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Speaker 1: First Contact with Lori Siegel is a production of Dot

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Speaker 1: Dot Dot Media and iHeartRadio. I guess I come back

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Speaker 1: to this line. Maybe it's a little dramatic, but it's

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Speaker 1: like AI to kill or not to kill? Right? Like

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Speaker 1: this idea that you guys could be building out autonomous

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Speaker 1: systems that can make the decision to kill? Will you

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Speaker 1: do that?

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Speaker 2: It's very, very hard to predict the future, but to

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Speaker 2: the extent that the tech is deployed as the last

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Speaker 2: resort and it ensures that human flourishing can continue in

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Speaker 2: a more abundant way.

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Speaker 1: Absolutely, to kill or not to kill? Should artificial intelligence

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Speaker 1: have the power to make that decision? And if it does,

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Speaker 1: will be liable if or when it all goes wrong?

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Speaker 1: Tech is creating a new arms race. Will the United

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Speaker 1: States be able to keep up with the likes of Russia?

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Speaker 1: And and what ethical lines will we draw or cross

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Speaker 1: to maintain our national defenses When it comes to our

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Speaker 1: future the ethics of war and technology are murky. Now,

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Speaker 1: with that in mind, I want to take you to

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Speaker 1: Orange County. Picture a handful of entrepreneurs, some of them

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Speaker 1: are controversial, sitting around a table. They've created a power

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Speaker 1: point outlining some radical ideas for the future of defense technology.

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Speaker 1: They're eating Chick fil A and Taco Bell and exploring

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Speaker 1: the idea that what the United States really needs is

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Speaker 1: a real life version of Stark Industries from iron Man

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Speaker 1: to build defense technology that would protect the United States

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Speaker 1: from future threats. Fast forward. That brainstorming session led to Andrel,

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Speaker 1: a defense technology company that launched in twenty seventeen. Now

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Speaker 1: it's a billion dollar company and at the center of

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Speaker 1: the debate when it comes to the future of war.

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Speaker 1: One of its founders, Tray Stephens, spends a life a

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Speaker 1: lot of time thinking about the philosophy of war, how

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Speaker 1: technology is transforming it, and how we're going to protect

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Speaker 1: ourselves as a nation. Expect rigorous debate, unpopular conversations, uncomfortable scenarios,

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Speaker 1: some talk of superheroes and science fiction, and a framework

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Speaker 1: to talk about war where the frontlines of futuristic battlefields

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Speaker 1: are blurred and technology is leading the charge. I'm Laurie Siegel,

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Speaker 1: and this is first contact. Well, generally I talk about

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Speaker 1: my first contact with folks, and I have no first

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Speaker 1: contact with you. This is the first time, Trey, that

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Speaker 1: I've ever met you, So welcome to first contact.

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Speaker 2: Thank you for having me.

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Speaker 1: But this isn't my first contact with this idea of

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Speaker 1: like war and ethics and defense technology. Because I know

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Speaker 1: your co founder, Palmer Lucky. I've interviewed him many times.

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Speaker 1: He's an interesting dude.

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Speaker 2: He is, yeah, super super interesting, super unique guy.

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Speaker 1: Would you describe.

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Speaker 2: I think he's one of these people that's thought deeply

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Speaker 2: about most things. Rather than having, you know, high conviction

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Speaker 2: but shallow knowledge, he has high conviction and lots of knowledge.

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Speaker 2: There seems to be this high correlation between people in

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Speaker 2: the tech community that are kind of like obsessively passionate

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Speaker 2: about topics and slightly eccentric and personality that makes them

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Speaker 2: a great fit for entrepreneurial endeavors. And Palmer is totally

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Speaker 2: one of those people.

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Speaker 1: He's the founder of Oculus we should mention for our listeners,

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Speaker 1: which is virtual reality company. Oculus sold to Facebook for

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Speaker 1: three billion dollars. And I remember my first time meeting

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Speaker 1: him was at Web Summit. It was years ago in Ireland,

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Speaker 1: and he always wears Hawaiian shirts and he always says

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Speaker 1: things that they definitely get him into trouble. And he

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Speaker 1: ended up leaving Facebook because of some controversy and starting

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Speaker 1: this company that you started with him, that we're going

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Speaker 1: to get into all about defense technology, which is also

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Speaker 1: interesting and controversial in its own right. And it's called ANDROL.

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Speaker 1: And I remember the last time I was at Yale's headquarters,

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Speaker 1: it was probably a year and a half ago. He's

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Speaker 1: like walking around barefoot. I just want to like paint

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Speaker 1: the picture because it is quite fascinating of all sorts

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Speaker 1: of like really fascinating technology that's like the future of warfare.

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Speaker 1: And it's in la it's not in Silicon Valley. And

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Speaker 1: you have a founder with a Hawaiian shirt who's like

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Speaker 1: kind of like a billionaire. I think he's a billionaire, right,

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Speaker 1: depends on who you ask. I guess, okay, unconfirmed, but

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Speaker 1: multi multimillionaire. And you guys are just dealing with these fascinating,

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Speaker 1: fascinating issues that a lot of people in Silicon Valley

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Speaker 1: shy away from. So that's how I'll kind of set

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Speaker 1: it all up. Was that Is that a fair way

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Speaker 1: to set it up?

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Speaker 2: Yeah? I think the only thing that Palmer would be

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Speaker 2: disappointed if I didn't point out is that Palmer did

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Speaker 2: not leave Facebook. Palmer was fired from Facebook. That is

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Speaker 2: an important distinction. But yeah, I mean he is, as

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Speaker 2: I said before, eccentric. He very rarely wears close toad shoes.

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Speaker 2: I've seen him get in trouble with this before. We

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Speaker 2: were on an off site together and he was playing

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Speaker 2: laser tag on a mountain bike, which is something that

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Speaker 2: I guess you do, and going downhill very rapidly and

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Speaker 2: went over the handlebars with his Hawaiian shirt open and

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Speaker 2: barefoot of course, and ended up like pretty badly scraping

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Speaker 2: up his chest and cutting his toe on I'm assuming

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Speaker 2: the pedal. But the kind of cool thing about him

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Speaker 2: is that he has that playful eccentric side, but he's

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Speaker 2: also incredibly serious and so there are very clear reasons

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Speaker 2: why he was on the mountain bike, why he was

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Speaker 2: charging downhill, what his strategy was for doing that. So

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Speaker 2: you know, this is like the kind of the combination

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Speaker 2: that I think makes him so unique is that it's

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Speaker 2: deep seriousness, deep strategy, but also eccentric and playful.

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Speaker 1: When we talk about Palmer's background, your background is like

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Speaker 1: completely different in a fascinating way, and so as co

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Speaker 1: founders is super interesting because your background is in intelligence, right,

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Speaker 1: and I saw that you were a student during nine

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Speaker 1: to eleven, and I read that that deeply impacted you,

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Speaker 1: and you ended up working for government, so you didn't

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Speaker 1: quite have the Silicon Valley background that a lot of

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Speaker 1: the people you're working with had, right.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, I was a senior in high school when nine

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Speaker 2: to eleven happened. Prior to that day, I thought I

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Speaker 2: was going to go into journalism, actually, and I remember

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Speaker 2: sitting in my principal's office in high school watching the

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Speaker 2: TV and talking to him about what it meant for

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Speaker 2: the world, and really decided on that day that I

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Speaker 2: wanted to go into a career in service to the country.

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Speaker 2: Had kind of toyed with whether or not that meant

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Speaker 2: going to the Air Force Academy and trying to be

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Speaker 2: a fighter pilot or going into the intelligence route, probably

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Speaker 2: via Georgehown, which is where I ended up going. Ended

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Speaker 2: up doing the intelligence thing, mostly from a probability perspective,

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Speaker 2: just realized that I might not end up getting that

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Speaker 2: fighter pilot billing and could have ended up doing something

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Speaker 2: far less interesting in the air. But yeah, it all

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Speaker 2: kind of goes back to that day.

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Speaker 1: And so talk to me about the government days. What

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Speaker 1: exactly were you doing?

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Speaker 2: Well, obviously I can't say exactly what I was doing.

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Speaker 1: Nice if we were going to talk around it in code, could.

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Speaker 2: You we were going to talk around it? I was

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Speaker 2: working the counter Terrorism Mission specifically focused on computational linguistics

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Speaker 2: for Arabic script based languages. Okay, I'll explain all of it.

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Speaker 1: Okay.

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Speaker 2: So basically I studied Arabic in college. And one of

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Speaker 2: the things that you find very quickly is that the

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Speaker 2: language works very differently than the Romance languages, and the

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Speaker 2: naming conventions are way harder to figure out, and they're

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Speaker 2: less unique than English names. So the most common name

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Speaker 2: in the English language, I think it's John. It's like

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Speaker 2: three percent of all English speaking men have the name John,

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Speaker 2: either first, middle last. In the Arabic speaking world, something

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Speaker 2: like over eighteen percent of Arabic speaking men have the

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Speaker 2: name Mohammed. So that makes name matching incredibly challenging. So

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Speaker 2: if you have a name like Mahmoudabass, that could be

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Speaker 2: literally like hundreds of thousands or millions of people with

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Speaker 2: that exact name Mahmudabas. And so the job for an

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Speaker 2: intelligence officer is significantly more challenging when dealing with these

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Speaker 2: foreign languages because you have to figure out is this

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Speaker 2: person actually the person that I'm trying to get reporting

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Speaker 2: on or is it just another person that has the

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Speaker 2: same name. And so I was working on trying to

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Speaker 2: resolve those entities with one another across a vast amount

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Speaker 2: of databases, which is a pretty tough problem.

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Speaker 1: So, and was there anything that was like, Okay, I'm

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Speaker 1: leaving the government, I'm going to Silicon Valley and working

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Speaker 1: at Palenteer. Was there anything that happened that was kind

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Speaker 1: of the catalyst.

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Speaker 2: I think it's just like the grinding down of bureaucracy.

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Speaker 2: I certainly never thought that I was going to work

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Speaker 2: for a Silicon Valley venture backed tech company when I

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Speaker 2: graduated from college. That was never part of the plan.

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Speaker 2: In fact, I remember joining Palenteer and asking really crazy

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Speaker 2: questions like what is the stock option, what is equity?

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Speaker 2: Why does that matter to my comp what is a

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Speaker 2: vesting schedule? I knew nothing about how these things worked,

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Speaker 2: and I think basically coming to the conclusion that I

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Speaker 2: wanted to be at a place where I was surrounded

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Speaker 2: by a bunch of people who were way smarter than

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Speaker 2: I was, who were much better at me at the

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Speaker 2: things that I was bad at, where I could add

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Speaker 2: unique value and that moved significantly faster than the bureaucracy

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Speaker 2: of the government, all the while still being able to

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Speaker 2: work on the mission that was really important to me.

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Speaker 1: Palenteer. For folks who don't know associated with Peter, t like,

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Speaker 1: did you meet Peter or was it that you got recruited?

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Speaker 1: How did that work?

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Speaker 2: I did not meet Peter. I actually got into Palenteer

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Speaker 2: from the guy that gave the demo to me when

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Speaker 2: I was working in the intelligence community. It was a

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Speaker 2: really small team at the time. I think there were

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Speaker 2: probably like less than twenty people at the company, and

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Speaker 2: I saw a demo, got really excited about it, kind

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Speaker 2: of pushed internally to be able to use it, told no,

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Speaker 2: and then ended up you know, jumping ship and joining

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Speaker 2: the company really early on.

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Speaker 1: And how did you end up meeting Palmer?

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Speaker 2: Yeah? So I got to know Peter really well over

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Speaker 2: my time at palent here, and in twenty thirteen he

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Speaker 2: asked if I would be interested in coming to join

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Speaker 2: Founder's Fund, which is a Silicon Valley venture capital firm

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Speaker 2: that Peter and some of the other PayPal founders started together.

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Speaker 1: And we should also say like Founder's Fund for folks

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Speaker 1: who don't know is an interesting venture capitalist fund in

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Speaker 1: Silicon Valley because they say unpopular things sometimes or invest

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Speaker 1: in things that are not just standard, Right, Is that

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Speaker 1: a fair thing to say?

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Speaker 2: Yeah, that's totally fair. We have a manifesto on our

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Speaker 2: website that I think when it first came out was

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Speaker 2: pretty unpopular. People thought we were a little crazy. The

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Speaker 2: cool thing about it has been over the last really

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Speaker 2: fourteen fifteen years that the fund has been around, these

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Speaker 2: ideas have become actually kind of weirdly popularized.

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Speaker 1: What was the manifesto.

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Speaker 2: It's a kind of long form essay on how we're

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Speaker 2: thinking about the future and how tech has stagnated and

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Speaker 2: how venture capital as an industry hasn't served entrepreneur as well,

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Speaker 2: and kind of diving into all of those reasons. But

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Speaker 2: you see some of these things cropping out of it,

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Speaker 2: like the founder friendly ethos of a venture fund. This

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Speaker 2: idea that actually the founders are the most important single unit,

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Speaker 2: elemental unit of a successful venture and you should as

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Speaker 2: a fund do the things that are optimizing for helping

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Speaker 2: those people. That has become super common, Like everyone talks

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Speaker 2: about being founder friendly as a VC, but you still

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Speaker 2: see really great funds that are firing CEOs, that are

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Speaker 2: taking aggressive governance stances against them, and this is something

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Speaker 2: that we foundationally will not do. We will not vote

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Speaker 2: against founders, we will not fire founders. We believe that

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Speaker 2: we should be optimizing for upside and not trying to

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Speaker 2: mitigate mediocre outcomes. You know, there's a bunch of other,

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Speaker 2: like more specific ideological things that you've probably seen on

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Speaker 2: Twitter or heard in the media about the positions that

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Speaker 2: we take. But yeah, we are We're pretty different, I

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Speaker 2: would say.

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Speaker 1: Right, And so you you met Palmer and you guys

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Speaker 1: started talking about war and defense, not initially, so what

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Speaker 1: were those initial conversations, Like.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, Founderson was the first institutional investor in Oculus. So

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Speaker 2: we've known Palmer since I think, you know, he was

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Speaker 2: like a teenager at that time.

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Speaker 1: I mean, and by the way, let's be honest, he's

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Speaker 1: not that much older now. He's like twenty six now,

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Speaker 1: so or twenty.

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Speaker 2: Seven, he's twenty seven, but but yeah, he's not that

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Speaker 2: much older now, that's true. Yeah, I met him, was

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Speaker 2: totally blown away by Oculus, bought one of the original

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Speaker 2: dev kits, have kind of enjoyed interacting with him, just

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Speaker 2: because of his passion and creativity, and had a couple

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Speaker 2: of conversations with him about this search that I was

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Speaker 2: doing at founders Son. So when I first joined the fund,

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Speaker 2: not knowing anything about venture capital, not knowing anything about

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Speaker 2: how the tech community works aside from my one experience

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Speaker 2: at Palenteer, I decided that I wanted to go and

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Speaker 2: find the next palanntaer SpaceX SO. Founder's Fund is a

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Speaker 2: large investor in both of those companies, and the theory

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Speaker 2: was those success stories should breed other success stories, and

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Speaker 2: so I went out and looked at every company I

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Speaker 2: could find that was doing business or interested in doing

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Speaker 2: business with the government, and ended up not really finding anything.

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Speaker 2: And I was talking to Palmer about this and saying, like,

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Speaker 2: you know, it's pretty crazy, given that our adversaries Russia,

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Speaker 2: China to a lesser extent but still present, Iran, North Korea,

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Speaker 2: We're doing things that were really challenging the strategic positioning

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Speaker 2: of the United States and our allies globally. And Palmer

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Speaker 2: agreed and had a ton of thoughts, as Palmer does

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Speaker 2: about many things, and I basically had this conversation with

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Speaker 2: him where I said, you know what, the United States

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Speaker 2: really needs is Stark Industries from the Ironman movies. We

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Speaker 2: need a company that is going to be well capitalized,

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Speaker 2: that will build products for the community, not requirements programs.

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Speaker 2: We're not doing a services contract on a cost bus basis,

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Speaker 2: but building products vertical and selling them directly to the

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Speaker 2: defense community to advance our ability to defend and deter.

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Speaker 2: He got really excited about that idea, and that was

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Speaker 2: kind of the early phase of him departing, as we said,

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Speaker 2: from Facebook and starting this company in twenty seventeen.

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Speaker 1: And I read that there was like a brainstorming session

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Speaker 1: that happened. I think there was Chick fil A involved

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Speaker 1: some crazy PowerPoint where you guys are putting the future

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Speaker 1: of warfare on there and there's all sorts of different

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Speaker 1: future of war slides. Can you just like take us

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Speaker 1: to that what that looked like? Take us to that

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Speaker 1: brainz I mean, because you're speaking in like very above

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Speaker 1: the whatever, like Silicon Valley terms, Like, just take us

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Speaker 1: to what that brainstorming session looked like. We're in Orange

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Speaker 1: County because that's where Palmer lives. Yep, you guys are

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Speaker 1: all sitting around eating Chick fil A. I'm from the South,

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Speaker 1: so I can get on board with that, you know,

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Speaker 1: explain what that jam session looked like. What this PowerPoint

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Speaker 1: of the future that could be borderlin dystopian if we're

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Speaker 1: not careful, we'll get into that looks like and like

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Speaker 1: what this whole thing happened? Just to just go there,

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Speaker 1: sure don't speak in Silicon Valley terms, that's what it

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Speaker 1: actually looked like.

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Speaker 2: Yees. So it was at Palmer's house. This would have

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Speaker 2: been I think in April or May of twenty seventeen.

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Speaker 2: We had invited a bunch of our smartest friends that

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Speaker 2: we could find that could be potentially interested in leaving

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Speaker 2: their current jobs to come do this with.

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Speaker 1: Us and anyone interesting that we'd know a.

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Speaker 2: Lot of the early employees of Andrel. So we had

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Speaker 2: Matt Graham, who is the co founder COO, Joe Chen

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Speaker 2: who was I think one of the first employees of Oculus,

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Speaker 2: with Palmer and Palmer and I and Matt Graham have

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Speaker 2: put together this deck that you're referencing that was basically like,

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Speaker 2: what would a stable world in the future look like

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Speaker 2: if we were actually able to deter violence? Like how

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Speaker 2: do we stop bad things from happening and do that

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Speaker 2: in a way that preserves our leadership over time. There

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Speaker 2: was Chick fil A. I will say that I'm allergic

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Speaker 2: to chicken. Palmer knew that I was allergic to chicken,

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Speaker 2: and Nicole Palmer's now wife then girlfriend went to Taco

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Speaker 2: Bell and bought an entire bag full of bean burritos.

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Speaker 2: And so everyone's eating chicken and I'm sitting there.

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Speaker 1: Just like good kept it class, just.

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Speaker 2: Crushing bean burritos. Yeah, Palmer is is an avid fast

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Speaker 2: food aficionado, and so he knows all the all the

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Speaker 2: places to go and the things to do. But that

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Speaker 2: was our dining of choice that day, and we kind

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Speaker 2: of just went through this whole plan, like what would

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Speaker 2: Stark Industries look like?

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Speaker 1: I love that you going back to like Iron Man?

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Speaker 2: Yeah, you know.

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Speaker 1: I mean it's like, when we're thinking about the future

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Speaker 1: of defense technology, how we're going to protect ourselves from

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Speaker 1: like Russia and China, Like it goes down to like

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Speaker 1: Chick fil a, bean burritos and Iron Man and like

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Speaker 1: a guy who likes to be barefoot. And I don't

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Speaker 1: mean this in like a snarky way, like this is

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Speaker 1: like what we're painting the picture of It's kind of interesting,

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Speaker 1: you know, I think.

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Speaker 2: I think this is one of the things that most

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Speaker 2: people don't realize about the defense community over really like

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Speaker 2: the last hundred years, is that these moments, these kind

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Speaker 2: of crucial moments in our history have been defined by

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Speaker 2: like founders, by entrepreneurs. Maybe they worked for the government,

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Speaker 2: maybe they didn't. But you had Benny Shriver with ICBMs.

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Speaker 2: You had Kelly Johnson with the U two, the SR

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Speaker 2: seventy one, the F one O four. You had Admiral

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Speaker 2: Rickover with the nuclear Navy. You had Howard Hughes and

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Speaker 2: all the things that he did in the aviation space.

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Speaker 2: And we've kind of gotten into this weird, like quasi

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Speaker 2: communist state where like no one's actually responsible for anything,

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Speaker 2: Like there are no founders, it's just bureaucracy that's running

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Speaker 2: all of these multi, multi, multi hundred of billion dollar

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Speaker 2: defense programs. And so I think the usage of Stark

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Speaker 2: Industries as the analogy is actually really powerful because it

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Speaker 2: says Tony Stark, the person, is actually the company. And

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Speaker 2: you see this tension that happens over the course of

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Speaker 2: all of the comic books and the movies where he

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Speaker 2: keeps trying to turn over responsibility for certain things actually

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Speaker 2: like it's him that makes this stuff work. And I

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Speaker 2: think Palmer has this powerful personality where he's able to

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Speaker 2: pull together really incredible people, really incredible engineers, work through

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Speaker 2: a vision and actually deliver the products that we say

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Speaker 2: we're going to deliver.

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Speaker 1: Right, Okay, So go back to that day, and so

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Speaker 1: you guys had put together this PowerPoint and what did

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Speaker 1: it have on it? It had all these different what

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Speaker 1: the future of warfare looked like? What did the future

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Speaker 1: of warfare look like?

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Speaker 2: I think future of warfare is probably the wrong term,

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Speaker 2: because the idea is actually to prevent warfare, right, Like

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Speaker 2: you want to deter violence, you don't want to have

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Speaker 2: more violence. Yeah, And so the PowerPoint was kind of

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Speaker 2: talking about what are the near term things that we

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Speaker 2: can do using existing technology, what are the medium term

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Speaker 2: things that we can work on that are probably going

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Speaker 2: to be possible in a five to ten year time horizon,

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Speaker 2: And what are like the science fiction ideas that would

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Speaker 2: completely change the game and force a paradigm shift in

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Speaker 2: international affairs. And we just had this kind of crazy

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Speaker 2: brainstorming session where everyone was pitching in their ideas saying,

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Speaker 2: actually that's not possible, or actually that's more possible than

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Speaker 2: we think that it is, And we were trying to

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Speaker 2: come to a rough agreement on what the first couple

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Speaker 2: of years of a company would look like if we

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Speaker 2: ended up starting it. And I think everyone left that

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Speaker 2: day feeling not only really excited about the vision and

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Speaker 2: commitments in hand for many of them, but also an

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Speaker 2: idea of the types of things we were going to

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Speaker 2: be able to build and a rough prioritization of what

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Speaker 2: that would look like.

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Speaker 1: And not to see the obvious though when we're talking

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Speaker 1: about the superhero bit, but you are coming with a

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Speaker 1: founder who was pushed out of Facebook for controversial comments

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Speaker 1: he made in like alt right forms. You have talent

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Speaker 1: here which you were a part of, which has come

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Speaker 1: under fire for surveillance issues and that kind of thing,

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Speaker 1: and is associated with Peter Teel, who's most certainly a

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Speaker 1: controversial figure. Nonetheless, So are you guys the superheroes to

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Speaker 1: do this? And how did you prepare to respond to

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Speaker 1: people looking at this team and saying, are we going

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Speaker 1: to trust this team to build and defend our future?

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Speaker 2: Yeah? I think everyone on the team has wildly diverse

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Speaker 2: ideological political beliefs. You know, Palmer's political beliefs are not

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Speaker 2: indicative of the rest of the founding team nor the company.

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Speaker 2: You know. The kind of the crazy thing about this

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Speaker 2: whole conversation is that by us standards, Palmer is pretty

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Speaker 2: boring in his political beliefs. Like he's a he's a libertarian,

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Speaker 2: he believes in limiting government regulation, he believes in, you know,

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Speaker 2: free market economy, and his engagement in the political sphere

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Speaker 2: is kind of limited to pursuing those things. I think

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Speaker 2: he's gotten a lot of really unfair press treatment that

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Speaker 2: does not resemble reality. And you know, I think the

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Speaker 2: company by and large is very aware of that, from

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Speaker 2: a founding team to the employees, we're all very aware

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Speaker 2: of that. The important thing about the association with all

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Speaker 2: of those kind of different aspects that you just mentioned

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Speaker 2: is that we have open, harsh dialogue internally about everything

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Speaker 2: about the products that we work on, about the programs

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Speaker 2: within the governments that we work on, about the countries

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Speaker 2: that we work with. And that would only be possible

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Speaker 2: if the people involved, particularly in leadership, were open and

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Speaker 2: receptive to that rigorous debate. And I think this is

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Speaker 2: something that Palmer found at Facebook, is that that was

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Speaker 2: not a culture that was open to rigorous debate. In fact,

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Speaker 2: it was only open to a single ideological bent that

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Speaker 2: is militarized in a way that you know, I think

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Speaker 2: the American people should all be pretty concerned about.

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Speaker 1: I think it's interesting. The last time I interviewed Palmer,

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Speaker 1: I had just finished doing a series of Conservatives undercover

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Speaker 1: in Silicon Valley, and like literally interviewed conservatives who didn't

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Speaker 1: feel comfortable coming out and talking about being conservative Silicon Valley.

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Speaker 1: We had to do it in shadow. This is before

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Speaker 1: I mean, there's certainly a culture war playing out, which

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Speaker 1: is a whole separate conversation, but we're seeing that on

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Speaker 1: a grand scale. Now we're going to take a quick

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Speaker 1: break to hear from our sponsors. But when we come back,

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Speaker 1: what exactly is Andrel building a look inside the technology. Also,

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Speaker 1: if you like what you're hearing, make sure you hit

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Speaker 1: subscribe to First Contact in your podcast app so you

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Speaker 1: don't miss another episode I want to talk about Andrel's

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Speaker 1: just in general, like what you guys are doing. So

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Speaker 1: Palmer's like the product guy, and he's like building out

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Speaker 1: crazy interesting technology and you're thinking, I think a lot

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Speaker 1: about these ethical issues and some of the more philosophical

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Speaker 1: issues as we kind of head into this future for

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Speaker 1: folks who don't know andrel. First of all, isn't this

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Speaker 1: the Lord of the Rings reference? If I'm getting it correct.

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Speaker 2: It is. Yeah, it's Elvish and Lord of the Rings

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Speaker 2: for a Flame of the West.

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Speaker 1: Okay, reasoning behind that.

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Speaker 2: It seemed really appropriate, still seems really appropriate. I mean,

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Speaker 2: Androl was the sort Narsal reforged. Narsal was the sword

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Speaker 2: that cut the one ring from the hand of Sauron

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Speaker 2: in the early ages, and it was reforged as Androl

438
00:23:18,480 --> 00:23:22,040
Speaker 2: to be welded by Aragorn during the Fellowship. So it

439
00:23:22,080 --> 00:23:24,920
Speaker 2: has kind of a storied history in the series where

440
00:23:24,960 --> 00:23:27,320
Speaker 2: Tolkien fans seem to make a lot of sense.

441
00:23:27,119 --> 00:23:29,040
Speaker 1: And so explain kind of the premise of what you

442
00:23:29,040 --> 00:23:29,760
Speaker 1: guys are building.

443
00:23:30,280 --> 00:23:34,000
Speaker 2: Yeah. So again, our kind of view of the future

444
00:23:34,200 --> 00:23:38,359
Speaker 2: is that if we're not very intentional in the West

445
00:23:38,600 --> 00:23:42,760
Speaker 2: with building the technology that's required to protect and preserve

446
00:23:43,080 --> 00:23:46,240
Speaker 2: our values in our way of life, that these technologies

447
00:23:46,280 --> 00:23:49,520
Speaker 2: are going to be built by our adversaries, and we

448
00:23:49,520 --> 00:23:53,159
Speaker 2: shouldn't trick ourselves into believing that our adversaries are in

449
00:23:53,160 --> 00:23:56,320
Speaker 2: some way our moral equals. They're not, and we want

450
00:23:56,760 --> 00:24:00,639
Speaker 2: the best technology that is going to deter conflict to

451
00:24:00,720 --> 00:24:05,080
Speaker 2: be controlled and operated by the people that have the

452
00:24:05,160 --> 00:24:08,160
Speaker 2: value system that we share. And so, you know, anything

453
00:24:08,160 --> 00:24:11,919
Speaker 2: that we can build that fulfills that mission while being

454
00:24:12,520 --> 00:24:16,200
Speaker 2: very cognizant of the ethical considerations, the very real, very

455
00:24:16,240 --> 00:24:19,160
Speaker 2: meaningful ethical considerations that are required as those things are built,

456
00:24:19,400 --> 00:24:21,520
Speaker 2: is something that we're really interested in working on.

457
00:24:21,760 --> 00:24:23,560
Speaker 1: And so I mean, in a most baseline thing, you

458
00:24:23,560 --> 00:24:27,680
Speaker 1: guys are building out consumer tech products, generally with artificial intelligence,

459
00:24:27,680 --> 00:24:30,240
Speaker 1: that you sell to our allies and the government.

460
00:24:30,920 --> 00:24:34,479
Speaker 2: Yeah, not everything is consumer. In fact, a lot of

461
00:24:34,520 --> 00:24:38,120
Speaker 2: the hardware that we integrate into our systems is not

462
00:24:38,160 --> 00:24:41,960
Speaker 2: intended for consumers. It's enterprise grade equipment. But yeah, basically,

463
00:24:42,000 --> 00:24:43,199
Speaker 2: the way that you can think about it is that

464
00:24:43,200 --> 00:24:47,200
Speaker 2: we're building both hardware and software to achieve mission ends

465
00:24:47,359 --> 00:24:50,280
Speaker 2: at the lowest cost possible for the taxpayer. And so

466
00:24:50,520 --> 00:24:54,080
Speaker 2: rather than building a bunch of bespoke technology on as

467
00:24:54,119 --> 00:24:57,080
Speaker 2: I said before, these cost plus contracts like the F

468
00:24:57,119 --> 00:25:00,240
Speaker 2: thirty five, the four class aircraft carrier, or even these

469
00:25:00,240 --> 00:25:04,320
Speaker 2: bespoke software programs like the Defense Travel Service and all

470
00:25:04,359 --> 00:25:06,359
Speaker 2: sorts of stuff like that, we're trying to take the

471
00:25:06,400 --> 00:25:09,199
Speaker 2: best of class that exists off the shelf, integrate it

472
00:25:09,200 --> 00:25:11,000
Speaker 2: with some things that we do have to build ourselves

473
00:25:11,040 --> 00:25:14,760
Speaker 2: because it's not available commercially, and then turn it into

474
00:25:14,760 --> 00:25:17,680
Speaker 2: a product that works today as well as we say

475
00:25:17,680 --> 00:25:19,919
Speaker 2: that it works and turn that over to the government

476
00:25:19,920 --> 00:25:21,560
Speaker 2: customers to use for their mission.

477
00:25:21,640 --> 00:25:23,600
Speaker 1: Can you give us a sense of the products you're building,

478
00:25:23,760 --> 00:25:25,560
Speaker 1: that the stuff that's out to market now, and who

479
00:25:25,600 --> 00:25:26,239
Speaker 1: you're working with.

480
00:25:26,560 --> 00:25:29,679
Speaker 2: Yeah. So our first product is what we call a

481
00:25:29,680 --> 00:25:33,920
Speaker 2: centry tower. It's a thirty some foot tower that has

482
00:25:33,920 --> 00:25:37,560
Speaker 2: integrated sensors. So instead of security officers sitting in a

483
00:25:37,720 --> 00:25:41,760
Speaker 2: dark room with hundreds of little CCTV feeds, the tower

484
00:25:41,840 --> 00:25:44,840
Speaker 2: is just telling the operator when something is happening that

485
00:25:44,880 --> 00:25:47,320
Speaker 2: they need to look at. This is really critical for

486
00:25:47,400 --> 00:25:51,160
Speaker 2: all sorts of critical infrastructure, whether it's military bases, oil

487
00:25:51,160 --> 00:25:55,800
Speaker 2: and gas facilities, national borders, whatever it might be. Second

488
00:25:55,840 --> 00:25:58,639
Speaker 2: product that we built is basically a tower that flies.

489
00:25:58,800 --> 00:26:01,520
Speaker 2: We call it ghost a helicopter that has many of

490
00:26:01,520 --> 00:26:04,360
Speaker 2: the same sensors. It's fully autonomous, so it takes off,

491
00:26:04,440 --> 00:26:07,880
Speaker 2: executes a mission, returns to base, and provides that same

492
00:26:07,960 --> 00:26:11,320
Speaker 2: level of autonomous operation and computer.

493
00:26:11,080 --> 00:26:14,040
Speaker 1: Vision, and what does that meant to do and where

494
00:26:14,040 --> 00:26:15,880
Speaker 1: do you expect to see that ploy?

495
00:26:16,240 --> 00:26:19,119
Speaker 2: Yeah, the same thing as the tower, except it it moves.

496
00:26:19,280 --> 00:26:21,840
Speaker 2: And so a tower by its very nature has a

497
00:26:21,960 --> 00:26:24,639
Speaker 2: range that it can operate in. And if something is

498
00:26:24,680 --> 00:26:27,000
Speaker 2: moving outside of that range, or you expect that things

499
00:26:27,040 --> 00:26:30,600
Speaker 2: are moving it more velocity, you might want a helicopter

500
00:26:30,880 --> 00:26:33,439
Speaker 2: to be able to track and pursue. There are a

501
00:26:33,440 --> 00:26:37,280
Speaker 2: lot of remote operations, like special forces units in the

502
00:26:37,280 --> 00:26:40,600
Speaker 2: field that might want forward notice of things that are

503
00:26:40,800 --> 00:26:42,400
Speaker 2: that they are going to be encountering on the road

504
00:26:42,400 --> 00:26:44,440
Speaker 2: ahead of them. So there are a lot of potential

505
00:26:44,440 --> 00:26:49,359
Speaker 2: applications for ghost. The third product we call ANVIL, which

506
00:26:49,400 --> 00:26:54,000
Speaker 2: is a kinetic interceptor for unmandarial systems. So I'll explain that.

507
00:26:55,040 --> 00:26:58,560
Speaker 2: So most people, I'm assuming have probably heard about the

508
00:26:58,600 --> 00:27:04,480
Speaker 2: threat of drones in airspace, particularly in military environments where isis.

509
00:27:04,640 --> 00:27:09,760
Speaker 2: Other adversaries are taking standard consumer drone technology like dgimavix

510
00:27:09,760 --> 00:27:12,879
Speaker 2: and stuff like that, putting grenades on them, or just

511
00:27:12,920 --> 00:27:16,639
Speaker 2: flying them for surveillance operations, and this has become a

512
00:27:17,640 --> 00:27:22,159
Speaker 2: terrible risk to our service members abroad. Taking them down

513
00:27:22,280 --> 00:27:26,280
Speaker 2: initially is as easy as jamming their radio signal and

514
00:27:26,320 --> 00:27:28,800
Speaker 2: forcing them to return to where they came from, or

515
00:27:28,960 --> 00:27:32,080
Speaker 2: denying GPS in some environments, things like that. But as

516
00:27:32,160 --> 00:27:35,080
Speaker 2: the drones become more and more autonomous where they don't

517
00:27:35,080 --> 00:27:38,000
Speaker 2: really emit any signals that you can jam, it becomes

518
00:27:38,040 --> 00:27:40,800
Speaker 2: harder and harder to remove them from your airspace. And

519
00:27:40,880 --> 00:27:44,040
Speaker 2: so kind of the crazy idea that Palmer and the

520
00:27:44,080 --> 00:27:47,560
Speaker 2: rest of the team had was to use another drone,

521
00:27:47,640 --> 00:27:50,080
Speaker 2: our own drone with a terminal guidance system on it,

522
00:27:50,200 --> 00:27:53,320
Speaker 2: to lock on to the adversarial drone and fly into

523
00:27:53,359 --> 00:27:56,000
Speaker 2: it at high speed, kind of like a flying bowling

524
00:27:56,040 --> 00:27:58,200
Speaker 2: ball that's intended to knock them out of the sky.

525
00:27:58,920 --> 00:28:01,400
Speaker 2: And so all of these things kind of paired together,

526
00:28:01,400 --> 00:28:04,879
Speaker 2: where you have static passive surveillance from the towers, you

527
00:28:04,960 --> 00:28:09,040
Speaker 2: have a dynamic mobile surveillance capability from the helicopters. You

528
00:28:09,080 --> 00:28:11,760
Speaker 2: have the interceptor that can take out aerial platforms that

529
00:28:11,800 --> 00:28:14,840
Speaker 2: are approaching your facility or whatever it might be. Are

530
00:28:14,880 --> 00:28:18,240
Speaker 2: like layers an overall platform that we call lattice, which

531
00:28:18,280 --> 00:28:22,240
Speaker 2: is the battlefield management, command and control software that sits

532
00:28:22,240 --> 00:28:22,880
Speaker 2: behind all of it.

533
00:28:23,280 --> 00:28:25,919
Speaker 1: And fast forward from this conversation you guys were having,

534
00:28:26,119 --> 00:28:28,679
Speaker 1: you know, in Orange County and talking about all this

535
00:28:28,720 --> 00:28:30,640
Speaker 1: kind of stuff to now like who are you doing

536
00:28:30,680 --> 00:28:33,359
Speaker 1: business with? Department of Homeland Security? Like who you know?

537
00:28:33,600 --> 00:28:35,680
Speaker 1: Who are you guys selling your technology to.

538
00:28:36,080 --> 00:28:39,120
Speaker 2: Yeah, Predictably, our largest customers the US Department of Defense,

539
00:28:40,080 --> 00:28:43,440
Speaker 2: numerous branches, so we're working with special Forces, We're working

540
00:28:43,480 --> 00:28:45,720
Speaker 2: with the Marine Corps, We're working with the Air Force,

541
00:28:45,760 --> 00:28:48,600
Speaker 2: the Navy, So that represents the majority of our business.

542
00:28:48,960 --> 00:28:52,280
Speaker 2: We do also have some work with Federal la Enforcement

543
00:28:52,400 --> 00:28:55,160
Speaker 2: and the Department of Homeland Security, and then we're working

544
00:28:55,200 --> 00:28:58,160
Speaker 2: with some of our international partners, close allies like the

545
00:28:58,240 --> 00:29:01,000
Speaker 2: United Kingdom and very similar defense mission sets.

546
00:29:01,480 --> 00:29:03,200
Speaker 1: The last time I interviewed paulm I must have been

547
00:29:03,240 --> 00:29:06,160
Speaker 1: I would say, like over a year ago. The headline

548
00:29:06,200 --> 00:29:08,840
Speaker 1: grabbing thing I remember for you guys was the first

549
00:29:08,840 --> 00:29:11,360
Speaker 1: product you guys were building was like the virtual border wall,

550
00:29:11,600 --> 00:29:14,600
Speaker 1: And I think that's the thing that people looked at

551
00:29:14,640 --> 00:29:17,640
Speaker 1: as are you building the digital wall for Trump? Because

552
00:29:17,640 --> 00:29:19,320
Speaker 1: this was the first thing you guys put out publicly.

553
00:29:19,320 --> 00:29:21,040
Speaker 1: A lot of people looked at Andrew and looked at

554
00:29:21,040 --> 00:29:23,320
Speaker 1: what you were doing and asked you some of these

555
00:29:23,400 --> 00:29:26,600
Speaker 1: questions about is this ethical what you're building and is

556
00:29:26,640 --> 00:29:28,840
Speaker 1: this the right thing? So I'd be curious to know

557
00:29:28,840 --> 00:29:30,360
Speaker 1: where that stands. Now.

558
00:29:31,120 --> 00:29:34,640
Speaker 2: Yeah, the work that we're doing with customs and border

559
00:29:34,640 --> 00:29:38,200
Speaker 2: protection within the Department of Homeland Security is not a

560
00:29:38,240 --> 00:29:43,080
Speaker 2: policy initiative. We don't have policy views on how border

561
00:29:43,120 --> 00:29:47,600
Speaker 2: control should be managed. But we do believe that within

562
00:29:47,640 --> 00:29:51,080
Speaker 2: the constructs of a democratic government, we should be supportive

563
00:29:51,240 --> 00:29:54,600
Speaker 2: of the things that the government is doing, the mission

564
00:29:54,640 --> 00:29:58,920
Speaker 2: that they're executing. And I think in this case, Democrats, Republicans,

565
00:29:59,360 --> 00:30:02,680
Speaker 2: everyone kind agrees that you have to have some form

566
00:30:02,680 --> 00:30:05,760
Speaker 2: of border security, just like literally every other country in

567
00:30:05,800 --> 00:30:09,040
Speaker 2: the world, and that when you're making decisions about what

568
00:30:09,120 --> 00:30:13,760
Speaker 2: policies you're going to accept with regards to that mission set,

569
00:30:14,120 --> 00:30:16,240
Speaker 2: you need to have data. You need to know what's

570
00:30:16,280 --> 00:30:19,280
Speaker 2: actually happening. You need to know what kind of people

571
00:30:19,320 --> 00:30:21,800
Speaker 2: are coming across the border. Is there actually the flow

572
00:30:21,840 --> 00:30:25,240
Speaker 2: of drugs and black market weapons that people think there are,

573
00:30:25,680 --> 00:30:28,800
Speaker 2: Are there unminarial systems that are posing a threat to

574
00:30:28,880 --> 00:30:31,240
Speaker 2: our civilian population. You know, there's all these questions that

575
00:30:31,240 --> 00:30:34,240
Speaker 2: you want to have answers to, and I think that

576
00:30:34,400 --> 00:30:37,320
Speaker 2: kind of an indefensible position would be, actually, we don't

577
00:30:37,400 --> 00:30:39,840
Speaker 2: need information, We don't need any data. We don't need

578
00:30:39,880 --> 00:30:43,120
Speaker 2: to know what's happening. We should just let everything happen

579
00:30:43,120 --> 00:30:45,720
Speaker 2: that's happening. And so I think this is kind of

580
00:30:45,760 --> 00:30:49,520
Speaker 2: why we've gotten such bipartisan support for the technology, is

581
00:30:49,560 --> 00:30:52,440
Speaker 2: that we're not making a political assertion.

582
00:30:52,680 --> 00:30:54,400
Speaker 1: How do you think ethically about the data? So the

583
00:30:54,480 --> 00:30:56,640
Speaker 1: data that you guys gather, I'm sure you're gathering a

584
00:30:56,640 --> 00:30:59,520
Speaker 1: lot of this data right from everything it's picking up.

585
00:30:59,640 --> 00:31:01,840
Speaker 1: And so what's the standard there?

586
00:31:02,080 --> 00:31:04,120
Speaker 2: You we do not own the data where data belongs

587
00:31:04,120 --> 00:31:06,400
Speaker 2: to the customer. And by the way, that's in every case,

588
00:31:06,440 --> 00:31:09,920
Speaker 2: every use case, aside from our own technology that we're

589
00:31:10,000 --> 00:31:13,920
Speaker 2: using in test environments. So yeah, basically they get the

590
00:31:13,920 --> 00:31:16,520
Speaker 2: feeds off of the towers to the helicopters or whatever

591
00:31:16,560 --> 00:31:20,560
Speaker 2: else they're using. Human beings, actual people who have a

592
00:31:20,680 --> 00:31:24,600
Speaker 2: job in a mission. In that job are making decisions

593
00:31:24,720 --> 00:31:27,440
Speaker 2: about how they respond to that data. So if you

594
00:31:27,480 --> 00:31:31,760
Speaker 2: see an unmandarial vehicle with drugs attached to it, which

595
00:31:31,800 --> 00:31:34,960
Speaker 2: is something that happens periodically, they can decide are we

596
00:31:34,960 --> 00:31:36,360
Speaker 2: going to pursue that, are we going to try to

597
00:31:36,360 --> 00:31:38,640
Speaker 2: shoot it down? Are we going to try to follow

598
00:31:38,640 --> 00:31:40,320
Speaker 2: it until it runs out of battery. Are we going

599
00:31:40,360 --> 00:31:42,400
Speaker 2: to let it go? You know, these are decisions that

600
00:31:42,480 --> 00:31:44,160
Speaker 2: human beings are making at the end of the day.

601
00:31:44,560 --> 00:31:47,400
Speaker 2: So yes, absolutely, there are ethical questions that are involved

602
00:31:47,440 --> 00:31:50,200
Speaker 2: with each of the products that we build, and there's

603
00:31:50,240 --> 00:31:52,240
Speaker 2: a process by which I think you go through thinking

604
00:31:52,320 --> 00:31:55,480
Speaker 2: about how that mission is realized and who are the

605
00:31:55,480 --> 00:31:57,400
Speaker 2: people that are involved in making that decision.

606
00:31:57,720 --> 00:31:59,360
Speaker 1: So can you explain that you talk a lot about

607
00:31:59,360 --> 00:32:01,960
Speaker 1: this just war theory. You just explained to us, like,

608
00:32:02,040 --> 00:32:03,320
Speaker 1: what's the just war theory?

609
00:32:03,880 --> 00:32:07,600
Speaker 2: Yeah, so just war theory. This is a many centuries

610
00:32:07,720 --> 00:32:13,600
Speaker 2: old framework for evaluating how and when you go to

611
00:32:14,080 --> 00:32:17,400
Speaker 2: war and how war is conducted. And you know, the

612
00:32:17,440 --> 00:32:20,520
Speaker 2: general concept is that there are all of these principles

613
00:32:20,560 --> 00:32:23,520
Speaker 2: that we can apply to any technology. They apply the

614
00:32:23,560 --> 00:32:26,520
Speaker 2: same to a knife, an arrow, a bannet as they

615
00:32:26,520 --> 00:32:31,000
Speaker 2: do to autonomous robots in battle. And so I had

616
00:32:31,040 --> 00:32:33,200
Speaker 2: wrote an essay that it seems like you've probably read

617
00:32:33,600 --> 00:32:37,920
Speaker 2: about defense ethics. So there are four specific principles that

618
00:32:38,040 --> 00:32:41,600
Speaker 2: I talked about in the essay. The first is last resort,

619
00:32:41,640 --> 00:32:44,080
Speaker 2: so the principle of war is last resort. The second

620
00:32:44,240 --> 00:32:49,120
Speaker 2: is discrimination, principles of discrimination and proportionality, and the last

621
00:32:49,200 --> 00:32:50,920
Speaker 2: is right intent or just authority.

622
00:32:51,040 --> 00:32:53,160
Speaker 1: So this is how you look at the ethical decisions

623
00:32:53,200 --> 00:32:55,360
Speaker 1: that you guys are making and the products you're building,

624
00:32:55,440 --> 00:32:57,560
Speaker 1: and what kind of framework you're going to think about

625
00:32:57,600 --> 00:32:59,680
Speaker 1: when when you're building things and deploying them.

626
00:32:59,760 --> 00:33:03,120
Speaker 2: That's right. So oftentimes, and even some of your previous guests,

627
00:33:03,160 --> 00:33:07,080
Speaker 2: say Professor Surf who had on to talk about brain

628
00:33:07,640 --> 00:33:10,360
Speaker 2: modifications and things like that, he talked about some of

629
00:33:10,400 --> 00:33:13,640
Speaker 2: the ethical and regulatory structures that should be put in

630
00:33:13,640 --> 00:33:16,920
Speaker 2: place for this. People often talk about how we need

631
00:33:17,000 --> 00:33:21,480
Speaker 2: some sort of ethical framework for evaluating autonomous systems, artificial intelligence,

632
00:33:21,600 --> 00:33:26,560
Speaker 2: quantum computing, neuromodifications, things like that. Yeah, and my argument,

633
00:33:26,680 --> 00:33:29,320
Speaker 2: the core argument is that actually there are frameworks that

634
00:33:29,400 --> 00:33:31,840
Speaker 2: exist today. Just war theory happens to be a really

635
00:33:31,880 --> 00:33:34,640
Speaker 2: good one for applying these principles, and you just have

636
00:33:34,680 --> 00:33:37,360
Speaker 2: to think critically about how those new technologies fit into

637
00:33:37,400 --> 00:33:38,680
Speaker 2: each of those paradigms.

638
00:33:38,760 --> 00:33:41,360
Speaker 1: First of all, a little birdie told me that you

639
00:33:41,440 --> 00:33:44,200
Speaker 1: do these dinners at your place. I have a feeling

640
00:33:44,480 --> 00:33:48,000
Speaker 1: that this theory you guys jam on this like maybe

641
00:33:48,080 --> 00:33:50,000
Speaker 1: like these dinners or some sort like can you give

642
00:33:50,080 --> 00:33:53,160
Speaker 1: us like specifics around the technology you're building now, and

643
00:33:53,200 --> 00:33:55,760
Speaker 1: if you don't mind, just like be as honest as possible,

644
00:33:55,800 --> 00:33:59,440
Speaker 1: because I think that you know, I understand that these

645
00:33:59,440 --> 00:34:01,720
Speaker 1: are hot button issues and that like you know that

646
00:34:02,120 --> 00:34:03,920
Speaker 1: there can be headlines out of them and everything. But

647
00:34:03,960 --> 00:34:06,680
Speaker 1: the stuff you're dealing with is really fascinating, right and

648
00:34:06,800 --> 00:34:08,799
Speaker 1: the issues that you're talking about night. I like what

649
00:34:08,840 --> 00:34:11,880
Speaker 1: you said about this idea of having rigorous debate and

650
00:34:11,920 --> 00:34:14,000
Speaker 1: saying things we can't say out loud and just kind

651
00:34:14,040 --> 00:34:15,840
Speaker 1: of like yelling at each other about theories and this

652
00:34:15,920 --> 00:34:18,840
Speaker 1: and that. So can you take us to this compound?

653
00:34:18,920 --> 00:34:21,400
Speaker 1: It's like two hours outside of La right or where

654
00:34:21,440 --> 00:34:22,359
Speaker 1: exactly is andre Ell?

655
00:34:22,400 --> 00:34:25,400
Speaker 2: It's like, depending on traffic, forty minutes, Okay, five hours,

656
00:34:25,400 --> 00:34:26,960
Speaker 2: I don't know, there's so much traffic there.

657
00:34:26,960 --> 00:34:29,520
Speaker 1: I'm just going to go with like five hours. But

658
00:34:30,120 --> 00:34:32,680
Speaker 1: take me to like how you apply this theory into

659
00:34:32,680 --> 00:34:35,399
Speaker 1: something really specific that you've worked on, because I can

660
00:34:35,440 --> 00:34:39,680
Speaker 1: imagine for you it's challenging and interesting and you really

661
00:34:39,719 --> 00:34:42,919
Speaker 1: are kind of thinking ethically about building out this technology

662
00:34:43,080 --> 00:34:46,160
Speaker 1: that you guys are going to be deploying and selling

663
00:34:46,160 --> 00:34:48,560
Speaker 1: to governments and putting in the hands of other people,

664
00:34:48,840 --> 00:34:50,759
Speaker 1: and seeing how it will be used. So, like, how

665
00:34:50,800 --> 00:34:53,319
Speaker 1: has this theory worked specifically, because when you talk about

666
00:34:53,320 --> 00:34:56,799
Speaker 1: my interview with Moron, like he talks about a lot

667
00:34:56,840 --> 00:34:59,359
Speaker 1: of this stuff in theory, you're actually doing a lot

668
00:34:59,400 --> 00:35:00,719
Speaker 1: of this stuff in reality.

669
00:35:01,560 --> 00:35:04,520
Speaker 2: Yeah, that's a really good point. This is something that

670
00:35:04,560 --> 00:35:07,080
Speaker 2: has to be approached with a high degree of seriousness

671
00:35:07,560 --> 00:35:10,239
Speaker 2: because it does have real world implications. This isn't a

672
00:35:10,360 --> 00:35:14,359
Speaker 2: theoretical conversation around you know, some defense technology that might

673
00:35:14,360 --> 00:35:16,279
Speaker 2: exist in ten years. It's like, these are the things

674
00:35:16,280 --> 00:35:18,640
Speaker 2: that are being deployed today, not only by ANDREL but

675
00:35:18,760 --> 00:35:20,759
Speaker 2: by a lot of other companies as well.

676
00:35:20,840 --> 00:35:22,880
Speaker 1: And so going to the technology that you guys are

677
00:35:22,920 --> 00:35:26,320
Speaker 1: building specifically, say like lattice, right, this technology that's already

678
00:35:26,320 --> 00:35:28,759
Speaker 1: been deployed at the border. Right, take us through the

679
00:35:28,840 --> 00:35:32,799
Speaker 1: ethical framework. What did you decide not to do? You know,

680
00:35:32,880 --> 00:35:35,080
Speaker 1: where did you guys decide to draw the line?

681
00:35:35,280 --> 00:35:37,719
Speaker 2: I would say that deciding where to draw the line

682
00:35:37,719 --> 00:35:42,200
Speaker 2: implies that there was some sort of conversation about accelerating

683
00:35:42,239 --> 00:35:45,000
Speaker 2: beyond what we were building as a product, which wouldn't

684
00:35:45,440 --> 00:35:48,040
Speaker 2: be an honest description of what happened. You know, I

685
00:35:48,040 --> 00:35:52,279
Speaker 2: think you could extrapolate a million different things ranging from

686
00:35:52,360 --> 00:35:55,239
Speaker 2: like some sort of laser in kind of a one

687
00:35:55,280 --> 00:35:58,320
Speaker 2: to one way or a nuclear weapon and everything in between.

688
00:35:58,640 --> 00:36:01,239
Speaker 2: With literally any technology that you built, anything that has

689
00:36:01,280 --> 00:36:03,160
Speaker 2: a camera on it, you could say, like that could

690
00:36:03,160 --> 00:36:06,759
Speaker 2: be used to target for firing many nuclear warheads. I

691
00:36:06,760 --> 00:36:09,360
Speaker 2: don't know, It's like that was never part of the conversation.

692
00:36:09,880 --> 00:36:14,200
Speaker 2: The entire concept behind the Centry tower was around data collection.

693
00:36:14,440 --> 00:36:16,600
Speaker 2: That was it from the very beginning. It was never

694
00:36:16,640 --> 00:36:18,120
Speaker 2: about anything more than data collection.

695
00:36:18,840 --> 00:36:21,680
Speaker 1: I guess I look at like maybe the inevitable. Do

696
00:36:21,680 --> 00:36:24,480
Speaker 1: you have conversations about facial recognition or we wouldn't go

697
00:36:24,560 --> 00:36:27,520
Speaker 1: near that. I mean where, like where do you draw

698
00:36:27,560 --> 00:36:29,720
Speaker 1: the line ethically or even when we talk about ghost

699
00:36:29,880 --> 00:36:32,200
Speaker 1: right something else you guys are deploying, Like what are

700
00:36:32,200 --> 00:36:35,640
Speaker 1: the other ethical conversations you guys have about those specific technologies?

701
00:36:35,840 --> 00:36:38,000
Speaker 2: Yeah, no, that is a really good question, And I

702
00:36:38,000 --> 00:36:40,960
Speaker 2: think this is like one of these examples where the

703
00:36:41,080 --> 00:36:44,800
Speaker 2: values that we hold as a country are wildly divergent

704
00:36:44,840 --> 00:36:49,320
Speaker 2: from our adversaries, like facial recognition, really really good point.

705
00:36:49,560 --> 00:36:52,040
Speaker 2: Is it necessary to the mission to be able to

706
00:36:52,680 --> 00:36:58,080
Speaker 2: at long range determine who people are algorithmically? No? Not

707
00:36:58,120 --> 00:37:02,520
Speaker 2: really like what our military wants to do, what our

708
00:37:02,560 --> 00:37:05,080
Speaker 2: officers in the Department of Homeland Security want to do,

709
00:37:05,200 --> 00:37:07,799
Speaker 2: is they want to know when something is happening. They

710
00:37:07,800 --> 00:37:12,719
Speaker 2: don't need information about who everyone is as identified by

711
00:37:12,760 --> 00:37:15,279
Speaker 2: some sort of by some sort of algorithm. This is

712
00:37:15,360 --> 00:37:17,719
Speaker 2: the thing that you know, China is doing, and this

713
00:37:17,800 --> 00:37:22,360
Speaker 2: is the ideology and technology that they're exporting to dozens

714
00:37:22,360 --> 00:37:26,280
Speaker 2: and dozens of countries in partnership with companies like Hickfision

715
00:37:26,400 --> 00:37:30,399
Speaker 2: and Dawa and sence Time and megv and huaweih. I mean,

716
00:37:30,880 --> 00:37:34,840
Speaker 2: that is the Chinese ideology that they're exporting. That's not

717
00:37:34,880 --> 00:37:36,160
Speaker 2: something that we're interested in doing.

718
00:37:36,480 --> 00:37:38,680
Speaker 1: Does it worry that you build out this technology? I'm

719
00:37:38,680 --> 00:37:40,640
Speaker 1: sure you get this question a lot. You know, you

720
00:37:40,760 --> 00:37:43,360
Speaker 1: develop this technology that you believe you do it in

721
00:37:43,400 --> 00:37:45,239
Speaker 1: an ethical way, but that it could be used in

722
00:37:45,280 --> 00:37:47,120
Speaker 1: a way that is not ethical. That someone could take

723
00:37:47,440 --> 00:37:50,279
Speaker 1: what you're doing and then add facial recognition to the

724
00:37:50,320 --> 00:37:51,880
Speaker 1: technology that you've deployed.

725
00:37:52,400 --> 00:37:54,759
Speaker 2: Yeah, I think this is why it's really important when

726
00:37:54,800 --> 00:37:58,640
Speaker 2: you're making sales of technology in the defense space to

727
00:37:58,800 --> 00:38:03,680
Speaker 2: consider the end user of that technology and what processes

728
00:38:03,760 --> 00:38:07,480
Speaker 2: exist to control that. One of the really important things

729
00:38:07,520 --> 00:38:11,120
Speaker 2: about this ethical conversation to us at andrel in the

730
00:38:11,160 --> 00:38:13,400
Speaker 2: context of the United States, is that, you know, we

731
00:38:13,400 --> 00:38:18,200
Speaker 2: shouldn't take the democratic process for granted. We are blessed

732
00:38:18,239 --> 00:38:20,239
Speaker 2: to be in a place that has a system of

733
00:38:20,320 --> 00:38:24,840
Speaker 2: checks and balances, a very large non political civil servant

734
00:38:25,000 --> 00:38:28,439
Speaker 2: bureaucracy that exists that makes these decisions, and we have

735
00:38:28,800 --> 00:38:32,000
Speaker 2: an ability to change policy at the ballot on a

736
00:38:32,280 --> 00:38:35,799
Speaker 2: every two year basis, basically at a federal level. And

737
00:38:35,880 --> 00:38:41,160
Speaker 2: so we don't believe that the quote enlightened technocrats in

738
00:38:41,560 --> 00:38:44,960
Speaker 2: Silicon Valley should have the ability to decide for the

739
00:38:45,000 --> 00:38:49,040
Speaker 2: American people what technology our government should be using and

740
00:38:49,040 --> 00:38:51,520
Speaker 2: what technology our government shouldn't be using. You know, we

741
00:38:51,560 --> 00:38:54,160
Speaker 2: believe people are really smart and that the government has

742
00:38:54,200 --> 00:38:57,680
Speaker 2: the ability to make changes as needed as this tech

743
00:38:57,760 --> 00:38:58,240
Speaker 2: is devloid.

744
00:38:58,640 --> 00:39:00,440
Speaker 1: One of the most interesting questions I think when it

745
00:39:00,440 --> 00:39:04,319
Speaker 1: comes to the future of tech and war is this,

746
00:39:04,480 --> 00:39:06,319
Speaker 1: I guess I come back to this line. Maybe it's

747
00:39:06,320 --> 00:39:09,000
Speaker 1: a little dramatic, but it's like AI to kill or

748
00:39:09,000 --> 00:39:11,920
Speaker 1: not to kill? Right, Like this idea that you guys

749
00:39:11,960 --> 00:39:15,080
Speaker 1: could be building out autonomous systems that can make the

750
00:39:15,120 --> 00:39:18,719
Speaker 1: decision to kill. Will you do that?

751
00:39:21,000 --> 00:39:25,880
Speaker 2: I mean, our policy internally has always been that in

752
00:39:25,960 --> 00:39:28,880
Speaker 2: almost every case, a human in the loop makes a

753
00:39:28,920 --> 00:39:32,200
Speaker 2: ton of sense. There are certainly cases where they might

754
00:39:32,200 --> 00:39:36,160
Speaker 2: not even involve human casualties, where you really can't have

755
00:39:36,200 --> 00:39:39,200
Speaker 2: a human For example, if you have hypersonic missiles flying

756
00:39:39,280 --> 00:39:41,600
Speaker 2: at you, you have like a split second to make

757
00:39:41,640 --> 00:39:43,800
Speaker 2: a decision about whether or not you're going to shoot

758
00:39:43,800 --> 00:39:46,320
Speaker 2: it down. And these are the types of things again

759
00:39:46,480 --> 00:39:50,840
Speaker 2: like iron Dome, that have been driven by computers. And

760
00:39:50,920 --> 00:39:55,000
Speaker 2: so there's this constant conversation that seems to be happening about, well,

761
00:39:55,200 --> 00:39:57,759
Speaker 2: in what future world like, will we just have to

762
00:39:57,760 --> 00:39:59,880
Speaker 2: make these decisions? Actually, like we've been doing this for

763
00:40:00,160 --> 00:40:03,200
Speaker 2: over a decade. There are computers that are making kinetic

764
00:40:03,320 --> 00:40:06,799
Speaker 2: decisions on a regular basis today when it deals with

765
00:40:07,120 --> 00:40:09,840
Speaker 2: human life. I think it raises the stakes quite a

766
00:40:09,840 --> 00:40:12,160
Speaker 2: bit in the engagement of humans in the loop and

767
00:40:12,200 --> 00:40:16,080
Speaker 2: that decision making, which does feel really important. I think

768
00:40:16,200 --> 00:40:19,359
Speaker 2: one of the conversations that doesn't seem to get enough

769
00:40:19,400 --> 00:40:24,120
Speaker 2: airtime is the idea that you can't just wait for

770
00:40:24,239 --> 00:40:27,880
Speaker 2: all of the theory around the ethics to be worked

771
00:40:27,880 --> 00:40:31,400
Speaker 2: out before you build something, because our adversaries will build

772
00:40:31,400 --> 00:40:34,080
Speaker 2: it and if we look back at history, you can

773
00:40:34,080 --> 00:40:37,040
Speaker 2: see that the welder of the technology, the person that

774
00:40:37,080 --> 00:40:39,799
Speaker 2: builds the technology and owns the technology, is really in

775
00:40:39,840 --> 00:40:43,200
Speaker 2: control of the standards and norms that are used to

776
00:40:43,239 --> 00:40:46,120
Speaker 2: deploy that technology. You can see this with the way

777
00:40:46,120 --> 00:40:48,840
Speaker 2: that China is approaching regulation around five G with the

778
00:40:48,880 --> 00:40:51,960
Speaker 2: International Telecommunications Union. They have a seat at the table.

779
00:40:52,160 --> 00:40:54,080
Speaker 2: We do not have a seat at the table. And

780
00:40:54,400 --> 00:40:58,600
Speaker 2: if you go into these conversations assuming that we're going

781
00:40:58,640 --> 00:41:01,200
Speaker 2: to somehow be able to, you know, push our agenda,

782
00:41:01,600 --> 00:41:03,799
Speaker 2: I think you will find in history that has been

783
00:41:03,840 --> 00:41:06,880
Speaker 2: the wrong assumption. Another example of this is the Intermediate

784
00:41:06,960 --> 00:41:09,960
Speaker 2: Range Nuclear Forces Treaty I inf that we had with

785
00:41:10,080 --> 00:41:12,880
Speaker 2: the Soviet Union, where we agreed with the Soviet Union

786
00:41:13,200 --> 00:41:16,480
Speaker 2: that we wouldn't build intermediate range ballistic missiles. China was

787
00:41:16,520 --> 00:41:19,000
Speaker 2: never a party this treaty. They move forward with building

788
00:41:19,040 --> 00:41:22,080
Speaker 2: intermediate range ballistic missiles. Then Russia, when they realized that

789
00:41:22,239 --> 00:41:26,120
Speaker 2: was happening, they also began building intermediate range ballistic missiles.

790
00:41:26,400 --> 00:41:29,440
Speaker 2: And so we put not only ourselves to the disadvantage,

791
00:41:29,480 --> 00:41:32,520
Speaker 2: but we put our service members in the Pacific at

792
00:41:32,640 --> 00:41:36,319
Speaker 2: risk for their lives because we were beholden to a

793
00:41:36,360 --> 00:41:39,399
Speaker 2: treaty that was not being followed, that was not being

794
00:41:39,520 --> 00:41:43,200
Speaker 2: taken seriously. And so whether or not we build AI

795
00:41:43,320 --> 00:41:45,920
Speaker 2: for defense, whether or not we build autonomous systems for defense,

796
00:41:45,960 --> 00:41:48,240
Speaker 2: whether or not we build better precision fires for defense,

797
00:41:48,560 --> 00:41:51,319
Speaker 2: whether or not we build quantum computers for defense, other

798
00:41:51,360 --> 00:41:53,399
Speaker 2: people are going to build these things. And we want

799
00:41:53,400 --> 00:41:54,839
Speaker 2: to be in a position where we have a seat

800
00:41:54,840 --> 00:41:57,800
Speaker 2: at the table talking about how those technologies are being used.

801
00:41:58,040 --> 00:42:00,040
Speaker 1: So take me to that seat at the table, so

802
00:42:00,080 --> 00:42:01,759
Speaker 1: as you have a seat at the table, you guys

803
00:42:01,760 --> 00:42:03,640
Speaker 1: are sitting there talking about these things. I remember the

804
00:42:03,680 --> 00:42:06,200
Speaker 1: last time I interviewed Palmer, like asking him that same

805
00:42:06,280 --> 00:42:09,600
Speaker 1: question about like will you deploy technology that could make

806
00:42:09,600 --> 00:42:12,440
Speaker 1: the decision to kill? And I remember, I think I

807
00:42:12,480 --> 00:42:15,239
Speaker 1: remember him, you know, saying right now, no, But that

808
00:42:15,280 --> 00:42:17,560
Speaker 1: doesn't mean in the future we won't, you know. And

809
00:42:17,600 --> 00:42:20,040
Speaker 1: I thought that was really interesting because I do think

810
00:42:20,040 --> 00:42:22,920
Speaker 1: it comes with all these really interesting ethical issues of

811
00:42:23,120 --> 00:42:26,560
Speaker 1: at what point and who's coding the decisions it's making,

812
00:42:26,719 --> 00:42:30,360
Speaker 1: and AI is so flawed in general, But so have

813
00:42:30,560 --> 00:42:34,000
Speaker 1: those conversations moved forward with you guys. I mean, what,

814
00:42:34,040 --> 00:42:35,960
Speaker 1: when's the last time you spoke about it or what

815
00:42:36,080 --> 00:42:37,000
Speaker 1: was the nature of it.

816
00:42:38,360 --> 00:42:41,120
Speaker 2: I can't think of any specific examples of tech that

817
00:42:41,120 --> 00:42:43,760
Speaker 2: we're building right now where that has been an issue.

818
00:42:44,120 --> 00:42:46,680
Speaker 2: But I think Palmer's answer is correct. I mean, there

819
00:42:46,680 --> 00:42:50,799
Speaker 2: are a lot of versions of just war application that

820
00:42:50,880 --> 00:42:54,520
Speaker 2: do involve lethality. It's very, very hard to predict the

821
00:42:54,560 --> 00:42:57,600
Speaker 2: future to say, like what the conflicts of tomorrow will be,

822
00:42:58,120 --> 00:43:01,520
Speaker 2: and you know the types of decisions technologists will have

823
00:43:01,560 --> 00:43:04,759
Speaker 2: to make in order to sustain an advantage in those conflicts.

824
00:43:05,239 --> 00:43:07,680
Speaker 2: But to the extent that the tech is deployed as

825
00:43:07,680 --> 00:43:10,200
Speaker 2: the last resort, to the extent that it is more discriminate,

826
00:43:10,400 --> 00:43:13,080
Speaker 2: to the extent that it is more proportional, to the

827
00:43:13,080 --> 00:43:16,400
Speaker 2: extent that it ensures last right intent and just authority,

828
00:43:16,840 --> 00:43:20,960
Speaker 2: and it ensures that human flourishing can continue in a

829
00:43:21,040 --> 00:43:24,799
Speaker 2: more abundant way. Absolutely, there are I'm sure there are

830
00:43:24,800 --> 00:43:28,760
Speaker 2: applications of technology that will have lethal intent that fulfill

831
00:43:28,840 --> 00:43:31,600
Speaker 2: and check all of those boxes that said, I'm sure

832
00:43:31,600 --> 00:43:34,120
Speaker 2: there are also technologies that will not. And those are

833
00:43:34,120 --> 00:43:36,960
Speaker 2: the technologies that not only would I not build, but

834
00:43:37,040 --> 00:43:38,359
Speaker 2: I also would not invest in them.

835
00:43:38,520 --> 00:43:41,879
Speaker 1: We're talking about the future of autonomous weapons and make

836
00:43:41,960 --> 00:43:45,040
Speaker 1: AI making the decision to kill not to kill. Are

837
00:43:45,040 --> 00:43:47,440
Speaker 1: you worried that if it makes a decision in a

838
00:43:47,480 --> 00:43:50,240
Speaker 1: split second, like traditionally it's been a human making that decision,

839
00:43:50,280 --> 00:43:52,920
Speaker 1: and we can put that on somebody that in the

840
00:43:52,920 --> 00:43:55,759
Speaker 1: future that this if AI makes the wrong decision, that

841
00:43:55,800 --> 00:43:57,920
Speaker 1: could the liability could fall on you, guys.

842
00:43:58,400 --> 00:44:01,400
Speaker 2: I think liability is a complex issue with all technology,

843
00:44:01,440 --> 00:44:04,000
Speaker 2: whether it's you know, self driving cars in the consumer

844
00:44:04,040 --> 00:44:06,960
Speaker 2: world or you know military technology and the defense world.

845
00:44:07,320 --> 00:44:10,640
Speaker 2: Of course, like the liability needs to be worked out

846
00:44:10,680 --> 00:44:13,919
Speaker 2: at some point, whether it's through regulation, whether it's through

847
00:44:14,040 --> 00:44:17,680
Speaker 2: some sort of legislative action. I don't view that as

848
00:44:17,680 --> 00:44:19,680
Speaker 2: something that would deter me from wanting to work in

849
00:44:19,760 --> 00:44:22,960
Speaker 2: this space, because again, I believe in the democratic process,

850
00:44:22,960 --> 00:44:24,680
Speaker 2: and I believe that there will be some sort of

851
00:44:24,800 --> 00:44:28,480
Speaker 2: fair reckoning for these things. I think one of the

852
00:44:28,480 --> 00:44:31,239
Speaker 2: things that has kind of always been inspiring to me

853
00:44:31,280 --> 00:44:34,840
Speaker 2: in this is that science fiction has kind of thought

854
00:44:34,880 --> 00:44:37,840
Speaker 2: through a lot of these ethical challenges well ahead of

855
00:44:37,880 --> 00:44:40,280
Speaker 2: its time, like well well well ahead of its time,

856
00:44:40,600 --> 00:44:42,839
Speaker 2: and so science fiction is an awesome place to go

857
00:44:43,239 --> 00:44:46,440
Speaker 2: to start talking through some of these really complex challenges,

858
00:44:46,800 --> 00:44:49,440
Speaker 2: like for example, the prime directive in Star Trek, Like

859
00:44:49,719 --> 00:44:52,799
Speaker 2: you know, Elon's over here talking about interstellar travel and

860
00:44:52,840 --> 00:44:56,040
Speaker 2: things like that. It's like Star Trek has worked through

861
00:44:56,920 --> 00:45:03,040
Speaker 2: more academic research on the impact of visiting neighboring civilizations

862
00:45:03,440 --> 00:45:07,359
Speaker 2: than any like university has. And I think these are

863
00:45:07,360 --> 00:45:09,239
Speaker 2: the types of things that we can and should be

864
00:45:09,280 --> 00:45:11,799
Speaker 2: looking to fiction to partially inform so that we can

865
00:45:11,840 --> 00:45:15,080
Speaker 2: be more prepared you know, at the eventual moment that

866
00:45:15,160 --> 00:45:17,360
Speaker 2: those technologies come to fruition, if they come to fruition

867
00:45:17,440 --> 00:45:19,439
Speaker 2: at all. But I think Star Trek is a great

868
00:45:19,440 --> 00:45:20,080
Speaker 2: example of that.

869
00:45:23,920 --> 00:45:25,640
Speaker 1: We're going to take another quick break to hear from

870
00:45:25,680 --> 00:45:31,080
Speaker 1: our sponsors. But when we come back, a mishap with Lightsabers, yep,

871
00:45:31,320 --> 00:45:35,480
Speaker 1: you heard me correctly, Lightsabers. And if you have questions

872
00:45:35,480 --> 00:45:39,040
Speaker 1: about the show, comments, really anything, you can text me

873
00:45:39,120 --> 00:45:42,520
Speaker 1: on my new community number nine one seven five four

874
00:45:42,680 --> 00:46:07,359
Speaker 1: zero three four one zero. So what would you say,

875
00:46:07,400 --> 00:46:09,960
Speaker 1: like as an ethicist and someone who's kind of thinking

876
00:46:10,000 --> 00:46:13,000
Speaker 1: about these things, and you say, like, let's go specifically

877
00:46:13,040 --> 00:46:14,880
Speaker 1: to andro, like if this is the kind of thing

878
00:46:14,880 --> 00:46:16,880
Speaker 1: that could come down the pipeline, Like what would you

879
00:46:16,920 --> 00:46:19,520
Speaker 1: want people to keep in mind when thinking about deploying

880
00:46:19,560 --> 00:46:21,960
Speaker 1: these systems with AI that have the ability to make

881
00:46:21,960 --> 00:46:24,640
Speaker 1: these decisions, Like, what is the conversation we should be

882
00:46:24,680 --> 00:46:27,920
Speaker 1: having nationally, Like, because you talk about the government, you know,

883
00:46:28,040 --> 00:46:30,640
Speaker 1: you need to regulate this, but oftentimes the government is

884
00:46:30,800 --> 00:46:33,240
Speaker 1: you know this probably better than anyone light years behind

885
00:46:33,239 --> 00:46:36,359
Speaker 1: the technology. So what is the conversation that we should

886
00:46:36,440 --> 00:46:38,399
Speaker 1: be having about this kind of thing.

887
00:46:39,160 --> 00:46:43,040
Speaker 2: Well, certainly within the government, the DoD the Department of

888
00:46:43,040 --> 00:46:47,440
Speaker 2: Defense has a very detailed rule of engagement that they

889
00:46:47,480 --> 00:46:50,239
Speaker 2: followed for a very very long time. This goes back to,

890
00:46:50,680 --> 00:46:53,160
Speaker 2: you know, the inclusion of the Geneva Conventions and United

891
00:46:53,200 --> 00:46:56,479
Speaker 2: Nations agreements about use of force. And so I think

892
00:46:56,640 --> 00:46:59,920
Speaker 2: these types of conversations come naturally to the defense community.

893
00:47:00,120 --> 00:47:02,840
Speaker 2: They know how to think about it. In the tech community,

894
00:47:02,960 --> 00:47:05,320
Speaker 2: I think it comes way less naturally, And that's where

895
00:47:05,360 --> 00:47:08,280
Speaker 2: I have to engage more with people on it, because

896
00:47:08,920 --> 00:47:13,040
Speaker 2: you know, these are generally strongly held, very strong beliefs,

897
00:47:13,120 --> 00:47:15,960
Speaker 2: with very little data to back them up. People that say,

898
00:47:16,000 --> 00:47:18,560
Speaker 2: like in theory, I would you know, I would never

899
00:47:18,600 --> 00:47:21,160
Speaker 2: work on these things, but I also haven't considered any

900
00:47:21,160 --> 00:47:24,480
Speaker 2: of the implications that lead to those decisions. And so

901
00:47:24,560 --> 00:47:27,759
Speaker 2: it becomes more of a conversation about presenting scenarios and

902
00:47:27,800 --> 00:47:30,200
Speaker 2: saying what is the most ethical way to move forward

903
00:47:30,280 --> 00:47:32,680
Speaker 2: with this? This is what the dinners at my house

904
00:47:32,800 --> 00:47:35,040
Speaker 2: are about. These are not I'm not hosting and Roil

905
00:47:35,080 --> 00:47:36,880
Speaker 2: employees at my house. That would be kind of a waste.

906
00:47:37,120 --> 00:47:37,879
Speaker 2: It gives me an.

907
00:47:37,760 --> 00:47:40,000
Speaker 1: Example, I think, I guess that's what I'm interested in. Like,

908
00:47:40,040 --> 00:47:41,799
Speaker 1: give me an example of one of those like those

909
00:47:42,280 --> 00:47:43,880
Speaker 1: scenarios that you guys talk about.

910
00:47:43,960 --> 00:47:48,080
Speaker 2: Sure, so let's imagine that North Korea either has like

911
00:47:48,320 --> 00:47:52,600
Speaker 2: humans or robots or humans in robots like mech warrior style,

912
00:47:53,440 --> 00:47:57,400
Speaker 2: and they just like flood into the demilitarized zone just

913
00:47:57,480 --> 00:48:02,040
Speaker 2: like thousands and thousands of objects that are pushing forward.

914
00:48:02,520 --> 00:48:06,840
Speaker 2: You have the option of a taking a like serious

915
00:48:06,920 --> 00:48:10,600
Speaker 2: kinetic one to many action and you know, firing very

916
00:48:10,640 --> 00:48:15,160
Speaker 2: large bombs, missiles, nukes, whatever to eliminate them, not knowing

917
00:48:15,480 --> 00:48:18,319
Speaker 2: what's good what's bad, or otherwise not knowing if there's

918
00:48:18,360 --> 00:48:20,759
Speaker 2: like a zombie plague that's like forcing everyone to flee

919
00:48:20,800 --> 00:48:24,680
Speaker 2: the country, or you can do some sort of AI

920
00:48:24,880 --> 00:48:27,560
Speaker 2: assisted like auto turret. So there's like, you know, I

921
00:48:27,560 --> 00:48:29,879
Speaker 2: don't know, guns on a swivel that you can kind

922
00:48:29,920 --> 00:48:33,520
Speaker 2: of control and they automatically lock on target. Or if

923
00:48:33,560 --> 00:48:37,400
Speaker 2: there was an AI that said differentiate between robots between

924
00:48:37,680 --> 00:48:41,640
Speaker 2: people and people that have weapons and only shoot people

925
00:48:41,680 --> 00:48:44,080
Speaker 2: with weapons and robots don't shoot any people that are

926
00:48:44,120 --> 00:48:48,840
Speaker 2: running towards the border without weapons. That's an AI driven technology,

927
00:48:49,040 --> 00:48:51,520
Speaker 2: and there is a lethal kill decision involved, But you

928
00:48:51,560 --> 00:48:55,279
Speaker 2: could save thousands and thousands and thousands of lives by

929
00:48:55,320 --> 00:48:59,440
Speaker 2: executing that strategy. Instead, a human could never make decisions

930
00:48:59,480 --> 00:49:02,480
Speaker 2: that rapid with that much data flooding into the system.

931
00:49:02,520 --> 00:49:04,759
Speaker 2: There's just no way they could do that and deconflicting

932
00:49:04,800 --> 00:49:06,480
Speaker 2: across all those targets at the same time.

933
00:49:07,160 --> 00:49:09,240
Speaker 1: I mean, and the idea is that even when humans

934
00:49:09,280 --> 00:49:12,680
Speaker 1: do make these decisions, oftentimes they are tired, fatigue, stress,

935
00:49:12,719 --> 00:49:15,560
Speaker 1: and under all of these and in these different situations

936
00:49:15,600 --> 00:49:18,160
Speaker 1: of when to decide to make the decision to kill

937
00:49:18,239 --> 00:49:18,960
Speaker 1: or not to kill.

938
00:49:18,960 --> 00:49:21,360
Speaker 2: I think if you go in you talk to the

939
00:49:21,400 --> 00:49:25,200
Speaker 2: soldiers that served in the last few international conflicts, the

940
00:49:25,280 --> 00:49:28,239
Speaker 2: decisions that torment them, that keep them awake at night,

941
00:49:28,560 --> 00:49:31,200
Speaker 2: are decisions that they had to make in the blink

942
00:49:31,200 --> 00:49:33,640
Speaker 2: of an eye. You know, a vehicle driving at high

943
00:49:33,640 --> 00:49:36,520
Speaker 2: speed towards one of their bases. You don't know if

944
00:49:36,520 --> 00:49:39,400
Speaker 2: that's a sick child and the father is just trying

945
00:49:39,440 --> 00:49:42,000
Speaker 2: to get them to medical care as quickly as possible,

946
00:49:42,360 --> 00:49:45,480
Speaker 2: or you know, a car full of explosive material that's

947
00:49:45,480 --> 00:49:47,880
Speaker 2: going to run into your base and kill service members

948
00:49:48,360 --> 00:49:50,560
Speaker 2: and they have to make these split second decisions about

949
00:49:50,600 --> 00:49:53,880
Speaker 2: what to do. They want more information, they want to

950
00:49:53,920 --> 00:49:57,640
Speaker 2: be able to make better trioge decisions, and by withholding

951
00:49:57,640 --> 00:50:00,000
Speaker 2: that technology for them, we're putting people's lives at resk,

952
00:50:00,080 --> 00:50:01,680
Speaker 2: both service members as well as civilians.

953
00:50:01,800 --> 00:50:04,040
Speaker 1: I only play the Devil's advocate on AI because then

954
00:50:04,040 --> 00:50:06,120
Speaker 1: I think about how flawed AI can be, how bias

955
00:50:06,160 --> 00:50:08,200
Speaker 1: it can be, and how sometimes the algorithm makes these

956
00:50:08,200 --> 00:50:10,440
Speaker 1: decisions and someone's on the other side of it and

957
00:50:10,440 --> 00:50:12,640
Speaker 1: you're like, wait a second, how did that happen? And

958
00:50:12,760 --> 00:50:16,520
Speaker 1: you question that as well. So I think they're equally

959
00:50:17,640 --> 00:50:20,360
Speaker 1: very different issues, but issues when it comes to AI

960
00:50:20,480 --> 00:50:23,320
Speaker 1: making these decisions, and I think, no doubt the future

961
00:50:23,360 --> 00:50:26,200
Speaker 1: will be autonomous systems that are AI driven when it

962
00:50:26,239 --> 00:50:29,000
Speaker 1: comes to the future of war. So like that seems

963
00:50:29,040 --> 00:50:31,440
Speaker 1: complicated to me as well, since AI is biased.

964
00:50:31,600 --> 00:50:34,520
Speaker 2: Yeah, there's bias in both directions. For sure. Human beings

965
00:50:34,640 --> 00:50:37,200
Speaker 2: have biases that they don't even realize they have that

966
00:50:37,320 --> 00:50:40,719
Speaker 2: cause them to make decisions. Computers have different sets of biases.

967
00:50:41,120 --> 00:50:43,879
Speaker 2: To the extent that we can understand the way that

968
00:50:43,920 --> 00:50:46,680
Speaker 2: these models are working, we can correct a lot of

969
00:50:46,680 --> 00:50:49,480
Speaker 2: those over time. I don't think there has ever in

970
00:50:49,520 --> 00:50:53,400
Speaker 2: the history of technology been a something that was perfect

971
00:50:53,440 --> 00:50:56,400
Speaker 2: at the outset, Like there's always room to improve. There

972
00:50:56,400 --> 00:50:58,000
Speaker 2: are things that we can do to make the models

973
00:50:58,000 --> 00:51:00,720
Speaker 2: more accurate, reduce the bias that's employer sit in them,

974
00:51:00,920 --> 00:51:02,839
Speaker 2: And I think that is important work.

975
00:51:02,880 --> 00:51:04,440
Speaker 1: But like to draw a line from me, I mean,

976
00:51:04,480 --> 00:51:07,000
Speaker 1: just draw I'm just asking for one line, you know,

977
00:51:07,200 --> 00:51:09,600
Speaker 1: like just give me something a certain type of defense

978
00:51:09,640 --> 00:51:12,799
Speaker 1: technology that you will not build, Like just like what

979
00:51:12,920 --> 00:51:15,840
Speaker 1: is your nozone? Like what is your Like someone says something,

980
00:51:15,920 --> 00:51:17,239
Speaker 1: You're like, ugh, not that.

981
00:51:17,880 --> 00:51:20,440
Speaker 2: I actually think these are really easy And there's a

982
00:51:20,440 --> 00:51:23,319
Speaker 2: bunch of them. Like one example would be some sort

983
00:51:23,360 --> 00:51:26,799
Speaker 2: of like bio plague that you can release into an

984
00:51:26,920 --> 00:51:32,319
Speaker 2: enemy territory, right, coronavirus, Like pretty sure that's ethically bad

985
00:51:32,719 --> 00:51:36,400
Speaker 2: if that was an adversary launching that attack. Anything that

986
00:51:36,560 --> 00:51:41,920
Speaker 2: is disproportionately affecting non combatants is to be avoided in

987
00:51:42,000 --> 00:51:45,959
Speaker 2: my mind, so I think that's one. Another is technology

988
00:51:46,080 --> 00:51:50,360
Speaker 2: that conceals information rather than making it more accessible to

989
00:51:50,400 --> 00:51:52,759
Speaker 2: decision makers. You can look at things like the Great

990
00:51:52,800 --> 00:51:57,760
Speaker 2: Firewall in China, or El Pakeet and Cuba blocking out information,

991
00:51:57,960 --> 00:52:01,440
Speaker 2: or the denial of Russia for its incursions into the

992
00:52:01,560 --> 00:52:04,640
Speaker 2: Ukraine and in Georgia. I think these are all like

993
00:52:04,719 --> 00:52:07,880
Speaker 2: examples of places where the government has made a concerted

994
00:52:07,920 --> 00:52:12,200
Speaker 2: effort to hide information from their population to defend potentially

995
00:52:12,520 --> 00:52:14,640
Speaker 2: a crazy decision that they might make in the future

996
00:52:15,000 --> 00:52:17,399
Speaker 2: that's super bad and not something that I would want

997
00:52:17,400 --> 00:52:18,480
Speaker 2: to be involved in ethically.

998
00:52:18,920 --> 00:52:20,879
Speaker 1: Has there been something at Andrew that kind of got

999
00:52:20,960 --> 00:52:23,560
Speaker 1: left on the cutting room table? You just decided we're

1000
00:52:23,560 --> 00:52:24,719
Speaker 1: not we're not building this.

1001
00:52:24,800 --> 00:52:27,920
Speaker 2: Ah none for ethical reasons, because we haven't really like

1002
00:52:28,080 --> 00:52:30,680
Speaker 2: edged into any of these crazy territories. Yet there are

1003
00:52:30,719 --> 00:52:33,240
Speaker 2: some that have been left on the cutting room table

1004
00:52:33,320 --> 00:52:36,640
Speaker 2: because they didn't work like we thought they should and

1005
00:52:36,800 --> 00:52:40,520
Speaker 2: weren't worth pursuing. We've had some crazy ideas around, like

1006
00:52:41,040 --> 00:52:43,239
Speaker 2: real life lightsabers and stuff like that, and it turns

1007
00:52:43,280 --> 00:52:45,080
Speaker 2: out that some of these things, like the science just

1008
00:52:45,200 --> 00:52:47,200
Speaker 2: isn't ready yet, by the way, the same can be

1009
00:52:47,239 --> 00:52:52,000
Speaker 2: said for augmented reality. For decades, soldiers have been really

1010
00:52:52,040 --> 00:52:54,839
Speaker 2: interested in a heads up display that they can wear

1011
00:52:54,920 --> 00:52:59,239
Speaker 2: in combat that gives them information on mission objectives, on

1012
00:52:59,560 --> 00:53:02,720
Speaker 2: where only actors are to prevent them from getting involved

1013
00:53:02,719 --> 00:53:07,239
Speaker 2: in friendly fire accidents, so on and so forth, map overlays.

1014
00:53:07,520 --> 00:53:09,040
Speaker 1: I remember Palmer saying that to me, and I thought

1015
00:53:09,040 --> 00:53:10,760
Speaker 1: that was really interesting. The last time we did an interview,

1016
00:53:10,760 --> 00:53:12,480
Speaker 1: who's saying the future almost feels like a bit of

1017
00:53:12,520 --> 00:53:14,759
Speaker 1: a video game, right, like and he and he has

1018
00:53:14,800 --> 00:53:17,600
Speaker 1: the video gaming background from Oculus, but like, you know,

1019
00:53:17,640 --> 00:53:21,000
Speaker 1: you have this almost virtual or augmented reality layer that

1020
00:53:21,040 --> 00:53:22,440
Speaker 1: shows you everything around you.

1021
00:53:22,760 --> 00:53:23,120
Speaker 2: That's right.

1022
00:53:23,239 --> 00:53:25,480
Speaker 1: Now You've just added like the idea of a lightsaber too,

1023
00:53:25,520 --> 00:53:27,239
Speaker 1: So my mind is blown a little bit.

1024
00:53:27,480 --> 00:53:29,799
Speaker 2: I think we can probably press pauls in the light saber, don't.

1025
00:53:29,800 --> 00:53:30,600
Speaker 2: I don't think that's hard.

1026
00:53:30,880 --> 00:53:31,880
Speaker 1: How far did you get?

1027
00:53:32,280 --> 00:53:35,239
Speaker 2: It got far enough that Palmer accidentally cut himself and

1028
00:53:35,640 --> 00:53:36,839
Speaker 2: had to get metical care.

1029
00:53:37,680 --> 00:53:39,600
Speaker 1: So what you guys built that is.

1030
00:53:39,640 --> 00:53:42,000
Speaker 2: That's a question for Palmer. I don't. I don't understand

1031
00:53:42,040 --> 00:53:44,399
Speaker 2: the exact physics of what happened, but needless to say,

1032
00:53:44,400 --> 00:53:46,440
Speaker 2: we are no longer building it. By the way, that

1033
00:53:46,520 --> 00:53:49,520
Speaker 2: would have been to use for breaching, so instead of

1034
00:53:49,680 --> 00:53:53,640
Speaker 2: putting C four on doors, using a plasma cutter essentially

1035
00:53:53,719 --> 00:53:55,719
Speaker 2: to get into denied environments.

1036
00:53:55,960 --> 00:53:58,879
Speaker 1: Oh man, so not like actually no, no, no, not hand

1037
00:53:58,920 --> 00:54:03,080
Speaker 1: to hand combat, just ensuring. Okay, And uh.

1038
00:54:03,280 --> 00:54:05,319
Speaker 2: So let's see what's the question.

1039
00:54:05,600 --> 00:54:07,080
Speaker 1: I know it's pretty far. It's pretty hard to come

1040
00:54:07,120 --> 00:54:07,480
Speaker 1: back from that.

1041
00:54:07,640 --> 00:54:10,360
Speaker 2: Yeah, we've just like gone down this path. Should we

1042
00:54:10,400 --> 00:54:13,880
Speaker 2: go for augmented reality? And so this has been a

1043
00:54:13,920 --> 00:54:16,160
Speaker 2: dream for soldiers for a really long time, and I

1044
00:54:16,400 --> 00:54:19,839
Speaker 2: think it would be incredible, Like there are all sorts

1045
00:54:19,880 --> 00:54:22,640
Speaker 2: of like ethical goods that can come out of this. Primarily,

1046
00:54:22,719 --> 00:54:25,600
Speaker 2: I think most people would be shocked by how many

1047
00:54:25,680 --> 00:54:29,240
Speaker 2: casualties that are caused in theater are friendly fire related,

1048
00:54:29,520 --> 00:54:32,839
Speaker 2: Like it's just deconflicting. All of the stuff that's going

1049
00:54:32,880 --> 00:54:36,200
Speaker 2: on is really hard and will only become harder as

1050
00:54:36,239 --> 00:54:40,839
Speaker 2: there are more autonomous assets deployed. And uh, obviously our

1051
00:54:40,880 --> 00:54:44,680
Speaker 2: team is the best in the world for building heads

1052
00:54:44,760 --> 00:54:47,719
Speaker 2: up displays for defense purposes. There's I don't think there's

1053
00:54:47,719 --> 00:54:50,000
Speaker 2: anyone in the world that has more talent than we

1054
00:54:50,080 --> 00:54:51,480
Speaker 2: do around this specific topic.

1055
00:54:51,640 --> 00:54:53,840
Speaker 1: I mean, if anyone's going to build out something like this,

1056
00:54:54,000 --> 00:54:57,400
Speaker 1: it could be the Oculous team, right that has built Oculus.

1057
00:54:57,520 --> 00:54:59,479
Speaker 2: Yeah, No, I mean there's there is no better team

1058
00:54:59,560 --> 00:55:03,359
Speaker 2: for doing that. And our decision was that it's just

1059
00:55:03,360 --> 00:55:05,960
Speaker 2: not there yet. The science is not there yet to

1060
00:55:06,040 --> 00:55:09,400
Speaker 2: make it credible. In deployment, there's a d D contract

1061
00:55:09,440 --> 00:55:13,760
Speaker 2: called IVAS, IVAS and Microsoft on the contract to deploy

1062
00:55:13,760 --> 00:55:17,719
Speaker 2: hollow lens, but it's like super test and prototype driven obviously,

1063
00:55:17,760 --> 00:55:20,680
Speaker 2: Like it's hard to imagine a soldier walking into combat

1064
00:55:20,719 --> 00:55:25,600
Speaker 2: with like a you know, really heavy, blocky HoloLens hanging

1065
00:55:25,640 --> 00:55:27,520
Speaker 2: over their head with a really tiny field of view,

1066
00:55:27,840 --> 00:55:30,080
Speaker 2: and so I think that there's some like test and

1067
00:55:30,120 --> 00:55:33,560
Speaker 2: evaluation that's happening to figure out what the future might

1068
00:55:33,600 --> 00:55:35,920
Speaker 2: look like. But you know, we'll be there and ready

1069
00:55:36,160 --> 00:55:38,759
Speaker 2: when the science is ready to make it possible. And

1070
00:55:38,840 --> 00:55:41,799
Speaker 2: the software that we're building this lattice platform is at

1071
00:55:41,840 --> 00:55:43,279
Speaker 2: the end of the day, it is the back end

1072
00:55:43,520 --> 00:55:45,840
Speaker 2: for feeding all of that data to the operator in

1073
00:55:45,840 --> 00:55:49,000
Speaker 2: the field, whether it's on their mobile device, you know,

1074
00:55:49,200 --> 00:55:53,520
Speaker 2: over radio communication or eventually in an augmented reality headset.

1075
00:55:53,920 --> 00:55:56,000
Speaker 1: And have you had any qualms of working with the

1076
00:55:56,040 --> 00:55:57,880
Speaker 1: current administration. I mean, I know you are part of

1077
00:55:57,880 --> 00:56:01,040
Speaker 1: the transition team for Trump and helping with Defense and

1078
00:56:01,040 --> 00:56:04,439
Speaker 1: giving recommendations on what they should do. Have you had

1079
00:56:04,520 --> 00:56:07,520
Speaker 1: any hesitations? And I know that you guys aren't political.

1080
00:56:07,560 --> 00:56:09,640
Speaker 1: You say you're not political, But do you take any

1081
00:56:09,800 --> 00:56:12,840
Speaker 1: of that into account to an extent, I mean beyond

1082
00:56:12,840 --> 00:56:16,040
Speaker 1: the fact that, yes, Silicon Valley is notoriously liberal. But

1083
00:56:16,680 --> 00:56:18,560
Speaker 1: I mean even for you personally, now that we're in

1084
00:56:18,600 --> 00:56:22,000
Speaker 1: an enclosed room and you know we have time so

1085
00:56:22,080 --> 00:56:24,600
Speaker 1: you can't really get out, I mean, do you think

1086
00:56:24,640 --> 00:56:27,880
Speaker 1: about any of this stuff personally, like what you're building,

1087
00:56:27,920 --> 00:56:30,359
Speaker 1: who you're building it for, where it's going to go,

1088
00:56:30,480 --> 00:56:31,800
Speaker 1: where it's going to end up.

1089
00:56:32,440 --> 00:56:35,000
Speaker 2: Talk to me, Are you implying that the door is

1090
00:56:35,040 --> 00:56:36,319
Speaker 2: locked and I'm not allowed to leave?

1091
00:56:36,840 --> 00:56:40,120
Speaker 1: Did I do that? I don't think, honestly, I don't

1092
00:56:40,120 --> 00:56:40,760
Speaker 1: think it's locked.

1093
00:56:41,520 --> 00:56:44,880
Speaker 2: The reality is, like I work at the intersection of tech, finance,

1094
00:56:44,960 --> 00:56:47,719
Speaker 2: and government, which are like the three most hated industries

1095
00:56:47,760 --> 00:56:52,200
Speaker 2: in America. So I'm not shying away from conflict or controversy.

1096
00:56:52,640 --> 00:56:55,160
Speaker 2: The way to state our engagement with the government is

1097
00:56:55,160 --> 00:56:58,759
Speaker 2: that we're working with the United States government. Administrations come

1098
00:56:58,760 --> 00:57:02,480
Speaker 2: and go some of them than others. And certainly they

1099
00:57:02,520 --> 00:57:08,120
Speaker 2: have influence in things like budget policy, execution, presidential authorizations

1100
00:57:08,280 --> 00:57:12,200
Speaker 2: like there are things that presidential administrations are responsible for,

1101
00:57:12,640 --> 00:57:17,520
Speaker 2: but by and large, the enormous population of civil servants

1102
00:57:17,560 --> 00:57:20,240
Speaker 2: are the ones that are responsible for executing the mission

1103
00:57:20,360 --> 00:57:23,120
Speaker 2: that they've been given to execute. And we are not

1104
00:57:23,240 --> 00:57:27,000
Speaker 2: going to withhold technology from the people that are responsible

1105
00:57:27,040 --> 00:57:29,000
Speaker 2: for this mission because of who's in the White House.

1106
00:57:29,280 --> 00:57:31,840
Speaker 1: But you are talking about a White House that has

1107
00:57:31,880 --> 00:57:35,280
Speaker 1: come under controversy for an immigration ban, and these are

1108
00:57:35,520 --> 00:57:39,160
Speaker 1: technologies that you're building that directly could impact in that

1109
00:57:39,240 --> 00:57:41,439
Speaker 1: kind of way. So I mean, does that ever come

1110
00:57:41,440 --> 00:57:44,400
Speaker 1: into account for you? Does that ever ply into how

1111
00:57:44,400 --> 00:57:45,160
Speaker 1: you feel about it?

1112
00:57:46,320 --> 00:57:47,960
Speaker 2: I mean, I think this is again the beauty of

1113
00:57:47,960 --> 00:57:51,360
Speaker 2: the democratic process, is that if there were some sort

1114
00:57:51,400 --> 00:57:54,280
Speaker 2: of policy that we had a strong disagreement with internally,

1115
00:57:54,520 --> 00:57:58,000
Speaker 2: unanimously or at least unanimous across the leadership of the company,

1116
00:57:58,440 --> 00:58:01,680
Speaker 2: would we push back can say like we're shutting the

1117
00:58:01,680 --> 00:58:04,880
Speaker 2: business down and not selling to the government because you know,

1118
00:58:04,920 --> 00:58:06,920
Speaker 2: we're afraid of where it's going. I can't say that

1119
00:58:07,280 --> 00:58:10,280
Speaker 2: it would be impossible that that would happen because you know,

1120
00:58:10,360 --> 00:58:13,720
Speaker 2: obviously crazy things have happened to nation states and distress

1121
00:58:13,920 --> 00:58:16,280
Speaker 2: over the history of the world. I don't think we're there.

1122
00:58:16,400 --> 00:58:19,400
Speaker 2: I don't think we're like on the prespice of some

1123
00:58:19,440 --> 00:58:23,240
Speaker 2: sort of revolution that's going to lead to some terrifying

1124
00:58:23,320 --> 00:58:27,600
Speaker 2: world war of significant ethical proportion. So in that regard,

1125
00:58:27,720 --> 00:58:30,560
Speaker 2: like the decision really comes about, you know, do you

1126
00:58:30,560 --> 00:58:32,920
Speaker 2: trust the democratic process? Do you trust that if a

1127
00:58:32,960 --> 00:58:36,440
Speaker 2: policy oversteps that there are ways that that policy can

1128
00:58:36,480 --> 00:58:40,080
Speaker 2: be corrected through the legislative process to the judicial process.

1129
00:58:40,160 --> 00:58:42,600
Speaker 2: And right now, I think the answer is unequivocally yes.

1130
00:58:43,120 --> 00:58:45,920
Speaker 2: We have a democratic controlled House of Representatives. They have

1131
00:58:45,920 --> 00:58:48,880
Speaker 2: the ability to legislate. The judicial branch is you know,

1132
00:58:49,000 --> 00:58:53,400
Speaker 2: functioning in America, where like the constitutionality of the policies

1133
00:58:53,440 --> 00:58:55,600
Speaker 2: that are laid out by the executive and legislative branch

1134
00:58:55,680 --> 00:58:59,760
Speaker 2: is constantly being evaluated. And as long as that's the case,

1135
00:58:59,760 --> 00:59:02,720
Speaker 2: I think I think, you know, it is the right, moral,

1136
00:59:02,760 --> 00:59:06,000
Speaker 2: ethical thing to do to continue working with the government

1137
00:59:06,000 --> 00:59:07,120
Speaker 2: of the United States of America.

1138
00:59:07,360 --> 00:59:09,400
Speaker 1: I didn't mean to almost are laughing, but my follow

1139
00:59:09,440 --> 00:59:11,840
Speaker 1: up was going to be, would you deploy lightsabers to

1140
00:59:11,880 --> 00:59:12,560
Speaker 1: this White House?

1141
00:59:14,600 --> 00:59:18,360
Speaker 2: Wow? I mean we could talk about the like ideology

1142
00:59:18,520 --> 00:59:20,800
Speaker 2: of the last three Star Wars movies, because I think

1143
00:59:20,880 --> 00:59:24,640
Speaker 2: Luke Skywalker in the last Jedi would certainly say that

1144
00:59:24,840 --> 00:59:27,520
Speaker 2: the answer should be no, because Jedi can't be trusted

1145
00:59:27,720 --> 00:59:30,960
Speaker 2: and they should be eradicated from the Earth because it's

1146
00:59:31,080 --> 00:59:34,400
Speaker 2: too much power. But I don't think we're talking about that.

1147
00:59:34,440 --> 00:59:37,360
Speaker 2: And I also think JJ Abrams clearly disagrees and made

1148
00:59:37,400 --> 00:59:39,600
Speaker 2: that very clear and Rise of Skywalker, which as a

1149
00:59:39,640 --> 00:59:41,120
Speaker 2: Star Wars fan, I really appreciate it.

1150
00:59:41,960 --> 00:59:45,720
Speaker 1: Okay, I want to know, Sorry, I totally derailed that.

1151
00:59:47,320 --> 00:59:49,080
Speaker 1: What is it like being involved in a business that

1152
00:59:49,360 --> 00:59:52,120
Speaker 1: a lot of folks in Silicon Valley kind of disagree with?

1153
00:59:52,240 --> 00:59:54,560
Speaker 1: Because you're looking at I think it was twenty eighteen,

1154
00:59:54,640 --> 00:59:57,560
Speaker 1: you have Amazon employees sending a letter to Jeff Bezos saying,

1155
00:59:57,640 --> 01:00:00,800
Speaker 1: you know, stop selling facial recognition and services to the

1156
01:00:00,880 --> 01:00:04,120
Speaker 1: US government. You had I think four thousand Google employees

1157
01:00:04,160 --> 01:00:08,200
Speaker 1: for Project Maven protesting this contract work with the government.

1158
01:00:08,840 --> 01:00:11,600
Speaker 1: This is an issue that's very sensitive of tech companies

1159
01:00:11,600 --> 01:00:15,040
Speaker 1: doing business with the government, especially this current administration. Do

1160
01:00:15,080 --> 01:00:17,840
Speaker 1: you feel that at andrel that it's not a popular

1161
01:00:17,880 --> 01:00:18,520
Speaker 1: thing you're doing.

1162
01:00:20,160 --> 01:00:23,000
Speaker 2: Two answers to the question. First is external to the company,

1163
01:00:23,040 --> 01:00:24,960
Speaker 2: and the second one I think is internal to the company.

1164
01:00:25,280 --> 01:00:28,840
Speaker 2: External the company first and foremost, it is incredibly important

1165
01:00:29,400 --> 01:00:34,320
Speaker 2: that I am available, accessible and having serious dialogue and

1166
01:00:34,360 --> 01:00:37,640
Speaker 2: conversation around what I believe are some of the world's

1167
01:00:37,680 --> 01:00:41,120
Speaker 2: most important questions around the ethics of defense technology. So,

1168
01:00:41,840 --> 01:00:44,680
Speaker 2: and this goes for all of the co founders of

1169
01:00:44,720 --> 01:00:49,200
Speaker 2: the company and Palmer included. And that's basically like, are

1170
01:00:49,200 --> 01:00:52,360
Speaker 2: we going to be dismissive of people's concerns. No, we

1171
01:00:52,360 --> 01:00:54,760
Speaker 2: should not be dismissive of people's concerns. Should we be

1172
01:00:55,000 --> 01:00:57,880
Speaker 2: involved in the dialogue around how these technologies are built,

1173
01:00:57,920 --> 01:01:00,520
Speaker 2: how the regulations are formed. Absolutely, we should be involved

1174
01:01:00,520 --> 01:01:02,920
Speaker 2: in that. And I think that's kind of key to

1175
01:01:03,680 --> 01:01:06,120
Speaker 2: you know, having this conversation with you, Lori, and to

1176
01:01:06,440 --> 01:01:09,560
Speaker 2: hosting dinners at my house and going down to Washington, DC,

1177
01:01:09,600 --> 01:01:12,520
Speaker 2: which I'm doing later this afternoon to engage in conversations

1178
01:01:12,520 --> 01:01:16,600
Speaker 2: with policymakers. It is really important to think through all

1179
01:01:16,640 --> 01:01:19,360
Speaker 2: of the implications of these decisions and make the right

1180
01:01:19,440 --> 01:01:23,400
Speaker 2: ethical decisions to the extent possible. In every case, internal

1181
01:01:23,440 --> 01:01:27,040
Speaker 2: to the company, I think is slightly different. So you know,

1182
01:01:27,080 --> 01:01:29,720
Speaker 2: you could see Brad Smith at Microsoft, Jeff Bezos at

1183
01:01:29,760 --> 01:01:32,600
Speaker 2: Amazon came out and took strong stances of support for

1184
01:01:32,880 --> 01:01:36,080
Speaker 2: the US government, for the Department of Defense. Google kind

1185
01:01:36,080 --> 01:01:38,680
Speaker 2: of went in a different direction, and I think has

1186
01:01:38,720 --> 01:01:42,440
Speaker 2: started backtracking a little bit on those decisions based on

1187
01:01:42,520 --> 01:01:44,760
Speaker 2: just a realization of the control of the business that

1188
01:01:44,920 --> 01:01:47,960
Speaker 2: the activist had internally. But at ANROL, you know, we're

1189
01:01:47,960 --> 01:01:52,400
Speaker 2: in a unique position because unlike Google, unlike Amazon, unlike Microsoft,

1190
01:01:52,800 --> 01:01:56,240
Speaker 2: our employees signed up to work on defense technology. And

1191
01:01:56,280 --> 01:01:58,400
Speaker 2: so when you read those letters that were written at

1192
01:01:58,400 --> 01:02:01,800
Speaker 2: other tech companies, the key point of contention was that

1193
01:02:01,840 --> 01:02:05,080
Speaker 2: they didn't quote sign up to work on defense. Well,

1194
01:02:05,080 --> 01:02:08,400
Speaker 2: at ANDREL they quote signed up for defense. They knew

1195
01:02:08,400 --> 01:02:11,960
Speaker 2: that from day one, and so regardless of political persuasion,

1196
01:02:12,320 --> 01:02:16,040
Speaker 2: you know, whether they're socialists or libertarians, or Big R

1197
01:02:16,160 --> 01:02:19,800
Speaker 2: Republicans or Little R, it doesn't matter. Everyone at the

1198
01:02:19,800 --> 01:02:22,520
Speaker 2: company is bought into the mission. And so when we

1199
01:02:22,560 --> 01:02:26,360
Speaker 2: have these discussions, we have ethical discussions, we have mission discussions,

1200
01:02:26,480 --> 01:02:29,120
Speaker 2: but it doesn't come down to the nature of the

1201
01:02:29,160 --> 01:02:31,360
Speaker 2: company or the vision for the future that we have.

1202
01:02:31,920 --> 01:02:35,040
Speaker 1: May I make a suggestion you may okay, it'd be

1203
01:02:35,120 --> 01:02:37,680
Speaker 1: interesting because you guys are having all these ethical conversations

1204
01:02:37,720 --> 01:02:41,120
Speaker 1: about the future. Having covered Silicon Valley all these years,

1205
01:02:41,360 --> 01:02:43,440
Speaker 1: it's a lot of dudes, right, And I don't know

1206
01:02:43,600 --> 01:02:46,200
Speaker 1: about these dinners, and I don't know about you know

1207
01:02:46,240 --> 01:02:47,640
Speaker 1: what it was like at Palmer when you guys are

1208
01:02:47,680 --> 01:02:50,920
Speaker 1: talking about the future. But whether it's women or diversity

1209
01:02:50,960 --> 01:02:53,360
Speaker 1: of mindset, you know, that's like a killer app right,

1210
01:02:53,480 --> 01:02:56,840
Speaker 1: It's like thinking about empathetic mediums, thinking about the human

1211
01:02:56,880 --> 01:02:59,400
Speaker 1: element and ways that I don't think a bunch of

1212
01:02:59,440 --> 01:03:01,520
Speaker 1: the same type folks will be able to think about.

1213
01:03:01,600 --> 01:03:03,440
Speaker 1: So I don't know what the breakdown is and I

1214
01:03:03,480 --> 01:03:05,680
Speaker 1: don't want to judge it of Andral, but I hope

1215
01:03:05,680 --> 01:03:07,600
Speaker 1: you guys have a diversity of thought in the room

1216
01:03:07,640 --> 01:03:09,720
Speaker 1: when you're thinking about these types of things, just because

1217
01:03:09,880 --> 01:03:11,800
Speaker 1: I do think you guys are very you have a

1218
01:03:11,840 --> 01:03:14,120
Speaker 1: big play at the future. So do you guys have

1219
01:03:14,240 --> 01:03:15,760
Speaker 1: diversity of thought in the room?

1220
01:03:16,200 --> 01:03:19,640
Speaker 2: Well, I mean diversity of thought absolutely. Other forms of

1221
01:03:19,680 --> 01:03:20,640
Speaker 2: diversity is.

1222
01:03:20,520 --> 01:03:22,840
Speaker 1: In the form diversity of thought that translates into the

1223
01:03:23,120 --> 01:03:26,040
Speaker 1: diversity forms like skin color, you know all.

1224
01:03:25,960 --> 01:03:29,240
Speaker 2: Of Yeah, you know, this is something that we work

1225
01:03:29,320 --> 01:03:30,400
Speaker 2: really hard at every day.

1226
01:03:30,560 --> 01:03:32,440
Speaker 1: But don't give me the Silicon Valley line on it, like,

1227
01:03:32,560 --> 01:03:34,640
Speaker 1: you know what, but I know everyone in Silicon Valley

1228
01:03:34,680 --> 01:03:36,360
Speaker 1: is working really hard to change it blah blah blah,

1229
01:03:36,360 --> 01:03:37,360
Speaker 1: and it hasn't really changed.

1230
01:03:37,560 --> 01:03:41,280
Speaker 2: I agree. And we do have people that are critical

1231
01:03:41,360 --> 01:03:44,640
Speaker 2: to our mission internally that do not look like standard

1232
01:03:44,680 --> 01:03:48,200
Speaker 2: Silicon Valley people of whether it's skin color or gender

1233
01:03:48,360 --> 01:03:51,080
Speaker 2: or whatever it might be. But of course not enough,

1234
01:03:51,200 --> 01:03:53,520
Speaker 2: and that's something that we are working hard at. Which

1235
01:03:53,560 --> 01:03:55,560
Speaker 2: is I know, as you said the Silicon Valley answer.

1236
01:03:55,920 --> 01:03:57,320
Speaker 2: The other thing that I would I would say here

1237
01:03:57,360 --> 01:04:00,400
Speaker 2: is that oftentimes people say that in the Defense commune

1238
01:04:01,080 --> 01:04:05,000
Speaker 2: it's like it's more unbalanced than in other industries. I

1239
01:04:05,000 --> 01:04:07,320
Speaker 2: think that is partly true, but there are some really

1240
01:04:07,360 --> 01:04:13,840
Speaker 2: really credible minority populations that already exists within the Defense

1241
01:04:13,920 --> 01:04:17,320
Speaker 2: that I think is as always very important for us

1242
01:04:17,360 --> 01:04:20,800
Speaker 2: to engage with. You know, under Secretary Ellen Lord is

1243
01:04:20,840 --> 01:04:24,160
Speaker 2: the head of Acquisitions and Sustainment at the Pentagon. She's

1244
01:04:24,200 --> 01:04:26,680
Speaker 2: you know, one of the top four people in the department,

1245
01:04:27,200 --> 01:04:30,840
Speaker 2: and we engage with her frequently. There are startup founders

1246
01:04:30,880 --> 01:04:35,520
Speaker 2: like Rachel Olney at Geocite and Danielle Perdomo at Gotena

1247
01:04:35,720 --> 01:04:38,920
Speaker 2: that are active in the defense community. There are academics

1248
01:04:39,000 --> 01:04:42,920
Speaker 2: like Renee Drista at Stanford are that are really strong

1249
01:04:43,800 --> 01:04:46,960
Speaker 2: in the journalism space. Some of the strongest defense reporters

1250
01:04:46,960 --> 01:04:50,560
Speaker 2: are are female. I think Lara Seeligman at Foreign Policy

1251
01:04:50,680 --> 01:04:53,240
Speaker 2: is incredibly strong in defense, knows what she's talking about.

1252
01:04:53,640 --> 01:04:56,880
Speaker 2: Morgan Brennan at CNBC is really strong. And so you

1253
01:04:56,920 --> 01:04:59,640
Speaker 2: know that this like rejection or some sort of suggestion

1254
01:04:59,720 --> 01:05:03,080
Speaker 2: that that doesn't exist, I think is just false and

1255
01:05:03,280 --> 01:05:04,600
Speaker 2: that should be tapped into. For sure.

1256
01:05:04,640 --> 01:05:06,480
Speaker 1: I'd be curious to know when we look at Russia

1257
01:05:06,560 --> 01:05:10,520
Speaker 1: and China, As someone who's been deeply involved and looks

1258
01:05:10,560 --> 01:05:13,919
Speaker 1: at these types of threats, what's like the scariest thing

1259
01:05:14,360 --> 01:05:16,520
Speaker 1: that Russia and China are doing that you're a little

1260
01:05:16,560 --> 01:05:18,840
Speaker 1: bit concerned that in the United States we're not going

1261
01:05:18,880 --> 01:05:20,240
Speaker 1: to be able to keep up with or we have

1262
01:05:20,280 --> 01:05:21,160
Speaker 1: to keep an eye out on.

1263
01:05:23,000 --> 01:05:25,640
Speaker 2: By the very nature of the conversation, the scariest things

1264
01:05:25,640 --> 01:05:27,600
Speaker 2: are the ones that we don't know about. That's the

1265
01:05:27,640 --> 01:05:30,120
Speaker 2: first thing that I would say. The second is that

1266
01:05:30,720 --> 01:05:35,920
Speaker 2: China has an actual strategy around exporting ideology and technology

1267
01:05:35,960 --> 01:05:39,080
Speaker 2: in tandem with one another. And so you know, if

1268
01:05:39,120 --> 01:05:42,080
Speaker 2: you look at the deployment of or the export of

1269
01:05:42,120 --> 01:05:44,960
Speaker 2: surveillance technologies globally. As I mentioned before, you have these

1270
01:05:45,040 --> 01:05:47,520
Speaker 2: companies like Hick Vision and Dawa that are camera companies

1271
01:05:47,640 --> 01:05:51,320
Speaker 2: Chinese camera companies. You have ie Fly Tech Dji that

1272
01:05:51,400 --> 01:05:55,520
Speaker 2: are drone companies. You have AI companies like meg v

1273
01:05:55,680 --> 01:05:57,960
Speaker 2: and since Time is the most valuable AI company in

1274
01:05:57,960 --> 01:06:01,360
Speaker 2: the entire world, that's interesting to to note. And then

1275
01:06:01,400 --> 01:06:04,640
Speaker 2: you have all of the networking and communications infrastructure behind Huawei.

1276
01:06:04,920 --> 01:06:07,400
Speaker 2: And when China is going out to countries that you

1277
01:06:07,440 --> 01:06:09,920
Speaker 2: know it's engaging with for Belton Road or engaging with

1278
01:06:10,000 --> 01:06:15,880
Speaker 2: for loan programs, they're coming in and they're saying Venezuela, Ecuador, Egypt, Iran,

1279
01:06:16,160 --> 01:06:18,800
Speaker 2: so on and so forth. Here is not only the

1280
01:06:18,880 --> 01:06:22,720
Speaker 2: technology but also the ideology that wraps up the surveillance

1281
01:06:22,720 --> 01:06:25,400
Speaker 2: state that we've built in China and that we've used

1282
01:06:25,400 --> 01:06:29,280
Speaker 2: to systematically oppress entire people groups using the technology that's

1283
01:06:29,280 --> 01:06:32,040
Speaker 2: being built by our tech community. That type of stuff

1284
01:06:32,240 --> 01:06:35,280
Speaker 2: is really scary to me, not only because you know

1285
01:06:35,320 --> 01:06:39,240
Speaker 2: it's being exported at a rate that is really unbelievable

1286
01:06:39,240 --> 01:06:41,720
Speaker 2: in the last five to ten years, but also because

1287
01:06:41,960 --> 01:06:44,840
Speaker 2: this is not the engagement. In the US, our defense

1288
01:06:44,880 --> 01:06:48,040
Speaker 2: Department does not work closely with the tech community, and

1289
01:06:48,120 --> 01:06:52,320
Speaker 2: so post Cold War, our best and brightest engineers kind

1290
01:06:52,320 --> 01:06:56,040
Speaker 2: of stopped going to the DoD directly or to the

1291
01:06:56,080 --> 01:07:00,479
Speaker 2: defense primes like Lockheed raytheon General Dynamics and so forth,

1292
01:07:00,720 --> 01:07:03,680
Speaker 2: and they started going in optimizing ads at Google and Facebook.

1293
01:07:03,760 --> 01:07:06,600
Speaker 2: You know, that's where the bulk of computer science talent

1294
01:07:06,680 --> 01:07:10,280
Speaker 2: is in the United States, and so our exports. If

1295
01:07:10,280 --> 01:07:13,960
Speaker 2: you look at the exports of United States technology internationally,

1296
01:07:13,960 --> 01:07:18,000
Speaker 2: particularly related to the military, like FORGM military financing, FORIGN

1297
01:07:18,000 --> 01:07:21,400
Speaker 2: military sales facilitated by the Department of State, it's like

1298
01:07:21,720 --> 01:07:26,840
Speaker 2: F thirty fives, it's Amram missiles. It's all this really

1299
01:07:26,920 --> 01:07:29,640
Speaker 2: high end military equipment that's built by primes, and it's

1300
01:07:29,720 --> 01:07:33,880
Speaker 2: not the like low level stuff that actually runs the

1301
01:07:33,920 --> 01:07:37,640
Speaker 2: countries that we're sending it to. And that's really concerning

1302
01:07:37,640 --> 01:07:37,840
Speaker 2: to me.

1303
01:07:38,360 --> 01:07:40,680
Speaker 1: Yeah, I saw you wrote in an op at like

1304
01:07:40,720 --> 01:07:43,600
Speaker 1: Putin in September twenty seventeen said that AI leadership was

1305
01:07:43,640 --> 01:07:45,720
Speaker 1: a means to become the ruler of the world. China

1306
01:07:45,720 --> 01:07:48,760
Speaker 1: has vowed to achieve AI dominance by twenty thirty. Meanwhile,

1307
01:07:48,840 --> 01:07:51,160
Speaker 1: much of the top AI talent, and the United States

1308
01:07:51,200 --> 01:07:53,800
Speaker 1: is working on things such as AD optimization, so that

1309
01:07:53,920 --> 01:07:56,520
Speaker 1: definitely seems like it is something you think a lot about.

1310
01:07:56,800 --> 01:07:59,480
Speaker 2: Yeah. Absolutely, you know, some of these countries, for what

1311
01:07:59,520 --> 01:08:02,440
Speaker 2: it's worth, China, Russia, they actually have the ability to

1312
01:08:02,560 --> 01:08:06,800
Speaker 2: conscript their top talent into working on national priorities. I'm

1313
01:08:06,800 --> 01:08:09,040
Speaker 2: not suggesting, by the way, that we should conscript a

1314
01:08:09,080 --> 01:08:11,320
Speaker 2: talent in the United States. I'm just stating that it

1315
01:08:11,400 --> 01:08:14,480
Speaker 2: is an obvious advantage that they have, which means that

1316
01:08:14,560 --> 01:08:18,120
Speaker 2: we need to figure out ways to appeal to the

1317
01:08:18,160 --> 01:08:21,439
Speaker 2: talent that we need domestically to get them to work

1318
01:08:21,439 --> 01:08:22,599
Speaker 2: on those national priorities.

1319
01:08:22,680 --> 01:08:24,160
Speaker 1: But how do you do that? Because there's been so

1320
01:08:24,240 --> 01:08:27,120
Speaker 1: much tension between Silicon Valley and the government for a while,

1321
01:08:27,360 --> 01:08:30,959
Speaker 1: and the government certainly has a reputation for moving slow

1322
01:08:31,120 --> 01:08:33,680
Speaker 1: and not really getting things done, and this current administration

1323
01:08:33,760 --> 01:08:36,639
Speaker 1: is in exactly a place that a lot of liberal

1324
01:08:36,760 --> 01:08:39,840
Speaker 1: leaning Silicon Valley wants to be a part of. So

1325
01:08:40,000 --> 01:08:43,120
Speaker 1: it certainly creates a conundrum of sorts.

1326
01:08:43,640 --> 01:08:45,439
Speaker 2: You know, I think there are a lot of people

1327
01:08:45,600 --> 01:08:48,719
Speaker 2: in the tech community that not only would be open

1328
01:08:48,800 --> 01:08:51,840
Speaker 2: to working on national priorities in defense, but would be

1329
01:08:51,880 --> 01:08:55,280
Speaker 2: excited to work in national priorities for defense. They just

1330
01:08:55,320 --> 01:08:56,960
Speaker 2: need a place to do it, and we have a

1331
01:08:57,000 --> 01:08:59,080
Speaker 2: model for this. If you look back over the last

1332
01:08:59,080 --> 01:09:01,120
Speaker 2: thirty years since the end of the Cold War, there

1333
01:09:01,120 --> 01:09:04,360
Speaker 2: are two unfortunately only two, but there are two multi

1334
01:09:04,360 --> 01:09:07,400
Speaker 2: billion dollar venture backed companies that have done the majority

1335
01:09:07,400 --> 01:09:10,320
Speaker 2: of the work with the government, Palenteer and SpaceX. Palenteer

1336
01:09:10,360 --> 01:09:12,559
Speaker 2: and SpaceX have been able to recruit the people they

1337
01:09:12,600 --> 01:09:16,320
Speaker 2: needed to execute their mission. Like they SpaceX has a

1338
01:09:16,320 --> 01:09:20,120
Speaker 2: collection of the best rocket scientists in the world working

1339
01:09:20,160 --> 01:09:23,960
Speaker 2: on the Falcon platforms. You know. Palenteer has access to

1340
01:09:24,240 --> 01:09:27,479
Speaker 2: the best you know, data engineers in the world to

1341
01:09:27,520 --> 01:09:32,160
Speaker 2: build Palnter Gotham and foundry products androll. You know, recruiting

1342
01:09:32,200 --> 01:09:34,560
Speaker 2: hasn't been the problem. It hasn't been one of the

1343
01:09:34,600 --> 01:09:37,599
Speaker 2: core problems. Like we're able to recruit and retain top talent.

1344
01:09:38,240 --> 01:09:41,400
Speaker 2: The problem is in the government working with those companies.

1345
01:09:41,800 --> 01:09:44,360
Speaker 2: And so if you look at Palanteer and SpaceX, it

1346
01:09:44,400 --> 01:09:47,559
Speaker 2: took them such a long time to actually crack into

1347
01:09:48,040 --> 01:09:51,600
Speaker 2: the government industrial base that they literally needed to have

1348
01:09:51,680 --> 01:09:54,840
Speaker 2: billionaire co founders, like they needed to have a billionaire

1349
01:09:55,000 --> 01:09:57,160
Speaker 2: working at the company to make sure that the business

1350
01:09:57,240 --> 01:10:01,600
Speaker 2: was able to be financed through meaning contract volume. You know,

1351
01:10:01,680 --> 01:10:04,840
Speaker 2: this is something that we realized at the onset when

1352
01:10:04,840 --> 01:10:07,320
Speaker 2: we first started andrel You know, you can debate whether

1353
01:10:07,400 --> 01:10:09,920
Speaker 2: or not Palmer's a billionaire, but I think having the

1354
01:10:09,960 --> 01:10:14,200
Speaker 2: ability to raise capital at good terms, at reasonable terms

1355
01:10:14,200 --> 01:10:17,680
Speaker 2: for capital intensive business as well as potentially finance the

1356
01:10:17,720 --> 01:10:22,280
Speaker 2: business through the slowness of government is incredibly important. And

1357
01:10:22,560 --> 01:10:26,839
Speaker 2: right now because of this ecosystem that's been created around

1358
01:10:27,000 --> 01:10:30,360
Speaker 2: the defense primes in the military, you really have to

1359
01:10:30,400 --> 01:10:33,080
Speaker 2: have this kind of Howard Hughes style of entrepreneurship where

1360
01:10:33,120 --> 01:10:36,679
Speaker 2: like only the the you know, ragtag bunch of billionaires

1361
01:10:36,680 --> 01:10:39,040
Speaker 2: are actually able to build a business, and that needs

1362
01:10:39,040 --> 01:10:40,479
Speaker 2: to be fixed. We need to get to the point

1363
01:10:40,520 --> 01:10:44,040
Speaker 2: where the government is willing and able to deploy meaningful

1364
01:10:44,120 --> 01:10:46,840
Speaker 2: contracts to companies that are working on things that are

1365
01:10:46,840 --> 01:10:49,479
Speaker 2: important to them rather than just like writing a bunch

1366
01:10:49,479 --> 01:10:52,800
Speaker 2: of little two hundred thousand dollars grants, which is their

1367
01:10:52,800 --> 01:10:53,639
Speaker 2: strategy today.

1368
01:10:53,760 --> 01:10:57,360
Speaker 1: Can you give us like a very visual like I

1369
01:10:57,400 --> 01:10:59,479
Speaker 1: want this very specific if you don't mind, Like what

1370
01:10:59,520 --> 01:11:02,120
Speaker 1: does the fewture of warfare look like? I mean, you're

1371
01:11:02,120 --> 01:11:03,720
Speaker 1: in the center of it. You can throw in some

1372
01:11:03,800 --> 01:11:05,800
Speaker 1: of your technologies you're building, some of the ones coming

1373
01:11:05,800 --> 01:11:08,200
Speaker 1: down the pipeline that you're not talking about yet, you

1374
01:11:08,200 --> 01:11:10,560
Speaker 1: can throw in those. Look, what does the future of

1375
01:11:10,600 --> 01:11:12,760
Speaker 1: warfare look like? How do we battle this out? How

1376
01:11:12,760 --> 01:11:15,400
Speaker 1: do we defend ourselves? What are soldiers using? Just like

1377
01:11:15,520 --> 01:11:16,200
Speaker 1: take us there.

1378
01:11:16,800 --> 01:11:18,599
Speaker 2: We've talked about some of these already. I think some

1379
01:11:18,640 --> 01:11:22,320
Speaker 2: of it is real time situational awareness of the entire battlefield,

1380
01:11:23,000 --> 01:11:25,799
Speaker 2: so knowing everything that's going on in an environment.

1381
01:11:25,960 --> 01:11:28,400
Speaker 1: So these augmented spaces.

1382
01:11:28,120 --> 01:11:30,840
Speaker 2: Yeah, augmented for soldiers on the ground to the extent

1383
01:11:30,880 --> 01:11:33,000
Speaker 2: that we require soldiers on the ground, though I expect

1384
01:11:33,080 --> 01:11:36,840
Speaker 2: that that number will go down significantly. But if any

1385
01:11:36,880 --> 01:11:40,040
Speaker 2: of the listeners have read the book or seen the

1386
01:11:40,040 --> 01:11:42,599
Speaker 2: movie enders game, you kind of know this concept of

1387
01:11:42,920 --> 01:11:46,320
Speaker 2: basically putting yourself in virtual reality and then kind of

1388
01:11:46,520 --> 01:11:49,280
Speaker 2: having a top down view of a battlespace and be

1389
01:11:49,320 --> 01:11:51,840
Speaker 2: able to manipulate the assets that exist in that space.

1390
01:11:52,280 --> 01:11:54,760
Speaker 2: That type of interaction is very likely going to be

1391
01:11:54,960 --> 01:11:57,160
Speaker 2: more and more common. The Air Force is starting to

1392
01:11:57,160 --> 01:11:59,160
Speaker 2: play around with this in a program that they're calling

1393
01:11:59,240 --> 01:12:02,400
Speaker 2: the Advanced Battle Management System, and I think that over

1394
01:12:02,400 --> 01:12:05,760
Speaker 2: the next ten years that's going to become super commonplace.

1395
01:12:05,880 --> 01:12:10,280
Speaker 2: So there's that I think, you know, as far as engagement,

1396
01:12:10,800 --> 01:12:13,920
Speaker 2: like kinetic engagement with the enemy will be much more

1397
01:12:14,000 --> 01:12:18,360
Speaker 2: driven by autonomous systems, whether they're remotely controlled or fully autonomous,

1398
01:12:18,800 --> 01:12:21,240
Speaker 2: so that we're not putting humans in harm's way where

1399
01:12:21,240 --> 01:12:24,599
Speaker 2: they're not required. Another great example of this is there's

1400
01:12:24,640 --> 01:12:27,840
Speaker 2: a venture backed company called shield Ai that has built

1401
01:12:27,920 --> 01:12:32,440
Speaker 2: a small drone amendarial system that can be tossed into

1402
01:12:32,680 --> 01:12:34,880
Speaker 2: a building and it will do a survey of the

1403
01:12:34,920 --> 01:12:38,599
Speaker 2: building and allow the operators, the special forces guys whatever

1404
01:12:38,600 --> 01:12:40,439
Speaker 2: that are about to kick down the door to know

1405
01:12:40,479 --> 01:12:44,479
Speaker 2: what's behind the door. This type of information collection that

1406
01:12:44,640 --> 01:12:46,720
Speaker 2: will save people's lives, I think will become more and

1407
01:12:46,800 --> 01:12:50,160
Speaker 2: more pervasive across all of the different battlefields. But really

1408
01:12:50,200 --> 01:12:53,120
Speaker 2: like the summarization of all of these categories is that

1409
01:12:54,000 --> 01:12:56,240
Speaker 2: I think, if we can stay ahead, the future of

1410
01:12:56,240 --> 01:12:59,240
Speaker 2: warfare is no warfare. And that is the intent is

1411
01:12:59,240 --> 01:13:02,280
Speaker 2: that you get to a where your information dominance, your

1412
01:13:02,280 --> 01:13:07,200
Speaker 2: battlefield dominance, your weapons platform dominance are all so so

1413
01:13:07,400 --> 01:13:11,840
Speaker 2: real and so large that the gap is insurmountable and

1414
01:13:11,920 --> 01:13:15,080
Speaker 2: the enemy won't want to engage in combat because they

1415
01:13:15,120 --> 01:13:18,360
Speaker 2: know that they'll lose. And you know, there's all sorts

1416
01:13:18,400 --> 01:13:21,680
Speaker 2: of like crazy science fiction versions of this. One of

1417
01:13:21,680 --> 01:13:24,600
Speaker 2: my favorite science fiction authors is this guy named Vern Revenge,

1418
01:13:24,960 --> 01:13:27,519
Speaker 2: and he has a series called the Peace War Series,

1419
01:13:27,720 --> 01:13:30,639
Speaker 2: and in it he talks about this like force field

1420
01:13:30,760 --> 01:13:33,599
Speaker 2: that he calls a bobble and the inside the bobble

1421
01:13:33,640 --> 01:13:36,439
Speaker 2: time is frozen and it's impenetrable. And so if you

1422
01:13:36,479 --> 01:13:39,160
Speaker 2: had two enemies that were fighting one another, you just

1423
01:13:39,200 --> 01:13:41,320
Speaker 2: bobble one of them and then you go to the

1424
01:13:41,320 --> 01:13:43,439
Speaker 2: other one and say, if you don't stop, we're going

1425
01:13:43,439 --> 01:13:45,479
Speaker 2: to babble you. And then you bobble them, and you

1426
01:13:45,560 --> 01:13:47,680
Speaker 2: unbobble the other one, and you say, I'm gonna say

1427
01:13:47,680 --> 01:13:49,080
Speaker 2: the same thing too. If you don't stop, we're going

1428
01:13:49,160 --> 01:13:51,240
Speaker 2: to babble you for ten thousand years. And then you

1429
01:13:51,400 --> 01:13:54,320
Speaker 2: unbobble them, and you say, like, it's your choice. You

1430
01:13:54,360 --> 01:13:56,640
Speaker 2: can engage in combat or you can be bobbled for

1431
01:13:56,640 --> 01:14:00,320
Speaker 2: ten thousand years. And basically the moral iss orry is

1432
01:14:00,320 --> 01:14:03,880
Speaker 2: that conflict basically just stops because people realize that the

1433
01:14:03,960 --> 01:14:06,880
Speaker 2: cost of engaging in conflict is way too high. And

1434
01:14:06,920 --> 01:14:08,760
Speaker 2: I'm not saying that we're like building a bibble or

1435
01:14:08,760 --> 01:14:11,040
Speaker 2: that we're anywhere near building a bobble. But I think

1436
01:14:11,120 --> 01:14:13,880
Speaker 2: every piece of technology that you build that continues to

1437
01:14:13,880 --> 01:14:17,120
Speaker 2: build upon your advantage gives us the ability to control

1438
01:14:17,280 --> 01:14:20,280
Speaker 2: to some extent the amount of conflict that's happening globally.

1439
01:14:20,520 --> 01:14:23,880
Speaker 1: Could the future of war be fought solely by artificial intelligence?

1440
01:14:24,560 --> 01:14:28,360
Speaker 2: I mean, I don't think so. This conversation is so

1441
01:14:28,439 --> 01:14:31,120
Speaker 2: far out there that it's always so hard to engage

1442
01:14:31,120 --> 01:14:34,880
Speaker 2: in like a credible way. You know, there's movies like

1443
01:14:34,960 --> 01:14:39,439
Speaker 2: Wargame where the computer decides that the fate of humanity

1444
01:14:39,520 --> 01:14:41,439
Speaker 2: will be better off of it, just like nukes everything

1445
01:14:41,479 --> 01:14:45,840
Speaker 2: to oblivion. You know. I think that humans are responsible

1446
01:14:45,880 --> 01:14:49,760
Speaker 2: for making human ethical decisions and it will be that

1447
01:14:49,840 --> 01:14:53,040
Speaker 2: way for a very very long time. And to the

1448
01:14:53,080 --> 01:14:57,639
Speaker 2: extent that computers are responsible for making decisions, we should

1449
01:14:57,640 --> 01:15:00,799
Speaker 2: be working on ways to counter that threat, to prevent

1450
01:15:00,840 --> 01:15:03,759
Speaker 2: that from becoming the way kind of like the standard

1451
01:15:04,040 --> 01:15:05,960
Speaker 2: for how conflict is managed.

1452
01:15:06,439 --> 01:15:08,320
Speaker 1: I only push back on that to say, well, it's

1453
01:15:08,560 --> 01:15:10,599
Speaker 1: isn't it y'all's jobs to think kind of far into

1454
01:15:10,640 --> 01:15:13,120
Speaker 1: the future, Because if the problem in technology is that

1455
01:15:13,160 --> 01:15:15,559
Speaker 1: it seems as though some of the folks in Silicon Valley,

1456
01:15:15,600 --> 01:15:17,639
Speaker 1: haven't thought far enough into the future, and we see

1457
01:15:17,640 --> 01:15:19,280
Speaker 1: all these human problems that have arisen.

1458
01:15:19,840 --> 01:15:23,120
Speaker 2: Yeah, I would say that there's some of this that

1459
01:15:23,280 --> 01:15:26,440
Speaker 2: is academic and true, like we should be having academic

1460
01:15:26,479 --> 01:15:30,360
Speaker 2: conversations about these things, but this is not how conflict

1461
01:15:30,400 --> 01:15:32,519
Speaker 2: it has been managed over the course of history. Like

1462
01:15:32,560 --> 01:15:35,800
Speaker 2: we didn't have a detailed discussion about the atom bomb

1463
01:15:36,439 --> 01:15:38,519
Speaker 2: and come up with like ethical frameworks for how we

1464
01:15:38,560 --> 01:15:41,639
Speaker 2: think about it, and then like only then after we've

1465
01:15:41,640 --> 01:15:44,719
Speaker 2: like perfected the ethical framework, decide to build it. Same

1466
01:15:44,720 --> 01:15:47,960
Speaker 2: thing with like Kimbio, same thing with precision guided weapons,

1467
01:15:48,000 --> 01:15:52,160
Speaker 2: same thing with Cyberg. Like these things get litigated, regulatorily

1468
01:15:52,280 --> 01:15:55,360
Speaker 2: litigated by the people that hold the technology. If we

1469
01:15:55,439 --> 01:15:57,360
Speaker 2: sit back and just say, like we're going to spend

1470
01:15:57,360 --> 01:16:01,120
Speaker 2: the next thirty years like having a bunch of like

1471
01:16:01,479 --> 01:16:05,560
Speaker 2: fireside chats at conferences with a bunch of academics about

1472
01:16:05,600 --> 01:16:09,400
Speaker 2: what each of these defense technologies could mean, and we

1473
01:16:09,439 --> 01:16:11,800
Speaker 2: don't build it. Guess who's going to build it? All

1474
01:16:11,880 --> 01:16:15,120
Speaker 2: of the other countries that are not having that academic dialogue,

1475
01:16:15,120 --> 01:16:17,479
Speaker 2: and we'll be sitting on our hands when they have

1476
01:16:18,400 --> 01:16:21,680
Speaker 2: a critical national security advantage against US. That puts our

1477
01:16:21,800 --> 01:16:24,320
Speaker 2: own lives at risk. That seems like a really bad

1478
01:16:24,360 --> 01:16:24,840
Speaker 2: trade off.

1479
01:16:25,040 --> 01:16:26,920
Speaker 1: Speaking of all of the other countries, who will you

1480
01:16:26,960 --> 01:16:27,800
Speaker 1: not do business with?

1481
01:16:29,160 --> 01:16:32,479
Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean this is it's a great question, and

1482
01:16:33,000 --> 01:16:36,920
Speaker 2: you know it. It's case dependent, it's process dependent, it's

1483
01:16:37,080 --> 01:16:40,679
Speaker 2: governmental system dependent. Certainly, we'll work with the close allies,

1484
01:16:40,960 --> 01:16:45,519
Speaker 2: so the five by community, Australia, UK, Canada, New Zealand.

1485
01:16:45,920 --> 01:16:48,680
Speaker 2: There are no questions about our close allies, but we

1486
01:16:48,760 --> 01:16:52,600
Speaker 2: have to have rigorous conversation about really anyone else. So

1487
01:16:52,720 --> 01:16:56,920
Speaker 2: no China, No China. Although I think the only reason

1488
01:16:57,000 --> 01:16:59,080
Speaker 2: China would want our technology at this point is to

1489
01:16:59,120 --> 01:17:02,519
Speaker 2: steal the IP and develop it for their own I

1490
01:17:02,560 --> 01:17:04,760
Speaker 2: don't think that they would actually be interested in being

1491
01:17:04,800 --> 01:17:05,840
Speaker 2: like a paying customer.

1492
01:17:06,320 --> 01:17:07,439
Speaker 1: Have you turned anyone down?

1493
01:17:08,640 --> 01:17:12,200
Speaker 2: Uh? You know, we have so much inbound interest right

1494
01:17:12,240 --> 01:17:14,960
Speaker 2: now in what we're building that you know, we turned

1495
01:17:15,000 --> 01:17:18,559
Speaker 2: down ninety nine percent of what comes into our into

1496
01:17:18,640 --> 01:17:19,240
Speaker 2: our funnel.

1497
01:17:19,240 --> 01:17:21,000
Speaker 1: But have you turned anyone down for those types of

1498
01:17:21,080 --> 01:17:24,439
Speaker 1: reasons like a make an ethical reason? Yea an ethical reason?

1499
01:17:25,040 --> 01:17:27,320
Speaker 2: Uh. We have decided not to follow up with people

1500
01:17:27,600 --> 01:17:31,160
Speaker 2: because we thought that the use case violated some ethical

1501
01:17:31,160 --> 01:17:34,880
Speaker 2: principle like who I wouldn't I wouldn't want to like

1502
01:17:34,960 --> 01:17:37,400
Speaker 2: start throwing people under the bus. Who I never even

1503
01:17:37,439 --> 01:17:41,800
Speaker 2: responded to an email for that. That seems coldhearted and unnecessary. Fair.

1504
01:17:42,800 --> 01:17:45,840
Speaker 1: Lately, I've become obsessed with this idea of spies and

1505
01:17:45,920 --> 01:17:47,920
Speaker 1: this idea that you know, there's so much valuable IP

1506
01:17:48,000 --> 01:17:49,880
Speaker 1: in Silicon Valley. You guys are in Silicon Valley based,

1507
01:17:49,920 --> 01:17:52,240
Speaker 1: but I'm assuming you know you guys are a valuable company.

1508
01:17:52,520 --> 01:17:54,639
Speaker 1: I'm assuming you guys do background checks and all sorts

1509
01:17:54,680 --> 01:17:57,439
Speaker 1: of stuff. But do you ever think about the employees

1510
01:17:57,439 --> 01:17:59,800
Speaker 1: you guys hire, or even in Silicon Valley as a

1511
01:17:59,800 --> 01:18:03,200
Speaker 1: whole ale? Worried about people kind of infiltrating these companies.

1512
01:18:03,200 --> 01:18:06,000
Speaker 1: I know it's kind of it's not necessarily androal focus,

1513
01:18:06,080 --> 01:18:08,479
Speaker 1: but just in general, having your experience in the government

1514
01:18:08,479 --> 01:18:11,000
Speaker 1: and now in Silicon value you are a palenteer. Do

1515
01:18:11,040 --> 01:18:14,320
Speaker 1: you ever worry about Nation States kind of infiltrating these

1516
01:18:14,320 --> 01:18:16,320
Speaker 1: companies for valuable data?

1517
01:18:16,840 --> 01:18:21,960
Speaker 2: Of course? Yeah, I mean I think our adversaries, particularly China,

1518
01:18:22,040 --> 01:18:26,559
Speaker 2: has made no secret of its interest in disrupting our

1519
01:18:26,560 --> 01:18:30,240
Speaker 2: defense industrial base and stealing intellectual property to the extent possible.

1520
01:18:30,760 --> 01:18:34,040
Speaker 2: The similarities to the F thirty five of their fifth

1521
01:18:34,040 --> 01:18:37,479
Speaker 2: generation fighter are striking like it seems to me like

1522
01:18:37,880 --> 01:18:40,479
Speaker 2: they're actually doing a pretty good job at sealing IP

1523
01:18:40,680 --> 01:18:43,320
Speaker 2: when when they want it. This is a huge concern.

1524
01:18:43,479 --> 01:18:44,920
Speaker 2: I mean, if you look at like the impact of

1525
01:18:44,960 --> 01:18:48,240
Speaker 2: the tariffs that have been recently implemented, compare that to

1526
01:18:48,920 --> 01:18:51,960
Speaker 2: the cost to the American economy for IP theft from China,

1527
01:18:52,000 --> 01:18:54,439
Speaker 2: and it's like there's not even a comparison, Like they're

1528
01:18:54,479 --> 01:18:57,759
Speaker 2: just just like ripping so much and so yeah, of course,

1529
01:18:57,840 --> 01:19:00,559
Speaker 2: like it would be crazy to not assume that they're

1530
01:19:00,560 --> 01:19:04,080
Speaker 2: trying to get at the personal data of the people

1531
01:19:04,120 --> 01:19:06,439
Speaker 2: that are working on these top priorities, as well as

1532
01:19:06,560 --> 01:19:09,920
Speaker 2: information proprietary to the companies that are working on these priorities.

1533
01:19:09,960 --> 01:19:12,360
Speaker 1: Have you had discussions about it at andreil Oh?

1534
01:19:12,400 --> 01:19:15,679
Speaker 2: Sure. I mean, information security is a critical piece of

1535
01:19:15,720 --> 01:19:19,160
Speaker 2: the pie for everyone working in the defense industrial base.

1536
01:19:19,800 --> 01:19:24,120
Speaker 2: We have a crack team of infosec professionals that spend

1537
01:19:24,120 --> 01:19:26,400
Speaker 2: their entire day thinking about how to lock down the

1538
01:19:26,479 --> 01:19:30,160
Speaker 2: edges of the network, how to think through insider threat.

1539
01:19:30,600 --> 01:19:32,680
Speaker 2: You know that it's a core competency that I.

1540
01:19:32,600 --> 01:19:34,280
Speaker 1: Think you have to have, and I know that for

1541
01:19:34,320 --> 01:19:36,720
Speaker 1: the border control tech. You guys actually went out there.

1542
01:19:36,760 --> 01:19:38,080
Speaker 1: I don't know if you went out there, but I

1543
01:19:38,120 --> 01:19:41,000
Speaker 1: know Palmer went out there and actually like was looking

1544
01:19:41,040 --> 01:19:43,320
Speaker 1: at this technology, deploying this technology, playing around with that.

1545
01:19:43,439 --> 01:19:46,320
Speaker 1: You know, you're out on the border. I'm sure there

1546
01:19:46,320 --> 01:19:49,799
Speaker 1: are certain dangers. Have you ever worried about your own safety?

1547
01:19:50,920 --> 01:19:53,479
Speaker 2: I wouldn't say that I've worried about my like physical safety.

1548
01:19:53,600 --> 01:19:56,559
Speaker 2: I've definitely spent a lot of time thinking about my

1549
01:19:57,000 --> 01:20:01,639
Speaker 2: digital footprint and making sure that I'm not presenting myself

1550
01:20:01,720 --> 01:20:06,599
Speaker 2: or my family to undoe risk. And so there's always

1551
01:20:06,680 --> 01:20:09,040
Speaker 2: this like kind of digital hygiene exercise that you can

1552
01:20:09,040 --> 01:20:11,200
Speaker 2: go through to try to protect against.

1553
01:20:10,920 --> 01:20:13,760
Speaker 1: That last question, why do you do this?

1554
01:20:15,920 --> 01:20:19,080
Speaker 2: It's a sense of duty, to be honest. I mean,

1555
01:20:20,120 --> 01:20:23,000
Speaker 2: it would be crazy to make it about some sort

1556
01:20:23,040 --> 01:20:25,880
Speaker 2: of like sacrifice because I think, you know, being an

1557
01:20:25,960 --> 01:20:29,280
Speaker 2: entrepreneur is a ton of fun, and I think if

1558
01:20:29,360 --> 01:20:33,720
Speaker 2: we're successful, I think there's financial reward for our employees,

1559
01:20:33,720 --> 01:20:37,040
Speaker 2: for our investors, certainly for the founding team. So you know,

1560
01:20:37,040 --> 01:20:38,920
Speaker 2: I'm not going to act like a martyr. But at

1561
01:20:38,920 --> 01:20:41,519
Speaker 2: the same time, like these are really hard problems and

1562
01:20:41,920 --> 01:20:45,120
Speaker 2: we're not building an app to share one hundred and

1563
01:20:45,160 --> 01:20:47,439
Speaker 2: forty characters in a slightly better way with our friends.

1564
01:20:47,479 --> 01:20:50,880
Speaker 2: Like this isn't popular, and I think we have to

1565
01:20:51,000 --> 01:20:54,360
Speaker 2: unify around the idea that it's really important. And going

1566
01:20:54,400 --> 01:20:57,519
Speaker 2: back to that September eleventh, two thousand and one, sitting

1567
01:20:57,560 --> 01:21:00,320
Speaker 2: in my principal's office, I knew it that much moment

1568
01:21:00,400 --> 01:21:01,840
Speaker 2: that this was going to be the career that I

1569
01:21:01,880 --> 01:21:03,760
Speaker 2: was going to work on. I didn't know that this

1570
01:21:03,800 --> 01:21:07,080
Speaker 2: is what I would be doing specifically, but I can't imagine,

1571
01:21:07,720 --> 01:21:10,439
Speaker 2: you know, going to work every day and not thinking

1572
01:21:10,439 --> 01:21:14,000
Speaker 2: about how I can be helpful to our national security,

1573
01:21:14,360 --> 01:21:17,479
Speaker 2: to the priorities that are set forward and the values

1574
01:21:17,600 --> 01:21:19,040
Speaker 2: that our national security stands for.

1575
01:21:19,320 --> 01:21:21,200
Speaker 1: Why did you know that that that was going to

1576
01:21:21,240 --> 01:21:22,639
Speaker 1: be what you're going to do the rest of your life.

1577
01:21:24,000 --> 01:21:27,759
Speaker 2: I think, you know, part of the lie that's being

1578
01:21:27,800 --> 01:21:32,360
Speaker 2: told to the world, particularly by the kind of modern culture,

1579
01:21:32,600 --> 01:21:36,280
Speaker 2: whether it's like millennial gen Z, whatever, is that there's

1580
01:21:36,520 --> 01:21:42,280
Speaker 2: absolute equivalents in like all things like morality, culture or whatever.

1581
01:21:42,600 --> 01:21:47,680
Speaker 2: And I think events like nine to eleven kind of

1582
01:21:47,760 --> 01:21:51,040
Speaker 2: stuck with me as this realization that there's a real

1583
01:21:51,080 --> 01:21:54,000
Speaker 2: world out there and like we can't just hide in

1584
01:21:54,120 --> 01:21:57,719
Speaker 2: this little bubble of comfort and say, like, actually everyone's

1585
01:21:57,760 --> 01:22:00,720
Speaker 2: the same, everyone believes the same things, who values the

1586
01:22:00,760 --> 01:22:05,280
Speaker 2: same things? Because I just fundamentally think that there's something

1587
01:22:05,520 --> 01:22:11,400
Speaker 2: about the democracy, there's something about capitalism, there's something about

1588
01:22:11,520 --> 01:22:16,200
Speaker 2: the freedom that were that were afforded that's worth defending.

1589
01:22:16,439 --> 01:22:21,080
Speaker 2: And without that, you end up living in these authoritarian,

1590
01:22:21,320 --> 01:22:25,840
Speaker 2: oppressive societies where none of those values can be exercised.

1591
01:22:26,120 --> 01:22:28,360
Speaker 2: And you know, I don't really care if I can

1592
01:22:28,640 --> 01:22:32,120
Speaker 2: open Twitter on my phone and you know, gap at

1593
01:22:32,360 --> 01:22:36,400
Speaker 2: people about the political issue du jour, But I do

1594
01:22:36,479 --> 01:22:40,000
Speaker 2: care a lot about my ability to exercise freedom of speech,

1595
01:22:40,479 --> 01:22:44,120
Speaker 2: and that's something that is not protected in many places

1596
01:22:44,120 --> 01:22:44,599
Speaker 2: in the world.

1597
01:22:49,400 --> 01:22:52,679
Speaker 1: So this episode had a lot to take in. I'm

1598
01:22:52,680 --> 01:22:55,720
Speaker 1: guessing you guys might have some thoughts. What do you

1599
01:22:55,720 --> 01:22:58,840
Speaker 1: think of Andrew and the technology they're building? Where should

1600
01:22:58,840 --> 01:23:01,680
Speaker 1: we draw the line? Text me on my new community

1601
01:23:01,760 --> 01:23:06,080
Speaker 1: number nine one seven five four zero three four one zero.

1602
01:23:06,479 --> 01:23:09,200
Speaker 1: It goes directly to my phone. I promise I'm not

1603
01:23:09,280 --> 01:23:12,880
Speaker 1: just saying that. And here's a personal request. If you

1604
01:23:13,040 --> 01:23:15,200
Speaker 1: like the show, I want to hear from you, leave

1605
01:23:15,280 --> 01:23:17,679
Speaker 1: us a review on the Apple podcast app or wherever

1606
01:23:17,720 --> 01:23:20,360
Speaker 1: you listen and don't forget to subscribe. See don't miss

1607
01:23:20,400 --> 01:23:23,080
Speaker 1: an episode. It helps us out a lot and follow me.

1608
01:23:23,280 --> 01:23:25,840
Speaker 1: I'm at Lori Siegel on Twitter and Instagram and the

1609
01:23:25,880 --> 01:23:29,439
Speaker 1: show is at First Contact Podcast on Instagram, on Twitter,

1610
01:23:29,479 --> 01:23:32,799
Speaker 1: We're at First Contact Pod. First Contact is a production

1611
01:23:32,840 --> 01:23:35,719
Speaker 1: of Dot dot Dot Media. Executive produced by Lori Siegel

1612
01:23:35,760 --> 01:23:38,880
Speaker 1: and Derek Dodge. This episode was produced and edited by

1613
01:23:38,880 --> 01:23:42,960
Speaker 1: Sabine Jansen and Jack Reagan. Original theme music by Xander Singh.

1614
01:23:43,479 --> 01:23:45,880
Speaker 1: First Contact with Lori Siegel is a production of Dot

1615
01:23:45,880 --> 01:23:54,960
Speaker 1: dot Dot Media and iHeartRadio. First Contact with Lori Siegel

1616
01:23:55,040 --> 01:23:57,880
Speaker 1: is a production of Dot dot Dot Media and iHeartRadio.