WEBVTT - why is the US gov using a ‘cartoonishly hackable’ messaging app?

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<v Speaker 1>I'm afraid Kaleidoscope and iHeart podcasts. This is kill Switch.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Dextera Thomas. Maybe you've heard a signal Gate. If not,

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<v Speaker 1>I'll get you up to speed real quick. Back in March,

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<v Speaker 1>a bunch of top White House staff, including the Vice President,

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<v Speaker 1>Secretary of Defense, and a lot of other people, were

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<v Speaker 1>discussing military operations in Yemen. And they were having this

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<v Speaker 1>discussion on a chat app called signal which you'll hear

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<v Speaker 1>more about in the second But amongst all the White

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<v Speaker 1>House officials was an outsider somebody, and that somebody turned

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<v Speaker 1>out to be US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, had

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<v Speaker 1>accidentally added a journalist from the Atlantic to that group chat.

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<v Speaker 1>That journalists did what journalists are supposed to do, tell

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<v Speaker 1>the public what's happening. It was embarrassing for the White House,

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<v Speaker 1>and it also raised a lot of questions about what

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<v Speaker 1>exactly the US is doing overseas. It's a big enough

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<v Speaker 1>deal that Signalgate has its own Wikipedia entry, and the

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<v Speaker 1>story would have ended there. Then fast forward to May. First,

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<v Speaker 1>a picture started to circulate of the very same guy,

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<v Speaker 1>Mike Waltz, looking at his phone in a meeting using

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<v Speaker 1>an app that looked familiar sort of.

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<v Speaker 2>He was in a cabinet meeting with President Trump and

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<v Speaker 2>other senior officials, and the Roysters photographer got him looking

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<v Speaker 2>down at his phone, and if you zoomed in, it

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<v Speaker 2>looked like he was using signal, which is of course

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<v Speaker 2>very Ray funny and Rai Ray ironic. So people saw

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<v Speaker 2>that they started tweeting it and posting on Blue Sky saying,

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<v Speaker 2>ha ha, look, Mike Waltz's using signal in this photo.

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<v Speaker 2>And then of course when you zoom in there are names.

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<v Speaker 2>It shows the chat and there's says Rubio. I only

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<v Speaker 2>know if one senior official who has a surname Rubio

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<v Speaker 2>obviously relates me to the Department of State. There's Gabbard,

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<v Speaker 2>I think probably Tolsy Gabbard. And then there's one that's

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<v Speaker 2>just straight up says jd Vance.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, I wasna say. Jadvance is right in there, and

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<v Speaker 1>I'm just I'm reading part of jd Vance's messages right here,

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<v Speaker 1>just in this picture, which brings up an entirely different question,

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<v Speaker 1>which is should you be reading your text messages during

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<v Speaker 1>a meeting in which they are photographers. But I suppose

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<v Speaker 1>we can leave that to the side. This is my

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<v Speaker 1>friend and former colleague from my Vice News days, Joseph Cox.

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<v Speaker 1>He now reports for and co owns the online publication

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<v Speaker 1>four or for Media.

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<v Speaker 2>Somebody put it in our in our work group chat

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<v Speaker 2>and I was say, I look at Signal every day,

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<v Speaker 2>like way too much, like twelve hours a day. I'm

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<v Speaker 2>looking at that app. This is not Signal. There's a

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<v Speaker 2>there's something ever so slightly different. And when I look

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<v Speaker 2>at the bottom, there's usually a message in Signal says

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<v Speaker 2>please verify your signal pin. And this is so you

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<v Speaker 2>remember the pin so you don't get locked out, and

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<v Speaker 2>it keeps your account more secure. It's a very good thing.

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<v Speaker 2>But at the bottom it said please remember your TM

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<v Speaker 2>SGNL pin. And I'm like, what the well the hell

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<v Speaker 2>is that? And then I google around and that leads

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<v Speaker 2>me to tele Message and their modified version of Signal.

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<v Speaker 1>You really have to be hyper focusing on this stuff

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<v Speaker 1>to notice it at all. And then you further zoomed

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<v Speaker 1>in and said, Yo, this ain't signal.

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<v Speaker 2>This is not signal, this is some weird modified version.

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<v Speaker 2>So yeah, we report that Mike Waltz has inadvertently revealed

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<v Speaker 2>the weird Signal clone that the Trump administration is using.

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<v Speaker 1>Just to clarify here, Signal the actual Signal is a

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<v Speaker 1>messaging app that uses what's called end to end encryption,

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<v Speaker 1>which means that when you send a message, nobody, not

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<v Speaker 1>the government, not even Signal can read your messages. Even

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<v Speaker 1>if they do intercept them, only the intended recipient can

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<v Speaker 1>read the message. It's basically the gold standard for secure messaging.

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<v Speaker 1>What Joseph noticed was that the app Mike Waltz was

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<v Speaker 1>using in the picture looked like the actual Signal, but

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<v Speaker 1>that something was off. This app looked kind of similar,

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<v Speaker 1>but it was clear that someone else had modified it,

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<v Speaker 1>and his suspicion was that this modified version might not

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<v Speaker 1>have had the same security that the actual Signal does.

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<v Speaker 1>So Joseph wrote an article on four or four that

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<v Speaker 1>explained the issue here, and the key was that phrase

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<v Speaker 1>at the bottom TMSGNL. Joseph started digging around and realized

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<v Speaker 1>that this was probably from a company called tele Message.

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<v Speaker 1>This company basically makes clones of popular messaging apps like WhatsApp, Telegram,

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<v Speaker 1>we Chat, and Yes Signal with one extra feature. It

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<v Speaker 1>saves copies of all the messages sent or received onto

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<v Speaker 1>another server not to spoil the next part. But maybe

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<v Speaker 1>you're already seeing the problem here, So let's talk about

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<v Speaker 1>the timeline. This picture of Mike Waltz circulates and Joseph

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<v Speaker 1>publishes that article on May first. On May third, two

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<v Speaker 1>days later, an anonymous hacker contacts another reporter named Micah

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<v Speaker 1>Lee saying that they've managed to hack tele a message,

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<v Speaker 1>and so Micah and Joseph put together another article explaining

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<v Speaker 1>how bad this really is.

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<v Speaker 2>I'm getting these screenshots and I'm getting sent this data.

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<v Speaker 2>One of the first examples is a screenshot of a

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<v Speaker 2>telemessage back end, which you know, a normal person should

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<v Speaker 2>not be able to access and a hacker should be

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<v Speaker 2>able to access it. And it has all of these

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<v Speaker 2>contact details for officials from Customs and Border Protection, implying

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<v Speaker 2>that they use the tool as well for some reason.

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<v Speaker 2>So I spend my Sunday phoning up numbers in this

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<v Speaker 2>list of CPB officials contact information, and I answer with

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<v Speaker 2>the name, and I say with Customs and Border and

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<v Speaker 2>they confirm, so it verifies the data. They then hang

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<v Speaker 2>up after I explain what's happening.

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<v Speaker 3>Wow.

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<v Speaker 2>But then there's the much more serious stuff, which is

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<v Speaker 2>messages that they may have thought were secure with a

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<v Speaker 2>modified version of Signal, and these messages are going off

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<v Speaker 2>against archived somewhere. The hacker was able to essentially intercept

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<v Speaker 2>them in the middle of that process, and we were

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<v Speaker 2>reading messages that were clearly sent that day of internal

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<v Speaker 2>conversations between various people. One example was one from it

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<v Speaker 2>looks like it was from Galaxy Digital, which is a

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<v Speaker 2>cryptocurrency connected company, and they were talking about some sort

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<v Speaker 2>of bill or law that the Dems may or may

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<v Speaker 2>not support. I'm not particularly interested in the specifics of

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<v Speaker 2>that bill, but it just shows you whoa this is

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<v Speaker 2>a really sensitive conversation, even if I don't really care

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<v Speaker 2>about cryptocurrency. This isn't something that a hacker should be

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<v Speaker 2>able to get, and this isn't something that I should

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<v Speaker 2>be able to read. But the implication is is that

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<v Speaker 2>Mike Waltz and people he was talking to, like Rubio

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<v Speaker 2>or whoever run this same platform, the hacker just managed

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<v Speaker 2>to break into and get the contents of messages. And

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<v Speaker 2>that's massive because who knows who else had access to this.

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<v Speaker 1>So just giving these government officials the benefit of the

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<v Speaker 1>doubt for a moment, maybe this is what happened. Using

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<v Speaker 1>an app that can automatically delete messages is not okay

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<v Speaker 1>for government officials because the public is supposed to have

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<v Speaker 1>access to non classified information, and one of the things

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<v Speaker 1>telemessage promises to do is help organizations comply with regulations

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<v Speaker 1>about retaining records. Now, we have no evidence of the

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<v Speaker 1>reasoning or timing of the government's use of telemessage, but

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<v Speaker 1>that would be a charitable reading here. Maybe they did

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<v Speaker 1>it to obey the law.

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<v Speaker 2>It is a really really, really really hard trade off,

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<v Speaker 2>and one side we want the government to keep records

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<v Speaker 2>so we can foil them and there can be accountability

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<v Speaker 2>and transparency whenever we need that, you know, either in

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<v Speaker 2>the current moment or at a later date. And then

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<v Speaker 2>when they do seemingly choose at all to do that,

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<v Speaker 2>it blows up massively in their face, and it's actually

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<v Speaker 2>probably even worse than the problem they were trying to

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<v Speaker 2>solve in the first place. Tele a message who don't

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<v Speaker 2>make signal, they don't develop signal in any capacity. They

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<v Speaker 2>don't do it for reach Out, Whatsapple Telegram either, but

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<v Speaker 2>they take those apps and they like shoven archiving ability

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<v Speaker 2>onto it. So presumably you might just not make a

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<v Speaker 2>fully secure solution. But then even more fundamentally, there are

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<v Speaker 2>just always going to be risks involved of this, and

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<v Speaker 2>it kind of reminds me of you know, government's always

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<v Speaker 2>asking for back doors into communication products. I'm not saying

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<v Speaker 2>tele message is absolutely a backdoor, and they don't use

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<v Speaker 2>that terminology, but practically it's kind of the same. It's

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<v Speaker 2>taking the messages and copying them elsewhere, which is what

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<v Speaker 2>we think of a backdoor. Fundamentally, by introduce seeing another

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<v Speaker 2>party to the chat, you're introducing more risk in some form.

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<v Speaker 1>Right exactly, because the idea here, what sounds like tell

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<v Speaker 1>Message is promising is that well, signal your message is

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<v Speaker 1>encrypted from one end to the other. It's end to

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<v Speaker 1>end encrypted, so nobody can intercept that. But then it's

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<v Speaker 1>going through tele messages being copied somewhere else, and so

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<v Speaker 1>by default, by definition, it's not encrypted in to end anymore.

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<v Speaker 2>So when we first reported on sort of the Trump

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<v Speaker 2>happening use of telemessage, the New York Times followed up

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<v Speaker 2>a few days later, and they were talking about some

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<v Speaker 2>of the security risks about this, and they spoke to

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<v Speaker 2>some executive that's Smash, which is the American company that

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<v Speaker 2>owns the Israeli company tele message, and that executive to

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<v Speaker 2>The New York Times was saying something like we we

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<v Speaker 2>don't de encrypts, which is a bizarre term I've never

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<v Speaker 2>heard anyone use with any in any serious context. But

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<v Speaker 2>what they were trying to say was basically, it's still secure,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, even though we have we're adding this archiving thing,

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<v Speaker 2>it's still secure. And I mean they say that, they

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<v Speaker 2>say it's still end to end encrypted, and of course

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<v Speaker 2>they're free to say whatever they want that they're comfortable

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<v Speaker 2>saying in their marketing material. But Michah Lee, the security

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<v Speaker 2>of research and journalist we worked on the hack, has

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<v Speaker 2>done a ray detailed analysis about how telem message does

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<v Speaker 2>have access to the plain text of messages. But then

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<v Speaker 2>I think even just more importantly, we were looking at

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<v Speaker 2>the contents of messages. It's clearly not end to end encrypted.

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<v Speaker 2>We were reading the messages. So and maybe there is

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<v Speaker 2>a way, and maybe there are some messages that are

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<v Speaker 2>encrypted by tele message, but what we've seen and what

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<v Speaker 2>I'm saying is some are definitely not.

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<v Speaker 1>And just to be clear, we don't necessarily know that

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<v Speaker 1>every single top ranking official in the government is using

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<v Speaker 1>this tele message clone of signal. It looks like tele

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<v Speaker 1>message acts enough like regular signal to where you can

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<v Speaker 1>send messages back and forth and you wouldn't know if

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<v Speaker 1>the person on the other side is using the clone.

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<v Speaker 1>But even if one person in a group chat is

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<v Speaker 1>using it, and we know that former National Security advisor

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<v Speaker 1>Mike Watz is using it, that potentially means that everyone

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<v Speaker 1>they talk to or everyone in a group chat is

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<v Speaker 1>having their messages sent to a third party server and

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<v Speaker 1>that someone else would be able to see those messages.

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<v Speaker 1>In the article, you pretty explicitly say we're not going

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<v Speaker 1>to tell you how the hacker did it, so it

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<v Speaker 1>sounds like the hacker communicated to you, this is how

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<v Speaker 1>I did it. You don't make that public. Why is

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<v Speaker 1>there Yeah, I.

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<v Speaker 2>Mean, first of all, we ask as part of the

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<v Speaker 2>verification process, if they can explain how they did it

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<v Speaker 2>in a verifiable manner, that's good or even better. Of course,

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<v Speaker 2>we can't always fully verify that because we're not going

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<v Speaker 2>to go do the hack ourselves inane and obviously, so

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<v Speaker 2>it really depends, and you have to be really, really

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<v Speaker 2>careful about what you're amplifying because if you include certain

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<v Speaker 2>information that could give other hackers or random people the

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<v Speaker 2>ability to go basically do it again, and who knows

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<v Speaker 2>what they're going to then do with that data. We

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<v Speaker 2>don't want to cause more harm, so there's a trade

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<v Speaker 2>off there, and it also relates to how security researchers

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<v Speaker 2>often disclose vulnerabilities. What hackers will often do is they

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<v Speaker 2>will probe a server or reverse engineering app. They'll go

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<v Speaker 2>to the company, Hey, I found this vulnerability. I think

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<v Speaker 2>you should fix it. The company will say, wow, that's

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<v Speaker 2>really bad. His ten thousand dollars in a T shirt

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<v Speaker 2>or a coffee mug or something, and they'll fix it,

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<v Speaker 2>hopefully within thirty days. Blah blah blah. That's called responsible disclosure.

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<v Speaker 2>That doesn't really involve the media at least traditionally. The

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<v Speaker 2>other way that some hackers do, and they did it

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<v Speaker 2>in this case, they find a vulnerability, they might actually

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<v Speaker 2>exploit that vulnerability to show it's real and to get data,

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<v Speaker 2>and then they go to the press. And in this case,

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<v Speaker 2>the hackers said they did this because they thought the

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<v Speaker 2>company might cover it up.

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<v Speaker 1>So after the four or four article comes out, NBC

0:12:57.440 --> 0:13:02.079
<v Speaker 1>reports that they'd spoken to a second hacker. Is it

0:13:02.200 --> 0:13:06.520
<v Speaker 1>possible that there's another hacker who's gotten information and not

0:13:06.760 --> 0:13:08.400
<v Speaker 1>reported it to a journalist.

0:13:08.960 --> 0:13:14.520
<v Speaker 2>It's absolutely possible. Like already you have one hacker who

0:13:14.520 --> 0:13:17.240
<v Speaker 2>provided information to us, you then have a second hacker

0:13:17.440 --> 0:13:19.760
<v Speaker 2>who also breaks into the system. And that's quite rare,

0:13:19.960 --> 0:13:23.560
<v Speaker 2>to be honest, Like, I report on so many data breaches,

0:13:24.040 --> 0:13:27.160
<v Speaker 2>and it's not common for a media outlet to report

0:13:27.160 --> 0:13:29.360
<v Speaker 2>on a hack and then a day or so later,

0:13:29.440 --> 0:13:31.880
<v Speaker 2>another media outlet says, another hacker got it. Like that

0:13:32.000 --> 0:13:36.160
<v Speaker 2>just doesn't doesn't really happen. Now, let's assume those hackers

0:13:36.160 --> 0:13:38.079
<v Speaker 2>are probably random hackers who were just talking to the

0:13:38.120 --> 0:13:42.720
<v Speaker 2>press or whatever. If you are from a nation state

0:13:42.760 --> 0:13:47.000
<v Speaker 2>intelligence agency like China or Russia or Iran, if you

0:13:47.840 --> 0:13:50.640
<v Speaker 2>haven't even looked at that server, you should probably lose

0:13:50.640 --> 0:13:55.360
<v Speaker 2>your job because that's literally your job is to find

0:13:55.400 --> 0:14:00.120
<v Speaker 2>out where these vulnerabilities are. You don't really have a

0:14:00.160 --> 0:14:04.600
<v Speaker 2>more pressing target than the people around Donald Trump or

0:14:04.640 --> 0:14:08.240
<v Speaker 2>Donald Trump himself. That's sort of in a circle. It

0:14:08.360 --> 0:14:10.720
<v Speaker 2>is your job too, among us of these people.

0:14:11.360 --> 0:14:14.440
<v Speaker 1>Should people stop using signal after all this came out?

0:14:14.760 --> 0:14:18.880
<v Speaker 2>Absolutely not. More people should use signal or a secure

0:14:18.880 --> 0:14:21.760
<v Speaker 2>alternative that makes sense in their life. Don't let the

0:14:21.840 --> 0:14:25.880
<v Speaker 2>telemassage Debarkle throw you off that just you probably don't

0:14:25.920 --> 0:14:28.360
<v Speaker 2>use a tool like that. It's like an archiving tool.

0:14:29.400 --> 0:14:33.320
<v Speaker 1>Okay, So hopefully we haven't scared you away from using Signal. Truly,

0:14:33.440 --> 0:14:36.240
<v Speaker 1>it is a great app. There's nothing wrong with Signal itself.

0:14:36.840 --> 0:14:40.640
<v Speaker 1>The issue is with tell Message. But there's something else

0:14:40.680 --> 0:14:43.080
<v Speaker 1>we need to talk about, because we've talked about the

0:14:43.120 --> 0:14:45.800
<v Speaker 1>technical side of all this, and now we need to

0:14:45.840 --> 0:14:49.200
<v Speaker 1>talk about the human side. Once a vulnerability is found,

0:14:49.640 --> 0:14:52.520
<v Speaker 1>the next step is figuring out what the potential damage is.

0:14:53.240 --> 0:14:55.120
<v Speaker 1>And to know that, you need to know whether this

0:14:55.240 --> 0:14:58.600
<v Speaker 1>vulnerability was a mistake or it was there on purpose.

0:14:59.080 --> 0:15:02.960
<v Speaker 1>And this is where things get tricky because Telemessage, the company,

0:15:03.400 --> 0:15:06.360
<v Speaker 1>not only has access to servers where messages are archived,

0:15:06.680 --> 0:15:09.600
<v Speaker 1>but they theoretically would have access to all the chat

0:15:09.600 --> 0:15:14.040
<v Speaker 1>logs of everything ever said using their service. And Telemessage

0:15:14.080 --> 0:15:16.720
<v Speaker 1>is based in Israel, founded by someone who worked in

0:15:16.720 --> 0:15:20.160
<v Speaker 1>intelligence for the Israel Defense Force. So what does this

0:15:20.240 --> 0:15:23.840
<v Speaker 1>mean for the US government and what might they do next?

0:15:25.000 --> 0:15:39.720
<v Speaker 1>That's after the break Politics is not really my forte.

0:15:40.000 --> 0:15:42.360
<v Speaker 1>But in order to understand what exactly is at stake

0:15:42.360 --> 0:15:44.560
<v Speaker 1>in this hack, I knew I'd have to learn a

0:15:44.560 --> 0:15:46.640
<v Speaker 1>little bit more about what people are saying in DC.

0:15:47.360 --> 0:15:49.960
<v Speaker 1>So I called up yet another friend and former colleague,

0:15:50.040 --> 0:15:54.400
<v Speaker 1>Evan McMorris Centaro. He's a longtime politics reporter and he

0:15:54.440 --> 0:15:57.600
<v Speaker 1>now writes a daily newsletter for a nonprofit media organization

0:15:57.800 --> 0:15:59.880
<v Speaker 1>called Notice That's NTU.

0:16:00.880 --> 0:16:04.280
<v Speaker 3>It kind of sort of broke in the journalism i'd say,

0:16:04.320 --> 0:16:06.720
<v Speaker 3>around that snowed in era. That's when I first started

0:16:07.040 --> 0:16:08.160
<v Speaker 3>hearing about it.

0:16:08.160 --> 0:16:11.480
<v Speaker 1>It's not just government officials who use Signal. Actually, outside

0:16:11.480 --> 0:16:14.360
<v Speaker 1>of tech people, journalists were some of the earliest adopters.

0:16:14.760 --> 0:16:16.920
<v Speaker 1>The fact that this app is not only secure, but

0:16:17.000 --> 0:16:20.160
<v Speaker 1>that it would automatically delete messages is a big benefit.

0:16:20.720 --> 0:16:22.680
<v Speaker 1>This stuff is really important when you're talking to a

0:16:22.760 --> 0:16:24.400
<v Speaker 1>source about something sensitive.

0:16:25.560 --> 0:16:28.040
<v Speaker 3>And you know, an important thing about Washington is everybody

0:16:28.040 --> 0:16:30.760
<v Speaker 3>that you're talking to is old for the most part,

0:16:31.280 --> 0:16:34.480
<v Speaker 3>and their tech savviness is very low, and so it

0:16:34.560 --> 0:16:38.240
<v Speaker 3>takes a long time for this something like this to

0:16:38.280 --> 0:16:41.000
<v Speaker 3>kind of matriculate out through the entire system. So now

0:16:41.080 --> 0:16:43.880
<v Speaker 3>we're in a world now where the Vice president is

0:16:43.920 --> 0:16:46.480
<v Speaker 3>on it, and the National Security Advisor is on it,

0:16:46.680 --> 0:16:48.560
<v Speaker 3>and the Secretary of Defense is on it. You know,

0:16:48.640 --> 0:16:51.480
<v Speaker 3>these are particularly old people as far as politics goes.

0:16:51.840 --> 0:16:54.800
<v Speaker 3>But it takes from that sort of snowed in time

0:16:54.880 --> 0:16:56.960
<v Speaker 3>all those years ago to now for it to become

0:16:57.080 --> 0:17:01.160
<v Speaker 3>very very prevalent as people sort of start to catch

0:17:01.200 --> 0:17:03.840
<v Speaker 3>on to something that's new. It is not like in

0:17:03.880 --> 0:17:07.520
<v Speaker 3>the movies where the movie shows, you know, the government

0:17:07.600 --> 0:17:12.840
<v Speaker 3>officials have the coolest, slickest, most amazing technology that has

0:17:13.760 --> 0:17:17.280
<v Speaker 3>the best features. In reality, you know, tech in the

0:17:17.280 --> 0:17:22.000
<v Speaker 3>government is a slow, slow moving process and one that

0:17:22.040 --> 0:17:24.879
<v Speaker 3>has a lot of lawyering involved. There are laws, very

0:17:24.880 --> 0:17:28.960
<v Speaker 3>specific laws about the kinds of records that government officials

0:17:29.000 --> 0:17:31.359
<v Speaker 3>have to keep, and so you know there's sort of like,

0:17:31.440 --> 0:17:34.000
<v Speaker 3>you know, these government officials will tell you we're keeping records,

0:17:34.359 --> 0:17:37.200
<v Speaker 3>we are doing things the right way. Some Biden officials

0:17:37.200 --> 0:17:38.520
<v Speaker 3>talked about how they would use it to you know,

0:17:39.080 --> 0:17:41.159
<v Speaker 3>plan like where they would meet up for dinner or

0:17:41.200 --> 0:17:43.200
<v Speaker 3>something like that if they were on the road somewhere,

0:17:43.359 --> 0:17:46.200
<v Speaker 3>things like that. But as we saw with this signal gate,

0:17:46.840 --> 0:17:50.959
<v Speaker 3>there was a real comfort in using this service for

0:17:51.320 --> 0:17:57.400
<v Speaker 3>something that would absolutely be governed by classified records acts

0:17:57.600 --> 0:18:00.000
<v Speaker 3>that are very specific and how classical records must be handled,

0:18:00.359 --> 0:18:03.439
<v Speaker 3>and also in record keeping that are very specific in

0:18:03.520 --> 0:18:07.359
<v Speaker 3>what kind of things administration officials have to keep to

0:18:07.400 --> 0:18:08.520
<v Speaker 3>be archived for history.

0:18:08.960 --> 0:18:13.320
<v Speaker 1>Why does this stuff need to be archived.

0:18:12.840 --> 0:18:15.480
<v Speaker 3>Well, you know, Acts of the presidential record jacks are

0:18:15.520 --> 0:18:19.440
<v Speaker 3>designed for history when you're president. When your government official,

0:18:20.200 --> 0:18:23.280
<v Speaker 3>your privacy is different. The work that you do, the

0:18:23.359 --> 0:18:26.439
<v Speaker 3>work product that you do as a government official. It

0:18:26.520 --> 0:18:29.080
<v Speaker 3>kind of belongs to the government with means it belongs

0:18:29.080 --> 0:18:32.120
<v Speaker 3>to everybody. That's true of the executive branch. It's not

0:18:32.160 --> 0:18:36.679
<v Speaker 3>true of Congress. It's a very important part of what

0:18:36.960 --> 0:18:41.480
<v Speaker 3>an administration does is create a history of how decisions

0:18:41.480 --> 0:18:44.920
<v Speaker 3>are made so future decisions can be made better. They

0:18:44.920 --> 0:18:47.800
<v Speaker 3>are not This is not your personal private email. Those

0:18:47.840 --> 0:18:52.119
<v Speaker 3>emails are public record and can be looked at by

0:18:52.160 --> 0:18:53.680
<v Speaker 3>people and can be requested by people.

0:18:54.040 --> 0:18:57.240
<v Speaker 1>So look, one of the first things that I thought

0:18:57.240 --> 0:18:59.679
<v Speaker 1>of when I saw this whole telemessage thing in the

0:18:59.720 --> 0:19:01.639
<v Speaker 1>hack is the first thing that popped in my mind

0:19:02.119 --> 0:19:04.359
<v Speaker 1>was this kind of reminds me of Hillary Clinton in

0:19:04.400 --> 0:19:06.320
<v Speaker 1>the emails, And it's become kind of a meme at

0:19:06.320 --> 0:19:08.359
<v Speaker 1>this point. You know, I've heard the memes so much

0:19:08.400 --> 0:19:11.360
<v Speaker 1>that I've actually kind of forgotten what the email thing

0:19:11.600 --> 0:19:12.440
<v Speaker 1>was about.

0:19:12.680 --> 0:19:17.920
<v Speaker 3>There are actually three separate email scandals in the Clinton

0:19:18.280 --> 0:19:21.240
<v Speaker 3>campaign twenty sixteen. A right, so let's start with the

0:19:21.240 --> 0:19:26.920
<v Speaker 3>first one. So Hillary Clinton, rather than use her email

0:19:27.040 --> 0:19:30.280
<v Speaker 3>system that was given to her the as Secretary of

0:19:30.320 --> 0:19:33.520
<v Speaker 3>State that goes through the government, she sent all of

0:19:33.560 --> 0:19:38.240
<v Speaker 3>her emails through a private email server that she had

0:19:38.280 --> 0:19:41.080
<v Speaker 3>set up herself. But so what happened was is that

0:19:41.119 --> 0:19:44.920
<v Speaker 3>when she was done being Secretary of State, she had

0:19:44.960 --> 0:19:47.720
<v Speaker 3>to do the Official Records Acts part of her job,

0:19:47.880 --> 0:19:51.280
<v Speaker 3>and so she turned over all of these emails. And

0:19:51.280 --> 0:19:52.919
<v Speaker 3>then it turned out that the way those emails had

0:19:52.960 --> 0:19:56.760
<v Speaker 3>been turned over was that her and her lawyers had

0:19:56.800 --> 0:19:59.840
<v Speaker 3>gone through all these emails on this server that she

0:20:00.040 --> 0:20:04.160
<v Speaker 3>owned and said, these are the ones that are professional,

0:20:04.160 --> 0:20:06.760
<v Speaker 3>these are the ones that you need to categorize, and

0:20:07.000 --> 0:20:10.720
<v Speaker 3>thousands of other ones we're keeping them. They're not they're

0:20:10.760 --> 0:20:13.400
<v Speaker 3>personal emails, they're not subject to the Official Records Act.

0:20:13.640 --> 0:20:16.439
<v Speaker 3>And then also we're like kind of deleting them for

0:20:16.520 --> 0:20:19.040
<v Speaker 3>all time, so it's never to be found again. The

0:20:19.080 --> 0:20:23.280
<v Speaker 3>second email scandal was the Clinton campaign itself. When it

0:20:23.359 --> 0:20:29.000
<v Speaker 3>was running, it's senior advisor, John Podesta, used his personal

0:20:29.160 --> 0:20:33.760
<v Speaker 3>Gmail for all of his communications with the campaign. He

0:20:33.840 --> 0:20:35.359
<v Speaker 3>was a top advisor. He got a lot of emails,

0:20:35.359 --> 0:20:37.880
<v Speaker 3>a lot of very sensitive series emails. So he gets

0:20:37.880 --> 0:20:41.000
<v Speaker 3>this weird email one day that asks him for like

0:20:41.080 --> 0:20:43.159
<v Speaker 3>his information and passwords and stuff were like you know,

0:20:43.280 --> 0:20:46.000
<v Speaker 3>links away as a phishing attack. He sends it to

0:20:46.040 --> 0:20:48.919
<v Speaker 3>the IT guy and says, is this bad? And the

0:20:49.000 --> 0:20:51.439
<v Speaker 3>IT guy sends it back email saying, now this is

0:20:51.440 --> 0:20:53.720
<v Speaker 3>a legitimate email, but actually he meant to say it

0:20:53.760 --> 0:20:58.320
<v Speaker 3>was an illegitimate email. Pessa clicks on it spears phishing attack.

0:20:58.480 --> 0:21:01.600
<v Speaker 3>All of his emails are harvested. Huge scandal for the

0:21:01.640 --> 0:21:04.560
<v Speaker 3>Clinton campaign, all right. So that's the second one. The

0:21:04.600 --> 0:21:08.480
<v Speaker 3>third one is that Kuma Abidin, who was another top

0:21:08.520 --> 0:21:11.360
<v Speaker 3>senior Clinton advisor while she was Secretary of State and

0:21:11.520 --> 0:21:15.000
<v Speaker 3>on her campaign, had a personal laptop of her own

0:21:15.920 --> 0:21:20.120
<v Speaker 3>and she would get all of Hillary Clinton's emails. And

0:21:20.359 --> 0:21:24.080
<v Speaker 3>so you know, they had had all this conversation. The

0:21:24.160 --> 0:21:27.879
<v Speaker 3>fbi'd investigated the private email server thing, They talked about it.

0:21:28.119 --> 0:21:29.960
<v Speaker 3>The FBI had said, look, this is not great that

0:21:30.040 --> 0:21:32.960
<v Speaker 3>you did this, but we don't see anything worth prosecuting here.

0:21:33.520 --> 0:21:36.960
<v Speaker 3>That happened early in the campaign, but at the very end,

0:21:37.119 --> 0:21:40.360
<v Speaker 3>in the last subverts of the campaign, whom Abiden's then

0:21:40.440 --> 0:21:45.720
<v Speaker 3>husband named Anthony Wiener, who was a congressman from New York.

0:21:46.080 --> 0:21:50.240
<v Speaker 3>He was involved in a very like embarrassing and like ongoing,

0:21:50.440 --> 0:21:55.199
<v Speaker 3>endless kind of sex scandal involving him texting people, some

0:21:55.240 --> 0:21:57.719
<v Speaker 3>of them underage, sexting them.

0:21:57.960 --> 0:21:58.120
<v Speaker 1>Right.

0:21:58.640 --> 0:22:01.080
<v Speaker 3>So, in the course of that investigator of that, they

0:22:01.160 --> 0:22:04.560
<v Speaker 3>uncover that, oh, he's been using this laptop that has

0:22:04.680 --> 0:22:07.560
<v Speaker 3>of course archived on it in its own version of

0:22:08.480 --> 0:22:11.959
<v Speaker 3>Outlook or its email software whatever it was, all of

0:22:12.000 --> 0:22:15.760
<v Speaker 3>these old Hillary Clinton emails that maybe some of them

0:22:15.760 --> 0:22:18.919
<v Speaker 3>are the ones that she, you know, tried to delete

0:22:18.920 --> 0:22:20.399
<v Speaker 3>from a server. We can go back where we can

0:22:20.440 --> 0:22:21.720
<v Speaker 3>look and see if any of them are going to

0:22:21.760 --> 0:22:24.679
<v Speaker 3>violate the lot. So this comes out right near the

0:22:24.760 --> 0:22:28.560
<v Speaker 3>very end of the campaign, and all of a sudden,

0:22:28.760 --> 0:22:31.359
<v Speaker 3>Hill Clinton's emails are back, and then she loses in

0:22:31.400 --> 0:22:34.439
<v Speaker 3>a very close election to Donald Trump, and a lot

0:22:34.480 --> 0:22:37.400
<v Speaker 3>of people equate it being at least one of these

0:22:37.400 --> 0:22:41.080
<v Speaker 3>email scandals that did it, possibly three, but really it

0:22:41.160 --> 0:22:43.879
<v Speaker 3>was email all along. But it does also feel like

0:22:43.920 --> 0:22:46.640
<v Speaker 3>a different time. I will give you a great example

0:22:46.680 --> 0:22:49.600
<v Speaker 3>that just happened, you know, the one hundred days of

0:22:49.600 --> 0:22:53.440
<v Speaker 3>Trump's administration just passed, and so everybody is trying to

0:22:53.480 --> 0:22:56.080
<v Speaker 3>score interview with the president and write a big piece

0:22:56.280 --> 0:22:59.800
<v Speaker 3>about the one hundred days. The Atlantic magazine, which of

0:22:59.840 --> 0:23:03.080
<v Speaker 3>course is the place where Signal Gate happened, was was revealed.

0:23:03.200 --> 0:23:07.199
<v Speaker 3>The reporters reveal that they just at one point just

0:23:07.359 --> 0:23:10.720
<v Speaker 3>called up the president on his cell phone and Trump

0:23:10.760 --> 0:23:14.120
<v Speaker 3>answered and agreed to do an interview.

0:23:14.320 --> 0:23:14.680
<v Speaker 1>Like just.

0:23:16.320 --> 0:23:19.920
<v Speaker 3>Hello, mister President, I'd like to interview. Okay, sure, we're

0:23:19.920 --> 0:23:22.600
<v Speaker 3>not talking about going through layers of security here. We're

0:23:22.640 --> 0:23:26.040
<v Speaker 3>not talking about going through you know, arbiters that are

0:23:26.119 --> 0:23:28.919
<v Speaker 3>checking on this. This is a guy just has a

0:23:28.960 --> 0:23:32.160
<v Speaker 3>phone that can ring, you can pick it up. When

0:23:32.760 --> 0:23:36.159
<v Speaker 3>President Obama was in power, you know, he wanted to

0:23:36.240 --> 0:23:38.760
<v Speaker 3>keep his personal BlackBerry. You know, this is how long

0:23:38.760 --> 0:23:40.760
<v Speaker 3>ago it was. The BlackBerry. A part of like what

0:23:40.840 --> 0:23:42.840
<v Speaker 3>made Obama cool was that he was like a guy

0:23:42.880 --> 0:23:45.240
<v Speaker 3>that knew how he was a BlackBerry and he wanted

0:23:45.240 --> 0:23:47.679
<v Speaker 3>to keep it. There was some conversation that maybe he

0:23:47.720 --> 0:23:51.879
<v Speaker 3>had been given this like super secure government version of

0:23:51.880 --> 0:23:54.239
<v Speaker 3>a BlackBerry. Near the end of his administration. You can

0:23:54.280 --> 0:23:56.320
<v Speaker 3>go on YouTube and you can watch this. He goes

0:23:56.480 --> 0:24:00.720
<v Speaker 3>on Jimmy Fallon and talks about getting his first smartphone

0:24:00.760 --> 0:24:03.480
<v Speaker 3>near the end of his administration, that the government gives

0:24:03.520 --> 0:24:06.520
<v Speaker 3>him a smartphone that he can use, and Obama says

0:24:06.520 --> 0:24:09.040
<v Speaker 3>he can't take a picture, I can't do a phone call,

0:24:09.280 --> 0:24:12.680
<v Speaker 3>can't send a text message because all that stuff makes

0:24:12.720 --> 0:24:15.679
<v Speaker 3>it not secure. Then the president having an ability to

0:24:15.680 --> 0:24:18.199
<v Speaker 3>do that, all that can be hacked not secure. The

0:24:18.240 --> 0:24:22.159
<v Speaker 3>president now gets a phone call from reporters. There was

0:24:22.240 --> 0:24:25.120
<v Speaker 3>no conversation at all about the president just having a

0:24:25.160 --> 0:24:29.760
<v Speaker 3>phone you can call. This is an incredibly different idea

0:24:30.359 --> 0:24:33.000
<v Speaker 3>of what it means to be a secure administration, and

0:24:33.040 --> 0:24:35.920
<v Speaker 3>nobody cares anymore. It just not even talked about. It's

0:24:35.960 --> 0:24:38.160
<v Speaker 3>a completely different landscape.

0:24:38.560 --> 0:24:40.199
<v Speaker 1>And I mean this has been different even on the

0:24:40.200 --> 0:24:43.680
<v Speaker 1>Republican side. I mean, didn't Bush just not use email,

0:24:43.920 --> 0:24:44.840
<v Speaker 1>not use personal email?

0:24:44.960 --> 0:24:49.920
<v Speaker 3>That's correct. George W. Bush famously sent a last email

0:24:50.320 --> 0:24:54.200
<v Speaker 3>to all of his friends in his email list, like, look,

0:24:54.200 --> 0:24:56.320
<v Speaker 3>I'm not gonna be able to email anymore because they

0:24:56.320 --> 0:24:57.800
<v Speaker 3>can see my email. So I'm not going to do

0:24:57.840 --> 0:25:00.960
<v Speaker 3>that anymore. Goodbye for now. And He's not the only

0:25:01.000 --> 0:25:03.640
<v Speaker 3>person to do this. I remember the interview with Lindsay Graham.

0:25:03.720 --> 0:25:05.560
<v Speaker 3>He has talked about how he is never in his

0:25:05.680 --> 0:25:08.640
<v Speaker 3>life sent an email? Wow, right, Why would I send

0:25:08.640 --> 0:25:10.320
<v Speaker 3>an email? He says? Why would I do that? And

0:25:10.359 --> 0:25:12.840
<v Speaker 3>the thing is, you know, part of being a senators

0:25:12.880 --> 0:25:14.320
<v Speaker 3>you have a staff or anything they can deal this

0:25:14.359 --> 0:25:17.479
<v Speaker 3>communication for you. Why, He's like, why do I send

0:25:17.480 --> 0:25:19.280
<v Speaker 3>an email? An email can only get me in trouble?

0:25:19.280 --> 0:25:20.240
<v Speaker 3>Why would I ever do it?

0:25:20.480 --> 0:25:22.520
<v Speaker 1>Let me jump to signal gate real quick, because let's

0:25:22.520 --> 0:25:26.280
<v Speaker 1>go with single gate. You've got these high levels senior

0:25:26.320 --> 0:25:30.680
<v Speaker 1>officials on the Trump administration talking about essentially war plans,

0:25:30.960 --> 0:25:35.280
<v Speaker 1>right doing it on signal What, strictly speaking, what were

0:25:35.280 --> 0:25:36.680
<v Speaker 1>they supposed to have been using.

0:25:37.320 --> 0:25:43.320
<v Speaker 3>There are extremely secure government communication tools that are used

0:25:43.760 --> 0:25:48.320
<v Speaker 3>to talk about things like national security stuff. But chat

0:25:48.359 --> 0:25:52.919
<v Speaker 3>that involves the Vice president, the Secretary of Defense, the

0:25:52.960 --> 0:25:57.119
<v Speaker 3>Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, and the chief

0:25:57.119 --> 0:25:59.800
<v Speaker 3>of staff and some of their deputies. Every single person

0:25:59.800 --> 0:26:04.399
<v Speaker 3>on that chat has access to millions of dollars of

0:26:04.480 --> 0:26:12.520
<v Speaker 3>equipment specifically designed to let them communicate without breaching national security.

0:26:12.680 --> 0:26:16.920
<v Speaker 3>For whatever reason, they chose not to use that stuff.

0:26:17.800 --> 0:26:21.480
<v Speaker 3>And the result is in this case, they ended up

0:26:21.520 --> 0:26:24.040
<v Speaker 3>inviting a reporter in. There's been a lot of reporting

0:26:24.040 --> 0:26:27.080
<v Speaker 3>for other government officials who talk about how, yes, we

0:26:27.200 --> 0:26:32.560
<v Speaker 3>use signal, but just how incredibly dumb and unbelieve, unfathomably

0:26:32.640 --> 0:26:36.399
<v Speaker 3>dumb it was to use a signal group chat to

0:26:36.640 --> 0:26:41.040
<v Speaker 3>plan and execute a military strike and to then detail

0:26:41.440 --> 0:26:44.200
<v Speaker 3>how that worked. The problem is not the reporter you

0:26:44.240 --> 0:26:48.440
<v Speaker 3>ineventally put on, it's the foreign power that can hack

0:26:48.520 --> 0:26:50.920
<v Speaker 3>it and look at it. So, even in a world

0:26:50.920 --> 0:26:55.800
<v Speaker 3>where people do increasingly use signal, this particular thing was

0:26:55.840 --> 0:26:58.520
<v Speaker 3>seen as one of the dumbest things that people can

0:26:58.560 --> 0:27:01.600
<v Speaker 3>imagine in a long long time in Washington, a town

0:27:01.640 --> 0:27:04.000
<v Speaker 3>where dumb things happen pretty much every day.

0:27:05.520 --> 0:27:10.159
<v Speaker 1>So sener Ron Widen has he basically is demanding and

0:27:10.160 --> 0:27:13.320
<v Speaker 1>he's released this letter, but he's demanding an investigation, right.

0:27:13.720 --> 0:27:17.360
<v Speaker 1>And there's one part of this letter that I found

0:27:18.000 --> 0:27:20.080
<v Speaker 1>kind of wild, right, And this is kind of near

0:27:20.119 --> 0:27:22.800
<v Speaker 1>the middle, near the end. So he's talking about tele

0:27:22.880 --> 0:27:26.159
<v Speaker 1>message and he says, I'm gonna read this here. It

0:27:26.240 --> 0:27:29.560
<v Speaker 1>remains unclear whether the design of this system was merely

0:27:29.680 --> 0:27:32.359
<v Speaker 1>the result of incompetence on the part of the foreign

0:27:32.400 --> 0:27:36.720
<v Speaker 1>company whose senior leadership are former intelligence officers, or a

0:27:36.760 --> 0:27:43.080
<v Speaker 1>backdoor designed to facilitate foreign intelligence collection against US government officials.

0:27:43.400 --> 0:27:46.920
<v Speaker 1>So the foreign government here and the foreign intelligence officers

0:27:46.960 --> 0:27:52.159
<v Speaker 1>he's speaking about this is Israel, which is regardless of

0:27:52.200 --> 0:27:55.760
<v Speaker 1>one's personal beliefs, may be the official US stance is

0:27:55.760 --> 0:27:58.280
<v Speaker 1>that we're very friendly with Israel. This is an ally

0:27:58.880 --> 0:28:03.159
<v Speaker 1>to even can leave open the door to suggest that

0:28:03.960 --> 0:28:11.720
<v Speaker 1>this is the creation of the app is intentional active espionage?

0:28:11.840 --> 0:28:14.280
<v Speaker 1>Am I just reading this? Or is this that actually

0:28:14.400 --> 0:28:15.919
<v Speaker 1>just a wild thing to say in public?

0:28:16.840 --> 0:28:20.680
<v Speaker 3>One Israel has absolutely by the United States a number

0:28:20.720 --> 0:28:23.920
<v Speaker 3>of times. You know that a country is going to

0:28:23.960 --> 0:28:26.280
<v Speaker 3>say something in public, but you really want to know

0:28:26.320 --> 0:28:30.040
<v Speaker 3>what they're talking about in private, right And so even

0:28:30.160 --> 0:28:34.359
<v Speaker 3>if that country is ostensibly your ally, you want to

0:28:34.359 --> 0:28:37.800
<v Speaker 3>know what's going on. And two, this has of course

0:28:37.840 --> 0:28:42.360
<v Speaker 3>been a central concern when it comes to information technology

0:28:42.440 --> 0:28:45.160
<v Speaker 3>and the government for a long time now. This idea

0:28:45.240 --> 0:28:48.680
<v Speaker 3>that this kind of technology can be used by a

0:28:48.720 --> 0:28:53.600
<v Speaker 3>foreign government to hack our stuff, even this foreign government,

0:28:53.640 --> 0:28:59.680
<v Speaker 3>even this ally is not an unlikely one. Why it does, like, look,

0:29:00.000 --> 0:29:04.760
<v Speaker 3>this piece of technology telling message was so sort of

0:29:04.840 --> 0:29:08.920
<v Speaker 3>cartoonishly hackable according to the reporting that we have read

0:29:08.960 --> 0:29:12.880
<v Speaker 3>about it, that either someone is just like really bad

0:29:12.960 --> 0:29:16.120
<v Speaker 3>at making something and has scammed people into buying it,

0:29:16.720 --> 0:29:20.920
<v Speaker 3>or they're stupid like a fox and they made this

0:29:21.000 --> 0:29:24.440
<v Speaker 3>thing so they could just harvest all the information that

0:29:24.480 --> 0:29:30.040
<v Speaker 3>they could get. Either way, you're looking at a huge

0:29:30.440 --> 0:29:37.040
<v Speaker 3>failure of the American governmental state to protect our secrets.

0:29:37.080 --> 0:29:40.880
<v Speaker 3>Clear like an undeniable fuck up. And the question is

0:29:40.920 --> 0:29:42.720
<v Speaker 3>just like how much of a fuck up is it?

0:29:43.080 --> 0:29:45.160
<v Speaker 3>And they're not sure yet, but that is what he

0:29:45.240 --> 0:29:49.360
<v Speaker 3>is saying needs to be investigated. After Pete hegsif their

0:29:49.400 --> 0:29:54.000
<v Speaker 3>secretary of defense was on this signal chat. Later reporting

0:29:54.040 --> 0:29:58.040
<v Speaker 3>discovered he had put an unsecure line into his office

0:29:58.040 --> 0:30:01.800
<v Speaker 3>in a Pentagon that he had ad maybe you signal.

0:30:02.400 --> 0:30:06.120
<v Speaker 3>In many other contexts, the President didn't say, Okay, we

0:30:06.200 --> 0:30:10.120
<v Speaker 3>got to do an investigation what exactly we have been

0:30:10.240 --> 0:30:14.000
<v Speaker 3>spreading all over the place through bad op sect by

0:30:14.040 --> 0:30:17.600
<v Speaker 3>our secretary of defense? Right, very serious job, right, The

0:30:17.640 --> 0:30:20.120
<v Speaker 3>President said, Look, I talked to him again. It was

0:30:20.160 --> 0:30:22.800
<v Speaker 3>a serious conversation. But you know he's going to get

0:30:22.800 --> 0:30:25.600
<v Speaker 3>it together now, that's for the president. That was the

0:30:25.640 --> 0:30:30.360
<v Speaker 3>President's response to this. So in that context, I would

0:30:30.360 --> 0:30:35.440
<v Speaker 3>say it is not that likely that Roten Widen is

0:30:35.440 --> 0:30:39.280
<v Speaker 3>going to get either of the investigations he wants from

0:30:39.280 --> 0:30:42.680
<v Speaker 3>the Trump administration. This administration is much more focused on

0:30:42.720 --> 0:30:47.560
<v Speaker 3>protecting its own, much more focused on circling the wagons here.

0:30:47.760 --> 0:30:50.760
<v Speaker 1>Evan, Okay, I get that, But do people in DC

0:30:50.960 --> 0:30:53.880
<v Speaker 1>even understand this stuff? Do they even care?

0:30:54.320 --> 0:30:56.719
<v Speaker 3>Well, you know, we are asking them to understand this stuff, right,

0:30:56.760 --> 0:30:58.240
<v Speaker 3>These are the ones who often these people who have

0:30:58.280 --> 0:31:01.160
<v Speaker 3>to write regulations about crypt currency for us, these are

0:31:01.120 --> 0:31:02.520
<v Speaker 3>the ones you have to figure out what we're going

0:31:02.560 --> 0:31:05.960
<v Speaker 3>to do about artificial intelligence. Right. The woman who is

0:31:06.000 --> 0:31:10.000
<v Speaker 3>in charge of determining how much we're going to use

0:31:10.160 --> 0:31:15.760
<v Speaker 3>artificial intelligence in American education recently referred to it as

0:31:15.920 --> 0:31:19.920
<v Speaker 3>a one like the steak sauce, not AI, but a

0:31:20.080 --> 0:31:24.800
<v Speaker 3>one in a public's forum. Wait, this is the Secretary

0:31:24.800 --> 0:31:28.520
<v Speaker 3>of Education, Wynda McMahon. She was talking about artificial intelligence

0:31:28.520 --> 0:31:29.000
<v Speaker 3>and education.

0:31:29.200 --> 0:31:31.320
<v Speaker 1>Okay, just as an aside here. I had to look

0:31:31.360 --> 0:31:33.840
<v Speaker 1>this up later and Evan was right. This was in

0:31:33.880 --> 0:31:36.840
<v Speaker 1>an education summit in San Diego, and she said a

0:31:37.000 --> 0:31:38.040
<v Speaker 1>one twice.

0:31:38.800 --> 0:31:42.760
<v Speaker 3>And so if you're a person involved in technology in

0:31:42.760 --> 0:31:44.680
<v Speaker 3>the tech world, if you're a person trying to get

0:31:44.680 --> 0:31:48.480
<v Speaker 3>these regulations or stop these regulations, these are the people

0:31:48.480 --> 0:31:51.280
<v Speaker 3>that you're working with. And I think it explains a

0:31:51.280 --> 0:31:53.520
<v Speaker 3>lot about some of the scandals that we have seen

0:31:53.560 --> 0:31:56.840
<v Speaker 3>when it comes to technology, and it also explains a

0:31:56.880 --> 0:32:01.400
<v Speaker 3>lot of some of the confusing life that we live

0:32:01.480 --> 0:32:03.080
<v Speaker 3>in America when it comes to technology.

0:32:03.640 --> 0:32:05.959
<v Speaker 1>Man. So maybe the last one I'll ask you here

0:32:06.000 --> 0:32:09.720
<v Speaker 1>then is you know you've you've been in the game

0:32:09.760 --> 0:32:13.239
<v Speaker 1>for a minute. You've been reporting on politics, and this

0:32:13.280 --> 0:32:15.600
<v Speaker 1>is how I know you, right, I know you. You

0:32:15.640 --> 0:32:17.720
<v Speaker 1>know we were advice. I knew you as like, if

0:32:17.760 --> 0:32:20.400
<v Speaker 1>I have a question about politics, let me ask Evin.

0:32:20.560 --> 0:32:21.760
<v Speaker 1>He's gonna understand this stuff.

0:32:21.960 --> 0:32:24.200
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, I'm a nerd. I with the nerd. I know

0:32:24.640 --> 0:32:26.280
<v Speaker 3>I did it. I would hold it.

0:32:26.400 --> 0:32:29.800
<v Speaker 1>But hold on, you're the politics nerd. Now you're kind

0:32:29.800 --> 0:32:32.959
<v Speaker 1>of having to be the technology nerd a little bit.

0:32:32.960 --> 0:32:35.760
<v Speaker 1>I'm starting to notice that tech is starting to creep

0:32:35.880 --> 0:32:39.800
<v Speaker 1>into politics. You got to understand signal. Five years ago,

0:32:39.840 --> 0:32:41.760
<v Speaker 1>I wouldn't have been asking you a questions about apps,

0:32:41.880 --> 0:32:45.920
<v Speaker 1>That's right. I'm starting to notice that politics reporting is

0:32:46.000 --> 0:32:49.160
<v Speaker 1>starting to Frankly, I think we should start requiring our

0:32:49.240 --> 0:32:52.480
<v Speaker 1>reporters know more about technology. Maybe they did in the past,

0:32:52.680 --> 0:32:54.240
<v Speaker 1>Like you can't get that pass, you know what I

0:32:54.320 --> 0:32:55.680
<v Speaker 1>mean for not knowing stuff?

0:32:56.200 --> 0:33:01.000
<v Speaker 3>Oh one, this is a huge problem in politics. It

0:33:01.080 --> 0:33:04.680
<v Speaker 3>matters what you can do with AI and things like

0:33:05.200 --> 0:33:09.200
<v Speaker 3>misinformation and fake videos. It matters what you can do

0:33:09.320 --> 0:33:13.280
<v Speaker 3>with things like the hack ability of some of these apps.

0:33:13.520 --> 0:33:17.120
<v Speaker 3>All this stuff matters, But you're still living in a

0:33:17.160 --> 0:33:22.000
<v Speaker 3>world in politics often where it's like, hey, it's just Twitter,

0:33:22.280 --> 0:33:25.400
<v Speaker 3>like it's twenty ten, or hey, it's just signal, Right,

0:33:25.400 --> 0:33:28.200
<v Speaker 3>we're just signaling. Who cares? It's just signal, Like what

0:33:28.240 --> 0:33:31.360
<v Speaker 3>are we doing? Who cares? And that is a huge problem.

0:33:31.560 --> 0:33:35.040
<v Speaker 3>It is a huge problem, and they're changing the nature

0:33:35.640 --> 0:33:40.680
<v Speaker 3>of the way politics works, and unless we're able to

0:33:40.840 --> 0:33:44.239
<v Speaker 3>get up to speed, we are hosed. So you are

0:33:44.280 --> 0:33:47.440
<v Speaker 3>one hundred percent right there. So we absolutely need to

0:33:47.520 --> 0:33:51.560
<v Speaker 3>know about this stuff. The tech is starting to eat

0:33:52.560 --> 0:33:58.440
<v Speaker 3>the politics, and the politics is not ready to stand

0:33:58.520 --> 0:34:02.280
<v Speaker 3>up to that yet. And maybe they will be, maybe

0:34:02.280 --> 0:34:05.600
<v Speaker 3>it'll happen, but right now it absolutely is not.

0:34:08.080 --> 0:34:10.160
<v Speaker 1>And this all brings us back to where we started

0:34:10.600 --> 0:34:13.880
<v Speaker 1>the technology. I asked a similar question to our first guest,

0:34:14.120 --> 0:34:17.560
<v Speaker 1>Joseph Cox from four or four Media. I've been reading

0:34:17.800 --> 0:34:21.279
<v Speaker 1>your reporting forever and it seems that a lot of

0:34:21.280 --> 0:34:26.319
<v Speaker 1>your stuff was focused on specifically on companies. But it

0:34:26.360 --> 0:34:30.239
<v Speaker 1>seems like a lot of politics reporting nowadays is necessarily

0:34:30.280 --> 0:34:32.440
<v Speaker 1>tech reporting, especially with this administration.

0:34:32.840 --> 0:34:37.759
<v Speaker 2>Oh yeah, absolutely. When you have the CEOs of the

0:34:37.760 --> 0:34:41.840
<v Speaker 2>biggest tech companies in America, you know, Jeff Bezos, Smug Zuckerberg,

0:34:42.120 --> 0:34:44.920
<v Speaker 2>Tim Cook, Ela Musk officely, but he's almost in his

0:34:44.960 --> 0:34:47.320
<v Speaker 2>own category because he essentially is a member of the

0:34:47.400 --> 0:34:50.919
<v Speaker 2>US government. When you have all of those people going

0:34:50.960 --> 0:34:54.640
<v Speaker 2>to Trump's inauguration and donating a million dollars each or

0:34:54.680 --> 0:35:00.600
<v Speaker 2>whatever to it, that inherently makes tech political. Three four

0:35:00.680 --> 0:35:03.320
<v Speaker 2>or five years ago, you'd have people say, oh, stick

0:35:03.360 --> 0:35:07.080
<v Speaker 2>to tech, you're getting too political. I tech is inherently political.

0:35:07.239 --> 0:35:10.960
<v Speaker 2>Is the tools and the companies that provide the technical

0:35:11.000 --> 0:35:16.920
<v Speaker 2>infrastructure for how the will's functions and political decisions directly

0:35:16.960 --> 0:35:21.400
<v Speaker 2>dictate that. And tech decisions can directly dictate political decisions

0:35:21.680 --> 0:35:23.879
<v Speaker 2>as well, so they're completely inseparable.

0:35:26.040 --> 0:35:28.239
<v Speaker 1>Maybe this is sort of obvious, but when I talk

0:35:28.280 --> 0:35:31.000
<v Speaker 1>to my friends who report on politics or the economy

0:35:31.080 --> 0:35:34.560
<v Speaker 1>or art or whatever, they're being expected to understand technology

0:35:34.600 --> 0:35:37.960
<v Speaker 1>for their work. Now, this stuff is connected, and I

0:35:38.000 --> 0:35:41.920
<v Speaker 1>think it always was, but especially now, we can't ignore it.

0:35:42.280 --> 0:35:44.160
<v Speaker 1>And that's part of what we're trying to explore with

0:35:44.360 --> 0:35:46.719
<v Speaker 1>kill Switch. If you want to keep up with Evans' work,

0:35:46.800 --> 0:35:49.680
<v Speaker 1>I highly recommend checking it out at Notice That's in

0:35:49.760 --> 0:35:53.560
<v Speaker 1>ot Us. You should also check out Joseph Cox's articles

0:35:53.560 --> 0:35:55.799
<v Speaker 1>on four or four and if you want a really

0:35:55.840 --> 0:35:59.399
<v Speaker 1>technical analysis of tell a Message and how cartoonishly bad

0:35:59.440 --> 0:36:02.600
<v Speaker 1>it is, I highly recommend checking out Michael Lee's article

0:36:02.640 --> 0:36:05.000
<v Speaker 1>on his own site, and all those links are in

0:36:05.040 --> 0:36:14.640
<v Speaker 1>the show notes. Thank you so much for listening to

0:36:14.719 --> 0:36:17.160
<v Speaker 1>kill Switch. Let us know what you think and yo,

0:36:17.239 --> 0:36:18.799
<v Speaker 1>if there's something you want us to cover, let us

0:36:18.840 --> 0:36:21.040
<v Speaker 1>know about that too. You can hit us at kill

0:36:21.080 --> 0:36:24.200
<v Speaker 1>Switch at Kalaidoscope dot NYC, or you can hit me

0:36:24.280 --> 0:36:26.840
<v Speaker 1>at dex digi that's d e x d I g

0:36:27.040 --> 0:36:29.279
<v Speaker 1>I on the Gram or on Blue Sky if that's

0:36:29.280 --> 0:36:32.120
<v Speaker 1>your thing. Also leave us a review that helps other

0:36:32.160 --> 0:36:34.680
<v Speaker 1>people find the show, which in turn helps us keep

0:36:34.719 --> 0:36:38.280
<v Speaker 1>doing our thing. Kill Switch is hosted by Me, Dexter Thomas,

0:36:38.800 --> 0:36:42.680
<v Speaker 1>is produced by Sena Ozaki, Darl Lukkatts and Kate Osborne

0:36:42.760 --> 0:36:44.720
<v Speaker 1>and this week we have production help from a LISTA

0:36:44.760 --> 0:36:47.920
<v Speaker 1>midcalf Our theme song is by me and Kyle Murdoch,

0:36:48.040 --> 0:36:51.719
<v Speaker 1>and Kyle also mixed. The show from Kalaidoscope. Our executive

0:36:51.719 --> 0:36:56.160
<v Speaker 1>producers are Oz Valashin, Mangesh Hatigodur and Kate Osbourne. From

0:36:56.200 --> 0:36:59.400
<v Speaker 1>iHeart our executive producers are Katrina Norvil and Nikki E.

0:36:59.560 --> 0:36:59.719
<v Speaker 3>Tour.

0:37:00.280 --> 0:37:03.200
<v Speaker 1>Catch on the next one, good Bye,