WEBVTT - Tech News: Musk's Twitter Deal On Hold

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.

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<v Speaker 1>Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host

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<v Speaker 1>Jonathan Strickland and how the tech are you. It's time

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<v Speaker 1>for the tech news for Tuesday, May two thousand twenty two,

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<v Speaker 1>and it's also time for an update to the Elon

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<v Speaker 1>Musk slash Twitter saga. When last we checked in, I

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<v Speaker 1>mentioned that the U S Securities and Exchange Commission was

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<v Speaker 1>investigating Musk for allegedly filing his intent to purchase Twitter

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<v Speaker 1>at least ten days too late, which in turn had

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<v Speaker 1>a potentially massive impact on other investors. But since then,

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of other stuff has happened. Namely, last Friday,

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<v Speaker 1>Elon Musk tweeted that the deal to purchase Twitter was

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<v Speaker 1>on hold, at least temporarily, because Twitter reported that it

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<v Speaker 1>estimated fewer than five pc of Twitter accounts are bought accounts,

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<v Speaker 1>i e. Fake accounts that are driven by automated processes.

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<v Speaker 1>Now must wasn't terribly clear at first about what the

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<v Speaker 1>actual problem was. Presumably the problem was that he didn't

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<v Speaker 1>believe Twitter and felt that the real number is much higher.

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<v Speaker 1>But here's the thing. He had already put in the

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<v Speaker 1>offer of buying the company at forty four billion dollars

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<v Speaker 1>and repeatedly was boasting about one of the main things

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<v Speaker 1>he wanted to do was purge twitter body accounts and

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<v Speaker 1>institute a verification system to make certain that every account

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<v Speaker 1>belongs to an actual human being. So naturally this led

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<v Speaker 1>people like me saying, well, if part of your reasoning

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<v Speaker 1>to purchase Twitter is to get rid of the bots

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<v Speaker 1>on it, why does this particular estimate upset you? And

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<v Speaker 1>that really comes down to money. I guess my assumption

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<v Speaker 1>is that Elon Musk's argument is that Twitter is misrepresenting

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<v Speaker 1>how many accounts on the platform are bots, and they

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<v Speaker 1>did that when filing with the SEC, and that this,

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<v Speaker 1>in turn has inflated Twitter's stock price. It it amounts

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<v Speaker 1>to fraud, either intentionally or otherwise. And it also means

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<v Speaker 1>that Twitter is overvalued, and that Elon Musk's initial offer

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<v Speaker 1>was based off Twitter's stock price, which has subsequently slipped

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<v Speaker 1>quite a bit, largely due to Musk kind of waffling

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<v Speaker 1>about the deal. Now I can see how that can

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<v Speaker 1>be a legit argument, except you would think that anyone

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<v Speaker 1>willing to pop down forty four billion dollars to buy

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<v Speaker 1>a company would already have done, you know, some pretty

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<v Speaker 1>thorough investigations to determine if the value represented by the

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<v Speaker 1>stock price actually reflected the real worth of the company,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, before you make the offer anyway. Musk also

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<v Speaker 1>in a reply to someone, mentioned that Twitter's supposed methodology

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<v Speaker 1>for determining how many bots are on the platform is

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<v Speaker 1>to take a random sample of just one accounts and

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<v Speaker 1>then investigate to see how many of those one hundred

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<v Speaker 1>are bought accounts and then extrapolate that. Um that, if true,

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<v Speaker 1>is is I mean to call it, to call it

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<v Speaker 1>too small a sample size is an understatement, like that's

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<v Speaker 1>that's nothing. You're talking about a platform that boasts a

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<v Speaker 1>couple of hundred million accounts on it. Just to take

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<v Speaker 1>one hundred and then trying to extrapolate anything from one

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<v Speaker 1>hundred random accounts, that's nothing. So if that is true,

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<v Speaker 1>that is a laughable approach to making those kinds of estimates.

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<v Speaker 1>But then Musk said that Twitter accused him of of

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<v Speaker 1>breaking a non disclosure agreement or in d a about

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<v Speaker 1>all this, and at a tech conference in Florida, Musk

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<v Speaker 1>said that the real percentage of body accounts is likely

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<v Speaker 1>twenty or higher, possibly as high as n though I

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<v Speaker 1>think that is ludicrously high and really doubted. I don't

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<v Speaker 1>think only of the accounts on Twitter are real people.

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<v Speaker 1>Um I think some of those real people are real jerks,

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<v Speaker 1>but they're still people. Musk then said that this deal

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<v Speaker 1>will not move forward unless Twitter can prove that less

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<v Speaker 1>than five percent of the accounts on the platform are

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<v Speaker 1>in fact bots or fake or spam or whatever. Musk

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<v Speaker 1>also said that if he could arrive at a lower

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<v Speaker 1>deal for Twitter, a purchase might not be out of

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<v Speaker 1>the question. Now I should add there is a ton

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<v Speaker 1>of speculation online that Musk is also scrambling because maybe

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<v Speaker 1>the funding he secured to purchase Twitter is no longer

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<v Speaker 1>sufficient to cover that already four billion dollar price tag,

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<v Speaker 1>so some of the funding depends on Musk's shares in

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<v Speaker 1>Tesla as uh as collateral, at least according to some reports.

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<v Speaker 1>But Tesla stock prices have also dropped significantly by around

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<v Speaker 1>thirty percent, because you know, they've been dropping ever since

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<v Speaker 1>this deal to buy Twitter was first announced, and Tesla

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<v Speaker 1>shareholders have been worrying that they might be saddled with

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<v Speaker 1>footing the bill for Musk's desire to own Twitter, which

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<v Speaker 1>has nothing to do with their their interest in Tesla

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<v Speaker 1>as a company. Well, if that is in fact true,

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<v Speaker 1>if you know things that he has as collateral has

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<v Speaker 1>have dipped in value by like thirty that could mean

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<v Speaker 1>that he might need to secure some additional funding sources

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<v Speaker 1>to cover the forty four billion dollars. Now, yes, Ellen

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<v Speaker 1>Musk is a multibillionaire. In fact, he's the richest person

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<v Speaker 1>in the world. He has an estimated wealth of around

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<v Speaker 1>two nineteen bill in dollars. But we have to remember

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<v Speaker 1>the vast majority of that wealth isn't liquid. It's wrapped

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<v Speaker 1>up in stuff like his stock in Tesla or in cryptocurrency,

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<v Speaker 1>and if Musk were to sell off assets for the

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<v Speaker 1>sake of liquidity, it would affect the value of those assets,

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<v Speaker 1>which means that he would get less for them than

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<v Speaker 1>what they are currently worth, which really just nails down

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<v Speaker 1>how insane wealth is, and that most rich people really

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<v Speaker 1>just leverage their assets to get hold of cash when

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<v Speaker 1>they need it rather than sell stuff off. Because if

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<v Speaker 1>you sell off a lot of it, well, it becomes

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<v Speaker 1>like supply and demand. Right. If you're flooding the market

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<v Speaker 1>with supply because you're offloading your massive shares in something,

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<v Speaker 1>the demand goes down and the price goes down, so

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<v Speaker 1>you get less than what you would have gotten if

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<v Speaker 1>you didn't sell it off. It's it's like this weird

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<v Speaker 1>catch twenty two, right. Anyway, My point is that even

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<v Speaker 1>though Musk is the wealthiest person in the world, he

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<v Speaker 1>does not have forty four billion dollars in cash just

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<v Speaker 1>laying around, so he had to secure additional funding, some

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<v Speaker 1>of which has depreciated in value since the time of

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<v Speaker 1>the announcement. So some people assume that Musk is really

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<v Speaker 1>looking for a way to back out of the deal

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<v Speaker 1>that will save face, or alternatively find a way to

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<v Speaker 1>renegotiate the deal so that he can purchase Twitter at

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<v Speaker 1>a much lower price. Uh. I think that that's something

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<v Speaker 1>Twitter's board might resist, and certainly Twitter's shareholders would probably

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<v Speaker 1>be less interested in it. You know, if they're being

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<v Speaker 1>told they're gonna get bought out at fifty four dollars

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<v Speaker 1>a share and then they're told no, I'm sorry, it's

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<v Speaker 1>gonna be closer to you know, forty dollars a share,

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<v Speaker 1>that's a big step down, right, And I'm just using

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<v Speaker 1>those as hypothetical figures, right, But the point being that

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<v Speaker 1>shareholders are probably not going to be as thrilled at

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<v Speaker 1>thought of getting a smaller payout, so it could put

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<v Speaker 1>the deal at risk. Now, if Musk does back out

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<v Speaker 1>of the deal on his terms, it will cost him

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<v Speaker 1>a cool billion dollars to do it, because that was

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<v Speaker 1>part of the negotiation, was that if either party called

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<v Speaker 1>off the deal, then it would come at a cost

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<v Speaker 1>of a billion dollars. Now, could it be that Musk

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<v Speaker 1>will ultimately spend a billion dollars to not buy Twitter? Meanwhile,

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<v Speaker 1>Twitter CEO Parague Agal dismissed Musk's objection, saying that he

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<v Speaker 1>would discuss the issue of spam accounts quote with the

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<v Speaker 1>benefit of data, facts and context end quote. So the

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<v Speaker 1>story is not over yet. A security consultant named Sultan

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<v Speaker 1>CoStim Khan created a hack that exploits the keyless operation

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<v Speaker 1>mode for certain automobiles, such as Tesla's, which is why

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<v Speaker 1>I'm mentioning this story right after the Elon Musk story. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>according to con his method works on other types of

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<v Speaker 1>vehicles too, but he specifically demonstrated it on Tesla vehicles

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<v Speaker 1>that it works on things like the models and the

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<v Speaker 1>model why his hack would allow him to not only

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<v Speaker 1>unlock a vehicle's doors, but also start the electric motor

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<v Speaker 1>and drive off in the car. So, in other words,

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<v Speaker 1>you could totally steal a Tesla using this technology. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>to pull it off requires a couple of pieces of hardware.

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<v Speaker 1>One piece is essentially a Bluetooth sniffer device, So this

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<v Speaker 1>is something that can detect Bluetooth signals that are being

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<v Speaker 1>broadcast from a source. Now, Bluetooth signals have a relatively

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<v Speaker 1>short range, so that means you would have to get

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<v Speaker 1>this sniffer device fairly close to your target with then

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<v Speaker 1>about fifteen feet or so, and you know, whether that

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<v Speaker 1>that target is a smartphone that has a specific app

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<v Speaker 1>that interacts with the Tesla or other vehicle, or it's

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<v Speaker 1>a keyless fob or whatever it might be, and it

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<v Speaker 1>then will sniff the signal that's being sent from that

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<v Speaker 1>device that would normally go to the vehicle. The sniffer

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<v Speaker 1>device would then relay that signal to a laptop that

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<v Speaker 1>is presumably close to the target vehicle, because again Bluetooth

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<v Speaker 1>doesn't have a very long range, So then con could

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<v Speaker 1>use the laptop that was coming in you know, that

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<v Speaker 1>was detecting the signal from the sniffer to broadcast a

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<v Speaker 1>similar signal to the car and unlock it and turn

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<v Speaker 1>on the electric motor. So this method is not super

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<v Speaker 1>easy to pull off. It does require some hardware and

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<v Speaker 1>some maneuvering in order to get it to work, but

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<v Speaker 1>the point is it is possible and there's no defense

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<v Speaker 1>against it. Con says that he contacted Tesla and other

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<v Speaker 1>companies and made them aware of this vulnerability, but fixing

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<v Speaker 1>this particular problem would require a fairly substantial overhaul of

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<v Speaker 1>the keyless entry system as well as the hardware it

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<v Speaker 1>runs on. And further more, the risk of someone actually

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<v Speaker 1>developing and then using this hack is fairly low, so

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<v Speaker 1>there do not appear to be any plans to address

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<v Speaker 1>this issue because the likelihood of it becoming a thing

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<v Speaker 1>out in the wild is fairly limited. Cohn also revealed

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<v Speaker 1>that other cars that use the quick set smart locks

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<v Speaker 1>are vulnerable to this kind of attack, but that drivers

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<v Speaker 1>who use their iPhones to access their vehicles have some

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<v Speaker 1>additional security measures that they can take advantage of. For one,

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<v Speaker 1>they can enable two factor authentication, which in general you

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<v Speaker 1>should pretty much always do for any system that offers it,

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<v Speaker 1>and also the iPhone compatible locks have a time out

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<v Speaker 1>that makes them harder to hack. The Android version locks

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<v Speaker 1>lack these security factors, though quick Set lands on an

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<v Speaker 1>upgrade later this year that will likely address that. We

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<v Speaker 1>have lots more stories to cover, including some more hacking

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<v Speaker 1>stories as well as a lot of other stuff. But

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<v Speaker 1>before we get to any of that, let's take a

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<v Speaker 1>quick break. We're back. Cal Newport posted in his blog

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<v Speaker 1>a really interesting piece about a scientific study titled taking

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<v Speaker 1>a one week break from Social Media Improves well being,

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<v Speaker 1>depression and anxiety. Well, the title of the paper pretty

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<v Speaker 1>much tells you what you need to know. The researchers

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<v Speaker 1>took on volunteers. They randomly divided those volunteers into two groups.

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<v Speaker 1>One group was the control group. They were given no instructions,

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<v Speaker 1>They just went about living their normal lives. The experiment

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<v Speaker 1>group was told to take a week long break from

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<v Speaker 1>social media, including popular platforms like Instagram, Facebook, TikTok, and Twitter.

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<v Speaker 1>After a week, the researchers found that the experiment group

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<v Speaker 1>reported they experienced less anxiety and depression, and they felt

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<v Speaker 1>an improved sense of well being. The improvements were significant

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<v Speaker 1>even when adjusting for variables like age and gender, so

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<v Speaker 1>it didn't just disappear once you started to factor those

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<v Speaker 1>variables into it. Newport points out, we should always look

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<v Speaker 1>at these kinds of scientific studies with some skepticism, largely

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<v Speaker 1>because methodologies can get a bit fuzzy, especially when we're

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<v Speaker 1>talking about things like mental health. There are so many

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<v Speaker 1>variables that impact our mental health that it can be

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<v Speaker 1>pretty much impossible to narrow in on one or two

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<v Speaker 1>variables and then eliminate all the rest. Right, Still, the

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<v Speaker 1>study seems to support earlier hypotheses that a dependence on

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<v Speaker 1>social media tends to bring with it an increased sense

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<v Speaker 1>of depression and anxiety. Anecdotally, I have cut way back

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<v Speaker 1>on my social network presence, having deactivated my Facebook account.

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<v Speaker 1>I don't go to Instagram, I don't have TikTok anymore,

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<v Speaker 1>and I only use Twitter for this show. I don't

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<v Speaker 1>I don't access my personal Twitter feed anymore. Are now

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<v Speaker 1>I can't say that I have had a massive improvement

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<v Speaker 1>in my mental health, but I do feel that I'm

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<v Speaker 1>not getting worse, which wasn't necessarily the case when I

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<v Speaker 1>was still on everything. But again, that's anecdotal evidence, which

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<v Speaker 1>really that's not evidence at all. We all know that, right,

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<v Speaker 1>Anecdotal evidence is not actual evidence. And goodness knows, I

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<v Speaker 1>would much rather feel like I was a totally new,

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<v Speaker 1>well adjusted person. I'm just not there yet. Still, if

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<v Speaker 1>you do find yourself feeling overwhelmed, it might be worth

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<v Speaker 1>considering taking a weak vacation from social media. It could help. Now,

0:14:37.640 --> 0:14:40.320
<v Speaker 1>I'm pretty sure. I talked about this next story in

0:14:40.360 --> 0:14:43.440
<v Speaker 1>an earlier episode that Apple has rolled out changes that

0:14:43.480 --> 0:14:47.960
<v Speaker 1>allow app developers to alter subscription prices and charge users

0:14:48.040 --> 0:14:54.320
<v Speaker 1>more money automatically, as long as certain conditions are met. Previously,

0:14:54.840 --> 0:14:58.840
<v Speaker 1>developers were required to send a notification to users alerting

0:14:58.880 --> 0:15:02.440
<v Speaker 1>them of an upcome main price hike for their services,

0:15:02.480 --> 0:15:05.960
<v Speaker 1>and the user would then have the option to opt

0:15:06.080 --> 0:15:09.160
<v Speaker 1>in to paying the higher price, or they could discontinue

0:15:09.200 --> 0:15:12.560
<v Speaker 1>their subscription. But Apple said that this method had the

0:15:12.640 --> 0:15:17.080
<v Speaker 1>unintended consequence of leading to interruptions and service because users

0:15:17.080 --> 0:15:21.960
<v Speaker 1>were missing or ignoring notifications so they didn't take the

0:15:22.000 --> 0:15:25.239
<v Speaker 1>action to opt in, and their service would get discontinued

0:15:25.280 --> 0:15:28.200
<v Speaker 1>once their subscription was over and the price hike had

0:15:28.200 --> 0:15:32.000
<v Speaker 1>taken effect, and it would cause some friction. So now

0:15:32.040 --> 0:15:34.960
<v Speaker 1>the policy has changed, developers still have to send out

0:15:34.960 --> 0:15:38.000
<v Speaker 1>a message to users alerting them ahead of time. If

0:15:38.000 --> 0:15:41.760
<v Speaker 1>they're going to change the price, but the price change

0:15:41.800 --> 0:15:45.240
<v Speaker 1>gets applied automatically and there's no opt in required, so

0:15:45.400 --> 0:15:50.160
<v Speaker 1>if the user doesn't actively deactivate their account, they get

0:15:50.240 --> 0:15:54.240
<v Speaker 1>charged more So, if you miss or ignore a message,

0:15:54.760 --> 0:15:57.520
<v Speaker 1>then you might discover when you're looking at your bank

0:15:57.560 --> 0:16:01.520
<v Speaker 1>statement that what used to cost X per month now

0:16:01.600 --> 0:16:05.880
<v Speaker 1>costs X plus something else per month. Apple does have

0:16:05.920 --> 0:16:08.440
<v Speaker 1>a few other requirements the developers have to meet in

0:16:08.560 --> 0:16:11.960
<v Speaker 1>order to qualify for this feature. Uh, the developers cannot

0:16:12.000 --> 0:16:15.880
<v Speaker 1>hike a price more than once per year. Any increase

0:16:15.960 --> 0:16:19.720
<v Speaker 1>that they give to any subscription cannot exceed five dollars

0:16:19.880 --> 0:16:24.520
<v Speaker 1>or fifty of the current subscription price for monthly subscriptions,

0:16:24.560 --> 0:16:28.080
<v Speaker 1>and if it's an annual subscription service, the max hike

0:16:28.320 --> 0:16:32.120
<v Speaker 1>is fifty dollars or fifty of the subscription price. The

0:16:32.240 --> 0:16:36.760
<v Speaker 1>increase also cannot break any local laws. Now, if developers

0:16:36.840 --> 0:16:39.880
<v Speaker 1>failed to meet some of those qualifications, they can still

0:16:39.960 --> 0:16:43.360
<v Speaker 1>increase their subscription prices, but they will have to adhere

0:16:43.400 --> 0:16:47.040
<v Speaker 1>to the old process of giving you know, users the

0:16:47.120 --> 0:16:51.680
<v Speaker 1>opportunity to opt in, or otherwise their service will be discontinued.

0:16:52.480 --> 0:16:55.920
<v Speaker 1>Darren Allen of tech Radar has an article titled bad

0:16:56.000 --> 0:16:59.080
<v Speaker 1>news and video. A m D S new GPUs are

0:16:59.080 --> 0:17:02.320
<v Speaker 1>in good stock and priced strictly at m s r

0:17:02.400 --> 0:17:06.120
<v Speaker 1>p UM. In case you're not familiar with the term

0:17:06.240 --> 0:17:10.560
<v Speaker 1>m s r P, that stands for manufacturers suggested retail price.

0:17:11.000 --> 0:17:14.080
<v Speaker 1>In other words, it's how much the company what makes

0:17:14.160 --> 0:17:18.600
<v Speaker 1>the thing tells stores how much they should charge to

0:17:18.680 --> 0:17:22.160
<v Speaker 1>sell that thing. It's their suggested retail price. Stores aren't

0:17:22.160 --> 0:17:25.440
<v Speaker 1>obligated to sell things at m s r P, but

0:17:25.840 --> 0:17:29.520
<v Speaker 1>it is what the manufacturers are suggesting. And obviously if

0:17:29.520 --> 0:17:32.760
<v Speaker 1>stores charge weight more than that and other stores charged

0:17:32.800 --> 0:17:37.040
<v Speaker 1>closer to m s RP, that creates competition in the market. YadA, YadA, YadA. Well,

0:17:37.040 --> 0:17:40.840
<v Speaker 1>when it comes to GPUs or graphics processing units, we've

0:17:40.840 --> 0:17:44.680
<v Speaker 1>had a long run of graphics cards being incredibly difficult

0:17:44.720 --> 0:17:49.399
<v Speaker 1>to find and grossly overpriced above m s r P.

0:17:50.560 --> 0:17:54.000
<v Speaker 1>One really big reason for that was that crypto minors

0:17:54.119 --> 0:17:57.800
<v Speaker 1>for currencies like ethereum, we're scooping up all the available

0:17:57.800 --> 0:18:01.760
<v Speaker 1>GPUs before they could hit consumer mark markets and plugging

0:18:01.800 --> 0:18:05.800
<v Speaker 1>them into mining machines, or they were buying GPUs at

0:18:05.880 --> 0:18:09.639
<v Speaker 1>way above market price and then putting them into mining

0:18:09.680 --> 0:18:13.520
<v Speaker 1>machines UM. And this gave a few enterprising folks the

0:18:13.600 --> 0:18:16.560
<v Speaker 1>chance to buy up cards very quickly and then hike

0:18:16.640 --> 0:18:20.120
<v Speaker 1>the price up to obscene levels before offering them up

0:18:20.119 --> 0:18:26.240
<v Speaker 1>on after market platforms like eBay. Uh. Then the you know,

0:18:26.480 --> 0:18:29.600
<v Speaker 1>you got to take into account the semiconductor chip shortage

0:18:29.640 --> 0:18:33.480
<v Speaker 1>that we're currently in, and there are all the factors

0:18:33.480 --> 0:18:36.199
<v Speaker 1>you really need right. You have limited supply, you have

0:18:36.320 --> 0:18:40.520
<v Speaker 1>high demand that fuels crazy high prices. Well, Alan Over

0:18:40.560 --> 0:18:42.440
<v Speaker 1>at tech Radar has pointed out that a m D

0:18:43.000 --> 0:18:46.399
<v Speaker 1>has several GPUs that appear to be in stock on

0:18:46.480 --> 0:18:50.119
<v Speaker 1>sites like new Egg, and more importantly, that these in

0:18:50.280 --> 0:18:52.919
<v Speaker 1>stock cards are pretty much priced where they should be.

0:18:53.440 --> 0:18:56.320
<v Speaker 1>Prices have been coming down a little bit recently, in

0:18:56.400 --> 0:19:00.359
<v Speaker 1>large part because the value of cryptocurrency has plummeted in

0:19:00.440 --> 0:19:05.680
<v Speaker 1>recent weeks. Obviously, if it costs more money to run

0:19:05.840 --> 0:19:11.240
<v Speaker 1>mining operations, then you get out of successfully mining cryptocurrency.

0:19:11.640 --> 0:19:14.359
<v Speaker 1>You stop doing it, right, because otherwise you're operating at

0:19:14.359 --> 0:19:17.520
<v Speaker 1>a net loss. You want to make profits. So if

0:19:17.600 --> 0:19:19.679
<v Speaker 1>it costs you more to do the thing, then you

0:19:19.720 --> 0:19:22.639
<v Speaker 1>get out of the thing, you stop doing it. That

0:19:22.720 --> 0:19:25.760
<v Speaker 1>also means we don't quite see the same rush to

0:19:25.840 --> 0:19:29.200
<v Speaker 1>snap up all available GPUs. Now, don't get me wrong,

0:19:29.240 --> 0:19:31.719
<v Speaker 1>there is still a rush, it's just not quite as

0:19:31.800 --> 0:19:34.360
<v Speaker 1>vicious as it used to be, and I suspect we'll

0:19:34.359 --> 0:19:38.520
<v Speaker 1>see GPU availability and pricing improve, assuming there's not a

0:19:38.600 --> 0:19:43.320
<v Speaker 1>huge surge in the crypto market specifically with Ethereum. Also,

0:19:43.359 --> 0:19:45.879
<v Speaker 1>we have to remember Ethereum is currently running its proof

0:19:45.960 --> 0:19:50.840
<v Speaker 1>of steak blockchain in parallel with its proof of work blockchain,

0:19:51.240 --> 0:19:54.080
<v Speaker 1>and proof of steak is not going to require all

0:19:54.080 --> 0:19:58.679
<v Speaker 1>that computational effort to verify transactions the way that proof

0:19:58.720 --> 0:20:02.639
<v Speaker 1>of work a pro which is do so once Ethereum

0:20:02.680 --> 0:20:06.199
<v Speaker 1>actually transitions to proof of steak, because right now the

0:20:06.280 --> 0:20:09.280
<v Speaker 1>actual transactions are still happening on proof of work blockchain.

0:20:09.720 --> 0:20:13.760
<v Speaker 1>But once things merge and Ethereum has transitioned over to

0:20:13.800 --> 0:20:17.000
<v Speaker 1>proof of steak, the demand for all those GPUs will

0:20:17.080 --> 0:20:20.359
<v Speaker 1>drop again. I mean, other cryptocurrencies will still use proof

0:20:20.359 --> 0:20:26.160
<v Speaker 1>of work, but they typically are valued much lower than Ethereum,

0:20:26.160 --> 0:20:29.239
<v Speaker 1>which in turn is valued much lower than bitcoing. So

0:20:29.320 --> 0:20:32.280
<v Speaker 1>it could mean that you know, the people who end

0:20:32.359 --> 0:20:35.680
<v Speaker 1>up seeking out and acquiring those cards end up being

0:20:35.720 --> 0:20:38.479
<v Speaker 1>you know, gamers who want to run their PCs so

0:20:38.520 --> 0:20:41.359
<v Speaker 1>that they can be able to to run the latest

0:20:41.400 --> 0:20:45.520
<v Speaker 1>titles at the highest settings. Wouldn't that be nice? Earlier

0:20:45.560 --> 0:20:49.160
<v Speaker 1>this year, I did an episode about the company San Sui,

0:20:49.480 --> 0:20:53.159
<v Speaker 1>once famous for producing high end audio equipment, and that

0:20:53.200 --> 0:20:56.160
<v Speaker 1>company is now really no more than a brand name,

0:20:56.760 --> 0:20:59.639
<v Speaker 1>something that's happened to a lot of companies over the years.

0:21:00.200 --> 0:21:02.240
<v Speaker 1>And we have another company that we can kind of

0:21:02.280 --> 0:21:04.760
<v Speaker 1>add to that list, and this one is on Kyo,

0:21:04.920 --> 0:21:08.840
<v Speaker 1>oh in k y O. Unlike san Sui, on Kyo's

0:21:08.880 --> 0:21:12.760
<v Speaker 1>target market was more in the mid range for audio

0:21:12.800 --> 0:21:16.520
<v Speaker 1>equipment and video equipment. The company produced a v equipment

0:21:16.520 --> 0:21:19.280
<v Speaker 1>that was a little more modest than the brands that

0:21:19.280 --> 0:21:23.159
<v Speaker 1>were targeting, you know, the the wealthy audio file crowd.

0:21:23.560 --> 0:21:26.800
<v Speaker 1>But on Kyo hit on hard times. It got delisted

0:21:26.840 --> 0:21:30.080
<v Speaker 1>from the Stock Exchange last year, and now the company,

0:21:30.160 --> 0:21:35.920
<v Speaker 1>which was originally founded way back in has gone bankrupt. However,

0:21:36.920 --> 0:21:42.040
<v Speaker 1>last year, Sharp and the American Premium Audio Company formed

0:21:42.040 --> 0:21:47.000
<v Speaker 1>a partnership and purchased the Onkyo Home Entertainment division. So

0:21:47.520 --> 0:21:50.879
<v Speaker 1>while on Kyo, the company that created that division is

0:21:50.920 --> 0:21:55.200
<v Speaker 1>no more, the assets, the brand, the technology, and all

0:21:55.240 --> 0:21:58.919
<v Speaker 1>the stuff that the company actually made now belongs to

0:21:59.000 --> 0:22:02.200
<v Speaker 1>other companies that are actually in a much better position.

0:22:03.160 --> 0:22:05.640
<v Speaker 1>So essentially it means we should still expect to see

0:22:05.640 --> 0:22:08.840
<v Speaker 1>on Kyo products on the market. It's just that the

0:22:08.880 --> 0:22:12.480
<v Speaker 1>company that started it all is no more. I might

0:22:12.520 --> 0:22:14.480
<v Speaker 1>have to do a full episode about this in the future.

0:22:14.960 --> 0:22:17.480
<v Speaker 1>In fact, leave me a talk back message on the

0:22:17.480 --> 0:22:20.040
<v Speaker 1>I Heart radio app if you agree. If you don't

0:22:20.040 --> 0:22:22.240
<v Speaker 1>know what that is. On the I Heart Radio app,

0:22:22.600 --> 0:22:25.200
<v Speaker 1>you will see a little microphone icon on the tech

0:22:25.280 --> 0:22:28.200
<v Speaker 1>stuff page, either on the page itself or on the

0:22:28.240 --> 0:22:31.000
<v Speaker 1>actual entry for this episode, and if you tap that,

0:22:31.440 --> 0:22:34.000
<v Speaker 1>you can leave a voice message up to thirty seconds

0:22:34.040 --> 0:22:37.159
<v Speaker 1>long and let me know what you think. All right,

0:22:37.200 --> 0:22:39.680
<v Speaker 1>We've got some more stories to get through before we

0:22:40.160 --> 0:22:51.360
<v Speaker 1>wrap up this episode, but first let's take another quick break. Well,

0:22:51.440 --> 0:22:54.480
<v Speaker 1>the power grid in the United States state of Texas

0:22:54.920 --> 0:22:58.320
<v Speaker 1>is back in the news again. So last year, during

0:22:58.359 --> 0:23:02.359
<v Speaker 1>a particularly harsh into storm, thousands of people in the

0:23:02.400 --> 0:23:05.880
<v Speaker 1>state of Texas experienced power outages and it really put

0:23:05.880 --> 0:23:11.080
<v Speaker 1>a spotlight on that state's unique situation. See. Unlike most

0:23:11.119 --> 0:23:12.920
<v Speaker 1>of the other states in the US, which have power

0:23:12.960 --> 0:23:16.000
<v Speaker 1>grids that interconnect with one another, Texas decided to go

0:23:16.200 --> 0:23:19.320
<v Speaker 1>in house with its power grid. And you might wonder

0:23:19.359 --> 0:23:24.679
<v Speaker 1>why well, Being interconnected means being partly dependent upon and

0:23:24.760 --> 0:23:28.119
<v Speaker 1>partly accountable to other parties, and gosh dang it, that

0:23:28.200 --> 0:23:31.960
<v Speaker 1>just ain't a Texan thing to do. More seriously, being

0:23:32.040 --> 0:23:34.960
<v Speaker 1>part of the interconnected system would bring texas As power

0:23:35.000 --> 0:23:38.840
<v Speaker 1>grid within the jurisdiction of federal regulations, and that darn

0:23:38.920 --> 0:23:42.240
<v Speaker 1>sure anna Texan thing to do. The state has always

0:23:42.240 --> 0:23:46.200
<v Speaker 1>been fiercely independent, even when it meant that citizens were

0:23:46.240 --> 0:23:49.320
<v Speaker 1>bound to suffer as a consequence. There's also a lot

0:23:49.359 --> 0:23:52.720
<v Speaker 1>of allegations that the various politicians who have maintained a

0:23:52.800 --> 0:23:57.280
<v Speaker 1>status quo have done so at considerable personal benefit, meaning

0:23:57.600 --> 0:24:00.760
<v Speaker 1>there's a lot of alleged greasing of politic coal wheels

0:24:00.840 --> 0:24:04.120
<v Speaker 1>going on here if you believe the accusations. But let's

0:24:04.119 --> 0:24:08.320
<v Speaker 1>talk about the impact on the average person. Back in

0:24:09.840 --> 0:24:13.639
<v Speaker 1>around folks lost their lives because they didn't have power

0:24:13.880 --> 0:24:18.520
<v Speaker 1>during this incredible winter storm, and now the Texas power

0:24:18.520 --> 0:24:21.840
<v Speaker 1>grid is struggling with electricity demands as the state experiences

0:24:22.160 --> 0:24:25.880
<v Speaker 1>high temperatures, not an unusual thing in Texas. Uh. It's

0:24:25.880 --> 0:24:29.000
<v Speaker 1>pretty hard to live in Texas without air conditioning, or

0:24:29.040 --> 0:24:31.800
<v Speaker 1>at least without a lot of fans. And it's definitely

0:24:31.920 --> 0:24:34.479
<v Speaker 1>dangerous to do it. So a lot of folks are

0:24:34.520 --> 0:24:37.480
<v Speaker 1>running their air conditioning when the weather gets hot, and

0:24:37.520 --> 0:24:41.240
<v Speaker 1>it's already really hot. Some parts of the state hit

0:24:41.320 --> 0:24:45.000
<v Speaker 1>a hundred five degrees fahrenheit or forty point six degrees

0:24:45.000 --> 0:24:50.560
<v Speaker 1>celsius yesterday. But this over taxes the state's power grid,

0:24:50.680 --> 0:24:53.720
<v Speaker 1>which is incapable of tapping into the rest of the

0:24:53.840 --> 0:24:56.760
<v Speaker 1>United States as systems which would allow it to help

0:24:56.840 --> 0:25:00.200
<v Speaker 1>shoulder the load. It can't do that because it's an

0:25:00.200 --> 0:25:04.199
<v Speaker 1>independent little island, and as a result, power stations have

0:25:04.320 --> 0:25:07.600
<v Speaker 1>had outages recently, and the state has urged citizens to

0:25:08.000 --> 0:25:11.439
<v Speaker 1>limit their power usage, asking people to set their thermostats

0:25:11.480 --> 0:25:14.160
<v Speaker 1>to seventy eight degrees fahrenheit and for those of y'all

0:25:14.160 --> 0:25:17.000
<v Speaker 1>who use the more civilized celsius, that's about twenty five

0:25:17.040 --> 0:25:20.600
<v Speaker 1>point six degrees celsius. They also have been asked not

0:25:20.640 --> 0:25:23.399
<v Speaker 1>to run any big appliances during the peak hours of

0:25:23.480 --> 0:25:26.560
<v Speaker 1>three PM to eight pm. And that's from our coat,

0:25:26.600 --> 0:25:32.160
<v Speaker 1>the ironically named Electric Reliability Council of Texas. It seems

0:25:32.160 --> 0:25:34.520
<v Speaker 1>to me like that reliability part of the name should

0:25:34.520 --> 0:25:37.560
<v Speaker 1>really be revisited. All right, let's get back to hacking

0:25:37.880 --> 0:25:42.160
<v Speaker 1>and exploiting hardware. Ours Technica reports that hackers have discovered

0:25:42.320 --> 0:25:45.520
<v Speaker 1>how to install malware on an iPhone that can run

0:25:45.640 --> 0:25:48.320
<v Speaker 1>even if the phone itself is powered off. And you

0:25:48.400 --> 0:25:51.000
<v Speaker 1>might think, well, how is that possible, Well, it's because

0:25:51.000 --> 0:25:54.920
<v Speaker 1>when you turn your iPhone off, it's not really totally

0:25:54.920 --> 0:25:57.520
<v Speaker 1>powered down. There are certain functions that the phone needs

0:25:57.560 --> 0:26:00.919
<v Speaker 1>to be able to do even if the phone itself

0:26:00.920 --> 0:26:04.800
<v Speaker 1>has been turned off for normal operation. So there are

0:26:04.800 --> 0:26:07.720
<v Speaker 1>certain features that run in a low power mode and

0:26:07.760 --> 0:26:10.479
<v Speaker 1>they just sip as little juice as they can in

0:26:10.560 --> 0:26:13.800
<v Speaker 1>order to continue to function even with the phone turned off,

0:26:14.160 --> 0:26:17.359
<v Speaker 1>and the hackers figured out how to exploit this mode

0:26:17.640 --> 0:26:20.840
<v Speaker 1>so that malware could run on a device that's even

0:26:20.880 --> 0:26:25.480
<v Speaker 1>been powered down. The key is Bluetooth, just like with

0:26:25.560 --> 0:26:30.200
<v Speaker 1>our our keyless entry conversation. Bluetooth was a big part

0:26:30.200 --> 0:26:33.120
<v Speaker 1>of that as well. The Bluetooth chip and an iPhone

0:26:33.200 --> 0:26:37.640
<v Speaker 1>lacks any digital signature methodology or encryption on its firmware,

0:26:38.040 --> 0:26:41.320
<v Speaker 1>which gave the hackers, which I keep saying hackers, they

0:26:41.320 --> 0:26:45.000
<v Speaker 1>were security researchers at the University of Darmstadt in this case,

0:26:45.359 --> 0:26:48.639
<v Speaker 1>gave them the opportunity to develop malware that could do

0:26:48.720 --> 0:26:52.000
<v Speaker 1>stuff like track the phone's physical location even when it's

0:26:52.040 --> 0:26:55.240
<v Speaker 1>turned off. That's one of the low power processes that

0:26:55.359 --> 0:26:57.840
<v Speaker 1>retain support even when a phone has powered down. It's

0:26:57.880 --> 0:27:01.640
<v Speaker 1>the find my feature, right, So if you had turned

0:27:01.680 --> 0:27:04.480
<v Speaker 1>your phone off and you left it somewhere, you want

0:27:04.520 --> 0:27:07.920
<v Speaker 1>that find my feature to work. Well. This is an

0:27:07.960 --> 0:27:11.600
<v Speaker 1>exploit of that. And considering that state backed companies like

0:27:11.640 --> 0:27:15.600
<v Speaker 1>the NSO group have previously targeted iOS devices to convert

0:27:15.680 --> 0:27:20.480
<v Speaker 1>those devices into surveillance tools, this new development is pretty concerning.

0:27:20.520 --> 0:27:23.560
<v Speaker 1>I mean, imagine being able to exploit a target device

0:27:23.920 --> 0:27:27.280
<v Speaker 1>and turn it into at least a partial surveillance tool,

0:27:27.359 --> 0:27:29.760
<v Speaker 1>even if it had been turned off. Even if the

0:27:29.760 --> 0:27:33.080
<v Speaker 1>owner thinks they're being savvy by turning their phone off

0:27:33.320 --> 0:27:36.680
<v Speaker 1>as they traveled to some sensitive location, they could potentially

0:27:36.680 --> 0:27:39.440
<v Speaker 1>be tracked by someone running malware and using a process

0:27:39.520 --> 0:27:44.639
<v Speaker 1>similar to the find my iPhone, which is not good now.

0:27:45.560 --> 0:27:48.720
<v Speaker 1>Security researchers and hackers in our last story, they're working

0:27:48.720 --> 0:27:51.720
<v Speaker 1>to improve security, but obviously there are other hackers who

0:27:51.760 --> 0:27:55.560
<v Speaker 1>have more extreme agendas, such is the case with CONTI,

0:27:55.920 --> 0:27:59.640
<v Speaker 1>a gang of Russian speaking hackers who not long ago

0:27:59.800 --> 0:28:02.639
<v Speaker 1>in full traded computer systems belonging to the government of

0:28:02.680 --> 0:28:06.439
<v Speaker 1>Costa Rica and then locked down those computer systems in

0:28:06.480 --> 0:28:11.080
<v Speaker 1>a ransomware attack. They recently have demanded a ransom of

0:28:11.080 --> 0:28:15.880
<v Speaker 1>of twenty million dollars UH. They increase that in fact

0:28:15.880 --> 0:28:19.080
<v Speaker 1>to twenty million, possibly because Costa Rica just installed a

0:28:19.160 --> 0:28:23.879
<v Speaker 1>new president, Roderigo Chavez, and then that president held a

0:28:23.920 --> 0:28:27.320
<v Speaker 1>press conference and hypothesized that the attack involved people inside

0:28:27.359 --> 0:28:32.199
<v Speaker 1>Costa Rica cooperating with the presumably Russian hacker group. And

0:28:32.520 --> 0:28:35.240
<v Speaker 1>that's something that the hackers themselves have said is true.

0:28:35.280 --> 0:28:38.280
<v Speaker 1>They claim that there are insiders in the government who

0:28:38.320 --> 0:28:41.240
<v Speaker 1>are working with them in order to compromise the systems.

0:28:41.440 --> 0:28:44.400
<v Speaker 1>The hackers have been implying that their goal is to

0:28:44.440 --> 0:28:47.920
<v Speaker 1>overthrow the government, but most researchers say that's likely just

0:28:48.040 --> 0:28:52.240
<v Speaker 1>posturing and that really all they want is cash, cash, money.

0:28:52.360 --> 0:28:55.280
<v Speaker 1>And I do talk a lot about hackers on tech stuff,

0:28:55.440 --> 0:28:58.080
<v Speaker 1>but one thing I frequently don't have information on is

0:28:58.200 --> 0:29:01.960
<v Speaker 1>who is actually developing the malware that's being used out

0:29:02.000 --> 0:29:05.240
<v Speaker 1>there in the real world. Some hacker groups rely on

0:29:05.320 --> 0:29:08.080
<v Speaker 1>tools that are made by people from outside the group itself.

0:29:08.360 --> 0:29:12.480
<v Speaker 1>They're deploying tools that were developed somewhere else. In fact,

0:29:12.560 --> 0:29:16.440
<v Speaker 1>there are plenty of hackers who do that exclusively, and

0:29:16.480 --> 0:29:19.080
<v Speaker 1>in hacking communities, they at least they used to be

0:29:19.120 --> 0:29:23.120
<v Speaker 1>referred to as script kiddies, people who, you know, we're

0:29:23.160 --> 0:29:26.520
<v Speaker 1>taking the programming code that someone else made and just

0:29:26.680 --> 0:29:29.280
<v Speaker 1>using it. But they don't develop code themselves. They don't

0:29:29.280 --> 0:29:34.160
<v Speaker 1>even necessarily understand how to code well anyway. The U

0:29:34.320 --> 0:29:37.640
<v Speaker 1>S Department of Justice claims it has identified someone responsible

0:29:37.680 --> 0:29:41.800
<v Speaker 1>for developing two different malware suites that have been used

0:29:41.840 --> 0:29:46.160
<v Speaker 1>in ransomware attacks. That person is a cardiologist living in

0:29:46.280 --> 0:29:50.760
<v Speaker 1>Venezuela named Boises louise A Gala Gonzalez. Now, according to

0:29:50.840 --> 0:29:54.600
<v Speaker 1>the d J, Zagala is the developer responsible for malware

0:29:54.640 --> 0:29:59.480
<v Speaker 1>called Jigsaw and another one called Thanos. Now. Apparently, one

0:29:59.480 --> 0:30:02.640
<v Speaker 1>of the zagala As relatives tipped off authorities that this

0:30:02.760 --> 0:30:07.000
<v Speaker 1>doctor was moonlighting as a sort of cyber warfare arms dealer,

0:30:07.360 --> 0:30:11.280
<v Speaker 1>supplying hacker groups with tools and providing technical support and

0:30:11.320 --> 0:30:16.160
<v Speaker 1>getting relatively modest payouts in the process. But Zagala was

0:30:16.240 --> 0:30:19.360
<v Speaker 1>using this relative to kind of funnel the money through

0:30:19.480 --> 0:30:21.760
<v Speaker 1>and not go directly back to him. And then the

0:30:21.840 --> 0:30:25.960
<v Speaker 1>relative got investigated as part of this overall investigation into

0:30:26.000 --> 0:30:29.960
<v Speaker 1>the hack and tipped the authorities off to Zagala. One

0:30:30.000 --> 0:30:33.080
<v Speaker 1>of the groups that Zagala was allegedly helping was a

0:30:33.120 --> 0:30:37.800
<v Speaker 1>state backed Iranian hacking group that targeted Israeli companies. So

0:30:37.920 --> 0:30:41.080
<v Speaker 1>Zagala is now charged with two counts of attempted computer

0:30:41.160 --> 0:30:45.440
<v Speaker 1>intrusions and conspiracy to commit computer intrusions. He has not

0:30:46.200 --> 0:30:49.440
<v Speaker 1>been arrested. He's charged with this by the United States,

0:30:49.480 --> 0:30:52.200
<v Speaker 1>but he's living in Venezuela and has not been arrested. Now,

0:30:52.240 --> 0:30:56.880
<v Speaker 1>should he be arrested and should he be uh extradited

0:30:57.000 --> 0:30:59.760
<v Speaker 1>and stand trial for those charges? He could face five

0:30:59.840 --> 0:31:02.920
<v Speaker 1>years in prison for each of the charges. It seems

0:31:02.920 --> 0:31:06.600
<v Speaker 1>that Zegala is a self taught hacker as well. And

0:31:06.720 --> 0:31:08.120
<v Speaker 1>it's really going to be a heck of a thing

0:31:08.160 --> 0:31:11.480
<v Speaker 1>for a cardiologist to devote spare time towards learning how

0:31:11.520 --> 0:31:15.440
<v Speaker 1>to code and then creating malware, particularly when you consider

0:31:15.520 --> 0:31:20.400
<v Speaker 1>that medical facilities are frequently the prime target for ransomware attacks.

0:31:21.240 --> 0:31:24.840
<v Speaker 1>Kind of disturbing. Finally, have you ever asked yourself how

0:31:24.880 --> 0:31:29.040
<v Speaker 1>many times are companies sharing my personal data with one another? Like?

0:31:29.160 --> 0:31:33.120
<v Speaker 1>How many times are the various entities out there, like

0:31:33.320 --> 0:31:37.480
<v Speaker 1>say a data broker, making transactions where your personal information

0:31:37.560 --> 0:31:40.120
<v Speaker 1>is part of the deal. Well, if you live in

0:31:40.160 --> 0:31:44.600
<v Speaker 1>the EU, the answer is probably around six times a

0:31:44.720 --> 0:31:48.280
<v Speaker 1>day on average. So that's how many times companies are

0:31:48.320 --> 0:31:52.880
<v Speaker 1>sharing your personal information with stuff like you know, advertising companies.

0:31:53.400 --> 0:31:56.840
<v Speaker 1>But you know, y'all in the EU can rest easy.

0:31:57.280 --> 0:31:58.840
<v Speaker 1>Those of us in the good old U s of a.

0:31:59.440 --> 0:32:04.080
<v Speaker 1>It's a walking seven hundred forty seven times per day

0:32:04.120 --> 0:32:07.280
<v Speaker 1>on average. This is according to the Irish Council for

0:32:07.360 --> 0:32:11.000
<v Speaker 1>Civil Liberties or i c c L. That keep in mind,

0:32:11.520 --> 0:32:16.160
<v Speaker 1>these companies aren't singling you out personally. Your data gets

0:32:16.240 --> 0:32:19.120
<v Speaker 1>lumped in with the data from millions of other people.

0:32:19.600 --> 0:32:21.600
<v Speaker 1>And one way this works is that when you visit

0:32:21.600 --> 0:32:25.120
<v Speaker 1>a web page, your browser exchanges information with that page.

0:32:25.240 --> 0:32:28.080
<v Speaker 1>The page bundles that information up with all the data

0:32:28.080 --> 0:32:30.040
<v Speaker 1>from folks who also went to that page at that

0:32:30.160 --> 0:32:33.560
<v Speaker 1>same time, and this becomes a block of info that

0:32:33.600 --> 0:32:36.920
<v Speaker 1>then gets auctioned off at a market and the winning

0:32:36.960 --> 0:32:41.040
<v Speaker 1>bidder gets the privilege of serving their ad to you.

0:32:41.360 --> 0:32:44.160
<v Speaker 1>This whole process takes less than a second to happen.

0:32:44.240 --> 0:32:47.760
<v Speaker 1>That's just the little delay that happens before an ad

0:32:47.880 --> 0:32:51.720
<v Speaker 1>loads in onto your page, and it's happening all the time.

0:32:52.160 --> 0:32:55.480
<v Speaker 1>The process is called real time Bidding or r t B.

0:32:56.360 --> 0:32:58.280
<v Speaker 1>You can read the full report on the I c

0:32:58.520 --> 0:33:02.160
<v Speaker 1>c L website. The report is titled the Biggest Data

0:33:02.240 --> 0:33:05.200
<v Speaker 1>Breach and it really pulls back the curtain on the

0:33:05.280 --> 0:33:09.120
<v Speaker 1>data trading industry. This is something that more governments around

0:33:09.160 --> 0:33:12.680
<v Speaker 1>the world are starting to look into and consider regulating,

0:33:12.960 --> 0:33:15.920
<v Speaker 1>so it's possible that this rampant exchange of people's personal

0:33:15.960 --> 0:33:19.479
<v Speaker 1>information will eventually get reined in. And that's it for

0:33:19.520 --> 0:33:22.880
<v Speaker 1>the Tech News for May seventeen, two thousand twenty two.

0:33:23.440 --> 0:33:25.240
<v Speaker 1>As a reminder, if you want to reach out to

0:33:25.320 --> 0:33:27.240
<v Speaker 1>tech Stuff, there are a couple of ways to do it.

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<v Speaker 1>One way is to use the I Heart radio app.

0:33:30.160 --> 0:33:32.960
<v Speaker 1>Navigate to the tech Stuff page and use that little

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0:33:36.720 --> 0:33:42.000
<v Speaker 1>to thirty seconds to make suggestions for topics, comment on episodes.

0:33:42.640 --> 0:33:44.680
<v Speaker 1>If you go into a specific episode and you leave

0:33:44.680 --> 0:33:47.280
<v Speaker 1>a talk back there, it will be tagged with that episode,

0:33:47.320 --> 0:33:49.560
<v Speaker 1>so I'll know that that's the episode you're referring to.

0:33:50.280 --> 0:33:52.800
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0:33:53.240 --> 0:33:55.360
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<v Speaker 1>me on Twitter. The handle for the show is text

0:33:58.000 --> 0:34:02.360
<v Speaker 1>Stuff H sw I'll talk to you again really soon.

0:34:03.160 --> 0:34:10.239
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