1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:04,720 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is 2 00:00:04,800 --> 00:00:09,119 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,200 --> 00:00:12,079 Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A 4 00:00:12,240 --> 00:00:25,200 Speaker 1: production of I Heart Radio. Welcome back to the show. 5 00:00:25,239 --> 00:00:27,840 Speaker 1: My name is Matt, my name is Noel. They call 6 00:00:27,920 --> 00:00:31,040 Speaker 1: me Ben. We're joining with our guest super producer, Max 7 00:00:31,480 --> 00:00:35,200 Speaker 1: Gerking Williams. Most importantly, you are you. You are here, 8 00:00:35,240 --> 00:00:37,879 Speaker 1: and that makes this the stuff they don't want you 9 00:00:37,960 --> 00:00:42,120 Speaker 1: to know. Last week we gave a sneak peak of 10 00:00:42,159 --> 00:00:46,360 Speaker 1: our audio book. You can hear part of an entire 11 00:00:46,520 --> 00:00:51,920 Speaker 1: chapter for free with three mystery missing minutes. But now 12 00:00:52,200 --> 00:00:54,560 Speaker 1: this Thursday, we are back with one of our favorite 13 00:00:54,600 --> 00:00:57,520 Speaker 1: segments in the show, listener Mail, where we get to 14 00:00:57,560 --> 00:01:02,880 Speaker 1: hear from you, our fellow Can you're se realist? Just 15 00:01:02,920 --> 00:01:07,240 Speaker 1: gonna be candid here, folks? Uh, it's this is gonna 16 00:01:07,280 --> 00:01:09,720 Speaker 1: be a little bit of a punchy one. I don't 17 00:01:09,720 --> 00:01:11,600 Speaker 1: know about you guys as far as a quick check 18 00:01:11,640 --> 00:01:13,800 Speaker 1: in which we usually do before we go on air, 19 00:01:13,959 --> 00:01:18,039 Speaker 1: but uh, whof I am I'm feeling it today? How 20 00:01:18,040 --> 00:01:20,240 Speaker 1: about you guys? Feeling good? Feeling great? How are you? 21 00:01:20,800 --> 00:01:23,640 Speaker 1: I'm feeling the joy feeling the love, feeling the pain, 22 00:01:24,080 --> 00:01:26,800 Speaker 1: trying to be open to all the fields. Doing good yes? 23 00:01:26,840 --> 00:01:33,600 Speaker 1: Seen Uh yeah, feeling feeling good, doing good? Yes? Isn't 24 00:01:33,600 --> 00:01:37,720 Speaker 1: that from most same bay? Yeah? Oh you know what, 25 00:01:37,800 --> 00:01:40,160 Speaker 1: it's such an old phrase. No, I think you're right. 26 00:01:40,240 --> 00:01:44,280 Speaker 1: I think you're right, formerly known as most death. Uh. Yes, 27 00:01:44,360 --> 00:01:48,400 Speaker 1: So we're gonna we're gonna ask ourselves, uh what is 28 00:01:48,440 --> 00:01:53,840 Speaker 1: a fact? We're gonna talk about a meta conspiracy on 29 00:01:53,880 --> 00:01:55,880 Speaker 1: the part of the powers that be, which I think 30 00:01:55,920 --> 00:01:59,320 Speaker 1: will be apropos to many of us listening along today 31 00:01:59,360 --> 00:02:03,800 Speaker 1: at home. But maybe first we start with something that 32 00:02:03,840 --> 00:02:08,000 Speaker 1: I think really really stood out to you, Matt Uh, 33 00:02:08,200 --> 00:02:10,639 Speaker 1: something you had asked me about this off air if 34 00:02:10,639 --> 00:02:13,080 Speaker 1: I had heard of this thing, and I and I 35 00:02:13,160 --> 00:02:15,799 Speaker 1: had and we have one of those lovely conversations where 36 00:02:15,800 --> 00:02:18,359 Speaker 1: it gets to the point that we have to stop 37 00:02:18,360 --> 00:02:21,760 Speaker 1: and say, dang, we should be recording this. I feel like, 38 00:02:21,840 --> 00:02:23,960 Speaker 1: never once have I brought something to your attention, Ben, 39 00:02:24,000 --> 00:02:26,600 Speaker 1: then you have not heard of it. I swear, Uh. 40 00:02:27,080 --> 00:02:31,600 Speaker 1: I can't surprise you with anything, Bolan. That's okay. Here 41 00:02:31,639 --> 00:02:35,239 Speaker 1: we go, guys, this is a message from Chief. Hey, guys, 42 00:02:35,520 --> 00:02:37,639 Speaker 1: so I was watching the news of the night and 43 00:02:37,680 --> 00:02:40,400 Speaker 1: I came across the story that mentioned a company by 44 00:02:40,400 --> 00:02:43,920 Speaker 1: the name of shot Spotter. I'm not sure if you 45 00:02:43,919 --> 00:02:45,800 Speaker 1: guys have heard about this company before, but what they 46 00:02:45,840 --> 00:02:51,200 Speaker 1: do is they place microphones microphones per square mile in 47 00:02:51,240 --> 00:02:56,480 Speaker 1: a city with the intent of identifying locating gun shots. 48 00:02:57,160 --> 00:03:00,680 Speaker 1: My worry is who has access to those microphones and 49 00:03:00,720 --> 00:03:04,320 Speaker 1: what are they listening to when there are no gun 50 00:03:04,360 --> 00:03:06,680 Speaker 1: shots trying to report by the A t ou. It's 51 00:03:06,680 --> 00:03:09,640 Speaker 1: pretty interesting figure. You guys be interested in it because 52 00:03:09,760 --> 00:03:15,360 Speaker 1: it raises some pretty interesting privacy questions. Um, look out, 53 00:03:15,880 --> 00:03:20,440 Speaker 1: security state, police state already here, not incoming. You guys 54 00:03:20,480 --> 00:03:23,280 Speaker 1: have a great day once again. UM, feel free to 55 00:03:23,320 --> 00:03:26,600 Speaker 1: do with this what you will. Cheep out, man, this 56 00:03:26,720 --> 00:03:28,640 Speaker 1: really rings a bell. I almost think I've heard about 57 00:03:28,639 --> 00:03:32,799 Speaker 1: it on my my weird ring doorbell opted in automatically 58 00:03:32,919 --> 00:03:38,360 Speaker 1: neighborhood report. Um, I don't actually make a lot of 59 00:03:38,400 --> 00:03:46,880 Speaker 1: sense because shot Spotter, if anything, is an integrated system. 60 00:03:46,920 --> 00:03:49,480 Speaker 1: That's what it's designed to do. Work with all the 61 00:03:49,520 --> 00:03:55,400 Speaker 1: other stuff that's already in place. Yeah, it's leveraging existing infrastructure. 62 00:03:55,520 --> 00:03:59,640 Speaker 1: It wants to be kind of bundled with every other 63 00:03:59,720 --> 00:04:04,560 Speaker 1: po stable. Uh, surveillance tool used by law enforcement, and 64 00:04:04,600 --> 00:04:09,600 Speaker 1: then of course private entities, private companies. Uh. The surprising 65 00:04:09,640 --> 00:04:13,480 Speaker 1: thing here is, you know they've been around in the 66 00:04:13,560 --> 00:04:17,919 Speaker 1: background for quite some time. I think they started in 67 00:04:17,960 --> 00:04:22,080 Speaker 1: the nineties, which might surprise a lot of people. Um, Matt, 68 00:04:22,160 --> 00:04:27,840 Speaker 1: how would you describe the system overall? Do you think 69 00:04:27,880 --> 00:04:30,960 Speaker 1: people are happy with it? Do you think it effectively 70 00:04:31,080 --> 00:04:34,640 Speaker 1: triangulates these sounds? Do you think it saves lives? Well, 71 00:04:34,680 --> 00:04:38,799 Speaker 1: the the tech is super cool. Let's start there. The 72 00:04:38,880 --> 00:04:42,080 Speaker 1: chief describes it really well, a bunch of microphones that 73 00:04:42,080 --> 00:04:46,000 Speaker 1: are concentrated within a square mile, right, and often there 74 00:04:46,000 --> 00:04:48,720 Speaker 1: are multiple square miles that have the system in place. 75 00:04:49,360 --> 00:04:52,760 Speaker 1: And then that means you've got I don't know, I mean, 76 00:04:52,760 --> 00:04:56,280 Speaker 1: think about how many mikes that is, guys, microphones per 77 00:04:56,320 --> 00:04:59,240 Speaker 1: square mile. Then let's say, how you know, if you 78 00:04:59,240 --> 00:05:02,400 Speaker 1: think about how big Atlanta is, maybe a certain sector 79 00:05:02,440 --> 00:05:09,040 Speaker 1: of Atlanta, let's just say midtown Atlanta where our office is. Um, 80 00:05:09,120 --> 00:05:12,839 Speaker 1: that's several square miles. Now, if a gun shot occurs 81 00:05:12,920 --> 00:05:16,520 Speaker 1: anywhere in within that grid system, each one of those 82 00:05:16,560 --> 00:05:18,840 Speaker 1: microphones is going to pick it up. Because of the 83 00:05:18,920 --> 00:05:22,880 Speaker 1: nature of the loudness of a gun shot and just 84 00:05:23,120 --> 00:05:26,680 Speaker 1: like triangulation the way it works with GPS. If you've 85 00:05:26,680 --> 00:05:30,400 Speaker 1: got one device and it can get pained by three 86 00:05:30,760 --> 00:05:35,000 Speaker 1: different places, are three different um cell phone towers, you 87 00:05:35,040 --> 00:05:37,960 Speaker 1: can tell where that device is by measuring the distance 88 00:05:37,960 --> 00:05:41,840 Speaker 1: from tower A, the distance tower being distance tower C right, 89 00:05:42,080 --> 00:05:44,720 Speaker 1: so you can figure out exactly where that device is 90 00:05:44,800 --> 00:05:49,640 Speaker 1: in space and time. Similarly, with these microphones or they 91 00:05:49,680 --> 00:05:53,560 Speaker 1: call him acoustic sensing devices, I think, uh, you can 92 00:05:53,600 --> 00:05:58,880 Speaker 1: triangulate a shots fired. Uh, that's really cool. I think 93 00:05:58,920 --> 00:06:02,920 Speaker 1: that's neat that can do that. Um. It's all about 94 00:06:02,920 --> 00:06:05,240 Speaker 1: the application of what are you using it for, And 95 00:06:05,279 --> 00:06:07,000 Speaker 1: in this case, it seems like it's being used for 96 00:06:07,040 --> 00:06:10,080 Speaker 1: a really good thing. Detect when shots have been fired, 97 00:06:10,440 --> 00:06:15,479 Speaker 1: so that first responders, right, you're talking fire, you're talking ambulance, 98 00:06:15,800 --> 00:06:18,680 Speaker 1: even police can show up to that place where shots 99 00:06:18,680 --> 00:06:21,080 Speaker 1: were fired and hopefully help somebody who has been a 100 00:06:21,120 --> 00:06:25,240 Speaker 1: victim of a gunshot if that's the case, or too. 101 00:06:25,560 --> 00:06:28,000 Speaker 1: And this is the big selling point for shot Sparter. 102 00:06:28,080 --> 00:06:33,160 Speaker 1: You guys to recover ballistics, so recover the shell casings 103 00:06:33,920 --> 00:06:36,560 Speaker 1: for a crime that's been committed, i e. Shooting a 104 00:06:36,600 --> 00:06:40,599 Speaker 1: gun in a city. I gotta say yes, Uh, fully 105 00:06:40,640 --> 00:06:44,760 Speaker 1: agree with you about the potential there to save lives 106 00:06:44,920 --> 00:06:49,800 Speaker 1: or to bring justice to victims of a crime. However, 107 00:06:50,160 --> 00:06:56,400 Speaker 1: one of the issues is that UH shot Spotter doesn't 108 00:06:56,600 --> 00:07:01,320 Speaker 1: leave this location just to the tech not leg Apparently 109 00:07:01,560 --> 00:07:05,159 Speaker 1: they also have modified alerts at the request of local 110 00:07:05,240 --> 00:07:13,120 Speaker 1: law enforcement, and their calculations have not been independently tested 111 00:07:13,160 --> 00:07:17,360 Speaker 1: at least as of one. So there there are opportunities 112 00:07:17,960 --> 00:07:22,960 Speaker 1: for some nefarious things to occur or some certainly not 113 00:07:23,120 --> 00:07:26,200 Speaker 1: above board things to occur. What I see not above 114 00:07:26,240 --> 00:07:29,160 Speaker 1: board blowboard things to occur. It sounds like it was 115 00:07:29,720 --> 00:07:32,520 Speaker 1: some distance from the board. Uh. You know. Another thing too, 116 00:07:32,600 --> 00:07:34,440 Speaker 1: is a lot of maybe not a lot, but some 117 00:07:34,480 --> 00:07:37,080 Speaker 1: other cities like Chicago that if you've used the technology 118 00:07:37,120 --> 00:07:39,480 Speaker 1: of UH not renewed it because they said they didn't 119 00:07:39,520 --> 00:07:42,240 Speaker 1: really have the data to back up that it was successful. 120 00:07:42,440 --> 00:07:44,200 Speaker 1: And you know, I was gonna sort of make a 121 00:07:44,240 --> 00:07:47,040 Speaker 1: callous bit of a callous point where it's like, isn't 122 00:07:47,760 --> 00:07:50,440 Speaker 1: you know hearing like going to the the idea of 123 00:07:50,480 --> 00:07:52,720 Speaker 1: its saving lives, going to the area of the gunshots 124 00:07:52,760 --> 00:07:54,400 Speaker 1: after the gunches have been fire, and sort of like 125 00:07:54,400 --> 00:07:56,600 Speaker 1: getting an Instagram add for buying a boat after you've 126 00:07:56,600 --> 00:07:59,280 Speaker 1: already just bought a boat, like, you're not going to 127 00:07:59,360 --> 00:08:01,560 Speaker 1: save the life because the life has already been taken, 128 00:08:01,600 --> 00:08:04,720 Speaker 1: presumably or attempted to have been taken. So you're identifying 129 00:08:04,800 --> 00:08:09,040 Speaker 1: areas of of problematic you know, behavior and stuff. And 130 00:08:09,040 --> 00:08:11,320 Speaker 1: then yes, I agree with you about the the crime 131 00:08:11,400 --> 00:08:14,680 Speaker 1: solving aspect because I think one point that that a 132 00:08:14,960 --> 00:08:18,560 Speaker 1: spokesperson for the either the police, uh force or the 133 00:08:18,560 --> 00:08:21,720 Speaker 1: company made was that people in certain neighborhoods that are 134 00:08:21,760 --> 00:08:24,200 Speaker 1: high crime have become desensitized to gunfire and don't even 135 00:08:24,200 --> 00:08:27,360 Speaker 1: call the police anymore. Well, yeah, okay, so there's a 136 00:08:27,400 --> 00:08:29,960 Speaker 1: lot there too to respond to. The first thing is 137 00:08:30,040 --> 00:08:36,160 Speaker 1: the alerting police when shots have been fired. Where I 138 00:08:36,280 --> 00:08:39,360 Speaker 1: lived for a long time in Shambly, Georgia, there was 139 00:08:40,240 --> 00:08:43,880 Speaker 1: pretty constant gunfire. You would hear shots fired a lot, 140 00:08:44,240 --> 00:08:47,160 Speaker 1: but you would also hear fireworks going off at times 141 00:08:47,200 --> 00:08:50,040 Speaker 1: when you wouldn't expect to hear fireworks going off, and 142 00:08:50,080 --> 00:08:52,760 Speaker 1: it was very different. It was very difficult for me, 143 00:08:52,920 --> 00:08:55,959 Speaker 1: as just a regular old citizen who does hear both 144 00:08:56,000 --> 00:08:59,560 Speaker 1: of those sounds quite often, to differentiate between you know, 145 00:08:59,640 --> 00:09:02,520 Speaker 1: what are what's a series of fireworks then what actually 146 00:09:02,720 --> 00:09:05,360 Speaker 1: was a ten round clip that just got unloaded, and 147 00:09:05,440 --> 00:09:08,760 Speaker 1: often it did. But I never once called the police 148 00:09:08,760 --> 00:09:11,120 Speaker 1: to say, hey, shots have been fired somewhere near me 149 00:09:11,800 --> 00:09:14,600 Speaker 1: in this part of Shambly, Georgia. Never once did I 150 00:09:14,640 --> 00:09:17,240 Speaker 1: do that. And what they're saying with shots fired is 151 00:09:17,280 --> 00:09:20,960 Speaker 1: you don't need anybody to report shots fired. Their system 152 00:09:21,080 --> 00:09:25,679 Speaker 1: detext when a gun is fired and and so like, 153 00:09:25,720 --> 00:09:27,960 Speaker 1: you literally don't need anyone to report it, which is 154 00:09:27,960 --> 00:09:31,160 Speaker 1: a really good thing. But it's also a really bad thing, 155 00:09:31,760 --> 00:09:36,040 Speaker 1: right because now you've got an automated system that is 156 00:09:36,120 --> 00:09:41,920 Speaker 1: reporting things like that and sending police officers theoretically to 157 00:09:42,200 --> 00:09:45,280 Speaker 1: a very specific location within I think it's less than 158 00:09:45,360 --> 00:09:49,080 Speaker 1: ninety feet, like a ninety ft radio ninety ft radius 159 00:09:49,080 --> 00:09:53,400 Speaker 1: of where this shot was fired, which is impressive. You know. 160 00:09:54,480 --> 00:09:58,360 Speaker 1: It's definitely a helpful thing, has the potential to be. 161 00:09:58,520 --> 00:10:02,280 Speaker 1: So it has been used, I believe, in many many 162 00:10:02,320 --> 00:10:05,760 Speaker 1: court cases by this point, because again, the nineteen nineties 163 00:10:06,360 --> 00:10:11,560 Speaker 1: pretty long time ago, right, We're talking thirty two years ago. Uh, 164 00:10:11,640 --> 00:10:14,080 Speaker 1: so we must assume that they have been working on 165 00:10:14,120 --> 00:10:17,320 Speaker 1: this technology for the entirety of that time, right, They've 166 00:10:17,320 --> 00:10:21,520 Speaker 1: been improving it, hopefully, uh getting it down to that 167 00:10:21,640 --> 00:10:27,720 Speaker 1: impressive nine radius nine ft radius. Rather Um, but my question, 168 00:10:27,960 --> 00:10:32,560 Speaker 1: Matt is I feel like any question. I know you 169 00:10:32,640 --> 00:10:35,160 Speaker 1: can already anticipate it. We're so on the same page 170 00:10:35,160 --> 00:10:40,200 Speaker 1: about this, Uh, surveillance chief. You brought this up. I 171 00:10:40,240 --> 00:10:43,280 Speaker 1: love how I love how you said it's not incoming. 172 00:10:43,440 --> 00:10:46,360 Speaker 1: You're right, the surveillance state is already here. That's why 173 00:10:46,440 --> 00:10:52,400 Speaker 1: places like a c l U are asking about this stuff, 174 00:10:52,720 --> 00:10:57,520 Speaker 1: right because as I understand, the detectors, once planted, once deployed, 175 00:10:57,559 --> 00:11:02,440 Speaker 1: they don't turn off. And they're also apparently much more 176 00:11:02,480 --> 00:11:07,319 Speaker 1: frequent in minority communities. Oh yes, they call them high 177 00:11:07,360 --> 00:11:10,360 Speaker 1: crime areas. But I mean, you know, Devil's Advocate, I mean, 178 00:11:10,400 --> 00:11:13,840 Speaker 1: if if if they are high crime areas and these 179 00:11:13,840 --> 00:11:17,600 Speaker 1: gunshots are being detected, there is that really profiling? If 180 00:11:17,679 --> 00:11:22,400 Speaker 1: if the data is real and isn't perhaps in a 181 00:11:22,440 --> 00:11:25,040 Speaker 1: good thing for those areas to be more policed. Again, now, 182 00:11:25,080 --> 00:11:28,400 Speaker 1: I know, put depending on the quality and the caliber 183 00:11:28,440 --> 00:11:31,199 Speaker 1: of the police, the people doing the policing. But I mean, 184 00:11:31,240 --> 00:11:34,079 Speaker 1: you know, I recently watched this movie Barbarian No spoilers. 185 00:11:34,240 --> 00:11:37,080 Speaker 1: It's great watch it, but there is some social commentary 186 00:11:37,120 --> 00:11:41,160 Speaker 1: and about Detroit specifically, Um, and you know, there are 187 00:11:41,200 --> 00:11:45,600 Speaker 1: some areas where it's hard to get cops out, you know, 188 00:11:45,800 --> 00:11:48,240 Speaker 1: like like because because they're because they're running all over 189 00:11:48,240 --> 00:11:52,040 Speaker 1: the place. So maybe having more accurate data could help 190 00:11:52,520 --> 00:11:57,440 Speaker 1: divide resources better. Perhaps, I don't know, yes, because you're 191 00:11:57,520 --> 00:11:59,840 Speaker 1: because of the accuracy of deployment, right, that can be 192 00:12:00,040 --> 00:12:02,520 Speaker 1: very helpful. But there are so many problems with this 193 00:12:02,559 --> 00:12:04,800 Speaker 1: guy's ben You've you pointed out some maybe it's worth 194 00:12:04,800 --> 00:12:07,760 Speaker 1: doing a quick episode on this, uh, like a spend 195 00:12:07,760 --> 00:12:10,719 Speaker 1: a good forty five minutes on it, because, uh, it's 196 00:12:10,720 --> 00:12:14,160 Speaker 1: so expensive to deploy. It's ten thousand dollars per square 197 00:12:14,200 --> 00:12:16,960 Speaker 1: mile just to install the microphones who get them up 198 00:12:17,000 --> 00:12:21,480 Speaker 1: and running, Then every year after that it's over sixty 199 00:12:21,880 --> 00:12:24,880 Speaker 1: dollars per square mile to operate. And that has to 200 00:12:24,920 --> 00:12:27,199 Speaker 1: do with the who's listening, which is one of the the 201 00:12:27,280 --> 00:12:30,320 Speaker 1: chiefs of their big questions. Who's actually listening to this stuff? Well, 202 00:12:30,360 --> 00:12:33,160 Speaker 1: it's people who are going to work for a shot spotter, 203 00:12:33,600 --> 00:12:38,320 Speaker 1: who who get an alert that's like gunfire detected, right, 204 00:12:38,559 --> 00:12:41,600 Speaker 1: And there is a series of short clips of this 205 00:12:41,800 --> 00:12:46,520 Speaker 1: detected gunfire. I'm doing air quotes from multiple microphones and 206 00:12:46,600 --> 00:12:49,080 Speaker 1: that person is trained or supposed to be trained to 207 00:12:49,160 --> 00:12:51,120 Speaker 1: be able to detect whether it is actually a gun 208 00:12:51,160 --> 00:12:54,319 Speaker 1: shot or a firework or something else. If it is 209 00:12:54,360 --> 00:12:57,679 Speaker 1: a gun shot, what's the caliber that was shot, is 210 00:12:57,720 --> 00:13:00,719 Speaker 1: it a fully automatic weapon? Like how quick succession were 211 00:13:00,760 --> 00:13:04,880 Speaker 1: these shots fired? And all kinds of other information about it, 212 00:13:04,920 --> 00:13:08,360 Speaker 1: which then better equips law enforcement when they're going into 213 00:13:08,360 --> 00:13:11,440 Speaker 1: a situation right to have the information. I want some 214 00:13:11,480 --> 00:13:15,199 Speaker 1: transparency and how the tech works because like I think, 215 00:13:15,240 --> 00:13:18,160 Speaker 1: you know, you were all interested in like audio processing 216 00:13:18,200 --> 00:13:21,920 Speaker 1: and like you know, our audio forensics. Like if there's 217 00:13:22,000 --> 00:13:24,920 Speaker 1: some sand to the way this tech works, I would 218 00:13:24,960 --> 00:13:27,240 Speaker 1: be interested, Like what are they basically this on? Like 219 00:13:27,280 --> 00:13:29,679 Speaker 1: you know, if you have like a simply safe home 220 00:13:29,720 --> 00:13:32,520 Speaker 1: security system or any home scare. This is not simply 221 00:13:32,520 --> 00:13:35,680 Speaker 1: say that you have like glass break sensors. Those operate 222 00:13:35,840 --> 00:13:39,160 Speaker 1: on sound, you know, they detect a certain frequency of 223 00:13:39,240 --> 00:13:41,680 Speaker 1: sound and then they they you know, they know that 224 00:13:41,760 --> 00:13:44,280 Speaker 1: it's not just the cat, you know, scraping the you know, 225 00:13:44,400 --> 00:13:48,800 Speaker 1: the hardwoods or something. I'm wondering how they determine that. 226 00:13:49,200 --> 00:13:51,000 Speaker 1: It has to just be like they have samples and 227 00:13:51,040 --> 00:13:54,000 Speaker 1: they're matching it up with the waveform, you know, to 228 00:13:54,040 --> 00:13:57,120 Speaker 1: see if it hits a certain shape. I'm I'm fascinated 229 00:13:57,120 --> 00:13:58,880 Speaker 1: by the tech, but it doesn't seem like they're being 230 00:13:58,880 --> 00:14:01,199 Speaker 1: particularly transparent to and I guess there's a good reason. 231 00:14:01,320 --> 00:14:05,800 Speaker 1: Could be like trade secret type stuff, proprietary algorithms. Uh, 232 00:14:05,840 --> 00:14:08,760 Speaker 1: there's probably some machine learning at this point to do 233 00:14:08,840 --> 00:14:13,320 Speaker 1: a comp but the the idea is that there, um, 234 00:14:13,440 --> 00:14:17,280 Speaker 1: they are having a human element in there, right, Matt. 235 00:14:17,360 --> 00:14:20,760 Speaker 1: And that's that's something that chief is asking to Essentially, 236 00:14:20,840 --> 00:14:24,320 Speaker 1: who watches the Watchman? Right age old question, and it's 237 00:14:24,360 --> 00:14:29,040 Speaker 1: one that usually has less than perfect answers. I mean, 238 00:14:29,080 --> 00:14:33,720 Speaker 1: even if you just look at the basics of shot Spotter, 239 00:14:33,880 --> 00:14:38,480 Speaker 1: you'll see that it's considered quite controversial in places like Detroit, 240 00:14:38,600 --> 00:14:44,680 Speaker 1: places like Chicago. Uh. This is also I remember I 241 00:14:44,720 --> 00:14:47,560 Speaker 1: haven't pulled it up here, but I remember shot Spotter 242 00:14:47,640 --> 00:14:53,280 Speaker 1: apparently apparently tried to cut off some public records request 243 00:14:53,520 --> 00:14:57,359 Speaker 1: at the past, the figurative past, and told their customers 244 00:14:57,640 --> 00:15:01,280 Speaker 1: how to go about denying or redact information they had 245 00:15:01,320 --> 00:15:05,880 Speaker 1: to provide. And that's that's interesting to me because is 246 00:15:05,920 --> 00:15:09,360 Speaker 1: that inherently sinister. It sounds it sounds like a cover up, 247 00:15:09,400 --> 00:15:11,560 Speaker 1: but it also could just be them trying to like 248 00:15:12,680 --> 00:15:18,520 Speaker 1: protect their processes as a company and then also protect officers. Right, 249 00:15:18,560 --> 00:15:21,760 Speaker 1: because if you plan like look I'm we talked about 250 00:15:21,800 --> 00:15:25,080 Speaker 1: Devil's Advocate earlier, let me take us to a darker place. 251 00:15:25,560 --> 00:15:28,160 Speaker 1: Someone knows how this stuff works, and they for some 252 00:15:28,240 --> 00:15:32,760 Speaker 1: reason want to target first responders, then it's very easy 253 00:15:32,800 --> 00:15:35,640 Speaker 1: to set up an ambush and just deploy the right 254 00:15:35,720 --> 00:15:39,320 Speaker 1: kind of ammunition, have a crew set up and waiting. 255 00:15:39,400 --> 00:15:41,840 Speaker 1: I don't think that's happened yet, and I hope it 256 00:15:41,920 --> 00:15:45,360 Speaker 1: never does. But there are problems with this. People have 257 00:15:45,480 --> 00:15:48,400 Speaker 1: been falsely accused and I think in a couple of 258 00:15:48,400 --> 00:15:53,119 Speaker 1: cases sent to prison because this thing, this technology identified 259 00:15:53,160 --> 00:15:55,880 Speaker 1: the shots were fired out of a particular location and 260 00:15:55,920 --> 00:15:59,280 Speaker 1: then uh, someone was picked up at that location and 261 00:15:59,360 --> 00:16:02,480 Speaker 1: accused of shooting a gun. So you can imagine if 262 00:16:02,520 --> 00:16:05,560 Speaker 1: you really wanted to pin something on somebody, you literally 263 00:16:05,600 --> 00:16:09,600 Speaker 1: go to their where they live and shoot a gun 264 00:16:10,320 --> 00:16:14,160 Speaker 1: at that location. If shot spotter is active, then leave 265 00:16:14,760 --> 00:16:17,280 Speaker 1: and now police are going to respond to that exact 266 00:16:17,320 --> 00:16:21,520 Speaker 1: area of shots fired. Right. That's scary to me. That's 267 00:16:21,520 --> 00:16:24,400 Speaker 1: really scary to me. And as you mentioned already, the 268 00:16:24,400 --> 00:16:25,840 Speaker 1: a c l U has a ton of problems with 269 00:16:25,880 --> 00:16:27,560 Speaker 1: us a bunch of other outlets have a ton of 270 00:16:27,600 --> 00:16:30,680 Speaker 1: problems with this tech, and they are just open mics 271 00:16:31,360 --> 00:16:36,000 Speaker 1: sitting there listening all the time. Seven in your neighborhood 272 00:16:36,120 --> 00:16:38,520 Speaker 1: if this is active where you live, much in the 273 00:16:38,560 --> 00:16:41,720 Speaker 1: same way, the CCTV cameras are are working, and the 274 00:16:42,080 --> 00:16:47,600 Speaker 1: neighborhood cameras are working, and it is constant surveillance all 275 00:16:47,680 --> 00:16:50,920 Speaker 1: the time. So we we also know how imperfect those 276 00:16:50,960 --> 00:16:54,320 Speaker 1: CCTV cameras can be. Or you know, where it's easy 277 00:16:54,360 --> 00:16:57,720 Speaker 1: to catch a hooded figure and then you know, pin 278 00:16:57,800 --> 00:16:59,960 Speaker 1: it on someone that's dressed similarly or something like that. 279 00:17:00,120 --> 00:17:04,800 Speaker 1: So this has even less confirming data to back it up. 280 00:17:04,840 --> 00:17:09,359 Speaker 1: Wouldn't you say yes? But but it's so integrated. Shot 281 00:17:09,400 --> 00:17:12,200 Speaker 1: Spotter can have the CCTV cameras in a certain area 282 00:17:12,480 --> 00:17:16,119 Speaker 1: point to the scene of a crime, alleged crime, or 283 00:17:16,160 --> 00:17:19,920 Speaker 1: where shots have fired. It can deploy drones in some 284 00:17:20,000 --> 00:17:24,280 Speaker 1: cities exactly to where the shots were fired. It is 285 00:17:24,440 --> 00:17:26,680 Speaker 1: it is that creepy orwellian stuff that I think we 286 00:17:26,720 --> 00:17:29,480 Speaker 1: should talk about it more. But for now, let's go 287 00:17:29,480 --> 00:17:31,000 Speaker 1: ahead and take a break. Here a word from our 288 00:17:31,040 --> 00:17:33,120 Speaker 1: sponsor and we'll come back. We want to hear from 289 00:17:33,119 --> 00:17:34,800 Speaker 1: you about this tech? What do you think? And have 290 00:17:34,920 --> 00:17:43,920 Speaker 1: you experienced it? But we'll be right back, and we're 291 00:17:43,960 --> 00:17:48,680 Speaker 1: back with a message from from you, another message from you. Yes, you, 292 00:17:49,440 --> 00:17:52,880 Speaker 1: This message comes through one of my favorite uh nicknames 293 00:17:52,920 --> 00:17:59,000 Speaker 1: in a minute. Uh not a tweaker, not a last name, tweaker. Uh. 294 00:17:59,040 --> 00:18:02,800 Speaker 1: And you'll understand you'll understand where this is coming from 295 00:18:02,840 --> 00:18:06,120 Speaker 1: in just a second. Uh. He goes like this, Hey, 296 00:18:06,160 --> 00:18:08,520 Speaker 1: guys and super producers. I should start off by saying 297 00:18:08,600 --> 00:18:11,520 Speaker 1: I'm stone sober and have been for a long time. 298 00:18:12,359 --> 00:18:15,000 Speaker 1: That statement will make sense in a moment. I have 299 00:18:15,040 --> 00:18:17,080 Speaker 1: a question that I don't think you guys have covered. 300 00:18:17,720 --> 00:18:23,359 Speaker 1: What is fact? Answer and quotes something that is known 301 00:18:23,680 --> 00:18:27,119 Speaker 1: or proven to be true? Grass is green. Well, not 302 00:18:27,200 --> 00:18:29,600 Speaker 1: to someone with an impairment or ailment of some sort. 303 00:18:30,080 --> 00:18:33,640 Speaker 1: The walls talk is an absolute fact to someone suffering 304 00:18:33,680 --> 00:18:36,399 Speaker 1: from many types of head injuries or mental health issues, 305 00:18:36,640 --> 00:18:39,000 Speaker 1: those examples could be chalked up to perspective. So I'll 306 00:18:39,040 --> 00:18:41,560 Speaker 1: go a bit further. A day is twenty four hours, 307 00:18:41,560 --> 00:18:44,119 Speaker 1: an hour is sixty minutes, a minute of sixty seconds. 308 00:18:44,119 --> 00:18:46,560 Speaker 1: What is a second? Well, a second is one eight 309 00:18:46,760 --> 00:18:49,920 Speaker 1: six thousand, four hundred of a day. So what is 310 00:18:49,920 --> 00:18:52,560 Speaker 1: a day? You see? How circular that is? What is 311 00:18:52,640 --> 00:18:55,199 Speaker 1: time other than a myth we all agree to believe in. 312 00:18:55,440 --> 00:18:59,240 Speaker 1: If these accepted quote unquote facts are just beliefs we 313 00:18:59,320 --> 00:19:04,600 Speaker 1: all choose to indulge in. My question remains, what is fact? 314 00:19:04,880 --> 00:19:09,280 Speaker 1: Have fun with this thought? Not a tweaker, that's not 315 00:19:09,400 --> 00:19:12,360 Speaker 1: a with a K N O T T A russ. 316 00:19:13,600 --> 00:19:16,840 Speaker 1: Thank you so much, Nan, This is this You're talking 317 00:19:16,840 --> 00:19:19,960 Speaker 1: a little bit about tautology, a little bit about circular 318 00:19:20,880 --> 00:19:26,080 Speaker 1: thinking here. Uh, you're also pointing out something that I love, 319 00:19:26,680 --> 00:19:29,000 Speaker 1: which is a lot of things that are accepted as 320 00:19:29,119 --> 00:19:33,840 Speaker 1: normal are sort of accidents, legacies of the great game 321 00:19:33,880 --> 00:19:40,000 Speaker 1: of telephone tradition. I once again positive is a little 322 00:19:40,000 --> 00:19:43,960 Speaker 1: more than pure pressure from the dead. Right. But but 323 00:19:44,160 --> 00:19:46,199 Speaker 1: with the I know that sounds a little hyperbolic. But 324 00:19:46,880 --> 00:19:51,159 Speaker 1: the question about time, right, why why is in our 325 00:19:51,720 --> 00:19:56,840 Speaker 1: sixty minutes and not one? Right? It's a good question, 326 00:19:57,080 --> 00:20:00,600 Speaker 1: and it goes back to the history of people trying 327 00:20:00,680 --> 00:20:03,719 Speaker 1: to figure out a system upon which they could all agree. 328 00:20:04,320 --> 00:20:08,440 Speaker 1: Why is the calendar in the West the calendar of 329 00:20:08,440 --> 00:20:11,840 Speaker 1: the majority of world practices? In business? Why is it? 330 00:20:12,000 --> 00:20:14,000 Speaker 1: Why is it twelve months? You know? What I mean, 331 00:20:14,480 --> 00:20:19,200 Speaker 1: you could you could divide it any a number of ways. Uh. 332 00:20:19,240 --> 00:20:23,840 Speaker 1: If you're talking about the basis of what is a fact, 333 00:20:23,960 --> 00:20:28,440 Speaker 1: the definition then the idea not to sound too Ben Shapiro, 334 00:20:29,119 --> 00:20:34,760 Speaker 1: is a fact is something that has self evident actual existence. 335 00:20:35,320 --> 00:20:38,159 Speaker 1: Gravity is a fact, and it doesn't matter how you 336 00:20:38,160 --> 00:20:41,440 Speaker 1: feel about it. Right, I've got some cool sunglasses. I'm 337 00:20:41,520 --> 00:20:44,760 Speaker 1: dropping them. They're falling at the same rate all the time, 338 00:20:45,480 --> 00:20:49,359 Speaker 1: even if I have an opinion that says they should not. Uh. 339 00:20:49,359 --> 00:20:52,760 Speaker 1: But really, what we're seeing is the limitation of human experience. 340 00:20:52,800 --> 00:20:55,439 Speaker 1: I would say, because everything we know about physics and 341 00:20:55,480 --> 00:20:59,120 Speaker 1: science shows us that the rules change when you get 342 00:20:59,160 --> 00:21:02,719 Speaker 1: too very lawe urge or very very small scales. So 343 00:21:02,920 --> 00:21:06,359 Speaker 1: fact is just sort of what everybody thinks works. But 344 00:21:06,480 --> 00:21:11,159 Speaker 1: even perspective, you know, the idea of perspective has a 345 00:21:11,160 --> 00:21:12,600 Speaker 1: lot to do with it. I mean you think about like, 346 00:21:12,640 --> 00:21:14,720 Speaker 1: you know, let's say something has proven to be fact 347 00:21:14,800 --> 00:21:17,520 Speaker 1: in a court of law. You know that has a 348 00:21:17,560 --> 00:21:20,639 Speaker 1: lot to do with perspective, even though you know they'll 349 00:21:20,800 --> 00:21:23,400 Speaker 1: say that it has to do with you know, just 350 00:21:23,400 --> 00:21:25,840 Speaker 1: just the just the facts, man, just the facts, you know. 351 00:21:26,080 --> 00:21:30,320 Speaker 1: But I mean, we know eyeball witness accounts highly um 352 00:21:31,000 --> 00:21:36,000 Speaker 1: related to to perspective. They can be um skewed by 353 00:21:36,400 --> 00:21:39,120 Speaker 1: certain biases, you know. And of course they try their 354 00:21:39,160 --> 00:21:41,320 Speaker 1: best to make sure that the witnesses are credible and 355 00:21:41,520 --> 00:21:43,879 Speaker 1: the jury members have no biases and things like that. 356 00:21:43,920 --> 00:21:47,000 Speaker 1: But it's nearly impossible to to to to you know, 357 00:21:47,200 --> 00:21:49,760 Speaker 1: inhabit the mind of a human being that is not 358 00:21:49,840 --> 00:21:52,240 Speaker 1: your own and understand you know, what makes them tick 359 00:21:52,760 --> 00:21:55,359 Speaker 1: um outside of a few like you know, ticking boxes 360 00:21:55,359 --> 00:21:57,720 Speaker 1: on a questionnaire. So I mean, you know, when you 361 00:21:57,720 --> 00:21:59,760 Speaker 1: when you have when you start getting into the facts 362 00:22:00,359 --> 00:22:04,359 Speaker 1: legally speaking, that really gets confusing because we also know 363 00:22:04,400 --> 00:22:08,280 Speaker 1: even if someone is convicted of a crime, uh that 364 00:22:08,440 --> 00:22:11,520 Speaker 1: is supposed to be based on fact. If that's the case, 365 00:22:11,560 --> 00:22:14,359 Speaker 1: then how can it be overturned? Does that not point 366 00:22:14,400 --> 00:22:18,119 Speaker 1: to the fallibility of the idea of fact, you know? 367 00:22:18,320 --> 00:22:21,720 Speaker 1: And and how little we should trust the idea of 368 00:22:21,840 --> 00:22:25,640 Speaker 1: fact when it's based on a system that involves so 369 00:22:25,720 --> 00:22:29,199 Speaker 1: much perspective and so much bias and so many lies. 370 00:22:29,720 --> 00:22:32,680 Speaker 1: And you literally have a person whose job it is 371 00:22:33,000 --> 00:22:37,239 Speaker 1: too convict somebody, you know, No matter what, it's not 372 00:22:37,280 --> 00:22:41,280 Speaker 1: always necessarily based on truth or fact or fairness, it's 373 00:22:41,280 --> 00:22:47,680 Speaker 1: about winning. I mean really, I know that's a lit yeah, 374 00:22:47,720 --> 00:22:50,160 Speaker 1: tiger blood. H it's just and it's it's a little 375 00:22:50,160 --> 00:22:52,760 Speaker 1: bit nihilistic, and but I just you know, we see 376 00:22:52,760 --> 00:22:55,240 Speaker 1: a time and time again that that people. You know, 377 00:22:55,480 --> 00:22:58,040 Speaker 1: there's a podcast that I worked on, uh several years 378 00:22:58,040 --> 00:23:00,320 Speaker 1: ago called Murder and Oregon about a man and who 379 00:23:00,359 --> 00:23:04,760 Speaker 1: was accused, most likely falsely of murdering this high ranking 380 00:23:04,760 --> 00:23:09,200 Speaker 1: government official just got overturd right correct as of today, 381 00:23:09,280 --> 00:23:12,879 Speaker 1: and uh where what what what does that say for 382 00:23:12,920 --> 00:23:18,879 Speaker 1: those facts? You know, um, it's all very fallible. But 383 00:23:18,720 --> 00:23:20,639 Speaker 1: but but ben to your point there, you know, scientific 384 00:23:20,680 --> 00:23:24,640 Speaker 1: facts and things that we know will happen upon repetition. 385 00:23:24,880 --> 00:23:26,600 Speaker 1: You know, I think those are the closest things to 386 00:23:27,440 --> 00:23:30,240 Speaker 1: hard fast facts that we can ever really depend on. 387 00:23:31,040 --> 00:23:32,960 Speaker 1: But so much, so much else, so much else, when 388 00:23:32,960 --> 00:23:35,080 Speaker 1: you start really dividing it up and chopping it up, 389 00:23:35,600 --> 00:23:39,080 Speaker 1: it's really easy to lose confidence in the quote unquote facts, Matt. 390 00:23:39,440 --> 00:23:41,760 Speaker 1: You know, people, there are so many people that think 391 00:23:41,760 --> 00:23:45,720 Speaker 1: that it's a fact to say that that Jesus Christ 392 00:23:45,760 --> 00:23:48,119 Speaker 1: died for our sins, or that you know, God is 393 00:23:48,160 --> 00:23:50,399 Speaker 1: good and exists in in in the sky and that 394 00:23:50,440 --> 00:23:52,120 Speaker 1: we're you know, if you're a good person, you're going 395 00:23:52,160 --> 00:23:55,399 Speaker 1: to have it. To some people, that is fact, but 396 00:23:55,400 --> 00:24:00,280 Speaker 1: it's it's patently unprovable, so that's faith. But they also 397 00:24:00,280 --> 00:24:02,960 Speaker 1: would believe that it's fact because they have so much 398 00:24:02,960 --> 00:24:05,119 Speaker 1: faith that to them it becomes fact. I don't know. 399 00:24:05,119 --> 00:24:06,920 Speaker 1: Do you have any thoughts, not necessarily on the religious angle, 400 00:24:06,920 --> 00:24:10,639 Speaker 1: but just on the difference between faith and facts. To me, 401 00:24:10,800 --> 00:24:13,800 Speaker 1: it comes down to who do you trust? What institution 402 00:24:13,840 --> 00:24:17,800 Speaker 1: do you trust? Do you trust your friends, your neighbors, 403 00:24:17,840 --> 00:24:21,560 Speaker 1: your Facebook group, your you know, the scientific community that 404 00:24:22,000 --> 00:24:25,639 Speaker 1: supports the scientists that you support and agree with. Uh? 405 00:24:26,240 --> 00:24:29,600 Speaker 1: You know, do you trust the methodology of an experiment? 406 00:24:30,200 --> 00:24:32,480 Speaker 1: You know? It's it's weird that in the end, the 407 00:24:32,600 --> 00:24:35,960 Speaker 1: status of a fact comes down to trust, and we do. 408 00:24:36,160 --> 00:24:38,480 Speaker 1: I think humanity finds ourselves in a weird place where 409 00:24:38,520 --> 00:24:41,320 Speaker 1: we've lost trust in a bunch of things. So it's 410 00:24:41,359 --> 00:24:44,719 Speaker 1: way harder to decide that this is fact or not. 411 00:24:44,840 --> 00:24:48,439 Speaker 1: And it is trust the same as faith. That's a 412 00:24:48,480 --> 00:24:52,720 Speaker 1: good one, I don't know. To me, faith is believing 413 00:24:52,760 --> 00:24:56,560 Speaker 1: in something that you have no way of proving, you 414 00:24:56,680 --> 00:25:00,520 Speaker 1: just know it in your bones. But trust tis more 415 00:25:00,600 --> 00:25:05,480 Speaker 1: like believing something someone tells you based on your perception 416 00:25:05,560 --> 00:25:08,680 Speaker 1: of their credibility. I don't know. It is a heady 417 00:25:08,760 --> 00:25:10,840 Speaker 1: it's a heady subject and and and then and it's 418 00:25:10,880 --> 00:25:14,359 Speaker 1: not just fun stone or talk. I mean, it really 419 00:25:14,480 --> 00:25:17,840 Speaker 1: is the idea of the perception of everything we see 420 00:25:17,880 --> 00:25:20,760 Speaker 1: when we go outside, and like what is what is 421 00:25:20,800 --> 00:25:22,639 Speaker 1: a day? How do we divide up our lives? Like 422 00:25:22,720 --> 00:25:26,360 Speaker 1: what matters? What? What is futile? So many of these 423 00:25:26,400 --> 00:25:29,160 Speaker 1: things are are all based around the idea of facts 424 00:25:29,480 --> 00:25:32,360 Speaker 1: and like what you choose to pursue. The only thing 425 00:25:32,400 --> 00:25:36,800 Speaker 1: I know that is truly futile is resistance. It's fair. 426 00:25:37,080 --> 00:25:39,640 Speaker 1: It's fair. Tell that to the invaders. Really, they'll tell 427 00:25:39,680 --> 00:25:43,360 Speaker 1: that to you before they shackle you in their craft. 428 00:25:44,240 --> 00:25:46,280 Speaker 1: What do y'all think? Let us know? I mean, this 429 00:25:46,359 --> 00:25:49,200 Speaker 1: is a fun one. Write us at you know conspiracy 430 00:25:49,200 --> 00:25:53,000 Speaker 1: and I heard radio dot com or on the Facebook group. Um, 431 00:25:53,080 --> 00:25:57,600 Speaker 1: what do you think facts are? Uh? Is it up 432 00:25:57,600 --> 00:26:01,600 Speaker 1: for debate? Are we overthinking this? Um? I don't think so, 433 00:26:02,040 --> 00:26:05,400 Speaker 1: but maybe that's even overthinking it. But in the meantime, 434 00:26:05,560 --> 00:26:07,480 Speaker 1: we're gonna take a quick break and then come back 435 00:26:07,480 --> 00:26:19,920 Speaker 1: with one more piece of listener mail, and we have returned. Uh, guys, 436 00:26:20,119 --> 00:26:21,960 Speaker 1: I will keep this one super quick. We have a 437 00:26:21,960 --> 00:26:24,720 Speaker 1: message from a frame which brought up something that I 438 00:26:24,720 --> 00:26:27,720 Speaker 1: believe we had talked about in the past. I've have 439 00:26:27,960 --> 00:26:32,080 Speaker 1: a pet theory that I recently discussed on a on 440 00:26:32,160 --> 00:26:36,200 Speaker 1: a different Facebook page that UM to me, makes a 441 00:26:36,240 --> 00:26:39,840 Speaker 1: lot of sense. It's about those more kind of out 442 00:26:39,880 --> 00:26:43,480 Speaker 1: there conspiracy theories. You know, you're flat Earth, there's indigo 443 00:26:43,520 --> 00:26:48,919 Speaker 1: with children, UM follow Earth or that kind of like 444 00:26:49,119 --> 00:26:53,400 Speaker 1: kind of just kookie stuff that doesn't really make much sense. 445 00:26:54,480 --> 00:26:58,040 Speaker 1: And when UM, I think about it, I think that 446 00:26:58,200 --> 00:27:03,440 Speaker 1: that kind of theory is propagated by the powers that 447 00:27:03,560 --> 00:27:07,439 Speaker 1: be in order to make the act of questioning the 448 00:27:07,440 --> 00:27:13,360 Speaker 1: government seemed ridiculous. UM like, oh yeah, you are you 449 00:27:13,400 --> 00:27:17,040 Speaker 1: think that, UM, I ran contrast worse than they like 450 00:27:17,160 --> 00:27:19,640 Speaker 1: to say it was. That means that you probably also 451 00:27:19,680 --> 00:27:23,120 Speaker 1: think the Earth is flat, etcetera. UM. That's not necessarily 452 00:27:23,119 --> 00:27:25,800 Speaker 1: the best example, but that's my point. With the more 453 00:27:25,920 --> 00:27:31,199 Speaker 1: UM out there easily disproven theories, the reason those remains 454 00:27:31,400 --> 00:27:36,800 Speaker 1: so popular is to keep UM, the more realistic view 455 00:27:37,000 --> 00:27:41,359 Speaker 1: of it, out of the public favor, And that about 456 00:27:41,400 --> 00:27:44,399 Speaker 1: sums it up. Without just repeating the same point so 457 00:27:44,920 --> 00:27:47,000 Speaker 1: thanks to the show. I love it. Um kind of 458 00:27:47,040 --> 00:27:51,600 Speaker 1: guys when your guests behind the Bastards and after that episode, 459 00:27:51,640 --> 00:27:53,520 Speaker 1: I was like, I like these guys a lot, So 460 00:27:53,920 --> 00:27:57,479 Speaker 1: thanks for what you do. I appreciate it. Thanks so much. Uh, 461 00:27:57,640 --> 00:27:59,680 Speaker 1: this is something we've talked about in the past. What 462 00:28:00,240 --> 00:28:02,440 Speaker 1: do you guys think? Do you think governments might purposely 463 00:28:02,480 --> 00:28:07,479 Speaker 1: propagate conspiracy theories? Yeah? Isn't that What psy ops is 464 00:28:08,440 --> 00:28:11,639 Speaker 1: means to a degree, is about like spreading misinformation for 465 00:28:11,680 --> 00:28:14,680 Speaker 1: the benefit of your own personal agenda or your own, 466 00:28:14,760 --> 00:28:18,280 Speaker 1: you know, the national agenda. It works really well to 467 00:28:18,440 --> 00:28:22,520 Speaker 1: discredit a leader you don't like. Yeah, agreed. We also 468 00:28:22,600 --> 00:28:26,960 Speaker 1: know that there's a common misconception that the FBI coined 469 00:28:27,000 --> 00:28:29,719 Speaker 1: the term conspiracy theory. That is not true, but it 470 00:28:29,840 --> 00:28:34,159 Speaker 1: is true that they certainly used manipulation of the media 471 00:28:34,200 --> 00:28:38,080 Speaker 1: in the wake of the jfk assassination to instruct all 472 00:28:38,280 --> 00:28:43,160 Speaker 1: papers and broadcast stations of note to refer to anything 473 00:28:43,160 --> 00:28:46,480 Speaker 1: that didn't fit the official narrative as a conspiracy theory. 474 00:28:46,960 --> 00:28:50,160 Speaker 1: It's also an ongoing joke on Reddit. If you enjoy 475 00:28:50,280 --> 00:28:54,480 Speaker 1: reading every like a few months, you guys know this. Uh, 476 00:28:54,560 --> 00:28:57,800 Speaker 1: someone will post some version of the following question, what 477 00:28:58,000 --> 00:29:00,720 Speaker 1: conspiracy theories do you believe may act really be true? 478 00:29:00,920 --> 00:29:04,480 Speaker 1: And inevitably there's somebody who comes in and says that 479 00:29:04,560 --> 00:29:07,600 Speaker 1: this read I believe this Reddit post keeps coming up 480 00:29:07,640 --> 00:29:11,120 Speaker 1: because governments want to know how much we know. And 481 00:29:11,400 --> 00:29:14,360 Speaker 1: that's I think meant in the spirit of a chuckle. 482 00:29:15,720 --> 00:29:19,440 Speaker 1: But but I feel like it's absolutely plausible. You know, 483 00:29:19,440 --> 00:29:24,040 Speaker 1: when we talked about how propaganda is conspiratorial in some ways, right, 484 00:29:24,200 --> 00:29:29,720 Speaker 1: and the US has propaganda abroad and domestic. Um, we 485 00:29:29,840 --> 00:29:35,880 Speaker 1: also know that, like you said, matt Um, this can 486 00:29:35,920 --> 00:29:41,760 Speaker 1: be very effective when wielded against an opponent in a 487 00:29:41,920 --> 00:29:46,400 Speaker 1: space of information control. Right, Like, conspiracy theories about people 488 00:29:46,400 --> 00:29:49,880 Speaker 1: of the Jewish faith are very very prevalent in parts 489 00:29:49,920 --> 00:29:53,640 Speaker 1: of the Middle East, right, and on the rise in 490 00:29:53,800 --> 00:29:58,040 Speaker 1: parts of East Asia as well. Um, conspiracy theories about 491 00:29:58,040 --> 00:30:04,520 Speaker 1: the US government are incredibly popular in North Korea, no surprise. 492 00:30:04,880 --> 00:30:07,040 Speaker 1: And it's not like the people who are falling for 493 00:30:07,120 --> 00:30:13,680 Speaker 1: some of these are any in any way unintelligent. They're 494 00:30:13,720 --> 00:30:16,560 Speaker 1: just working with the information they have at the time. 495 00:30:17,000 --> 00:30:19,280 Speaker 1: And also in the case of the US, the US 496 00:30:19,320 --> 00:30:21,480 Speaker 1: has done a lot of dirt over the years, so 497 00:30:21,520 --> 00:30:23,840 Speaker 1: it's we talked about this in the past, like it's 498 00:30:23,920 --> 00:30:26,880 Speaker 1: quite you know. I hate to say it when this 499 00:30:26,880 --> 00:30:30,920 Speaker 1: show is all about exercising critical thought. But if someone 500 00:30:31,120 --> 00:30:34,120 Speaker 1: comes to us, which happens quite often, and pitches an 501 00:30:34,160 --> 00:30:37,920 Speaker 1: idea of the US government or some faction thereof conspiring 502 00:30:38,000 --> 00:30:42,840 Speaker 1: to do something at this juncture, the three of us 503 00:30:42,960 --> 00:30:46,600 Speaker 1: don't immediately say no at this point, you know what 504 00:30:46,640 --> 00:30:50,600 Speaker 1: I mean. So, for instance, you will see governments spreading 505 00:30:50,800 --> 00:30:55,480 Speaker 1: conspiracy theories in the ancient past and in the modern day, 506 00:30:55,640 --> 00:30:59,120 Speaker 1: like I would ask you, uh, like, Matt, do you 507 00:30:59,200 --> 00:31:05,000 Speaker 1: think Russia is propagating conspiracy theories to support the conflict 508 00:31:05,000 --> 00:31:08,680 Speaker 1: in Ukraine? God, that's a really softful. I did a 509 00:31:08,800 --> 00:31:11,440 Speaker 1: terrible job with that question. I mean, I think I 510 00:31:11,480 --> 00:31:14,959 Speaker 1: think the I think the West is doing the exact 511 00:31:14,960 --> 00:31:18,720 Speaker 1: same thing to to support their stance of you know, 512 00:31:19,280 --> 00:31:24,560 Speaker 1: soft diplomacy and tactics to try and push Russia after Crimea, 513 00:31:25,240 --> 00:31:27,120 Speaker 1: and then it kind of backfired a little bit, or 514 00:31:27,120 --> 00:31:29,760 Speaker 1: maybe it's working out exactly how they want. I think 515 00:31:29,800 --> 00:31:34,240 Speaker 1: those kinds of theories they get floated around and put 516 00:31:34,320 --> 00:31:40,320 Speaker 1: on social media on purpose by government agents. Uh. I think, 517 00:31:42,280 --> 00:31:44,880 Speaker 1: I don't know, I know that that's real, because I've 518 00:31:44,920 --> 00:31:48,760 Speaker 1: seen it and it's been proven that that federal funds 519 00:31:49,160 --> 00:31:52,360 Speaker 1: go to this kind of thing. So it's not just 520 00:31:52,440 --> 00:31:55,600 Speaker 1: Russia doing it. No, No, there are very few good 521 00:31:55,640 --> 00:31:58,640 Speaker 1: guys left. I mean, I would also say it to 522 00:31:58,680 --> 00:32:03,240 Speaker 1: your point a frame, it's not just governments in general. Right, 523 00:32:03,400 --> 00:32:06,920 Speaker 1: we can accept that all governments will, as rational actors, 524 00:32:07,400 --> 00:32:11,440 Speaker 1: use any means available to kind of exert their goals, 525 00:32:11,520 --> 00:32:18,120 Speaker 1: and often the goals that they're chasing um inherently require 526 00:32:18,840 --> 00:32:23,280 Speaker 1: damage to other actors. Right, States are very self centered. 527 00:32:23,560 --> 00:32:27,520 Speaker 1: You know, if any any state you can imagine, yes, 528 00:32:27,680 --> 00:32:31,840 Speaker 1: including Bhutan, any state you can imagine if it were 529 00:32:31,840 --> 00:32:35,080 Speaker 1: a person, would be a pretty bad person in terms 530 00:32:35,120 --> 00:32:39,480 Speaker 1: of their behavior. And that's again not a ding. Governments are. 531 00:32:41,080 --> 00:32:43,200 Speaker 1: Governments are a big part of the way the world 532 00:32:43,360 --> 00:32:46,600 Speaker 1: works in Corporations aren't immune either, of course not. I 533 00:32:46,960 --> 00:32:49,240 Speaker 1: just feel like if if if anyone's got this tactic 534 00:32:49,280 --> 00:32:53,320 Speaker 1: in their playbook, then you know, logically speaking, and to 535 00:32:53,440 --> 00:32:58,800 Speaker 1: any opponent to that government or or company or hacker 536 00:32:58,840 --> 00:33:01,200 Speaker 1: group or whoever it might be, is going to have 537 00:33:01,240 --> 00:33:03,680 Speaker 1: to play just as dirty. There's no way, there's no 538 00:33:03,720 --> 00:33:06,960 Speaker 1: two ways around it. If people are using misinformation or 539 00:33:07,000 --> 00:33:11,360 Speaker 1: disinformation as a tactic or strategy. Then what do you 540 00:33:11,360 --> 00:33:13,720 Speaker 1: think the truth will set you free? That's I mean, no, 541 00:33:14,000 --> 00:33:16,720 Speaker 1: you have to be just as dirty. That's the only way. 542 00:33:16,880 --> 00:33:19,120 Speaker 1: I'm not saying it's okay. I'm just saying it's sal works. 543 00:33:19,680 --> 00:33:22,320 Speaker 1: So I think for us to believe that, you know, 544 00:33:22,680 --> 00:33:25,440 Speaker 1: the the acts that we see other quote unquote bad 545 00:33:25,480 --> 00:33:29,560 Speaker 1: actor governments or whatever you know, doing that we're somehow 546 00:33:29,560 --> 00:33:32,840 Speaker 1: immune to on on our shining castle on the hill, 547 00:33:33,240 --> 00:33:37,640 Speaker 1: I think that's just silly to think. Yeah, it's I 548 00:33:37,640 --> 00:33:41,400 Speaker 1: mean to the point about corporations, which you're reading my 549 00:33:41,440 --> 00:33:43,880 Speaker 1: mind there, Matt too. It reminds me of one of 550 00:33:43,920 --> 00:33:48,480 Speaker 1: my favorite recent urban legends or Internet legends. Is not proven, 551 00:33:49,120 --> 00:33:54,760 Speaker 1: but there has been this longstanding conspiracy that Walt Disney 552 00:33:56,320 --> 00:33:59,959 Speaker 1: was frozen. His entire body or his head was frozen 553 00:34:00,000 --> 00:34:03,080 Speaker 1: and with the hopes being that he could one day 554 00:34:03,080 --> 00:34:07,800 Speaker 1: be resurrected. That's not the conspiracy theory. The conspiracy theory 555 00:34:07,840 --> 00:34:13,080 Speaker 1: that's interesting is this, it's the idea that Disney made 556 00:34:13,080 --> 00:34:17,000 Speaker 1: the movie Frozen and named it Frozen so that when 557 00:34:17,000 --> 00:34:21,040 Speaker 1: people search Disney Frozen, they would stop running into that 558 00:34:21,200 --> 00:34:25,239 Speaker 1: story about Walt Disney. Being Frozen instead they would run 559 00:34:25,239 --> 00:34:29,680 Speaker 1: into the movie. Um it is. I don't know about 560 00:34:29,680 --> 00:34:33,960 Speaker 1: the motivations, but it's true that that that has um 561 00:34:34,000 --> 00:34:36,799 Speaker 1: ascended in search. You're going to see references to the 562 00:34:36,800 --> 00:34:39,239 Speaker 1: film if you Google or use your search Brosler your 563 00:34:39,320 --> 00:34:43,640 Speaker 1: choice to search, uh, Frozen Disney. Hell, they doubled down 564 00:34:43,640 --> 00:34:46,359 Speaker 1: and made Frozen to talk about money in the waters there. 565 00:34:46,560 --> 00:34:49,440 Speaker 1: It isn't quite the same thing, but we also seem 566 00:34:49,800 --> 00:34:53,040 Speaker 1: more closer I think to what we're talking about here. 567 00:34:53,320 --> 00:34:59,320 Speaker 1: Um A frame is the the character assassination, smear tactics 568 00:34:59,440 --> 00:35:02,680 Speaker 1: used by big oil or big tobacco when they want 569 00:35:02,719 --> 00:35:06,799 Speaker 1: to discredit a scientist, right where they want to discredit 570 00:35:06,960 --> 00:35:11,160 Speaker 1: a politician. You can. I mean, we have said this 571 00:35:11,200 --> 00:35:15,520 Speaker 1: point before. The danger of using, of weaponizing the phrase 572 00:35:15,560 --> 00:35:19,759 Speaker 1: conspiracy theory is that it makes some It draws a 573 00:35:19,840 --> 00:35:24,520 Speaker 1: false equivalency between some patently untrue things and some very real, 574 00:35:24,880 --> 00:35:28,600 Speaker 1: very dangerous things, you know. I mean, it's just like 575 00:35:28,640 --> 00:35:34,880 Speaker 1: you're describing, it's very convenient. It's insidious for someone to say, hey, 576 00:35:34,880 --> 00:35:39,600 Speaker 1: this person is exposing too much about the c I 577 00:35:39,719 --> 00:35:43,719 Speaker 1: A right and what was it? Freedom Airlines? Was that 578 00:35:43,760 --> 00:35:47,800 Speaker 1: the one are America that was That's right, it was 579 00:35:48,239 --> 00:35:51,680 Speaker 1: are America. So this person is getting too close to 580 00:35:51,719 --> 00:35:55,640 Speaker 1: the truth about Air America and the CIA and the 581 00:35:55,719 --> 00:35:59,680 Speaker 1: drug trade. So let's smear them as a conspiracy theorist 582 00:35:59,800 --> 00:36:01,960 Speaker 1: and let's spread let's say they believe in all these 583 00:36:02,000 --> 00:36:06,880 Speaker 1: other crazy things. I don't know, I mean, factions of 584 00:36:06,920 --> 00:36:09,840 Speaker 1: the U. S. Government spread conspiracy theories about the election 585 00:36:10,280 --> 00:36:16,400 Speaker 1: right in recent years. I don't have specific proof. This 586 00:36:16,440 --> 00:36:19,239 Speaker 1: would need to be more of an episode, I think 587 00:36:19,280 --> 00:36:22,200 Speaker 1: for us to dive in and say, here are the 588 00:36:22,239 --> 00:36:26,040 Speaker 1: following examples of when someone tried to cover up something 589 00:36:26,080 --> 00:36:29,680 Speaker 1: true with something that seems kind of bonkers or distracting. 590 00:36:30,280 --> 00:36:34,040 Speaker 1: You know, like ask yourself this when you see um 591 00:36:34,239 --> 00:36:40,040 Speaker 1: so called conspiratorial investigations on television or you know, on 592 00:36:40,120 --> 00:36:44,040 Speaker 1: your streaming platform of choice. How come they talk about 593 00:36:44,040 --> 00:36:47,040 Speaker 1: like hunting ghosts. How come they talk about hunting bigfoot? 594 00:36:47,080 --> 00:36:50,080 Speaker 1: There's room for that. But why aren't they talking about lobbying? 595 00:36:50,480 --> 00:36:52,160 Speaker 1: Why aren't they talking you know what I mean, why 596 00:36:52,200 --> 00:36:57,120 Speaker 1: aren't they talking about ongoing co intel pro ops or assassinations. 597 00:36:57,840 --> 00:37:01,320 Speaker 1: It's because that stuff is true. Also, like fantasy is 598 00:37:01,360 --> 00:37:03,920 Speaker 1: easier to indulge in, I mean, not to say that 599 00:37:03,960 --> 00:37:05,719 Speaker 1: all that stuff's fantasy, but like, I mean, it's a 600 00:37:05,760 --> 00:37:09,200 Speaker 1: lot easier to you know, it's it's less it's less depressing, 601 00:37:09,280 --> 00:37:12,279 Speaker 1: it doesn't hit as close to home, and it's more 602 00:37:12,320 --> 00:37:15,600 Speaker 1: of its entertainment as opposed to education requires less of 603 00:37:15,640 --> 00:37:21,240 Speaker 1: a less active viewing and participatory you know, listening and viewing. 604 00:37:21,520 --> 00:37:23,240 Speaker 1: Like it's just like I just lay back and watched 605 00:37:23,280 --> 00:37:27,400 Speaker 1: this these these cookie you know, ghost hunters get spooked 606 00:37:27,880 --> 00:37:31,720 Speaker 1: in the dark as opposed to having to learn about 607 00:37:31,760 --> 00:37:34,600 Speaker 1: how lobbying works and why it's so insidious and all 608 00:37:34,600 --> 00:37:36,360 Speaker 1: of the ins and outs, and it can just you know, 609 00:37:36,360 --> 00:37:37,919 Speaker 1: I can take you down some rabbit holes and maybe 610 00:37:37,960 --> 00:37:42,160 Speaker 1: you're uncomfortable, so people would rather stay complacent. Adam Conover 611 00:37:42,280 --> 00:37:44,279 Speaker 1: is doing cool stuff on that show The G Word 612 00:37:44,560 --> 00:37:50,439 Speaker 1: on Netflix. Yeah, with former President Barack Obama. Also one 613 00:37:50,440 --> 00:37:54,040 Speaker 1: of the big coups on that show was gaining entrance 614 00:37:54,160 --> 00:37:58,880 Speaker 1: to a meat packing plant. Those things are pretty locked down, 615 00:37:59,600 --> 00:38:02,279 Speaker 1: which I kind of assumed, but I wasn't aware of 616 00:38:02,320 --> 00:38:05,920 Speaker 1: the extent of their security. And he makes a sandwich 617 00:38:05,920 --> 00:38:08,759 Speaker 1: with the former president. But yeah, that's a I I 618 00:38:09,920 --> 00:38:11,959 Speaker 1: enjoyed that show. I haven't watched all of it well, 619 00:38:12,120 --> 00:38:14,359 Speaker 1: we would love to we'd love your help with this one, 620 00:38:14,400 --> 00:38:18,360 Speaker 1: fellow conspiracy realists. A frame. You have written in about 621 00:38:18,480 --> 00:38:22,560 Speaker 1: something that I think that we have thought about often 622 00:38:22,760 --> 00:38:25,160 Speaker 1: over the years. So you're in the right place. And 623 00:38:25,239 --> 00:38:30,360 Speaker 1: hopefully our fellow listeners can help us find some specific 624 00:38:30,440 --> 00:38:34,120 Speaker 1: examples and we'll look to and hopefully we can make 625 00:38:34,160 --> 00:38:36,520 Speaker 1: that an episode in the future as well as an 626 00:38:36,520 --> 00:38:40,320 Speaker 1: episode on shot spot or uh. So, thank you chief, 627 00:38:40,360 --> 00:38:43,359 Speaker 1: thank you not to tweaker, thank you a frame, and 628 00:38:43,400 --> 00:38:47,720 Speaker 1: thanks to everyone for tuning in. Uh. We can't wait 629 00:38:47,760 --> 00:38:49,080 Speaker 1: for you to be a part of the show. 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