WEBVTT - Preparing for the Future of War

0:00:15.356 --> 0:00:22.516
<v Speaker 1>Pushkin. If you go to the front line of the

0:00:22.556 --> 0:00:26.356
<v Speaker 1>war in Ukraine and you look up, there's a very

0:00:26.356 --> 0:00:30.236
<v Speaker 1>good chance you'll see a drone. Could be a friendly drone,

0:00:30.676 --> 0:00:34.116
<v Speaker 1>could be an enemy drone, could be a reconnaissance drone,

0:00:34.716 --> 0:00:36.516
<v Speaker 1>or it could be a drone that is trying to

0:00:36.636 --> 0:00:39.796
<v Speaker 1>kill you. The war in Ukraine is the first war

0:00:39.876 --> 0:00:44.596
<v Speaker 1>in history where huge numbers of cheap drones powered largely

0:00:44.596 --> 0:00:48.276
<v Speaker 1>by commercial grade hardware and open source software, are playing

0:00:48.276 --> 0:00:53.516
<v Speaker 1>a central role. This technological change has profound implications. It

0:00:53.556 --> 0:00:57.156
<v Speaker 1>gives smaller countries like Ukraine new ways to fight, and

0:00:57.196 --> 0:01:00.836
<v Speaker 1>it means the militaries of big traditional powers military is

0:01:00.836 --> 0:01:04.756
<v Speaker 1>built on twentieth century technologies like tanks and aircraft carriers,

0:01:05.276 --> 0:01:14.876
<v Speaker 1>need to radically change just to keep up. I'm Jacob Goldstein,

0:01:14.956 --> 0:01:17.076
<v Speaker 1>and this is what's your problem. My guest today is

0:01:17.156 --> 0:01:20.996
<v Speaker 1>Christopher Kirkoff. Nine years ago, Christopher helped to start the

0:01:20.996 --> 0:01:24.836
<v Speaker 1>Defense Innovation Unit, a Defense Department office in Silicon Valley.

0:01:25.156 --> 0:01:28.836
<v Speaker 1>He currently works as an advisor there. Christopher says, in

0:01:28.876 --> 0:01:31.636
<v Speaker 1>many ways, the US military has failed to keep up

0:01:31.676 --> 0:01:35.676
<v Speaker 1>with the way military technology has changed. That fundamentally is

0:01:35.676 --> 0:01:38.596
<v Speaker 1>the problem. DIU is trying to solve how can the

0:01:38.676 --> 0:01:42.436
<v Speaker 1>giant bureaucracy that is the US military catch up with

0:01:42.516 --> 0:01:48.676
<v Speaker 1>the latest military technology. Christopher is a civilian. He had

0:01:48.676 --> 0:01:52.356
<v Speaker 1>a bunch of national security related jobs in the Obama administration,

0:01:52.876 --> 0:01:55.476
<v Speaker 1>and he recently co wrote a book about his work

0:01:55.556 --> 0:01:59.156
<v Speaker 1>at the Defense Innovation Unit, the DIIU. Christopher and I

0:01:59.276 --> 0:02:02.356
<v Speaker 1>talk about the book and the DIIU later in the interview,

0:02:02.796 --> 0:02:05.596
<v Speaker 1>but to start, we talked about the weapons and tech

0:02:05.756 --> 0:02:08.836
<v Speaker 1>being used in the war in Ukraine. So, I mean,

0:02:08.836 --> 0:02:12.876
<v Speaker 1>it's in some ways like the war in Ukraine. It

0:02:12.916 --> 0:02:16.516
<v Speaker 1>is some version of the war or the kind of

0:02:16.556 --> 0:02:20.196
<v Speaker 1>war you've been thinking about for a long time, years

0:02:20.236 --> 0:02:20.636
<v Speaker 1>and years.

0:02:21.356 --> 0:02:24.516
<v Speaker 2>Well, I've always looked at Ukraine, you know, at sort

0:02:24.516 --> 0:02:27.596
<v Speaker 2>of two levels. The first, of course, is that it's

0:02:27.636 --> 0:02:32.036
<v Speaker 2>just a very tragic and frankly needless war. You know,

0:02:32.076 --> 0:02:38.596
<v Speaker 2>there's there's very few reasons right ever to go to war,

0:02:38.836 --> 0:02:41.316
<v Speaker 2>and this is a particularly stupid war that's just going

0:02:41.356 --> 0:02:44.556
<v Speaker 2>to cost a lot of young men and women their lives.

0:02:45.276 --> 0:02:47.956
<v Speaker 2>So it's tragic, and I'm terribly sorry for the suffering

0:02:47.996 --> 0:02:50.316
<v Speaker 2>of the Ukrainian people, and frankly the suffering of the

0:02:50.356 --> 0:02:53.076
<v Speaker 2>young conscripted Russian soldiers as well, So let me just

0:02:53.196 --> 0:02:56.956
<v Speaker 2>say that to start. But the second way that I

0:02:56.956 --> 0:03:01.396
<v Speaker 2>look at Ukraine as you know, essentially a laboratory of war.

0:03:02.276 --> 0:03:06.676
<v Speaker 2>We saw in you know, a decade ago already the

0:03:06.796 --> 0:03:10.076
<v Speaker 2>rise of commercial technologies that it was it was obvious

0:03:10.156 --> 0:03:14.156
<v Speaker 2>could be weaponized and weaponized at scale. And I mean

0:03:14.196 --> 0:03:16.476
<v Speaker 2>I remember sitting on the e ring of the Pentagon

0:03:16.596 --> 0:03:21.236
<v Speaker 2>watching YouTube videos of drones, you know, first of all,

0:03:21.316 --> 0:03:24.636
<v Speaker 2>quad copters flying around, you know, first sinkly, then in pairs,

0:03:24.756 --> 0:03:28.116
<v Speaker 2>then doing dances, and it was really easy to imagine

0:03:29.036 --> 0:03:31.556
<v Speaker 2>that at some point in the future those drones could

0:03:31.596 --> 0:03:35.756
<v Speaker 2>themselves also be carrying payloads of various kinds. And not

0:03:35.796 --> 0:03:38.876
<v Speaker 2>only that, but I mean these are drones that you know,

0:03:38.916 --> 0:03:41.316
<v Speaker 2>you could order on Amazon, right, they were a few

0:03:41.436 --> 0:03:46.396
<v Speaker 2>hundred dollars, so they were incredibly inexpensive to begin experimenting with.

0:03:46.516 --> 0:03:51.636
<v Speaker 2>So all the ingredients were there for a complete revolution

0:03:52.076 --> 0:03:56.756
<v Speaker 2>in the tools with which which war could be fought,

0:03:57.516 --> 0:04:00.876
<v Speaker 2>and they came together kind of all at once in

0:04:00.916 --> 0:04:08.156
<v Speaker 2>a way when Russian armored columns began and advancing in Ukraine. Right.

0:04:08.316 --> 0:04:10.796
<v Speaker 1>I mean, it's it's kind of easy to forget now,

0:04:10.836 --> 0:04:15.316
<v Speaker 1>but it at the time when Russia invaded Ukraine, seems

0:04:15.356 --> 0:04:19.556
<v Speaker 1>like the basic conventional wisdom was, oh, giant country with

0:04:19.596 --> 0:04:23.676
<v Speaker 1>a huge army invading, They're going to win in a week.

0:04:24.236 --> 0:04:28.116
<v Speaker 1>And that didn't happen. I mean, what what role did

0:04:28.556 --> 0:04:32.236
<v Speaker 1>this sort of new set of technologies play in allowing

0:04:32.316 --> 0:04:33.756
<v Speaker 1>Ukraine to defend itself.

0:04:34.596 --> 0:04:37.756
<v Speaker 2>Well, you know that the technologies actually came into play

0:04:37.836 --> 0:04:42.596
<v Speaker 2>even before the invasion commenced. And one of the most

0:04:42.676 --> 0:04:45.196
<v Speaker 2>visible ways that came into play is I mean, this

0:04:45.276 --> 0:04:47.596
<v Speaker 2>is the first war in a way where there's so

0:04:47.716 --> 0:04:53.236
<v Speaker 2>many private imagery companies that have their own satellite constellations

0:04:53.236 --> 0:04:56.636
<v Speaker 2>that are beaming back to Earth high resolution imagery, resolution

0:04:56.756 --> 0:04:59.116
<v Speaker 2>of the order of what would have been, you know,

0:04:59.396 --> 0:05:03.316
<v Speaker 2>a Cold War spy satellite just a few years ago. Uh.

0:05:03.556 --> 0:05:07.756
<v Speaker 2>And this this importantly, this, these images weren't just going

0:05:07.836 --> 0:05:10.396
<v Speaker 2>to you know, the US government or to other militaries.

0:05:10.396 --> 0:05:13.196
<v Speaker 2>They were available to anybody that wanted to see them.

0:05:13.956 --> 0:05:18.756
<v Speaker 2>And so when Putin and the Kremlin was issuing statements

0:05:18.756 --> 0:05:21.276
<v Speaker 2>to the effect that no, they weren't going to invade Ukraine,

0:05:21.316 --> 0:05:24.316
<v Speaker 2>in fact, they were demobilizing the Russian military and preparing

0:05:24.356 --> 0:05:29.516
<v Speaker 2>to ship material back to Russia. By rail. The Biden

0:05:29.516 --> 0:05:34.716
<v Speaker 2>administration was able to release commercial imagery that showed no,

0:05:34.916 --> 0:05:38.556
<v Speaker 2>in fact, there's armored columns lining up on the border

0:05:38.996 --> 0:05:39.556
<v Speaker 2>ready to go.

0:05:40.196 --> 0:05:42.356
<v Speaker 1>Uh huh. I mean the fact that it was commercial

0:05:42.396 --> 0:05:45.316
<v Speaker 1>means you didn't even need the Biden administration, right like

0:05:45.476 --> 0:05:49.276
<v Speaker 1>anybody who paid for a subscription could see that the

0:05:49.356 --> 0:05:50.596
<v Speaker 1>Russian tanks were there.

0:05:50.476 --> 0:05:55.556
<v Speaker 2>Right exactly, and so and this carried on. Then so

0:05:55.596 --> 0:06:01.396
<v Speaker 2>the invasion begins and the Ukrainians not only have eyes

0:06:01.436 --> 0:06:06.356
<v Speaker 2>and ears from this commercial data fees, not just imagery,

0:06:06.436 --> 0:06:11.716
<v Speaker 2>but also radio frequency intelligence, and that gets paired quickly

0:06:11.796 --> 0:06:15.876
<v Speaker 2>with starlink at a moment when you know, the Russians

0:06:15.876 --> 0:06:18.836
<v Speaker 2>are using very advanced cyber attacks to attempt to take

0:06:18.876 --> 0:06:21.476
<v Speaker 2>down not only the Internet in Ukraine, but also the

0:06:21.476 --> 0:06:25.516
<v Speaker 2>command and control structure of the Ukrainian military. And what

0:06:26.036 --> 0:06:29.356
<v Speaker 2>then happened next was really quite unique and amazing. The

0:06:29.876 --> 0:06:36.276
<v Speaker 2>Ukrainian government had become quite adept at offering digital services

0:06:36.316 --> 0:06:39.676
<v Speaker 2>to its citizens, both through online websites and through a

0:06:39.716 --> 0:06:43.556
<v Speaker 2>smartphone app that the government built. In fact, Zelensky actually

0:06:43.636 --> 0:06:47.756
<v Speaker 2>campaigned as a somebody who would bring in a new

0:06:47.836 --> 0:06:51.956
<v Speaker 2>generation of digital services, whether it was taxes or you know,

0:06:51.996 --> 0:06:56.636
<v Speaker 2>the ability to incorporate online. So the Ukrainian government very

0:06:56.716 --> 0:07:01.036
<v Speaker 2>quickly reconfigure a smartphone app that Ukrainians used every day

0:07:01.116 --> 0:07:04.956
<v Speaker 2>in their ordinary lives to allow Ukrainians to be able

0:07:04.996 --> 0:07:07.236
<v Speaker 2>to send in spot reports of you know, I just

0:07:07.276 --> 0:07:10.076
<v Speaker 2>saw a tank column moving past my town.

0:07:10.436 --> 0:07:12.556
<v Speaker 1>You basically just pull out your phone and open your

0:07:12.596 --> 0:07:16.236
<v Speaker 1>app and instead of whatever, calling an uber, you say,

0:07:16.356 --> 0:07:17.316
<v Speaker 1>I just saw a tank.

0:07:17.476 --> 0:07:20.876
<v Speaker 2>Well, yeah, so the nickname for this became Uber for artillery.

0:07:21.476 --> 0:07:25.796
<v Speaker 2>It literally was possible for citizens to file a spot

0:07:25.876 --> 0:07:29.196
<v Speaker 2>report that went right away to a command center in

0:07:29.236 --> 0:07:33.596
<v Speaker 2>the Ministry of Defense, and artillery and other weapons were

0:07:33.596 --> 0:07:35.836
<v Speaker 2>literally dispatched on that information.

0:07:36.516 --> 0:07:41.036
<v Speaker 1>So, okay, So that's the sort of initial state of play.

0:07:41.676 --> 0:07:44.316
<v Speaker 1>And then there's this evolution, right it seems like it's

0:07:44.396 --> 0:07:47.356
<v Speaker 1>three years from now, a long time. There has been

0:07:47.396 --> 0:07:54.036
<v Speaker 1>this really intense yeah, evolution, innovation right on both sides.

0:07:54.276 --> 0:07:57.396
<v Speaker 1>Talk to me about that. How has how has technology

0:07:57.516 --> 0:08:00.716
<v Speaker 1>driven this sort of rapid evolution of war fighting over

0:08:00.756 --> 0:08:01.636
<v Speaker 1>the last few years.

0:08:02.156 --> 0:08:06.676
<v Speaker 2>Well, Ukraine has been described the Ukrainian military has been described,

0:08:06.916 --> 0:08:09.436
<v Speaker 2>you know, as a as a military that already came

0:08:09.476 --> 0:08:13.956
<v Speaker 2>with a silicon valley wing attached to it because Ukraine

0:08:14.516 --> 0:08:18.636
<v Speaker 2>over the last two decades has redefined itself as a

0:08:18.676 --> 0:08:23.036
<v Speaker 2>country of programmers. It has a large endemic IT industry

0:08:23.796 --> 0:08:27.036
<v Speaker 2>that was there before the war, and the Ukrainian government

0:08:27.076 --> 0:08:31.316
<v Speaker 2>was really smart in that it mobilized, of course, military

0:08:31.356 --> 0:08:34.476
<v Speaker 2>age males to serve It really is a citizen army

0:08:34.516 --> 0:08:37.636
<v Speaker 2>in that respect, but it took anybody that had engineering

0:08:37.716 --> 0:08:42.116
<v Speaker 2>or programming skills and it allowed them either to work

0:08:42.156 --> 0:08:45.596
<v Speaker 2>for a private company developing technology or to work for

0:08:45.636 --> 0:08:49.996
<v Speaker 2>the military developing technology. And so from the first weeks

0:08:49.996 --> 0:08:55.276
<v Speaker 2>of the war you had an incredible number of engineers

0:08:55.516 --> 0:09:01.956
<v Speaker 2>spitballing on how to develop indigenous technology that could take

0:09:01.996 --> 0:09:04.316
<v Speaker 2>on the Russians. And this mattered because as soon as

0:09:04.356 --> 0:09:08.836
<v Speaker 2>the Russians got their advanced electronic warfare systems to the

0:09:08.876 --> 0:09:12.316
<v Speaker 2>front and move them forward and turn them on even

0:09:12.516 --> 0:09:16.116
<v Speaker 2>advanced Western drones that either Ukraine already had in this

0:09:16.196 --> 0:09:18.516
<v Speaker 2>inventory or rushed in and the opening weeks of the

0:09:18.516 --> 0:09:23.716
<v Speaker 2>war became essentially ineffective because they were not programmed nor

0:09:23.756 --> 0:09:26.476
<v Speaker 2>did they have the sensors on them to be able

0:09:26.556 --> 0:09:31.556
<v Speaker 2>to defeat the extremely advanced Russian countermeasures that were immediately

0:09:31.636 --> 0:09:31.996
<v Speaker 2>rolled out.

0:09:32.036 --> 0:09:34.956
<v Speaker 1>So the Russians were essentially jamming the drones in some way.

0:09:34.996 --> 0:09:38.436
<v Speaker 1>They had some kind of technology that rendered sort of

0:09:38.436 --> 0:09:43.116
<v Speaker 1>off the shelf or even military grade drones ineffective.

0:09:43.356 --> 0:09:46.596
<v Speaker 2>The jamming was so powerful that if you were in

0:09:46.756 --> 0:09:49.556
<v Speaker 2>Kiev and you say you were on the third or

0:09:49.596 --> 0:09:51.836
<v Speaker 2>fourth form of a hotel and you tried to order

0:09:51.996 --> 0:09:57.476
<v Speaker 2>an uber your location on the map in the Uber app,

0:09:57.476 --> 0:09:59.676
<v Speaker 2>which show up in the middle of the Indian Ocean.

0:10:00.036 --> 0:10:04.396
<v Speaker 2>Because the GPS jamming was so effective that even in cities,

0:10:04.796 --> 0:10:07.356
<v Speaker 2>it wasn't possible to pick up a reliable signal that

0:10:07.396 --> 0:10:10.276
<v Speaker 2>you know, cities that were hundred miles from the front.

0:10:10.956 --> 0:10:16.076
<v Speaker 2>So at the front, the electromagnetic spectrum was just flooded

0:10:16.116 --> 0:10:21.956
<v Speaker 2>with energy and that caused right away, it touched off

0:10:21.996 --> 0:10:28.596
<v Speaker 2>this technology race to invent drones that could essentially fly

0:10:28.716 --> 0:10:33.236
<v Speaker 2>on their own, even through incredibly intense jamming. And so

0:10:33.316 --> 0:10:36.236
<v Speaker 2>the Ukrainians and it was remarkable to go see when

0:10:36.716 --> 0:10:38.596
<v Speaker 2>my co author Radshaw and I got a chance to

0:10:38.676 --> 0:10:43.556
<v Speaker 2>visit Ukraine a year and a half ago, we went

0:10:43.676 --> 0:10:47.116
<v Speaker 2>to a number of drone companies and they have essentially

0:10:47.276 --> 0:10:51.196
<v Speaker 2>the Ukrainians in a matter of months, recreated the entire

0:10:51.836 --> 0:10:56.556
<v Speaker 2>American Cold War precision strike complex that we first got

0:10:56.556 --> 0:11:00.516
<v Speaker 2>to know so well in the original Gulf War, where

0:11:00.556 --> 0:11:03.756
<v Speaker 2>we all of a sudden were dropping bombs down chimneys.

0:11:03.796 --> 0:11:08.836
<v Speaker 2>So the Ukrainians have an essence, used a combination of

0:11:09.196 --> 0:11:15.236
<v Speaker 2>open source software and low cost hardware to recreate everything

0:11:15.356 --> 0:11:19.396
<v Speaker 2>from the function of our a wax planes. These are

0:11:19.476 --> 0:11:24.076
<v Speaker 2>the airline looking airplanes with the giant raidardomes on top

0:11:24.196 --> 0:11:27.996
<v Speaker 2>that provide a kind of God's eye view of the battlefield.

0:11:28.316 --> 0:11:31.356
<v Speaker 2>So they literally have drones whose sole purpose is to

0:11:31.436 --> 0:11:35.596
<v Speaker 2>keep track of large parts of the battlefield to other

0:11:36.356 --> 0:11:41.956
<v Speaker 2>smaller surveillance drones that will go take pictures of a

0:11:41.996 --> 0:11:46.116
<v Speaker 2>specific area that the Ukrainians want to target. They'll relay

0:11:46.156 --> 0:11:49.316
<v Speaker 2>that imagery back kind of almost like miniature YouTube spy

0:11:49.596 --> 0:11:54.076
<v Speaker 2>planes flying and dropping film canisters and whatnot, and they'll

0:11:54.156 --> 0:11:57.356
<v Speaker 2>quickly be able to then load the images of Russian

0:11:57.356 --> 0:12:01.916
<v Speaker 2>targets that they want to hit up onto killer drones

0:12:02.236 --> 0:12:06.156
<v Speaker 2>that will then use image recognition and terrain following software

0:12:06.956 --> 0:12:11.556
<v Speaker 2>to go hunt and find the target. It's with fully

0:12:11.796 --> 0:12:14.756
<v Speaker 2>you know autonomy on fully autonomous routes right that don't

0:12:14.796 --> 0:12:18.436
<v Speaker 2>require phoning home for them either to navigate or have

0:12:18.476 --> 0:12:22.036
<v Speaker 2>permission to engage. On top of that, you actually have

0:12:22.116 --> 0:12:26.196
<v Speaker 2>the Ukrainians using open source software to fuse different sensor streams,

0:12:26.276 --> 0:12:29.876
<v Speaker 2>so you can have a Ukrainian commander that on a

0:12:29.916 --> 0:12:33.596
<v Speaker 2>tablet computer in front of them has data feeds from

0:12:33.876 --> 0:12:37.516
<v Speaker 2>surveillance drones that that are relaying video in real time

0:12:37.676 --> 0:12:45.916
<v Speaker 2>to maps of the electronic warfare spectrum. You know. So

0:12:45.996 --> 0:12:48.756
<v Speaker 2>it's really incredible what they've been able to do for

0:12:49.316 --> 0:12:52.956
<v Speaker 2>essentially pennies on the dollar of what the American military

0:12:53.076 --> 0:12:56.076
<v Speaker 2>is spent to recreate the same technological stack.

0:12:56.836 --> 0:12:59.316
<v Speaker 1>So you went to Ukraine a year and a half

0:12:59.396 --> 0:13:02.356
<v Speaker 1>ago or so. You mentioned a couple of the places

0:13:02.396 --> 0:13:04.956
<v Speaker 1>you visited. One of them is sort of a had

0:13:04.996 --> 0:13:08.196
<v Speaker 1>been the Ukrainian version of like best Buy right and

0:13:08.316 --> 0:13:10.356
<v Speaker 1>had been transfer warmed. Tell me about that.

0:13:11.116 --> 0:13:14.636
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it was wild running around the city of Kiev

0:13:15.516 --> 0:13:19.756
<v Speaker 2>visiting a number of the places that the government had

0:13:19.796 --> 0:13:23.356
<v Speaker 2>commandeered for the war effort. And so one of these

0:13:23.356 --> 0:13:26.836
<v Speaker 2>places was an all literal you know, Ukraine's version of

0:13:26.876 --> 0:13:29.356
<v Speaker 2>Best Buy, a big box store essentially on the wall

0:13:29.396 --> 0:13:33.916
<v Speaker 2>were still signed saying you know, televisions, appliances, you know,

0:13:34.036 --> 0:13:37.316
<v Speaker 2>there were ads for washing machines, you know, on the walls,

0:13:37.356 --> 0:13:39.276
<v Speaker 2>like walking to the Best Buy, but instead of there

0:13:39.316 --> 0:13:41.356
<v Speaker 2>being a whole bunch of electronics for you to buy,

0:13:42.116 --> 0:13:45.356
<v Speaker 2>there were benches, work benches laid out in an assembly

0:13:45.436 --> 0:13:50.636
<v Speaker 2>a line style rows and this particular electronics store was

0:13:50.676 --> 0:13:55.356
<v Speaker 2>being used to mass produce quad copter Kamakazi drones. So

0:13:55.676 --> 0:13:58.036
<v Speaker 2>at one end of the assembly line you would start

0:13:58.076 --> 0:14:01.796
<v Speaker 2>with the frame of the drone and by the time

0:14:01.796 --> 0:14:03.396
<v Speaker 2>he got to the other end, you would have a

0:14:03.476 --> 0:14:07.916
<v Speaker 2>completely working drone with communications software ready to be mated

0:14:08.516 --> 0:14:13.396
<v Speaker 2>with either an anti personnel charge or a shaped charge

0:14:13.476 --> 0:14:16.076
<v Speaker 2>to go through armor, you know, a couple of kilogram

0:14:16.196 --> 0:14:20.076
<v Speaker 2>charge that would create these inexpensive mass produced quad copters

0:14:20.116 --> 0:14:21.716
<v Speaker 2>into quite potent weapons.

0:14:23.116 --> 0:14:25.996
<v Speaker 1>When you say a charge, should I think bomb? It's

0:14:26.076 --> 0:14:27.276
<v Speaker 1>basically a little.

0:14:27.036 --> 0:14:29.196
<v Speaker 2>Bomb, right, yeah, larger than a grenade.

0:14:29.396 --> 0:14:32.956
<v Speaker 1>Yeah. And then it would so go out to the

0:14:32.956 --> 0:14:34.756
<v Speaker 1>front and they'd put the bomb on it and they'd

0:14:35.036 --> 0:14:38.596
<v Speaker 1>go crash it into a Russian tank or something like that.

0:14:38.996 --> 0:14:42.356
<v Speaker 2>They sure would. And this goes back to the incredibly

0:14:44.276 --> 0:14:48.156
<v Speaker 2>novel hybrid warfare that we're seeing in Ukraine, where yes,

0:14:48.316 --> 0:14:51.956
<v Speaker 2>there are you know, in many respects, the war in

0:14:52.076 --> 0:14:55.156
<v Speaker 2>Ukraine is a. There is a lot of continuities with

0:14:55.196 --> 0:14:57.596
<v Speaker 2>the First and the Second World War. There are trench lines,

0:14:57.636 --> 0:15:01.636
<v Speaker 2>there is artillery, there are tanks and mechanize differenttry that

0:15:01.876 --> 0:15:04.756
<v Speaker 2>are moving around. But at the same time in the

0:15:04.836 --> 0:15:08.716
<v Speaker 2>trenches are drone pilots and they are launching armed drones

0:15:08.756 --> 0:15:14.196
<v Speaker 2>and sense drones that are watching enemy movements behind enemy lines.

0:15:14.276 --> 0:15:18.116
<v Speaker 2>And so the battle you know in World War One

0:15:18.196 --> 0:15:21.236
<v Speaker 2>or World War Two typically happened at the front where

0:15:21.316 --> 0:15:25.356
<v Speaker 2>forces actually came into contact with one another. Today, Joan

0:15:25.356 --> 0:15:27.956
<v Speaker 2>Wolfire is pushing the battle behind the front.

0:15:28.396 --> 0:15:31.036
<v Speaker 1>It makes the front sort of more porous exactly.

0:15:31.156 --> 0:15:35.156
<v Speaker 2>So if you were, example, you know, a Russian armor unit,

0:15:35.196 --> 0:15:39.156
<v Speaker 2>and you're trying to advance into Ukrainian territory, you have

0:15:39.236 --> 0:15:43.276
<v Speaker 2>to bring your tanks and your armored personal carriers with

0:15:43.396 --> 0:15:47.396
<v Speaker 2>your infantry towards the front. Well, the Ukrainian has gone

0:15:47.396 --> 0:15:51.156
<v Speaker 2>in the habit of using their inexpensive kamikaze drones to

0:15:51.236 --> 0:15:54.756
<v Speaker 2>loiter and track armored personal carriers, and at the moment

0:15:54.876 --> 0:15:58.076
<v Speaker 2>at which troops would disembark the armored personal carrier to

0:15:58.716 --> 0:16:03.676
<v Speaker 2>move towards the front, they would strike. So this you know,

0:16:03.796 --> 0:16:07.396
<v Speaker 2>lawn range or sort of short range precisions. Strike has

0:16:07.476 --> 0:16:11.036
<v Speaker 2>completely changed how the war is being fought. It's being

0:16:11.076 --> 0:16:13.756
<v Speaker 2>fought unlike any other war in modern times.

0:16:14.476 --> 0:16:16.196
<v Speaker 1>So the war has been going on for a few years.

0:16:16.956 --> 0:16:20.636
<v Speaker 1>Both Russia and Ukraine have clearly been learning and you know,

0:16:20.716 --> 0:16:23.996
<v Speaker 1>developing new technology at this incredibly rapid pace. How does

0:16:24.036 --> 0:16:27.116
<v Speaker 1>the war in Ukraine look different now than it did

0:16:27.676 --> 0:16:30.396
<v Speaker 1>three years ago or two years ago shortly after it started.

0:16:31.196 --> 0:16:34.116
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, well, we're you know, back to a place that's

0:16:35.476 --> 0:16:39.236
<v Speaker 2>a well known place to historians, to military historians, where

0:16:40.156 --> 0:16:46.276
<v Speaker 2>you know, there was an initial explosion of conflict in

0:16:46.316 --> 0:16:51.876
<v Speaker 2>the in the confused invasion, where massive Russian armored columns

0:16:52.196 --> 0:16:54.276
<v Speaker 2>rushed in at multiple points in the country. They were

0:16:54.316 --> 0:16:58.756
<v Speaker 2>ultimately beaten back to a certain point. Those lines, you know,

0:16:59.236 --> 0:17:04.036
<v Speaker 2>over time came to freeze. Because each side has very

0:17:04.076 --> 0:17:10.076
<v Speaker 2>potent precision strike weapons, it's very hard to change those lines.

0:17:10.116 --> 0:17:13.476
<v Speaker 2>In other words, the defense in a way has an advantage.

0:17:14.476 --> 0:17:18.716
<v Speaker 2>It's very very hard to use offensive mass to gain territory,

0:17:18.756 --> 0:17:22.436
<v Speaker 2>which is why we've seen the battle lines not shift

0:17:22.596 --> 0:17:25.276
<v Speaker 2>all that much after they settled in the initial months

0:17:25.276 --> 0:17:27.716
<v Speaker 2>of the year. But what's going on behind them has

0:17:27.716 --> 0:17:34.796
<v Speaker 2>been this incredible combat through cycles of innovation, who can

0:17:35.316 --> 0:17:38.516
<v Speaker 2>come up with better electronic countermeasures, who can come up

0:17:38.556 --> 0:17:41.396
<v Speaker 2>with the next generation of drones that will defeat them?

0:17:41.636 --> 0:17:43.796
<v Speaker 2>And so both the Russians and the Ukrainians have been

0:17:43.836 --> 0:17:48.596
<v Speaker 2>innovating behind the front lines and then bringing that technology forward.

0:17:48.836 --> 0:17:51.396
<v Speaker 1>Does the world look different in some way now than

0:17:51.436 --> 0:17:52.956
<v Speaker 1>it did a couple of years ago? Or is it

0:17:52.996 --> 0:17:56.716
<v Speaker 1>different on such a subtle level, like the gpsgmming is

0:17:56.756 --> 0:17:58.836
<v Speaker 1>better and the countermeasures are better, and so the net

0:17:58.836 --> 0:18:01.316
<v Speaker 1>effect is the same.

0:18:02.236 --> 0:18:06.116
<v Speaker 2>I say, it's different in pretty dramatic ways. So today

0:18:06.956 --> 0:18:12.076
<v Speaker 2>there are such effect of small scale Kamakazi drones that

0:18:12.796 --> 0:18:18.156
<v Speaker 2>they can effectively hunt individuals. So we are truly today

0:18:18.316 --> 0:18:22.556
<v Speaker 2>in a black Mere episode where if you're a civilian

0:18:22.876 --> 0:18:26.516
<v Speaker 2>at a border city near the front, or a soldier

0:18:27.236 --> 0:18:30.876
<v Speaker 2>at the front, you are in danger of every time

0:18:30.916 --> 0:18:34.916
<v Speaker 2>you leave the bunker or leave your house literally being

0:18:34.956 --> 0:18:37.036
<v Speaker 2>pursued by a drone that's trying to kill you.

0:18:37.156 --> 0:18:39.876
<v Speaker 1>I mean, how do you survive a kamakazi drone attack?

0:18:40.356 --> 0:18:44.556
<v Speaker 2>You essentially have to take cover and so oftentimes you

0:18:44.596 --> 0:18:48.916
<v Speaker 2>know the sound of a drone buzzing, you know, And

0:18:48.956 --> 0:18:51.316
<v Speaker 2>this is a challenge, right because on every square mile

0:18:51.356 --> 0:18:54.756
<v Speaker 2>of the front, they're probably a dozen or more drones

0:18:54.796 --> 0:18:56.396
<v Speaker 2>in the air at any given time.

0:18:56.756 --> 0:18:59.196
<v Speaker 1>So if you're fighting this where there's basically always a

0:18:59.276 --> 0:19:01.796
<v Speaker 1>drone flying over your head and maybe it's coming to

0:19:01.916 --> 0:19:04.476
<v Speaker 1>kill you personally, and maybe it's not.

0:19:04.876 --> 0:19:09.756
<v Speaker 2>The airspace on both sides of the lines incredibly overrun

0:19:09.916 --> 0:19:12.676
<v Speaker 2>with drones. I mean they are literally smacking it to

0:19:12.796 --> 0:19:15.996
<v Speaker 2>each other in the air. It's like flocks of birds

0:19:16.076 --> 0:19:19.756
<v Speaker 2>at this point. So so no, the changes we're seeing, frankly,

0:19:19.916 --> 0:19:22.316
<v Speaker 2>are not subtle at all. They're quite dramatic.

0:19:22.956 --> 0:19:26.276
<v Speaker 1>So what does the US learn from the war in Ukraine.

0:19:27.156 --> 0:19:29.516
<v Speaker 2>It's woken the United States and our allies up in

0:19:29.796 --> 0:19:33.516
<v Speaker 2>two very profound ways. The first is that, you know,

0:19:33.516 --> 0:19:38.316
<v Speaker 2>it turns out we had not been stockpiling adequate material

0:19:38.596 --> 0:19:41.836
<v Speaker 2>for war, whether it was howards to shells or anti

0:19:41.876 --> 0:19:48.276
<v Speaker 2>tank missiles or sophisticated rockets we had basically you know,

0:19:48.396 --> 0:19:50.876
<v Speaker 2>ran to the storage cupboard and found it to be

0:19:50.996 --> 0:19:54.836
<v Speaker 2>almost bare. And that's very alarming. You know, it happened

0:19:54.836 --> 0:19:57.436
<v Speaker 2>because of course munitions, when the budget gets tired, it's

0:19:57.476 --> 0:19:59.676
<v Speaker 2>easy to say, oh, we'll buy more next year. So

0:19:59.716 --> 0:20:01.836
<v Speaker 2>that's how we ended up in that situation. So we

0:20:02.236 --> 0:20:05.636
<v Speaker 2>discovered a crisis actually of military readiness on our side,

0:20:05.956 --> 0:20:09.196
<v Speaker 2>and we discovered a manufacturing base more than that that

0:20:09.476 --> 0:20:13.236
<v Speaker 2>was not easily able to be mobilized because many factories

0:20:13.236 --> 0:20:16.476
<v Speaker 2>that produce these weapons had been idle for years or

0:20:16.516 --> 0:20:19.756
<v Speaker 2>even shuttered. And in a world in which supply chains

0:20:19.796 --> 0:20:23.276
<v Speaker 2>are threatened globally, if you can't assume the seas are

0:20:23.316 --> 0:20:25.156
<v Speaker 2>going to be saved for transit, you have to be

0:20:25.196 --> 0:20:30.556
<v Speaker 2>able to manufacture this weaponry within your borders. But there

0:20:30.636 --> 0:20:33.076
<v Speaker 2>was an even more profound wake up call, and let's

0:20:33.116 --> 0:20:35.876
<v Speaker 2>just go back to the use of Kamakazi drones. We

0:20:35.996 --> 0:20:39.476
<v Speaker 2>gave the Ukrainians very early in the war and one

0:20:39.636 --> 0:20:43.236
<v Speaker 2>A one Abraham's battle tanks. These are the most sophisticated

0:20:43.316 --> 0:20:47.276
<v Speaker 2>battle tank in the world. We've all seen pictures of them.

0:20:48.196 --> 0:20:50.476
<v Speaker 2>You can be driving down the highway in an Abram's

0:20:50.796 --> 0:20:52.756
<v Speaker 2>battle tank at seventy miles an hour and you can

0:20:52.756 --> 0:20:55.516
<v Speaker 2>decide which window of a skyscraper to put around through them.

0:20:55.556 --> 0:20:58.956
<v Speaker 2>It's an incredible piece of hardware. And almost all thirty

0:20:58.956 --> 0:21:01.996
<v Speaker 2>one of those tanks have been destroyed or disabled by

0:21:02.076 --> 0:21:05.156
<v Speaker 2>Russian Kamakazi drones that each cost no more than a

0:21:05.156 --> 0:21:06.396
<v Speaker 2>few thousand dollars a piece.

0:21:07.076 --> 0:21:09.956
<v Speaker 1>And what's the tank cost the tankst.

0:21:09.436 --> 0:21:11.756
<v Speaker 2>Oh gosh, I don't know, twelve or fifteen million dollars

0:21:11.836 --> 0:21:16.596
<v Speaker 2>or maybe more. So that tells me another military strategist,

0:21:17.276 --> 0:21:21.996
<v Speaker 2>that if you're an army who bought a lot of tanks,

0:21:22.116 --> 0:21:25.836
<v Speaker 2>and you presume that your military strength comes from those tanks,

0:21:26.436 --> 0:21:29.916
<v Speaker 2>you could easily be surprised by an adversary using really

0:21:29.956 --> 0:21:32.876
<v Speaker 2>an expensive Kama Coze drones. In other words, the era

0:21:34.236 --> 0:21:37.676
<v Speaker 2>of manned mechanized warfare is over. In the same way

0:21:37.716 --> 0:21:41.116
<v Speaker 2>that during the First World War, tanks showed us that

0:21:41.156 --> 0:21:43.956
<v Speaker 2>the cavalry age was coming to a close, we are

0:21:43.996 --> 0:21:46.916
<v Speaker 2>now at the end of the era of the battle tank.

0:21:47.676 --> 0:21:51.596
<v Speaker 1>So you're sayings, tanks now are about as useful as

0:21:51.596 --> 0:21:59.836
<v Speaker 1>horses were in nineteen fifteen. Yes, what do we do

0:21:59.916 --> 0:22:03.276
<v Speaker 1>about that? What does that mean for the United States?

0:22:04.356 --> 0:22:11.276
<v Speaker 2>Well, the reason why my cousin I wrote a book

0:22:11.356 --> 0:22:14.556
<v Speaker 2>all about just how far behind the US military finds

0:22:14.596 --> 0:22:21.476
<v Speaker 2>itself is that this phenomena of less expensive technology overcoming

0:22:22.476 --> 0:22:25.556
<v Speaker 2>legacy weapons systems, you know, the sort of building blocks

0:22:25.596 --> 0:22:29.116
<v Speaker 2>of the Cold War American military isn't true just for tanks,

0:22:29.676 --> 0:22:32.316
<v Speaker 2>And in fact we're already seeing this in Ukraine, where

0:22:32.316 --> 0:22:36.436
<v Speaker 2>the Russian black sea fleet is today being kept in

0:22:36.636 --> 0:22:44.716
<v Speaker 2>port by Ukrainians ingenious use of autonomous boats that are

0:22:45.316 --> 0:22:50.196
<v Speaker 2>carrying payloads of high explosives that have rammed in and

0:22:50.276 --> 0:22:54.396
<v Speaker 2>sunk the largest Russian ship, the Moskova on the black seat.

0:22:55.076 --> 0:22:58.796
<v Speaker 2>So the naval strategists called the Russian fleet now being

0:22:58.836 --> 0:23:01.276
<v Speaker 2>a fleet in being, it's a fleet kept in port

0:23:01.716 --> 0:23:05.596
<v Speaker 2>because of cheap autonomous technology. So, in other words, many

0:23:05.636 --> 0:23:12.556
<v Speaker 2>of the Americans most powerful militaries systems, aircraft carriers, battle tanks,

0:23:12.636 --> 0:23:16.716
<v Speaker 2>battleships may now no longer be as effective as they

0:23:16.756 --> 0:23:18.756
<v Speaker 2>were just a few years ago.

0:23:19.116 --> 0:23:22.076
<v Speaker 1>I mean so in terms of changing the equilibrium. Is

0:23:22.076 --> 0:23:26.116
<v Speaker 1>the effect of essentially autonomous technology drones and then ship

0:23:26.196 --> 0:23:31.036
<v Speaker 1>drones to give more power to countries with less money.

0:23:31.956 --> 0:23:33.156
<v Speaker 1>Is that one effect?

0:23:33.396 --> 0:23:36.876
<v Speaker 2>Well, there's two effects. So the first and most obvious

0:23:36.876 --> 0:23:41.316
<v Speaker 2>effect is that a country with fewer financial resources can

0:23:41.996 --> 0:23:46.836
<v Speaker 2>amass larger degrees of military power. But there's a second

0:23:46.836 --> 0:23:51.316
<v Speaker 2>and more insidious effect, which is that militaries are inherently

0:23:51.356 --> 0:23:55.876
<v Speaker 2>conservative institutions for a couple of reasons. One, war is

0:23:55.916 --> 0:24:00.676
<v Speaker 2>a very unforgiving teacher. And it's almost impossible through just

0:24:00.756 --> 0:24:04.676
<v Speaker 2>simulations alone to actually replicate combat conditions. And so you

0:24:04.756 --> 0:24:07.636
<v Speaker 2>can test, you can test new systems all you want,

0:24:07.676 --> 0:24:09.676
<v Speaker 2>but you won't actually have the com evident. So they're

0:24:09.676 --> 0:24:11.156
<v Speaker 2>going to work in the way you suspect them to

0:24:11.636 --> 0:24:13.476
<v Speaker 2>work or want them to work until you go to war.

0:24:14.116 --> 0:24:18.196
<v Speaker 2>So this is what leads militaries to almost always perpetually

0:24:18.236 --> 0:24:21.636
<v Speaker 2>be overfocused on winning the last war rather than winning

0:24:21.676 --> 0:24:23.036
<v Speaker 2>the war. That's the cop.

0:24:26.236 --> 0:24:28.796
<v Speaker 1>Still to come on the show. Why the US military

0:24:28.956 --> 0:24:31.436
<v Speaker 1>is not ready to fight a war right now according

0:24:31.436 --> 0:24:45.476
<v Speaker 1>to Chris, and what it might take to change that. So, okay,

0:24:45.516 --> 0:24:48.236
<v Speaker 1>there is this problem right the US military is not

0:24:48.396 --> 0:24:51.556
<v Speaker 1>really keeping up with technological change. And this is a

0:24:51.596 --> 0:24:54.396
<v Speaker 1>problem that Christopher has been working on for a while now.

0:24:54.796 --> 0:24:56.836
<v Speaker 1>It's a key part of the reason he was tapped

0:24:56.876 --> 0:25:00.396
<v Speaker 1>to help launch the Defense Innovation Unit back in twenty sixteen,

0:25:01.316 --> 0:25:03.236
<v Speaker 1>and to kind of set the scene here right to

0:25:03.236 --> 0:25:05.876
<v Speaker 1>give a sense of what he and his colleagues were

0:25:05.916 --> 0:25:08.076
<v Speaker 1>up against, what they were trying to change when they

0:25:08.156 --> 0:25:11.756
<v Speaker 1>launched the Defense Inovation Unit. I asked Christopher about this

0:25:11.876 --> 0:25:14.876
<v Speaker 1>story that he and his co author tell in their book,

0:25:15.436 --> 0:25:18.036
<v Speaker 1>it's the story of something they saw at the US

0:25:18.076 --> 0:25:22.276
<v Speaker 1>military's Combined Air Operations Center in Katar.

0:25:22.956 --> 0:25:27.876
<v Speaker 2>So the Combined Air Operations Center is this nerve center

0:25:28.036 --> 0:25:31.996
<v Speaker 2>that is in charge of running all air operations in

0:25:32.076 --> 0:25:35.356
<v Speaker 2>the Middle East in an area that's actually larger than

0:25:35.396 --> 0:25:40.396
<v Speaker 2>the lower forty eight States. And so any plane, any missile,

0:25:40.956 --> 0:25:45.116
<v Speaker 2>any air strike that goes on in this extraordinary piece

0:25:45.196 --> 0:25:50.316
<v Speaker 2>of geography is the responsibility of a set of airmen

0:25:51.076 --> 0:25:55.076
<v Speaker 2>and women that operate in a base in Qatar. And

0:25:55.516 --> 0:25:59.516
<v Speaker 2>in twenty sixteen, you'll remember, there was a crisis in

0:25:59.516 --> 0:26:05.636
<v Speaker 2>the Middle East. Isis was storming through countries, was encircling

0:26:05.756 --> 0:26:09.436
<v Speaker 2>the Iraqi population in Mosul, was trying to prosecut the

0:26:09.516 --> 0:26:13.116
<v Speaker 2>largest genocide of the twenty first century against the Ziti

0:26:13.196 --> 0:26:17.716
<v Speaker 2>people who were trapped on Mountain Jar. And these civilians

0:26:17.756 --> 0:26:22.236
<v Speaker 2>were kept alive only by an extraordinary campaign of US

0:26:22.276 --> 0:26:28.636
<v Speaker 2>air strikes. We were striking ISIS forces every few minutes

0:26:28.956 --> 0:26:31.636
<v Speaker 2>twenty four to seven for weeks on end, in a

0:26:31.676 --> 0:26:36.516
<v Speaker 2>bombing campaign that's the highest intensity in history. And to

0:26:36.556 --> 0:26:39.316
<v Speaker 2>sustain a bombing campaign of this you have to have,

0:26:39.356 --> 0:26:42.236
<v Speaker 2>of course fighter aircraft and surveillance, but you also have

0:26:42.316 --> 0:26:46.316
<v Speaker 2>to have refueling tankers. These fighter jets are gas guzzlers.

0:26:46.756 --> 0:26:49.876
<v Speaker 2>They need to refill their gas tanks every forty minutes

0:26:49.956 --> 0:26:53.036
<v Speaker 2>or so, and to do that they have to mate

0:26:53.116 --> 0:26:56.476
<v Speaker 2>up with air refueling tankers. And this is actually a

0:26:56.596 --> 0:27:00.116
<v Speaker 2>very complex thing to figure out because fighters come in

0:27:00.196 --> 0:27:03.316
<v Speaker 2>different types, they refuel at different altitudes, they have different

0:27:03.356 --> 0:27:07.116
<v Speaker 2>nozzles on them, and if you have hundreds of aircraft

0:27:07.516 --> 0:27:11.876
<v Speaker 2>a day aloft operating in combat support roles, you need

0:27:12.236 --> 0:27:17.556
<v Speaker 2>dozens of tankers to refuel them. So how did the

0:27:17.836 --> 0:27:22.876
<v Speaker 2>Air Force men and women in uniform and guitar orchestrate

0:27:23.556 --> 0:27:28.116
<v Speaker 2>the complex planning of tanker routes. Well, they used a whiteboard.

0:27:29.036 --> 0:27:34.916
<v Speaker 2>We showed up in twenty sixteen and found people essentially

0:27:34.956 --> 0:27:37.316
<v Speaker 2>operating like we did in World War Two, except instead

0:27:37.356 --> 0:27:42.876
<v Speaker 2>of having a chalkboard and magnets, we had a whiteboard.

0:27:43.156 --> 0:27:45.916
<v Speaker 2>And they were having to do all these calculations by hand,

0:27:46.636 --> 0:27:49.876
<v Speaker 2>which took an enormous number of hours. Why by hand

0:27:50.196 --> 0:27:52.756
<v Speaker 2>because the computer program that was supposed to do this

0:27:53.276 --> 0:27:55.956
<v Speaker 2>had broken and they were waiting for an upgrade. But

0:27:55.996 --> 0:27:59.076
<v Speaker 2>they had been waiting seven years for an upgrade that

0:27:59.116 --> 0:28:01.476
<v Speaker 2>one of the large defense companies was in charge of

0:28:01.836 --> 0:28:04.996
<v Speaker 2>developing that was way of rebudget and way behind schedule.

0:28:05.156 --> 0:28:07.156
<v Speaker 1>They'd been waiting seven years for an upgrade, and they

0:28:07.156 --> 0:28:10.156
<v Speaker 1>were in the middle of this like multi multi million

0:28:10.236 --> 0:28:15.116
<v Speaker 1>dollar command center the US had built, coordinating hundreds of

0:28:15.156 --> 0:28:16.716
<v Speaker 1>flights all the time.

0:28:16.796 --> 0:28:20.316
<v Speaker 2>It gets worse. So the minute that there's a deviation

0:28:20.596 --> 0:28:24.396
<v Speaker 2>from the plan, whether that's bad weather or you know,

0:28:24.996 --> 0:28:27.956
<v Speaker 2>unexpected combat operations in a different area than you'd plan

0:28:28.076 --> 0:28:30.436
<v Speaker 2>for now you have to redo the calculations on the fly.

0:28:31.156 --> 0:28:34.596
<v Speaker 2>So this is actually introducing a lot of unneeded risk

0:28:34.956 --> 0:28:37.756
<v Speaker 2>in our combat operations that that only puts it risk

0:28:38.676 --> 0:28:40.796
<v Speaker 2>the men and women of the US military, but also

0:28:40.836 --> 0:28:43.796
<v Speaker 2>puts it risk the forces on the ground that we're

0:28:43.796 --> 0:28:46.116
<v Speaker 2>trying to protect, where the civilians were trying to defend.

0:28:46.756 --> 0:28:50.356
<v Speaker 1>You describe like somewhere in the process, there'd be like

0:28:50.356 --> 0:28:53.196
<v Speaker 1>somebody with one spreadsheet and then there was another spreadsheet,

0:28:53.196 --> 0:28:56.596
<v Speaker 1>but like the two spreadsheets couldn't like talk to each other, right,

0:28:56.636 --> 0:28:58.676
<v Speaker 1>so somebody had to read out the numbers to get

0:28:58.716 --> 0:29:01.996
<v Speaker 1>it from one spreadsheet to the other. You describe extra

0:29:02.676 --> 0:29:07.036
<v Speaker 1>refueling flights all the time because they couldn't, you know,

0:29:07.196 --> 0:29:10.276
<v Speaker 1>process the data fast enough essentially by hand.

0:29:10.516 --> 0:29:14.036
<v Speaker 2>There, they had multiple different databases they had to manually

0:29:14.036 --> 0:29:17.716
<v Speaker 2>fuel fuse together. Somebody would literally stand behind the computer

0:29:17.796 --> 0:29:20.076
<v Speaker 2>operator to make sure they were typing in the numbers right,

0:29:20.516 --> 0:29:23.956
<v Speaker 2>and it would take fifty person hours to put together

0:29:24.356 --> 0:29:28.796
<v Speaker 2>the refueling plan for the next day. So we realized

0:29:28.836 --> 0:29:32.156
<v Speaker 2>this was an opportunity to show what Silicon Valley does best,

0:29:32.196 --> 0:29:37.116
<v Speaker 2>which is rapid iteration using software to create an optimization

0:29:37.196 --> 0:29:39.156
<v Speaker 2>algorithm that could solve this in seconds.

0:29:39.596 --> 0:29:41.836
<v Speaker 1>Why hadn't they just fixed it? Let me ask the

0:29:41.956 --> 0:29:45.396
<v Speaker 1>naive question, like, it's not as a technical matter, it's

0:29:45.476 --> 0:29:47.556
<v Speaker 1>not a hard problem. What was the actual problem.

0:29:47.996 --> 0:29:50.756
<v Speaker 2>So the problem is that the way the military bias

0:29:50.836 --> 0:29:56.156
<v Speaker 2>technology and the way Silicon Valley makes it, it's like

0:29:56.396 --> 0:30:00.236
<v Speaker 2>Mars and Venus, they're on two different planets. So the

0:30:00.276 --> 0:30:04.956
<v Speaker 2>military way, it's called a requirements based system of developing technology.

0:30:05.036 --> 0:30:07.196
<v Speaker 2>So a bunch of people sit in a windowless room

0:30:07.236 --> 0:30:10.836
<v Speaker 2>and they imagine, if I were to need a piece

0:30:10.876 --> 0:30:13.276
<v Speaker 2>of technology to help with air refueling, what should it

0:30:13.316 --> 0:30:16.356
<v Speaker 2>look like. And they write a bunch of specifications down

0:30:16.796 --> 0:30:19.036
<v Speaker 2>that they think would be great. So it's drawn up

0:30:19.076 --> 0:30:22.236
<v Speaker 2>in the abstract and then because contracting takes a lot

0:30:22.276 --> 0:30:26.836
<v Speaker 2>in the military. Oftentimes multiple generations of technology come along

0:30:27.356 --> 0:30:30.196
<v Speaker 2>before that system ever gets built, but of course it

0:30:30.236 --> 0:30:32.396
<v Speaker 2>has to be built through the original specifications.

0:30:32.996 --> 0:30:35.316
<v Speaker 1>So the thing you get is basically a thing somebody

0:30:35.356 --> 0:30:41.476
<v Speaker 1>designed ten years ago or more, which is so obviously

0:30:41.516 --> 0:30:44.796
<v Speaker 1>a bad idea, right, And I mean certainly you make

0:30:44.836 --> 0:30:46.836
<v Speaker 1>a compelling case in the book that it's obviously a

0:30:46.836 --> 0:30:50.956
<v Speaker 1>bad idea. Is there any counter argument? Is there any

0:30:50.996 --> 0:30:52.276
<v Speaker 1>case for the way they do it?

0:30:52.916 --> 0:30:55.276
<v Speaker 2>There is, And we have to be very sympathetic to

0:30:55.316 --> 0:30:57.396
<v Speaker 2>the people that are a part of the system because

0:30:57.436 --> 0:30:59.956
<v Speaker 2>the system actually was built to do something a little

0:30:59.956 --> 0:31:02.796
<v Speaker 2>bit different, and that is, you know, there aren't too

0:31:02.836 --> 0:31:06.876
<v Speaker 2>many companies that can build a nuclear powered aircraft carrier

0:31:07.036 --> 0:31:10.236
<v Speaker 2>or a submarine or a fifth generation stuff fighter, and

0:31:10.276 --> 0:31:13.676
<v Speaker 2>so you can't exactly go on Amazon and comparison price

0:31:13.716 --> 0:31:15.796
<v Speaker 2>shop if the're you're the US govern.

0:31:15.676 --> 0:31:18.156
<v Speaker 1>There is no market. There is no market for a

0:31:18.236 --> 0:31:20.756
<v Speaker 1>nuclear sub in a conventional sense. Yeah.

0:31:20.956 --> 0:31:25.076
<v Speaker 2>So the Defense Procurement system and the associated auditing system

0:31:25.316 --> 0:31:30.876
<v Speaker 2>that governs it is designed to save taxpayer dollar by

0:31:31.436 --> 0:31:35.996
<v Speaker 2>coming up with exceptionally precise specifications through which things must

0:31:36.076 --> 0:31:39.076
<v Speaker 2>be built and then a cost accounting system that is

0:31:39.116 --> 0:31:42.316
<v Speaker 2>meant to make sure that the taxpayer is never overcharged

0:31:42.716 --> 0:31:46.076
<v Speaker 2>from the one or two companies that can supply this technology.

0:31:46.236 --> 0:31:48.356
<v Speaker 2>So it was built for a different era, and in

0:31:48.476 --> 0:31:52.516
<v Speaker 2>terms of building aircraft carriers it actually does a reasonable job.

0:31:52.916 --> 0:31:56.036
<v Speaker 2>But commercial technology, there is a market. You don't have

0:31:56.116 --> 0:31:57.796
<v Speaker 2>to do it that way, and in fact, doing it

0:31:57.836 --> 0:31:59.156
<v Speaker 2>that way only slows you down.

0:32:00.476 --> 0:32:06.516
<v Speaker 1>So okay, so you go, you see this terrible, inefficient, dangerous,

0:32:06.636 --> 0:32:13.396
<v Speaker 1>expensive technology failure that is happening at this base and cutter,

0:32:13.436 --> 0:32:13.916
<v Speaker 1>what do you do?

0:32:16.596 --> 0:32:20.316
<v Speaker 2>Phone home? So my Cothur Raj got on the phone

0:32:20.316 --> 0:32:29.356
<v Speaker 2>that night and we immediately fedexed Imax and deployed a

0:32:29.396 --> 0:32:32.196
<v Speaker 2>few Air Force courders and a few coders from the

0:32:32.196 --> 0:32:35.756
<v Speaker 2>Silicon Valley out with the Pivotal to Qatar to sit

0:32:36.036 --> 0:32:39.836
<v Speaker 2>side by side with the airmen and women doing the

0:32:39.876 --> 0:32:44.076
<v Speaker 2>tanker planning and to build an automated app that they

0:32:44.076 --> 0:32:47.396
<v Speaker 2>could use eventually to push a button and have this done.

0:32:47.836 --> 0:32:50.836
<v Speaker 2>And it took just over a million dollars and just

0:32:50.916 --> 0:32:52.476
<v Speaker 2>over one hundred days to do it.

0:32:55.036 --> 0:32:58.156
<v Speaker 1>And you said it saved a million dollars in excess

0:32:58.196 --> 0:33:00.716
<v Speaker 1>flights in like a couple of days.

0:33:00.836 --> 0:33:04.876
<v Speaker 2>Right, So before the Air Force had to actually keep

0:33:04.916 --> 0:33:09.396
<v Speaker 2>a couple refueling tankers on standby to scramble because because

0:33:09.396 --> 0:33:12.356
<v Speaker 2>they weren't able to pivot the plan fast enough. And

0:33:12.396 --> 0:33:15.516
<v Speaker 2>of course, each time you scramble an enormous seven sixty

0:33:15.516 --> 0:33:20.516
<v Speaker 2>seven sized aircraft full of kerosene, it's energetically expensive. So

0:33:20.596 --> 0:33:23.876
<v Speaker 2>the tool that we use to optimize air tanker refueling

0:33:24.036 --> 0:33:28.156
<v Speaker 2>actually has saved the Air Force today something like I

0:33:28.156 --> 0:33:31.676
<v Speaker 2>think twenty four million gallons of kerosene a year. So

0:33:31.716 --> 0:33:33.916
<v Speaker 2>we're talking, you know, a lot of money of savings, right,

0:33:33.956 --> 0:33:36.036
<v Speaker 2>So this is this is a no brainer. Spend the money,

0:33:36.156 --> 0:33:40.236
<v Speaker 2>automate it. You get better mission outcomes for lower cost.

0:33:40.356 --> 0:33:43.476
<v Speaker 2>It's the Silicon Valley way of co developing technology with

0:33:43.516 --> 0:33:47.356
<v Speaker 2>the users, of iterating on a minimum, minimum viral product

0:33:47.716 --> 0:33:50.076
<v Speaker 2>and then adding features to that product as you go along.

0:33:51.036 --> 0:33:55.356
<v Speaker 1>So this is like an early win in a fairly

0:33:55.396 --> 0:33:58.716
<v Speaker 1>straightforward way. I mean also worth noting that having the

0:33:58.796 --> 0:34:01.156
<v Speaker 1>coders go sit with the people who are using the

0:34:01.196 --> 0:34:04.676
<v Speaker 1>thing is like classic Silicon Valley, right, get close to

0:34:04.756 --> 0:34:07.756
<v Speaker 1>the user, see what they need, as opposed to like

0:34:08.276 --> 0:34:11.596
<v Speaker 1>have a guy in Washington ten years ago drop a

0:34:11.636 --> 0:34:13.516
<v Speaker 1>list of things he thinks people are going to need

0:34:13.556 --> 0:34:17.076
<v Speaker 1>ten years from now. Right, there are a couple of

0:34:17.516 --> 0:34:21.676
<v Speaker 1>new companies selling weapons and technology to the government that

0:34:21.716 --> 0:34:24.436
<v Speaker 1>seem worth talking about, that seem quite different than the

0:34:24.476 --> 0:34:31.116
<v Speaker 1>sort of twentieth century giant military contractors, Right, Pallanteer and Anderil.

0:34:32.356 --> 0:34:34.156
<v Speaker 1>Tell me about those two companies and how they fit

0:34:34.236 --> 0:34:35.676
<v Speaker 1>with this broader story.

0:34:36.276 --> 0:34:41.036
<v Speaker 2>Well, it's important to recognize that the defense contracts we

0:34:41.076 --> 0:34:43.156
<v Speaker 2>have today, particularly the large ones that we know about,

0:34:43.196 --> 0:34:46.476
<v Speaker 2>the household names so Lockheed, Martin, Boeing, and so on

0:34:46.516 --> 0:34:51.156
<v Speaker 2>and so forth, they are really best thought of kind

0:34:51.156 --> 0:34:57.516
<v Speaker 2>of like utility companies, as highly regulated enterprises that are

0:34:57.556 --> 0:35:01.796
<v Speaker 2>not like traditional product companies because they have to adhere

0:35:01.836 --> 0:35:06.636
<v Speaker 2>to this massive system of cost accounting and auditing, this

0:35:07.156 --> 0:35:11.236
<v Speaker 2>two thousand page re regulation that governs everything they do.

0:35:11.836 --> 0:35:15.556
<v Speaker 2>And so in fact, the Pentagon has created these companies

0:35:16.316 --> 0:35:18.996
<v Speaker 2>and the way they operate, which is extraordinarily inefficient in

0:35:19.076 --> 0:35:22.356
<v Speaker 2>terms of how modern technology is produced by the commercial sector.

0:35:22.996 --> 0:35:27.076
<v Speaker 2>So what's so interesting about companies like Anderole, like Palanteer,

0:35:27.276 --> 0:35:31.916
<v Speaker 2>like shield Ai. They are traditional product companies in the

0:35:31.996 --> 0:35:36.036
<v Speaker 2>sense that Google and Microsoft are. They are unburdened by

0:35:36.876 --> 0:35:41.236
<v Speaker 2>having to erect this massive, separate accounting system to deal

0:35:41.316 --> 0:35:45.516
<v Speaker 2>with the Department of Defense bureaucracy because they are primarily

0:35:45.596 --> 0:35:49.836
<v Speaker 2>selling their technology through a completely different kind of contract

0:35:49.836 --> 0:35:52.956
<v Speaker 2>that we pioneered at DIU that our twenty nine year

0:35:52.996 --> 0:35:57.156
<v Speaker 2>old employee, Lauren Daily, came up with by seeing up

0:35:57.196 --> 0:35:59.876
<v Speaker 2>late at night and reading congressional legalation.

0:35:59.796 --> 0:36:02.556
<v Speaker 1>Basically a way that the Department of Defense can buy

0:36:02.636 --> 0:36:06.836
<v Speaker 1>weapons without going through the traditional two thousand page process.

0:36:06.956 --> 0:36:07.436
<v Speaker 2>Exactly.

0:36:07.996 --> 0:36:11.956
<v Speaker 1>It's so amazing that that's what's driving the technological change

0:36:12.036 --> 0:36:15.276
<v Speaker 1>right in a way, not surprising but quite interesting, right

0:36:15.356 --> 0:36:20.756
<v Speaker 1>that this, this the process ends up driving the outcome

0:36:21.316 --> 0:36:22.796
<v Speaker 1>in a backwards way.

0:36:23.876 --> 0:36:27.116
<v Speaker 2>Well, political scientists and sociologists all, you know, are always

0:36:27.196 --> 0:36:29.796
<v Speaker 2>keen to look at what you know, structures are operating,

0:36:29.916 --> 0:36:31.876
<v Speaker 2>and there is of course a whole discipline looks at

0:36:31.916 --> 0:36:34.916
<v Speaker 2>public institutions, which are constrained quite a bit more than

0:36:34.956 --> 0:36:38.556
<v Speaker 2>public companies. So once it isn't surprised. But what is

0:36:38.596 --> 0:36:41.996
<v Speaker 2>a surprise is the difference that one individual made in this.

0:36:42.116 --> 0:36:45.956
<v Speaker 2>So Lauren Daly, you know, the daughter of a tank driver,

0:36:46.796 --> 0:36:50.436
<v Speaker 2>somebody who entered the army as an acquisition specialist. As

0:36:50.476 --> 0:36:54.076
<v Speaker 2>her way of serving the country, figures out that there's

0:36:54.156 --> 0:36:57.596
<v Speaker 2>a loophole a Congress that a renegae Senate staffer is

0:36:57.676 --> 0:37:01.236
<v Speaker 2>just inserted in the National Defense Authorization Act that that

0:37:01.436 --> 0:37:04.396
<v Speaker 2>DAU can drive a truck through, and in a matter

0:37:04.436 --> 0:37:07.276
<v Speaker 2>of weeks, through some hustling at the Pentagon and the

0:37:07.276 --> 0:37:11.876
<v Speaker 2>support of thatsh, Carter codified this new method of procuring

0:37:11.916 --> 0:37:15.356
<v Speaker 2>technology called the Commercial Solutions Offering that essentially all want

0:37:15.436 --> 0:37:18.756
<v Speaker 2>us to negotiate with companies for a few weeks very openly,

0:37:18.916 --> 0:37:21.916
<v Speaker 2>in a very conversational way on commercial terms, so the

0:37:21.956 --> 0:37:24.516
<v Speaker 2>way they were used to negotiating and then to sign

0:37:24.516 --> 0:37:27.396
<v Speaker 2>a contract. So this was a game changer. And I

0:37:27.396 --> 0:37:30.916
<v Speaker 2>am so proud to report that since twenty sixteen to date,

0:37:31.436 --> 0:37:35.236
<v Speaker 2>about eighty billion dollars of technology acquisition by the departed

0:37:35.276 --> 0:37:37.836
<v Speaker 2>Defense has gone through this new mechanism. And in fact,

0:37:38.236 --> 0:37:42.156
<v Speaker 2>last week Trump Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth signed out

0:37:42.156 --> 0:37:47.156
<v Speaker 2>a memo mandating that all software bought by the Department

0:37:47.196 --> 0:37:51.076
<v Speaker 2>of Defense be acquired using this means, not the old

0:37:51.396 --> 0:37:54.596
<v Speaker 2>two thousand page, two thousand pageway.

0:37:55.556 --> 0:37:59.956
<v Speaker 1>Huh So it's sort of the end of the old

0:38:00.556 --> 0:38:03.516
<v Speaker 1>pretty clearly bad way of buying software for the military.

0:38:04.436 --> 0:38:06.996
<v Speaker 2>Yes, And so you know, there's two things to keep

0:38:07.036 --> 0:38:10.116
<v Speaker 2>in mind here. You know, one, it doesn't make sense

0:38:10.156 --> 0:38:13.236
<v Speaker 2>to use a two thousand page rule book to buy

0:38:13.276 --> 0:38:16.156
<v Speaker 2>things where you don't need it, where there's an actual market.

0:38:16.396 --> 0:38:19.516
<v Speaker 2>But the second thing that's really important. We would never

0:38:19.596 --> 0:38:22.436
<v Speaker 2>go to Microsoft or Amazon and ask them to build

0:38:22.436 --> 0:38:25.996
<v Speaker 2>an aircraft carrier. So why were we going to Raytheon

0:38:26.076 --> 0:38:29.076
<v Speaker 2>or Lockheed Martin and asking them or north remmen to

0:38:29.076 --> 0:38:32.956
<v Speaker 2>build software. It's not their core expertise. So the Pentagon,

0:38:33.116 --> 0:38:35.956
<v Speaker 2>in the last eight years, thanks in part to its

0:38:35.996 --> 0:38:39.556
<v Speaker 2>Silicon Valley office, has gotten a lot smarter about how

0:38:39.596 --> 0:38:42.916
<v Speaker 2>to procure advanced technology. And so fast forward to today.

0:38:43.676 --> 0:38:47.516
<v Speaker 2>The most exciting contract the Air Force is letting to

0:38:47.556 --> 0:38:52.556
<v Speaker 2>build up to potentially ten thousand supersonic autonomous drones that

0:38:52.596 --> 0:38:57.956
<v Speaker 2>will fight alongside our fifth generation man fighters. That contract

0:38:58.356 --> 0:39:02.076
<v Speaker 2>went to anderall In General Atomics, not de Boeing, not

0:39:02.156 --> 0:39:04.396
<v Speaker 2>to Lockheed, not to one of the prime So we're

0:39:04.436 --> 0:39:09.116
<v Speaker 2>seeing this complete sea change in who is being successful

0:39:09.476 --> 0:39:13.276
<v Speaker 2>at pulling down the biggest contracts with the most advanced

0:39:13.276 --> 0:39:14.996
<v Speaker 2>technology come out of the Department today.

0:39:16.356 --> 0:39:25.196
<v Speaker 1>So do you think the US is ready to fight

0:39:25.196 --> 0:39:28.996
<v Speaker 1>a war right now, No, go on.

0:39:31.636 --> 0:39:37.476
<v Speaker 2>We are in the unfortunate position of having made major

0:39:37.796 --> 0:39:46.916
<v Speaker 2>decatal investments in weapons systems that have essentially reached the

0:39:46.996 --> 0:39:47.956
<v Speaker 2>end of their lifespan.

0:39:48.756 --> 0:39:52.436
<v Speaker 1>You mean like tank and aircraft carrier. Yes, not a

0:39:52.436 --> 0:39:55.396
<v Speaker 1>particular tank or aircraft carrier, but just any tank or

0:39:55.436 --> 0:39:58.796
<v Speaker 1>aircraft carrier is now basically obsolete.

0:39:58.956 --> 0:40:03.836
<v Speaker 2>And we have a three part challenge. We're not yet

0:40:03.876 --> 0:40:08.516
<v Speaker 2>exactly sure because we haven't experimented enough what technology to

0:40:08.596 --> 0:40:12.996
<v Speaker 2>buy to replace them. We're also not sure exactly how

0:40:12.996 --> 0:40:16.436
<v Speaker 2>to use that new technology and what the military calls

0:40:16.556 --> 0:40:20.796
<v Speaker 2>concepts of operation. So when we invented care aviation, that's

0:40:20.836 --> 0:40:25.636
<v Speaker 2>a whole new way of using aircraft to fight naval.

0:40:25.356 --> 0:40:28.396
<v Speaker 1>Battles, you have to figure out what to do with

0:40:28.676 --> 0:40:30.676
<v Speaker 1>ten thousand supersonic drones.

0:40:30.756 --> 0:40:34.116
<v Speaker 2>And the third problem we have is that once we

0:40:34.196 --> 0:40:37.476
<v Speaker 2>do figure out what technology to buy and what operating

0:40:37.556 --> 0:40:41.036
<v Speaker 2>concepts to insert them into, we have to scale that up.

0:40:41.676 --> 0:40:43.756
<v Speaker 1>Is there not a fourth problem, which was we're still

0:40:43.756 --> 0:40:47.756
<v Speaker 1>spending billions and billions of dollars on weapons that you're

0:40:47.876 --> 0:40:50.316
<v Speaker 1>arguing aren't going to work, are obsolete.

0:40:51.156 --> 0:40:55.116
<v Speaker 2>Yes, that is a fourth problem. The Biden administration shifted

0:40:55.196 --> 0:40:57.796
<v Speaker 2>less than one percent of the Department of Defense's procurement

0:40:57.836 --> 0:41:01.556
<v Speaker 2>budget towards autonomous.

0:41:01.076 --> 0:41:04.396
<v Speaker 1>Weapons less than one percent, meaning basically.

0:41:03.916 --> 0:41:05.876
<v Speaker 2>Zero, basically zero.

0:41:06.156 --> 0:41:11.396
<v Speaker 1>Yes, I feel like that's a bigger problem than the

0:41:11.396 --> 0:41:13.196
<v Speaker 1>other three. And I mean that comes through in the

0:41:13.236 --> 0:41:16.556
<v Speaker 1>book in a way, right, like your antagonist in the book,

0:41:17.676 --> 0:41:21.156
<v Speaker 1>in a narrative sense, is not Russia or China or

0:41:21.196 --> 0:41:24.996
<v Speaker 1>isis right. It's bureaucrats. It's it's you know, you go

0:41:25.076 --> 0:41:27.716
<v Speaker 1>to Capitol Hill and somebody's like, we're going to take

0:41:27.716 --> 0:41:30.396
<v Speaker 1>your money away because you're not spending any money in Indiana,

0:41:30.436 --> 0:41:34.156
<v Speaker 1>and that's where my congressman is from. And it seems

0:41:34.156 --> 0:41:36.516
<v Speaker 1>like that is still a problem.

0:41:37.156 --> 0:41:39.436
<v Speaker 2>It is, And you know, this is one of these

0:41:39.476 --> 0:41:43.276
<v Speaker 2>moments where the strategic environment is changing so fast and

0:41:43.316 --> 0:41:46.956
<v Speaker 2>anybody watching or reading the news knows it from what's

0:41:46.996 --> 0:41:50.236
<v Speaker 2>happening in Ukraine, what's happening in the Middleize, what's happening elsewhere.

0:41:51.036 --> 0:41:54.236
<v Speaker 2>And so we're in this situation where the ordinary way

0:41:54.796 --> 0:41:58.916
<v Speaker 2>we buy technology and manage the military won't work. If

0:41:58.916 --> 0:42:00.796
<v Speaker 2>we keep doing it, we're going to walk the plank.

0:42:01.476 --> 0:42:05.596
<v Speaker 2>So we're now in a fierce battle to outmaneuver our

0:42:05.636 --> 0:42:09.356
<v Speaker 2>own system to transform it before there's another common.

0:42:10.116 --> 0:42:13.756
<v Speaker 1>Frankly, it's hard for me to imagine the kind of

0:42:14.036 --> 0:42:17.556
<v Speaker 1>change you're suggesting is needed. Like when I think of

0:42:17.636 --> 0:42:20.636
<v Speaker 1>how whatever Congress works, and how the country works, and

0:42:20.676 --> 0:42:23.996
<v Speaker 1>how the military works and how everything works, it's hard

0:42:24.036 --> 0:42:26.036
<v Speaker 1>for him to imagine. I mean, unless there was a war,

0:42:26.236 --> 0:42:28.956
<v Speaker 1>which I don't want to happen obviously, right, Like, I

0:42:28.956 --> 0:42:30.636
<v Speaker 1>don't know, what do you think is going to happen?

0:42:31.356 --> 0:42:34.596
<v Speaker 2>Well, you know, to make a more optimistic case, there

0:42:34.636 --> 0:42:36.596
<v Speaker 2>are a lot of things that are now going in

0:42:36.636 --> 0:42:40.876
<v Speaker 2>our favor. Most fundamentally, there is a new consensus in

0:42:40.916 --> 0:42:43.996
<v Speaker 2>the Pentagon and in the Congress that we're in a

0:42:44.036 --> 0:42:47.316
<v Speaker 2>crisis and the way to solve it is to pivot

0:42:47.356 --> 0:42:50.116
<v Speaker 2>the way the Department of Defense buys technology and use

0:42:50.196 --> 0:42:53.716
<v Speaker 2>this technology. And at the same time, there's a new

0:42:53.716 --> 0:42:57.156
<v Speaker 2>commitment in industry. We have a very dynamic economy the

0:42:57.196 --> 0:43:02.116
<v Speaker 2>United States of America, with venture backed investment creating small

0:43:02.116 --> 0:43:06.716
<v Speaker 2>scale infusions of technology that scales up companies in incredible ways.

0:43:07.076 --> 0:43:10.636
<v Speaker 2>So since Defense Innovation Unit figure it out this more

0:43:11.236 --> 0:43:13.876
<v Speaker 2>seamless way to quickly buy technology and actually make the

0:43:13.916 --> 0:43:17.196
<v Speaker 2>government a good customer. In Silicon Valley, there's been about

0:43:17.196 --> 0:43:21.436
<v Speaker 2>two hundred and fifty billion dollars of venture funds now

0:43:21.476 --> 0:43:25.236
<v Speaker 2>in play to back defense tech startups like and Andro

0:43:25.276 --> 0:43:27.676
<v Speaker 2>Al's am on the most successful, but there are hundreds more.

0:43:28.276 --> 0:43:32.676
<v Speaker 2>So the market is already responding. And today there is

0:43:32.796 --> 0:43:36.756
<v Speaker 2>more dynamic invention going on in the defense tech sector

0:43:36.756 --> 0:43:41.756
<v Speaker 2>than I think anywhere else. And so if the consensus

0:43:41.796 --> 0:43:44.876
<v Speaker 2>in the Pentagon in Congress can actually be changed into

0:43:46.116 --> 0:43:50.436
<v Speaker 2>shifts in the budget, we will quickly beheaded in the

0:43:50.476 --> 0:43:50.956
<v Speaker 2>right direction.

0:43:51.476 --> 0:43:54.716
<v Speaker 1>I was with you until you said, if consensus in

0:43:54.756 --> 0:43:59.116
<v Speaker 1>the Pentagon in Congress can be changed, right, that's like

0:43:59.156 --> 0:44:01.916
<v Speaker 1>there's so much money there and so much inertia, and

0:44:01.996 --> 0:44:07.476
<v Speaker 1>like the government seems quite bad in many domains at

0:44:07.716 --> 0:44:14.356
<v Speaker 1>changing when change is needed. That it seems I don't know,

0:44:15.036 --> 0:44:16.956
<v Speaker 1>you think that might happen. It seems unlikely to me.

0:44:18.556 --> 0:44:22.996
<v Speaker 2>Well, you know, again to paint the optimist picture.

0:44:24.116 --> 0:44:26.516
<v Speaker 1>Well, just for a sec what do you think? What

0:44:26.556 --> 0:44:27.556
<v Speaker 1>do you think is going to happen?

0:44:28.196 --> 0:44:33.596
<v Speaker 2>I am worried that people now understand the problem, but

0:44:33.916 --> 0:44:37.996
<v Speaker 2>the pendulum of change is going to swing too slowly. Huh.

0:44:38.836 --> 0:44:43.476
<v Speaker 1>So I read that you recently did a residence at Anthropic,

0:44:43.596 --> 0:44:47.236
<v Speaker 1>which is one of the big frontier AI companies that

0:44:47.356 --> 0:44:50.796
<v Speaker 1>may claude the large language model, And so I'm curious.

0:44:50.876 --> 0:44:54.436
<v Speaker 1>This is very interesting to me, Like what did you

0:44:54.716 --> 0:44:57.196
<v Speaker 1>learn there? Like, what do you know now that you

0:44:57.356 --> 0:45:00.716
<v Speaker 1>didn't know before you you were there?

0:45:01.316 --> 0:45:04.956
<v Speaker 2>The United States is unquestionably right now ahead at least

0:45:04.956 --> 0:45:08.596
<v Speaker 2>by a little bit in artificial intelligence. So's it's a

0:45:08.636 --> 0:45:11.916
<v Speaker 2>technology that we're better at than anybody else. And so

0:45:11.996 --> 0:45:14.996
<v Speaker 2>I think that the sort of sixty four million dollar

0:45:15.076 --> 0:45:18.236
<v Speaker 2>question in terms of military strategy for the United States

0:45:18.356 --> 0:45:22.356
<v Speaker 2>is whether or not we can harness AI in designing

0:45:22.396 --> 0:45:25.676
<v Speaker 2>a new military because right now that is the one

0:45:25.716 --> 0:45:28.916
<v Speaker 2>thing that will give us an unquestioned advantage in the battlefield.

0:45:30.156 --> 0:45:32.956
<v Speaker 1>I mean, more generally, how do you think about AI

0:45:33.116 --> 0:45:35.036
<v Speaker 1>in the future of war? I mean, what does it

0:45:35.116 --> 0:45:39.876
<v Speaker 1>mean for the equilibrium? And what does it mean for

0:45:39.916 --> 0:45:44.116
<v Speaker 1>the sort of relative abilities of big countries and small

0:45:44.116 --> 0:45:48.596
<v Speaker 1>countries and kind of you know, rogue actors, Like how

0:45:48.596 --> 0:45:51.316
<v Speaker 1>does it change the power dynamics?

0:45:51.796 --> 0:45:55.356
<v Speaker 2>Well, I'm really glad you used the word equilibrium because

0:45:55.476 --> 0:46:00.836
<v Speaker 2>it's a it's a core concept in strategy. There's a

0:46:00.876 --> 0:46:05.756
<v Speaker 2>whole literature on something called strategic stability, and it's a

0:46:05.796 --> 0:46:08.796
<v Speaker 2>literature that comes out in part of the Cold War.

0:46:09.636 --> 0:46:13.876
<v Speaker 2>It's a literature that has to reckon with the counterintuitive

0:46:13.916 --> 0:46:17.356
<v Speaker 2>finding that the proliferation of nuclear weapons otherds, the more

0:46:17.396 --> 0:46:22.316
<v Speaker 2>countries that became nuclear powers, the less incidents of conflict

0:46:22.356 --> 0:46:27.156
<v Speaker 2>between them there were, so nuclear weapons, an incredibly dangerous technology,

0:46:27.156 --> 0:46:30.396
<v Speaker 2>in a strange way, actually made the world safer.

0:46:30.796 --> 0:46:32.116
<v Speaker 1>So far, so far.

0:46:32.196 --> 0:46:34.996
<v Speaker 2>Now, with this whole true, if everybody had a nuclear weapon,

0:46:35.396 --> 0:46:35.996
<v Speaker 2>probably not.

0:46:36.276 --> 0:46:39.076
<v Speaker 1>Right, And there's also a tail risk where it's like,

0:46:39.556 --> 0:46:43.036
<v Speaker 1>maybe this was just the lucky whatever eighty years, but

0:46:43.156 --> 0:46:44.996
<v Speaker 1>go on, yeah, so far, so far.

0:46:45.116 --> 0:46:49.316
<v Speaker 2>So I think that the question is what will AI

0:46:49.596 --> 0:46:55.876
<v Speaker 2>do to strategic stability? Will it actually enhance it in

0:46:55.916 --> 0:46:58.996
<v Speaker 2>the following sense of AI is clearly going to make

0:46:59.356 --> 0:47:04.036
<v Speaker 2>warfare much more destructive than it is today, and more

0:47:04.076 --> 0:47:07.436
<v Speaker 2>destructive systems will raise the cost of going to war.

0:47:07.956 --> 0:47:12.196
<v Speaker 2>And so if multiple countries have really advanced AI, even

0:47:12.236 --> 0:47:13.916
<v Speaker 2>if one country is a little bit ahead of the other,

0:47:14.516 --> 0:47:17.476
<v Speaker 2>that won't change the fact that either one going to

0:47:17.516 --> 0:47:22.196
<v Speaker 2>war starting a war will be massively costly. So it

0:47:22.276 --> 0:47:27.476
<v Speaker 2>could be that AI, as a very diffuse technology, actually

0:47:27.516 --> 0:47:32.516
<v Speaker 2>increases to deterrence, in effect creating a higher bar to

0:47:32.556 --> 0:47:36.956
<v Speaker 2>starting a war. The optimistic scenario, the truly optimistic scenario,

0:47:37.036 --> 0:47:39.476
<v Speaker 2>is that not only does AI the diffusion of AI

0:47:39.556 --> 0:47:45.476
<v Speaker 2>technology make great power war less likely, but because there

0:47:45.516 --> 0:47:47.556
<v Speaker 2>are going to be some bad actors that get a

0:47:47.556 --> 0:47:51.596
<v Speaker 2>hold of this stuff and go cause a RUCKUS, that's

0:47:51.636 --> 0:47:55.036
<v Speaker 2>actually going to increase the interest of nations like the

0:47:55.156 --> 0:47:59.676
<v Speaker 2>US and China working together to ensure they retain their

0:47:59.676 --> 0:48:02.356
<v Speaker 2>own sovereignty and moopolying the means of violence to keep

0:48:02.356 --> 0:48:05.676
<v Speaker 2>their citizens safe. So it could actually not only decrease

0:48:05.756 --> 0:48:07.996
<v Speaker 2>the likelihood of great power of war, it could increase

0:48:08.316 --> 0:48:11.116
<v Speaker 2>international cop ration because we desperately need it if we're

0:48:11.116 --> 0:48:14.316
<v Speaker 2>all going to stay safe. Now. There is, of course,

0:48:14.516 --> 0:48:18.916
<v Speaker 2>a darker alternative. One flavor of that darker alternative is

0:48:18.956 --> 0:48:22.116
<v Speaker 2>that there is a country that believes they have a

0:48:22.196 --> 0:48:27.396
<v Speaker 2>breakout uh uh you know AI, and that that changes

0:48:27.396 --> 0:48:30.236
<v Speaker 2>for them the calculus of wanting to go to war

0:48:30.236 --> 0:48:32.556
<v Speaker 2>because they think that they'll just be able to eke

0:48:32.596 --> 0:48:36.236
<v Speaker 2>out enough advantage that that they'll launch an attack. Also,

0:48:36.436 --> 0:48:38.596
<v Speaker 2>I mean there's another danger too. We have to remember that,

0:48:38.676 --> 0:48:43.716
<v Speaker 2>you know, Vietnam started because in part the US Navy

0:48:43.756 --> 0:48:46.476
<v Speaker 2>thought its destroyers were attacked in the Gulf of Talking,

0:48:46.756 --> 0:48:49.436
<v Speaker 2>leading the you know US Congress to pass the Golf

0:48:49.476 --> 0:48:53.156
<v Speaker 2>of Tonkin Resolutions, which later led to the deployment of

0:48:53.156 --> 0:48:55.916
<v Speaker 2>troops in Vietnam. Well, turns out the attack never happened.

0:48:55.956 --> 0:48:59.836
<v Speaker 2>It was just mass confusion. Uh, And so AI introduces

0:48:59.956 --> 0:49:02.356
<v Speaker 2>a lot more uncertainty into the battlefield. That that is

0:49:02.396 --> 0:49:04.996
<v Speaker 2>a risk, that is that is worth knowing. And then

0:49:05.316 --> 0:49:09.516
<v Speaker 2>truly dark scenario is that AI allows small grop groups

0:49:10.196 --> 0:49:13.396
<v Speaker 2>to project lethality in a way that's very hard to control.

0:49:13.716 --> 0:49:15.596
<v Speaker 1>What do you what do you mean when you say that?

0:49:15.676 --> 0:49:18.076
<v Speaker 2>What means that you could go by or make a

0:49:18.116 --> 0:49:21.076
<v Speaker 2>weapon for low cost that there is no that there

0:49:21.156 --> 0:49:25.076
<v Speaker 2>is no effective defense for, so that you could go

0:49:25.236 --> 0:49:28.476
<v Speaker 2>toe to toe, you know, with with the most advanced

0:49:28.476 --> 0:49:31.236
<v Speaker 2>police force or homeland security force in military and still

0:49:31.276 --> 0:49:33.996
<v Speaker 2>cause a bunch of damage. So that is indeed a

0:49:34.236 --> 0:49:37.356
<v Speaker 2>very legitimate worry. It always has been. AI would just

0:49:37.396 --> 0:49:41.596
<v Speaker 2>be the latest technological innovation to land in the hands

0:49:41.596 --> 0:49:44.716
<v Speaker 2>of bad actors that are looking to do bad things.

0:49:48.196 --> 0:50:01.876
<v Speaker 1>We'll be back in a minute with the lightning round. Okay,

0:50:03.676 --> 0:50:05.796
<v Speaker 1>let's finish with the lightning round, which is going to

0:50:05.876 --> 0:50:11.236
<v Speaker 1>be a little lighter. It's going to be like then

0:50:11.276 --> 0:50:15.476
<v Speaker 1>the rest of this conversation. I read in a bio

0:50:15.556 --> 0:50:19.876
<v Speaker 1>of yours online that you have backpacked in over thirty countries,

0:50:19.876 --> 0:50:25.116
<v Speaker 1>including a trek from Moscow to Singapore overland, and I'm

0:50:25.116 --> 0:50:30.876
<v Speaker 1>curious about that trip in particular. What was one really

0:50:30.916 --> 0:50:32.276
<v Speaker 1>bad moment on that trip.

0:50:34.476 --> 0:50:39.356
<v Speaker 2>I'll go with food poisoning in eastern Siberia that caused

0:50:39.396 --> 0:50:43.116
<v Speaker 2>me to hallucinate at a time. I was staying in

0:50:43.156 --> 0:50:47.636
<v Speaker 2>a Russian farmhouse up a ladder in a loft, so

0:50:47.756 --> 0:50:51.836
<v Speaker 2>I had to while I was hallucinating, climb down to

0:50:52.956 --> 0:50:56.716
<v Speaker 2>use the bathroom every few minutes late late one night.

0:50:56.756 --> 0:50:58.996
<v Speaker 2>But I will say it was an incredible trip.

0:50:59.036 --> 0:51:01.556
<v Speaker 1>That wait, I want to get to the incredible trip part.

0:51:01.636 --> 0:51:04.356
<v Speaker 1>But what was the nature of the hallucination.

0:51:07.116 --> 0:51:12.036
<v Speaker 2>It was like profoundly lifelike dreams, and I recognized at

0:51:12.036 --> 0:51:15.436
<v Speaker 2>the time for you know, what they were, and it

0:51:15.516 --> 0:51:17.996
<v Speaker 2>was just bizarre to be, you know, on this rural

0:51:18.036 --> 0:51:22.036
<v Speaker 2>farm in eastern Siberia hallucinating and trying to climb down

0:51:22.036 --> 0:51:26.556
<v Speaker 2>a ladder. So don't you know crap where I'm sleeping?

0:51:27.236 --> 0:51:30.356
<v Speaker 1>Yes, yes, okay, you were going to say how great

0:51:30.356 --> 0:51:31.676
<v Speaker 1>the trip was, tell me that part.

0:51:31.836 --> 0:51:36.276
<v Speaker 2>It was just absolutely astonishing to go from Moscow ultimately

0:51:36.276 --> 0:51:38.876
<v Speaker 2>all the way to Singapore over a land because we

0:51:38.956 --> 0:51:41.076
<v Speaker 2>got to watch out the window of a train moving

0:51:41.116 --> 0:51:44.916
<v Speaker 2>into about twenty miles an hour Europe turned into Asia,

0:51:45.716 --> 0:51:49.556
<v Speaker 2>and we brought history books along and read them and

0:51:49.636 --> 0:51:53.316
<v Speaker 2>it was an incredible education and I'm so glad we

0:51:53.356 --> 0:51:55.876
<v Speaker 2>took that trip. It certainly shaped how I see the

0:51:55.876 --> 0:51:58.036
<v Speaker 2>world and I'll never forget it.

0:51:58.596 --> 0:52:03.116
<v Speaker 1>And is it right that you have like some super

0:52:03.316 --> 0:52:05.276
<v Speaker 1>top secret clearance.

0:52:05.716 --> 0:52:08.076
<v Speaker 2>Well, they haven't told me where the aliens are, so

0:52:08.316 --> 0:52:10.076
<v Speaker 2>I don't know how high have a clearance. I actually

0:52:10.076 --> 0:52:10.316
<v Speaker 2>have it.

0:52:10.836 --> 0:52:14.956
<v Speaker 1>Across that question off the list. I'm like, I'm curious, what, like,

0:52:16.116 --> 0:52:17.836
<v Speaker 1>what do you have to do to get a you know,

0:52:17.876 --> 0:52:19.236
<v Speaker 1>a really high level clearance.

0:52:20.596 --> 0:52:21.796
<v Speaker 2>Well you just had to fill out a bunch of

0:52:21.796 --> 0:52:24.676
<v Speaker 2>paperwork and and take take a drug test.

0:52:25.316 --> 0:52:25.716
<v Speaker 1>Uh.

0:52:26.156 --> 0:52:28.596
<v Speaker 2>But what I will say is that, you know, holding

0:52:28.596 --> 0:52:32.196
<v Speaker 2>a security clearance, you know, is not all fun, right,

0:52:32.356 --> 0:52:34.756
<v Speaker 2>because you you learn dings about the world, and you

0:52:34.756 --> 0:52:38.156
<v Speaker 2>you see things that you you often can't can't forget.

0:52:39.196 --> 0:52:42.276
<v Speaker 2>So although I was really thrilled when I first was

0:52:42.316 --> 0:52:45.196
<v Speaker 2>granted a top secret clearance. There are days now that

0:52:45.236 --> 0:52:46.756
<v Speaker 2>I wish I never had one.

0:52:47.076 --> 0:52:54.596
<v Speaker 1>Huh, because the world is scarier or that than you

0:52:54.596 --> 0:52:56.396
<v Speaker 1>than you would have thought.

0:52:58.036 --> 0:53:01.596
<v Speaker 2>Uh, the world is is scarier and and and more

0:53:01.676 --> 0:53:05.836
<v Speaker 2>dangerous and and uh people people sometimes do really really

0:53:06.036 --> 0:53:06.756
<v Speaker 2>awful things.

0:53:07.196 --> 0:53:11.956
<v Speaker 1>Yes, anything else you want to talking about, I would.

0:53:11.756 --> 0:53:14.676
<v Speaker 2>I would just say to everybody that's listening that that

0:53:14.796 --> 0:53:19.356
<v Speaker 2>now is an incredible time to be watching the world,

0:53:19.476 --> 0:53:24.076
<v Speaker 2>because we really are seeing historic things happen almost every day.

0:53:24.196 --> 0:53:26.316
<v Speaker 2>And anybody that pick us up a news story about

0:53:26.396 --> 0:53:30.636
<v Speaker 2>Ukraine or about China or about the Middle East, it's

0:53:30.676 --> 0:53:33.476
<v Speaker 2>sort of like reading the papers. I suppose you know,

0:53:33.516 --> 0:53:35.396
<v Speaker 2>in the run up to the First World War the

0:53:35.716 --> 0:53:38.756
<v Speaker 2>Second World War, you just see things that are so

0:53:38.916 --> 0:53:41.996
<v Speaker 2>striking and that tell you so much about where the

0:53:42.596 --> 0:53:46.436
<v Speaker 2>world is going. Uh, that that that it's worth it's

0:53:46.436 --> 0:53:47.276
<v Speaker 2>worth paying attention.

0:53:48.796 --> 0:53:50.676
<v Speaker 1>I got nervous when you said run up to the

0:53:50.676 --> 0:53:52.316
<v Speaker 1>First World War or Second World War.

0:53:53.516 --> 0:53:58.716
<v Speaker 2>Well, I say that quite quite specifically in the sense

0:53:58.796 --> 0:54:02.996
<v Speaker 2>that you know, warfare is changing remarkably fast, and we've

0:54:03.036 --> 0:54:08.276
<v Speaker 2>seen a succession of advanced militaries fail, the Russian military,

0:54:08.876 --> 0:54:13.476
<v Speaker 2>the Israeli military demonstrably failed during the attacks that Moss

0:54:13.476 --> 0:54:17.116
<v Speaker 2>waged on October seventh, and I think it would be

0:54:18.116 --> 0:54:21.356
<v Speaker 2>humorous to imagine that our military, the American military, couldn't

0:54:21.396 --> 0:54:25.076
<v Speaker 2>fail in a similar way. So that's why I think

0:54:25.116 --> 0:54:29.316
<v Speaker 2>it's really important to pay attention to what's happening in

0:54:29.436 --> 0:54:32.956
<v Speaker 2>conflict around the world and to realize that we as

0:54:32.996 --> 0:54:35.676
<v Speaker 2>Americans now need to pay a lot more attention because

0:54:35.716 --> 0:54:38.396
<v Speaker 2>we no longer have the margin of error that we're

0:54:38.396 --> 0:54:41.316
<v Speaker 2>accustomed to in being able to project military power.

0:54:48.596 --> 0:54:51.956
<v Speaker 1>Christopher Kierkoff is an advisor at the Defense Innovation Unit.

0:54:53.116 --> 0:54:56.396
<v Speaker 1>Today's show was produced by Gabriel Hunter Cheng. It was

0:54:56.636 --> 0:55:00.116
<v Speaker 1>edited by Lyddy Jane Kott and engineered by Sarah Brugier.

0:55:00.556 --> 0:55:03.876
<v Speaker 1>You can email us at problem at Pushkin dot FM.

0:55:04.316 --> 0:55:06.676
<v Speaker 1>I'm Jacob Goldstein and we'll be back next week with

0:55:06.756 --> 0:55:11.956
<v Speaker 1>another episode of What's Your Problem? Doctor A sign instituted

0:55:12.196 --> 0:55:13.516
<v Speaker 1>the fat FA