1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:04,720 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is 2 00:00:04,800 --> 00:00:09,119 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,200 --> 00:00:12,079 Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A 4 00:00:12,240 --> 00:00:25,439 Speaker 1: production of My Heart Radio. Hello, welcome back to the show. 5 00:00:25,520 --> 00:00:28,040 Speaker 1: My name is Matt, my name is Noel. They called 6 00:00:28,040 --> 00:00:31,480 Speaker 1: me Ben. We're joined as always with our super producer Paul. 7 00:00:31,520 --> 00:00:36,080 Speaker 1: Mission Control decons. Most importantly, you are you, You are here, 8 00:00:36,240 --> 00:00:39,519 Speaker 1: and that makes this the stuff they don't want you 9 00:00:39,680 --> 00:00:43,360 Speaker 1: to know. You know. I was thinking, we're all familiar 10 00:00:43,479 --> 00:00:47,400 Speaker 1: with the idea of secret documents in fiction, right, It's 11 00:00:47,880 --> 00:00:52,360 Speaker 1: it's the the mommy of any any good spy thriller. Right, 12 00:00:52,440 --> 00:00:56,680 Speaker 1: It's the great mcguffin of so many stories. And increasingly 13 00:00:56,800 --> 00:01:01,320 Speaker 1: conversations about real life classified documents are in the mainstream news. 14 00:01:01,440 --> 00:01:04,080 Speaker 1: More people are thinking about them in a factual way 15 00:01:04,319 --> 00:01:07,440 Speaker 1: than they have for many years. But, as our fellow 16 00:01:07,480 --> 00:01:12,360 Speaker 1: conspiracy realist Jack Over on Instagram recently asked, what does 17 00:01:12,400 --> 00:01:15,119 Speaker 1: all this stuff mean? What is all this gobbledegook? That's 18 00:01:15,120 --> 00:01:19,039 Speaker 1: why today we're exploring federal classification. They're probably a couple 19 00:01:19,080 --> 00:01:22,640 Speaker 1: of episodes related to this and why it is such 20 00:01:22,680 --> 00:01:27,120 Speaker 1: a problem in the modern day, Uh, here are the facts. 21 00:01:28,959 --> 00:01:31,640 Speaker 1: You gotta have it, right, You gotta have secrets. It's 22 00:01:31,640 --> 00:01:36,199 Speaker 1: a necessary evil. And uh, you know we're big transparency advocates, 23 00:01:36,240 --> 00:01:40,399 Speaker 1: but even even folks like us know that some doors 24 00:01:40,520 --> 00:01:45,080 Speaker 1: have have to remain closed, right, Like, it's I think 25 00:01:45,080 --> 00:01:48,120 Speaker 1: it's reasonable to assume, you know, whether you were died 26 00:01:48,160 --> 00:01:51,400 Speaker 1: in the wool patriot, or whether you're like an avowed 27 00:01:51,480 --> 00:01:54,840 Speaker 1: enemy of the so called Great Satan, or like millions 28 00:01:54,840 --> 00:01:57,000 Speaker 1: of other people, you just happened to live in the US. 29 00:01:57,360 --> 00:01:59,960 Speaker 1: I think we all assume that this country has a 30 00:02:00,000 --> 00:02:03,360 Speaker 1: lot of secrets to keep. Oh yeah, no question there. Well, yeah, 31 00:02:03,400 --> 00:02:07,280 Speaker 1: and anytime there's global conflict, because of the way our 32 00:02:08,040 --> 00:02:10,959 Speaker 1: systems of society are set up, you've got to have 33 00:02:11,160 --> 00:02:14,720 Speaker 1: secret action possible. And in order to take a secret action, 34 00:02:15,320 --> 00:02:19,919 Speaker 1: you have to conspire with your team basically, or collude 35 00:02:19,919 --> 00:02:22,680 Speaker 1: with your team, work with your team in secret to 36 00:02:22,800 --> 00:02:26,120 Speaker 1: get things done. It's just weird that we also have 37 00:02:26,240 --> 00:02:30,120 Speaker 1: a system of democracy, at least in this country, where 38 00:02:30,200 --> 00:02:33,320 Speaker 1: were we all kind of pay for a government to 39 00:02:33,400 --> 00:02:36,839 Speaker 1: function for us, but then we don't get to know 40 00:02:37,000 --> 00:02:40,960 Speaker 1: what that government is doing. Often. It's very strange. Yeah, 41 00:02:41,120 --> 00:02:43,240 Speaker 1: that's you can at the root of one of the 42 00:02:43,360 --> 00:02:46,760 Speaker 1: paradox is here, and it very much is a conspiracy. 43 00:02:46,800 --> 00:02:50,320 Speaker 1: You know, we we mentioned this in our books stuff 44 00:02:50,360 --> 00:02:52,200 Speaker 1: that will want you to know, which is out now 45 00:02:52,240 --> 00:02:55,320 Speaker 1: wherever you find your favorite books, uh, and just you know, 46 00:02:55,639 --> 00:02:57,440 Speaker 1: to mention some some local spots you can get it. 47 00:02:57,480 --> 00:03:00,400 Speaker 1: Books are Magic in Brooklyn has them, and pal Books 48 00:03:00,440 --> 00:03:02,919 Speaker 1: in Portland. We've had some really cool reports of sightings 49 00:03:02,960 --> 00:03:06,639 Speaker 1: in the wild. Need to know that these very awesome, legacy, 50 00:03:07,080 --> 00:03:13,040 Speaker 1: amazing businesses have the book. So the US itself started 51 00:03:13,160 --> 00:03:17,280 Speaker 1: as a secret plot. It started as a conspiracy and 52 00:03:17,480 --> 00:03:21,520 Speaker 1: now hundreds of years later, like any other government, this 53 00:03:21,639 --> 00:03:26,480 Speaker 1: need for secrecy eventually lead to wait for it, paperwork. 54 00:03:26,960 --> 00:03:30,480 Speaker 1: Oh and also murder and also coups and uh ton 55 00:03:30,520 --> 00:03:33,520 Speaker 1: of corruption. But well, just for today, we'll we'll put 56 00:03:33,520 --> 00:03:37,880 Speaker 1: that to the side a little bit and you'll see why. Vocabulary, 57 00:03:37,960 --> 00:03:41,560 Speaker 1: oh gosh, so much fun. Vocabulary so much dare we 58 00:03:41,560 --> 00:03:48,720 Speaker 1: say jargon meant to obfiskate? Yeah, legally ease right, Uh, 59 00:03:49,240 --> 00:03:52,280 Speaker 1: all sorts of things. You know, we said this years 60 00:03:52,280 --> 00:03:55,280 Speaker 1: ago and I still think it's true. At a certain 61 00:03:55,320 --> 00:03:59,840 Speaker 1: point you have to ask, is this language purposely meant 62 00:04:00,160 --> 00:04:03,240 Speaker 1: to be off putting right there. There are a lot 63 00:04:03,280 --> 00:04:05,600 Speaker 1: of people who don't want you to read these sorts 64 00:04:05,640 --> 00:04:09,200 Speaker 1: of things. Uh. And that's not saying that they're all 65 00:04:09,480 --> 00:04:12,760 Speaker 1: Munti Burns esque lawful evil on the D and D scale, 66 00:04:12,880 --> 00:04:16,560 Speaker 1: just you know, doing some weird stuff, steepling their fingers 67 00:04:16,600 --> 00:04:20,800 Speaker 1: and going No one would make it through this paragraph, 68 00:04:20,800 --> 00:04:23,640 Speaker 1: but the result ends up being the same as if 69 00:04:23,680 --> 00:04:27,120 Speaker 1: they had done that on purpose. Every other nation has 70 00:04:27,120 --> 00:04:30,400 Speaker 1: done this too. It's not a glasshouse situation. It's a 71 00:04:30,440 --> 00:04:33,800 Speaker 1: glass planet here. Uh. In the US, the Civil Service 72 00:04:33,839 --> 00:04:38,040 Speaker 1: Act of eighty three established what we call the predecessor 73 00:04:38,240 --> 00:04:41,920 Speaker 1: of background checks. Background checks still very much a thing. 74 00:04:42,040 --> 00:04:44,400 Speaker 1: We've got an episode coming up. I think it will 75 00:04:44,440 --> 00:04:48,560 Speaker 1: be later this week on that. Uh. But it's strange 76 00:04:48,600 --> 00:04:52,719 Speaker 1: because they've always been, as Corporate America puts it, building 77 00:04:52,839 --> 00:04:55,400 Speaker 1: the plane while they're flying it, right, or building the 78 00:04:55,440 --> 00:04:59,400 Speaker 1: car while they're driving it. The current system for classifying 79 00:04:59,440 --> 00:05:03,920 Speaker 1: stuff with established way back in nine and it keeps 80 00:05:03,920 --> 00:05:09,320 Speaker 1: getting uh readdressed by executive orders often and then there 81 00:05:09,320 --> 00:05:13,720 Speaker 1: will be congressional investigations that usually happen when someone has 82 00:05:13,760 --> 00:05:18,040 Speaker 1: shot the bed in one way or another. Uh. Currently, 83 00:05:19,040 --> 00:05:23,360 Speaker 1: anything we say about the classification system as it stands today, 84 00:05:23,640 --> 00:05:27,400 Speaker 1: is mapped out by an executive order from the Barack 85 00:05:27,440 --> 00:05:31,880 Speaker 1: Obama administration Executive Order one three, five to six. Save 86 00:05:32,000 --> 00:05:35,599 Speaker 1: you some time. It's not really a page turner. It's 87 00:05:35,640 --> 00:05:38,680 Speaker 1: freely available online. You can read it. It's got a 88 00:05:38,680 --> 00:05:42,200 Speaker 1: lot of the legal ease nomenclature. It tries to be precise, 89 00:05:42,680 --> 00:05:45,320 Speaker 1: but as we'll see, it still runs into some of 90 00:05:45,360 --> 00:05:49,680 Speaker 1: the same vague and dangerous problems of the classification system overall, 91 00:05:49,760 --> 00:05:52,840 Speaker 1: which are conspiracies. Yeah, I mean, it's it's it's kind 92 00:05:52,839 --> 00:05:55,799 Speaker 1: of like, you know, when maybe a legal an opposing 93 00:05:55,880 --> 00:05:58,600 Speaker 1: legal team wants to just throw a wrench in the 94 00:05:58,640 --> 00:06:01,640 Speaker 1: works of you know who, remember they're arguing against, they 95 00:06:01,640 --> 00:06:06,200 Speaker 1: will just um bury them in in discovery or or 96 00:06:06,240 --> 00:06:08,479 Speaker 1: in like you know, paperwork that is literally sending like 97 00:06:08,480 --> 00:06:11,039 Speaker 1: truckloads of stuff. Uh So they end up in a 98 00:06:11,080 --> 00:06:13,520 Speaker 1: needle in the haystack situation. And that's kind of what 99 00:06:13,560 --> 00:06:17,400 Speaker 1: a lot of these overly long, overly complex documents kind 100 00:06:17,440 --> 00:06:20,000 Speaker 1: of are for the public. Because I had a minor 101 00:06:20,000 --> 00:06:21,680 Speaker 1: revelation I just want to share with you before we 102 00:06:21,720 --> 00:06:23,960 Speaker 1: move on to the next part. I was thinking about 103 00:06:24,120 --> 00:06:29,520 Speaker 1: why the uh colonists were so successful in their tradecraft 104 00:06:29,720 --> 00:06:33,000 Speaker 1: attempts during the Revolutionary War when the United States was 105 00:06:33,000 --> 00:06:37,240 Speaker 1: founded through this conspiracy, right, And I imagine the British forces, 106 00:06:38,160 --> 00:06:42,960 Speaker 1: the government itself being very much used to tradecraft, trying 107 00:06:43,000 --> 00:06:45,960 Speaker 1: to infiltrate their ranks, right, trying to get in and 108 00:06:46,000 --> 00:06:50,240 Speaker 1: find information, figure stuff out about their movements for an advantage. Right. 109 00:06:50,720 --> 00:06:52,600 Speaker 1: But it feels I was trying to think of a 110 00:06:52,640 --> 00:06:58,000 Speaker 1: time when the British government would have had British like people, 111 00:06:58,040 --> 00:07:02,080 Speaker 1: people who were recently British uh, trying attempting to do 112 00:07:02,120 --> 00:07:04,760 Speaker 1: that against them, attempting to work against them like and 113 00:07:04,760 --> 00:07:07,880 Speaker 1: then figuring out it must have been much more difficult 114 00:07:08,400 --> 00:07:12,400 Speaker 1: to ascertain whether someone was a perhaps foreign spy in 115 00:07:12,440 --> 00:07:17,000 Speaker 1: this case, because foreign spy would have been formerly British, 116 00:07:17,760 --> 00:07:20,360 Speaker 1: not that long ago, I guess, does that make sense? Sure? 117 00:07:20,560 --> 00:07:23,280 Speaker 1: Yet there were also, of course, you know, uh, colonists 118 00:07:23,320 --> 00:07:26,280 Speaker 1: from other parts of Europe, you know, Germany, France and 119 00:07:26,320 --> 00:07:31,040 Speaker 1: so on, who would have been treated as possible you know, 120 00:07:31,160 --> 00:07:36,120 Speaker 1: possible possible spies or infiltrators. One one thing I think 121 00:07:36,160 --> 00:07:38,920 Speaker 1: that's huge about that situation is we have to remember 122 00:07:39,320 --> 00:07:43,000 Speaker 1: how slow information was. You know what I mean. So 123 00:07:43,400 --> 00:07:48,080 Speaker 1: there there was literally no way for the crown to 124 00:07:48,240 --> 00:07:51,920 Speaker 1: know what was going down until someone got across the 125 00:07:51,920 --> 00:07:53,920 Speaker 1: ocean to tell them. So there was a lot there 126 00:07:54,000 --> 00:07:57,000 Speaker 1: was a big window of time here that just doesn't 127 00:07:57,000 --> 00:08:00,640 Speaker 1: exist today. You know, I think that's I think that's 128 00:08:00,640 --> 00:08:04,760 Speaker 1: a big part of it. Um. Also, there was a 129 00:08:04,800 --> 00:08:08,280 Speaker 1: lot of a lot of local support. That part of 130 00:08:08,360 --> 00:08:12,000 Speaker 1: history isn't isn't sanitized, that part is true. A lot 131 00:08:12,120 --> 00:08:15,120 Speaker 1: of people were going, I might not agree on everything 132 00:08:15,120 --> 00:08:19,600 Speaker 1: with you, but yeah, no, screw these taxes. I hate this. 133 00:08:20,320 --> 00:08:23,120 Speaker 1: I hate this keen guy. Where does he get the nerve? 134 00:08:23,600 --> 00:08:25,720 Speaker 1: And you know what, if you have a problem, come 135 00:08:25,800 --> 00:08:28,560 Speaker 1: find us. The exact same thing is going to happen 136 00:08:28,640 --> 00:08:32,240 Speaker 1: when lunar colonies come into existence. The exact same thing 137 00:08:32,320 --> 00:08:34,840 Speaker 1: is going to happen if people ever have a permanent 138 00:08:34,880 --> 00:08:42,760 Speaker 1: foothold on Mars. What are you gonna do? Yeah? Um, 139 00:08:42,880 --> 00:08:45,679 Speaker 1: I mean nuclear weapons would be the danger, but then 140 00:08:45,720 --> 00:08:49,920 Speaker 1: you would literally be wiping everything off the map. So anyway, 141 00:08:50,160 --> 00:08:55,040 Speaker 1: that's that's definitely gonna happen, right Uh. The first the 142 00:08:55,120 --> 00:08:58,480 Speaker 1: first lunar government, if it is a government not a 143 00:08:58,520 --> 00:09:01,040 Speaker 1: private entity, is a only gonna be part of the 144 00:09:01,120 --> 00:09:06,080 Speaker 1: Terran world. For Generation or two, I would give it, 145 00:09:06,160 --> 00:09:08,160 Speaker 1: you know, and I'm glad to Eat Crow on air 146 00:09:08,280 --> 00:09:10,400 Speaker 1: if I'm wrong in the show still on when that happens. 147 00:09:10,440 --> 00:09:14,240 Speaker 1: But Generation or two, Max, Hey, there should be a 148 00:09:14,280 --> 00:09:17,559 Speaker 1: podcast called Eating Crow. I don't know, Sorry, it just 149 00:09:17,600 --> 00:09:20,400 Speaker 1: occurred to me. That's I don't know why. I don't 150 00:09:20,400 --> 00:09:21,640 Speaker 1: know what it will be about. It might be a 151 00:09:21,679 --> 00:09:23,959 Speaker 1: weird a SMR like muck Bang type thing, or it 152 00:09:24,040 --> 00:09:27,880 Speaker 1: might just be someone apologizing, um, you know, very self 153 00:09:27,960 --> 00:09:32,520 Speaker 1: deprecatingly every every episode. I almost guarantee it already exists. 154 00:09:32,679 --> 00:09:35,439 Speaker 1: It's a good name, Tom, I'm saying it is. It 155 00:09:35,520 --> 00:09:42,000 Speaker 1: is hosted by Pete de Reya. Eating Crow. It's for uh, 156 00:09:42,200 --> 00:09:46,920 Speaker 1: it's amazing. It's stories of amazing people, for entrepreneurs and leaders. 157 00:09:47,520 --> 00:09:49,600 Speaker 1: We haven't heard it. I haven't heard it. I don't know, 158 00:09:49,720 --> 00:09:52,800 Speaker 1: but you know, we we are very much. We're not 159 00:09:52,840 --> 00:09:55,360 Speaker 1: a zero sum game here. We do believe that rising 160 00:09:55,400 --> 00:10:01,280 Speaker 1: tides carry all vessels. Federal classification does think of things 161 00:10:01,360 --> 00:10:04,880 Speaker 1: in the terms of a zero sum game. Right now, 162 00:10:05,480 --> 00:10:09,120 Speaker 1: multiple agencies in the government can classify stuff. From the 163 00:10:09,160 --> 00:10:12,160 Speaker 1: Department of Defense does most of it. Uh, Department of 164 00:10:12,240 --> 00:10:16,520 Speaker 1: Energy does a lot because they touch nuclear technology. Uh. 165 00:10:16,520 --> 00:10:21,720 Speaker 1: And for a while, being cleared by one agency didn't 166 00:10:21,760 --> 00:10:26,319 Speaker 1: always mean you were cleared by another one. That's changed. 167 00:10:26,559 --> 00:10:29,240 Speaker 1: So now like if you get a background check and 168 00:10:29,320 --> 00:10:33,480 Speaker 1: you pass it such that say, uh, the d o 169 00:10:33,559 --> 00:10:37,200 Speaker 1: D gives you secret access, then that same background check 170 00:10:37,559 --> 00:10:40,679 Speaker 1: is supposed to be honored by other agencies as long 171 00:10:40,760 --> 00:10:44,160 Speaker 1: as it's still current. But you know, it's like transferring 172 00:10:44,200 --> 00:10:47,719 Speaker 1: credits at a college. You'd be surprised by how how 173 00:10:47,800 --> 00:10:50,679 Speaker 1: messy it can get. Of course, you know, if you're 174 00:10:50,720 --> 00:10:54,160 Speaker 1: the average US resident, you're not going to run into 175 00:10:54,160 --> 00:10:58,560 Speaker 1: this stuff. And unfortunately, folks, we looked into this. You 176 00:10:58,640 --> 00:11:03,040 Speaker 1: cannot classify info on your own. You can't. You can 177 00:11:03,200 --> 00:11:05,800 Speaker 1: like make a motion to have a record sealed, but 178 00:11:05,840 --> 00:11:08,280 Speaker 1: if you're a civilian, that's about as close as you get. 179 00:11:08,520 --> 00:11:12,959 Speaker 1: You can't. You know, um, you can't accidentally shart at 180 00:11:13,000 --> 00:11:16,920 Speaker 1: your next holiday party and then tell everybody that that 181 00:11:17,080 --> 00:11:21,080 Speaker 1: is considered classified information, right and that because you can't 182 00:11:21,080 --> 00:11:24,480 Speaker 1: put them in prison if they say, oh, man, you know, 183 00:11:25,160 --> 00:11:28,920 Speaker 1: Derek or Jane or whatever totally started and everybody knew 184 00:11:28,960 --> 00:11:31,240 Speaker 1: it because they were talking at the time. But wait 185 00:11:31,240 --> 00:11:33,760 Speaker 1: a minute, but there are are there not instances though, 186 00:11:34,120 --> 00:11:38,880 Speaker 1: where something maybe you know, of national security interest does 187 00:11:38,920 --> 00:11:45,600 Speaker 1: occur with witnesses what happens then then then well, yeah, 188 00:11:45,600 --> 00:11:48,560 Speaker 1: that's my first go to. But are there potentially like 189 00:11:48,640 --> 00:11:50,440 Speaker 1: you better sign this thing and we'll give you some 190 00:11:50,480 --> 00:11:52,600 Speaker 1: money or something, and if you say anything then at 191 00:11:52,600 --> 00:11:54,840 Speaker 1: this point you will be liable And if they don't 192 00:11:54,840 --> 00:11:56,600 Speaker 1: play ball, then maybe it has take them out. But 193 00:11:56,640 --> 00:11:59,360 Speaker 1: surely this has happened. Yeah. Before the days of the 194 00:11:59,400 --> 00:12:02,680 Speaker 1: Internet and social media especially, was a lot easier to 195 00:12:02,760 --> 00:12:07,760 Speaker 1: tamp down on that kind of um. The strategy used 196 00:12:07,800 --> 00:12:11,559 Speaker 1: to be tamped down in suppressing information, right, and now 197 00:12:11,600 --> 00:12:17,560 Speaker 1: increasingly the strategy is to flood information. Right. So now 198 00:12:17,679 --> 00:12:21,480 Speaker 1: you've gone from like one person says here's a needle, 199 00:12:21,640 --> 00:12:24,480 Speaker 1: and you go, oh, snap, that's a secret needle. Shut up, 200 00:12:24,640 --> 00:12:27,920 Speaker 1: don't tell anyone. Now that doesn't work as well. So 201 00:12:27,960 --> 00:12:32,160 Speaker 1: now people have to increasingly or agencies and entities have 202 00:12:32,280 --> 00:12:36,520 Speaker 1: to increasingly say, oh, maybe there's a needle, but let's 203 00:12:36,520 --> 00:12:42,400 Speaker 1: see if you can find it through these I was 204 00:12:42,440 --> 00:12:44,719 Speaker 1: talking about earlier, where it's like, yeah, either the thing 205 00:12:44,800 --> 00:12:47,240 Speaker 1: is in here and we are technically in compliance of 206 00:12:47,240 --> 00:12:49,640 Speaker 1: what we're supposed to do under the law. But also 207 00:12:49,800 --> 00:12:52,520 Speaker 1: like screw you and fat chance you're ever gonna find 208 00:12:52,559 --> 00:12:56,360 Speaker 1: what you're looking for. Oh also speaking of fighting the 209 00:12:56,600 --> 00:12:58,760 Speaker 1: because I love going into the trenches on this kind 210 00:12:58,760 --> 00:13:01,480 Speaker 1: of stuff, guys, you know that. Uh, not to brag, 211 00:13:01,559 --> 00:13:04,840 Speaker 1: but someone just got their piece of the settlement with 212 00:13:05,240 --> 00:13:09,679 Speaker 1: Wells Fargo. Uh So you get what you get what 213 00:13:10,280 --> 00:13:16,360 Speaker 1: I can't. I can't put a number on it. But 214 00:13:16,400 --> 00:13:20,120 Speaker 1: the next round of drinks, his next next half a shot, 215 00:13:20,160 --> 00:13:27,000 Speaker 1: we'll share, We'll split it. Uh So, for a long time, 216 00:13:27,400 --> 00:13:30,040 Speaker 1: the issue was and this is still a thing. Anybody 217 00:13:30,040 --> 00:13:33,240 Speaker 1: who's listening, who's in the business today knows this. A 218 00:13:33,280 --> 00:13:37,000 Speaker 1: lot of agencies tend to function as their own little fiefdoms. 219 00:13:37,480 --> 00:13:39,600 Speaker 1: And that's a that's a problem, you know, that kind 220 00:13:39,600 --> 00:13:44,000 Speaker 1: of siloing of information that continual in fighting for budget 221 00:13:44,440 --> 00:13:50,040 Speaker 1: that leads to serious issues. And I don't know, I'm 222 00:13:50,080 --> 00:13:51,839 Speaker 1: still stuck on it. You know, just for fun, it 223 00:13:51,880 --> 00:13:53,760 Speaker 1: would be great to hear from some of our fellow 224 00:13:53,800 --> 00:13:57,400 Speaker 1: conspiracy realists who tried to convince a government or friend 225 00:13:57,440 --> 00:14:00,320 Speaker 1: group they had classified something. Let us know if it 226 00:14:00,360 --> 00:14:03,200 Speaker 1: works for you. But to our knowledge, I think at 227 00:14:03,240 --> 00:14:06,880 Speaker 1: this point The closest you as a civilian can get 228 00:14:07,640 --> 00:14:11,600 Speaker 1: is trying to get someone to find to file an 229 00:14:11,600 --> 00:14:14,960 Speaker 1: inn d A, which actually can get pretty unethical and 230 00:14:14,960 --> 00:14:18,880 Speaker 1: they don't always work. You can uh petition to have 231 00:14:18,920 --> 00:14:22,280 Speaker 1: a record sealed or something, but if there, if there's 232 00:14:22,320 --> 00:14:25,120 Speaker 1: a witness, and you yourself are not a man in black, 233 00:14:25,600 --> 00:14:27,960 Speaker 1: uh Johnny Cash or otherwise, you're gonna have a tough 234 00:14:28,000 --> 00:14:30,720 Speaker 1: time keeping it secret. But maybe we talked about that 235 00:14:30,800 --> 00:14:34,680 Speaker 1: so secret there are there are different levels right there, 236 00:14:34,760 --> 00:14:37,200 Speaker 1: levels to the game. So maybe we can walk through 237 00:14:37,240 --> 00:14:40,160 Speaker 1: what those are, and then some of the exceptions, which 238 00:14:40,360 --> 00:14:42,360 Speaker 1: we might have to save for a later episode because 239 00:14:42,360 --> 00:14:45,600 Speaker 1: they're the real juicy ones. So um, getting back to 240 00:14:46,440 --> 00:14:49,920 Speaker 1: what classification is. It can typically be divided up into 241 00:14:50,000 --> 00:14:53,600 Speaker 1: three sections or or I guess levels, you know, almost 242 00:14:53,680 --> 00:14:57,800 Speaker 1: like escalations, you know, each one kind of being more 243 00:14:57,800 --> 00:15:01,440 Speaker 1: more secret than the next. You've got confidential, which is 244 00:15:01,880 --> 00:15:08,120 Speaker 1: described officially as the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could 245 00:15:08,120 --> 00:15:12,400 Speaker 1: be expected to cause damage to the national security that 246 00:15:12,440 --> 00:15:17,160 Speaker 1: the original classification authority is able to identify or describe. God, 247 00:15:17,240 --> 00:15:20,880 Speaker 1: that's clear as clear as crystal. The most important thing 248 00:15:20,920 --> 00:15:24,440 Speaker 1: here is it's something that could reasonably be expected to 249 00:15:24,520 --> 00:15:29,480 Speaker 1: cause damage. Right, reasonably expected to cause some damage to 250 00:15:29,600 --> 00:15:32,640 Speaker 1: national security. And then it just goes up from there 251 00:15:33,080 --> 00:15:35,680 Speaker 1: with with tiny little modifiers to let you know the 252 00:15:35,800 --> 00:15:41,320 Speaker 1: severity has increased. And then we've got secret secret secrets 253 00:15:41,320 --> 00:15:43,400 Speaker 1: are no fun because it could like get you killed, 254 00:15:44,320 --> 00:15:48,160 Speaker 1: the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably once again could be 255 00:15:48,200 --> 00:15:52,680 Speaker 1: expected to cause serious damage to the national security um 256 00:15:52,880 --> 00:15:56,360 Speaker 1: that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe. 257 00:15:56,480 --> 00:16:01,600 Speaker 1: So we've gone from damage to serious damage. Right, Okay, 258 00:16:01,720 --> 00:16:04,880 Speaker 1: it's also really important to note there that that part 259 00:16:05,000 --> 00:16:06,880 Speaker 1: at the end where your brain kind of shuts off 260 00:16:07,440 --> 00:16:11,640 Speaker 1: the that the original classification authority is able to identify 261 00:16:11,840 --> 00:16:14,040 Speaker 1: or describe. It's very important. You have to be able 262 00:16:14,080 --> 00:16:18,000 Speaker 1: to show that this thing will cause damage. Right. You 263 00:16:18,000 --> 00:16:21,440 Speaker 1: can't just say some agent or some person who is 264 00:16:21,480 --> 00:16:24,840 Speaker 1: in charge of one of these organizations can't just say, well, 265 00:16:25,080 --> 00:16:27,440 Speaker 1: we're pretty sure it's gonna cause damage. You have to 266 00:16:27,480 --> 00:16:29,800 Speaker 1: show it again. Shout out to the Mitchell and Webb 267 00:16:29,920 --> 00:16:34,000 Speaker 1: conspiracy sketches. They're so good. Please watch them. Uh they've 268 00:16:34,000 --> 00:16:36,920 Speaker 1: got one on the moon landing, one on Princess Diana, 269 00:16:37,200 --> 00:16:41,200 Speaker 1: and then one on aliens. I think so they're The 270 00:16:41,320 --> 00:16:45,640 Speaker 1: next one is the crowd favorite, beloved by conspiracy realists 271 00:16:45,720 --> 00:16:51,200 Speaker 1: and screenwriters alike. Top secret, also also weirdly beloved by 272 00:16:51,200 --> 00:16:54,520 Speaker 1: a lot of folks in government. Uh. This is the 273 00:16:54,680 --> 00:16:58,520 Speaker 1: unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause 274 00:16:58,840 --> 00:17:03,920 Speaker 1: exceptionally rave damage to the national security that the original 275 00:17:03,960 --> 00:17:07,920 Speaker 1: classification authority is able to identify or describe. We're gonna 276 00:17:08,040 --> 00:17:10,960 Speaker 1: keep things like special Access programs or s a p 277 00:17:11,160 --> 00:17:14,879 Speaker 1: s and controlled unclassified to one side for now. Although 278 00:17:14,960 --> 00:17:19,440 Speaker 1: controlled unclassifies my favorite because it is one of my favorites. 279 00:17:19,480 --> 00:17:23,240 Speaker 1: Because they're saying it's illegal to distribute this. Okay, we 280 00:17:23,400 --> 00:17:26,359 Speaker 1: know that people know, but we don't wanna, you know, 281 00:17:26,920 --> 00:17:28,919 Speaker 1: put it in the headline. We don't want it on 282 00:17:29,040 --> 00:17:33,359 Speaker 1: page one of the conversation. Uh. And this, you know. 283 00:17:33,400 --> 00:17:36,639 Speaker 1: I'm glad you guys point out the commonalities here. There 284 00:17:36,680 --> 00:17:41,320 Speaker 1: are three big components to the way this is constructed. 285 00:17:41,400 --> 00:17:45,640 Speaker 1: So the first is it's all about national security. Right. 286 00:17:45,920 --> 00:17:49,440 Speaker 1: It's a purposely vague, broad and shifting term. That's one 287 00:17:49,480 --> 00:17:52,280 Speaker 1: of the big problems as well. Uh, Matt, I want 288 00:17:52,280 --> 00:17:54,920 Speaker 1: to go back to what you said earlier. The addition 289 00:17:54,960 --> 00:17:59,159 Speaker 1: at the end of classifying, agency can't just say you know, 290 00:18:00,400 --> 00:18:03,320 Speaker 1: they have to they have to say this, we have 291 00:18:03,400 --> 00:18:06,359 Speaker 1: to describe what makes this information a threat, and we 292 00:18:06,400 --> 00:18:09,360 Speaker 1: have to describe the ways in which it could damage 293 00:18:09,480 --> 00:18:15,360 Speaker 1: national security. However, this agency or entity defines national security, 294 00:18:15,400 --> 00:18:19,240 Speaker 1: which is a great boogeyman and rhetorical device used to 295 00:18:19,480 --> 00:18:23,320 Speaker 1: scare you if you were American. Also, reasonably, that term 296 00:18:23,400 --> 00:18:26,480 Speaker 1: throws me a little bit, reasonably to whom you know 297 00:18:26,480 --> 00:18:28,320 Speaker 1: what I mean, like like that that that that to 298 00:18:28,400 --> 00:18:31,639 Speaker 1: me where it seems like it might be a unifying 299 00:18:31,720 --> 00:18:33,960 Speaker 1: element or a way of kind of like, you know, 300 00:18:34,359 --> 00:18:36,760 Speaker 1: having these things have some sort of standard. To me, 301 00:18:36,880 --> 00:18:40,440 Speaker 1: it's kind of like a vague element reasonably, you know 302 00:18:40,440 --> 00:18:42,800 Speaker 1: what I mean, I mean it just reasonably depending on 303 00:18:42,840 --> 00:18:45,880 Speaker 1: the circumstance. And then too, and who's who's talking. Yeah, 304 00:18:46,000 --> 00:18:48,840 Speaker 1: there's some I mean, it's almost like we'll get to 305 00:18:48,880 --> 00:18:52,800 Speaker 1: this later. But it's, uh, it's pretty subjective. Those those 306 00:18:52,880 --> 00:18:58,240 Speaker 1: three components are all dangerously subjective, and sometimes they have 307 00:18:58,320 --> 00:19:01,520 Speaker 1: to be. But good example, just off the top of 308 00:19:01,520 --> 00:19:07,639 Speaker 1: the dome would be um going public with the construction 309 00:19:08,040 --> 00:19:15,120 Speaker 1: details an operation manual for a new type of nuclear missile, 310 00:19:15,520 --> 00:19:19,480 Speaker 1: right that could reasonably be expected to damage national security 311 00:19:19,520 --> 00:19:23,040 Speaker 1: because you're telling geopolitical rivals, hey, here's what we built. 312 00:19:23,440 --> 00:19:26,600 Speaker 1: You can do it at home. But unreasonable would be 313 00:19:26,680 --> 00:19:30,640 Speaker 1: creating like a Rube Goldberg esque mousetrap series of events 314 00:19:30,840 --> 00:19:34,520 Speaker 1: that would lead to a harmy national security. Like nobody 315 00:19:34,560 --> 00:19:38,479 Speaker 1: can know that the head of the n essay is 316 00:19:39,320 --> 00:19:44,119 Speaker 1: UH super into the sport of cricket, because if people 317 00:19:44,240 --> 00:19:49,640 Speaker 1: know cricket, being popular in areas like Pakistan may lead 318 00:19:49,680 --> 00:19:52,399 Speaker 1: to him being approached by people who are big in 319 00:19:52,440 --> 00:19:57,080 Speaker 1: the cricket community and they may leverage him for secrets. Therefore, 320 00:19:57,359 --> 00:20:00,400 Speaker 1: he is a it's a grave threat to national security. 321 00:20:00,680 --> 00:20:04,040 Speaker 1: Knowing to know that he is an absolute nut for cricket, 322 00:20:04,400 --> 00:20:06,960 Speaker 1: that would be kind of unreasonable. But you can see 323 00:20:06,960 --> 00:20:09,480 Speaker 1: it making sense if I keep thinking about the SR 324 00:20:09,520 --> 00:20:13,560 Speaker 1: seventi one UH plane, guys, the spy plane. It feels 325 00:20:13,600 --> 00:20:16,480 Speaker 1: like if that thing, if you're writing that out in 326 00:20:16,480 --> 00:20:18,840 Speaker 1: the same way in long form of why that thing 327 00:20:18,880 --> 00:20:21,240 Speaker 1: has to be kept secret, it would make sense, even 328 00:20:21,240 --> 00:20:24,200 Speaker 1: though it would be a chain of events. Right the public, 329 00:20:24,640 --> 00:20:27,320 Speaker 1: if we tell the public that these UFOs they were 330 00:20:27,359 --> 00:20:30,680 Speaker 1: seeing were actually this you know, new spy plane, then 331 00:20:30,760 --> 00:20:33,359 Speaker 1: our you know, geopolitical enemies find out that we have 332 00:20:33,440 --> 00:20:36,440 Speaker 1: this spy plane. Then they realized that they've also been 333 00:20:36,440 --> 00:20:39,439 Speaker 1: seeing the spy plane, and just like you could make sense, 334 00:20:39,880 --> 00:20:42,800 Speaker 1: and it's a it's a feedback loop too because one 335 00:20:42,840 --> 00:20:45,200 Speaker 1: of the big and you know, we want to speak 336 00:20:45,200 --> 00:20:48,080 Speaker 1: carefully about this, but one of the big motivators for 337 00:20:48,160 --> 00:20:53,000 Speaker 1: a lot of classification, at least in those hypotheticals were discussing, 338 00:20:53,640 --> 00:20:57,399 Speaker 1: involves not letting the enemy know how we know what 339 00:20:57,560 --> 00:21:00,680 Speaker 1: we know, right, So some U A piece stuff might 340 00:21:00,680 --> 00:21:06,000 Speaker 1: be classified because uh, factions of the US government don't 341 00:21:06,040 --> 00:21:10,320 Speaker 1: want other countries to know the sophistication or the nature 342 00:21:10,320 --> 00:21:13,800 Speaker 1: of their surveillance techniques. That's a very real concern. So 343 00:21:14,600 --> 00:21:17,879 Speaker 1: that's it. Those rankings. By the way, Uh, since they 344 00:21:17,920 --> 00:21:21,679 Speaker 1: all talk about the degree of potential harm what they 345 00:21:21,720 --> 00:21:25,480 Speaker 1: call potential harm in the business sensitivity, How sensitive is this? 346 00:21:25,800 --> 00:21:28,560 Speaker 1: They're not talking about emo albums, so they're talking about 347 00:21:28,720 --> 00:21:31,800 Speaker 1: how dangerous something could be, and they just thought sensitive 348 00:21:31,880 --> 00:21:34,879 Speaker 1: was a less scary word. So anyway, that's the show. 349 00:21:35,080 --> 00:21:39,280 Speaker 1: We got them record scratched. Not really. Uh, this feels 350 00:21:39,320 --> 00:21:42,360 Speaker 1: high level, right, it feels cut and dried, but it's 351 00:21:42,400 --> 00:21:45,399 Speaker 1: just scratching the surface. And there is no doubt. There's 352 00:21:45,560 --> 00:21:49,400 Speaker 1: absolutely no doubt that in some cases over the years 353 00:21:49,480 --> 00:21:53,240 Speaker 1: and quite recently, this same approach to secrecy has done 354 00:21:53,320 --> 00:21:56,480 Speaker 1: much more harm than it has done good. We'll tell 355 00:21:56,520 --> 00:22:05,959 Speaker 1: you what we mean after word from our sponsors. Here's 356 00:22:06,080 --> 00:22:12,639 Speaker 1: where it gets crazy. Uh, first, first things first, way 357 00:22:12,680 --> 00:22:16,000 Speaker 1: more people have access to this stuff than you might think, 358 00:22:16,280 --> 00:22:26,239 Speaker 1: like millions of people in the US soon talking about right, So, 359 00:22:26,280 --> 00:22:30,119 Speaker 1: how many people, Like, what's the threshold for secrecy? This 360 00:22:30,200 --> 00:22:32,240 Speaker 1: is my question. I know it's a very dumb question, 361 00:22:32,240 --> 00:22:35,600 Speaker 1: but I love dumb questions. What's the like, at what 362 00:22:35,800 --> 00:22:40,560 Speaker 1: threshold does something no longer become secret? How many people 363 00:22:41,240 --> 00:22:44,760 Speaker 1: does it take to know something before everybody can say 364 00:22:44,760 --> 00:22:48,440 Speaker 1: this is no longer a secret? Right? Like, if if 365 00:22:48,560 --> 00:22:53,920 Speaker 1: three millions something people all get top secret classification tomorrow, 366 00:22:54,520 --> 00:22:58,679 Speaker 1: are we still gonna pretend it's a secret. We have 367 00:22:58,800 --> 00:23:03,119 Speaker 1: a handshake, have to it's for national security. But I 368 00:23:03,160 --> 00:23:04,639 Speaker 1: have a question for you guys. I was watching a 369 00:23:04,680 --> 00:23:06,760 Speaker 1: show with my girlfriend the other night, and uh, there 370 00:23:06,800 --> 00:23:09,000 Speaker 1: was like a redacted document, you know, and it had 371 00:23:09,040 --> 00:23:12,639 Speaker 1: all the like the scratched out text correct, And she 372 00:23:12,720 --> 00:23:15,000 Speaker 1: pointed out, like why would you even print the thing 373 00:23:15,000 --> 00:23:17,399 Speaker 1: out if you're just gonna go through it? And uh 374 00:23:17,400 --> 00:23:19,760 Speaker 1: and and you know black line it like that. And 375 00:23:19,800 --> 00:23:23,360 Speaker 1: I guess my my response was, well, it wasn't always 376 00:23:23,359 --> 00:23:25,720 Speaker 1: like that, you know. It's like some of those things change, 377 00:23:25,960 --> 00:23:29,240 Speaker 1: right and and and yeah, sometimes you legally have to 378 00:23:30,040 --> 00:23:33,400 Speaker 1: print that stuff out right because you're compelled to by 379 00:23:33,440 --> 00:23:40,720 Speaker 1: the law government. Well and also if you think about 380 00:23:40,760 --> 00:23:45,240 Speaker 1: the old school, the old school methods are still in place, 381 00:23:45,320 --> 00:23:48,200 Speaker 1: that's because now they're more secure than a lot of 382 00:23:48,320 --> 00:23:52,400 Speaker 1: you know, like cloud storage. Why would you do that? Um, 383 00:23:52,440 --> 00:23:57,240 Speaker 1: But this, this kind of this clearance question also gets 384 00:23:57,320 --> 00:24:02,680 Speaker 1: us in really crazy situations. When the Chelsea Manning leaks hit, 385 00:24:03,760 --> 00:24:07,280 Speaker 1: they're parts of the government put out orders to their 386 00:24:07,280 --> 00:24:10,680 Speaker 1: employees saying, hey, if you don't have access, you can't 387 00:24:10,720 --> 00:24:13,840 Speaker 1: read this. Even though it's like all over the news, 388 00:24:13,960 --> 00:24:16,560 Speaker 1: even though it's all over wiki leaks, it's a type 389 00:24:16,600 --> 00:24:20,320 Speaker 1: and a click away. It gets surreal. So as of August, 390 00:24:21,680 --> 00:24:23,639 Speaker 1: which is some of the latest numbers, we could find 391 00:24:24,200 --> 00:24:27,560 Speaker 1: somewhere around one point three million people in this country 392 00:24:27,720 --> 00:24:32,439 Speaker 1: had some kind of top secret security clearance. That doesn't 393 00:24:32,480 --> 00:24:36,159 Speaker 1: mean they all hang out in some borges esque library, 394 00:24:36,640 --> 00:24:40,080 Speaker 1: you know, joking about who really killed jfk Uh. They 395 00:24:40,119 --> 00:24:45,399 Speaker 1: also don't get universal access to everything. Uh, that's not 396 00:24:45,520 --> 00:24:48,119 Speaker 1: how it works. And everybody works in the security field 397 00:24:48,119 --> 00:24:51,760 Speaker 1: who just heard that idea probably almost had a heart 398 00:24:51,800 --> 00:24:56,160 Speaker 1: attack because that's ridiculous. It's a messy bag of badgers. 399 00:24:56,240 --> 00:24:58,840 Speaker 1: It's a ton of people. They're expected to keep a 400 00:24:58,840 --> 00:25:01,960 Speaker 1: ton of secrets, and a lot of these secrets. Honestly, 401 00:25:02,640 --> 00:25:06,160 Speaker 1: to you, the average resident of the US, if that's 402 00:25:06,160 --> 00:25:08,680 Speaker 1: what you're based, it wouldn't matter to you. You wouldn't care. 403 00:25:08,720 --> 00:25:13,560 Speaker 1: You'd be like, what's the big hubbub bub? Where's the beef? Right? Why? Why? 404 00:25:13,560 --> 00:25:18,320 Speaker 1: Why is this a secret? It's like if you caught somebody, Um, 405 00:25:18,359 --> 00:25:22,080 Speaker 1: if you caught somebody in a completely unnecessary lie, you know, 406 00:25:22,240 --> 00:25:28,080 Speaker 1: and you said, uh you they were like, Okay, I'm 407 00:25:28,080 --> 00:25:31,240 Speaker 1: wearing green socks but no one can know, and you 408 00:25:31,320 --> 00:25:34,720 Speaker 1: found out their socks were read, and you would say, well, 409 00:25:35,000 --> 00:25:38,080 Speaker 1: why why are we having this conversation? Man trying to 410 00:25:38,080 --> 00:25:42,080 Speaker 1: contuse you because you might be the enemy? Right. It's 411 00:25:42,160 --> 00:25:44,640 Speaker 1: weird stuff. It makes this whole conversation makes me think 412 00:25:44,680 --> 00:25:48,080 Speaker 1: about that listener who sent us a voicemail about that 413 00:25:48,119 --> 00:25:51,800 Speaker 1: manhole cover that had the alarm on it, Like, how 414 00:25:51,800 --> 00:25:56,160 Speaker 1: many people knew that manhole had an alarm on it? Like, 415 00:25:56,240 --> 00:25:58,760 Speaker 1: I wonder how many people there were. I bet it's 416 00:25:58,800 --> 00:26:02,800 Speaker 1: way more than I imagine. Oh yeah, yeah, And and 417 00:26:02,920 --> 00:26:08,080 Speaker 1: sadly it's not. It's still not Chen or Chen's employer, 418 00:26:08,200 --> 00:26:12,000 Speaker 1: the people who could help avoid that that situation. And 419 00:26:12,359 --> 00:26:14,760 Speaker 1: we're able to joke about this because Chen's okay, by 420 00:26:14,760 --> 00:26:17,000 Speaker 1: the way, Uh, but this happens a lot more than 421 00:26:17,040 --> 00:26:19,639 Speaker 1: you think, and a lot more people have access to 422 00:26:20,440 --> 00:26:24,800 Speaker 1: secret stuff than that it sounds. But that's a big problem. 423 00:26:24,880 --> 00:26:29,879 Speaker 1: There's their fiefdoms, their cliques. You know, we said before 424 00:26:29,880 --> 00:26:32,479 Speaker 1: the break that a lot of groups can classify something 425 00:26:32,960 --> 00:26:38,280 Speaker 1: well to be very diplomatic, they're they're a little proactive 426 00:26:38,280 --> 00:26:41,200 Speaker 1: about it, they're a little zealous about it. And this 427 00:26:41,240 --> 00:26:44,120 Speaker 1: is where we go to a great piece written by 428 00:26:44,200 --> 00:26:48,840 Speaker 1: Mike Giglio for The Atlantic back in correct Um. And 429 00:26:48,960 --> 00:26:52,760 Speaker 1: in this piece, Giglio points out that since World War Two, 430 00:26:53,160 --> 00:26:58,480 Speaker 1: eight different government commissions have taken a a hard look 431 00:26:58,520 --> 00:27:02,600 Speaker 1: at this um and every single one of them found 432 00:27:02,600 --> 00:27:07,600 Speaker 1: that the US is most likely overclassifying things. So the 433 00:27:07,680 --> 00:27:12,119 Speaker 1: question then becomes, what does it mean to over classify. Um. 434 00:27:12,160 --> 00:27:16,720 Speaker 1: It essentially means that some people are getting a little 435 00:27:16,760 --> 00:27:20,440 Speaker 1: bit too high on their own authority and and uh 436 00:27:20,600 --> 00:27:24,640 Speaker 1: and wielding it like a like a like a blunt instrument. Um, 437 00:27:24,760 --> 00:27:28,280 Speaker 1: their horses too high. Indeed, it is your soapboxes are 438 00:27:28,320 --> 00:27:31,119 Speaker 1: too stacked. Uh. This is not to say that the 439 00:27:31,160 --> 00:27:33,960 Speaker 1: classification is a bad thing, because we know it's not 440 00:27:34,040 --> 00:27:35,600 Speaker 1: a bad thing. I mean there's a reason for it 441 00:27:35,640 --> 00:27:38,919 Speaker 1: to exist. There is information that if falling into the 442 00:27:38,960 --> 00:27:44,280 Speaker 1: wrong hands, could actually put you know, American lives at risk. 443 00:27:45,800 --> 00:27:49,120 Speaker 1: And and look, if there was no classification, if there 444 00:27:49,119 --> 00:27:52,240 Speaker 1: were no secrets, not just in the US, but around 445 00:27:52,240 --> 00:27:56,439 Speaker 1: the planet, then civilization as you know it listening to 446 00:27:56,480 --> 00:28:00,920 Speaker 1: this podcast would come toppling down very quick. Things would 447 00:28:00,920 --> 00:28:06,480 Speaker 1: descend into chaos. And that's not hyperbole. But Giglio knowing 448 00:28:06,520 --> 00:28:11,320 Speaker 1: this as well, says too much national security information, from 449 00:28:11,359 --> 00:28:16,280 Speaker 1: trivial to the politically inconvenient, gets labeled confidential secret or 450 00:28:16,320 --> 00:28:19,440 Speaker 1: top secret, meaning you can't you will never be able 451 00:28:19,480 --> 00:28:22,400 Speaker 1: to access it unless you have that clearance, you pass 452 00:28:22,480 --> 00:28:25,240 Speaker 1: that background check, you get read on as they say 453 00:28:25,240 --> 00:28:30,400 Speaker 1: in special access programs. But again, like to the earlier point, 454 00:28:30,400 --> 00:28:33,119 Speaker 1: you made matter of course, you have to classify stuff 455 00:28:33,200 --> 00:28:38,200 Speaker 1: like undercover operations, black bags, stuff abroad, sending the stealth 456 00:28:38,240 --> 00:28:42,080 Speaker 1: helicopters to get bin laden, or the latest hot gossip 457 00:28:42,320 --> 00:28:46,280 Speaker 1: on a foreign rival, or research into surveillance tech and 458 00:28:46,320 --> 00:28:50,000 Speaker 1: weapons of war. But then there's stuff like this, And 459 00:28:50,040 --> 00:28:52,400 Speaker 1: I really appreciate that you put this in here, Mike. 460 00:28:52,880 --> 00:28:57,720 Speaker 1: This is a legitimate classified paragraph from a two thousand 461 00:28:57,800 --> 00:29:01,160 Speaker 1: six diplomatic cable. It was leaked by Chelsea Manning in 462 00:29:02,520 --> 00:29:05,480 Speaker 1: I suggest we round robin it and just well, it's 463 00:29:05,520 --> 00:29:09,720 Speaker 1: kind of long, so we'll just switch off sentence to sentence. Uh, 464 00:29:09,840 --> 00:29:12,680 Speaker 1: And then, dear listeners, tell us if you think this 465 00:29:12,720 --> 00:29:15,400 Speaker 1: should have been classified at the end, or actually, um, 466 00:29:16,000 --> 00:29:18,360 Speaker 1: if you guys have already read this, well, let's let's 467 00:29:18,400 --> 00:29:21,320 Speaker 1: also amongst ourselves talk about whether this should have been secret. 468 00:29:21,760 --> 00:29:26,360 Speaker 1: Dakastani weddings are serious business, a forum for showing respect, 469 00:29:26,520 --> 00:29:30,320 Speaker 1: fealty and alliance among families. The bride and groom themselves 470 00:29:30,400 --> 00:29:33,480 Speaker 1: are a little more than show pieces. Weddings take place 471 00:29:33,480 --> 00:29:37,160 Speaker 1: in discreet parts over three days. On the first day, 472 00:29:37,200 --> 00:29:40,560 Speaker 1: the groom's family and the bride's family simultaneously hold separate 473 00:29:40,560 --> 00:29:44,760 Speaker 1: receptions that sounds nice. During the receptions, the groom leads 474 00:29:44,800 --> 00:29:48,160 Speaker 1: a delegation to the bride's reception and escorts her back 475 00:29:48,160 --> 00:29:51,560 Speaker 1: to his own reception, at which point she formerly becomes 476 00:29:51,560 --> 00:29:53,960 Speaker 1: a member of the groom's family, for saking her old 477 00:29:53,960 --> 00:29:57,000 Speaker 1: family and clan. The next day, the groom's parents hold 478 00:29:57,040 --> 00:30:00,480 Speaker 1: another reception, this time for the bride's family and friends, 479 00:30:00,760 --> 00:30:04,560 Speaker 1: who can inspect the family they have given their daughter too. 480 00:30:05,160 --> 00:30:08,200 Speaker 1: On the third day, he rose no, it says, the 481 00:30:08,280 --> 00:30:12,040 Speaker 1: bride's family holds a reception for the groom's parents and family. 482 00:30:12,280 --> 00:30:16,160 Speaker 1: If annything has redacted the word reception, because that'd be 483 00:30:16,200 --> 00:30:18,000 Speaker 1: would be a lot of black ink right there. Attle 484 00:30:18,320 --> 00:30:20,800 Speaker 1: does this is like a column out of like you know, 485 00:30:21,880 --> 00:30:23,760 Speaker 1: a Vanity fair or something like that. It really just 486 00:30:23,800 --> 00:30:26,360 Speaker 1: sounds like sort of like a you know, Robin Leech 487 00:30:26,560 --> 00:30:29,160 Speaker 1: kind of Lifestyles of the rich and famous, sort of 488 00:30:29,360 --> 00:30:34,080 Speaker 1: David Attenborough anthropological word. It's a cable. It's a cable. 489 00:30:34,160 --> 00:30:37,720 Speaker 1: So it's just it's information coming from is it from 490 00:30:37,720 --> 00:30:41,160 Speaker 1: the consulate or from from an embassy? Right, that's generally 491 00:30:41,160 --> 00:30:47,680 Speaker 1: what these cables were. Just communications. Yes, they're just diplomatic messages. 492 00:30:47,720 --> 00:30:52,440 Speaker 1: So look this doesn't have it. It's like a telegram, right, 493 00:30:52,480 --> 00:30:56,400 Speaker 1: it's a text best text based message from you know, 494 00:30:56,520 --> 00:31:00,600 Speaker 1: various parts of the Department of State. So I guess, first, 495 00:31:00,640 --> 00:31:05,360 Speaker 1: congratulations to all the Dagastani newlyweds out there, But how 496 00:31:05,440 --> 00:31:08,719 Speaker 1: is this national security? When Chelsea Manning leaks this is 497 00:31:08,760 --> 00:31:13,560 Speaker 1: technically a crime for which one can be imprisoned, despite 498 00:31:13,560 --> 00:31:16,960 Speaker 1: the fact that when we confirm this, you can find 499 00:31:17,000 --> 00:31:21,520 Speaker 1: information about these weddings at any number of publicly accessible forums, 500 00:31:21,720 --> 00:31:25,280 Speaker 1: right you can. You know, it's the age of the internet. 501 00:31:25,320 --> 00:31:28,320 Speaker 1: You could go on Twitter and say, hey, anybody know 502 00:31:28,880 --> 00:31:31,800 Speaker 1: uh Dagastani person, tell me about the weddings, and then 503 00:31:31,800 --> 00:31:34,720 Speaker 1: they would tell you. Because it's not like they're giving 504 00:31:34,760 --> 00:31:39,440 Speaker 1: you the keys to nuclear power, so that stuff is classified. 505 00:31:40,360 --> 00:31:45,760 Speaker 1: And and again that's not a thing on the Dakastani newlyweds. Again, congratulations, 506 00:31:45,800 --> 00:31:48,760 Speaker 1: but your wedding is not a matter of national security, 507 00:31:49,200 --> 00:31:53,960 Speaker 1: most people would say another another funny one that got 508 00:31:54,000 --> 00:31:57,880 Speaker 1: me here, h was very hell arresque catch twenty two. 509 00:31:58,320 --> 00:32:04,200 Speaker 1: Even the grand Poobas of the intelligence community think this 510 00:32:04,320 --> 00:32:07,120 Speaker 1: is overkilled. The former director of the CIA and the 511 00:32:07,200 --> 00:32:10,440 Speaker 1: n s A famously complained about it Michael Hayden said 512 00:32:10,880 --> 00:32:14,560 Speaker 1: everything secret. I mean I got an email see Merry Christmas. 513 00:32:14,680 --> 00:32:17,680 Speaker 1: It carried a top secret in s A classification marking. 514 00:32:19,400 --> 00:32:26,000 Speaker 1: That's his quote, Ship Christmas. Nobody. I should have said 515 00:32:26,040 --> 00:32:35,120 Speaker 1: happy holidays. That's why, uh war on Christmas? I said. 516 00:32:37,040 --> 00:32:40,040 Speaker 1: So that's that's kind of weird though, right like when 517 00:32:40,040 --> 00:32:42,880 Speaker 1: we because when we think about this stuff, we think 518 00:32:43,000 --> 00:32:48,720 Speaker 1: of you know, uh, secret operations, we think of suppressed technology, 519 00:32:48,920 --> 00:32:53,080 Speaker 1: we think of active spies or active wet work missions. 520 00:32:53,120 --> 00:32:57,000 Speaker 1: But no, it's stuff like sometimes this stuff like Merry Christmas. 521 00:32:57,160 --> 00:33:00,320 Speaker 1: And here's how these people handle weddings, very like talk 522 00:33:00,360 --> 00:33:03,360 Speaker 1: of the town. It is there is the purpose of 523 00:33:03,440 --> 00:33:07,000 Speaker 1: this redaction just so you don't even know the person 524 00:33:07,160 --> 00:33:11,080 Speaker 1: was there and and and who they were. And maybe 525 00:33:11,080 --> 00:33:14,200 Speaker 1: there's more to it that could be you know, from 526 00:33:14,240 --> 00:33:18,400 Speaker 1: prying eyes, uh give away the game to some degree, 527 00:33:19,200 --> 00:33:23,320 Speaker 1: right right, figuring out how we got this information again 528 00:33:23,840 --> 00:33:26,760 Speaker 1: or um, you know. But then the question comes up 529 00:33:27,000 --> 00:33:31,160 Speaker 1: from earlier, what is a reasonable expectation of damage the 530 00:33:31,240 --> 00:33:34,520 Speaker 1: national security? I mean it gets weird. You could say 531 00:33:34,600 --> 00:33:37,000 Speaker 1: this is people with good intentions just being a little 532 00:33:37,040 --> 00:33:39,920 Speaker 1: over zealous, little over protective, and that does make sense 533 00:33:40,200 --> 00:33:43,480 Speaker 1: until you realize the next problem. Different agencies of the 534 00:33:43,640 --> 00:33:49,520 Speaker 1: same government use classification against each other. They use it 535 00:33:49,560 --> 00:33:52,240 Speaker 1: to beef. And this is a true story. It's that 536 00:33:52,360 --> 00:33:58,480 Speaker 1: old jurism addiction crap, right, Yes, it's like but I 537 00:33:58,560 --> 00:34:00,959 Speaker 1: like it. It's almost like up tweets, you know what 538 00:34:00,960 --> 00:34:04,120 Speaker 1: I mean, But like that that people can't see, you know. 539 00:34:04,160 --> 00:34:06,080 Speaker 1: It's it's it's like because there's they're these you know, 540 00:34:06,160 --> 00:34:10,799 Speaker 1: back and forth with these agencies, etcetera. That they're they're 541 00:34:10,880 --> 00:34:13,000 Speaker 1: seeing these. So there could be little digs kind of 542 00:34:13,040 --> 00:34:15,160 Speaker 1: built in, uh, in the same way that you know, 543 00:34:15,280 --> 00:34:20,720 Speaker 1: celebrity might dis another celebrity on Twitter without actually naming them. 544 00:34:20,040 --> 00:34:22,839 Speaker 1: M yeah, I think that's a good comparison. I mean, 545 00:34:23,040 --> 00:34:26,440 Speaker 1: each agency can function often is its own little kingdom, 546 00:34:26,520 --> 00:34:29,200 Speaker 1: and they have goals and desires that might contradict the 547 00:34:29,239 --> 00:34:32,080 Speaker 1: goals and desires of their counterparts. They're also in an 548 00:34:32,080 --> 00:34:36,640 Speaker 1: eternal existential war for that piece of that beautiful taxpayer pie. 549 00:34:37,080 --> 00:34:41,239 Speaker 1: So despite having common cause on paper, these groups beef 550 00:34:41,320 --> 00:34:47,120 Speaker 1: with each other literally all the time. And and Giglio, Uh, 551 00:34:47,280 --> 00:34:50,760 Speaker 1: if we go back to Atlantic article. Uh, Giglio points 552 00:34:50,760 --> 00:34:53,879 Speaker 1: out how this becomes an issue Giglio says, quote, there 553 00:34:53,920 --> 00:34:57,000 Speaker 1: are many scandals that were shielded from view, not just 554 00:34:57,160 --> 00:34:59,920 Speaker 1: from the public, but from government officials who might have 555 00:35:00,000 --> 00:35:03,640 Speaker 1: put a stop to them, at least in part by classification. 556 00:35:04,080 --> 00:35:07,680 Speaker 1: That makes so much sense to me. Guys. We talk 557 00:35:07,760 --> 00:35:11,320 Speaker 1: on the show all the time about how often when 558 00:35:11,360 --> 00:35:14,200 Speaker 1: some conspiracy begins, it's because somebody messed up just a 559 00:35:14,200 --> 00:35:17,960 Speaker 1: tiny bit or maybe a really big bit. But but 560 00:35:18,200 --> 00:35:22,439 Speaker 1: the organization decided, note, we have to protect ourselves by 561 00:35:22,480 --> 00:35:27,239 Speaker 1: protecting this person, by making this whole thing not have happened. Right, 562 00:35:27,719 --> 00:35:31,440 Speaker 1: And everybody messes up sometimes. It doesn't matter how awesome 563 00:35:31,480 --> 00:35:33,440 Speaker 1: you are, it doesn't matter what clearance you've got. Everybody 564 00:35:33,480 --> 00:35:37,600 Speaker 1: messes up a little bit sometimes. So like I'm just 565 00:35:37,680 --> 00:35:42,120 Speaker 1: imagining this game where they're all trying to shield their 566 00:35:42,200 --> 00:35:47,560 Speaker 1: own mess ups from each other organization. It's so silly, 567 00:35:47,600 --> 00:35:50,240 Speaker 1: it's weird, it seems. It seems like a comedy movie 568 00:35:50,280 --> 00:35:52,600 Speaker 1: to me. It is. It is very much. You know, 569 00:35:52,640 --> 00:35:55,120 Speaker 1: we get to a death, a death of Stalin again 570 00:35:55,200 --> 00:35:59,759 Speaker 1: Catch twenty two territory with this doctor Strange Love as well. 571 00:36:00,000 --> 00:36:03,719 Speaker 1: So yeah, correct, actor Strange Love as well. So this 572 00:36:03,760 --> 00:36:06,319 Speaker 1: is where we go to folks like Elizabeth Goydon, who 573 00:36:06,640 --> 00:36:10,719 Speaker 1: directs the National Security Program at the Brennan Center, and 574 00:36:11,040 --> 00:36:15,600 Speaker 1: Goydon notes that it's not always just to cover up 575 00:36:15,880 --> 00:36:19,640 Speaker 1: the happy accidents, the little mistakes that are all but 576 00:36:19,880 --> 00:36:23,720 Speaker 1: part of the beautiful human tapestry. It's also a known 577 00:36:23,800 --> 00:36:28,000 Speaker 1: technique used to keep other people out of the conversation 578 00:36:28,200 --> 00:36:32,200 Speaker 1: and minimize resistance. You're the CIA, you're gonna do something 579 00:36:32,200 --> 00:36:36,040 Speaker 1: that you know the FBI or Congress or whomever might 580 00:36:36,080 --> 00:36:39,759 Speaker 1: not like, then just classify it so that they can't 581 00:36:39,800 --> 00:36:43,120 Speaker 1: they can't get access to it. Uh. A notorious ajaimable 582 00:36:43,400 --> 00:36:46,400 Speaker 1: that Goydon brings up would be the CIA's use of 583 00:36:46,560 --> 00:36:49,880 Speaker 1: torture or I guess the Legal Department requires me to 584 00:36:49,920 --> 00:36:55,480 Speaker 1: call it enhanced interrogation or something. In the aftermath of September. Uh, 585 00:36:55,600 --> 00:37:01,200 Speaker 1: they they did conduct torture. They definitely did it. Black 586 00:37:01,239 --> 00:37:05,560 Speaker 1: sites scattered across the world, and this was seen as 587 00:37:05,560 --> 00:37:09,719 Speaker 1: a necessary evil. But also visibility of this program was 588 00:37:09,840 --> 00:37:13,920 Speaker 1: classified out of conversations so that people couldn't stop them beforehand. 589 00:37:14,560 --> 00:37:18,280 Speaker 1: And that's the issue. The higher classification, the fewer people 590 00:37:18,320 --> 00:37:21,800 Speaker 1: can read it or raise a flag if something's wrong. 591 00:37:22,440 --> 00:37:26,600 Speaker 1: And this is the weaponization of classification. It doesn't get 592 00:37:26,640 --> 00:37:31,640 Speaker 1: talked about much in mainstream discourse because people would rather 593 00:37:31,719 --> 00:37:35,040 Speaker 1: you not know about it. Just to put it plainly, 594 00:37:35,120 --> 00:37:38,239 Speaker 1: people don't want you to think about the ways of 595 00:37:38,280 --> 00:37:40,360 Speaker 1: which this stuff could be used. They want you on 596 00:37:40,400 --> 00:37:44,400 Speaker 1: your heels. They want you defensive and scared of whatever 597 00:37:44,480 --> 00:37:48,000 Speaker 1: fits under the umbrella of the national security boogeyman. And 598 00:37:48,040 --> 00:37:51,960 Speaker 1: that's simply not always the case. Yell by time, Well, 599 00:37:52,080 --> 00:37:54,120 Speaker 1: let's take a quick pause, have it worth our sponsor, 600 00:37:54,160 --> 00:37:56,879 Speaker 1: and then we're gonna come back and get more, get 601 00:37:56,920 --> 00:38:00,000 Speaker 1: more top secret, get more in the weeds of this stuff, 602 00:38:00,000 --> 00:38:02,960 Speaker 1: because man, there's a lot a lot more dig into. 603 00:38:05,600 --> 00:38:07,400 Speaker 1: This episode of stuff they don't want you to know. 604 00:38:07,520 --> 00:38:10,200 Speaker 1: Is brought to you in part by Illumination Global Unlimited. 605 00:38:10,520 --> 00:38:13,480 Speaker 1: Tired of things is not going your way? 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Then all you have 615 00:38:48,840 --> 00:38:50,960 Speaker 1: to do is pony up the fee of one thousand, 616 00:38:51,000 --> 00:38:54,320 Speaker 1: eight hundred and eighty three dollars American exactly that amount 617 00:38:54,320 --> 00:38:57,000 Speaker 1: if you please, and he'll be all set. Nothing else 618 00:38:57,040 --> 00:39:00,520 Speaker 1: to do but wait for the benefits to start kicking in. Okay, 619 00:39:00,560 --> 00:39:03,480 Speaker 1: So what kind of benefits. That's a lot of money. 620 00:39:03,680 --> 00:39:05,239 Speaker 1: I don't know if I can afford that. Am I 621 00:39:05,280 --> 00:39:08,400 Speaker 1: getting something amazing? Well, it's a lot of money and 622 00:39:08,480 --> 00:39:11,400 Speaker 1: a lot of questions. Look, you'll never know how the 623 00:39:11,440 --> 00:39:15,400 Speaker 1: Secret Sausage is made, and frankly, neither will we. Like 624 00:39:15,520 --> 00:39:18,279 Speaker 1: who cares? As long as it works, right, Daddy, I 625 00:39:18,320 --> 00:39:22,640 Speaker 1: don't fear anything anymore. It's fabulous. Must be that Secret 626 00:39:22,760 --> 00:39:25,600 Speaker 1: Sausage cod hows a lot of money. Become a special 627 00:39:25,640 --> 00:39:29,480 Speaker 1: access patron today. Secret Sausage can, in limited use, provide 628 00:39:29,520 --> 00:39:33,719 Speaker 1: the following side effects drops the scurvy ropes two, toes, three, 629 00:39:33,760 --> 00:39:37,319 Speaker 1: toes five, the number seven appearing in strange places. If 630 00:39:37,320 --> 00:39:42,600 Speaker 1: your mes Litho Limited Edition release Vinyl Secret sausage subsidiary 631 00:39:42,640 --> 00:39:54,560 Speaker 1: of Illumination Global Unlimited. And we have returned as I 632 00:39:54,760 --> 00:39:57,160 Speaker 1: always folks. You know, we don't always get to choose 633 00:39:57,160 --> 00:40:01,200 Speaker 1: the ads. The Legal Department says, UH, tells us to 634 00:40:01,239 --> 00:40:03,880 Speaker 1: say that we are grateful for the continued sponsorship of 635 00:40:03,920 --> 00:40:08,719 Speaker 1: Illumination Global Unlimited. If you are not read onto the 636 00:40:08,840 --> 00:40:12,600 Speaker 1: third act of this episode, then unfortunately, we're gonna have 637 00:40:12,640 --> 00:40:16,040 Speaker 1: to advise you to stop listening. Now. It's not even 638 00:40:16,040 --> 00:40:18,879 Speaker 1: gonna play if you try and keep going, not even 639 00:40:18,920 --> 00:40:22,440 Speaker 1: gonna play. So if it's playing, congratulations, whether or not 640 00:40:22,480 --> 00:40:26,399 Speaker 1: you know it, you have a clearance. Uh. And that's 641 00:40:26,440 --> 00:40:29,359 Speaker 1: because you must be important to national security, which leads 642 00:40:29,400 --> 00:40:32,919 Speaker 1: us to the big question what exactly is national security? Well, 643 00:40:33,040 --> 00:40:35,879 Speaker 1: sort of like beauty or porn. People are gonna tell 644 00:40:35,880 --> 00:40:38,160 Speaker 1: you I you know it when I see it, and 645 00:40:38,200 --> 00:40:41,000 Speaker 1: they're all gonna have different opinions and both run deep. 646 00:40:43,400 --> 00:40:46,320 Speaker 1: The hardest thing about this concept is that national security 647 00:40:46,400 --> 00:40:49,960 Speaker 1: is a very real thing and it is important whatever 648 00:40:50,000 --> 00:40:52,320 Speaker 1: it is, as a as a morphous as it may be, 649 00:40:53,040 --> 00:40:58,680 Speaker 1: whatever it is, we we know it's important. Yeah, that's 650 00:40:58,719 --> 00:41:01,439 Speaker 1: like number one. It's like we're in always study trying 651 00:41:01,440 --> 00:41:03,440 Speaker 1: to figure out what a vigu is, you know, like, 652 00:41:03,520 --> 00:41:05,560 Speaker 1: what's the I'm trying to get a you know how 653 00:41:05,600 --> 00:41:08,680 Speaker 1: like gangsters say something at the top. You know, it's 654 00:41:08,719 --> 00:41:14,000 Speaker 1: like a vague as it's short for something too oh vigorous. Yeah, okay, okay, 655 00:41:14,040 --> 00:41:16,320 Speaker 1: co I had to learn that's literally just now Murban Dictionary. 656 00:41:16,400 --> 00:41:21,160 Speaker 1: So yeah, so there's a there is no deniance real thing. 657 00:41:21,160 --> 00:41:23,400 Speaker 1: It is true. I imagine you're the head of the 658 00:41:23,480 --> 00:41:26,240 Speaker 1: d OE, the Department of Energy. We mentioned them because 659 00:41:26,239 --> 00:41:30,320 Speaker 1: they're huge in this field because they touched the nukes. 660 00:41:30,360 --> 00:41:34,040 Speaker 1: So you know, nuclear research needs as much secrecy as 661 00:41:34,040 --> 00:41:37,600 Speaker 1: possible because billions of dollars and more importantly, if you're 662 00:41:37,600 --> 00:41:41,240 Speaker 1: a decent person, millions of human lives hang in the balance. 663 00:41:41,440 --> 00:41:45,000 Speaker 1: But stuff gets so sticky so quick. I know, I'm 664 00:41:45,040 --> 00:41:47,600 Speaker 1: cursing a lot in today's episode, but there's just so 665 00:41:47,719 --> 00:41:53,160 Speaker 1: much free about the concept of national security has experienced 666 00:41:53,200 --> 00:41:56,640 Speaker 1: a cartoonish degree of what is called mission creep. We've 667 00:41:56,640 --> 00:41:59,719 Speaker 1: discussed this in the past. Mission creep is when something 668 00:41:59,719 --> 00:42:03,040 Speaker 1: starts with a narrow scope, just like an easy example 669 00:42:03,320 --> 00:42:07,200 Speaker 1: is let's say let's say Matt Noel and I are 670 00:42:07,239 --> 00:42:11,320 Speaker 1: on a mission to buy a pizza. So we started 671 00:42:11,320 --> 00:42:14,439 Speaker 1: having meetings about it for some reason, and by the 672 00:42:14,560 --> 00:42:17,720 Speaker 1: end of our meetings, we're not just buying one pizza. 673 00:42:18,040 --> 00:42:23,120 Speaker 1: Now we have constructed a multi year strategic plan that 674 00:42:23,160 --> 00:42:26,920 Speaker 1: allocates certain amounts of funding to various types of pizza 675 00:42:27,080 --> 00:42:31,520 Speaker 1: rated by desirability and allergens. Or or we've just decided 676 00:42:31,560 --> 00:42:37,280 Speaker 1: to go into the pizzeria business. Yeah, that's the next step. Man. 677 00:42:37,360 --> 00:42:39,720 Speaker 1: You conjured in my mind this image of the Department 678 00:42:39,719 --> 00:42:43,399 Speaker 1: of Energy and there's just some nukes about and it's 679 00:42:43,400 --> 00:42:49,040 Speaker 1: just about later. Yeah. But it's like like cats at 680 00:42:49,040 --> 00:42:51,560 Speaker 1: a bookstore. Yeah. Yeah, Yeah, it's this thing that is 681 00:42:51,600 --> 00:42:53,759 Speaker 1: the Department of Energy and it's just got these nukes 682 00:42:53,800 --> 00:42:58,320 Speaker 1: and it's just like huh oh yeah, just touching the nukes. 683 00:42:58,600 --> 00:43:03,440 Speaker 1: I don't know, it's just yeah, that's very doctor strange love. 684 00:43:03,280 --> 00:43:05,840 Speaker 1: I was listening to a podcast about and they pointed 685 00:43:05,840 --> 00:43:08,279 Speaker 1: out some I didn't really clock there's a lot of 686 00:43:08,320 --> 00:43:13,680 Speaker 1: weird sexual energy in that movie surrounding I mean I did, 687 00:43:13,760 --> 00:43:16,239 Speaker 1: but I didn't really think about how overt it was. Like, 688 00:43:16,280 --> 00:43:18,520 Speaker 1: I mean, obviously talking about precious bodily fluids, but just 689 00:43:18,800 --> 00:43:21,480 Speaker 1: like the General Ripper I think is his name, he's 690 00:43:21,560 --> 00:43:24,319 Speaker 1: just ready to go, like he and and and he's 691 00:43:24,360 --> 00:43:27,560 Speaker 1: like about about to pop. If you know what, I yeah, 692 00:43:27,719 --> 00:43:29,719 Speaker 1: I think he. I think he needs that kind of 693 00:43:29,760 --> 00:43:36,239 Speaker 1: military situation to really, you know, feel adequation exactly. Thank you. 694 00:43:37,640 --> 00:43:42,480 Speaker 1: Here's an old Playboy fold out is actually just a missile, 695 00:43:42,840 --> 00:43:46,960 Speaker 1: you know. So it's it's true. These things get sticky 696 00:43:47,000 --> 00:43:51,439 Speaker 1: because al right, originally, oh gosh, yeah, no, we gotta 697 00:43:51,520 --> 00:43:54,879 Speaker 1: keep it. That was accidental. Legal will just write to us. 698 00:43:55,120 --> 00:44:00,600 Speaker 1: Um so it originally meant just a possible military attack. 699 00:44:01,080 --> 00:44:04,480 Speaker 1: You have to have operational security. You have to protect 700 00:44:04,560 --> 00:44:08,280 Speaker 1: national security because you're making sure the nation is safe 701 00:44:08,600 --> 00:44:14,719 Speaker 1: from adversaries foreign and domestic. But these days, because big 702 00:44:14,760 --> 00:44:18,640 Speaker 1: business is so hand in hand with governments on a 703 00:44:18,680 --> 00:44:22,239 Speaker 1: global level and on a domestic level, it is a 704 00:44:22,360 --> 00:44:25,759 Speaker 1: national security has stretched, it's warped. You could say it's 705 00:44:25,760 --> 00:44:28,200 Speaker 1: evolved or devolved, we don't care. But it now it 706 00:44:28,239 --> 00:44:32,800 Speaker 1: means things like economic security, Will this make us lose money? 707 00:44:33,040 --> 00:44:36,440 Speaker 1: Energy security? Will this mean we can't keep the lights on? 708 00:44:36,920 --> 00:44:40,160 Speaker 1: Food security? Can we will this threaten our ability to 709 00:44:40,360 --> 00:44:44,000 Speaker 1: feed the population, etcetera, etcetera. But it gets even worse 710 00:44:44,040 --> 00:44:48,640 Speaker 1: and more ridiculous when government officials start conflating, oh, and 711 00:44:48,920 --> 00:44:53,879 Speaker 1: business tycoons start conflating national security with political goals. Will 712 00:44:53,920 --> 00:44:57,600 Speaker 1: this helper hurt my team? Will this and endanger my job, 713 00:44:57,920 --> 00:45:01,040 Speaker 1: my career, my profits? From Q one to queue four 714 00:45:02,000 --> 00:45:06,279 Speaker 1: and people do that all the time. The Goydon says, 715 00:45:06,320 --> 00:45:09,720 Speaker 1: the system is set up to fail. There's not really accountability. 716 00:45:10,080 --> 00:45:14,840 Speaker 1: So what happens when national security becomes more like personal security? 717 00:45:15,000 --> 00:45:17,400 Speaker 1: How great would that be? How great would it be 718 00:45:17,520 --> 00:45:22,040 Speaker 1: to say, hey, you know, um, I need a zero 719 00:45:22,200 --> 00:45:27,279 Speaker 1: percent loan because me going broke is a matter of 720 00:45:27,400 --> 00:45:32,239 Speaker 1: national security. Banks have done that, you know what I mean. 721 00:45:32,600 --> 00:45:36,120 Speaker 1: They didn't get in trouble, so why not me? Says America. 722 00:45:36,760 --> 00:45:40,440 Speaker 1: It's making me think about those cables again, um, the 723 00:45:40,480 --> 00:45:44,680 Speaker 1: diplomatic cables, and just about how much of that stuff 724 00:45:44,880 --> 00:45:48,400 Speaker 1: didn't feel important because there's so many cables that were 725 00:45:48,480 --> 00:45:52,040 Speaker 1: leaked at that time into a lot of it was 726 00:45:52,160 --> 00:45:57,800 Speaker 1: just I don't know, regular calms, except communications between people 727 00:45:57,880 --> 00:46:00,640 Speaker 1: that seem to be kind of mean in nature when 728 00:46:00,680 --> 00:46:03,480 Speaker 1: they're talking about other people, like seriously, like just kind 729 00:46:03,480 --> 00:46:10,120 Speaker 1: of I don't know I E. And you imagine that 730 00:46:10,200 --> 00:46:13,920 Speaker 1: maybe that's really one of the main reasons people wanted 731 00:46:14,000 --> 00:46:16,240 Speaker 1: to keep this stuff. Well, there are two things. Because 732 00:46:16,280 --> 00:46:20,000 Speaker 1: those communications are classified, they're not going to come out, 733 00:46:20,040 --> 00:46:22,120 Speaker 1: so you can kind of say whatever you want. I 734 00:46:22,120 --> 00:46:25,040 Speaker 1: guess maybe that's what makes those people say some of 735 00:46:25,040 --> 00:46:27,440 Speaker 1: those things. But at the same time, it makes me 736 00:46:27,480 --> 00:46:30,440 Speaker 1: think that that that's one of the reasons you'd want 737 00:46:30,480 --> 00:46:34,160 Speaker 1: to keep it classified. Yeah, because it's all about relationships. 738 00:46:34,200 --> 00:46:39,480 Speaker 1: You could impact a relationship at some at some level, 739 00:46:39,600 --> 00:46:42,520 Speaker 1: and this this is a real problem and there's a 740 00:46:42,600 --> 00:46:47,399 Speaker 1: hypothetical aspect to it. So let's talk about the valid part. Yeah, 741 00:46:47,480 --> 00:46:50,399 Speaker 1: you're the president, you're a prime minister something like that. 742 00:46:50,480 --> 00:46:54,000 Speaker 1: You're you're you're a big man on campus, and you're 743 00:46:54,000 --> 00:46:57,520 Speaker 1: about to conclude this huge policy deal. You campaigned on 744 00:46:57,600 --> 00:47:00,680 Speaker 1: this deal. People are waiting for you to do your job, 745 00:47:00,880 --> 00:47:03,200 Speaker 1: you know, and it doesn't matter what it is. It 746 00:47:03,239 --> 00:47:08,319 Speaker 1: could be anything autonomous drones, trade deal on semiconductors, expansion 747 00:47:08,520 --> 00:47:12,319 Speaker 1: of resource extraction, and foreign minds. And you're having this 748 00:47:12,520 --> 00:47:17,160 Speaker 1: candid conversation with your team about how your counterpart in 749 00:47:17,239 --> 00:47:21,600 Speaker 1: another country is just a wild dude. He's getting plastered, 750 00:47:21,800 --> 00:47:25,120 Speaker 1: he's hiring sex workers, he's even showed up in public 751 00:47:25,719 --> 00:47:29,560 Speaker 1: at Pennsylvania Avenue drunk is a skunk and his underwear 752 00:47:29,760 --> 00:47:32,200 Speaker 1: trying to get a cab and get some pizza. That 753 00:47:32,360 --> 00:47:38,720 Speaker 1: is a true story that happens with Yelson sounding familiar. Yeah, 754 00:47:39,000 --> 00:47:42,879 Speaker 1: uh yeah, yeah Yelson. It was uh even more fun 755 00:47:42,880 --> 00:47:47,640 Speaker 1: than us at parties where's Yelton did get over served 756 00:47:47,840 --> 00:47:50,960 Speaker 1: as they would say, wandered into the street in d 757 00:47:51,040 --> 00:47:54,880 Speaker 1: C and his underwear trying to halicap and gets pizza. 758 00:47:55,200 --> 00:47:58,320 Speaker 1: Security got to him before the dominoes. But it was 759 00:47:58,560 --> 00:48:03,279 Speaker 1: so funny, gosh, but it really happens. And you know, 760 00:48:04,120 --> 00:48:07,760 Speaker 1: the truth of the matter is the real politic is like, yeah, 761 00:48:07,960 --> 00:48:12,080 Speaker 1: you might winge and moan about this guy in private, 762 00:48:12,400 --> 00:48:14,600 Speaker 1: but you need to make sure the public, both your 763 00:48:14,640 --> 00:48:17,680 Speaker 1: country and his or hers are theirs, sees you as 764 00:48:17,719 --> 00:48:21,600 Speaker 1: too important, level headed folks with good intentions, so you 765 00:48:21,760 --> 00:48:25,840 Speaker 1: classify your little therapy and complaining sessions as a matter 766 00:48:25,960 --> 00:48:30,440 Speaker 1: of national security. This happens so much more often than 767 00:48:30,520 --> 00:48:34,120 Speaker 1: people think. But also it has to Oh yeah, man, 768 00:48:34,160 --> 00:48:36,120 Speaker 1: it's like when a cop turns on their blue lights 769 00:48:36,120 --> 00:48:38,680 Speaker 1: so they can run a light, you know, I mean, 770 00:48:38,960 --> 00:48:41,400 Speaker 1: only it's much more agreeingus than that, and and and 771 00:48:41,600 --> 00:48:45,800 Speaker 1: much more obscured. But yeah, that's that's just a blatant 772 00:48:45,800 --> 00:48:48,560 Speaker 1: abuse of power. But how can you even go about 773 00:48:48,680 --> 00:48:53,480 Speaker 1: calling someone on it when it's been classified? Right, you 774 00:48:53,640 --> 00:48:56,880 Speaker 1: don't have the right to ask me that you should 775 00:48:56,880 --> 00:49:02,680 Speaker 1: be arrested for even knowing about that time. Well, you know, 776 00:49:02,800 --> 00:49:05,319 Speaker 1: me and that guy went to that place, which was 777 00:49:05,360 --> 00:49:10,399 Speaker 1: not a brothel but a charity. Uh so, yeah, I mean, 778 00:49:11,120 --> 00:49:14,600 Speaker 1: so there are clear problems. That's our that's our statement today. 779 00:49:14,680 --> 00:49:17,479 Speaker 1: And whether you were in the business or outside of it, uh, 780 00:49:17,719 --> 00:49:20,759 Speaker 1: you can see those problems are clear and apparent to 781 00:49:20,840 --> 00:49:25,000 Speaker 1: go across administrations, to go across political ideologies. If you're 782 00:49:25,000 --> 00:49:28,560 Speaker 1: not in the United States the unfortunately, something very much 783 00:49:28,640 --> 00:49:30,840 Speaker 1: like this is probably occurring in your neck of the 784 00:49:30,840 --> 00:49:34,920 Speaker 1: global woods. So how do we fix it? Should we 785 00:49:35,000 --> 00:49:41,319 Speaker 1: fix it? Yeah? No, let's just keep it now. I'll say, 786 00:49:41,480 --> 00:49:46,799 Speaker 1: you know, I love I love imagining founding fathers and 787 00:49:46,920 --> 00:49:51,000 Speaker 1: historical figures of yesteryear on Twitter. You know that never 788 00:49:51,080 --> 00:49:56,040 Speaker 1: happened until recently. But I mean maybe people should be 789 00:49:56,080 --> 00:49:58,200 Speaker 1: overly cautious. Do we have to do? We have to 790 00:49:58,280 --> 00:50:02,680 Speaker 1: just accept the corrupt in conspiracy of people, you know, 791 00:50:04,160 --> 00:50:06,920 Speaker 1: doing what seems best for them, even if it endangers 792 00:50:06,960 --> 00:50:11,320 Speaker 1: the nation, because the alternative is living in a world 793 00:50:11,360 --> 00:50:15,240 Speaker 1: where your government leaders are going on social social media 794 00:50:15,320 --> 00:50:17,560 Speaker 1: and saying stuff like l M A O yels and 795 00:50:17,680 --> 00:50:20,240 Speaker 1: you're a real one shots on me. Once we squash 796 00:50:20,320 --> 00:50:22,799 Speaker 1: this cold war, you know what I mean, ro guys, 797 00:50:22,840 --> 00:50:26,720 Speaker 1: squash this cold beef. Yes, squash that cold correct, squash 798 00:50:26,760 --> 00:50:30,320 Speaker 1: that cold beef. But I mean, that's the thing. These people, 799 00:50:30,960 --> 00:50:34,080 Speaker 1: no matter what the propaganda tells you about anyone in 800 00:50:34,120 --> 00:50:36,600 Speaker 1: the world, these people are human. And that means that 801 00:50:36,640 --> 00:50:39,479 Speaker 1: if they're human, they talk the way that you talk 802 00:50:39,600 --> 00:50:43,400 Speaker 1: with your friends in private. It's just more dangerous for 803 00:50:43,440 --> 00:50:47,399 Speaker 1: them to be around a hot mic. So it's kind 804 00:50:47,400 --> 00:50:49,000 Speaker 1: of weird. It's like, you know what else it reminds 805 00:50:49,000 --> 00:50:51,239 Speaker 1: me of, I know, we're going along. It reminds me 806 00:50:51,400 --> 00:50:58,000 Speaker 1: of legacy software stuff that has been patched and repatched 807 00:50:58,320 --> 00:51:03,440 Speaker 1: and bandiated so much over time that it's almost a 808 00:51:03,480 --> 00:51:07,160 Speaker 1: ship of thesis argument. And people don't always know how 809 00:51:07,160 --> 00:51:09,640 Speaker 1: it works. They just know that there's some stuff that 810 00:51:09,680 --> 00:51:11,920 Speaker 1: you can't do. You know, there's other stuff that you 811 00:51:12,000 --> 00:51:14,520 Speaker 1: have to do. That's the reason why sometimes in the 812 00:51:14,560 --> 00:51:17,960 Speaker 1: world of I T there are people whose entire job 813 00:51:18,280 --> 00:51:22,200 Speaker 1: is just to um, just to be the one person 814 00:51:22,280 --> 00:51:26,440 Speaker 1: who knows how this crazy thing works, right, like training 815 00:51:26,480 --> 00:51:30,960 Speaker 1: programs or stuff like Scimitar for delta UM. This kind 816 00:51:31,000 --> 00:51:34,719 Speaker 1: of stuff is UM. I don't know. It's a very 817 00:51:34,800 --> 00:51:39,320 Speaker 1: fragile system. You try. You could try to fix some things, 818 00:51:39,640 --> 00:51:42,680 Speaker 1: but then you could end up making it worse. And 819 00:51:42,719 --> 00:51:46,480 Speaker 1: one of the immediate consequences of that is going to 820 00:51:46,560 --> 00:51:49,840 Speaker 1: be the definition of national security just gets a little 821 00:51:49,880 --> 00:51:52,759 Speaker 1: bit bigger every single time you try to fix it. 822 00:51:53,800 --> 00:51:55,319 Speaker 1: In the end, we don't have to worry about any 823 00:51:55,360 --> 00:51:58,680 Speaker 1: of this guy's It's not gonna last much longer. I 824 00:51:58,680 --> 00:52:01,320 Speaker 1: I had this dream the other night. I'm sorry to 825 00:52:01,320 --> 00:52:03,560 Speaker 1: bore you with this real quick, but the other night 826 00:52:03,600 --> 00:52:08,480 Speaker 1: that everything ends, just like humanity. Civilization just ends for 827 00:52:08,520 --> 00:52:13,480 Speaker 1: whatever reason. And there's there's this one person who managed to, 828 00:52:14,160 --> 00:52:17,080 Speaker 1: uh to make it in one of these bunkers. It's 829 00:52:17,080 --> 00:52:21,000 Speaker 1: like a billionaire, right, really smart billionaire, and they made it. 830 00:52:21,760 --> 00:52:26,000 Speaker 1: And before they die, uh, they're able to type out 831 00:52:26,040 --> 00:52:29,360 Speaker 1: everything they can remember that happened in history in a 832 00:52:29,760 --> 00:52:33,200 Speaker 1: like a text document, and that's the only thing that 833 00:52:33,560 --> 00:52:36,520 Speaker 1: sticks around for the next time humanity begins to arise. 834 00:52:36,600 --> 00:52:39,879 Speaker 1: And that becomes the Holy Book. It's just this billionaire's 835 00:52:39,920 --> 00:52:47,360 Speaker 1: remembrances of what happened in history as he died of starvation. Anyway, eha. 836 00:52:48,760 --> 00:52:52,359 Speaker 1: You know, history is written by the victors, and that's 837 00:52:52,400 --> 00:52:55,799 Speaker 1: the reason why it's so important to read as much 838 00:52:55,880 --> 00:52:59,560 Speaker 1: about history as you can, because somewhere hidden in there 839 00:52:59,840 --> 00:53:01,879 Speaker 1: is the future of what's going to happen to you 840 00:53:02,160 --> 00:53:05,200 Speaker 1: and the generations after you, which I know sounds terrifying, 841 00:53:05,320 --> 00:53:07,040 Speaker 1: but it is very true. I had a had a 842 00:53:07,120 --> 00:53:10,319 Speaker 1: dream recently, Matt where I had a series of dreams 843 00:53:10,320 --> 00:53:12,440 Speaker 1: where I was hanging out with Robin Williams. I'm not 844 00:53:12,520 --> 00:53:14,879 Speaker 1: sure why I was in his He had this really 845 00:53:14,960 --> 00:53:17,600 Speaker 1: nice apartment in New York, and it it was like helping 846 00:53:17,640 --> 00:53:22,680 Speaker 1: him build furniture and he's giving me advice. It's a 847 00:53:22,760 --> 00:53:26,120 Speaker 1: weird dream, and he was he wasn't it felt realistic, 848 00:53:26,120 --> 00:53:28,320 Speaker 1: you guys, because he wasn't nice to everyone. He was 849 00:53:28,360 --> 00:53:31,920 Speaker 1: the weird as some people. My dream logs are classified. Okay, stop, 850 00:53:32,640 --> 00:53:35,239 Speaker 1: how do I get read on? Yeah? Alright, so read 851 00:53:35,320 --> 00:53:37,920 Speaker 1: us onto your opinions there, folks. We're gonna be following 852 00:53:38,000 --> 00:53:42,040 Speaker 1: up later with an episode on security clearances and how 853 00:53:42,080 --> 00:53:47,640 Speaker 1: that becomes so insanely weird as well. In the meantime, 854 00:53:47,960 --> 00:53:50,160 Speaker 1: we want to know your thoughts, whether you're inside or 855 00:53:50,200 --> 00:53:53,359 Speaker 1: outside the biz. Is there a way to fix this? 856 00:53:53,640 --> 00:53:56,600 Speaker 1: Should it be fixed? What? What are some other problems 857 00:53:56,719 --> 00:53:58,560 Speaker 1: you think people need to be made aware of. We 858 00:53:58,680 --> 00:54:00,799 Speaker 1: can't wait to your thoughts. We try to be easy 859 00:54:00,840 --> 00:54:04,080 Speaker 1: to find UM online until they classify us. Yeah, you 860 00:54:04,080 --> 00:54:07,640 Speaker 1: can find us on Facebook, on YouTube, and on Twitter 861 00:54:07,680 --> 00:54:10,560 Speaker 1: at the handle conspiracy Stuff and by the way, Twitter 862 00:54:10,719 --> 00:54:14,640 Speaker 1: as a platform right now, absolute bonker's delight to behold. 863 00:54:14,840 --> 00:54:18,280 Speaker 1: I just thought i'd thrown this in. A fake newly 864 00:54:18,440 --> 00:54:23,799 Speaker 1: eight dollar verified Chiquita Bennett Brand's account tweeted, We've just 865 00:54:23,960 --> 00:54:27,760 Speaker 1: overthrown the government of Brazil, to which the actual still 866 00:54:28,040 --> 00:54:31,160 Speaker 1: identical with the same verified check mark that they, you know, 867 00:54:31,239 --> 00:54:35,080 Speaker 1: actually received legitimately responded, we apologize to those who have 868 00:54:35,480 --> 00:54:38,879 Speaker 1: who have been served a misleading message from a fake 869 00:54:39,000 --> 00:54:42,000 Speaker 1: Chiquita account. We have not overthrown a government since nineteen 870 00:54:42,080 --> 00:54:46,919 Speaker 1: fifty four. That's great. Here's here's another one I read. 871 00:54:47,040 --> 00:54:50,799 Speaker 1: I left it was Tesla looking verified saying breaking a 872 00:54:50,880 --> 00:54:54,000 Speaker 1: second Tesla has hit the World Trade Center. Uh so 873 00:54:54,200 --> 00:54:57,000 Speaker 1: this is yeah, it's what a time to be alive. 874 00:54:57,120 --> 00:55:00,680 Speaker 1: What a time. We're conspiracy stuff on those plat forums 875 00:55:00,719 --> 00:55:05,680 Speaker 1: including Twitter, um conspiracy stuff show on Instagram. Yeah, hopefully 876 00:55:05,680 --> 00:55:09,880 Speaker 1: you can discern if it's actually us or not. Oh guys, 877 00:55:10,400 --> 00:55:16,400 Speaker 1: the uncertainty is peak. It's top uncertainty. And in these 878 00:55:16,520 --> 00:55:20,320 Speaker 1: uncertain times, some of our fellow conspiracy realists find nothing 879 00:55:20,360 --> 00:55:24,600 Speaker 1: more reliable than an old school phone call. The power 880 00:55:24,680 --> 00:55:26,640 Speaker 1: is yours. All you have to do is pick up 881 00:55:26,680 --> 00:55:31,480 Speaker 1: your phone telephonic device and dial one eight three three 882 00:55:31,840 --> 00:55:35,080 Speaker 1: st d W y t K. You'll hear a voice. 883 00:55:35,120 --> 00:55:36,960 Speaker 1: You'll hear a beep that tells you you're in the 884 00:55:37,040 --> 00:55:40,480 Speaker 1: right place beep. After that, you get three minutes. Go wild, 885 00:55:40,640 --> 00:55:43,800 Speaker 1: get really weird. Give yourself a nickname, a moniker and 886 00:55:43,920 --> 00:55:46,640 Speaker 1: a k A. We love them as much as Daily Zeitgeist. 887 00:55:47,120 --> 00:55:49,239 Speaker 1: Tell us what's on your mind. Tell us if we 888 00:55:49,280 --> 00:55:51,920 Speaker 1: can use your name and message on the air. Most importantly, 889 00:55:51,960 --> 00:55:55,040 Speaker 1: don't censor yourself. If you need uh more than three 890 00:55:55,040 --> 00:55:57,239 Speaker 1: minutes to tell us your story, you got links this end. 891 00:55:57,280 --> 00:55:59,200 Speaker 1: We always love that. Take us to the edge of 892 00:55:59,200 --> 00:56:00,960 Speaker 1: the rabbit hole. Will do the rest. All you have 893 00:56:01,000 --> 00:56:02,560 Speaker 1: to do is drop us a line at our old 894 00:56:02,640 --> 00:56:07,040 Speaker 1: fashioned email address where we are conspiracy at iHeart radio 895 00:56:07,320 --> 00:56:28,279 Speaker 1: dot com. Stuff they don't want you to know is 896 00:56:28,320 --> 00:56:31,319 Speaker 1: a production of I heart Radio. For more podcasts from 897 00:56:31,360 --> 00:56:34,400 Speaker 1: my heart Radio, visit the i heart radio app, Apple Podcasts, 898 00:56:34,520 --> 00:56:36,360 Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.