00:09:47,840 Speaker 1: And you know, people like me could look around and 157 00:09:48,120 --> 00:09:50,679 Speaker 1: quite easily see like that they're not ready like this, this, 158 00:09:51,160 --> 00:09:54,160 Speaker 1: the institutions of government aren't there. The corruption is endemic. 159 00:09:54,200 --> 00:09:57,400 Speaker 1: It's it's going to be horrendous. Um. But there's a 160 00:09:57,400 --> 00:10:00,000 Speaker 1: tremendous amount of pressure on the junior officers to say 161 00:10:00,040 --> 00:10:03,040 Speaker 1: end up false reports, making things seem much more rosier 162 00:10:03,080 --> 00:10:06,840 Speaker 1: than they were echoes of Vietnam, when the body counts 163 00:10:06,880 --> 00:10:08,959 Speaker 1: got inflated as they went up the chain of command. 164 00:10:09,000 --> 00:10:12,000 Speaker 1: So by the time information got to Westmoreland, it really 165 00:10:12,040 --> 00:10:14,720 Speaker 1: did seem to mean that the Communists are being killed 166 00:10:14,720 --> 00:10:16,640 Speaker 1: more quickly than they were being and then they could 167 00:10:16,640 --> 00:10:19,800 Speaker 1: be replaced. Um. And that was a very corrupt, a 168 00:10:19,840 --> 00:10:23,559 Speaker 1: remarkably corrupt system. UM. But this is a fact of 169 00:10:23,679 --> 00:10:26,080 Speaker 1: organization life. I think if the people above you say 170 00:10:26,080 --> 00:10:28,880 Speaker 1: they want they want want to a kind of result, 171 00:10:29,240 --> 00:10:31,600 Speaker 1: you want to give them what they want. Um. So 172 00:10:31,679 --> 00:10:36,520 Speaker 1: Obama comes in, and I think any Democrat coming into 173 00:10:36,559 --> 00:10:38,079 Speaker 1: the White House in two thousand nine is going to 174 00:10:38,160 --> 00:10:40,440 Speaker 1: find a way to extricate the United States from the 175 00:10:40,440 --> 00:10:45,280 Speaker 1: Iraq War. It is deeply unpopular, It cost George bush 176 00:10:45,679 --> 00:10:48,920 Speaker 1: Um public support, so that by two thousand six, the 177 00:10:48,960 --> 00:10:52,640 Speaker 1: Democrats have control of Congress. By two thousand nine, aided 178 00:10:52,640 --> 00:10:55,040 Speaker 1: by the eight by the fiscal collapse in two thousand eight, 179 00:10:55,320 --> 00:10:57,720 Speaker 1: they win the White House. But if it's if it's 180 00:10:57,760 --> 00:11:00,520 Speaker 1: Hillary Clinton, she finds a way out. If it's Obama. 181 00:11:00,600 --> 00:11:03,240 Speaker 1: He finds a way out. Now. His particular way of campaigning, 182 00:11:03,520 --> 00:11:06,320 Speaker 1: as you point out Iraq is he calls at the 183 00:11:06,320 --> 00:11:10,199 Speaker 1: war of choice Afghanistan the war of necessity. Afghanistan is 184 00:11:10,240 --> 00:11:14,079 Speaker 1: where nine eleven attacks were planned and launched. The Taliban 185 00:11:14,480 --> 00:11:17,120 Speaker 1: is coming back in Afghanistan. We can't afford to have 186 00:11:17,200 --> 00:11:19,840 Speaker 1: the Taliban come back because that that's an invitation for 187 00:11:19,880 --> 00:11:23,480 Speaker 1: al Qaeda to come back in Afghanistan. Um, the war 188 00:11:23,480 --> 00:11:26,480 Speaker 1: in Afghanistan has gone badly for the past two or 189 00:11:26,520 --> 00:11:30,880 Speaker 1: three years. The government has control has weakened. So Obama 190 00:11:30,920 --> 00:11:34,680 Speaker 1: depicts that as a war of necessity. That gives him 191 00:11:34,800 --> 00:11:39,119 Speaker 1: um and his victory gives him the status to extricate 192 00:11:39,160 --> 00:11:44,000 Speaker 1: the United States from the war in a in Iran Iraq. Sorry, 193 00:11:44,480 --> 00:11:47,079 Speaker 1: but it also commits him he's got to figure out 194 00:11:47,080 --> 00:11:50,080 Speaker 1: a way to win in Afghanistan or to you know, 195 00:11:50,120 --> 00:11:53,760 Speaker 1: to fight that war of necessity. So he's unlike someone 196 00:11:53,840 --> 00:11:58,559 Speaker 1: like Richard Nixon in nine who gets elected promising peace 197 00:11:58,600 --> 00:12:02,439 Speaker 1: with honor, which communal most anything, right. The only thing 198 00:12:02,480 --> 00:12:04,760 Speaker 1: you can't do with when you promise peace with with honor, 199 00:12:04,800 --> 00:12:10,000 Speaker 1: you cannot withdraw unilaterally, and you cannot escalate substantially, but 200 00:12:10,040 --> 00:12:12,120 Speaker 1: pretty much anything else is on the table, which is 201 00:12:12,160 --> 00:12:15,360 Speaker 1: the way Richard Nixon wanted. With Obama, his hands are tied. 202 00:12:15,400 --> 00:12:17,880 Speaker 1: He's got to prevail in some way in Afghanistan. He 203 00:12:18,000 --> 00:12:22,560 Speaker 1: quickly realizes that's not practical UM the United States. He's 204 00:12:22,600 --> 00:12:26,559 Speaker 1: not prepared to make a ten year commitment to counterinsurgency UM, 205 00:12:26,600 --> 00:12:29,240 Speaker 1: but he can allow the government to collapse. He starts 206 00:12:29,240 --> 00:12:31,880 Speaker 1: slipping into decisions that push him in a particular way. 207 00:12:32,040 --> 00:12:35,400 Speaker 1: Nation building is very unpopular. It's an unpopular idea, right, 208 00:12:35,400 --> 00:12:37,880 Speaker 1: but the but he needs to buy time. There's an 209 00:12:37,880 --> 00:12:40,720 Speaker 1: election in Afghanistan in two thousand nine. It's six months 210 00:12:40,760 --> 00:12:43,240 Speaker 1: after his he comes into the White House. He's worn 211 00:12:43,320 --> 00:12:45,760 Speaker 1: by the military. The government in Afghanistan is on the 212 00:12:45,800 --> 00:12:47,920 Speaker 1: verge of collapse. The elections that are supposed to be 213 00:12:47,960 --> 00:12:50,720 Speaker 1: held may not come off if the United States doesn't 214 00:12:51,240 --> 00:12:54,400 Speaker 1: um provide greater stability. So he initially agrees to a 215 00:12:54,520 --> 00:12:58,319 Speaker 1: very modest troop increase in Afghanistan. Then he's doing a 216 00:12:58,360 --> 00:13:02,360 Speaker 1: strategic review, and strategic reviews by presidents in wars that 217 00:13:02,400 --> 00:13:06,360 Speaker 1: aren't going well almost always take There's a kind of 218 00:13:06,400 --> 00:13:09,240 Speaker 1: form that they take, which is the military gives president 219 00:13:09,320 --> 00:13:13,840 Speaker 1: three options. UM. One option is to withdraw, de escalate, 220 00:13:13,960 --> 00:13:16,320 Speaker 1: wind down the war. UM. The other one is to 221 00:13:16,480 --> 00:13:20,400 Speaker 1: escalate dramatically, and the third one in the middle is 222 00:13:20,440 --> 00:13:22,320 Speaker 1: to do more of what you're doing, maybe with a 223 00:13:22,360 --> 00:13:26,320 Speaker 1: few more troops. It's superficially always the one that seems 224 00:13:26,360 --> 00:13:29,480 Speaker 1: the most reasonable. So one thing I would say to 225 00:13:29,480 --> 00:13:32,480 Speaker 1: a president, be aware of the three option approach when 226 00:13:32,559 --> 00:13:35,439 Speaker 1: when you're talking to your advisors, because it almost always 227 00:13:35,440 --> 00:13:37,440 Speaker 1: will turn out to be the case that only the 228 00:13:37,480 --> 00:13:40,959 Speaker 1: one in the middle seems to make sense. Now, in 229 00:13:41,000 --> 00:13:47,840 Speaker 1: the case of Afghanistan, UM, Obama, to his credit, encourage 230 00:13:47,960 --> 00:13:51,560 Speaker 1: Joe Biden, then vice Vice president, who favored a counter 231 00:13:51,679 --> 00:13:56,440 Speaker 1: terrorism approach, to argue strongly for that approach UM, even 232 00:13:56,480 --> 00:13:59,040 Speaker 1: though other advisors didn't agree with Biden, he wanted to 233 00:13:59,080 --> 00:14:02,360 Speaker 1: make sure that was on the table. The historical parallel 234 00:14:02,360 --> 00:14:05,959 Speaker 1: that was an Obama's mind was Lyndon Johnson coming into 235 00:14:06,120 --> 00:14:09,440 Speaker 1: the Vietnam situation in sixty four and nineteen sixty five 236 00:14:09,559 --> 00:14:13,200 Speaker 1: considering whether to involve the United States more deeply, and 237 00:14:13,320 --> 00:14:18,000 Speaker 1: Obama knew from his readings that UM Johnson hadn't had 238 00:14:18,040 --> 00:14:21,920 Speaker 1: a broad spectrum reviews UM and that nobody with sufficient 239 00:14:21,960 --> 00:14:24,960 Speaker 1: stature who was opposed escalation was really in the room. 240 00:14:25,120 --> 00:14:29,120 Speaker 1: There was George Ball, who was an under Secretary of State, 241 00:14:29,160 --> 00:14:31,560 Speaker 1: who argued that Vietnam was a road to nowhere for 242 00:14:31,600 --> 00:14:33,760 Speaker 1: the United States, that it couldn't prevail. It was the 243 00:14:33,800 --> 00:14:36,720 Speaker 1: wrong war to fight in the wrong place. And and 244 00:14:36,840 --> 00:14:39,640 Speaker 1: Johnson went through a kind of ritual argument with George 245 00:14:39,640 --> 00:14:41,880 Speaker 1: Ball every time they talked about sending a few more 246 00:14:41,920 --> 00:14:46,280 Speaker 1: troops or increasing the bombing campaign. George Ball would say, 247 00:14:46,280 --> 00:14:48,880 Speaker 1: this is a mistake, and Lyndon Johnson would would say, 248 00:14:49,120 --> 00:14:51,160 Speaker 1: you make some good points. And then somebody else in 249 00:14:51,200 --> 00:14:53,840 Speaker 1: the room MC George Bundy or somebody else would say, 250 00:14:53,880 --> 00:14:56,040 Speaker 1: but we can't allow the communists to win here. This 251 00:14:56,120 --> 00:14:59,800 Speaker 1: is a critical part of our international strategy. If they 252 00:14:59,800 --> 00:15:02,520 Speaker 1: win here, they'll they'll go on from here to explace 253 00:15:02,600 --> 00:15:07,120 Speaker 1: in white Place. Um, we can't. We can't afford to lose. 254 00:15:07,160 --> 00:15:09,640 Speaker 1: And Johnson would eventually say, I don't like this war, 255 00:15:09,720 --> 00:15:11,440 Speaker 1: but you're right, I really have no choice but to 256 00:15:11,480 --> 00:15:15,120 Speaker 1: fight it. Uh and and Obama didn't want to have 257 00:15:15,160 --> 00:15:16,800 Speaker 1: that kind of debate, so he wanted to have a 258 00:15:16,920 --> 00:15:20,920 Speaker 1: serious argument about it. Now. He Obama was wrong about 259 00:15:20,960 --> 00:15:25,480 Speaker 1: one thing. Um in two thousand nine, when Obama becomes president. 260 00:15:25,640 --> 00:15:28,640 Speaker 1: It's not in any way analogous to Lyndon Johnson in 261 00:15:28,720 --> 00:15:32,280 Speaker 1: nineteen sixty four. That's the start of the escalation. Obama's 262 00:15:32,280 --> 00:15:33,920 Speaker 1: coming in at the end of the war. It's going 263 00:15:33,960 --> 00:15:35,160 Speaker 1: to have to be the end of the war in 264 00:15:35,160 --> 00:15:38,120 Speaker 1: a sense. It's been going on too long, and major 265 00:15:38,240 --> 00:15:42,040 Speaker 1: escalation is not on the table. Nobody wants it. American 266 00:15:42,080 --> 00:15:45,880 Speaker 1: interest don't require it. So he's thinking nineteen sixty four, 267 00:15:46,360 --> 00:15:50,040 Speaker 1: probably he should have been thinking seventy three. You know, 268 00:15:50,080 --> 00:15:51,960 Speaker 1: how do you get out of this without it all 269 00:15:52,040 --> 00:15:56,800 Speaker 1: going south? Obama decides on a surge like the surge 270 00:15:56,840 --> 00:16:00,920 Speaker 1: in Iraq, except it's different in the sense that um, 271 00:16:00,960 --> 00:16:03,760 Speaker 1: it's he he says right away, it's not gonna last 272 00:16:03,800 --> 00:16:05,560 Speaker 1: as long. We're gonna get that. We're not going to 273 00:16:05,600 --> 00:16:07,280 Speaker 1: put as many troops in, but we're going to get 274 00:16:07,280 --> 00:16:09,000 Speaker 1: them in there quicker, and then we're going to get 275 00:16:09,040 --> 00:16:11,200 Speaker 1: them out. Oh and by the way, as he said 276 00:16:11,320 --> 00:16:14,280 Speaker 1: when he announced the policy in two thousand nine, we're 277 00:16:14,320 --> 00:16:16,960 Speaker 1: not really trying to win this war anymore. All we're 278 00:16:17,000 --> 00:16:20,000 Speaker 1: trying to do is degrade the Taliban. UM. So if 279 00:16:20,000 --> 00:16:22,160 Speaker 1: you want to go back to the Vietnam analogy. It's 280 00:16:23,280 --> 00:16:25,600 Speaker 1: three or seventy two or seventy three, when the United 281 00:16:25,600 --> 00:16:27,920 Speaker 1: States is trying to get out, and we don't want 282 00:16:27,920 --> 00:16:30,160 Speaker 1: the government to collapse right after we leave, because that 283 00:16:30,160 --> 00:16:33,080 Speaker 1: would be embarrassing to us. As a Kissinger and Nixon 284 00:16:33,080 --> 00:16:34,960 Speaker 1: said at the time, we just want a decent interval. 285 00:16:35,000 --> 00:16:37,240 Speaker 1: We know that the psyche and government is going to collapse, 286 00:16:37,600 --> 00:16:39,320 Speaker 1: we just don't want it to happen while we're still 287 00:16:39,360 --> 00:16:42,920 Speaker 1: in the watch. Pretty much so, but now Obama hoped 288 00:16:42,960 --> 00:16:46,560 Speaker 1: for a little better than that. But this point rings 289 00:16:46,600 --> 00:16:49,560 Speaker 1: true even today, which is, as soon as you make 290 00:16:49,600 --> 00:16:53,240 Speaker 1: it clear you are leaving, the external power makes clear 291 00:16:53,280 --> 00:16:57,160 Speaker 1: that it's leaving, the local actors know it, and you 292 00:16:57,280 --> 00:17:00,280 Speaker 1: lose all leverage. This was Trump's fatal this akee if 293 00:17:00,280 --> 00:17:02,200 Speaker 1: you will, when he announced to withdrawal from both Syria 294 00:17:02,240 --> 00:17:06,280 Speaker 1: and Afghanistan. Okay, we're leaving now, so why would any 295 00:17:06,320 --> 00:17:09,439 Speaker 1: of the other players pay attention to us. We've just 296 00:17:09,600 --> 00:17:11,760 Speaker 1: we've just given a we've just said we're on our 297 00:17:11,800 --> 00:17:14,360 Speaker 1: way out. You don't need to. And I think what 298 00:17:14,440 --> 00:17:17,960 Speaker 1: people around Trump have said now in talking about Afghanistan, 299 00:17:18,000 --> 00:17:23,120 Speaker 1: for example, is um we can't afford to pull out precipitously, 300 00:17:23,240 --> 00:17:26,680 Speaker 1: precisely because we will lose any leverage we have in 301 00:17:27,600 --> 00:17:31,680 Speaker 1: determining what happens politically and militarily after we go. I mean, 302 00:17:31,880 --> 00:17:35,480 Speaker 1: there seems something so vain about the notion of we 303 00:17:35,520 --> 00:17:38,440 Speaker 1: have to stay at war because otherwise our president will 304 00:17:38,440 --> 00:17:42,359 Speaker 1: be embarrassed. I mean, I understand there's national prestige on 305 00:17:42,400 --> 00:17:44,480 Speaker 1: the line, but that sounds like a horrible everything. I 306 00:17:44,520 --> 00:17:49,040 Speaker 1: think Obama said about launching an attack on Syria because 307 00:17:49,080 --> 00:17:51,280 Speaker 1: they think tanks would tell him, it's about credibility. You 308 00:17:51,320 --> 00:17:53,080 Speaker 1: have to you have to stand by your red wine. 309 00:17:53,320 --> 00:17:56,320 Speaker 1: And he said something like bombing a country for credibility 310 00:17:56,440 --> 00:17:59,720 Speaker 1: is like the dumbest reason to bomb people. Um, given 311 00:17:59,720 --> 00:18:03,000 Speaker 1: that a BOMBA had put his credibility on the line. Unfortunately, 312 00:18:03,000 --> 00:18:05,359 Speaker 1: when he when he essentially drew that line and said, 313 00:18:05,960 --> 00:18:08,560 Speaker 1: chemical gas is the chemical warfare is the thing that 314 00:18:08,600 --> 00:18:11,760 Speaker 1: I won't allow. You don't draw lines in the sand 315 00:18:13,040 --> 00:18:15,720 Speaker 1: unless you're really prepared to to live up to them, 316 00:18:15,720 --> 00:18:20,600 Speaker 1: and and boxing yourself in is is something that's going 317 00:18:20,640 --> 00:18:25,000 Speaker 1: to happen in wartime anyway. Don't don't enable it, don't 318 00:18:25,080 --> 00:18:27,840 Speaker 1: don't make it happen faster um the one so. The 319 00:18:27,880 --> 00:18:30,199 Speaker 1: one thing I would point out in the book that 320 00:18:30,200 --> 00:18:32,600 Speaker 1: that I stress in looking at some of the debates 321 00:18:32,600 --> 00:18:36,080 Speaker 1: about presidential war powers and how presidents ought to lead countries, 322 00:18:36,760 --> 00:18:39,760 Speaker 1: is that any president is going to lose his freedom 323 00:18:39,760 --> 00:18:43,080 Speaker 1: of action over the course of a war. The smartest 324 00:18:43,119 --> 00:18:46,320 Speaker 1: thing he can do, or she can do, assuming it's 325 00:18:46,320 --> 00:18:48,719 Speaker 1: a woman in the White House, is to try and 326 00:18:48,800 --> 00:18:51,920 Speaker 1: preserve that freedom of action for as long as possible, 327 00:18:51,960 --> 00:18:54,920 Speaker 1: so that you can change course in certain ways when 328 00:18:54,920 --> 00:18:59,080 Speaker 1: you need to, and are in generally speaking, the best 329 00:18:59,119 --> 00:19:01,760 Speaker 1: wartime president. I'll go back to Abraham Lincoln. Of the 330 00:19:01,800 --> 00:19:04,600 Speaker 1: presidents I looked at, the most effective ones are the 331 00:19:04,600 --> 00:19:08,119 Speaker 1: ones who managed to some extent to safeguard their freedom 332 00:19:08,160 --> 00:19:11,399 Speaker 1: of action for the longest possible time. It can't be 333 00:19:11,480 --> 00:19:15,080 Speaker 1: sustained indefinitely. The choices you make are gonna hamper A 334 00:19:15,200 --> 00:19:18,520 Speaker 1: hamper will hamper you, and even terrific I mean, very 335 00:19:18,640 --> 00:19:22,800 Speaker 1: capable wartime presidents like Franklin Roosevelt made lots of mistakes 336 00:19:22,840 --> 00:19:25,560 Speaker 1: that compromised their freedom of action as they went along. 337 00:19:26,960 --> 00:19:30,080 Speaker 1: I'm also interested in how I think it happened with 338 00:19:30,119 --> 00:19:33,399 Speaker 1: Obama and also with George W. Bush that they got stung. 339 00:19:34,119 --> 00:19:37,119 Speaker 1: And I believe it was in Cheney maybe Chinese memoir 340 00:19:37,160 --> 00:19:39,480 Speaker 1: where he talks about how he was pushing for military 341 00:19:39,520 --> 00:19:44,440 Speaker 1: action in Syria during the George W. Bush administration, and UM, 342 00:19:44,480 --> 00:19:47,639 Speaker 1: everyone's like, no, no, this is after Iraq. They're like, no, no, 343 00:19:47,720 --> 00:19:51,159 Speaker 1: We're not doing that again. And then UM, and what 344 00:19:51,320 --> 00:19:55,600 Speaker 1: we talked about with Obama being very resistant about Syria 345 00:19:56,119 --> 00:20:01,480 Speaker 1: and um shrewd we not escalating the situation and Ukraine. UM, 346 00:20:01,560 --> 00:20:03,800 Speaker 1: it seems like they maybe both of them, both of 347 00:20:03,800 --> 00:20:06,480 Speaker 1: these presidents got stung early on and they began to 348 00:20:07,760 --> 00:20:11,959 Speaker 1: express some of that skepticism we had talked about. I 349 00:20:12,000 --> 00:20:14,960 Speaker 1: think they both they both definitely got got stung. I 350 00:20:15,000 --> 00:20:17,800 Speaker 1: think some of them, some were were slower to come 351 00:20:17,800 --> 00:20:22,120 Speaker 1: to skepticism than others. Um. If I look at look 352 00:20:22,119 --> 00:20:25,600 Speaker 1: at Obama and Syria even now, and what what have 353 00:20:25,680 --> 00:20:28,760 Speaker 1: you learned from this this episode? There are no good choices? 354 00:20:29,200 --> 00:20:31,640 Speaker 1: What was Obama? What could Obama have done in two 355 00:20:31,640 --> 00:20:34,840 Speaker 1: thousand and thirteen that would have been the right choice 356 00:20:35,440 --> 00:20:39,520 Speaker 1: when the serious falling apart, the government is waging war 357 00:20:39,600 --> 00:20:42,600 Speaker 1: on its people. Um, the Soviets are beginning to poke 358 00:20:42,640 --> 00:20:44,600 Speaker 1: their nose. The Russians are beginning to poke their noses 359 00:20:44,640 --> 00:20:48,240 Speaker 1: in um. I guess I called him the Soviets because 360 00:20:48,240 --> 00:20:50,159 Speaker 1: they're back to being so much like the Soviets and 361 00:20:50,200 --> 00:20:55,520 Speaker 1: their behavior all habits die hard. The Russians are are interfering. 362 00:20:55,760 --> 00:21:00,560 Speaker 1: He's apparently used chemical weapons on his own people. So 363 00:21:00,600 --> 00:21:03,560 Speaker 1: what's the good choice here? Well, if you intervene, you're 364 00:21:03,600 --> 00:21:08,680 Speaker 1: in another war that is as unpromising as as Iraq was. Um. 365 00:21:09,480 --> 00:21:14,200 Speaker 1: You you have um isis on the ground, they're expanding 366 00:21:14,240 --> 00:21:17,520 Speaker 1: its its territory. You can you take them on as 367 00:21:17,560 --> 00:21:22,199 Speaker 1: another military challenge. But you've already committed US forces in 368 00:21:22,280 --> 00:21:25,640 Speaker 1: Afghanistan pretty much indefinitely hoping to get out of that. 369 00:21:26,040 --> 00:21:28,520 Speaker 1: You just got the United States out of Iraq. You 370 00:21:28,600 --> 00:21:31,359 Speaker 1: have a domestic agenda that you want to pursue. And 371 00:21:31,400 --> 00:21:35,320 Speaker 1: here's the Syrian conflict that's presenting itself with essentially no 372 00:21:35,560 --> 00:21:39,679 Speaker 1: allies or partners on the ground. Um. You know, the 373 00:21:39,760 --> 00:21:43,639 Speaker 1: feeble attempts by the CIA and others to create a 374 00:21:43,840 --> 00:21:48,280 Speaker 1: pro Western military was kind of it didn't work. It 375 00:21:48,320 --> 00:21:51,320 Speaker 1: hasn't worked, all right, it didn't work. Then no allies 376 00:21:51,359 --> 00:21:57,280 Speaker 1: on the ground. Um, So going in with no clear target, No, 377 00:21:57,760 --> 00:22:01,720 Speaker 1: no strategy. Essentially, you're gonna you're gonna replace um, the 378 00:22:01,800 --> 00:22:05,200 Speaker 1: Syrian regime with what. So there's no there's no good 379 00:22:05,280 --> 00:22:08,400 Speaker 1: choice there, but you stay out and what happens isis 380 00:22:08,440 --> 00:22:13,040 Speaker 1: expands UM, It sets up it's caliphate, the government alive 381 00:22:13,160 --> 00:22:17,639 Speaker 1: and serialize itself closely with Russia, Russian influences, influence grows. 382 00:22:18,640 --> 00:22:21,640 Speaker 1: Frankly in some situations, there are only bad choices from 383 00:22:21,640 --> 00:22:24,440 Speaker 1: American presidents. You try and figure out the least bad one. 384 00:22:24,800 --> 00:22:28,200 Speaker 1: I'm not convinced that Obama picked didn't pick the least 385 00:22:28,200 --> 00:22:29,919 Speaker 1: bad one. It may have been because we don't know 386 00:22:29,960 --> 00:22:32,040 Speaker 1: what would have happened. May have been the best one, 387 00:22:32,480 --> 00:22:35,320 Speaker 1: the best option, but the best of just a poor 388 00:22:35,359 --> 00:22:38,320 Speaker 1: set of choices, and that's sometimes what presidents deal with. 389 00:22:39,600 --> 00:22:42,160 Speaker 1: And in the end, I mean, we ended up going 390 00:22:42,200 --> 00:22:47,000 Speaker 1: with covert action, special operations and air strikes, which interestingly, 391 00:22:47,960 --> 00:22:53,840 Speaker 1: the American public seems very comfortable with. Yeah, almost no casualties. Yeah, 392 00:22:53,840 --> 00:22:55,760 Speaker 1: it seems like it doesn't really bother Like, we don't 393 00:22:55,800 --> 00:22:58,840 Speaker 1: really regard that as war. Now there seems to be 394 00:22:58,920 --> 00:23:01,800 Speaker 1: there's very little out cry over the bombing in Yemen 395 00:23:01,920 --> 00:23:04,840 Speaker 1: right now, which is done with has been done with 396 00:23:04,880 --> 00:23:09,919 Speaker 1: American support. UM. There's no outcry over drone strikes. UM. 397 00:23:09,960 --> 00:23:14,440 Speaker 1: If light, the light footprint of of special forces of 398 00:23:14,600 --> 00:23:19,040 Speaker 1: various kinds, coupled with air strikes, coupled with training missions 399 00:23:19,080 --> 00:23:24,879 Speaker 1: of certain kinds UM seemed to be the the level 400 00:23:24,960 --> 00:23:29,800 Speaker 1: of imperial expansionist practice that the American public is perfectly happy, 401 00:23:29,840 --> 00:23:31,479 Speaker 1: too happy to live with. You know, when the British 402 00:23:31,480 --> 00:23:34,879 Speaker 1: Empire was at its peak, British units would be centered 403 00:23:34,880 --> 00:23:37,880 Speaker 1: all around the world and they fight various wars against 404 00:23:37,920 --> 00:23:41,679 Speaker 1: Afghans or Zulus or others, and the British public was 405 00:23:41,760 --> 00:23:45,760 Speaker 1: perfectly acceptable because it was a professional military. They were volunteers, 406 00:23:45,880 --> 00:23:52,040 Speaker 1: long service volunteers UM, no conscription UM. The soldiers were 407 00:23:52,119 --> 00:23:55,399 Speaker 1: considered to be on the fringe of British society. Nobody worried. 408 00:23:55,960 --> 00:23:57,719 Speaker 1: The only thing if people worried if there was an 409 00:23:57,720 --> 00:24:00,600 Speaker 1: embarrassing defeat, which the British had their share of, But 410 00:24:00,640 --> 00:24:04,200 Speaker 1: otherwise it didn't seem to particularly concern the public. UM. 411 00:24:04,240 --> 00:24:07,080 Speaker 1: And we've never had an imperial mindset like that, But 412 00:24:07,160 --> 00:24:09,639 Speaker 1: we've now come to something which I think is closer 413 00:24:09,680 --> 00:24:12,159 Speaker 1: to that than we've had in the past. The professional 414 00:24:12,200 --> 00:24:14,879 Speaker 1: soldiers who are willing to go out and be deployed 415 00:24:15,440 --> 00:24:20,560 Speaker 1: um in relatively small units with few casualties. This is 416 00:24:20,600 --> 00:24:23,560 Speaker 1: something that the American people seem prepared to live with. 417 00:24:23,840 --> 00:24:27,680 Speaker 1: It's getting very little discussion now in the political campaign 418 00:24:27,680 --> 00:24:29,960 Speaker 1: that we're about to start, is getting very little discussion, 419 00:24:30,600 --> 00:24:33,639 Speaker 1: UM in general, in public. And the only time you 420 00:24:33,680 --> 00:24:37,240 Speaker 1: get a discussion is if the president abruptly decides enough 421 00:24:37,280 --> 00:24:39,959 Speaker 1: of this and talks about leaving, and then people tell 422 00:24:40,040 --> 00:24:44,040 Speaker 1: him why you can't do that? Exactly That are once 423 00:24:44,080 --> 00:24:46,920 Speaker 1: in a while when um, you know, four soldiers get 424 00:24:47,000 --> 00:24:49,879 Speaker 1: killed by a suicide bomber in Syria, or you know, 425 00:24:49,920 --> 00:24:54,639 Speaker 1: four soldiers get killed in an ambush, suddenly everyone's like, whoa, whoa, 426 00:24:54,800 --> 00:24:57,480 Speaker 1: why do why do we have people that what's going 427 00:24:57,560 --> 00:24:59,879 Speaker 1: on here? You can't do that? You know? But that 428 00:25:00,080 --> 00:25:02,680 Speaker 1: the only time when things go really bad. But I mean, 429 00:25:02,720 --> 00:25:05,879 Speaker 1: seguing from that, I wanted to, of course, ask about 430 00:25:05,960 --> 00:25:09,359 Speaker 1: what's happened since you wrote this book with President Trump, 431 00:25:09,720 --> 00:25:13,400 Speaker 1: because he ran on you know, his campaign was, as 432 00:25:13,400 --> 00:25:15,240 Speaker 1: we were talking about before we got started, we're gonna 433 00:25:15,240 --> 00:25:17,399 Speaker 1: be doing so much winning, We're gonna be sick of winning. 434 00:25:18,080 --> 00:25:20,440 Speaker 1: We're we're gonna get out of Syria. We're gonna get 435 00:25:20,440 --> 00:25:23,720 Speaker 1: out of all these protracted conflicts in the Middle East. 436 00:25:24,240 --> 00:25:28,719 Speaker 1: And um, even somebody is bombastic as President Trump, who 437 00:25:28,800 --> 00:25:31,480 Speaker 1: doesn't really seem to care much what the political establishment 438 00:25:31,520 --> 00:25:34,400 Speaker 1: thinks of him, has been unable to extricate us from 439 00:25:34,720 --> 00:25:38,480 Speaker 1: the global war on terror, even during the debates. Blaming 440 00:25:38,720 --> 00:25:41,879 Speaker 1: Jeb Bush his brother for nine eleven, it was pretty 441 00:25:41,880 --> 00:25:44,640 Speaker 1: outrage Just remember that there were a number of things 442 00:25:44,640 --> 00:25:48,200 Speaker 1: to stand out in the cas we could, We could 443 00:25:48,240 --> 00:25:51,840 Speaker 1: spend a long time making a list he made. He 444 00:25:52,280 --> 00:25:55,159 Speaker 1: came into that campaign and he knew who his public was. 445 00:25:56,080 --> 00:26:02,720 Speaker 1: His and his public um generally UM, the populoust piece 446 00:26:02,720 --> 00:26:09,160 Speaker 1: of the public where people Midwestern rust belt, working class Americans, 447 00:26:09,240 --> 00:26:13,840 Speaker 1: predominantly white, UM dismissed by both party, having getting having 448 00:26:13,920 --> 00:26:17,080 Speaker 1: little voice in either party. And he understood that that's 449 00:26:17,119 --> 00:26:20,639 Speaker 1: actually UM, the part of the an important part of 450 00:26:20,640 --> 00:26:24,320 Speaker 1: the population that sent its sons and daughters off to 451 00:26:24,359 --> 00:26:27,399 Speaker 1: these wars. The irony of it, as you've said before, 452 00:26:27,520 --> 00:26:30,159 Speaker 1: Jack too, is like, that's completely not who he is. 453 00:26:30,280 --> 00:26:33,560 Speaker 1: He is a New York elitist, of course, yeah, that 454 00:26:33,920 --> 00:26:37,199 Speaker 1: but that mean a lot of there are a lot 455 00:26:37,280 --> 00:26:41,280 Speaker 1: of faux populists out there, So I'm not. The fact 456 00:26:41,400 --> 00:26:43,840 Speaker 1: is he had a he had a public, and that 457 00:26:43,960 --> 00:26:47,280 Speaker 1: public was frustrated, had many frustrations, and one of the 458 00:26:47,320 --> 00:26:49,880 Speaker 1: frustrations was an endless war that nobody could figure out 459 00:26:49,920 --> 00:26:51,960 Speaker 1: how to win. Um. So what do you say to 460 00:26:52,000 --> 00:26:54,720 Speaker 1: that public? Say, first, we're gonna win, You're gonna get 461 00:26:54,720 --> 00:26:58,360 Speaker 1: tired of winning. Um, that's not actually a policy statement, 462 00:26:58,760 --> 00:27:01,520 Speaker 1: it says, it's actually an echo of frustration. That's all 463 00:27:01,560 --> 00:27:05,800 Speaker 1: it is. It's a frustration statement. Um. So it it 464 00:27:05,800 --> 00:27:09,400 Speaker 1: It hit accord with the public. But then he also said, 465 00:27:09,440 --> 00:27:13,040 Speaker 1: we've been involved in this these long, pointless wars, trying 466 00:27:13,040 --> 00:27:15,520 Speaker 1: to do nation building in parts of the world where 467 00:27:15,680 --> 00:27:19,280 Speaker 1: nation building would be difficult or impossible. Enough of that, right, 468 00:27:19,440 --> 00:27:22,159 Speaker 1: we're not We're doing He wasn't necessarily wrong on no, No, 469 00:27:22,320 --> 00:27:25,920 Speaker 1: he was right, and to his credit, because he hasn't 470 00:27:25,920 --> 00:27:27,959 Speaker 1: delivered on a lot of his promises, this is one 471 00:27:28,000 --> 00:27:30,840 Speaker 1: he's kept so far. Okay, he has not put the 472 00:27:30,960 --> 00:27:34,679 Speaker 1: United States in the business of nation building. Um. He 473 00:27:34,800 --> 00:27:38,240 Speaker 1: has engaged in counter terrorism, and then he has and 474 00:27:38,400 --> 00:27:40,000 Speaker 1: so what he has been looking to do is to 475 00:27:40,040 --> 00:27:43,800 Speaker 1: find a way to eventually extricate the United states from 476 00:27:43,800 --> 00:27:47,439 Speaker 1: these wars without a lot of good options. So if 477 00:27:47,440 --> 00:27:49,160 Speaker 1: you think about what do you do when you're trying 478 00:27:49,200 --> 00:27:55,880 Speaker 1: to get out of Syria or Iraq or Afghanistan. Um, 479 00:27:55,960 --> 00:27:57,960 Speaker 1: on the one hand, you've got people whispering in your ear, 480 00:27:58,640 --> 00:28:01,440 Speaker 1: we can't leave. Okay, that it would it would be 481 00:28:01,640 --> 00:28:05,560 Speaker 1: devastating to the region if we left, American credibility would 482 00:28:05,600 --> 00:28:07,159 Speaker 1: be on the line. But as I pointed out, you 483 00:28:07,200 --> 00:28:11,600 Speaker 1: also you lose your leverage. Essentially, once the locals know 484 00:28:11,720 --> 00:28:15,439 Speaker 1: you're leaving, they'll they're gonna they're gonna worry about their 485 00:28:15,440 --> 00:28:18,240 Speaker 1: own interests and and pay very little attention to you. 486 00:28:18,920 --> 00:28:21,840 Speaker 1: So you and so if you don't want to pull 487 00:28:21,840 --> 00:28:25,080 Speaker 1: out precipitously, what are you gonna do? Um? Well, if 488 00:28:25,119 --> 00:28:27,640 Speaker 1: you you stay in, I mean, you continue to keep 489 00:28:27,680 --> 00:28:32,400 Speaker 1: this this loaf, this limited footprint UM with few casualties, 490 00:28:32,920 --> 00:28:36,720 Speaker 1: a policy that can be sustained largely indefinitely. And it 491 00:28:36,760 --> 00:28:38,680 Speaker 1: has one advantage that I can see, which it does 492 00:28:38,720 --> 00:28:41,000 Speaker 1: give you leverage when it comes to peace talks in 493 00:28:41,040 --> 00:28:44,479 Speaker 1: the region. All Right, you're you're basically signaling we're here 494 00:28:44,520 --> 00:28:47,280 Speaker 1: to stay. We can we can keep doing this for 495 00:28:47,320 --> 00:28:49,320 Speaker 1: as long as we want to. We've got plenty of 496 00:28:49,360 --> 00:28:52,040 Speaker 1: money to do it. It doesn't cost us that much. Um. 497 00:28:52,120 --> 00:28:55,240 Speaker 1: The American public doesn't care about it, So it won't 498 00:28:55,240 --> 00:28:57,240 Speaker 1: do any good to try to target the American public. 499 00:28:57,280 --> 00:29:00,240 Speaker 1: If you're opposed to this. They're not paying attention. They've check, 500 00:29:00,480 --> 00:29:04,120 Speaker 1: they've checked out essentially, um, which from many, which in 501 00:29:04,200 --> 00:29:07,080 Speaker 1: some circumstances is a real is a real problem, but 502 00:29:07,280 --> 00:29:10,320 Speaker 1: in others it can be an advantage. So we can 503 00:29:10,400 --> 00:29:14,800 Speaker 1: keep doing this forever more or less. Um. So Trump 504 00:29:14,840 --> 00:29:17,160 Speaker 1: doesn't know how to get out, and and then at 505 00:29:17,200 --> 00:29:19,760 Speaker 1: the same time he's probably got people whispering in his ears. 506 00:29:20,320 --> 00:29:27,960 Speaker 1: Mm hmm. Venezuela, what do you make of the sort 507 00:29:28,000 --> 00:29:30,840 Speaker 1: of like pump fake that he did in regards to 508 00:29:30,880 --> 00:29:33,960 Speaker 1: Syria and making this unilateral decision. We're pulling out, we're 509 00:29:33,960 --> 00:29:36,440 Speaker 1: getting out and then within what was it, like three 510 00:29:36,560 --> 00:29:39,200 Speaker 1: or four weeks, and we're gonna stay And then and 511 00:29:39,240 --> 00:29:41,719 Speaker 1: then that CBS interview, we're gonna stay in Iraq. We're 512 00:29:41,760 --> 00:29:46,120 Speaker 1: gonna stay in Syria to watch iran um. That's an 513 00:29:46,160 --> 00:29:50,000 Speaker 1: interesting twist about how you're gonna watch iran um. But 514 00:29:50,200 --> 00:29:53,440 Speaker 1: leave that be that as it may. So presidents have 515 00:29:54,560 --> 00:29:59,840 Speaker 1: processes or they don't actually. Um, Most presidents have processes, 516 00:30:00,160 --> 00:30:02,480 Speaker 1: and the processes had their good side, which is that 517 00:30:02,600 --> 00:30:05,240 Speaker 1: they if they work well, they give you a pretty 518 00:30:05,320 --> 00:30:09,120 Speaker 1: thorough opportunity to look at the advantages and the cost 519 00:30:09,200 --> 00:30:12,400 Speaker 1: of any course of action. Um. You know what, if 520 00:30:12,600 --> 00:30:17,320 Speaker 1: you have a serious debate about escalating in Vietnam and 521 00:30:17,360 --> 00:30:19,640 Speaker 1: your Joint chiefs of Staff tell you you should do 522 00:30:19,640 --> 00:30:22,520 Speaker 1: it this way and you should call up the reserves, 523 00:30:22,840 --> 00:30:25,720 Speaker 1: at least you know what the military thinks about this, 524 00:30:26,120 --> 00:30:28,480 Speaker 1: and your political people are telling you another thing, and 525 00:30:28,520 --> 00:30:31,600 Speaker 1: you consorted all out. There's a process there. Barack Obama 526 00:30:31,640 --> 00:30:35,280 Speaker 1: and considering his options in Afghanistan has a very good 527 00:30:35,360 --> 00:30:38,480 Speaker 1: process as these things go. For debating the alternatives. Do 528 00:30:38,520 --> 00:30:40,520 Speaker 1: you really want to send in eighty thousand troops? Do 529 00:30:40,560 --> 00:30:42,920 Speaker 1: you want to send in thirty or forty? Do you 530 00:30:42,920 --> 00:30:46,760 Speaker 1: want Joe Biden's counter terrorism? The arguments are hashed out 531 00:30:46,760 --> 00:30:51,200 Speaker 1: and they're considered seriously by people with backgrounds in the field. Um, 532 00:30:51,320 --> 00:30:53,360 Speaker 1: you may get a lot of conventional wisdom, but you 533 00:30:53,480 --> 00:30:56,960 Speaker 1: probably get some different conventional wisdom, and at least you've 534 00:30:56,960 --> 00:31:01,080 Speaker 1: given it some thought. Um. And I think tipically the 535 00:31:01,760 --> 00:31:03,880 Speaker 1: result I'm not saying the rules are necessarily good, but 536 00:31:03,920 --> 00:31:07,320 Speaker 1: at least you've heard from all of the players. So 537 00:31:07,440 --> 00:31:09,800 Speaker 1: far as I can tell, Trump has no process. I 538 00:31:09,840 --> 00:31:13,959 Speaker 1: don't know what I mean. People have have have implied 539 00:31:14,000 --> 00:31:17,200 Speaker 1: that Putin suggested to him that he get out of Syria. 540 00:31:18,240 --> 00:31:21,000 Speaker 1: I have no idea whether that's true, but there was 541 00:31:21,400 --> 00:31:24,600 Speaker 1: everyone seems to have been caught by surprise. When everybody's 542 00:31:24,640 --> 00:31:26,880 Speaker 1: caught by surprise, you know, there's no process. He just 543 00:31:26,880 --> 00:31:28,320 Speaker 1: wakes up in the morning. It's like, you know what, 544 00:31:28,400 --> 00:31:31,080 Speaker 1: pretty much, and so then the process comes in after 545 00:31:31,120 --> 00:31:35,280 Speaker 1: the fact. Okay, now I've said we're leaving, and now 546 00:31:35,320 --> 00:31:37,520 Speaker 1: everybody's going to tell me why we can't do that, 547 00:31:37,640 --> 00:31:39,640 Speaker 1: and I'm going to have to find a way to 548 00:31:39,760 --> 00:31:43,080 Speaker 1: back down from what I said. Uh, and maybe it's 549 00:31:43,080 --> 00:31:45,120 Speaker 1: going to be that I'll say, we're staying in Syria 550 00:31:45,200 --> 00:31:47,880 Speaker 1: because that's how we're going to keep Iran on its toes. 551 00:31:47,920 --> 00:31:51,040 Speaker 1: And I'll stay in Afghanistan because I know now there 552 00:31:51,040 --> 00:31:53,719 Speaker 1: are some negotiations that are going on between the government 553 00:31:53,720 --> 00:31:57,040 Speaker 1: and the Taliban and other parties, and we don't want 554 00:31:57,040 --> 00:31:59,840 Speaker 1: to alter. We don't want to make a statement there 555 00:31:59,840 --> 00:32:02,640 Speaker 1: with leaving because we can't be sure that we'll be 556 00:32:02,680 --> 00:32:07,440 Speaker 1: able to protect um Afghanistan from having the Taliban come 557 00:32:07,440 --> 00:32:10,440 Speaker 1: back into power and it becoming a haven for terrorists. Again, 558 00:32:10,800 --> 00:32:12,720 Speaker 1: kind of the basic things you would you would think 559 00:32:12,720 --> 00:32:16,000 Speaker 1: a president would realize before he makes the announcement, But 560 00:32:16,560 --> 00:32:20,920 Speaker 1: better that he better that he stepped back and reconsider 561 00:32:21,000 --> 00:32:25,200 Speaker 1: his position than out of some stubbornness or rigidity say no, 562 00:32:25,360 --> 00:32:27,880 Speaker 1: I've said my position and we're going to stick to it. Well, 563 00:32:27,960 --> 00:32:31,400 Speaker 1: some Trump supporters would make the point that or they 564 00:32:31,680 --> 00:32:34,720 Speaker 1: would feel that these sorts of things that he says 565 00:32:34,720 --> 00:32:37,600 Speaker 1: are strategic gambits, that it's a sort of strategem that 566 00:32:37,680 --> 00:32:41,200 Speaker 1: he's throwing out this bold move and then from their 567 00:32:41,320 --> 00:32:46,280 Speaker 1: negotiating somewhere down to a middle position. I suppose eventually 568 00:32:46,320 --> 00:32:49,080 Speaker 1: we'll have some evidence from inside the administration about what 569 00:32:49,200 --> 00:32:51,680 Speaker 1: thought went on. But I don't see any of that. 570 00:32:52,680 --> 00:32:57,320 Speaker 1: I think I don't see in Trump's general actions. I 571 00:32:57,320 --> 00:32:59,880 Speaker 1: don't see a grand strategic vision that he's pursuing it 572 00:33:00,040 --> 00:33:03,400 Speaker 1: and certainly not following it through systematically down to the 573 00:33:03,480 --> 00:33:07,320 Speaker 1: level of a decision in Afghanistan. Then, I think the 574 00:33:07,360 --> 00:33:09,200 Speaker 1: next thing I wanted to ask you about that we 575 00:33:09,280 --> 00:33:12,760 Speaker 1: mentioned briefly in you had said that one thing Trump 576 00:33:12,760 --> 00:33:14,880 Speaker 1: has followed through on is not getting us involved in 577 00:33:15,000 --> 00:33:18,440 Speaker 1: more conflicts than we're already in. Um. But something I've 578 00:33:18,480 --> 00:33:23,120 Speaker 1: been looking at recently is Iran, And of course he's 579 00:33:23,120 --> 00:33:28,360 Speaker 1: been making some pretty uh holacious statements about Iran sometimes 580 00:33:28,360 --> 00:33:32,560 Speaker 1: on social media. Is this uh more bluff and bluster 581 00:33:33,520 --> 00:33:36,920 Speaker 1: or is it is there something is he signaling something 582 00:33:36,920 --> 00:33:42,080 Speaker 1: we should be taking more seriously? Well, let's take let's 583 00:33:42,120 --> 00:33:46,040 Speaker 1: go back in history to a to a thinker um 584 00:33:46,120 --> 00:33:51,080 Speaker 1: whose words still resonate today, and that's Machiavelli and Machiavelli's 585 00:33:51,120 --> 00:33:55,600 Speaker 1: comment in The Prince to the effect that leaders don't change. 586 00:33:56,320 --> 00:33:59,120 Speaker 1: They don't change because they feel that would put them 587 00:33:59,120 --> 00:34:02,640 Speaker 1: in the position that they're in of leadership. What worked 588 00:34:02,680 --> 00:34:05,360 Speaker 1: to get to that point will continue to work. Right. 589 00:34:05,680 --> 00:34:09,279 Speaker 1: So if we look at Donald Trump, UM, we might say, well, 590 00:34:09,719 --> 00:34:13,200 Speaker 1: look at North Korea. His initial reaction, his initial post 591 00:34:13,239 --> 00:34:15,759 Speaker 1: to North Korea was a threatening one. UM. You know, 592 00:34:15,840 --> 00:34:18,720 Speaker 1: he fire and fury like the world has never seen, 593 00:34:19,360 --> 00:34:22,200 Speaker 1: and you know, pushing us towards the brink of war 594 00:34:22,520 --> 00:34:25,760 Speaker 1: with North Korea to the point that it became quite scary, 595 00:34:25,840 --> 00:34:28,839 Speaker 1: before he backed down to some extent and he had 596 00:34:28,840 --> 00:34:31,560 Speaker 1: his conversation with the head of North Korea, the first 597 00:34:31,560 --> 00:34:35,120 Speaker 1: conversation in which he announced that like Neville Chamberla and 598 00:34:35,200 --> 00:34:38,800 Speaker 1: he had a chief piece for our time, complete denuclearization. 599 00:34:39,640 --> 00:34:42,440 Speaker 1: Well that didn't happen. Um, so we're but we're But 600 00:34:42,520 --> 00:34:47,200 Speaker 1: basically this notion of the possibility exists that he sees 601 00:34:47,680 --> 00:34:51,400 Speaker 1: the bluster and the threat as a prelude to negotiation 602 00:34:51,760 --> 00:34:54,560 Speaker 1: and softens up the other side because the other side 603 00:34:54,680 --> 00:34:59,080 Speaker 1: becomes intimidated to some exento, fearful that this guy is 604 00:34:59,160 --> 00:35:02,080 Speaker 1: just crazy enough to do it. Um. You may remember 605 00:35:02,080 --> 00:35:04,920 Speaker 1: there was a crazy Nixon theory in Vietnam that the 606 00:35:04,960 --> 00:35:08,440 Speaker 1: crazy Nixon idea was that Nixon would be threatening to 607 00:35:08,560 --> 00:35:12,359 Speaker 1: unleash such violence on the North Vietnamese that they would 608 00:35:12,360 --> 00:35:15,560 Speaker 1: be drawn back to the negotiating table. Um. And there 609 00:35:15,560 --> 00:35:17,880 Speaker 1: are a couple of episodes in the Vietnam period that 610 00:35:18,040 --> 00:35:20,440 Speaker 1: suggests that may that may have been the way Nixon 611 00:35:20,520 --> 00:35:25,760 Speaker 1: was thinking. Um. The bombing, the secret bombing of Cambodia, 612 00:35:25,840 --> 00:35:28,000 Speaker 1: for example, he knew he couldn't bomb North Vietnam, but 613 00:35:28,040 --> 00:35:30,359 Speaker 1: he wanted to show him meant business, so he had 614 00:35:30,400 --> 00:35:33,919 Speaker 1: be fifty twos dropping bombs on the jungles of Cambodia. Um. 615 00:35:34,160 --> 00:35:37,040 Speaker 1: Why why he thought that that that would work better 616 00:35:37,080 --> 00:35:39,640 Speaker 1: than the bombing of North Vietnam had worked under Johnson 617 00:35:40,080 --> 00:35:43,239 Speaker 1: was never really clear. But sometimes presidents you think that 618 00:35:43,400 --> 00:35:46,839 Speaker 1: gestures like that matter. So Trump may have a kind 619 00:35:46,840 --> 00:35:49,839 Speaker 1: of you know, the crazy Trump thesis would be that 620 00:35:50,400 --> 00:35:53,719 Speaker 1: I'll act date reckless, I'll bring us to the precipice, 621 00:35:53,760 --> 00:35:56,480 Speaker 1: and then I'll back down, and the other side, having 622 00:35:56,520 --> 00:35:59,840 Speaker 1: seen that, I'm I mean business, will be serious of 623 00:36:00,280 --> 00:36:04,160 Speaker 1: negotiating with me. Um. It hasn't worked with North Korea 624 00:36:04,360 --> 00:36:06,680 Speaker 1: particularly well so far. I mean there's a real danger 625 00:36:06,719 --> 00:36:11,000 Speaker 1: there too, especially when you're playing with words, exchanging barbs 626 00:36:11,040 --> 00:36:15,560 Speaker 1: with another nuclear power. Oh, absolutely, or with any power. 627 00:36:15,600 --> 00:36:21,000 Speaker 1: I think there's is a real danger because signaling in 628 00:36:21,080 --> 00:36:24,800 Speaker 1: wartime and more potential war situations is always a difficult 629 00:36:24,880 --> 00:36:28,200 Speaker 1: and dangerous activity to get to get in. You are 630 00:36:28,239 --> 00:36:30,520 Speaker 1: trying to send a message. You know what message you 631 00:36:30,560 --> 00:36:33,160 Speaker 1: are trying to send, but you don't know what the 632 00:36:33,160 --> 00:36:36,960 Speaker 1: other side is receiving. And especially in the case of dictatorships, 633 00:36:37,400 --> 00:36:41,759 Speaker 1: UM information passes badly. UM up and down the chain. 634 00:36:41,800 --> 00:36:44,359 Speaker 1: It doesn't, it doesn't necessarily pass up and down very well. 635 00:36:44,400 --> 00:36:47,759 Speaker 1: In our society we're relatively open, but in dictatorships it 636 00:36:47,920 --> 00:36:51,719 Speaker 1: it really doesn't move up and down well. And so 637 00:36:51,800 --> 00:36:54,839 Speaker 1: whether the other side, whether you understand what the other 638 00:36:54,880 --> 00:36:57,799 Speaker 1: side is thinking, it's very much open to question, and 639 00:36:57,960 --> 00:37:02,160 Speaker 1: it's a very risky proposition, very risky to assume that 640 00:37:02,200 --> 00:37:04,520 Speaker 1: the other side will respond the way you think they 641 00:37:04,520 --> 00:37:07,520 Speaker 1: will respond. UM. And this was there's been a problem, 642 00:37:07,680 --> 00:37:10,879 Speaker 1: was a problem for example, in Vietnam during the Vietnam War, 643 00:37:11,320 --> 00:37:14,280 Speaker 1: when we were bombing North Vietnam in n and sixty 644 00:37:14,280 --> 00:37:18,560 Speaker 1: six and sixty seven, there would be these bombing pauses UM. 645 00:37:18,640 --> 00:37:21,400 Speaker 1: And the bombing pauses were generally intended by the United 646 00:37:21,440 --> 00:37:24,799 Speaker 1: States as an overture in the North Vietnamese to come 647 00:37:24,800 --> 00:37:27,319 Speaker 1: to the peace table, to take you know, to think 648 00:37:27,360 --> 00:37:30,920 Speaker 1: again about their position and our position. UM. But there 649 00:37:30,960 --> 00:37:34,360 Speaker 1: was no direct communications, so the messages were going through intermediaries, 650 00:37:34,680 --> 00:37:37,800 Speaker 1: and they often were garbled, and sometimes they traveled very slowly. 651 00:37:37,840 --> 00:37:40,839 Speaker 1: So there would be bombing halts and the United States 652 00:37:40,880 --> 00:37:43,399 Speaker 1: would try to send a message and then it would 653 00:37:43,400 --> 00:37:46,319 Speaker 1: resume bombing before the North Vietnamese haid have ever had 654 00:37:46,320 --> 00:37:49,839 Speaker 1: a chance to receive the message, much less respond, So 655 00:37:49,920 --> 00:37:52,680 Speaker 1: they would think well, they're acting in bad faith. They 656 00:37:52,800 --> 00:37:55,120 Speaker 1: know they talk about a bombing hope with their bombing us. Again, 657 00:37:56,560 --> 00:38:01,160 Speaker 1: all these signaling activities are have risks with them. And 658 00:38:01,200 --> 00:38:05,960 Speaker 1: if you think you're communicating something to terran by threatening them, 659 00:38:06,040 --> 00:38:10,360 Speaker 1: um or to Maduro in Venezuela by threatening him, you 660 00:38:10,719 --> 00:38:13,920 Speaker 1: better you can't know that they are hearing the message 661 00:38:14,040 --> 00:38:16,600 Speaker 1: the same way you think they should be hearing that message. 662 00:38:17,760 --> 00:38:20,359 Speaker 1: Saddam Hussein is a fascinating case. If you look at 663 00:38:20,400 --> 00:38:22,359 Speaker 1: the lead up to the wars, he didn't believe we 664 00:38:22,360 --> 00:38:25,840 Speaker 1: were coming. Well, you remember there was all the discussion 665 00:38:25,880 --> 00:38:28,480 Speaker 1: of weapons of mass destruction, right, and we wanted to 666 00:38:28,480 --> 00:38:31,279 Speaker 1: have proof there were no weapons of mass destruction, that 667 00:38:31,360 --> 00:38:33,279 Speaker 1: he had destroyed all of his w m D s 668 00:38:34,520 --> 00:38:37,400 Speaker 1: um and we thought there's no way he would dare 669 00:38:37,600 --> 00:38:39,839 Speaker 1: not to give us the right to do these inspections 670 00:38:39,880 --> 00:38:43,399 Speaker 1: because we're his most dangerous enemy. Well it turns out 671 00:38:43,640 --> 00:38:47,480 Speaker 1: that in Saddam Hussein's eyes, we weren't the most dangerous enemy. 672 00:38:48,120 --> 00:38:51,400 Speaker 1: His own people, his own generals, were the most dangerous enemy, 673 00:38:51,760 --> 00:38:56,000 Speaker 1: and his one trump card against them was their fear 674 00:38:56,080 --> 00:38:58,719 Speaker 1: that he still had weapons of mass destruction. So he 675 00:38:58,800 --> 00:39:01,880 Speaker 1: actually wanted them to be. He wanted to create the 676 00:39:01,960 --> 00:39:05,640 Speaker 1: uncertainty for his own people or for the Iranians next 677 00:39:05,640 --> 00:39:09,400 Speaker 1: door that he still had chemical and biological weapons, so 678 00:39:09,480 --> 00:39:12,160 Speaker 1: that they wouldn't. He knew his his conventional military had 679 00:39:12,160 --> 00:39:16,120 Speaker 1: been drastically weakened and they couldn't really and and was 680 00:39:16,200 --> 00:39:19,719 Speaker 1: incapable of defending him against the serious adversary. But if 681 00:39:19,760 --> 00:39:22,360 Speaker 1: there were chemical weapons, that was a whole different story. 682 00:39:23,000 --> 00:39:26,719 Speaker 1: So his understanding of who his enemies were was completely 683 00:39:26,760 --> 00:39:30,840 Speaker 1: different from what the Bush administration thought. Um this, the 684 00:39:31,320 --> 00:39:35,279 Speaker 1: lack of communication, the misunderstandings, had a lot to do 685 00:39:35,360 --> 00:39:37,520 Speaker 1: with the games that were played up to the beginning 686 00:39:37,560 --> 00:39:41,440 Speaker 1: of that of the of the war in iraq Um 687 00:39:41,480 --> 00:39:43,680 Speaker 1: and we have to be wary of this happening in 688 00:39:43,760 --> 00:39:48,279 Speaker 1: any other potential conflict situation. There's a tremendous possibility of 689 00:39:48,360 --> 00:39:53,719 Speaker 1: miscommunication and misunderstanding. Another one of President Trump's campaign promises, 690 00:39:53,760 --> 00:39:56,400 Speaker 1: which you know he followed through on, was pulling us 691 00:39:56,400 --> 00:40:01,200 Speaker 1: out of their irandeal, which seems counterintuitive. You know, that 692 00:40:01,320 --> 00:40:05,680 Speaker 1: was a deal that curtailed Iran's progress towards a nuclear weapon. 693 00:40:05,719 --> 00:40:08,200 Speaker 1: And we can argue the effectiveness of it, but surely 694 00:40:08,239 --> 00:40:10,520 Speaker 1: it's better to have something in place than have nothing 695 00:40:10,560 --> 00:40:15,080 Speaker 1: in place, nothing constraining them. Why do you think Trump 696 00:40:15,080 --> 00:40:16,640 Speaker 1: went through with this and what do you think he 697 00:40:16,719 --> 00:40:21,360 Speaker 1: was trying to signal with it? I'm not sure. I 698 00:40:22,600 --> 00:40:27,520 Speaker 1: like you, I read the press. Um. I think Trump 699 00:40:27,560 --> 00:40:30,320 Speaker 1: fancies himself and we all know this, as the world's 700 00:40:30,360 --> 00:40:33,520 Speaker 1: greatest deal maker. Um, he can make a better deal 701 00:40:33,520 --> 00:40:36,080 Speaker 1: than anyone else can. Whether it's true or not, it's 702 00:40:36,080 --> 00:40:38,400 Speaker 1: not the question. He thinks of himself that way. He 703 00:40:39,520 --> 00:40:44,480 Speaker 1: attacked Obama's Iran deal. He thought it was a terrible deal. Um. 704 00:40:44,560 --> 00:40:46,600 Speaker 1: He if you look at the kinds of deal, he 705 00:40:46,640 --> 00:40:50,880 Speaker 1: doesn't like halfway measures, Okay. He he wants big solutions. 706 00:40:51,719 --> 00:40:54,360 Speaker 1: So his big solution he wants to assure that Iran 707 00:40:54,440 --> 00:40:58,000 Speaker 1: cannot ever get a nuclear weapon. He wants to completely 708 00:40:58,080 --> 00:41:01,440 Speaker 1: denuclearize North Korea. He wants, he wants the big thing. 709 00:41:01,480 --> 00:41:04,160 Speaker 1: If it's not the big deal, it's not the whole enchilada, 710 00:41:04,440 --> 00:41:06,560 Speaker 1: it's not worth it. In his eyes. He thinks or 711 00:41:06,680 --> 00:41:09,440 Speaker 1: he thinks he can get a better deal, and so 712 00:41:09,480 --> 00:41:12,880 Speaker 1: he's prepared to rip up the paper in the pursuit 713 00:41:12,920 --> 00:41:16,319 Speaker 1: of a better deal. Whether he can get one or not, 714 00:41:16,520 --> 00:41:19,399 Speaker 1: time would tell, But in general, as you point out, 715 00:41:19,440 --> 00:41:22,279 Speaker 1: there's a risk you've you've thrown away the deal that 716 00:41:22,320 --> 00:41:27,080 Speaker 1: you had um and that you had made in good faith. 717 00:41:27,120 --> 00:41:29,880 Speaker 1: It doesn't matter whether Congress signs the treaty or not 718 00:41:30,120 --> 00:41:32,560 Speaker 1: as far as another country is concerned. If a president 719 00:41:32,560 --> 00:41:34,960 Speaker 1: of the United States puts his name on the dotted line, 720 00:41:35,239 --> 00:41:39,040 Speaker 1: that's the United States speaking. So the Iranians expect the 721 00:41:39,360 --> 00:41:42,000 Speaker 1: deal to be honored, the Europeans expect the deal to 722 00:41:42,000 --> 00:41:44,760 Speaker 1: be honored. And now we're in a weaker position because 723 00:41:44,880 --> 00:41:48,160 Speaker 1: the Europeans have lifted many of their sanctions. Other countries 724 00:41:48,200 --> 00:41:51,640 Speaker 1: are prepared to deal with Iran, so our leverage is 725 00:41:51,760 --> 00:41:55,319 Speaker 1: largely gone from that. But from what I can see 726 00:41:55,320 --> 00:42:00,479 Speaker 1: so far, I don't see Donald Trump inclined to bring 727 00:42:00,520 --> 00:42:05,359 Speaker 1: the United States into a military conflict. Um It's it's 728 00:42:05,400 --> 00:42:09,320 Speaker 1: not his area of expertise. He has seen the results 729 00:42:09,320 --> 00:42:12,440 Speaker 1: go bad. Whatever Donald Trump is, he is not a 730 00:42:12,440 --> 00:42:16,920 Speaker 1: stupid man um And he is, although he's not a 731 00:42:17,000 --> 00:42:20,480 Speaker 1: deep student of history to say the least, he knows 732 00:42:20,600 --> 00:42:24,560 Speaker 1: what the public reaction was to the Iraq War, and 733 00:42:24,719 --> 00:42:28,680 Speaker 1: he doesn't want his legacy to be another war like 734 00:42:28,800 --> 00:42:34,200 Speaker 1: the Iraq War, which utterly destroyed the Bush forty three presidency. 735 00:42:34,400 --> 00:42:37,719 Speaker 1: He's not he's not interested in that. So for him, 736 00:42:37,760 --> 00:42:42,680 Speaker 1: it's about the bluster, the talk, the grand bargain at 737 00:42:42,719 --> 00:42:46,279 Speaker 1: the end that that seals his place in history and 738 00:42:46,320 --> 00:42:49,480 Speaker 1: wins him the Nobel Prize UM, and that's what he 739 00:42:49,520 --> 00:42:52,160 Speaker 1: hopes to come away from these situations with. I think, 740 00:42:52,440 --> 00:42:55,320 Speaker 1: at least based on the North Korea model, is there 741 00:42:55,360 --> 00:42:59,400 Speaker 1: a real problem with um? Because you studied these presidencies, 742 00:42:59,480 --> 00:43:03,120 Speaker 1: you know, in depth, it strikes me that there must 743 00:43:03,160 --> 00:43:05,520 Speaker 1: be a problem that we work in these four year 744 00:43:05,760 --> 00:43:11,480 Speaker 1: political cycles maybe eight years, you know. Um, we make deals, 745 00:43:11,520 --> 00:43:14,320 Speaker 1: we pull out of them, we top all these regimes, 746 00:43:14,320 --> 00:43:16,319 Speaker 1: and then the next president comes in and almost wants 747 00:43:16,360 --> 00:43:19,360 Speaker 1: to act like none of that happened. Um. You know, 748 00:43:19,520 --> 00:43:22,400 Speaker 1: why would a why would a regime de nuclear rise 749 00:43:23,120 --> 00:43:25,560 Speaker 1: when we've been in the business of regime change. I 750 00:43:25,600 --> 00:43:27,880 Speaker 1: mean that is like the one hedge, like, you know, 751 00:43:28,000 --> 00:43:31,080 Speaker 1: the United States probably isn't gonna, you know, invade your 752 00:43:31,120 --> 00:43:35,880 Speaker 1: country if you have nuclear weapons. This the lesson that 753 00:43:35,960 --> 00:43:40,319 Speaker 1: the North Koreans took from Libya. Libya was exactly that 754 00:43:40,920 --> 00:43:44,360 Speaker 1: if if Kadafi had had nuclear weapons, he'd still be 755 00:43:44,400 --> 00:43:47,879 Speaker 1: in power. There's no way we're going to allow ourselves 756 00:43:48,000 --> 00:43:50,960 Speaker 1: to be to be put in the position where external 757 00:43:50,960 --> 00:43:53,640 Speaker 1: country can come in join with our own people who 758 00:43:53,680 --> 00:43:57,279 Speaker 1: we don't trust, UH and bomb us and destroy our 759 00:43:57,320 --> 00:44:00,759 Speaker 1: own military. Um and I and you know, and we 760 00:44:00,840 --> 00:44:03,200 Speaker 1: end up as the leaders of this country being dragged 761 00:44:03,200 --> 00:44:06,000 Speaker 1: by the people and they did, and being beaten to death. 762 00:44:06,160 --> 00:44:09,440 Speaker 1: That's not what the North Koreans want. UM. What Trump 763 00:44:09,480 --> 00:44:13,400 Speaker 1: tried to do in the most recent negotiation in Hanoi, 764 00:44:14,000 --> 00:44:18,799 Speaker 1: which was an interesting location. Um, yeah, he did. He 765 00:44:18,840 --> 00:44:21,840 Speaker 1: did just walk out of that. That is correct, um. 766 00:44:21,920 --> 00:44:24,560 Speaker 1: And it'll be a while before we fully understand why 767 00:44:24,600 --> 00:44:27,680 Speaker 1: that is said literally today's headline. But what he tried 768 00:44:27,719 --> 00:44:31,080 Speaker 1: to do was to suggest that Vietnam was an alternative 769 00:44:31,120 --> 00:44:35,840 Speaker 1: model for the North Koreans. UM. And here's the argument 770 00:44:36,040 --> 00:44:38,799 Speaker 1: the United States. You know, a generation to call for 771 00:44:38,920 --> 00:44:43,239 Speaker 1: the war in Korea, A little another generation entered for 772 00:44:43,360 --> 00:44:47,160 Speaker 1: the war in Vietnam. We were adversaries. Um. In each case, 773 00:44:47,320 --> 00:44:52,719 Speaker 1: fifty Americans give their lives in the end. Um, the 774 00:44:52,800 --> 00:44:56,360 Speaker 1: United States turns out to be able to be a friend, 775 00:44:56,440 --> 00:44:59,879 Speaker 1: a warm friend of the Vietnamese, open up strong relate 776 00:45:00,000 --> 00:45:07,040 Speaker 1: ships with Vietnam. Becomes Vietnam's main export recipient. UH, and 777 00:45:08,440 --> 00:45:11,239 Speaker 1: our relations are so strong with the Vietnamese that they 778 00:45:11,239 --> 00:45:14,080 Speaker 1: now regard us as one of the as an ally 779 00:45:14,239 --> 00:45:20,680 Speaker 1: against Chinese domination. UM. So there's that path um that 780 00:45:20,680 --> 00:45:23,239 Speaker 1: that we might suggest for the North Koreans, or there's 781 00:45:23,320 --> 00:45:29,600 Speaker 1: the one of continuing belligerents, poverty, etcetera. Can you persuade 782 00:45:29,680 --> 00:45:34,000 Speaker 1: the North Koreans that there is a Vietnam like path 783 00:45:34,640 --> 00:45:40,080 Speaker 1: toation too well, to reunification, yes, but also to economic development, 784 00:45:40,120 --> 00:45:43,600 Speaker 1: prosperity and peace. And it's not clear that that that 785 00:45:43,600 --> 00:45:45,840 Speaker 1: that you can. But I think it was an interesting 786 00:45:45,960 --> 00:45:48,560 Speaker 1: gambit on Trump's part. I don't know whether. I don't 787 00:45:48,600 --> 00:45:50,879 Speaker 1: know how much background there was to this. I don't 788 00:45:50,920 --> 00:45:53,320 Speaker 1: how much build up there was. And that's one of 789 00:45:53,360 --> 00:45:57,200 Speaker 1: the things about trumping Trump's diplomacy that's peculiar, is it. 790 00:45:57,280 --> 00:45:59,960 Speaker 1: Usually you have summit meetings after the agreement has been made. 791 00:46:01,000 --> 00:46:04,040 Speaker 1: The experts write the agreements, they read the fine print, 792 00:46:04,080 --> 00:46:06,799 Speaker 1: they hassle about the details, and then the leaders get 793 00:46:06,840 --> 00:46:10,920 Speaker 1: together and celebrate when when the deed is done. Trump's 794 00:46:10,960 --> 00:46:15,320 Speaker 1: having has a different model of how to negotiate UM. 795 00:46:15,360 --> 00:46:17,840 Speaker 1: It initially showed promise in his first meeting with the 796 00:46:17,880 --> 00:46:19,719 Speaker 1: North Koreans, and now it seems to be turning out 797 00:46:19,719 --> 00:46:21,680 Speaker 1: the case that the North Koreans came away with a 798 00:46:21,760 --> 00:46:24,640 Speaker 1: very different understanding of that meeting. I have no intention 799 00:46:25,000 --> 00:46:28,839 Speaker 1: of actually denuclearizing the way Trump wants them to. And 800 00:46:29,400 --> 00:46:32,120 Speaker 1: do you think that the more we antagonize the Iranians 801 00:46:32,160 --> 00:46:36,560 Speaker 1: the way we have, does that incentivize them to pursue 802 00:46:36,800 --> 00:46:41,280 Speaker 1: weapons of mass destruction as their their hedge against potential 803 00:46:41,320 --> 00:46:43,799 Speaker 1: American aggression. I mean, I know right now they're not. 804 00:46:44,200 --> 00:46:47,520 Speaker 1: It appears that's what Gina haspell and uh Dan coates 805 00:46:47,560 --> 00:46:51,239 Speaker 1: the d N I testified to just what last month. UM, 806 00:46:51,360 --> 00:46:57,640 Speaker 1: the Iranians would like to have peaceful relationships relations with 807 00:46:57,640 --> 00:47:01,239 Speaker 1: the United States. UM. They'd like to be recognized as 808 00:47:01,320 --> 00:47:06,000 Speaker 1: an influential player in the regional player and respected as that. UM. 809 00:47:06,320 --> 00:47:08,080 Speaker 1: There are lots of things that they want from the 810 00:47:08,200 --> 00:47:10,480 Speaker 1: United States that they think that they can get from 811 00:47:10,480 --> 00:47:13,840 Speaker 1: the United States. And they were willing to sign the 812 00:47:13,880 --> 00:47:15,719 Speaker 1: deal in the first place because it was in their 813 00:47:15,760 --> 00:47:20,120 Speaker 1: interest to do so. UM. They're still respecting it by 814 00:47:20,160 --> 00:47:23,640 Speaker 1: all appearances, because they hope that the United States in 815 00:47:23,640 --> 00:47:26,840 Speaker 1: a sense comes around. UM. In, you know, to a 816 00:47:26,880 --> 00:47:31,000 Speaker 1: more sensible position there. And maybe they could be countries. 817 00:47:31,120 --> 00:47:34,360 Speaker 1: Countries you mentioned the four year cycle. Other countries weighed 818 00:47:34,400 --> 00:47:37,759 Speaker 1: out our election cycle. China wait a hundred years. They 819 00:47:37,760 --> 00:47:41,279 Speaker 1: don't care. They can wait for another president. Um, they 820 00:47:41,280 --> 00:47:44,000 Speaker 1: waited for I mean the in the Vietnam War. The 821 00:47:44,960 --> 00:47:50,080 Speaker 1: Saigon government decided to outweit Lyndon Johnson when his term 822 00:47:50,120 --> 00:47:52,799 Speaker 1: was ending, expecting that Richard Nixon would give them a 823 00:47:52,840 --> 00:47:56,279 Speaker 1: better deal. And that's one of the reasons. And and 824 00:47:56,280 --> 00:47:59,600 Speaker 1: and that's what Henry Kissinger essentially signal to them. They 825 00:47:59,680 --> 00:48:02,839 Speaker 1: get a better deal. So they scuttled a peace deal 826 00:48:02,880 --> 00:48:06,000 Speaker 1: that was on the table in two Then it turned 827 00:48:06,000 --> 00:48:08,640 Speaker 1: out they shortly they learned soon thereafter that Nixon also 828 00:48:08,640 --> 00:48:12,480 Speaker 1: had every intention of withdrawing from Vietnam. Um. So they gained. 829 00:48:12,520 --> 00:48:14,719 Speaker 1: They didn't gain very much except a little time by 830 00:48:14,760 --> 00:48:19,160 Speaker 1: doing that. So the Iranians could be waiting for another president. Um. 831 00:48:19,200 --> 00:48:21,040 Speaker 1: You know, the North Koreans may decide to wait for 832 00:48:21,080 --> 00:48:25,280 Speaker 1: another president. Yes, everybody can. Our electoral cycle is regular, 833 00:48:25,800 --> 00:48:29,680 Speaker 1: and you hope for the hope for the best. Um. 834 00:48:30,160 --> 00:48:32,359 Speaker 1: I will say that if you let's take the first 835 00:48:32,400 --> 00:48:35,680 Speaker 1: case in the book, Abraham Lincoln um the Confederacy in 836 00:48:35,719 --> 00:48:40,759 Speaker 1: eighteen sixty four. Its strategy was playing for time so 837 00:48:40,840 --> 00:48:44,200 Speaker 1: the northern public would get frustrated and elect a Democrat, 838 00:48:44,400 --> 00:48:47,239 Speaker 1: George McClellan, who announced he would make peace with the 839 00:48:47,239 --> 00:48:51,880 Speaker 1: South essentially as quickly as possible, recognizing the Confederacy. So 840 00:48:52,000 --> 00:48:54,960 Speaker 1: if you're the South in eighteen sixty four and you're 841 00:48:54,960 --> 00:49:00,000 Speaker 1: looking at Lincoln's reelection, you know that delivering um defeats 842 00:49:00,080 --> 00:49:03,080 Speaker 1: to the Union Army and essentially at least making making 843 00:49:03,080 --> 00:49:05,840 Speaker 1: it seem to the Northern public that no progress was 844 00:49:05,920 --> 00:49:09,279 Speaker 1: being made in the war after three plus years of 845 00:49:09,680 --> 00:49:13,080 Speaker 1: fighting and the heaviest casualties of any American war in history. 846 00:49:14,200 --> 00:49:16,480 Speaker 1: That would lead the Northern public to decide they wanted 847 00:49:16,480 --> 00:49:19,000 Speaker 1: a peace candidate. And that's what the South was playing 848 00:49:19,000 --> 00:49:22,800 Speaker 1: for in eighteen sixty four. So with with rare exception 849 00:49:23,200 --> 00:49:26,000 Speaker 1: um World War Two, it wouldn't make a difference. In 850 00:49:26,080 --> 00:49:29,560 Speaker 1: nineteen forty four, the Allies were committed to unconditional surrender 851 00:49:29,560 --> 00:49:31,400 Speaker 1: of the war was going to play out that way. 852 00:49:31,440 --> 00:49:34,680 Speaker 1: But in other cases, in nineteen seventy two of Vietnam 853 00:49:34,800 --> 00:49:38,879 Speaker 1: um the American public is fair game when it comes 854 00:49:38,920 --> 00:49:41,600 Speaker 1: to other countries looking at how to fight their wars. 855 00:49:42,120 --> 00:49:45,719 Speaker 1: Um I mentioned that there was a a book was 856 00:49:45,760 --> 00:49:48,480 Speaker 1: written about fifteen years ago, maybe not quite that long ago, 857 00:49:48,520 --> 00:49:51,000 Speaker 1: by Rupert Smith, the British general, called War among the 858 00:49:51,000 --> 00:49:54,520 Speaker 1: People Bore Amongst the People, and he argues this is 859 00:49:54,560 --> 00:49:58,400 Speaker 1: about insurgencies and how basically towards today are not fought 860 00:49:58,400 --> 00:50:04,560 Speaker 1: by recognized armies, but rather by irregular forces asymmetrical conflicts. 861 00:50:04,719 --> 00:50:08,120 Speaker 1: See these irregular forces hiding among the people. They're hard 862 00:50:08,160 --> 00:50:11,239 Speaker 1: to find, they're hard to separate. When you attack them, 863 00:50:11,239 --> 00:50:16,400 Speaker 1: you cause large, large civilian casualties. Um. When they suffered defeats, 864 00:50:16,440 --> 00:50:18,640 Speaker 1: they simply blend back into It. Was this the book 865 00:50:18,680 --> 00:50:20,920 Speaker 1: that said when a strong power fights a weaker power, 866 00:50:21,120 --> 00:50:24,200 Speaker 1: they end up becoming weaker themselves. A number of books 867 00:50:24,239 --> 00:50:26,360 Speaker 1: have said that point. Smith's point is that the character 868 00:50:26,400 --> 00:50:29,160 Speaker 1: of war changes. But we should also recognize when we 869 00:50:29,160 --> 00:50:31,960 Speaker 1: talk about war among the people, that the people include 870 00:50:31,960 --> 00:50:34,760 Speaker 1: the people of the United States. Although they're not directly 871 00:50:34,760 --> 00:50:37,759 Speaker 1: in the line of fire, they're very much a political 872 00:50:37,880 --> 00:50:42,720 Speaker 1: target UM that the enemy understands and tries to influence. 873 00:50:42,760 --> 00:50:47,439 Speaker 1: The North Vietnamese did this um intentionally during the Vietnamal views. Yeah, 874 00:50:47,520 --> 00:50:51,560 Speaker 1: but well even before that, they they recognize that the 875 00:50:51,600 --> 00:50:55,680 Speaker 1: American people could be made, could become war weary in 876 00:50:55,800 --> 00:50:58,520 Speaker 1: short order. Um, this is not why they launched the 877 00:50:58,520 --> 00:51:01,320 Speaker 1: Tet offensive for them. Actually a side benefit of the 878 00:51:01,360 --> 00:51:05,319 Speaker 1: Tet Offensive. They lose militarily, they gained politically. But they 879 00:51:05,440 --> 00:51:08,799 Speaker 1: realize that the American public can be made, can get 880 00:51:08,800 --> 00:51:12,400 Speaker 1: war weary, and if they dragged the conflict out, eventually 881 00:51:12,400 --> 00:51:15,000 Speaker 1: the American public will turn its back on the war. 882 00:51:15,239 --> 00:51:18,880 Speaker 1: And it turned out that that Vietnamization, the process of 883 00:51:18,960 --> 00:51:21,600 Speaker 1: turning the war over to the South Vietnamese and bringing 884 00:51:21,640 --> 00:51:26,360 Speaker 1: American troops home, had the unintended effect of encouraging the 885 00:51:26,440 --> 00:51:28,680 Speaker 1: American people to check out on the war so that 886 00:51:28,680 --> 00:51:31,000 Speaker 1: it no longer mattered to them. You end the draft, 887 00:51:31,040 --> 00:51:33,920 Speaker 1: you bring the troops home. It's not unlike the conflicts 888 00:51:33,920 --> 00:51:37,480 Speaker 1: you describe. Now, we're still there training the Vietnamese, We're 889 00:51:37,480 --> 00:51:40,160 Speaker 1: still their bonds. No price for the public. The casualties 890 00:51:40,160 --> 00:51:43,279 Speaker 1: are going down. The public is losing interest. But as 891 00:51:43,280 --> 00:51:46,480 Speaker 1: its public loses interest, it also stops caring about the outcome. 892 00:51:46,800 --> 00:51:49,560 Speaker 1: So the fact that ultimately the South Vietnamese government will 893 00:51:49,600 --> 00:51:52,759 Speaker 1: collapse means nothing to the American people, they've they've checked out. 894 00:51:53,239 --> 00:51:56,400 Speaker 1: And so it is in Iraq. You know, a generation 895 00:51:56,520 --> 00:51:58,840 Speaker 1: later in two by two thousand and eight, the American 896 00:51:58,880 --> 00:52:00,920 Speaker 1: people have checked out on the Iraq War. Do they 897 00:52:00,960 --> 00:52:03,920 Speaker 1: care what happens in Iraq afterwards? No, they really don't. 898 00:52:04,239 --> 00:52:08,520 Speaker 1: Get the troops home, the casualties go down. It's probably 899 00:52:08,600 --> 00:52:12,239 Speaker 1: largely true in Afghanistan today. The American public doesn't care 900 00:52:12,640 --> 00:52:16,279 Speaker 1: after a certain point that. In the case of Afghanistan, 901 00:52:16,280 --> 00:52:18,920 Speaker 1: there's an advantage in that because the administration can continue 902 00:52:18,960 --> 00:52:22,040 Speaker 1: doing what it's doing without much public reaction to it. 903 00:52:22,360 --> 00:52:24,719 Speaker 1: But in other cases, when the American public checks out, 904 00:52:25,120 --> 00:52:27,799 Speaker 1: the president is left with no good argument to make 905 00:52:27,840 --> 00:52:30,160 Speaker 1: about why this matters to the United States. What's the 906 00:52:30,200 --> 00:52:33,799 Speaker 1: American interest here? Um, Like pulling us out of the 907 00:52:33,920 --> 00:52:36,640 Speaker 1: Trans Pacific Partnership and things like this. I feel like 908 00:52:36,680 --> 00:52:40,440 Speaker 1: the American public just doesn't necessarily engage wholesale, and so 909 00:52:40,680 --> 00:52:43,160 Speaker 1: certainly not was something like the Trans Pacific Partnership, because 910 00:52:43,200 --> 00:52:44,680 Speaker 1: very few people know what it is or what it 911 00:52:44,719 --> 00:52:47,439 Speaker 1: would do. Um. The war, at least at one point 912 00:52:47,480 --> 00:52:53,160 Speaker 1: was was graphic, um and important, and presidents what they 913 00:52:53,239 --> 00:52:55,680 Speaker 1: also find is that their their words matter less as 914 00:52:55,719 --> 00:52:59,759 Speaker 1: time goes on, they've inflated the significance of the conflict 915 00:53:00,120 --> 00:53:03,600 Speaker 1: um in part because they have to justify going to war. 916 00:53:04,080 --> 00:53:06,839 Speaker 1: But once they inflate the significance of the conflict, it's 917 00:53:06,840 --> 00:53:09,279 Speaker 1: hard for them to back down. And usually it's it 918 00:53:09,320 --> 00:53:12,000 Speaker 1: takes another president to get us out of that conflict. 919 00:53:12,160 --> 00:53:14,280 Speaker 1: George W. Bush wasn't going to get us out of Iraq. 920 00:53:14,880 --> 00:53:17,680 Speaker 1: His successor would. George W. Bush wasn't gonna get us 921 00:53:17,680 --> 00:53:21,279 Speaker 1: out of Afghanistan. Obama didn get us out of the Afghanistan. 922 00:53:21,600 --> 00:53:25,319 Speaker 1: His successor may um. So in these conflicts, these long 923 00:53:25,400 --> 00:53:28,319 Speaker 1: conflicts that go on, Lyndon Johnson didn't get us out 924 00:53:28,360 --> 00:53:31,000 Speaker 1: of Vietnam. Richard Nixon did. The first the president who 925 00:53:31,040 --> 00:53:33,800 Speaker 1: launches the war and inflates its importance at the beginning 926 00:53:34,080 --> 00:53:37,400 Speaker 1: into something like an existential conflict. The survival of the 927 00:53:37,520 --> 00:53:41,320 Speaker 1: United States is at stake here, by whatever tenuous logic 928 00:53:41,400 --> 00:53:44,120 Speaker 1: it is. Okay, it's it's easy in the case of 929 00:53:44,440 --> 00:53:47,480 Speaker 1: World War Two, and relatively easy in the case of 930 00:53:47,520 --> 00:53:49,520 Speaker 1: the Civil War to say the survival of the United 931 00:53:49,560 --> 00:53:53,080 Speaker 1: States is at stake. What do you do when it isn't? Though, Raddy, 932 00:53:53,160 --> 00:53:55,200 Speaker 1: I mean the survival of the United States is not 933 00:53:55,320 --> 00:53:59,560 Speaker 1: at stake when Woodrow Wilson gets us into World War One. Um, 934 00:53:59,640 --> 00:54:02,080 Speaker 1: which makes it really hard for it Woodrow Wilson to 935 00:54:02,080 --> 00:54:03,919 Speaker 1: make the case to get the United States into World 936 00:54:03,960 --> 00:54:06,640 Speaker 1: War one. The survival of the United States is not 937 00:54:06,760 --> 00:54:10,800 Speaker 1: at stake. In Vietnam, you have these long, attenuated arguments 938 00:54:10,800 --> 00:54:13,600 Speaker 1: about the dominoes right about you know how you know, 939 00:54:14,280 --> 00:54:16,399 Speaker 1: then the next week they're in Australia and the week 940 00:54:16,440 --> 00:54:20,640 Speaker 1: after that in San Francisco or you know, um, it's silly, 941 00:54:20,719 --> 00:54:23,480 Speaker 1: you know, images the imagery still stays with us. And 942 00:54:23,520 --> 00:54:27,080 Speaker 1: George W. Bush I remember Tony Blair going on television 943 00:54:27,080 --> 00:54:28,840 Speaker 1: and talking about how our RAQ was going to launch 944 00:54:28,840 --> 00:54:31,400 Speaker 1: like a chemical weapons attack on London. What could happen 945 00:54:31,440 --> 00:54:34,920 Speaker 1: in hours? Like what well and and Condoleeza Rice. Right, 946 00:54:34,920 --> 00:54:36,560 Speaker 1: we don't want the you know, the yellow cake to 947 00:54:36,560 --> 00:54:40,000 Speaker 1: become a mushroom cloud, you know, the inflated you know, 948 00:54:40,719 --> 00:54:47,680 Speaker 1: threat of the nuclear weapons. But to make the case 949 00:54:47,760 --> 00:54:49,600 Speaker 1: for the sacrifice of going to war, you something you 950 00:54:49,640 --> 00:54:51,920 Speaker 1: do inflate it, right, You've got to mobilize those like 951 00:54:52,000 --> 00:54:57,800 Speaker 1: jingoistic nationalistic sentiments and then the letdown when you're unsuccessful 952 00:54:58,760 --> 00:55:01,759 Speaker 1: and the dawn and gradual realization that you know, well, 953 00:55:01,760 --> 00:55:05,440 Speaker 1: you get right down to it, there weren't any w 954 00:55:05,680 --> 00:55:07,920 Speaker 1: m d s in a in a rock. They went 955 00:55:08,040 --> 00:55:12,239 Speaker 1: looking for them, and they couldn't find them. Although curiously, 956 00:55:12,480 --> 00:55:15,359 Speaker 1: public opinion polls showed about two years after the war 957 00:55:16,040 --> 00:55:18,279 Speaker 1: that there was a partisan split over whether or not 958 00:55:18,360 --> 00:55:20,000 Speaker 1: there had been w m d s. I think there 959 00:55:20,040 --> 00:55:22,640 Speaker 1: still are that that could very well be. I haven't 960 00:55:22,680 --> 00:55:25,800 Speaker 1: looked in any recent surveys, but Republicans became more convinced 961 00:55:25,800 --> 00:55:27,879 Speaker 1: that there had been w m d s and Democrats 962 00:55:28,000 --> 00:55:30,960 Speaker 1: became less convinced, which probably says more about the way 963 00:55:31,000 --> 00:55:33,640 Speaker 1: our partisan mind have its work than anything else. We 964 00:55:34,400 --> 00:55:36,760 Speaker 1: have taken up almost an hour of your time already, 965 00:55:36,800 --> 00:55:38,960 Speaker 1: But I guess maybe the way to wrap this up 966 00:55:39,040 --> 00:55:41,520 Speaker 1: unless you have any you know, concluding remarks or anything 967 00:55:41,520 --> 00:55:43,800 Speaker 1: else about the book you wanted to talk about, I 968 00:55:44,080 --> 00:55:47,279 Speaker 1: did want to ask you, do you see um a 969 00:55:47,360 --> 00:55:51,240 Speaker 1: potential roadmap or a potential way forward that the United 970 00:55:51,280 --> 00:55:55,080 Speaker 1: States could begin to extricate itself from these many many 971 00:55:55,080 --> 00:55:57,839 Speaker 1: different conflicts were in Is it even possible or if 972 00:55:57,840 --> 00:56:00,279 Speaker 1: we just created this war machine, the the you know, 973 00:56:00,360 --> 00:56:03,760 Speaker 1: so called military industrial complex, we can't even back away 974 00:56:03,840 --> 00:56:07,560 Speaker 1: from it because our our culture is predicated upon it. 975 00:56:09,440 --> 00:56:12,640 Speaker 1: You have to rely essentially on the good judgment and 976 00:56:12,719 --> 00:56:15,400 Speaker 1: self restraint of the President of the United So we're 977 00:56:15,440 --> 00:56:23,040 Speaker 1: in trouble especially currently, well are we? Yes, yes and no. 978 00:56:23,160 --> 00:56:27,800 Speaker 1: I mean when I say that is because the more power, 979 00:56:28,560 --> 00:56:32,600 Speaker 1: the military capacity is at every president's disposal. And that's 980 00:56:32,800 --> 00:56:36,440 Speaker 1: the big change between the pre modern ear before World 981 00:56:36,440 --> 00:56:39,680 Speaker 1: War Two and the present time. Because before World War Two, 982 00:56:39,719 --> 00:56:43,000 Speaker 1: you didn't have a military basically you could deploy immediately 983 00:56:43,360 --> 00:56:46,480 Speaker 1: there was any significance. You have to create armies when 984 00:56:46,600 --> 00:56:49,799 Speaker 1: wars were about to happen. Um. Lincoln had to build 985 00:56:49,840 --> 00:56:53,640 Speaker 1: an army from nothing in the Civil War. It changes 986 00:56:53,680 --> 00:56:56,360 Speaker 1: in the late nineteenth century, beginning with the creation of 987 00:56:56,360 --> 00:56:59,360 Speaker 1: a modern United States Navy, which projects us as a 988 00:56:59,400 --> 00:57:01,160 Speaker 1: world power, and that means we're going to be more 989 00:57:01,280 --> 00:57:03,239 Speaker 1: entangled in different parts of the world. We start to 990 00:57:03,239 --> 00:57:05,879 Speaker 1: getting involved in colonialism and things. And then after World 991 00:57:05,920 --> 00:57:08,440 Speaker 1: War two. Sorry, after World War Two, the United States 992 00:57:08,480 --> 00:57:13,280 Speaker 1: doesn't fully demobilize. Um. We maintain a large standing military 993 00:57:13,360 --> 00:57:16,320 Speaker 1: on a on a permanent basis. Um. We we do 994 00:57:16,400 --> 00:57:19,800 Speaker 1: some demobilization after World War Two, but UM, it's limited 995 00:57:19,840 --> 00:57:22,120 Speaker 1: and very little after the Korean War. And so now 996 00:57:22,160 --> 00:57:27,120 Speaker 1: we have a military that spends somewhere around of all 997 00:57:27,360 --> 00:57:31,919 Speaker 1: the world's total expenditures on military forces. UM. So it's there, 998 00:57:32,120 --> 00:57:35,280 Speaker 1: it's not it's not going where anywhere where a superpower 999 00:57:35,520 --> 00:57:38,280 Speaker 1: we may. We're not quite the hegemonic power we were 1000 00:57:38,320 --> 00:57:41,600 Speaker 1: after the Soviet Union collapsed. Um. But a unit and 1001 00:57:41,720 --> 00:57:45,320 Speaker 1: essentially a superpower, but that has that kind of hegemony 1002 00:57:46,280 --> 00:57:51,200 Speaker 1: and wants to preserve it. Sees any disruption in the 1003 00:57:51,240 --> 00:57:54,920 Speaker 1: global order as a threat, no matter how far away 1004 00:57:54,960 --> 00:58:00,600 Speaker 1: it is, whether it's Venezuela or it's Afghanistan, you name it. 1005 00:58:00,640 --> 00:58:03,480 Speaker 1: Any potential, any war could potentially threaten that. So we 1006 00:58:03,560 --> 00:58:06,919 Speaker 1: are on our on our guard all the time, all 1007 00:58:06,920 --> 00:58:11,880 Speaker 1: the time with the military force, with the sense that 1008 00:58:11,920 --> 00:58:15,720 Speaker 1: our interests are at stake in any conflict around the world. 1009 00:58:16,800 --> 00:58:20,000 Speaker 1: Potentially leads us to the situation where we would consider 1010 00:58:20,160 --> 00:58:23,800 Speaker 1: using force nowadays in time in ways that we never 1011 00:58:23,880 --> 00:58:26,360 Speaker 1: would have before World War Two. So what stops you 1012 00:58:26,520 --> 00:58:31,760 Speaker 1: it is the president's essentially restraint, whether he's advised that 1013 00:58:31,840 --> 00:58:35,800 Speaker 1: way or whether he's inherently skeptical of military involvement, which 1014 00:58:35,840 --> 00:58:40,360 Speaker 1: is what Obama was you're not going to Only those 1015 00:58:40,400 --> 00:58:44,280 Speaker 1: presidents who are aware of the risks will be will 1016 00:58:44,360 --> 00:58:47,200 Speaker 1: will be careful. I think about getting us into into 1017 00:58:47,240 --> 00:58:50,600 Speaker 1: military conflicts, and I don't think in the in the 1018 00:58:50,640 --> 00:58:54,080 Speaker 1: wars we've been fighting, there has been nearly enough attention 1019 00:58:54,120 --> 00:58:57,960 Speaker 1: to the risks that we take when we go into war. Um, 1020 00:58:58,000 --> 00:59:00,640 Speaker 1: we know that we can win the conventional phase. We 1021 00:59:00,720 --> 00:59:02,600 Speaker 1: know there aren't gonna and that's not going to take 1022 00:59:02,720 --> 00:59:08,640 Speaker 1: very long because no conventional force that we're potentially confronting 1023 00:59:08,960 --> 00:59:11,960 Speaker 1: can compete with the conventional force of the United States. 1024 00:59:12,000 --> 00:59:15,720 Speaker 1: So the early victory is right there. Um. Donald Rumsfeld 1025 00:59:16,240 --> 00:59:19,840 Speaker 1: was in one sense that UM smart about this because 1026 00:59:20,360 --> 00:59:25,520 Speaker 1: his view was we do kinetic Warfarewell, okay, that's what 1027 00:59:25,560 --> 00:59:29,320 Speaker 1: we should be doing. The rest we should outsource nation building, 1028 00:59:29,440 --> 00:59:34,360 Speaker 1: leave it to the French or the Brits, but we 1029 00:59:34,360 --> 00:59:36,840 Speaker 1: should not do nation But now, of course, there's no 1030 00:59:36,880 --> 00:59:39,440 Speaker 1: way you can put that into practice and national style. 1031 00:59:39,840 --> 00:59:43,520 Speaker 1: And Rumsfeld was a terrible Secretary of Defense because he 1032 00:59:44,080 --> 00:59:46,800 Speaker 1: does win the kinetic phase of the war in Iraq 1033 00:59:46,840 --> 00:59:49,840 Speaker 1: and has no clue what to do afterward. He want afterwards, 1034 00:59:49,880 --> 00:59:51,560 Speaker 1: he wants to control it, but he doesn't know what 1035 00:59:51,640 --> 00:59:55,480 Speaker 1: to do with it, So the temptation to use force 1036 00:59:56,000 --> 01:00:00,560 Speaker 1: will be there because we do have overwhelming force. Getting 1037 01:00:00,560 --> 01:00:02,920 Speaker 1: in is easy. Presidents have lots of things they can 1038 01:00:02,920 --> 01:00:05,000 Speaker 1: do to get us into war and lots of ways 1039 01:00:05,000 --> 01:00:06,960 Speaker 1: they can fight those choose to fight those wars in 1040 01:00:06,960 --> 01:00:11,000 Speaker 1: the early stage. That's not the problem. Okay, it's getting 1041 01:00:11,040 --> 01:00:15,240 Speaker 1: out and actually accomplishing what you want. That's that's the key. 1042 01:00:15,280 --> 01:00:17,800 Speaker 1: That's the key question, and you've got to be realistic 1043 01:00:17,840 --> 01:00:20,800 Speaker 1: about it. I and others have written about this. Essentially, 1044 01:00:20,880 --> 01:00:23,240 Speaker 1: before you go into a war, you ought to be 1045 01:00:23,320 --> 01:00:26,680 Speaker 1: thinking about what the political accomplished goal is, what's the 1046 01:00:26,920 --> 01:00:29,440 Speaker 1: what's the peace building part of it? What do you 1047 01:00:29,440 --> 01:00:31,080 Speaker 1: want to accomplish at the end, And then you have 1048 01:00:31,160 --> 01:00:34,360 Speaker 1: to work your way backwards from that to the point 1049 01:00:34,360 --> 01:00:36,080 Speaker 1: where you're going to get into the war, and and 1050 01:00:36,120 --> 01:00:38,880 Speaker 1: think about each step as you work your way backwards 1051 01:00:39,360 --> 01:00:42,360 Speaker 1: in planning the kind of military, kind of military operation 1052 01:00:42,400 --> 01:00:44,360 Speaker 1: you want to have, or whether it's smart to do 1053 01:00:44,400 --> 01:00:47,160 Speaker 1: it at all. And that's something that we have done 1054 01:00:47,960 --> 01:00:51,560 Speaker 1: really poorly, and presidents have done poorly. They're very they're 1055 01:00:51,640 --> 01:00:54,720 Speaker 1: capable of thinking about the first step, they're capable of 1056 01:00:54,800 --> 01:00:57,920 Speaker 1: imagining a big long term goal in part to justify 1057 01:00:57,960 --> 01:01:01,480 Speaker 1: going to war. But they're not capable connecting the two ends. 1058 01:01:02,200 --> 01:01:03,960 Speaker 1: None of them has been very good at connecting the 1059 01:01:04,000 --> 01:01:08,280 Speaker 1: two ends UM. And until the President does that, there's 1060 01:01:08,320 --> 01:01:10,919 Speaker 1: a real risk of getting into a conflict that leads 1061 01:01:10,960 --> 01:01:15,280 Speaker 1: to nowhere UM and put and leaves us worse off 1062 01:01:15,320 --> 01:01:19,360 Speaker 1: than when we went in. I mean, I remember when 1063 01:01:19,360 --> 01:01:22,920 Speaker 1: we interviewed uh Mark Boyatt, who's a Special Forces colonel, 1064 01:01:22,960 --> 01:01:25,640 Speaker 1: and he who's I was asking him about how unpopular 1065 01:01:25,920 --> 01:01:29,240 Speaker 1: then the notion of nation building is with many Americans, 1066 01:01:29,280 --> 01:01:30,960 Speaker 1: and he's like, well, okay, then we're going to be 1067 01:01:30,960 --> 01:01:33,440 Speaker 1: there forever. Like you just have to understand, like if 1068 01:01:33,440 --> 01:01:34,920 Speaker 1: we're not going to nation build, then what are we 1069 01:01:35,000 --> 01:01:37,560 Speaker 1: just going to have troops in Iraq or Syria or 1070 01:01:37,560 --> 01:01:40,360 Speaker 1: wherever they're going to stay there forever. You know, as 1071 01:01:40,360 --> 01:01:43,520 Speaker 1: you said that, we haven't connected the two ends. Did 1072 01:01:43,560 --> 01:01:48,960 Speaker 1: he have a suggestion? UM? I think he would suggest UM. 1073 01:01:49,200 --> 01:01:50,960 Speaker 1: Didn't he have a specific thing? It was like two 1074 01:01:50,960 --> 01:01:54,520 Speaker 1: and a half generation he did. He did, UM. But 1075 01:01:54,560 --> 01:01:57,520 Speaker 1: I think what he was talking about was we need 1076 01:01:57,560 --> 01:02:00,440 Speaker 1: to have in Afghanistan a fifty year plan, and we 1077 01:02:00,480 --> 01:02:02,200 Speaker 1: need to have an understanding that when you deploy to 1078 01:02:02,240 --> 01:02:04,680 Speaker 1: Afghanistan for a year, you're not there to win the 1079 01:02:04,720 --> 01:02:07,120 Speaker 1: war in the year, You're there to just advance the 1080 01:02:07,240 --> 01:02:11,040 Speaker 1: plan a little bit. And yeah, it takes several generations, 1081 01:02:11,280 --> 01:02:13,920 Speaker 1: but that that seems like something that's unrealistic. For as 1082 01:02:14,000 --> 01:02:16,800 Speaker 1: much as I love Mark, Um, it seems like the 1083 01:02:16,800 --> 01:02:21,800 Speaker 1: American public doesn't have the patience or the stamina for 1084 01:02:22,160 --> 01:02:24,920 Speaker 1: a long term campaign like that. So I have one 1085 01:02:25,000 --> 01:02:27,600 Speaker 1: comment on that, which is that I think there's a 1086 01:02:27,640 --> 01:02:32,720 Speaker 1: particular moment or and sometimes a short interval in a conflict, 1087 01:02:32,960 --> 01:02:36,720 Speaker 1: where you could persuade Congress to make a long term 1088 01:02:36,720 --> 01:02:39,240 Speaker 1: commitment to the security of another country or what I 1089 01:02:39,280 --> 01:02:42,000 Speaker 1: sometimes what I would call the Korea solution. Right, we're 1090 01:02:42,000 --> 01:02:45,080 Speaker 1: still in Korea. Um, it's not cheap to be there. 1091 01:02:45,360 --> 01:02:49,280 Speaker 1: There hasn't been armed conflict since nineteen fifty three, so 1092 01:02:49,360 --> 01:02:51,760 Speaker 1: we are basically we are two and a half generational 1093 01:02:51,880 --> 01:02:55,360 Speaker 1: numbers of troops. Right. Um. The threat is still there 1094 01:02:55,480 --> 01:02:58,440 Speaker 1: to some extent, and that remains a concern. But but 1095 01:02:58,520 --> 01:03:02,640 Speaker 1: we certainly did nay building economy building very successfully in Korea. 1096 01:03:03,280 --> 01:03:07,160 Speaker 1: In Vietnam, Um, I make the argument in the book 1097 01:03:07,240 --> 01:03:10,080 Speaker 1: that there was a window of opportunity when Richard Nixon 1098 01:03:10,160 --> 01:03:13,400 Speaker 1: might have gotten Congress to sign on to a long 1099 01:03:13,480 --> 01:03:15,840 Speaker 1: term commitment to the South Vietnamese government that would have 1100 01:03:15,920 --> 01:03:21,520 Speaker 1: kept American advisers there, American UM planes there to bomb 1101 01:03:21,600 --> 01:03:24,800 Speaker 1: if the North Vietnamese attacked. Then the North Vietnamese at 1102 01:03:24,800 --> 01:03:27,720 Speaker 1: that point had been crippled by losses in tet and 1103 01:03:27,760 --> 01:03:30,760 Speaker 1: the year after tet Um, the American anti war movement 1104 01:03:31,000 --> 01:03:34,680 Speaker 1: in nineteen sixty nine have been set back by Nixon's 1105 01:03:34,720 --> 01:03:39,720 Speaker 1: success Um, and so it's for probably six months between 1106 01:03:39,880 --> 01:03:43,160 Speaker 1: nineteen sixty nine and nineteen fall sixty nine early nineteen 1107 01:03:43,160 --> 01:03:46,960 Speaker 1: seventy Nixon probably could have pushed through Congress at the 1108 01:03:47,000 --> 01:03:49,680 Speaker 1: peak of his popularity, legislation that would have committed the 1109 01:03:49,760 --> 01:03:53,840 Speaker 1: United States to a long term relationship with the Saigon government. 1110 01:03:54,280 --> 01:03:57,800 Speaker 1: He blew it because he invaded Cambodia and Um, you know, 1111 01:03:58,040 --> 01:04:00,720 Speaker 1: revived the anti war movement and the Democrat ats, So 1112 01:04:01,080 --> 01:04:03,440 Speaker 1: the window passed. I think there was a window in 1113 01:04:03,480 --> 01:04:07,440 Speaker 1: Afghanistan um for a long term security commitment. Probably when 1114 01:04:07,440 --> 01:04:10,280 Speaker 1: Obama first came into office, he could have a he 1115 01:04:10,320 --> 01:04:13,000 Speaker 1: could have negotiated and with Congress and had a long 1116 01:04:13,120 --> 01:04:16,360 Speaker 1: term commitment that would have kept the American American presence 1117 01:04:16,360 --> 01:04:19,600 Speaker 1: there in American Aid going UM. But at this point 1118 01:04:19,680 --> 01:04:21,960 Speaker 1: it's probably too late to do that. I think the 1119 01:04:22,000 --> 01:04:25,480 Speaker 1: American people don't feel strongly enough to make a significant commitment. 1120 01:04:26,280 --> 01:04:29,400 Speaker 1: So if you're going, if you think you need to 1121 01:04:29,440 --> 01:04:31,560 Speaker 1: be there for a long time, and you want to 1122 01:04:31,600 --> 01:04:34,400 Speaker 1: signal that to an adversary too, you have to know 1123 01:04:34,480 --> 01:04:36,640 Speaker 1: when the window is that you can get Congress to 1124 01:04:36,680 --> 01:04:39,600 Speaker 1: buy into it. It's and if you do that, I 1125 01:04:39,640 --> 01:04:42,200 Speaker 1: think you can get a career type solution in some 1126 01:04:42,280 --> 01:04:44,760 Speaker 1: of these conflicts is that one of the things where 1127 01:04:44,760 --> 01:04:47,480 Speaker 1: it would be a trade off, like UM, some of 1128 01:04:47,480 --> 01:04:49,680 Speaker 1: the troops caps that we've had in Syria and then 1129 01:04:49,720 --> 01:04:52,120 Speaker 1: in the past we had in like Hunduras and places 1130 01:04:52,160 --> 01:04:55,040 Speaker 1: like that, where it's like you can deploy a hundred 1131 01:04:55,040 --> 01:04:58,040 Speaker 1: troops or five hundred troops or whatever, and that's the 1132 01:04:58,080 --> 01:05:00,720 Speaker 1: tradeoff you make with Congress. It could take a variety 1133 01:05:00,720 --> 01:05:03,280 Speaker 1: of different forms UM. I think with the point. The 1134 01:05:03,320 --> 01:05:06,240 Speaker 1: point is you want at some point Congress to buy 1135 01:05:06,320 --> 01:05:09,800 Speaker 1: into the idea that we we have a long term 1136 01:05:09,800 --> 01:05:13,000 Speaker 1: commitment to this government UM and to this and to 1137 01:05:13,040 --> 01:05:16,400 Speaker 1: its survival, and it's important to American national security interest, 1138 01:05:17,040 --> 01:05:18,800 Speaker 1: and you have to do that while people still care 1139 01:05:18,880 --> 01:05:21,760 Speaker 1: enough about the conflict, while you have enough political support 1140 01:05:21,760 --> 01:05:24,960 Speaker 1: as president to do that, while we're anti war. Opposition 1141 01:05:25,080 --> 01:05:29,160 Speaker 1: is not firmly against that, or isn't strong enough to 1142 01:05:29,160 --> 01:05:30,960 Speaker 1: stop you from doing that. There are a number of 1143 01:05:31,000 --> 01:05:35,560 Speaker 1: combinations here, um, but presidents recognizing a window of opportunity 1144 01:05:35,680 --> 01:05:38,840 Speaker 1: is an important part of their leadership skill. Andy, this 1145 01:05:38,880 --> 01:05:42,200 Speaker 1: has been an awesome conversation, So glad you can come 1146 01:05:42,200 --> 01:05:45,800 Speaker 1: in today because that we interview a lot of veterans, 1147 01:05:45,800 --> 01:05:48,240 Speaker 1: a lot of people with military expertise, but we typically 1148 01:05:48,240 --> 01:05:51,320 Speaker 1: talk more on the tactical level. And UM, I think 1149 01:05:51,320 --> 01:05:53,720 Speaker 1: it's rare that we get into this sort of high 1150 01:05:53,840 --> 01:05:58,480 Speaker 1: level strategic thought that goes in into the decisions that 1151 01:05:58,520 --> 01:06:01,400 Speaker 1: are made to get us into war and get us out. 1152 01:06:01,760 --> 01:06:06,840 Speaker 1: Their expression of amateurs talk tactics, professional talks, professionals talk logistics, 1153 01:06:07,400 --> 01:06:11,120 Speaker 1: and academics talk politics. The problem is that they don't 1154 01:06:11,160 --> 01:06:14,560 Speaker 1: understand each other. That's always the problem. Yeah, that and 1155 01:06:14,760 --> 01:06:18,640 Speaker 1: that that that can be And UM, one of the 1156 01:06:18,640 --> 01:06:21,160 Speaker 1: things I'm proud of about the book is that, um, 1157 01:06:21,240 --> 01:06:23,960 Speaker 1: the people who read it and reviewed it have not 1158 01:06:23,960 --> 01:06:27,720 Speaker 1: not found flaws with the military analysis that's in the book. 1159 01:06:27,920 --> 01:06:32,560 Speaker 1: I mean, I take very seriously the need to be 1160 01:06:32,640 --> 01:06:35,120 Speaker 1: accurate in all of what I say. Um and I've 1161 01:06:35,120 --> 01:06:38,280 Speaker 1: certainly read a lot of books by academics who get 1162 01:06:38,320 --> 01:06:42,000 Speaker 1: the tactics part wrong, so I paid attention to that too. Yeah, 1163 01:06:42,160 --> 01:06:46,360 Speaker 1: when war is all about details. The website is Andrew 1164 01:06:46,480 --> 01:06:49,480 Speaker 1: Polski dot com. The book, once again, although it's not 1165 01:06:49,520 --> 01:06:52,360 Speaker 1: a new book, but hopefully our audience picks it up, 1166 01:06:52,440 --> 01:06:56,400 Speaker 1: is Elusive Victories the American Presidency at War, covering everything 1167 01:06:56,560 --> 01:06:59,720 Speaker 1: from the early presidencies all the way up to George W. Bush. 1168 01:07:00,200 --> 01:07:03,280 Speaker 1: And I should ask you as well. In the nineties 1169 01:07:03,320 --> 01:07:05,800 Speaker 1: you authored a book called The Rise of the Therapeutic State. 1170 01:07:05,800 --> 01:07:07,320 Speaker 1: If people want to check that out, you want to 1171 01:07:07,320 --> 01:07:10,880 Speaker 1: give us a brief synopsis. It's not it's an academic book. 1172 01:07:10,920 --> 01:07:13,479 Speaker 1: It's not written for a general audience. This I won't 1173 01:07:13,520 --> 01:07:16,120 Speaker 1: say this book is an easy or quick read, but 1174 01:07:16,240 --> 01:07:19,080 Speaker 1: by comparison with that one, this one is the one 1175 01:07:19,120 --> 01:07:21,400 Speaker 1: I would direct people to. What what is the Rise 1176 01:07:21,400 --> 01:07:25,280 Speaker 1: of the Therapeutic State. It's about social welfare programs and 1177 01:07:25,760 --> 01:07:28,960 Speaker 1: about the intrusiveness of social welfare programs and how they 1178 01:07:29,080 --> 01:07:31,480 Speaker 1: developed over time. Interesting how do you how do you 1179 01:07:31,480 --> 01:07:34,520 Speaker 1: like being a professor? Though at Hunter UM I liked 1180 01:07:34,560 --> 01:07:37,040 Speaker 1: it very much at the moment I moved over into 1181 01:07:37,080 --> 01:07:40,920 Speaker 1: academic administration. But this book wouldn't I don't know that 1182 01:07:40,960 --> 01:07:43,520 Speaker 1: this book would exist. The Elusive Victories might not have 1183 01:07:43,600 --> 01:07:46,200 Speaker 1: been written if it weren't for my students at Hunter College. 1184 01:07:46,680 --> 01:07:49,920 Speaker 1: UM in the students at Hunter College asking questions, well, 1185 01:07:49,920 --> 01:07:53,160 Speaker 1: if they they started after the war began in Iraq, 1186 01:07:53,440 --> 01:07:56,280 Speaker 1: we had to teach in at Hunter and the students 1187 01:07:56,400 --> 01:07:59,200 Speaker 1: organized it and asked faculty and political science to talk 1188 01:07:59,240 --> 01:08:02,240 Speaker 1: about senance at war, we'll talk about what we'll talk 1189 01:08:02,280 --> 01:08:06,040 Speaker 1: about the war. I talked about wartime presidential powers there, 1190 01:08:06,760 --> 01:08:09,640 Speaker 1: and then I began to include it in courses that 1191 01:08:09,680 --> 01:08:12,920 Speaker 1: I taught, and I taught even specifically courses on wartime 1192 01:08:12,960 --> 01:08:15,880 Speaker 1: presidential leadership. I had students, some of whom I name 1193 01:08:15,960 --> 01:08:18,080 Speaker 1: in the book and my acknowledgements, who worked with me 1194 01:08:18,160 --> 01:08:23,080 Speaker 1: on research UM so their curiosity about it inspired me 1195 01:08:23,200 --> 01:08:27,759 Speaker 1: to get deeply into this subject UM as an outgrowth 1196 01:08:27,800 --> 01:08:30,519 Speaker 1: of earlier work that I had done on the presidency UM. 1197 01:08:30,560 --> 01:08:34,479 Speaker 1: I think Hunter College is an amazing public university with 1198 01:08:34,520 --> 01:08:36,840 Speaker 1: a remarkable set of students and I'm proud to have 1199 01:08:36,880 --> 01:08:40,920 Speaker 1: spent my career there associated with them. Excellent. Well, this 1200 01:08:40,920 --> 01:08:42,760 Speaker 1: this has been great. As Jack said, it kind of 1201 01:08:42,800 --> 01:08:45,400 Speaker 1: switches it up from what we normally do, which we 1202 01:08:45,400 --> 01:08:48,440 Speaker 1: we enjoy doing now and again it's kind of conversation 1203 01:08:48,520 --> 01:08:51,519 Speaker 1: I think is important to understand many of the other 1204 01:08:51,600 --> 01:08:54,479 Speaker 1: podcasts we've done with you know, we did one with 1205 01:08:54,840 --> 01:08:58,200 Speaker 1: Mike Lampy the other day, who was um one of 1206 01:08:58,240 --> 01:09:01,559 Speaker 1: the really the fathers of or four special operations, and 1207 01:09:01,600 --> 01:09:03,120 Speaker 1: he was one of the guys on the ground at 1208 01:09:03,160 --> 01:09:07,759 Speaker 1: Desert one in Iran. In we start to understand those 1209 01:09:07,800 --> 01:09:09,880 Speaker 1: things and how they happen and why they happened. I 1210 01:09:09,880 --> 01:09:12,320 Speaker 1: mean that was the Carter administration. Did you look at 1211 01:09:12,479 --> 01:09:15,479 Speaker 1: Operation Eagle Claw at all? No? No, But I will 1212 01:09:15,479 --> 01:09:18,760 Speaker 1: say also another factor that entered into my writing the 1213 01:09:18,800 --> 01:09:21,479 Speaker 1: book was that my son, as I mentioned before we 1214 01:09:21,479 --> 01:09:23,920 Speaker 1: went out of my son was going into the military. 1215 01:09:24,439 --> 01:09:27,920 Speaker 1: UM did r OTC going into the army, into the infantry. 1216 01:09:28,560 --> 01:09:33,960 Speaker 1: About the time I was writing the book and talking 1217 01:09:34,000 --> 01:09:37,880 Speaker 1: to him, talking to other r OTC cadets, his friends, 1218 01:09:38,520 --> 01:09:43,160 Speaker 1: UM I got I became more interested, more aware of 1219 01:09:43,200 --> 01:09:45,920 Speaker 1: the seriousness of what they were prepared to do with 1220 01:09:45,960 --> 01:09:50,400 Speaker 1: their lives and more mindful even then of the heavy 1221 01:09:50,439 --> 01:09:55,479 Speaker 1: burden that a president should feel before committing troops to 1222 01:09:55,560 --> 01:09:59,680 Speaker 1: the war. UM. At one point, right about the time 1223 01:09:59,720 --> 01:10:03,719 Speaker 1: the book was published, I also was invited um by 1224 01:10:05,080 --> 01:10:07,720 Speaker 1: Colonel Ike Wilson to come up to West Point and 1225 01:10:07,760 --> 01:10:11,920 Speaker 1: talk to them two cadets there about it um and 1226 01:10:12,479 --> 01:10:14,679 Speaker 1: at and at another time when I was talking about 1227 01:10:14,720 --> 01:10:17,479 Speaker 1: the book, I was. I gave lectures based on the 1228 01:10:17,479 --> 01:10:20,920 Speaker 1: book a couple of times in Vietnam. Yeah, and uh 1229 01:10:21,920 --> 01:10:24,880 Speaker 1: talking about the talking about the American War as they 1230 01:10:24,880 --> 01:10:29,599 Speaker 1: called talking about the American War UM on the Mekong 1231 01:10:29,760 --> 01:10:32,720 Speaker 1: River or at the U. S Consulate and Hochi Minh 1232 01:10:32,760 --> 01:10:37,160 Speaker 1: City is a very different experience from talking about the 1233 01:10:37,160 --> 01:10:40,640 Speaker 1: war here in the United States. And interestingly I was 1234 01:10:40,680 --> 01:10:43,240 Speaker 1: told there when I met some of the people in 1235 01:10:43,240 --> 01:10:47,479 Speaker 1: intellectuals and ho Chi Minh City when I was there 1236 01:10:49,040 --> 01:10:52,519 Speaker 1: the the American War. Courses on the American War are 1237 01:10:52,560 --> 01:10:56,360 Speaker 1: not taught by history departments in Vietnam, taught by political department. 1238 01:10:56,400 --> 01:10:59,840 Speaker 1: They are taught by the Department of Marxism Leninism. So 1239 01:11:00,200 --> 01:11:05,040 Speaker 1: it apparently is is still considered too sensitive a subject 1240 01:11:05,680 --> 01:11:11,120 Speaker 1: um to trust to history alone. Wow, very interesting as 1241 01:11:11,160 --> 01:11:15,200 Speaker 1: scar as we leave. Yeah, well, wrapping things up here. 1242 01:11:15,720 --> 01:11:17,559 Speaker 1: As I always let you guys know, we have some 1243 01:11:17,720 --> 01:11:20,599 Speaker 1: very interesting stuff going on here in Hurricane Group. Um, 1244 01:11:20,720 --> 01:11:23,280 Speaker 1: if you go to Hurricane dot Media you can see 1245 01:11:23,280 --> 01:11:25,519 Speaker 1: all of it. I'm gonna tell you some things on 1246 01:11:25,520 --> 01:11:27,840 Speaker 1: the horizon right now, though, be sure to check out 1247 01:11:27,880 --> 01:11:30,840 Speaker 1: Create Club. We have different tiers of membership depending on 1248 01:11:30,880 --> 01:11:33,080 Speaker 1: how prepared you want to be, and gift options are 1249 01:11:33,120 --> 01:11:36,360 Speaker 1: available as well. The guys involved in Create Club are 1250 01:11:36,400 --> 01:11:39,760 Speaker 1: doing an awesome job with putting together great gear, a 1251 01:11:39,760 --> 01:11:44,240 Speaker 1: lot of custom products made for us, everything from sunglass 1252 01:11:44,280 --> 01:11:47,240 Speaker 1: cases to eat E C bags and other manly products. 1253 01:11:47,560 --> 01:11:50,000 Speaker 1: It's a club fore men, buy men. You can check 1254 01:11:50,000 --> 01:11:52,400 Speaker 1: that all out of Create Club dot Us. Once again, 1255 01:11:52,439 --> 01:11:56,240 Speaker 1: that's Great Club dot Us. Also, as a reminder for 1256 01:11:56,240 --> 01:11:58,640 Speaker 1: those listening, now is the time to sign up for 1257 01:11:58,640 --> 01:12:02,400 Speaker 1: the spec Ops Channel. That's our channel that offers the 1258 01:12:02,439 --> 01:12:07,560 Speaker 1: most exclusive shows, documentaries and interviews covering the most exciting 1259 01:12:07,600 --> 01:12:11,400 Speaker 1: military content today. The spec Ops channel premier show Training 1260 01:12:11,400 --> 01:12:16,080 Speaker 1: Cell follows former Special Operations Forces as they participate in 1261 01:12:16,120 --> 01:12:19,599 Speaker 1: the most advanced training in the country, everything from shooting schools, 1262 01:12:19,840 --> 01:12:24,240 Speaker 1: defensive driving, jungle and winter warfare, climbing, and a whole 1263 01:12:24,240 --> 01:12:26,599 Speaker 1: lot more. Again, you can watch all of this content 1264 01:12:27,000 --> 01:12:30,360 Speaker 1: by subscribing to the spec Ops channel at spec ops 1265 01:12:30,439 --> 01:12:33,439 Speaker 1: channel dot com and take advantage of a membership today 1266 01:12:33,479 --> 01:12:36,280 Speaker 1: for only four ninety nine a month. That's spec ops 1267 01:12:36,360 --> 01:12:40,200 Speaker 1: channel dot com. Sign up today. Last thing I'm gonna 1268 01:12:40,280 --> 01:12:42,760 Speaker 1: let you guys know about that we're really pushing very hard. 1269 01:12:42,840 --> 01:12:47,280 Speaker 1: Here is the news Rep Financial Report. This is exclusive 1270 01:12:47,400 --> 01:12:50,439 Speaker 1: information that you can act on today to secure a 1271 01:12:50,520 --> 01:12:53,880 Speaker 1: brighter future for tomorrow. The news Rep Financial Report can 1272 01:12:53,920 --> 01:12:57,960 Speaker 1: help you discover new investment strategies in the defense sector. 1273 01:12:58,160 --> 01:13:01,400 Speaker 1: Defense industry stocks can be a lucrative investment if you 1274 01:13:01,439 --> 01:13:04,560 Speaker 1: buy at the right time. Our team of foreign policy, 1275 01:13:04,680 --> 01:13:09,560 Speaker 1: security and military experts provide real time intelligence for stocks 1276 01:13:09,600 --> 01:13:12,760 Speaker 1: based on global trends that affects financial markets in the 1277 01:13:12,880 --> 01:13:17,160 Speaker 1: national defense industry. By subscribing now, you'll get exclusive access 1278 01:13:17,200 --> 01:13:21,240 Speaker 1: to our industry expertise, the news Rep Financial Newsletter Advantage, 1279 01:13:21,280 --> 01:13:25,680 Speaker 1: which is our team that offers unmatched defense industry familiarity 1280 01:13:25,720 --> 01:13:30,680 Speaker 1: and expertise, unbiased knowledge of geopolitical trends. Full access to 1281 01:13:30,760 --> 01:13:35,679 Speaker 1: news Reps Foreign Policy, security and financial intelligence platform, access 1282 01:13:35,720 --> 01:13:38,640 Speaker 1: to our team of experts and analysts. Just go to 1283 01:13:38,680 --> 01:13:40,519 Speaker 1: the finn Rep tab that's right at the top of 1284 01:13:40,560 --> 01:13:42,439 Speaker 1: the news rep dot com. Go to the news rep 1285 01:13:42,479 --> 01:13:45,599 Speaker 1: dot com, click on the fin Rep tab at the top. 1286 01:13:46,120 --> 01:13:48,760 Speaker 1: If you're a member, you actually don't have access to this. 1287 01:13:48,800 --> 01:13:51,400 Speaker 1: So this is a separate thing that we're doing and 1288 01:13:51,840 --> 01:13:53,960 Speaker 1: people are loving it. So it's right there on the 1289 01:13:54,000 --> 01:13:56,759 Speaker 1: news rep dot com the fin Rep tab at the top. 1290 01:13:57,200 --> 01:14:00,400 Speaker 1: Sign up for that as well. And uh aaking of 1291 01:14:00,520 --> 01:14:03,519 Speaker 1: like switching things up. Next episode, we're gonna have a 1292 01:14:03,520 --> 01:14:07,000 Speaker 1: guy on that is from a really interesting background, really, 1293 01:14:07,280 --> 01:14:10,280 Speaker 1: you know, outside of the media world. Although he self 1294 01:14:10,280 --> 01:14:14,360 Speaker 1: published this book and that's Captain Edward Black, who wrote 1295 01:14:14,400 --> 01:14:16,880 Speaker 1: True Stories of a small town Cop. We know we 1296 01:14:16,880 --> 01:14:19,040 Speaker 1: have a lot of people in the law enforcement community 1297 01:14:19,040 --> 01:14:21,720 Speaker 1: who listen, and uh, I think it's good to get 1298 01:14:21,720 --> 01:14:25,160 Speaker 1: that perspective sometimes I and and maybe you make some 1299 01:14:25,240 --> 01:14:27,479 Speaker 1: statements out of ignorance of you know, we don't have 1300 01:14:27,479 --> 01:14:31,519 Speaker 1: that background. So I'm fascinated by that because the big 1301 01:14:31,560 --> 01:14:36,120 Speaker 1: town cops, uh, they're covered quite well by big town newspapers, 1302 01:14:36,479 --> 01:14:40,240 Speaker 1: but rural America is it's like a black hole a 1303 01:14:40,240 --> 01:14:42,400 Speaker 1: lot of times as far as the media is concerned, 1304 01:14:42,479 --> 01:14:46,000 Speaker 1: so I'm I'm excited to hear what he has to say. Yeah, 1305 01:14:46,080 --> 01:14:48,120 Speaker 1: And and then on the horizon we have some other 1306 01:14:48,160 --> 01:14:50,960 Speaker 1: great guests. Mike Schlitz is gonna come back on with us. 1307 01:14:50,960 --> 01:14:52,960 Speaker 1: It's it's been a very long time since we've had 1308 01:14:53,040 --> 01:14:56,679 Speaker 1: Mike on. UM. Before I leave for Florida, i'd i'd 1309 01:14:56,680 --> 01:14:59,560 Speaker 1: actually like to do possibly a show of just Q 1310 01:14:59,760 --> 01:15:01,680 Speaker 1: and an A. Uh So, if you guys want to 1311 01:15:01,680 --> 01:15:04,559 Speaker 1: send some emails to soft Rep dot radio at soft 1312 01:15:04,600 --> 01:15:07,080 Speaker 1: rep dot com. I'll try to get to all those. 1313 01:15:07,320 --> 01:15:10,560 Speaker 1: Maybe do that show. It's just an idea I have. Um, 1314 01:15:10,600 --> 01:15:13,080 Speaker 1: I've gotten a lot of recent emails though that are 1315 01:15:13,320 --> 01:15:16,960 Speaker 1: extremely long. Keep it, keep it concise to like one 1316 01:15:17,040 --> 01:15:19,560 Speaker 1: or two questions. This guy sent me like nine questions. 1317 01:15:19,800 --> 01:15:21,240 Speaker 1: I'm not gonna get to that. So yeah, if it 1318 01:15:21,680 --> 01:15:24,920 Speaker 1: if it's uh sorry, yeah, and uh Andy is laughing 1319 01:15:24,960 --> 01:15:27,040 Speaker 1: at that, but yeah, if it's just you know, concise, 1320 01:15:27,200 --> 01:15:28,920 Speaker 1: we like to answer that stuff. So send it to 1321 01:15:28,960 --> 01:15:31,760 Speaker 1: soft Rep dot Radio at soft rep dot com. And 1322 01:15:31,800 --> 01:15:34,840 Speaker 1: then before we did this interview, I was in here 1323 01:15:34,880 --> 01:15:37,479 Speaker 1: early and I interviewed Kristen Beck, who has been on 1324 01:15:37,520 --> 01:15:40,479 Speaker 1: the show plenty of times, but who I've never met. 1325 01:15:40,880 --> 01:15:43,000 Speaker 1: We talked about a whole lot of stuff. We went 1326 01:15:43,200 --> 01:15:46,799 Speaker 1: ninety minutes and I'm gonna have that for when I leave. 1327 01:15:47,439 --> 01:15:49,479 Speaker 1: Uh So it's not the best st of so be 1328 01:15:49,600 --> 01:15:53,240 Speaker 1: prepared to hear that one. In March, Kristen Beck and 1329 01:15:53,320 --> 01:15:55,479 Speaker 1: myself we went over a whole lot of things because 1330 01:15:55,520 --> 01:15:58,479 Speaker 1: Christen happened to be in New York and was here 1331 01:15:58,479 --> 01:16:03,320 Speaker 1: with her dog Lily, and people outside we're loving seeing 1332 01:16:03,640 --> 01:16:06,479 Speaker 1: you know, big service dog gear. But we got into 1333 01:16:06,479 --> 01:16:09,960 Speaker 1: some we we talked about drones, we talked about women 1334 01:16:10,000 --> 01:16:14,240 Speaker 1: in combat, um and and just Christian's career with several 1335 01:16:14,439 --> 01:16:17,400 Speaker 1: you know, seal teams and records that that Kristen broke. 1336 01:16:17,760 --> 01:16:21,800 Speaker 1: Sorry I missed that one, I dare you. Yeah, I've 1337 01:16:21,800 --> 01:16:25,200 Speaker 1: asked people about about her in the past times in 1338 01:16:25,240 --> 01:16:27,920 Speaker 1: the in the seal teams, and everyone's like, no, when 1339 01:16:28,080 --> 01:16:32,640 Speaker 1: back when she was he uh good seal good. Well, 1340 01:16:32,680 --> 01:16:36,439 Speaker 1: if you listen to this episode, you know, it gets 1341 01:16:36,439 --> 01:16:38,960 Speaker 1: into records that she broke on the shooting range and 1342 01:16:39,000 --> 01:16:42,000 Speaker 1: things like that, and you know it's pretty cool. Um 1343 01:16:42,040 --> 01:16:44,360 Speaker 1: so maybe you'll want to listen back to that one. 1344 01:16:44,800 --> 01:16:48,000 Speaker 1: But it was, um it was interesting to finally meet 1345 01:16:48,040 --> 01:16:52,840 Speaker 1: the person in person. Um, once again, it's uh, Andrew 1346 01:16:52,960 --> 01:16:57,080 Speaker 1: Polsky dot com. Check out Elusive Victories, anything else that 1347 01:16:57,280 --> 01:16:59,320 Speaker 1: you want to get to before we wrap this up. 1348 01:16:59,680 --> 01:17:02,519 Speaker 1: It probably doesn't serve my interest to say this, but um, 1349 01:17:02,560 --> 01:17:06,439 Speaker 1: there are a lot of used copies available on Amazon 1350 01:17:07,240 --> 01:17:09,439 Speaker 1: for very for a very low price. As author, I 1351 01:17:09,479 --> 01:17:11,880 Speaker 1: don't get any royalties but as author right now, but 1352 01:17:11,960 --> 01:17:13,800 Speaker 1: I'd really like to have as people read the book. 1353 01:17:14,320 --> 01:17:16,920 Speaker 1: I mean, that's that's pretty cool. That means you really 1354 01:17:16,920 --> 01:17:20,040 Speaker 1: stand behind you know the importance of what you're writing. Yeah, 1355 01:17:20,520 --> 01:17:22,800 Speaker 1: any uh, I think I asked this before it came in, 1356 01:17:22,840 --> 01:17:26,759 Speaker 1: But any further books on the horizon on the distance horizon, 1357 01:17:26,840 --> 01:17:29,040 Speaker 1: But we'll have to wait. Okay, maybe we'll have you 1358 01:17:29,080 --> 01:17:31,800 Speaker 1: back in if it's in our wheelhouse. I thought this 1359 01:17:31,840 --> 01:17:34,400 Speaker 1: is a great one. Thanks, thanks for coming in. We 1360 01:17:34,439 --> 01:17:38,080 Speaker 1: will love having people in studio and hopefully this audience 1361 01:17:38,160 --> 01:17:40,839 Speaker 1: enjoys it because, like we said, it's it's something very different, 1362 01:17:41,280 --> 01:17:44,960 Speaker 1: but as you said, ties into other episodes that we've done. Yeah. 1363 01:17:45,080 --> 01:17:48,000 Speaker 1: If you want to understand why the decisions were made 1364 01:17:48,000 --> 01:17:51,160 Speaker 1: to launch military operations that we talk about every day, 1365 01:17:51,200 --> 01:17:53,719 Speaker 1: I think you have to read about the strategic thought 1366 01:17:53,720 --> 01:17:57,800 Speaker 1: that goes into it. Well. Seven cool. Thank you, Thank 1367 01:17:57,840 --> 01:18:03,200 Speaker 1: you so much. Been listening to self Rep Radio. New 1368 01:18:03,240 --> 01:18:07,240 Speaker 1: episodes up every Wednesday and Friday. Follow the show on 1369 01:18:07,320 --> 01:18:10,200 Speaker 1: Instagram and Twitter at self Rep Radio