1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:04,680 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is 2 00:00:04,760 --> 00:00:09,080 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,200 --> 00:00:12,079 Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A 4 00:00:12,200 --> 00:00:25,639 Speaker 1: production of I Heart Radio. Hello, welcome back to the show. 5 00:00:25,720 --> 00:00:28,280 Speaker 1: My name is Matt, my name is Noel. They call 6 00:00:28,400 --> 00:00:31,480 Speaker 1: me Ben. We're joined as always with our super producer 7 00:00:31,600 --> 00:00:36,320 Speaker 1: Alexis code named Doc Holiday Jackson. Most importantly, you are you. 8 00:00:36,320 --> 00:00:39,200 Speaker 1: You are here, and that makes this the stuff they 9 00:00:39,240 --> 00:00:43,879 Speaker 1: don't want you to know. Folks. I'm recording from a 10 00:00:44,080 --> 00:00:47,199 Speaker 1: very remote location this week, but I didn't want to 11 00:00:47,240 --> 00:00:50,919 Speaker 1: miss the opportunity to speak with everyone today. We are 12 00:00:51,000 --> 00:00:56,160 Speaker 1: recording today's Strange News segment on Monday, August, and some 13 00:00:56,360 --> 00:01:01,400 Speaker 1: deeply troubling things are happening across the globe. Wherever you live, 14 00:01:01,720 --> 00:01:05,280 Speaker 1: you have probably already heard about the chaos sweeping Afghanistan 15 00:01:05,520 --> 00:01:09,720 Speaker 1: as U S forces make a hasty retreat and city 16 00:01:09,840 --> 00:01:15,160 Speaker 1: after city after city falls to the Taliban. The recent 17 00:01:15,240 --> 00:01:19,520 Speaker 1: footage of massive crowds mobbing the airport to escape Kabul 18 00:01:19,840 --> 00:01:23,479 Speaker 1: bears a shocking similarity to the fall of Saigon in nine. 19 00:01:25,720 --> 00:01:29,400 Speaker 1: Our thoughts, as individuals and as the show, are with 20 00:01:29,520 --> 00:01:34,000 Speaker 1: the citizens of Afghanistan, many of whom were born after 21 00:01:34,040 --> 00:01:37,560 Speaker 1: the events of September eleven, which sparked the US his 22 00:01:37,680 --> 00:01:41,920 Speaker 1: most recent twenty year period of activities in a country 23 00:01:42,000 --> 00:01:46,520 Speaker 1: historically under siege from one foreign government to the next. 24 00:01:47,240 --> 00:01:51,040 Speaker 1: It seems the Graveyard of Empires has once again proven 25 00:01:51,120 --> 00:01:55,920 Speaker 1: its nicknamed true and as we record, the Taliban is 26 00:01:56,080 --> 00:02:01,160 Speaker 1: re implementing draconian bands on music, he woman rights, especially 27 00:02:01,200 --> 00:02:04,840 Speaker 1: those of women, and much much more. We'll have a 28 00:02:04,960 --> 00:02:08,480 Speaker 1: full episode on the way, but for now, please be 29 00:02:08,560 --> 00:02:13,720 Speaker 1: aware that this is a profoundly complex situation with a 30 00:02:13,760 --> 00:02:18,880 Speaker 1: lot of history that isn't often mentioned. It's a complexity 31 00:02:18,919 --> 00:02:22,959 Speaker 1: that isn't being fully explored in most Western media. So 32 00:02:23,280 --> 00:02:27,240 Speaker 1: if you are listening and have personal experience in this region, 33 00:02:27,800 --> 00:02:30,600 Speaker 1: I'd love to hear from you. Uh please write directly 34 00:02:30,880 --> 00:02:34,160 Speaker 1: Conspiracy iHeart radio dot com or give us a call 35 00:02:34,400 --> 00:02:38,120 Speaker 1: one eight three three s T d W y t K. 36 00:02:39,080 --> 00:02:43,720 Speaker 1: But for now, something different. It's often said that the 37 00:02:43,760 --> 00:02:46,800 Speaker 1: course of true love never did run true, and it 38 00:02:46,880 --> 00:02:50,919 Speaker 1: seems this observation is just as relevant beneath the waves 39 00:02:51,040 --> 00:02:54,880 Speaker 1: as it is on the shore. As we've discussed at 40 00:02:54,960 --> 00:02:57,840 Speaker 1: length in the past, the world's oceans are in a 41 00:02:57,960 --> 00:03:01,680 Speaker 1: state of crisis and she and pollution has created an 42 00:03:01,680 --> 00:03:05,680 Speaker 1: existential threat to an enormous chunk of the world sea life, 43 00:03:06,320 --> 00:03:12,080 Speaker 1: rising temperatures, oil spills, plastic everywhere, you name it. You know, 44 00:03:12,240 --> 00:03:15,720 Speaker 1: living in the ocean was never easy, and now the 45 00:03:15,800 --> 00:03:19,440 Speaker 1: creatures beneath those waves are essentially playing the game of 46 00:03:19,480 --> 00:03:23,919 Speaker 1: life on hard mode. Scientists still don't understand the full 47 00:03:24,000 --> 00:03:27,600 Speaker 1: spectrum of long tail effects and consequences that come from 48 00:03:27,680 --> 00:03:31,480 Speaker 1: dumping so much junk into the water. And this goes 49 00:03:31,639 --> 00:03:35,800 Speaker 1: far beyond the harrowing photos of turtles caught in plastic 50 00:03:35,880 --> 00:03:39,160 Speaker 1: six pack rings or you know, fish whose bodies are 51 00:03:39,240 --> 00:03:45,640 Speaker 1: riddled with microplastics. Yet this isn't the typical story about waste. 52 00:03:46,120 --> 00:03:49,280 Speaker 1: It is a striking one, and for context, it's important 53 00:03:49,280 --> 00:03:52,839 Speaker 1: to say that, according to the International Union for Conservation 54 00:03:52,880 --> 00:03:58,040 Speaker 1: of Nature, at least eight million tons of plastic end 55 00:03:58,120 --> 00:04:02,320 Speaker 1: up in the ocean every single year. Furthermore, plastics in 56 00:04:02,400 --> 00:04:06,760 Speaker 1: general make up eight percent of what's called marine debris 57 00:04:06,840 --> 00:04:10,400 Speaker 1: from the surface waters all the way down through the 58 00:04:10,440 --> 00:04:15,279 Speaker 1: abyssal plane to deep sea sediments. It is literally affecting 59 00:04:15,640 --> 00:04:20,599 Speaker 1: every single kind of maritime organism. There's no real exception 60 00:04:20,640 --> 00:04:25,320 Speaker 1: to this rule. But the humble hermit crab and a 61 00:04:25,360 --> 00:04:28,960 Speaker 1: couple of other crustaceans are having a weirder time than 62 00:04:29,040 --> 00:04:33,400 Speaker 1: most because you see the hermit crab and some of 63 00:04:33,440 --> 00:04:39,640 Speaker 1: these other organisms may actually be uh into plastic. Doc 64 00:04:39,800 --> 00:04:42,719 Speaker 1: can we get some kind of like sexy R and 65 00:04:42,760 --> 00:04:51,600 Speaker 1: B music ratans I mean into plastic, like into plastic, 66 00:04:52,720 --> 00:04:57,440 Speaker 1: quiet storm level into plastic. Here's what happened. A research 67 00:04:57,520 --> 00:05:00,880 Speaker 1: team at the University of Hull has found an additive 68 00:05:01,000 --> 00:05:05,960 Speaker 1: and plastic named olamide is causing hermit crabs to get 69 00:05:06,400 --> 00:05:09,080 Speaker 1: kind of how I'm bothered, as well as some kinds 70 00:05:09,080 --> 00:05:13,080 Speaker 1: of shrimp. When they're exposed to this chemical, their respiration 71 00:05:13,200 --> 00:05:19,200 Speaker 1: rate increases, which indicates some sort of excitement. What kind 72 00:05:19,200 --> 00:05:23,160 Speaker 1: of excitement, Well, it depends on who you ask. Some 73 00:05:23,200 --> 00:05:28,720 Speaker 1: people claim it's a kind of attraction my record skip 74 00:05:28,839 --> 00:05:32,760 Speaker 1: what No, Seriously, it's true. Olyamide is known to be 75 00:05:32,920 --> 00:05:37,480 Speaker 1: what's called a sex pheromone or info chemical. This acts 76 00:05:37,520 --> 00:05:41,279 Speaker 1: as a stimulant for some marine species, including things like 77 00:05:41,320 --> 00:05:45,760 Speaker 1: hermit crabs and shrimp. The researchers specifically found that quote 78 00:05:46,040 --> 00:05:51,520 Speaker 1: olyamide also has a striking resemblance to oleic acid, a 79 00:05:51,600 --> 00:05:56,840 Speaker 1: chemical released by arthropods during decomposition, and since hermit crabs 80 00:05:56,839 --> 00:06:01,839 Speaker 1: are scavengers, they might misidentify polyamide as a food source, 81 00:06:02,200 --> 00:06:07,840 Speaker 1: which creates a trap. Fullamide, which most people probably haven't 82 00:06:07,880 --> 00:06:12,280 Speaker 1: heard of, is a combon plastic additive. It's used as 83 00:06:12,360 --> 00:06:17,960 Speaker 1: what's called a slip agent. That's a lubricant that's put 84 00:06:18,040 --> 00:06:21,360 Speaker 1: on plastics that need to be released from molds after 85 00:06:21,440 --> 00:06:26,560 Speaker 1: they've been shaped. This stuff fullamide also helps the internal 86 00:06:26,640 --> 00:06:32,840 Speaker 1: structure of plastics flow smoothly, and it's used in polypropylene, 87 00:06:33,120 --> 00:06:36,760 Speaker 1: which is in a ton of things like food containers. 88 00:06:36,760 --> 00:06:43,880 Speaker 1: But it's also an organic molecule that is found naturally 89 00:06:43,920 --> 00:06:49,320 Speaker 1: its human blood plasma and animal pheromones in something called 90 00:06:49,360 --> 00:06:54,000 Speaker 1: the cleaner shrimp. This stuff pull amide has been found 91 00:06:54,080 --> 00:07:01,159 Speaker 1: to help catalyze a mating response in sexual old partners 92 00:07:01,200 --> 00:07:05,640 Speaker 1: because they sense this pheromone, and this pheromone signals to 93 00:07:05,800 --> 00:07:09,600 Speaker 1: them that it's time for, you know, a little adult 94 00:07:09,640 --> 00:07:15,840 Speaker 1: shrimp swim. So some pop science news sites focused purely 95 00:07:15,880 --> 00:07:20,240 Speaker 1: on the sexual angle here, but researchers and experts like 96 00:07:20,360 --> 00:07:25,320 Speaker 1: chemical ecologist Paula Schermacher are quick to note this chemical 97 00:07:25,480 --> 00:07:30,920 Speaker 1: may trigger different responses in different animals. So yes, leam 98 00:07:30,960 --> 00:07:34,720 Speaker 1: I could help trigger that mating response in cleaner shrimp, 99 00:07:35,160 --> 00:07:39,760 Speaker 1: but in hermit crabs, Schermacher says, the substance seems to 100 00:07:39,800 --> 00:07:42,480 Speaker 1: trigger something a little more like what we will call 101 00:07:43,000 --> 00:07:48,240 Speaker 1: food attraction. It's a feeding stimulant. I mean, maybe it's 102 00:07:48,280 --> 00:07:51,640 Speaker 1: best to think of how excited you might be if 103 00:07:51,680 --> 00:07:55,880 Speaker 1: you've been craving pizza all weekend or all day and 104 00:07:55,920 --> 00:07:59,280 Speaker 1: then you happen to pass by a pizzeria and you 105 00:07:59,360 --> 00:08:05,120 Speaker 1: smell the fresh baked pizza aroma, you know, and you 106 00:08:05,160 --> 00:08:07,760 Speaker 1: can you know, you can smell the garlic, and your 107 00:08:07,800 --> 00:08:11,560 Speaker 1: stomach is rebelling and trying to steer you towards this place. 108 00:08:11,840 --> 00:08:16,880 Speaker 1: That smell gets you on board, right, not smell probably 109 00:08:18,360 --> 00:08:22,600 Speaker 1: nudges you toward going to pizzeria or going to you know, 110 00:08:22,640 --> 00:08:25,920 Speaker 1: it could be barbecue, whatever you smell when you're hungry. Uh, 111 00:08:25,960 --> 00:08:29,880 Speaker 1: this this is the same reaction those hermit crabs maybe experiencing. 112 00:08:30,360 --> 00:08:34,240 Speaker 1: But the thing is, the smell of pizza probably doesn't 113 00:08:34,280 --> 00:08:39,640 Speaker 1: get people amorous. Well, I mean, most people, you know, 114 00:08:40,160 --> 00:08:42,480 Speaker 1: live your life as long as you're not hurting anyone. 115 00:08:43,000 --> 00:08:46,240 Speaker 1: But most people would just say pizza is delicious, not 116 00:08:46,320 --> 00:08:52,000 Speaker 1: like pizza. Yeah, so that's the long and short. There 117 00:08:52,080 --> 00:08:55,840 Speaker 1: is a substance in waste plastic that smells like awesome 118 00:08:55,880 --> 00:09:00,640 Speaker 1: food to submarine life, and it's the pheromone equivalent of 119 00:09:00,640 --> 00:09:04,240 Speaker 1: a booty call for some other marine life. Didn't see 120 00:09:04,280 --> 00:09:07,240 Speaker 1: that when coming. Cheers to anyone who had that on 121 00:09:07,280 --> 00:09:12,520 Speaker 1: their dystopian bingo card. Right. So, putting aside bad jokes 122 00:09:12,559 --> 00:09:17,160 Speaker 1: about being catfished, this research should be making a bigger splash. 123 00:09:17,559 --> 00:09:22,080 Speaker 1: It's profoundly frightening to realize just how much a single 124 00:09:22,240 --> 00:09:26,240 Speaker 1: substance can affect wildlife in such a specific set of ways. 125 00:09:26,640 --> 00:09:30,160 Speaker 1: Only am I, let's remember, is just one of many 126 00:09:30,280 --> 00:09:34,400 Speaker 1: many chemicals associated with plastic being dumped in the ocean 127 00:09:34,840 --> 00:09:38,080 Speaker 1: right now, So we have to ask ourselves, what about 128 00:09:38,160 --> 00:09:42,360 Speaker 1: all the other stuff going beneath the waves? How do 129 00:09:42,400 --> 00:09:47,760 Speaker 1: these chemicals affect wildlife? And how can humans know which 130 00:09:47,880 --> 00:09:52,600 Speaker 1: chemicals and which effects to research? The problem is vast. 131 00:09:53,320 --> 00:09:58,120 Speaker 1: It is mind boggling. And again, as we record right now, 132 00:09:58,480 --> 00:10:02,800 Speaker 1: as you're listening to this, civilization continues to pump stuff 133 00:10:02,920 --> 00:10:08,200 Speaker 1: into the world's oceans while hermit crabs and horny nous 134 00:10:08,320 --> 00:10:11,120 Speaker 1: or getting most of the headlines here. The reality is 135 00:10:11,160 --> 00:10:14,800 Speaker 1: that this is the tip of a large, looming iceberg 136 00:10:15,120 --> 00:10:20,120 Speaker 1: of unknown consequences. So what do you think, fellow conspiracy realist? 137 00:10:20,679 --> 00:10:24,599 Speaker 1: What else could be happening down there beneath the waves? 138 00:10:24,720 --> 00:10:29,320 Speaker 1: And what happens to humanity when these unforeseen consequences affect 139 00:10:29,480 --> 00:10:32,840 Speaker 1: life on land? What do we do when this bill 140 00:10:32,920 --> 00:10:38,480 Speaker 1: comes due? Signing off from an undisclosed location, Stay safe, 141 00:10:38,880 --> 00:10:42,800 Speaker 1: Let's talk soon. Oh man, that was a great story. 142 00:10:43,160 --> 00:10:46,160 Speaker 1: I'm sorry that we weren't all together to discuss that more, 143 00:10:46,480 --> 00:10:49,280 Speaker 1: but I'm really glad that we learned about it. I 144 00:10:49,320 --> 00:10:51,800 Speaker 1: want to jump back really quickly, Noll, if that's okay 145 00:10:51,800 --> 00:10:54,600 Speaker 1: with you, to Afghanistan. I wanted to talk about that 146 00:10:54,640 --> 00:10:57,440 Speaker 1: today on the episode. But we we figure it's going 147 00:10:57,480 --> 00:10:59,680 Speaker 1: to be better if we compile all of our information 148 00:10:59,720 --> 00:11:02,520 Speaker 1: into you know, one major stuff they don't want you 149 00:11:02,520 --> 00:11:05,000 Speaker 1: to know. Well, it's an ongoing story obviously. I mean 150 00:11:05,160 --> 00:11:07,760 Speaker 1: we're gonna keep hearing more and more about what led 151 00:11:07,800 --> 00:11:09,640 Speaker 1: to this. I mean, you know what led to it, right, 152 00:11:09,679 --> 00:11:13,240 Speaker 1: But it seems like uh, no dumb moment where it's like, 153 00:11:13,640 --> 00:11:15,439 Speaker 1: of course this is going to happen. It wasn't the 154 00:11:15,480 --> 00:11:19,000 Speaker 1: whole point of like being there occupying Afghanistan for all 155 00:11:19,040 --> 00:11:22,720 Speaker 1: these years. Isn't this like exactly what we were trying 156 00:11:22,760 --> 00:11:27,360 Speaker 1: to keep from happening? The Taliban reoccupying Afghanistan, you know, 157 00:11:27,400 --> 00:11:30,160 Speaker 1: for all of these years, and yet the moment we uh, 158 00:11:30,280 --> 00:11:32,760 Speaker 1: we take off here, it is it seems like a 159 00:11:32,840 --> 00:11:36,959 Speaker 1: real um critique of of you know, all of this, uh, 160 00:11:37,120 --> 00:11:39,200 Speaker 1: this investment we've put into that country and all of 161 00:11:39,240 --> 00:11:43,760 Speaker 1: the time we spent there. It is a weird situation, 162 00:11:44,280 --> 00:11:47,600 Speaker 1: a tale of a quagmire as old as time, right. 163 00:11:47,720 --> 00:11:50,080 Speaker 1: And Ben was right on there when he referred to 164 00:11:50,120 --> 00:11:53,320 Speaker 1: it as the place where UH countries go to die 165 00:11:53,440 --> 00:11:57,400 Speaker 1: or or empires go to die, Afghanistan, UH. And I 166 00:11:57,400 --> 00:11:58,920 Speaker 1: want to talk about it further when we when all 167 00:11:58,960 --> 00:12:00,679 Speaker 1: three of us can be gathered to discuss. But I 168 00:12:00,720 --> 00:12:03,760 Speaker 1: want to point out just something really quickly, which is 169 00:12:04,160 --> 00:12:09,640 Speaker 1: the rapid nature of what occurred, how quickly this happened. 170 00:12:09,800 --> 00:12:13,320 Speaker 1: As Ben said, we're recording this on August sixteenth, that's 171 00:12:13,320 --> 00:12:18,040 Speaker 1: a Monday, and on the last Friday, as we record, 172 00:12:18,280 --> 00:12:20,320 Speaker 1: I want to read you this just a few things 173 00:12:20,320 --> 00:12:23,560 Speaker 1: from this article out of ABC News. It says Taliban 174 00:12:23,679 --> 00:12:27,480 Speaker 1: fighters executing surrendering troops, which could amount to war crimes. 175 00:12:27,559 --> 00:12:31,120 Speaker 1: US officials say the US Embassy and Kabul has also 176 00:12:31,280 --> 00:12:37,040 Speaker 1: urged Americans to evacuate Afghanistan. So that was happening on Friday. Uh, 177 00:12:37,080 --> 00:12:40,080 Speaker 1: there were a lot of alarms being raised because the 178 00:12:40,080 --> 00:12:44,040 Speaker 1: Taliban was on a a heavy offensive against many of 179 00:12:44,040 --> 00:12:48,400 Speaker 1: the cities in Afghanistan all as of last Friday, and 180 00:12:48,440 --> 00:12:51,240 Speaker 1: they had been doing so for not that long. But 181 00:12:51,559 --> 00:12:55,280 Speaker 1: the offensives have been tracked by Western news sites for 182 00:12:55,360 --> 00:12:57,719 Speaker 1: quite a while. I want to read two things from 183 00:12:57,760 --> 00:13:00,800 Speaker 1: that article quote. The U s Embassy in Kabul has 184 00:13:00,840 --> 00:13:05,040 Speaker 1: also urged Americans to evacuate Afghanistan immediately, amid fears that 185 00:13:05,080 --> 00:13:07,760 Speaker 1: the capital could fall into Taliban hands in a matter 186 00:13:07,920 --> 00:13:12,840 Speaker 1: of weeks. That was on Friday. A military analysis said 187 00:13:12,880 --> 00:13:16,080 Speaker 1: the city could be isolated in thirty to sixty days 188 00:13:16,440 --> 00:13:20,360 Speaker 1: and be captured in ninety days, a US official told 189 00:13:20,360 --> 00:13:24,240 Speaker 1: ABC News. But that timeline seemed even more accelerated Thursday, 190 00:13:24,280 --> 00:13:28,160 Speaker 1: as the Taliban claimed another another city, the third largest 191 00:13:28,440 --> 00:13:34,480 Speaker 1: in the country. So that happened on Friday, then on 192 00:13:34,679 --> 00:13:39,440 Speaker 1: Sunday yesterday, over the weekend. Here's uh, here's something from 193 00:13:39,440 --> 00:13:43,160 Speaker 1: the Daily Saba s A B A H. Here's the title. 194 00:13:43,360 --> 00:13:52,120 Speaker 1: Afghan President Ghani relinquishes power, Taliban form interim government um so. 195 00:13:52,840 --> 00:13:56,560 Speaker 1: And and in between those two stories, Also on Sunday, 196 00:13:56,600 --> 00:13:59,800 Speaker 1: they also took over Bogram Air Force Base, one of 197 00:13:59,840 --> 00:14:04,600 Speaker 1: the major I don't know icons I guess of American 198 00:14:04,800 --> 00:14:09,320 Speaker 1: and Western power within the country. They took that over. It. Well, 199 00:14:09,400 --> 00:14:12,199 Speaker 1: there's a prison within that air force base that housed 200 00:14:12,240 --> 00:14:16,480 Speaker 1: over five thousand people. Those are Taliban fighters, those are 201 00:14:17,400 --> 00:14:20,320 Speaker 1: ISIS fighters, those are all kinds of people there. The 202 00:14:20,360 --> 00:14:23,440 Speaker 1: Taliban took the whole thing over and began releasing prisoners 203 00:14:24,280 --> 00:14:27,520 Speaker 1: all over the weekend. Uh. It's just insane and I 204 00:14:27,600 --> 00:14:31,240 Speaker 1: cannot wait to discuss this further in a full episode. 205 00:14:31,560 --> 00:14:34,240 Speaker 1: Biden summed it up nicely and I'm like the most 206 00:14:34,560 --> 00:14:37,400 Speaker 1: again no dust statement of the year. The truth is, 207 00:14:37,840 --> 00:14:43,080 Speaker 1: this did unfold more quickly than we had anticipated. Um yeah, 208 00:14:43,080 --> 00:14:45,640 Speaker 1: And I get it. He's making a political maneuver. He 209 00:14:45,680 --> 00:14:48,520 Speaker 1: says he didn't want to pass this on to another administration. 210 00:14:48,920 --> 00:14:51,960 Speaker 1: This is he's been the fourth president to preside over 211 00:14:52,000 --> 00:14:55,320 Speaker 1: this decades long conflict that has always you know, the 212 00:14:55,400 --> 00:14:57,200 Speaker 1: quagmire is the word of the day. It seems like 213 00:14:57,240 --> 00:14:59,960 Speaker 1: it's always felt like that, and it was also complicated 214 00:15:00,240 --> 00:15:02,680 Speaker 1: initially what led to the invasion in the first place. 215 00:15:02,720 --> 00:15:04,800 Speaker 1: So it's kind of been a thing that's you know, 216 00:15:04,920 --> 00:15:07,840 Speaker 1: been inherited and kind of serviced over the years, and 217 00:15:07,880 --> 00:15:10,160 Speaker 1: like it's always felt like it's been one step forward, 218 00:15:10,240 --> 00:15:12,640 Speaker 1: three steps back. So maybe he just wanted to get 219 00:15:12,680 --> 00:15:15,080 Speaker 1: out of there, um and just be done with it. 220 00:15:15,360 --> 00:15:18,120 Speaker 1: But it's also like not a great look, uh, and 221 00:15:18,160 --> 00:15:19,960 Speaker 1: a lot to unpack because the history of it is 222 00:15:20,000 --> 00:15:23,600 Speaker 1: long and very complicated. That's right, And we're not doing 223 00:15:23,640 --> 00:15:26,080 Speaker 1: that now, no, but but we will soon. For now, 224 00:15:26,120 --> 00:15:27,960 Speaker 1: we're gonna take a quick break here, a word from 225 00:15:27,960 --> 00:15:31,240 Speaker 1: our sponsor. Then we'll be right back with more strange news. 226 00:15:37,880 --> 00:15:42,560 Speaker 1: And we're back with more strange news, potentially another with 227 00:15:42,960 --> 00:15:47,119 Speaker 1: by the Biden administration. UM. This one a little lower profile, 228 00:15:47,200 --> 00:15:51,880 Speaker 1: but the ramifications could be equally as as distressing as 229 00:15:51,960 --> 00:15:54,800 Speaker 1: is what's happening over there in Afghanistan. UM probably seen 230 00:15:54,840 --> 00:15:56,720 Speaker 1: a lot in the news lately, or at least on 231 00:15:56,760 --> 00:15:59,880 Speaker 1: social media. UM. More so on social media, I would 232 00:15:59,880 --> 00:16:03,400 Speaker 1: say even then in the news that fentanyl, the synthetic 233 00:16:03,440 --> 00:16:08,400 Speaker 1: opioid um has really been wreaking havoc on people causing 234 00:16:08,440 --> 00:16:12,440 Speaker 1: tens of thousands of overdose deaths a year UM in 235 00:16:12,480 --> 00:16:15,240 Speaker 1: your local communities or in your local scenes or whatever. 236 00:16:15,560 --> 00:16:20,000 Speaker 1: You may have started to see people posting uh screenshots 237 00:16:20,080 --> 00:16:24,120 Speaker 1: or image macros or whatever talking about street drugs being 238 00:16:24,200 --> 00:16:27,520 Speaker 1: laced with fentanyl UM, which, as as we know, we've 239 00:16:27,520 --> 00:16:29,840 Speaker 1: talked about it before, especially in our Big Farma episode 240 00:16:30,040 --> 00:16:33,920 Speaker 1: and about Perdue Farma in particular, how little fentanyl it 241 00:16:33,960 --> 00:16:37,440 Speaker 1: takes to cause a deadly overdose. It's like it either's 242 00:16:37,480 --> 00:16:39,520 Speaker 1: images online where you can see a penny and then 243 00:16:39,520 --> 00:16:41,680 Speaker 1: you can see some crumbs of fenciel next to it, 244 00:16:41,920 --> 00:16:45,520 Speaker 1: and it's literally like one or two milligrams. It can 245 00:16:45,520 --> 00:16:48,920 Speaker 1: cause you to absolutely drop dead. And and to do 246 00:16:48,960 --> 00:16:51,520 Speaker 1: with what what type of fentanyl it is, because there's 247 00:16:51,560 --> 00:16:55,480 Speaker 1: so many different cousins like chemical cousin. Thank you Matt. 248 00:16:55,520 --> 00:16:57,360 Speaker 1: That's a big part of what today's story is about 249 00:16:57,480 --> 00:17:00,160 Speaker 1: as well. UM. It's sort of a two tiered story. UM. 250 00:17:00,200 --> 00:17:02,160 Speaker 1: But so again with those you know shares that you 251 00:17:02,240 --> 00:17:04,760 Speaker 1: might be seeing Instagram about, you know, it's about looking 252 00:17:04,760 --> 00:17:06,440 Speaker 1: out for your friends, if you know any addicts or 253 00:17:06,440 --> 00:17:08,080 Speaker 1: you know any users. I mean, plenty of people do 254 00:17:08,119 --> 00:17:09,439 Speaker 1: and you don't have to be an addict to be 255 00:17:09,520 --> 00:17:13,040 Speaker 1: a drug user, but um, cocaine, um M, d M 256 00:17:13,040 --> 00:17:15,800 Speaker 1: A things like that. There is or has been a 257 00:17:15,800 --> 00:17:19,280 Speaker 1: lot of concern about these street drugs that are laced 258 00:17:19,320 --> 00:17:22,400 Speaker 1: with this potentially deadly substance that can cause an instant 259 00:17:22,440 --> 00:17:25,800 Speaker 1: overdose if just by you know, in just in sufflating, 260 00:17:25,800 --> 00:17:28,600 Speaker 1: I believe is the words for snorting or injecting just 261 00:17:28,640 --> 00:17:33,360 Speaker 1: a few grains. Not Graham's minds, you grains um. And 262 00:17:33,440 --> 00:17:35,560 Speaker 1: so there's a lot of like information or called to 263 00:17:35,560 --> 00:17:39,600 Speaker 1: action on making sure you get this overdose deterrent called 264 00:17:39,720 --> 00:17:43,159 Speaker 1: narcan um, which is uh, it's like a little in hailer, 265 00:17:43,240 --> 00:17:45,720 Speaker 1: and you can literally save someone's life. It's apparently very 266 00:17:45,800 --> 00:17:48,760 Speaker 1: very very powerful um and relatively easy to get. You 267 00:17:48,760 --> 00:17:50,919 Speaker 1: can get them at pharmacies. There are places that are 268 00:17:50,920 --> 00:17:53,000 Speaker 1: passing them out for free and teaching classes on how 269 00:17:53,040 --> 00:17:54,840 Speaker 1: to use them. So it's a lot of the stuff 270 00:17:54,880 --> 00:17:56,760 Speaker 1: that I've been seeing is about like being prepared and 271 00:17:57,000 --> 00:17:59,720 Speaker 1: watching out for your friends and maybe carrying one of 272 00:17:59,720 --> 00:18:02,159 Speaker 1: these are round with you. But the story for today 273 00:18:02,960 --> 00:18:08,400 Speaker 1: is about a bit of a pr let's say, misstep. 274 00:18:08,760 --> 00:18:11,439 Speaker 1: The San Diego Police Department did because yes, while we 275 00:18:11,480 --> 00:18:15,080 Speaker 1: know this substance is very, very dangerous, it is still 276 00:18:15,119 --> 00:18:19,159 Speaker 1: possible to fearmonger about it in ways that could actually 277 00:18:19,200 --> 00:18:22,240 Speaker 1: do more damage than create positive outcomes. And this is 278 00:18:22,240 --> 00:18:24,639 Speaker 1: I think what is happening with this story out of 279 00:18:24,680 --> 00:18:27,840 Speaker 1: San Diego. Essentially, the San Diego Police merman did was 280 00:18:27,880 --> 00:18:31,159 Speaker 1: they released a video which essentially it almost looks like 281 00:18:31,200 --> 00:18:35,080 Speaker 1: you're watching a news package. Um, you've got stand ups 282 00:18:35,119 --> 00:18:38,600 Speaker 1: from these different officers. Um. But you have this bodycam 283 00:18:38,680 --> 00:18:42,439 Speaker 1: footage of a young officer handling something evidence of some 284 00:18:42,520 --> 00:18:44,639 Speaker 1: kind during a traffic stop in a in a trunk 285 00:18:44,840 --> 00:18:47,080 Speaker 1: and then all of a sudden passing out, just like 286 00:18:47,160 --> 00:18:49,600 Speaker 1: literally keeling over on his back. Then you have this 287 00:18:50,359 --> 00:18:52,800 Speaker 1: very heroic footage of the body cam, the perspective shot 288 00:18:52,840 --> 00:18:55,960 Speaker 1: of his partner unpacking one of these Narcanon hailers from 289 00:18:55,960 --> 00:18:59,000 Speaker 1: the blister pack and then administering it to his buddy. Um. 290 00:18:59,119 --> 00:19:01,560 Speaker 1: Then he's loaded onto Guerney and it's almost literally one 291 00:19:01,600 --> 00:19:03,879 Speaker 1: of those like sitting up with the two thumbs up. 292 00:19:03,920 --> 00:19:07,640 Speaker 1: It's like thanks for saving me, pal um. And then 293 00:19:07,680 --> 00:19:10,040 Speaker 1: it's got stand ups, you know, like talking heads of 294 00:19:10,080 --> 00:19:12,479 Speaker 1: the officer or his partner. Uh. And I believe one 295 00:19:12,480 --> 00:19:15,600 Speaker 1: other representative of the San Diego Police Department. But the 296 00:19:15,720 --> 00:19:19,560 Speaker 1: officer unequivalently says I overdosed, and his partners saying and 297 00:19:19,600 --> 00:19:21,119 Speaker 1: his eyes rolled into the back of his head. He 298 00:19:21,160 --> 00:19:24,400 Speaker 1: was clearly overdosing all the way to the hospital. Um. 299 00:19:24,440 --> 00:19:26,919 Speaker 1: And they released this and the news ran it as fact, 300 00:19:27,119 --> 00:19:29,280 Speaker 1: like the local news. There's are several examples of this 301 00:19:29,359 --> 00:19:32,800 Speaker 1: being picked up and just run as fact because amidst 302 00:19:32,840 --> 00:19:35,679 Speaker 1: this kind of you know, climate of fear that I'm 303 00:19:35,720 --> 00:19:38,280 Speaker 1: talking about, a very real fear that should be real 304 00:19:38,760 --> 00:19:41,439 Speaker 1: around this substance. UM. It was. It's the kind of 305 00:19:41,440 --> 00:19:43,359 Speaker 1: thing where, of course you're gonna like not question this, 306 00:19:43,400 --> 00:19:45,040 Speaker 1: You're gonna you're gonna run it. You're gonna be like, 307 00:19:45,080 --> 00:19:46,800 Speaker 1: oh my god, it can you can. You can kill 308 00:19:46,840 --> 00:19:48,960 Speaker 1: you just by touching it, just by like looking at it, 309 00:19:49,040 --> 00:19:53,320 Speaker 1: you know. Um. And so then we have some folks 310 00:19:53,320 --> 00:19:55,760 Speaker 1: in the medical community coming out and saying, well, actually, 311 00:19:56,560 --> 00:20:01,240 Speaker 1: this isn't true at all. Um. You cannot overdose simply 312 00:20:01,320 --> 00:20:07,320 Speaker 1: by touching the substance. UM. It's just not biologically possible, 313 00:20:07,680 --> 00:20:10,159 Speaker 1: is what the experts are saying. So let's let's go 314 00:20:10,200 --> 00:20:12,520 Speaker 1: to the experts real quick. Before we do that, I 315 00:20:12,560 --> 00:20:14,760 Speaker 1: just want to say, this is really surprising to me. 316 00:20:14,840 --> 00:20:17,800 Speaker 1: And I think I fell victim to some of the 317 00:20:17,880 --> 00:20:21,200 Speaker 1: stories coming out about fentonyl and officers coming into contact 318 00:20:21,240 --> 00:20:23,679 Speaker 1: with it, not this particular one, but in the past, 319 00:20:23,720 --> 00:20:27,439 Speaker 1: other stories about an officer encountering fentanyl and getting it 320 00:20:27,480 --> 00:20:30,119 Speaker 1: on them and then needing narcan just in case. And 321 00:20:30,160 --> 00:20:32,240 Speaker 1: I think we even talked about it before. I think 322 00:20:32,280 --> 00:20:35,640 Speaker 1: we did too, Matt. I think we did too. And 323 00:20:35,640 --> 00:20:38,720 Speaker 1: and here's the thing. Um, they never released any toxicology 324 00:20:38,800 --> 00:20:42,240 Speaker 1: that the young man didn't die, the dude didn't die, um, 325 00:20:42,280 --> 00:20:45,200 Speaker 1: but they never actually confirmed that it was an overdose 326 00:20:45,240 --> 00:20:47,959 Speaker 1: with the hospital and the sheriff of the San Diego 327 00:20:47,960 --> 00:20:52,399 Speaker 1: Police Department admitted that he himself, not a doctor, is 328 00:20:52,440 --> 00:20:55,080 Speaker 1: the one who put this out to the public that 329 00:20:55,160 --> 00:20:58,280 Speaker 1: it was an overdose. And again, this video really is 330 00:20:58,359 --> 00:21:01,440 Speaker 1: what you would call a public serve announcement type video, 331 00:21:01,680 --> 00:21:03,840 Speaker 1: you know, or almost like a yeah, it's it's meant 332 00:21:03,840 --> 00:21:07,760 Speaker 1: to educate, but unfortunately it's just laced no pun intended 333 00:21:08,119 --> 00:21:12,639 Speaker 1: with within misinformation. And these experts they were talking about, 334 00:21:13,040 --> 00:21:15,240 Speaker 1: one of which is someone named Gretchen Bergman, who's the 335 00:21:15,240 --> 00:21:18,199 Speaker 1: executive director and co founder of an organization called a 336 00:21:18,240 --> 00:21:21,399 Speaker 1: New Path UM and a New path is meant to 337 00:21:21,440 --> 00:21:25,439 Speaker 1: reduce the stigma associated with drug abuse and disorders, to 338 00:21:25,520 --> 00:21:28,920 Speaker 1: treat it more like a psychological condition um that needs 339 00:21:28,960 --> 00:21:32,439 Speaker 1: to be treated therapeutically, rather than having people locked up. 340 00:21:33,000 --> 00:21:35,640 Speaker 1: And and she said, um, it just didn't feel right. 341 00:21:35,680 --> 00:21:38,640 Speaker 1: It didn't sound right. He had gloves on, But even 342 00:21:38,640 --> 00:21:41,159 Speaker 1: if he had gotten it on his skin, he would 343 00:21:41,200 --> 00:21:44,639 Speaker 1: have had to take his hand to his mouth or nose. 344 00:21:45,080 --> 00:21:49,199 Speaker 1: It doesn't seep into your pores um. And this is 345 00:21:49,359 --> 00:21:53,760 Speaker 1: backed up by numerous other medical professionals in various sources 346 00:21:53,880 --> 00:21:55,440 Speaker 1: that that we read or that that I read for this. 347 00:21:55,960 --> 00:21:58,840 Speaker 1: And you know, it's just interesting because the idea of 348 00:21:58,880 --> 00:22:01,800 Speaker 1: stigmatizing drug users is something that's always kind of gone 349 00:22:01,880 --> 00:22:03,959 Speaker 1: hand in hand with like the quote unquote war on drugs, 350 00:22:04,000 --> 00:22:08,399 Speaker 1: and you know the idea of mandatory minimums and treating 351 00:22:08,440 --> 00:22:11,199 Speaker 1: drug users as criminals rather than people that are in 352 00:22:11,240 --> 00:22:14,640 Speaker 1: need of counseling or you know, mental health issues right 353 00:22:14,760 --> 00:22:17,200 Speaker 1: or or are suffering for mental health issues. And that's 354 00:22:17,200 --> 00:22:19,600 Speaker 1: someone that Biden, as part of his campaign, was very 355 00:22:19,680 --> 00:22:21,960 Speaker 1: much about. You know, he's got a son that famously 356 00:22:21,960 --> 00:22:27,639 Speaker 1: struggled with drug addiction. UM. But apparently uh he is 357 00:22:27,680 --> 00:22:34,560 Speaker 1: also quietly done expanded legislation that does just that, imposes 358 00:22:34,560 --> 00:22:38,359 Speaker 1: mandatory minimums not on fentanyl itself, but on what's called 359 00:22:38,359 --> 00:22:40,800 Speaker 1: fentanyl analogs. And Matt, you hit the nail on the 360 00:22:40,840 --> 00:22:42,880 Speaker 1: head at the top of the segment. You were talking 361 00:22:42,880 --> 00:22:45,760 Speaker 1: about how many different flavors and styles and flavors is 362 00:22:45,800 --> 00:22:49,560 Speaker 1: some being joking, but you know different like slight variations 363 00:22:49,560 --> 00:22:53,240 Speaker 1: on the molecule that is fentonyl um that can be 364 00:22:53,280 --> 00:22:56,080 Speaker 1: considered fentyyl analogs. Uh. And you know, some of them 365 00:22:56,080 --> 00:22:59,200 Speaker 1: are way, way way stronger, and some of them are 366 00:22:59,280 --> 00:23:01,200 Speaker 1: completely and not qu us. Some of them are a 367 00:23:01,240 --> 00:23:08,200 Speaker 1: little weaker. But through this thing called class wide scheduling, UM, 368 00:23:08,320 --> 00:23:12,439 Speaker 1: they are all treated the same. And it essentially amounts to, 369 00:23:12,640 --> 00:23:15,000 Speaker 1: I read a really great article on the Marshall Project, 370 00:23:15,600 --> 00:23:20,639 Speaker 1: amounts to a similar treatment to what was done with 371 00:23:20,680 --> 00:23:26,520 Speaker 1: crack cocaine in the nineteen eighties versus powder cocaine. Essentially, 372 00:23:26,600 --> 00:23:29,200 Speaker 1: what was done with crack was crack was treated much 373 00:23:29,240 --> 00:23:31,840 Speaker 1: more harshly in terms of possession because it was seen 374 00:23:31,880 --> 00:23:34,399 Speaker 1: as this epidemic. But it was also I think we 375 00:23:34,680 --> 00:23:38,720 Speaker 1: could probably all agree seen as a way to harass 376 00:23:38,760 --> 00:23:43,160 Speaker 1: and jail and mess with members of minority communities, because 377 00:23:43,160 --> 00:23:45,919 Speaker 1: if there's more crack in minority communities and more powder 378 00:23:45,960 --> 00:23:50,320 Speaker 1: cocaine in affluent communities, well you're more likely to get 379 00:23:50,400 --> 00:23:54,600 Speaker 1: longer harsher sentences in minority communities. And you know, you 380 00:23:54,600 --> 00:23:57,919 Speaker 1: could argue the causation of that, but it seems to 381 00:23:57,960 --> 00:24:00,560 Speaker 1: me like it was done pretty conscious. And the same 382 00:24:00,600 --> 00:24:03,080 Speaker 1: thing is true with this when we're talking about drugs 383 00:24:03,160 --> 00:24:06,080 Speaker 1: laced with fentanyl. They can be laced with either fentanyl 384 00:24:06,160 --> 00:24:08,800 Speaker 1: proper fentanyl like you would get prescribed, you know, from 385 00:24:08,800 --> 00:24:11,359 Speaker 1: a doctor, which it is used to schedule to drug, 386 00:24:11,760 --> 00:24:15,520 Speaker 1: which means that it has high instances of addiction, but 387 00:24:15,600 --> 00:24:17,919 Speaker 1: also that it um is a drug that can be 388 00:24:18,000 --> 00:24:20,639 Speaker 1: used to treat It has like legitimate use to treat 389 00:24:21,119 --> 00:24:24,720 Speaker 1: conditions like cancer and pain from cancer. UM. But the 390 00:24:24,760 --> 00:24:30,760 Speaker 1: analogs MATT are actually receiving harsher penalties. So it requires 391 00:24:30,760 --> 00:24:34,640 Speaker 1: a much smaller amount of a fentanyl analog to be found, say, 392 00:24:34,720 --> 00:24:37,280 Speaker 1: laced inside of a batch of cocaine that someone is selling, 393 00:24:37,640 --> 00:24:40,960 Speaker 1: than actual fentanyl itself. And the argument is that this 394 00:24:41,040 --> 00:24:44,080 Speaker 1: is being done in a similar way targeting minority communities. 395 00:24:44,080 --> 00:24:46,639 Speaker 1: So what do you think? Uh, this is what I 396 00:24:46,640 --> 00:24:50,439 Speaker 1: would say. Very recently we started a show called Psychoactive 397 00:24:50,880 --> 00:24:54,840 Speaker 1: with host Ethan Nadalman, who founded the Drug Policy Alliance 398 00:24:55,280 --> 00:24:58,560 Speaker 1: and was the last week NOS. On August five, we 399 00:24:58,680 --> 00:25:03,560 Speaker 1: released an episode all about this, specifically about analogs of 400 00:25:03,640 --> 00:25:06,400 Speaker 1: fentanyl and what fentanyl is and why there are more 401 00:25:06,520 --> 00:25:12,959 Speaker 1: deaths from overdose than car accidents, gun shootings, drownings and 402 00:25:13,160 --> 00:25:16,040 Speaker 1: a couple other things combined, and just like why how 403 00:25:16,119 --> 00:25:18,520 Speaker 1: is that happening? Right? And it was all about this 404 00:25:18,880 --> 00:25:22,640 Speaker 1: specific thing, all of these different analogs because some of them, 405 00:25:23,440 --> 00:25:26,080 Speaker 1: at least from that interview, from to my understanding, it 406 00:25:26,160 --> 00:25:29,679 Speaker 1: has to do with the strength. Sometimes these analogs are 407 00:25:30,480 --> 00:25:33,879 Speaker 1: ten times more strong than regular fentanyl, which is already 408 00:25:33,960 --> 00:25:37,399 Speaker 1: like forty times more strong than heroin. Than some of 409 00:25:37,440 --> 00:25:40,720 Speaker 1: them are not as strong. But it's very difficult to 410 00:25:40,760 --> 00:25:43,480 Speaker 1: know what you're dealing with, especially if you're on the 411 00:25:43,600 --> 00:25:47,560 Speaker 1: user level. You have no idea, right unless the person 412 00:25:47,880 --> 00:25:50,639 Speaker 1: you're you know, whoever your dealer is, is a legit 413 00:25:50,720 --> 00:25:55,120 Speaker 1: chemist who's making the stuff, who can describe it perfectly 414 00:25:55,160 --> 00:25:57,919 Speaker 1: to you and you can understand it perfectly. It's a 415 00:25:58,040 --> 00:26:01,920 Speaker 1: dangerous situation, and I can see why. I can see 416 00:26:01,920 --> 00:26:05,800 Speaker 1: why maybe law enforcement would want to punish the use 417 00:26:05,840 --> 00:26:08,480 Speaker 1: of this stuff much much more because it is causing 418 00:26:08,840 --> 00:26:11,639 Speaker 1: so much death who you are, where you are. But 419 00:26:11,880 --> 00:26:17,840 Speaker 1: why wide treat the analog more harshly than the substance itself. Well, 420 00:26:18,680 --> 00:26:22,640 Speaker 1: it's it's hard. I can't recall this interview completely from Psychoactive, 421 00:26:22,720 --> 00:26:26,919 Speaker 1: but one of the major points is that the years 422 00:26:26,960 --> 00:26:30,320 Speaker 1: supply of fentanyl that comes from outside of the US, 423 00:26:30,800 --> 00:26:33,320 Speaker 1: if you imagine the shipping of shipping in of drugs, 424 00:26:33,640 --> 00:26:37,400 Speaker 1: there's all kinds of creative and weird ways that that 425 00:26:37,800 --> 00:26:41,000 Speaker 1: you know and other people do to get stuff in, right, 426 00:26:41,320 --> 00:26:43,600 Speaker 1: but also to reduce the weights and like have more 427 00:26:43,640 --> 00:26:46,000 Speaker 1: strength with less weight. One I I'm not going to 428 00:26:46,080 --> 00:26:47,560 Speaker 1: say it correctly. You have to listen to interview to 429 00:26:47,560 --> 00:26:51,600 Speaker 1: get it. But the the actual physical amount of fentanyl 430 00:26:51,640 --> 00:26:54,920 Speaker 1: that is in circulation in the United States in any 431 00:26:54,960 --> 00:26:59,679 Speaker 1: given year is very, very tiny. It was like to 432 00:26:59,680 --> 00:27:03,679 Speaker 1: to small whatever the units were with two tiny amounts. 433 00:27:03,680 --> 00:27:06,120 Speaker 1: Just talking about how difficult it is to police that, right, 434 00:27:06,320 --> 00:27:10,240 Speaker 1: if you imagine a smuggling operation when it's an analog, 435 00:27:10,800 --> 00:27:13,439 Speaker 1: I think it's I don't know, I really don't know. 436 00:27:13,520 --> 00:27:17,360 Speaker 1: I'm imagining if they're finding that it's being produced statewide somewhere, 437 00:27:17,600 --> 00:27:20,359 Speaker 1: you know, in some labs. I I this is all 438 00:27:20,359 --> 00:27:22,639 Speaker 1: speculation on my part because I have no idea. I 439 00:27:22,680 --> 00:27:24,639 Speaker 1: have no idea why they would treat the analogs that 440 00:27:24,680 --> 00:27:28,119 Speaker 1: differently besides the huge variance in effect. No, I'm totally 441 00:27:28,160 --> 00:27:31,640 Speaker 1: with you, and I think UM legislation that would target 442 00:27:32,080 --> 00:27:34,520 Speaker 1: the manufacturers and the folks that are actually bringing this 443 00:27:34,640 --> 00:27:38,080 Speaker 1: in makes a lot of sense. But ultimately, what this 444 00:27:38,200 --> 00:27:43,280 Speaker 1: legislation does is it punishes the street level dealers UM 445 00:27:43,520 --> 00:27:48,480 Speaker 1: without really you know, having much in place to find 446 00:27:48,520 --> 00:27:50,400 Speaker 1: the root. Cause maybe that's just because it's it's too 447 00:27:50,400 --> 00:27:52,840 Speaker 1: difficult because it is such a small amount. But there's 448 00:27:52,840 --> 00:27:55,080 Speaker 1: a there's an article about this dude, Todd Coleman, who 449 00:27:55,160 --> 00:27:58,240 Speaker 1: got sentenced to ten years in federal prison for selling 450 00:27:58,280 --> 00:28:01,600 Speaker 1: thirty grams of cocaine UM and the reason for that 451 00:28:01,760 --> 00:28:03,960 Speaker 1: is because the crime lab found that it was laced 452 00:28:03,960 --> 00:28:09,679 Speaker 1: with three illegal fentanyl analogs, one was benzel fentanyl UM, 453 00:28:09,800 --> 00:28:14,280 Speaker 1: and in fact they were incorrect. The prime lab made 454 00:28:14,280 --> 00:28:17,600 Speaker 1: a mistake. They none of the compounds were an a 455 00:28:17,680 --> 00:28:21,600 Speaker 1: fentanyl analog. Two of them weren't even controlled substances UM. 456 00:28:21,600 --> 00:28:24,280 Speaker 1: But the point is like, if they found this this 457 00:28:24,280 --> 00:28:28,720 Speaker 1: this fentanyl analog UM, it is a harsher penalty than 458 00:28:28,880 --> 00:28:32,840 Speaker 1: actual fentanyl UM. And we and that doesn't matter if 459 00:28:32,840 --> 00:28:35,520 Speaker 1: it's if it's one of the you know, molecules or 460 00:28:35,680 --> 00:28:38,840 Speaker 1: one of the variations that is absolutely innocuous, or if 461 00:28:38,840 --> 00:28:41,600 Speaker 1: it's something like car fentanyl, which is like I think 462 00:28:41,680 --> 00:28:45,680 Speaker 1: ten thousand times stronger than morphin um. So it's just 463 00:28:45,800 --> 00:28:48,160 Speaker 1: it's just interesting. And I'm not trying to be alarmist. 464 00:28:48,200 --> 00:28:51,640 Speaker 1: And I mean, the Marshall Project is a nonprofit journalism 465 00:28:52,000 --> 00:28:54,760 Speaker 1: organization that you know, deals with criminal justice stuff and 466 00:28:55,000 --> 00:28:57,479 Speaker 1: possibly is you know, has an agenda. But I do 467 00:28:57,520 --> 00:29:00,200 Speaker 1: think it's interesting that the way you can look got 468 00:29:00,240 --> 00:29:03,120 Speaker 1: it similar to like crack versus cocaine. I think it's 469 00:29:03,160 --> 00:29:05,280 Speaker 1: an interesting thing because you are going to be more 470 00:29:05,320 --> 00:29:09,560 Speaker 1: likely to find UM some of these these fenel fentyl 471 00:29:09,600 --> 00:29:13,800 Speaker 1: analog or some of these laced drugs in uh, you know, 472 00:29:14,160 --> 00:29:19,640 Speaker 1: minority communities, not minority communities, but maybe from minority dealers. 473 00:29:20,080 --> 00:29:22,040 Speaker 1: It's it's hard to say. Look, here's the rough thing 474 00:29:22,080 --> 00:29:26,880 Speaker 1: for me, man somebody I loved. Somebody there was a 475 00:29:26,920 --> 00:29:30,120 Speaker 1: fan of this show, was really close to me. Um 476 00:29:30,360 --> 00:29:34,600 Speaker 1: got sold by some street level dealer cocaine that had 477 00:29:34,640 --> 00:29:37,360 Speaker 1: fenel in it and he died. And if I could 478 00:29:37,360 --> 00:29:41,640 Speaker 1: find that person, I would I'm not gonna say I 479 00:29:41,640 --> 00:29:43,320 Speaker 1: I would love for that person to be in prison 480 00:29:43,480 --> 00:29:46,480 Speaker 1: so that I can't get to them. Um. What I'm 481 00:29:46,520 --> 00:29:53,080 Speaker 1: saying is I understand why law enforcement has that view 482 00:29:53,600 --> 00:29:59,840 Speaker 1: of like this per somebody selling fentinyl laced anything should 483 00:29:59,840 --> 00:30:03,000 Speaker 1: go away, but it won't ever stop the problem because 484 00:30:03,040 --> 00:30:05,160 Speaker 1: someone will always be there to fill the position if 485 00:30:05,360 --> 00:30:10,120 Speaker 1: persone goes to prison. Right. Um, So it's just it's 486 00:30:10,160 --> 00:30:13,280 Speaker 1: a it's a terrible situation. I don't even know how 487 00:30:13,320 --> 00:30:15,640 Speaker 1: to put it. Man, It's just it really is terrible. 488 00:30:15,760 --> 00:30:18,480 Speaker 1: If there's injustice, there's injustice, and it needs to be 489 00:30:18,520 --> 00:30:23,400 Speaker 1: taken care of. Just the substance itself is so dangerous. 490 00:30:23,760 --> 00:30:26,520 Speaker 1: It is. But it's also and let's also talk about 491 00:30:26,560 --> 00:30:28,960 Speaker 1: the fact that many of these analogs, it's all it's 492 00:30:28,960 --> 00:30:31,560 Speaker 1: all a game that these like black market labs are 493 00:30:31,600 --> 00:30:35,440 Speaker 1: playing to keep from being prosecuted. Because if you change 494 00:30:35,440 --> 00:30:38,520 Speaker 1: a molecule of something and make it something that's not 495 00:30:38,680 --> 00:30:44,120 Speaker 1: technically scheduled, then um, you are in fact shirking the 496 00:30:44,200 --> 00:30:47,520 Speaker 1: law a little bit. But you know, again Devil's advocate here, 497 00:30:47,560 --> 00:30:49,280 Speaker 1: I'm just trying to look at both sides. And there's 498 00:30:49,280 --> 00:30:52,280 Speaker 1: the crack cocaine, you know, um analogy, But then there's 499 00:30:52,320 --> 00:30:57,640 Speaker 1: also like, well, if you preschedule all fentonel analogs, even 500 00:30:57,680 --> 00:31:02,240 Speaker 1: ones that haven't been invented yet, then you are potentially 501 00:31:02,960 --> 00:31:07,760 Speaker 1: lowering the incentive for higher level manufacturers and dealers to 502 00:31:07,840 --> 00:31:10,800 Speaker 1: lace their stuff within in the first place. So that 503 00:31:10,840 --> 00:31:12,600 Speaker 1: could be seen as a as as a you know, 504 00:31:13,360 --> 00:31:16,000 Speaker 1: a positive version of this. But I also don't understand 505 00:31:16,080 --> 00:31:19,400 Speaker 1: why there's so many other things to lace your drugs with. 506 00:31:19,640 --> 00:31:23,160 Speaker 1: Why would you lace your drugs with something that will 507 00:31:23,200 --> 00:31:27,239 Speaker 1: literally kill your customers. I've never understood that you just 508 00:31:27,280 --> 00:31:32,720 Speaker 1: need so very little, right per whatever you're selling, per dose, 509 00:31:32,800 --> 00:31:35,680 Speaker 1: per use. So I mean, I think that's why it's 510 00:31:36,080 --> 00:31:37,800 Speaker 1: well I don't know, I'm not I'm not an expert, 511 00:31:37,800 --> 00:31:40,360 Speaker 1: but it certainly seems like that's why, because it's very 512 00:31:40,440 --> 00:31:43,720 Speaker 1: very strong and you need very very little. So let's 513 00:31:43,760 --> 00:31:47,120 Speaker 1: just say you could have pretty terrible cocaine, but a 514 00:31:47,160 --> 00:31:50,000 Speaker 1: little bit of fentyl goes a long way in that case. 515 00:31:50,200 --> 00:31:52,520 Speaker 1: I guess that's true. But it's also like, I mean, 516 00:31:53,080 --> 00:31:56,840 Speaker 1: fentanyl is a depressant and cocaine is a stimulants. Anyone 517 00:31:57,120 --> 00:31:59,960 Speaker 1: that anyone that thinks, oh my gosh, this this coke 518 00:32:00,040 --> 00:32:02,200 Speaker 1: cane is great because a little bit of fentonyl is 519 00:32:02,240 --> 00:32:05,240 Speaker 1: in it probably doesn't know what the effects of cocaine 520 00:32:05,280 --> 00:32:09,840 Speaker 1: feel like. Yeah, sure, like me, but but you know, 521 00:32:10,280 --> 00:32:13,720 Speaker 1: same with heroin's name, with whatever else people are buying 522 00:32:14,240 --> 00:32:18,520 Speaker 1: and using. It's just, uh, it's gross. And just to 523 00:32:18,640 --> 00:32:22,040 Speaker 1: wrap it up with a statistic, six of drug overdoses 524 00:32:22,080 --> 00:32:24,400 Speaker 1: last year could be attributed to fentil and I bet 525 00:32:24,480 --> 00:32:26,880 Speaker 1: you this year because of the pandemic and because of 526 00:32:26,920 --> 00:32:29,480 Speaker 1: maybe maybe it's maybe it has to do with um 527 00:32:29,600 --> 00:32:32,840 Speaker 1: interruptions and supply chains to matt you know, and then 528 00:32:32,840 --> 00:32:35,160 Speaker 1: things like that, and just feeling like or someone even 529 00:32:35,240 --> 00:32:39,840 Speaker 1: pointed out, maybe they're just trying to put another addictive 530 00:32:39,880 --> 00:32:42,960 Speaker 1: substance into something to make you more addicted to it, 531 00:32:43,480 --> 00:32:46,520 Speaker 1: even if you don't clock the difference and the effects, 532 00:32:46,600 --> 00:32:48,360 Speaker 1: you know what I mean. So that could be part 533 00:32:48,360 --> 00:32:49,880 Speaker 1: of it too. There's a lot of reasons and uh, 534 00:32:49,920 --> 00:32:52,520 Speaker 1: and these are evil people and absolutely should be put away. 535 00:32:52,560 --> 00:32:55,560 Speaker 1: But just then addition something to consider. It's weird, man, 536 00:32:55,600 --> 00:32:59,440 Speaker 1: It's weird because it's all just humans trying to experiment 537 00:32:59,480 --> 00:33:04,040 Speaker 1: and get through something. I don't know. There's so many Uh, 538 00:33:04,200 --> 00:33:07,760 Speaker 1: it's so complicated, you know, right, the use of drugs, 539 00:33:08,120 --> 00:33:10,320 Speaker 1: the selling of drugs. Why you would maybe feel like 540 00:33:10,360 --> 00:33:13,760 Speaker 1: you need to do that? Um, Why some people do 541 00:33:14,440 --> 00:33:17,320 Speaker 1: need to do that. Why governments take advantage of that, 542 00:33:17,520 --> 00:33:20,800 Speaker 1: Why you know, corrupt police departments take advantage of that. 543 00:33:21,320 --> 00:33:27,800 Speaker 1: Why cartel's form and hold power. It's just God, I 544 00:33:27,880 --> 00:33:31,520 Speaker 1: really don't like drugs. Sorry, guys, I promise I'm not. 545 00:33:31,720 --> 00:33:35,320 Speaker 1: I'm not some nark or police officer. I've just experienced 546 00:33:35,360 --> 00:33:38,600 Speaker 1: some negative things in my life I associated with them. 547 00:33:38,640 --> 00:33:41,880 Speaker 1: So it literally, yeah, you go ahead and do the 548 00:33:41,920 --> 00:33:45,440 Speaker 1: bingo thing because I just don't like it. Well, um, 549 00:33:45,480 --> 00:33:47,160 Speaker 1: there's a lot not to like. It's not what to 550 00:33:47,200 --> 00:33:49,520 Speaker 1: like for sure. And we are going to take a 551 00:33:49,560 --> 00:33:51,600 Speaker 1: quick pause now for a word from our sponsor, and 552 00:33:51,640 --> 00:34:00,800 Speaker 1: then we'll be back with today's last strange news. All right, 553 00:34:01,120 --> 00:34:05,480 Speaker 1: and we're back. We are jumping to a weird story. 554 00:34:05,480 --> 00:34:08,560 Speaker 1: It's strange news. I would call it strange news for sure. 555 00:34:09,280 --> 00:34:13,839 Speaker 1: It's a little bit stale, maybe because the original things 556 00:34:13,880 --> 00:34:17,719 Speaker 1: that occurred happened last year in November, and then we're 557 00:34:17,800 --> 00:34:22,680 Speaker 1: updated in June of this year. But the big news 558 00:34:22,719 --> 00:34:25,200 Speaker 1: is coming out right now, and I think we should 559 00:34:25,200 --> 00:34:27,960 Speaker 1: talk about it. Let's do it. Uh. This story has 560 00:34:28,000 --> 00:34:31,800 Speaker 1: to do with money people, people who manage budgets, people 561 00:34:31,840 --> 00:34:37,440 Speaker 1: who manage accounts, and what happens when someone with access 562 00:34:37,520 --> 00:34:44,120 Speaker 1: to the funnel of that cheese uh maybe funnel like 563 00:34:44,120 --> 00:34:48,839 Speaker 1: a cheese fountain, like at at Golden Corral. Really, yeah, 564 00:34:49,280 --> 00:34:53,319 Speaker 1: they have a thing the thing. Please continue, Okay, what 565 00:34:53,360 --> 00:34:56,840 Speaker 1: happens when somebody who has access to where that begins, 566 00:34:56,960 --> 00:34:59,719 Speaker 1: or at least uh an access point somewhere within the chain, 567 00:34:59,760 --> 00:35:02,840 Speaker 1: just I used to do something wrong? Well, here in 568 00:35:03,080 --> 00:35:07,480 Speaker 1: lies the story of Ralph boog Leasy, a fifty nine 569 00:35:07,520 --> 00:35:10,040 Speaker 1: year old man now today as we record this, who 570 00:35:10,080 --> 00:35:15,560 Speaker 1: was working for the University Medical Service Association Incorporated. That's 571 00:35:15,600 --> 00:35:18,279 Speaker 1: what he's working for. They are associated with the University 572 00:35:18,360 --> 00:35:22,520 Speaker 1: of South Florida, and he's one of these guys who's 573 00:35:22,640 --> 00:35:25,560 Speaker 1: kind of higher level manager on the money side of 574 00:35:25,600 --> 00:35:32,160 Speaker 1: this organization. He just pled guilty to embezzling twelve point 575 00:35:32,280 --> 00:35:37,759 Speaker 1: eight million dollars. Yeah, that's a huge that's a huge 576 00:35:37,800 --> 00:35:41,200 Speaker 1: amount of money to embezzle. Uh. You know, I always, 577 00:35:41,400 --> 00:35:44,440 Speaker 1: I always think back to a certain Mike Judge movie 578 00:35:44,480 --> 00:35:47,719 Speaker 1: when it comes to embezzling money, trying to take a 579 00:35:47,760 --> 00:35:50,440 Speaker 1: tiny bit of money off the top of every transaction 580 00:35:50,640 --> 00:35:54,360 Speaker 1: or something. Uh. In this case, it was very different. 581 00:35:54,960 --> 00:35:59,040 Speaker 1: In this case, Ralph was using company credit cards and 582 00:35:59,120 --> 00:36:04,440 Speaker 1: accounts to just make huge payments for things, payments that 583 00:36:04,560 --> 00:36:09,520 Speaker 1: were very odd in general. And what according to the 584 00:36:09,560 --> 00:36:13,319 Speaker 1: Tampa Bay Times, he would he would just try and 585 00:36:13,440 --> 00:36:17,240 Speaker 1: mask some of these payments and invoices for large sums 586 00:36:17,280 --> 00:36:20,200 Speaker 1: of money, and he got away with it for a 587 00:36:20,239 --> 00:36:24,160 Speaker 1: long time. Kind of weird. I'm trying to imagine. Just 588 00:36:24,200 --> 00:36:27,480 Speaker 1: to give an example, Nolan, Ben and I, as a 589 00:36:27,560 --> 00:36:31,800 Speaker 1: part of our duties, as you know, producers here, executive producers, 590 00:36:32,080 --> 00:36:36,239 Speaker 1: we have to do a thing where we cite invoices. 591 00:36:36,400 --> 00:36:38,239 Speaker 1: Right if we make a payment on behalf of the 592 00:36:38,239 --> 00:36:41,799 Speaker 1: company for some service, some good, some recording equipment, or 593 00:36:41,840 --> 00:36:44,720 Speaker 1: some studio time, we have to go through and report 594 00:36:44,800 --> 00:36:47,000 Speaker 1: exactly what that is. Give her a seat, you know, 595 00:36:47,120 --> 00:36:50,560 Speaker 1: give a reason for spending that money. Well, Ralph had 596 00:36:50,600 --> 00:36:52,280 Speaker 1: to do the same kind of thing, but the people 597 00:36:52,320 --> 00:36:55,080 Speaker 1: around him, the people you know who he reported to, 598 00:36:55,160 --> 00:37:01,080 Speaker 1: Apparently we're just not noticing or looking the other or 599 00:37:01,160 --> 00:37:03,560 Speaker 1: worse well, I mean, you know, as we know, being 600 00:37:03,640 --> 00:37:06,520 Speaker 1: part of a large organization like like we are. Uh, 601 00:37:06,560 --> 00:37:09,960 Speaker 1: this seemed to be a relatively small nonprofit corporation, I 602 00:37:10,000 --> 00:37:12,280 Speaker 1: mean comparatively be like hier Ratio is a massive company. 603 00:37:12,600 --> 00:37:17,120 Speaker 1: And uh, I think we've all, you know, to varying degrees, um, 604 00:37:17,440 --> 00:37:21,160 Speaker 1: been behind on those expense reports and usually only get 605 00:37:21,239 --> 00:37:24,480 Speaker 1: robo emails. Um. It's not like we have someone knocking 606 00:37:24,480 --> 00:37:26,800 Speaker 1: down our door saying, hey, where are those expense reports? 607 00:37:26,800 --> 00:37:29,759 Speaker 1: Where are those TPS reports? You know, nobody is really 608 00:37:29,800 --> 00:37:32,960 Speaker 1: doing that, So it's pretty common I think for things 609 00:37:33,040 --> 00:37:35,759 Speaker 1: like that to lapse. Uh, you know, And it's not 610 00:37:35,800 --> 00:37:38,080 Speaker 1: like anything that we're not reporting is because we're doing 611 00:37:38,120 --> 00:37:42,080 Speaker 1: anything to various Um, it's usually because we're just underwater 612 00:37:42,120 --> 00:37:43,719 Speaker 1: and haven't gotten a chance to get to it yet. 613 00:37:43,800 --> 00:37:46,440 Speaker 1: And it's usually very obvious based on what we're buying 614 00:37:46,920 --> 00:37:48,840 Speaker 1: and it's going to somebody. You know, it's not like 615 00:37:48,880 --> 00:37:51,440 Speaker 1: we're stockpiling this stuff. But Matt, this is not what 616 00:37:51,520 --> 00:37:53,239 Speaker 1: was happening with this story, and this stuff was going 617 00:37:53,400 --> 00:37:56,319 Speaker 1: to a very specific thing that seems like it would 618 00:37:56,320 --> 00:37:58,480 Speaker 1: have immediately raised the red flag if not just for 619 00:37:58,520 --> 00:38:03,680 Speaker 1: this reason alone. Well, agreed, agreed. Uh, we're not doing 620 00:38:03,680 --> 00:38:07,400 Speaker 1: anything wrong, and I'm just stressing that. But this, uh, 621 00:38:07,440 --> 00:38:10,560 Speaker 1: this guy was and it was going to a weird place, 622 00:38:10,640 --> 00:38:13,799 Speaker 1: going a couple of weird places. I'm gonna start on 623 00:38:14,000 --> 00:38:16,879 Speaker 1: the lower end the stuff that's reported later in all 624 00:38:16,880 --> 00:38:19,319 Speaker 1: the articles that you can read about this before we 625 00:38:19,360 --> 00:38:23,080 Speaker 1: get to the juicy thing. Noll If that's okay, it 626 00:38:23,080 --> 00:38:25,680 Speaker 1: didn't spoil it. This guy is accused, according to the 627 00:38:25,680 --> 00:38:30,720 Speaker 1: Tampa Bay Times, of making around six hundred fifty thousand 628 00:38:30,800 --> 00:38:34,480 Speaker 1: dollars in payments to an LLC that was owned by 629 00:38:34,560 --> 00:38:43,040 Speaker 1: himself and his wife. Um like personal travel. Liked dollars 630 00:38:43,040 --> 00:38:48,040 Speaker 1: in personal travel? Can you imagine traveling that much? I cannot, 631 00:38:48,400 --> 00:38:50,560 Speaker 1: and we travel a lot, and we know what those 632 00:38:50,600 --> 00:38:55,319 Speaker 1: bills about too, and they ain't nowhere near that. Yeah, 633 00:38:55,320 --> 00:38:58,640 Speaker 1: how how about this? A hundred and ninety thousand dollars 634 00:38:58,680 --> 00:39:01,719 Speaker 1: in rent payments? Trying to think of how much I've 635 00:39:01,719 --> 00:39:05,279 Speaker 1: paid in rent over the course of my life, and 636 00:39:05,280 --> 00:39:08,120 Speaker 1: it's a lot of houses, a lot of places that 637 00:39:08,160 --> 00:39:10,799 Speaker 1: I've rented. I don't think I get anywhere near that, 638 00:39:10,920 --> 00:39:13,160 Speaker 1: So I'm wondering. You know, there's no breaking down of 639 00:39:13,200 --> 00:39:16,520 Speaker 1: these numbers in these articles, but yes, in the corporate seedings, 640 00:39:16,560 --> 00:39:19,960 Speaker 1: I'm sure they're doing that. Um, A hundred and twenty 641 00:39:20,040 --> 00:39:24,359 Speaker 1: one dollars in house improvements. Oh no, how about this 642 00:39:24,800 --> 00:39:31,360 Speaker 1: twenty one grand in cell phone bills? Why? What? What 643 00:39:31,680 --> 00:39:33,520 Speaker 1: a cell phone bills? Like a hundred? I mean, I 644 00:39:33,520 --> 00:39:35,439 Speaker 1: have I pay for my and my mom's cell phone 645 00:39:35,480 --> 00:39:38,279 Speaker 1: bill and it's two a month. It's not a lot 646 00:39:38,400 --> 00:39:42,680 Speaker 1: less like, what could possibly what? What are you doing? Well, 647 00:39:42,680 --> 00:39:46,600 Speaker 1: I don't it's a lot of roaming. He also sent 648 00:39:46,640 --> 00:39:48,920 Speaker 1: a hundred dollars to his wife's pay Pal account, so 649 00:39:49,000 --> 00:39:52,120 Speaker 1: you know that was really the nail and the coffin there. 650 00:39:52,200 --> 00:39:54,279 Speaker 1: But no, let's let's jump to the main reason why 651 00:39:54,320 --> 00:39:58,360 Speaker 1: we're talking about this as strange news. This guy found 652 00:39:58,480 --> 00:40:01,319 Speaker 1: a way somehow, and I think this is one of 653 00:40:01,360 --> 00:40:05,719 Speaker 1: the one of the main cruxes of why he agreed, 654 00:40:05,760 --> 00:40:08,920 Speaker 1: why he's pleading guilty, why he signed the plea agreement. 655 00:40:08,960 --> 00:40:14,120 Speaker 1: Back in June, he was funneling money to a website 656 00:40:14,880 --> 00:40:19,720 Speaker 1: called my girl fund dot com. Now what we're gonna 657 00:40:19,719 --> 00:40:22,440 Speaker 1: talk about here. If anyone's listening and their their children 658 00:40:22,680 --> 00:40:28,040 Speaker 1: or younger people, maybe consider pausing or skipping forward. Um, 659 00:40:28,360 --> 00:40:30,920 Speaker 1: I'll just say before we go any further, this is 660 00:40:31,080 --> 00:40:35,360 Speaker 1: a This is an adult website for adult things that 661 00:40:35,440 --> 00:40:39,640 Speaker 1: we're going to discuss. Okay, Okay, well we'll continue. We're 662 00:40:39,640 --> 00:40:41,799 Speaker 1: talking like an only fans type sitch Man. We're talking 663 00:40:41,840 --> 00:40:44,840 Speaker 1: like porn hub premium, Like I just need any of 664 00:40:44,880 --> 00:40:47,399 Speaker 1: the details. It's say, it's like a cam site, if 665 00:40:47,440 --> 00:40:50,000 Speaker 1: that makes sense, but it's also an adult like chat 666 00:40:51,000 --> 00:40:54,000 Speaker 1: cam site. I don't chatter bait. Probably is it chatter bait? 667 00:40:54,120 --> 00:40:56,920 Speaker 1: Is that what it is? Clearly I'm a porn officially not. 668 00:40:57,000 --> 00:41:00,440 Speaker 1: I don't know what that Sorry, I'm sorry, really showing 669 00:41:00,520 --> 00:41:03,879 Speaker 1: my head here. Kids all right, we'll stop. The kids 670 00:41:03,880 --> 00:41:05,680 Speaker 1: are gone. What is chatter bait? I don't even know 671 00:41:05,680 --> 00:41:07,640 Speaker 1: what that is. It's a cam It's just a campsite. 672 00:41:07,680 --> 00:41:10,640 Speaker 1: It's a camp site that involves communication back and form. 673 00:41:10,800 --> 00:41:13,160 Speaker 1: I don't use it. I'm just I'm keyed in to 674 00:41:13,280 --> 00:41:15,239 Speaker 1: the Internet and the zeitgeist. You guys, I just know 675 00:41:15,280 --> 00:41:18,239 Speaker 1: about this stuff. But it's a yeah, it's something where 676 00:41:18,239 --> 00:41:21,360 Speaker 1: you can have you know, direct communication, you can give gifts, 677 00:41:21,400 --> 00:41:23,840 Speaker 1: you can give tips. You know, it's it's it involves 678 00:41:23,880 --> 00:41:26,880 Speaker 1: chatting directly and you can have you know, the performers 679 00:41:26,920 --> 00:41:30,080 Speaker 1: do certain things depending on how much you tip. So 680 00:41:30,400 --> 00:41:33,239 Speaker 1: point being is it's not a subscription service, and it 681 00:41:33,280 --> 00:41:35,560 Speaker 1: could be at all bets are off thing where if 682 00:41:35,560 --> 00:41:37,480 Speaker 1: you're really have a problem and you're in some sort 683 00:41:37,480 --> 00:41:41,640 Speaker 1: of like porn addiction rabbit hole, you could be dropping 684 00:41:41,800 --> 00:41:44,840 Speaker 1: mad cash on a particular performer of your choice. That 685 00:41:44,840 --> 00:41:48,920 Speaker 1: would be like outrageous. Well, you may think that that's 686 00:41:48,960 --> 00:41:51,480 Speaker 1: what Ralph was doing, but it seems like there's something 687 00:41:51,520 --> 00:41:56,040 Speaker 1: else at play as well. He according to the Tampa 688 00:41:56,040 --> 00:42:00,200 Speaker 1: Bay Times, uh we said twelve point eight six millionion 689 00:42:00,239 --> 00:42:03,640 Speaker 1: dollars in total that he embezzled. Well, eleven and a 690 00:42:03,680 --> 00:42:07,439 Speaker 1: half million of that went to my girl fund dot 691 00:42:07,480 --> 00:42:12,319 Speaker 1: com eleven and a half million dollars. And before you know, 692 00:42:12,400 --> 00:42:15,200 Speaker 1: you think, wow, this guy just was yeah, like you said, 693 00:42:15,280 --> 00:42:18,279 Speaker 1: really into a few people and gave them a lot 694 00:42:18,360 --> 00:42:22,799 Speaker 1: of money. Um, he was actually embezzling this money with 695 00:42:23,239 --> 00:42:26,880 Speaker 1: they think authorities think with the help of a family 696 00:42:27,920 --> 00:42:32,280 Speaker 1: or or a close family associate, let's say I believe 697 00:42:32,320 --> 00:42:37,440 Speaker 1: they said it was his step son's fiancee. They reportedly 698 00:42:37,520 --> 00:42:41,600 Speaker 1: found an Excel document that showed around seven hundred and 699 00:42:41,600 --> 00:42:46,000 Speaker 1: fifty thousand dollars in profits that they had made through 700 00:42:46,120 --> 00:42:50,480 Speaker 1: somehow giving money to this website and buying credits with 701 00:42:50,560 --> 00:42:53,000 Speaker 1: that money. Because it's like a they've got a credit 702 00:42:53,040 --> 00:42:56,239 Speaker 1: system where you use your your actual currency to buy 703 00:42:56,239 --> 00:42:59,240 Speaker 1: the credits, then you donate those credits to the person. 704 00:42:59,600 --> 00:43:02,080 Speaker 1: The pay age of the person, I guess is a laundering, 705 00:43:02,080 --> 00:43:04,319 Speaker 1: it's a cover up kind of kind of thing, or yeah, 706 00:43:04,440 --> 00:43:05,839 Speaker 1: it's it's this is That's why I want to talk 707 00:43:05,840 --> 00:43:08,040 Speaker 1: about it. It's really it's just something that I don't 708 00:43:08,040 --> 00:43:11,680 Speaker 1: have a full understanding of, but I'm interested in because 709 00:43:11,800 --> 00:43:14,359 Speaker 1: it reminds me of some of the scams you can 710 00:43:14,440 --> 00:43:18,080 Speaker 1: do with a gift card that you would buy from 711 00:43:18,120 --> 00:43:21,160 Speaker 1: somewhere and then you put money that's kind of ill 712 00:43:21,200 --> 00:43:24,480 Speaker 1: gotten onto a onto a card like that. Then you 713 00:43:24,520 --> 00:43:28,280 Speaker 1: can use that card or you can cash out that card. Um, 714 00:43:28,320 --> 00:43:30,560 Speaker 1: it's kind of like that, only they were funneling it 715 00:43:30,640 --> 00:43:34,880 Speaker 1: through this particular website. So whatever they did, because we 716 00:43:34,920 --> 00:43:38,120 Speaker 1: don't know exactly, we know that they were funneling tons 717 00:43:38,120 --> 00:43:41,160 Speaker 1: and tons of money through this website. The question is 718 00:43:41,760 --> 00:43:44,040 Speaker 1: whether or not the people who run the website and 719 00:43:44,080 --> 00:43:47,040 Speaker 1: the finances of the website had any idea it was happening, 720 00:43:47,080 --> 00:43:51,840 Speaker 1: because surely that was a large like those are large transactions, 721 00:43:51,880 --> 00:43:55,200 Speaker 1: I'm assuming, right, Or was it were just was it 722 00:43:55,280 --> 00:43:58,120 Speaker 1: just the two of them working together? How else were 723 00:43:58,160 --> 00:44:02,560 Speaker 1: they funneling this money through? This is what we have 724 00:44:02,840 --> 00:44:06,240 Speaker 1: from the u m s A. According to the Tampa 725 00:44:06,239 --> 00:44:10,200 Speaker 1: Bay Times, UM, this full the full report that was 726 00:44:10,239 --> 00:44:14,360 Speaker 1: generated found that the internal controls, you know, after all 727 00:44:14,400 --> 00:44:17,600 Speaker 1: of this stuff went down, right, uh, and several people 728 00:44:17,640 --> 00:44:21,000 Speaker 1: got fired, including Ralph. Ralph got fired his like an 729 00:44:21,000 --> 00:44:24,360 Speaker 1: auditor got fired, and another superior got fired. This is 730 00:44:24,360 --> 00:44:27,040 Speaker 1: what they found. Their controls for preventing fraud were week. 731 00:44:27,400 --> 00:44:31,640 Speaker 1: The university's internal audit team identified numerous transactions where he 732 00:44:31,680 --> 00:44:35,000 Speaker 1: was just processing entries in a way that concealed his actions. 733 00:44:35,719 --> 00:44:39,840 Speaker 1: And it says they have since quote implemented enhanced control structures, 734 00:44:40,040 --> 00:44:45,320 Speaker 1: including upgrading financial reporting systems to better protect against criminal acts. 735 00:44:46,680 --> 00:44:49,839 Speaker 1: Good good on them. I suppose that's great, right after 736 00:44:49,920 --> 00:44:53,319 Speaker 1: a couple of you know, twelve dozen million dollars, Uh, 737 00:44:53,480 --> 00:44:55,680 Speaker 1: just goes out the door. I just feel like, I mean, 738 00:44:55,800 --> 00:44:58,520 Speaker 1: my credit card company cuts me off if I spend 739 00:44:58,760 --> 00:45:01,799 Speaker 1: too much money like a state, Like, how are there 740 00:45:01,840 --> 00:45:05,440 Speaker 1: not like obvious like red flag you know, like algorithms 741 00:45:05,480 --> 00:45:08,200 Speaker 1: built into these massive financial kind you know, I mean 742 00:45:08,320 --> 00:45:09,960 Speaker 1: he's saying with the I heart. Like for example, like 743 00:45:10,000 --> 00:45:12,239 Speaker 1: we we have corporate cards that we have to use sometimes, 744 00:45:12,800 --> 00:45:15,160 Speaker 1: and we were just at a conference and I had 745 00:45:15,200 --> 00:45:17,400 Speaker 1: to pay for a bunch of hotel rooms for other people. 746 00:45:17,840 --> 00:45:20,680 Speaker 1: I got a red flag email from you know, our 747 00:45:20,680 --> 00:45:23,680 Speaker 1: finance department. Uh, I think it was auto generated, and 748 00:45:23,719 --> 00:45:26,400 Speaker 1: then it was forwarded to me by an actual human 749 00:45:26,800 --> 00:45:29,919 Speaker 1: making sure that these charges were legit, and I said, yes, 750 00:45:29,920 --> 00:45:33,120 Speaker 1: they're legit. But it was me, the potential fraud ster 751 00:45:33,520 --> 00:45:37,120 Speaker 1: that was saying, yes, these charges are legit, uh, for reasons. 752 00:45:37,320 --> 00:45:39,080 Speaker 1: So I suppose if that same thing happened with our 753 00:45:39,120 --> 00:45:41,440 Speaker 1: guy here, it could have been a similar situation. But 754 00:45:42,120 --> 00:45:45,120 Speaker 1: it just all of these just seems so suspicious, every 755 00:45:45,160 --> 00:45:48,120 Speaker 1: single one. Yeah, it's it's some weird stuff. And we're 756 00:45:48,160 --> 00:45:51,080 Speaker 1: not even going into all the details here, but I'm 757 00:45:51,120 --> 00:45:54,880 Speaker 1: gonna read you, uh this last thing, which is, so 758 00:45:54,880 --> 00:45:56,920 Speaker 1: where did this money come from? He's working for a 759 00:45:56,960 --> 00:46:02,280 Speaker 1: nonprofit associated with the Universe City of South Florida. They 760 00:46:02,320 --> 00:46:06,200 Speaker 1: they seem to be involved, at least from my understanding, 761 00:46:06,600 --> 00:46:11,279 Speaker 1: with staffing. So staffing a lot of the organization's needs. Um, 762 00:46:11,719 --> 00:46:15,400 Speaker 1: there's medical really big medical schools there, it says a 763 00:46:15,520 --> 00:46:18,359 Speaker 1: corney of this article. The stolen money quote came from 764 00:46:18,400 --> 00:46:22,840 Speaker 1: the funds generated by patient care and just wait for it, 765 00:46:23,080 --> 00:46:27,520 Speaker 1: no state philanthropic grant or research money was impacted. So, 766 00:46:27,760 --> 00:46:32,200 Speaker 1: you know, just the money that patients were going in 767 00:46:32,320 --> 00:46:36,520 Speaker 1: for procedures and for healthcare, that's all they was stolen. 768 00:46:37,520 --> 00:46:41,400 Speaker 1: Uh But I guess from the company's standpoint, that means 769 00:46:42,160 --> 00:46:44,600 Speaker 1: that's basically their profits. It's not the you know, the 770 00:46:44,680 --> 00:46:47,600 Speaker 1: money they were holding for any other major reason. Freaking 771 00:46:47,600 --> 00:46:52,600 Speaker 1: wild dude, really weird stuff. What's the stuff they don't 772 00:46:52,600 --> 00:46:55,200 Speaker 1: want you to know? Well, there are a lot of 773 00:46:55,200 --> 00:47:00,200 Speaker 1: people who are somewhat connected to the financial process is 774 00:47:00,239 --> 00:47:04,279 Speaker 1: of companies across the world, And it makes me wonder 775 00:47:04,360 --> 00:47:06,839 Speaker 1: how much of this stuff is happening on what kind 776 00:47:06,880 --> 00:47:11,000 Speaker 1: of scale? Right? Is it really tiny stuff? Are we 777 00:47:11,080 --> 00:47:14,160 Speaker 1: are we thinking office space level here or are we 778 00:47:14,239 --> 00:47:20,080 Speaker 1: thinking what the office space guys actually did accidentally right, 779 00:47:20,200 --> 00:47:22,759 Speaker 1: it stole millions and millions of dollars. It would be 780 00:47:22,800 --> 00:47:25,160 Speaker 1: really cool to know if you've ever heard of anything 781 00:47:25,239 --> 00:47:28,640 Speaker 1: like this, if you've got an interesting account of something 782 00:47:28,680 --> 00:47:31,880 Speaker 1: like this occurring, or maybe even an historical example, we 783 00:47:31,920 --> 00:47:34,160 Speaker 1: would love to hear from you. Yes, And we'd also 784 00:47:34,160 --> 00:47:36,279 Speaker 1: love to hear from you about your thoughts on the 785 00:47:36,320 --> 00:47:40,040 Speaker 1: treatment of fentanyl and fentanyl analogs and of you know, 786 00:47:40,080 --> 00:47:42,640 Speaker 1: whether you think UM doing these kind of stunts well 787 00:47:42,719 --> 00:47:45,359 Speaker 1: intentioned or not, that the San Diego Police Department did 788 00:47:45,880 --> 00:47:49,120 Speaker 1: um is a good idea or what Please write to us. 789 00:47:49,320 --> 00:47:51,240 Speaker 1: You can find us online at all of the usual 790 00:47:51,320 --> 00:47:54,400 Speaker 1: social media spots of note. Yes, you can find us 791 00:47:54,440 --> 00:47:59,040 Speaker 1: on Twitter and Facebook. We are conspiracy stuff. Also on YouTube, 792 00:47:59,239 --> 00:48:03,279 Speaker 1: conspiracy stuff on Instagram, were conspiracy stuff show? Oh hey, 793 00:48:03,480 --> 00:48:06,120 Speaker 1: And by the way, if you know anything about hermit 794 00:48:06,200 --> 00:48:10,520 Speaker 1: crabs and other crustaceans and the whole thing with oceanic 795 00:48:10,560 --> 00:48:13,920 Speaker 1: plastic waste that Ben was talking about, we definitely want 796 00:48:13,920 --> 00:48:16,440 Speaker 1: to hear from you two, So don't forget that part. Please. 797 00:48:17,120 --> 00:48:19,080 Speaker 1: If you don't want to find us on social media 798 00:48:19,040 --> 00:48:20,920 Speaker 1: and you don't like the stuff, we do have a 799 00:48:20,960 --> 00:48:23,840 Speaker 1: phone number, that's right. It's one s t d w 800 00:48:24,200 --> 00:48:26,840 Speaker 1: y t K. You got three minutes to leave a message. 801 00:48:27,160 --> 00:48:29,200 Speaker 1: Please let us know what to call you. Give yourself 802 00:48:29,239 --> 00:48:31,719 Speaker 1: a nickname, we can call you anonymous, whatever you want 803 00:48:32,239 --> 00:48:33,759 Speaker 1: um and try to stay to that three minutes and 804 00:48:33,800 --> 00:48:36,240 Speaker 1: we will potentially use it on one of our weekly 805 00:48:36,360 --> 00:48:39,479 Speaker 1: listener mail episodes. Yes, yes, yes, And if you don't 806 00:48:39,480 --> 00:48:41,600 Speaker 1: want to do any of that stuff, but you still 807 00:48:41,640 --> 00:48:44,319 Speaker 1: want to contact us, please send us a good old 808 00:48:44,320 --> 00:49:05,320 Speaker 1: fashioned email. We are conspiracy at iHeart radio dot com. Yeah. 809 00:49:06,560 --> 00:49:08,640 Speaker 1: Stuff they don't want you to know. Is a production 810 00:49:08,719 --> 00:49:11,800 Speaker 1: of I heart Radio. For more podcasts from my heart Radio, 811 00:49:11,960 --> 00:49:14,800 Speaker 1: visit the i heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever 812 00:49:14,880 --> 00:49:16,160 Speaker 1: you listen to your favorite shows.