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Speaker 1: This is Master's in Business with Barry Ridholds on Bloomberg Radio.

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Speaker 2: This week on the podcast, I have an extra special guest.

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Speaker 2: Michael Carmon is co head of Private Markets at Wellington Management.

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Speaker 2: Wellington's a fascinating company. They've been around literally nearly a century.

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Speaker 2: At one point in time, Jack Bogel, founder of Vanguard,

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Speaker 2: was chairman of their mutual funds. Just really a fascinating

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Speaker 2: history from a private company to a public company back

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Speaker 2: to a partnership. Really interesting, and Michael has had a

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Speaker 2: bird's eye view of this for really the past twenty

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Speaker 2: five years. He is uniquely situated because he has run

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Speaker 2: both public mutual funds as well as privates including late

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Speaker 2: stage venture, private equity, credit down the list. He really

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Speaker 2: sees all sides of the lfant and is capable of

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Speaker 2: describing it in a way that I thought was both

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Speaker 2: fascinating and informative. I found this to be an interesting

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Speaker 2: discussion and I think you will also, with no further ado,

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Speaker 2: my conversation with Wellington Management's Michael Carmon.

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Speaker 3: Thank you, Barry, thank you for having me.

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Speaker 2: So let's talk a little bit about Wellington, which has

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Speaker 2: really a fascinating history, not only have they been around

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Speaker 2: since I think nineteen twenty five, almost one hundred years old,

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Speaker 2: and one point in time Jack Bogel was their chairman

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Speaker 2: at least of the mutual fund division. Tell us a

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Speaker 2: little bit about the firm's history and how it's evolved

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Speaker 2: over the past one hundred years.

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Speaker 1: Sure, well, I haven't been there for most of the

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Speaker 1: hundred years, so you're just so you're aware.

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Speaker 2: Okay, you look a little younger than that.

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Speaker 3: Thank you. I appreciate that.

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Speaker 1: And as you noted, the firm's almost one hundred years old.

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Speaker 1: Started in nineteen twenty eight and twenty eight. One of

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Speaker 1: the interesting aspects of the firm is that it was

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Speaker 1: a public company at one point in the nineteen seventy

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Speaker 1: The company went private in nineteen seventy nine and we

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Speaker 1: became a partnership twenty nine original partners. We now have

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Speaker 1: almost two hundred partners and we've gone through probably about

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Speaker 1: three generations of partnership change, which is very unusual. As

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Speaker 1: you know, in the business, it usually is very difficult.

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Speaker 1: But because the ownership was very dispersed among all of

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Speaker 1: the partners, it made those transitions very easy. And so

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Speaker 1: we've grown from a very small company with twenty nine

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Speaker 1: partners back in nineteen seventy nine too, as you noted

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Speaker 1: over a trillion dollars of assets and it become very diversified.

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Speaker 1: We were originally very equity heavy back in the day,

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Speaker 1: and we made a lot of investments on the fixed

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Speaker 1: income side, so fixed income is now a substantial percentage.

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Speaker 3: Of our assets.

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Speaker 1: We entered the liquid alts market with hedge funds back

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Speaker 1: in nineteen ninety four, and we entered the private market

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Speaker 1: in twenty fourteen with my product in late stage growth.

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Speaker 2: So you weren't there in twenty eight, you weren't there

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Speaker 2: in seventy nine. When did you join?

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Speaker 3: Well, I joined in nineteen ninety nine in.

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Speaker 1: The middle of the tech bubble as a growth investor.

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Speaker 1: Great time for the first nine months. Sure, it was

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Speaker 1: April of ninety nine. I had an amazing ninety nine

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Speaker 1: and early two thousand and I had left a hedge fund.

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Speaker 1: So I was probably one of the few people to

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Speaker 1: leave a hedge fund and go to a larger institution

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Speaker 1: in the middle.

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Speaker 3: Of the tech bubble. But I wanted to be on

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Speaker 3: a larger platform.

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Speaker 1: I love being with a lot of other investors and

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Speaker 1: being very collaborative and collegial, and I felt that that's

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Speaker 1: what embodied Wellington's culture, which was exactly what I got

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Speaker 1: and what we continue to be today. And so I

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Speaker 1: loved it from the first day I got there, and

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Speaker 1: now I've been there for just under twenty five years.

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Speaker 2: So let's define some terms. Everybody knows what a hedge

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Speaker 2: fund is, but let's talk about liquid alts. How do

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Speaker 2: you define liquid alts?

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Speaker 1: Liquid alts I basically define as versions of hedge funds, basically,

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Speaker 1: and you know, it's a synonym for hedge funds. And

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Speaker 1: thinking about the alts market, right, there's liquid alts and

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Speaker 1: then there's non liquid alts, which would be mostly on

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Speaker 1: the private side. And so our initial thrust was what

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Speaker 1: our first hedge fund was, a financial services hedge fund

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Speaker 1: started by Nick Adams back in nineteen ninety four, which will,

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Speaker 1: I guess be celebrating its thirtieth anniversary next year. And

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Speaker 1: now we have a number of different hedge funds. We

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Speaker 1: have in the macro, we have multistrat we have point

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Speaker 1: hedge funds in technology, in the healthcare field, and so

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Speaker 1: we've built out over twenty billion dollar hedge fund liquid

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Speaker 1: business and now we've added privates to that.

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Speaker 2: So I want to focus on the phrase liquid alts,

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Speaker 2: which I don't think a lot of lay people understand. Typically,

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Speaker 2: when you're invested in a hedge fund or private equity,

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Speaker 2: you agree to be locked up for a certain period

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Speaker 2: of time. There are occasional windows or gates that open

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Speaker 2: and you could take some capital out. So when you

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Speaker 2: commit to pe or venture, whatever that money is figure

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Speaker 2: seven to ten years, you're not going to touch it.

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Speaker 2: When you say liquid as, what you're really saying is

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Speaker 2: if you need this money back within X period of time,

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Speaker 2: you could get some or all of it. What has

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Speaker 2: distinguished liquid alts from these ill liquid locked up privates?

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Speaker 1: Sure, when I think of liquid als there's probably two

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Speaker 1: parts of it. So one is, to your point, the

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Speaker 1: money is not locked up for multiple years. Generally we

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Speaker 1: have a one to maybe two year lockup where you

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Speaker 1: can you can't access that capital. But more importantly, when

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Speaker 1: I fer liquid alts, it's generally the investments that they're

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Speaker 1: making are in liquid liquid products, mostly public market products,

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Speaker 1: and you can go long, you can go short, you

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Speaker 1: can have leverage, you can have higher exposure levels, but

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Speaker 1: the securities are in the liquid public markets versus private equity,

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Speaker 1: which are in ill liquid private markets.

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Speaker 2: So it applies to both you the investor have a

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Speaker 2: much shorter period of illiquidity and specifically the assets that

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Speaker 2: the fund is investing.

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Speaker 1: In, correct, and definitely more emphasis on the types of

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Speaker 1: investments the fund is made.

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Speaker 2: So you started out investing directly in the public market,

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Speaker 2: small cap, mid cap, various styles. How did you find

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Speaker 2: your way to that side of the street, the more

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Speaker 2: private side of the street.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, it's it's a great question.

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Speaker 1: And so to your point, I was a public portfolio manager,

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Speaker 1: started as a tech analyst and made my way to

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Speaker 1: associate portfolio manager and then began managing public portfolios in

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Speaker 1: nineteen ninety six prior to getting to Wellington.

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Speaker 2: Where were you managing those four in ninety six for

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Speaker 2: a hedge fund?

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Speaker 1: So that was actually Montgomery Asset Management. I don't know

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Speaker 1: if you remember the old Montgomery Securities, old school, correct.

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Speaker 1: And I loved Montgomery and Robertson Stevens and all these

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Speaker 1: boutique firms that are all gone. But they started an

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Speaker 1: asset management division, and my family and I moved out

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Speaker 1: to California and that was my first job in being

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Speaker 1: a portfolio manager was running a small cap fund for

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Speaker 1: them back in nineteen ninety six.

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Speaker 2: A little bit of a tech bias or it didn't

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Speaker 2: matter you go it was.

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Speaker 3: It was diversified.

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Speaker 1: But as a growth manager mature, obviously you're going to

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Speaker 1: have a reasonable wait to the tech sector. And I

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Speaker 1: started as a tech analyst, but I became over the years,

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Speaker 1: I became a much more diversified investor. That's probably the

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Speaker 1: biggest reason I was able to navigate the other side

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Speaker 1: of the tech bubble because I grew up in a

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Speaker 1: period where I did invest in other sectors besides tech,

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Speaker 1: and so that was very helpful when tech went out

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Speaker 1: of favor for basically a decade.

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Speaker 2: So who were the investors when you started doing small

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Speaker 2: cap and growth and are these the same sorts of

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Speaker 2: investors now doing privates at Wellington?

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Speaker 1: So when my first fund that I ran when I

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Speaker 1: was at Montgomery was a mutual fund, so it was

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Speaker 1: all individual investors. And that was the period of time

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Speaker 1: where you can be in some news publication and your

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Speaker 1: fund would become hot and you would get hundreds of

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Speaker 1: millions of dollars in assets in a short period of time.

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Speaker 3: And that's literally what happened to us.

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Speaker 1: But when you think about what I'm doing today and

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Speaker 1: the types of investors I have today today, it's more

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Speaker 1: of a combination of wealth management, so more in the

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Speaker 1: family office, high net worth ultra high net worth, and

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Speaker 1: then the other half of our business is large, large

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Speaker 1: and medium sized institutions.

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Speaker 2: How do you transition from public investing public stocks, you know,

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Speaker 2: mom and pop mutual fund investors, to family offices in

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Speaker 2: private So I would imagine that's a series of pretty

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Speaker 2: significant changes, both in what you're investing in and the

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Speaker 2: process of finding things to put capital into.

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Speaker 3: Yeah.

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Speaker 1: Absolutely, And I think of it as I've had a

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Speaker 1: second career right that I've made this transit difference.

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Speaker 2: It's like I was a lawyer, so this is my

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Speaker 2: second career or third career if you include asset management.

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Speaker 2: But I would think public and private are kind of

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Speaker 2: shades of the same thing. You're saying a distinct difference

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Speaker 2: from public mutual fund to private equity and late stage venture.

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Speaker 3: They are shades of the same thing. No doubt.

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Speaker 1: All of the skills that I garnered on the public

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Speaker 1: side have been transferable to the private side, and in fact,

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Speaker 1: in terms of what I do specifically in late stage growth.

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Speaker 3: My message has always.

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Speaker 1: Been that we've been able to bring our public market

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Speaker 1: expertise to the private markets because the companies were investing in,

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Speaker 1: as you're aware, used to go public at a much

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Speaker 1: earlier stage.

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Speaker 3: When I was going back to that small cap fund.

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Speaker 1: Iran, I would sit across the table from companies that

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Speaker 1: had two, three, four hundred million dollar market caps that

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Speaker 1: were going public.

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Speaker 2: Right.

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Speaker 1: The best example I always love to give is that

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Speaker 1: Amazon's last private round was at a sixty million dollar

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Speaker 1: post money valuation.

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Speaker 2: That's unbelievable, correct.

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Speaker 1: And today, as you know, you have companies like Stripe

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Speaker 1: doing fifty five billion dollar rounds right post money valuations

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Speaker 1: until the market has changed dramatically. And so to your question,

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Speaker 1: the way I started getting into this market was effectively

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Speaker 1: the FOMO of now seeing companies staying private life longer

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Speaker 1: as a public market investor, and I was running mutual

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Speaker 1: funds at Wellington as well as one of our hedge funds,

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Speaker 1: and I had the latitude to invest a certain percentage

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Speaker 1: of my assets in ill liquid investments and.

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Speaker 2: From Wellington, even though you're running mostly public equities.

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Speaker 1: Correct, under the forty Act, you could have up to

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Speaker 1: and you wouldn't do this, but you could have up

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Speaker 1: to fifteen percent in ill liquid securities. And for me,

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Speaker 1: in my mutual funds, I was in like the mid

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Speaker 1: to high single digits. But I started getting involved in

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Speaker 1: buying a lot of these companies as I realized that

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Speaker 1: companies were beginning to stay private longer.

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Speaker 2: And to clarify the way the SEC defined ill liquid

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Speaker 2: securities in the forty Act for mutual funds, some of

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Speaker 2: these might even have been public companies but trade by appointment,

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Speaker 2: not a lot of float, not a lot of shares,

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Speaker 2: or was it strictly non public private companies.

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Speaker 1: Well, you're getting above my pay grade in terms of

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Speaker 1: being that specific. That's why you're the lawyer and I'm not.

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Speaker 2: But I mean, it just seems funny that the SEC

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Speaker 2: would say up to fifteen percent. You just wonder what

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Speaker 2: was the genesis of that. Was this just not widely

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Speaker 2: traded stocks or was it really not public stocks.

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Speaker 1: I don't know specifically the answer to the whys of this,

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Speaker 1: since it was done another thing that was done before

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Speaker 1: my time nineteen forty.

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Speaker 2: But I was just a kid, so I don't remember.

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Speaker 2: I wasn't paying attention. So then This raised a kind

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Speaker 2: of interesting question. You're you're adding more private and a

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Speaker 2: liquid stocks to your portfolio. At what point does Wellington

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Speaker 2: sort of rub its chin and say, hey, this is

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Speaker 2: an interesting space. We're really private, curious, we want to

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Speaker 2: see if we can expand to this. What's that process like?

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Speaker 1: So the rubbing of the chin occurred in October of

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Speaker 1: twenty twelve when I wrote a memo to my partner

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Speaker 1: in crime, General O'Reilly, who's now my co head on privates,

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Speaker 1: and I said, hey, I think this might be a

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Speaker 1: really long term secular trend of companies staying private longer.

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Speaker 1: And I do think it's challenging to buy ill liquids

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Speaker 1: in publicly daily traded vehicles because of the ill liquidity

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Speaker 1: aspect of it. We should consider doing a dedicated fund

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Speaker 1: to take advantage of this trend for our clients. And

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Speaker 1: so that was about two years before our first close

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Speaker 1: and so we had never as you noted, we've never

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Speaker 1: done private. So we had to socialize if this was

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Speaker 1: a business and a direction that we wanted to take.

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Speaker 1: And I think that Wellington has always been very bottom

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Speaker 1: up and very entrepreneurial. And so after explaining why, I

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Speaker 1: thought we could do super well in this category. We

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Speaker 1: launched the product in twenty fourteen, and we were fortunate

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Speaker 1: to have several of our clients who believed in us

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Speaker 1: and believed in the team, and so we had our

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Speaker 1: first clothes in two thousand November of twenty fourteen, and

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Speaker 1: ultimately we raised a billion dollars for our first fund

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Speaker 1: in the private space.

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Speaker 2: So from a billion dollars almost ten years years ago,

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Speaker 2: what's Wellington's privates today? Some multiple that I would imagine correct.

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Speaker 1: So we're at about eight billion of commitments and money

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Speaker 1: under management. We now have five products in the space.

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Speaker 1: In fact, my original product invested in biotech. In twenty nineteen,

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Speaker 1: we spun out Biotech into a separate, dedicated product for

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Speaker 1: the biotech space, and now we've added products in investment

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Speaker 1: grade private credit. We have a product in the sustainability

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Speaker 1: climate area. We have a product called Wave which is

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Speaker 1: focused on diverse founders. And so now we've built out

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Speaker 1: the space further and our hopes are to launch additional

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Speaker 1: products in the space over the next several years and

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Speaker 1: really build a very multi dimensional, multi asset platform that

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Speaker 1: will address private equity, mostly inventure credit, as well as

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Speaker 1: real estate.

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Speaker 2: So I've read a bunch of analysts research technical term,

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Speaker 2: bunch of research I've I've frequently seen analyzes that show

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Speaker 2: microcap and small cap run very parallel to venture capital

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Speaker 2: in terms of performance and volatility and other descriptions. What

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Speaker 2: have you found given your background running small cap at

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Speaker 2: one point in time and now doing a little bit later,

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Speaker 2: late stage venture capital. Are the parallels there at all?

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Speaker 2: Or is that sort of academic research overstated? Now?

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Speaker 1: I think it's a very fair characterization of the way

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Speaker 1: to think about this, because it's kind of the way

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Speaker 1: that I thought about this. And in fact, what's interesting

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Speaker 1: is that in my product, we have several clients that

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Speaker 1: use us as a small cap growth alternative. And the

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Speaker 1: reason being is that if you believe in my premise

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Speaker 1: that companies are staying private longer, what's happening is many

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Speaker 1: companies today are going public and skipping small cap.

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Speaker 3: Right if you think.

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Speaker 1: About the airbnbs and Ubers and many many others, they're

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Speaker 1: coming public not at three hundred million dollars, they're coming

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Speaker 1: public at ten billion, twenty billion, thirty billion. And so

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Speaker 1: their view is that, well, if we want to continue

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Speaker 1: to have exposure to the next generation of great companies.

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Speaker 3: This is a product that.

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Speaker 1: Will enable us to have exposure to that set of companies,

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Speaker 1: and so I think it is a fair characterization. In fact,

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Speaker 1: when we look at performance, we use as our public

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Speaker 1: market equivalent, we use the Russell two thousand growth index

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Speaker 1: as our comparison of whether we're doing a good job

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Speaker 1: or not doing a benchmark correct.

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Speaker 3: Correct.

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Speaker 2: So the obvious question is, at first, your thesis has

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Speaker 2: proven to be true for a long time, what do

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Speaker 2: we down to thirty five hundred companies in the Wilster

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Speaker 2: five thousand, fewer companies going public? So you definitely got

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Speaker 2: that right. I got to ask, why do you think

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Speaker 2: that is? What is the underlying reason why companies are

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Speaker 2: choosing to stay private for longer.

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Speaker 1: I think it's a really great question. And when we

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Speaker 1: first started, we felt the thesis was that Sarbanes Oxley

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Speaker 1: that was put in place in the early two thousands

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Speaker 1: made it a little bit more onerous and made it

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Speaker 1: more expensive for smaller cap companies to go public because

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Speaker 1: they they raised the regulatory burden of doing that, And

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Speaker 1: I think that was the genesis of this. But as

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Speaker 1: I sat in the boardroom and we have a lot

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Speaker 1: of observation rights. Board observation rights in terms of what

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Speaker 1: we do probably get them close to seventy five percent

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Speaker 1: of the time. What I've discovered is that I think

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Speaker 1: it actually makes sense because when you're private, you can

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Speaker 1: think more strategically.

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Speaker 3: You're not trying to make the March quarter in the

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Speaker 3: June quarter in the same time.

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Speaker 2: Longer term for sure.

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Speaker 1: Correct, you can think longer term, and when you're still

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Speaker 1: at a phase where you have fifty seventy five hundred

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Speaker 1: million dollars of revenues, you want to have a lot

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Speaker 1: of latitude. You want to have the ability to say,

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Speaker 1: you know what, we need to invest more money now.

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Speaker 1: And as you know, you start making decisions like that

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Speaker 1: in the public market, and you release your earnings results

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Speaker 1: and say like, hey, our earnings next quarter are going

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Speaker 1: to be half of what we thought they were going

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Speaker 1: to be. Your stock price generally doesn't go up, and

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Speaker 1: then you go into the doghouse and you got to

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Speaker 1: scratch your way out of it. Whereas when I'm in

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Speaker 1: the board room, we probably spend ten percent of the

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Speaker 1: time maybe talking about the quarter, and ninety percent of

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Speaker 1: the time really thinking strategically about where we can take

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Speaker 1: this business, how do we expand our product line? How

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Speaker 1: do we expand geographically? How do we expand distribution? And

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Speaker 1: so I think that for me, my thinking has evolved

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Speaker 1: in that I believe that it could make companies stronger

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Speaker 1: for longer if they have more time to think strategically

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Speaker 1: and then make that transition to having to balance the

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Speaker 1: strategic with the tactical.

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Speaker 2: There's no doubt that the era when you were running

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Speaker 2: a mutual fund the late nineties, there was a rush

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Speaker 2: to bring a lot of premature companies public. So let's

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Speaker 2: hold that aside. Clearly, just you know, issuing IPOs based

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Speaker 2: on clicks and eyeballs wasn't gonna work. But that said,

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Speaker 2: you bring up the regulatory burden of Sarbanes Oxley, but

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Speaker 2: that alone wouldn't get it done if there wasn't just

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Speaker 2: tons and tons of capital around. Talk about what's available

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Speaker 2: for early stage, seed, late stage companies that are looking

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Speaker 2: to do around. There's no shortage of investors around, are there?

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Speaker 3: Yeah?

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Speaker 1: No, that's that's a fair point because everything I just

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Speaker 1: said would mean nothing if there wasn't capital to deploy

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Speaker 1: into these businesses. And over the last call it twenty

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Speaker 1: plus years, which from early stage and seed to late stage,

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Speaker 1: there has been more and more capital in the I

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Speaker 1: think in the earlier stage it's much more dedicated funds.

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Speaker 1: It's the traditional vcs that we all know that are

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Speaker 1: in that market, and as you get to the later stage,

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Speaker 1: it's it's a lot more eclectic. It's some dedicated funds

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Speaker 1: like ours. There are more multi stage funds where there

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Speaker 1: were funds that were doing Series b's and c's and

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Speaker 1: are now doing late stage, where generally our fund averaging

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Speaker 1: a Series D. In terms of where we invest, there's

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Speaker 1: crossover funds, there's hybrid funds. Even hedge funds and mutual

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Speaker 1: funds have invested in this space. And so there are

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Speaker 1: a lot of pockets. A lot of people like myself

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Speaker 1: when I first started, are taking public mutual funds some

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Speaker 1: of the bigger players out there, and they're also investing

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Speaker 1: in this space. And so there has been more capital

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Speaker 1: available for these companies, which is what has enabled them

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Speaker 1: to stay private longer.

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Speaker 2: Really interesting, so let's talk a little bit about the

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Speaker 2: process of evaluating different types of privates. You kind of

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Speaker 2: alluded that the skills you learned evaluating small cap growth

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Speaker 2: companies is very applicable to late stage venture and other privates.

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Speaker 2: Take us through that. What are the similarities?

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Speaker 1: Yes, absolutely, And because I would not be a good

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Speaker 1: early stage investor, I don't have any skill sets in

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Speaker 1: evaluating three people in a garage with an idea. But

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Speaker 1: when we're looking at companies, and many of the companies

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Speaker 1: in our portfolio they all have usually fifty million dollars

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Speaker 1: plus in revenues. Many of them have one hundred two

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Speaker 1: hundred plus in revenues, those skill sets are very applicable.

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Speaker 1: And because there's now product market fit, there's now streams

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Speaker 1: a data about how their customers have responded to their product,

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Speaker 1: how sticky are their customers, what the competitive landscape looks like.

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Speaker 1: So all of the information that we were assessing on

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Speaker 1: the public side is very applicable to the private side.

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Speaker 1: And what I think distinguishes us at Wellington is that

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Speaker 1: we're able to utilize our public market investors in the

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Speaker 1: due diligence process in helping us assess. We have fifty

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Speaker 1: five global industry analysts that have been covering their industries

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Speaker 1: for ten twenty thirty plus years, and whether it's logistics

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Speaker 1: or aerospace or a software company, we have the information,

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Speaker 1: and we have the skill sets to do that, and

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Speaker 1: we have a lot of data to analyze, and we

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Speaker 1: could predict the future. We know what the company is

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Speaker 1: thinking about the future. Our numbers are generally going to

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Speaker 1: be lower because many of those numbers are aspirational. But

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Speaker 1: assessing management teams so qualitative and quantitative, is very similar

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Speaker 1: to what I've done on the public side for many,

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Speaker 1: many years.

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Speaker 2: So the parallels. You have a management team that you

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Speaker 2: can evaluate, you have a product that you can review,

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Speaker 2: you have customers and revenue you can look at. All

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Speaker 2: of this comes down to execution. Those are the similarities.

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Speaker 2: What are the differences when you're looking at a company

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Speaker 2: that hasn't yet gone public isn't quite that mature.

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Speaker 1: I think I wouldn't think of it as a difference,

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Speaker 1: but I think it gets to your point. The part

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Speaker 1: that we don't know is the future. It can this

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Speaker 1: management team execute from here to the public markets. And

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Speaker 1: we always believe that our value added in the space

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Speaker 1: is that we can help them on that last mile

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Speaker 1: from the private market to the public market.

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Speaker 2: So that you're touching on something to ask what are

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Speaker 2: the milestones between a fifty million dollar company, meaning they're

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Speaker 2: doing fifty million in revenues. They've been around a few years,

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Speaker 2: but they want to bulk up, they want to become

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Speaker 2: more substantial. Do we care about round numbers like one

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Speaker 2: hundred million or five hundred million in sales or is

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Speaker 2: we just want to see that steady growth over time

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Speaker 2: and greater customer acquisition.

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Speaker 1: I think every company is unique and their journey is

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Speaker 1: very unique. And what I have found is that there

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Speaker 1: have been a number of situations where we invested and

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Speaker 1: things went off the rail early on and the companies

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Speaker 1: needed to pivot or they had big headwinds. I always

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Speaker 1: loved to use the example of Coupong, which is in

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Speaker 1: e commerce space in South Korea, whose growth rate what

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Speaker 1: we owned it went from probably one hundred percent down

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Speaker 1: to twenty percent and then re accelerated as they got

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Speaker 1: their logistics strategy in order. And then DraftKings, which is

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Speaker 1: kind of the post to child that was at one

436
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Speaker 1: point sued by practically every attorney general in the country

437
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Speaker 1: whether daily fantasy sports was even legitimate, and then eventually

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Speaker 1: became a big player in sports betting and I gaming,

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Speaker 1: and so those went totally.

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Speaker 3: Off the rails that we had marked them down.

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Speaker 1: Probably close to fifty percent at one point and then

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Speaker 1: ended up being Two of our best outcomes is that

443
00:23:16,240 --> 00:23:18,520
Speaker 1: every company just has a different journey and the goal

444
00:23:18,640 --> 00:23:19,800
Speaker 1: is is to be patient.

445
00:23:19,840 --> 00:23:20,560
Speaker 3: In many case, you.

446
00:23:20,600 --> 00:23:23,000
Speaker 2: Were an early investor in DraftKings also, is that right?

447
00:23:23,440 --> 00:23:25,840
Speaker 2: And then what was the resolution? So we know what

448
00:23:25,880 --> 00:23:28,600
Speaker 2: happened with them? They blew up when the Supreme Court

449
00:23:28,640 --> 00:23:33,160
Speaker 2: overturned the rule that only allowed gambling in certain states,

450
00:23:33,640 --> 00:23:36,760
Speaker 2: and now they're one of the handful of giant players there.

451
00:23:37,080 --> 00:23:38,360
Speaker 2: What was the Korean company?

452
00:23:38,440 --> 00:23:41,960
Speaker 1: So the Korean South Korean company is called Kupong, which

453
00:23:42,000 --> 00:23:46,359
Speaker 1: is basically simply the Amazon of South Korea. And so

454
00:23:46,440 --> 00:23:48,720
Speaker 1: they went through and I remember going through this with

455
00:23:48,800 --> 00:23:51,120
Speaker 1: Bomb who is the CEO. Is that they were going

456
00:23:51,119 --> 00:23:53,520
Speaker 1: through a very similar thing that Amazon went through early

457
00:23:53,560 --> 00:23:56,760
Speaker 1: in their existence. Is they were going from multiple day

458
00:23:56,920 --> 00:23:59,640
Speaker 1: delivery down to two day delivery, to one day delivery

459
00:23:59,720 --> 00:24:03,240
Speaker 1: to literally our delivery and doing all the logistics behind

460
00:24:03,280 --> 00:24:06,240
Speaker 1: that required a lot of infrastructure, and at one point

461
00:24:06,240 --> 00:24:08,600
Speaker 1: they had to really slow down growth to make sure

462
00:24:08,640 --> 00:24:10,720
Speaker 1: they got that right. And once they got it right,

463
00:24:10,720 --> 00:24:13,919
Speaker 1: they were able to reaccelerate. And they had a moment

464
00:24:13,960 --> 00:24:16,400
Speaker 1: where they were getting very close to running out of capital,

465
00:24:16,520 --> 00:24:18,880
Speaker 1: but they were able to put around together and then

466
00:24:18,920 --> 00:24:22,399
Speaker 1: they ended up having a really good outcome in the

467
00:24:22,400 --> 00:24:24,520
Speaker 1: public markets, and they went public.

468
00:24:24,960 --> 00:24:25,280
Speaker 3: They did.

469
00:24:25,280 --> 00:24:28,240
Speaker 1: They're public, yeah, public on NASDAK and so they've now

470
00:24:28,280 --> 00:24:30,119
Speaker 1: been public. I think they went public in twenty one,

471
00:24:30,119 --> 00:24:33,320
Speaker 1: so they've been public two plus years now, and so

472
00:24:33,359 --> 00:24:35,520
Speaker 1: they had a really good outcome. But those were two

473
00:24:35,960 --> 00:24:38,360
Speaker 1: that were not you know, is to your point going

474
00:24:38,440 --> 00:24:40,080
Speaker 1: up until the right like it was, there was a

475
00:24:40,119 --> 00:24:43,160
Speaker 1: lot of sideways there and a lot of nail biting,

476
00:24:43,480 --> 00:24:45,320
Speaker 1: and then they ended up having good outcomes. But then

477
00:24:45,320 --> 00:24:48,960
Speaker 1: there's others that, to your point, will just continue to

478
00:24:49,640 --> 00:24:53,080
Speaker 1: pound out forty fifty sixty percent growth and go from

479
00:24:53,160 --> 00:24:57,080
Speaker 1: unprofitable to eventually profitable. And then our job is just

480
00:24:57,160 --> 00:24:59,879
Speaker 1: really to help them think through what do you know

481
00:25:00,240 --> 00:25:02,359
Speaker 1: to do between now and when you go public to

482
00:25:02,440 --> 00:25:06,600
Speaker 1: make sure that you remain a very attractive company in

483
00:25:06,640 --> 00:25:09,400
Speaker 1: the public markets, right, because there's always this risk which

484
00:25:09,440 --> 00:25:13,000
Speaker 1: I worry a lot about, is that companies stay private longer.

485
00:25:13,040 --> 00:25:16,919
Speaker 1: But sometimes they can stay private too long, right, correct,

486
00:25:16,920 --> 00:25:18,960
Speaker 1: because you need you still need to have a really

487
00:25:19,359 --> 00:25:22,879
Speaker 1: good story for the public markets, because the public markets

488
00:25:22,920 --> 00:25:25,919
Speaker 1: want to see a long term trend that they can

489
00:25:25,960 --> 00:25:26,400
Speaker 1: buy into.

490
00:25:26,560 --> 00:25:27,520
Speaker 3: And if they.

491
00:25:27,400 --> 00:25:30,200
Speaker 1: Believe that you've already seen your best days, your best

492
00:25:30,280 --> 00:25:32,159
Speaker 1: days are now behind you, that's not going to be

493
00:25:32,200 --> 00:25:34,880
Speaker 1: a really interesting public investment. And so we really need

494
00:25:34,920 --> 00:25:37,359
Speaker 1: to think through what's the right timing, what are the

495
00:25:37,400 --> 00:25:40,320
Speaker 1: right dynamics, and what do you need to do today

496
00:25:40,480 --> 00:25:43,080
Speaker 1: to set yourself up for a really strong public showing.

497
00:25:43,359 --> 00:25:47,520
Speaker 2: So how do these areas work together or are they

498
00:25:47,600 --> 00:25:50,639
Speaker 2: three distinct fields of investment?

499
00:25:51,119 --> 00:25:54,080
Speaker 1: So some of it works together and there's some synergies

500
00:25:54,119 --> 00:25:57,520
Speaker 1: and some ability for us to really invest across the

501
00:25:57,960 --> 00:25:59,960
Speaker 1: platform from early stags to lay stage. On the bench

502
00:26:00,320 --> 00:26:03,359
Speaker 1: side investment great private credit is a totally new area

503
00:26:03,440 --> 00:26:06,679
Speaker 1: for us. But I think the commonality of everything that

504
00:26:06,720 --> 00:26:09,919
Speaker 1: we're doing is through the lens of where can Wellington

505
00:26:10,160 --> 00:26:14,399
Speaker 1: have an edge? What have we done historically on the

506
00:26:14,440 --> 00:26:17,760
Speaker 1: public side that would make sense to poort over to

507
00:26:17,880 --> 00:26:20,800
Speaker 1: the private side and leverage and scale that right, So

508
00:26:20,840 --> 00:26:24,760
Speaker 1: you think about credit, we have a multiple one hundred billion,

509
00:26:24,920 --> 00:26:29,359
Speaker 1: hundreds of billion dollars of revenue of asset business and

510
00:26:29,440 --> 00:26:31,560
Speaker 1: credit and so we have a lot of expertise, We

511
00:26:31,600 --> 00:26:35,359
Speaker 1: have a lot of experts, whether it's portfolio managers, analysts,

512
00:26:35,400 --> 00:26:38,359
Speaker 1: macro economists, and so there's a lot of things that

513
00:26:38,400 --> 00:26:40,879
Speaker 1: we can do in that space that we think we

514
00:26:40,880 --> 00:26:44,680
Speaker 1: can deliver very strong results. And similarly, as we think

515
00:26:44,680 --> 00:26:47,040
Speaker 1: about real estate, which we're not in yet but something

516
00:26:47,040 --> 00:26:50,439
Speaker 1: we're thinking about. We have a public reteam on the

517
00:26:50,440 --> 00:26:54,200
Speaker 1: equity side, we have a public presence on the credit

518
00:26:54,320 --> 00:26:56,560
Speaker 1: and fixed income side, and so we think that's an

519
00:26:56,600 --> 00:27:00,199
Speaker 1: area that we can extend our expertise to also, and

520
00:27:00,240 --> 00:27:02,359
Speaker 1: so we think about it through through that lens in

521
00:27:02,400 --> 00:27:05,520
Speaker 1: terms of where we where we believe the platform can

522
00:27:05,640 --> 00:27:08,080
Speaker 1: enable us to be super strong and what we've been

523
00:27:08,280 --> 00:27:12,720
Speaker 1: very i think very successful at doing is attracting investors

524
00:27:12,840 --> 00:27:13,800
Speaker 1: who buy into that.

525
00:27:14,080 --> 00:27:16,919
Speaker 2: So is some of the thinking around that these are

526
00:27:17,000 --> 00:27:21,720
Speaker 2: essentially uncorrelated in terms of their returns or does eventually

527
00:27:21,760 --> 00:27:25,200
Speaker 2: all things go to one and the lack of correlation

528
00:27:25,320 --> 00:27:25,879
Speaker 2: goes away.

529
00:27:26,280 --> 00:27:28,400
Speaker 1: I think it always depends. I think you know, when

530
00:27:28,400 --> 00:27:30,800
Speaker 1: you look at what we're doing on the late stage space,

531
00:27:30,840 --> 00:27:34,200
Speaker 1: that's probably the most correlated to the public markets. We're

532
00:27:34,240 --> 00:27:37,960
Speaker 1: definitely taking the direction that we're going from and how

533
00:27:38,000 --> 00:27:40,720
Speaker 1: our performance is somewhat from what's going on on the

534
00:27:40,720 --> 00:27:45,040
Speaker 1: public side. Obviously, with our early stage fund, that's many

535
00:27:45,119 --> 00:27:48,159
Speaker 1: years away from a liquidity event, so that's probably the

536
00:27:48,240 --> 00:27:51,240
Speaker 1: least correlated. So I think it's going to depend on

537
00:27:52,280 --> 00:27:54,640
Speaker 1: the asset class. I think all things. I don't think

538
00:27:54,640 --> 00:27:56,919
Speaker 1: all things go to one. But there's going to be

539
00:27:57,040 --> 00:27:59,400
Speaker 1: some correlation with what's going on in the public markets

540
00:27:59,680 --> 00:28:03,480
Speaker 1: and happening economically. That's going to have an impact on

541
00:28:04,280 --> 00:28:07,480
Speaker 1: the performance of the businesses that we're investing in on

542
00:28:07,520 --> 00:28:10,359
Speaker 1: the private side similar to businesses that we invest in

543
00:28:10,400 --> 00:28:11,040
Speaker 1: on the public site.

544
00:28:11,280 --> 00:28:14,600
Speaker 2: That's really interesting. So let's talk a little bit about

545
00:28:15,000 --> 00:28:19,480
Speaker 2: the IPO market. Seems like it's been mostly frozen this

546
00:28:19,640 --> 00:28:22,639
Speaker 2: year twenty twenty three. Why do you think that is?

547
00:28:23,560 --> 00:28:26,639
Speaker 1: So the IPO market always takes its queue from the

548
00:28:26,680 --> 00:28:29,880
Speaker 1: public markets, and as you know, last year twenty two

549
00:28:30,320 --> 00:28:33,480
Speaker 1: we had a bear market. It was pretty harsh bear market,

550
00:28:33,520 --> 00:28:35,040
Speaker 1: and particularly in growth.

551
00:28:35,280 --> 00:28:37,879
Speaker 2: It was a modest bear market in the S and

552
00:28:37,920 --> 00:28:41,800
Speaker 2: P five hundred off about nineteen percent, but the Nasdaq,

553
00:28:41,880 --> 00:28:44,240
Speaker 2: the tech heavy NASDAK I think, was down thirty two

554
00:28:44,320 --> 00:28:47,280
Speaker 2: or thirty four percent. That's a big losing a third

555
00:28:47,320 --> 00:28:48,760
Speaker 2: of your value, that's a big whack.

556
00:28:48,960 --> 00:28:52,200
Speaker 1: Yes, that was a little bit more nuclear winter, and

557
00:28:52,800 --> 00:28:54,640
Speaker 1: if you look at the innards of that, there were

558
00:28:54,680 --> 00:28:58,640
Speaker 1: a lot of companies down sixty, seventy and eighty percent.

559
00:28:58,680 --> 00:29:02,160
Speaker 1: And so when that happens, portfolio managers having been one

560
00:29:02,440 --> 00:29:04,080
Speaker 1: shut down. The last thing you want to do when

561
00:29:04,120 --> 00:29:07,120
Speaker 1: you have fifty fires in your portfolio is to look

562
00:29:07,120 --> 00:29:09,320
Speaker 1: at a new idea. Right, You're still trying to figure

563
00:29:09,320 --> 00:29:11,840
Speaker 1: out what you need to keep, what you need to jettison.

564
00:29:12,360 --> 00:29:15,720
Speaker 1: And so that is why the IPO market shuts down

565
00:29:15,760 --> 00:29:16,480
Speaker 1: in a bear market.

566
00:29:16,600 --> 00:29:19,480
Speaker 2: Now, now today, what do we have the SMP we're

567
00:29:19,520 --> 00:29:22,160
Speaker 2: recording this in the beginning of the fourth quarter. The

568
00:29:22,240 --> 00:29:25,920
Speaker 2: SMP is up about twelve percent for the year, above

569
00:29:26,000 --> 00:29:29,640
Speaker 2: average historically, and yet the IPO market still seems to

570
00:29:29,640 --> 00:29:33,680
Speaker 2: be a little chilly. Is it just recovering from last year?

571
00:29:33,800 --> 00:29:36,600
Speaker 2: Or why we still floundering along?

572
00:29:36,920 --> 00:29:39,040
Speaker 1: So we're thwing. I think we're in the thawing thwing,

573
00:29:39,160 --> 00:29:41,240
Speaker 1: okay orring moment. Right, we're starting to get there. And

574
00:29:41,280 --> 00:29:43,720
Speaker 1: if you look historically, and we've looked at data from

575
00:29:43,760 --> 00:29:47,400
Speaker 1: the last forty years, generally the IPO market when it

576
00:29:47,480 --> 00:29:50,920
Speaker 1: shuts down, it shuts down for about a year. Occasionally

577
00:29:50,920 --> 00:29:53,200
Speaker 1: it will shut down for two years plus, and as

578
00:29:53,240 --> 00:29:56,280
Speaker 1: you're noting, we're kind of in the second year of this,

579
00:29:56,520 --> 00:29:59,800
Speaker 1: and as you also noted, the markets are starting to recover.

580
00:30:00,120 --> 00:30:03,320
Speaker 1: And as the markets recover, public investors start to get

581
00:30:03,320 --> 00:30:05,760
Speaker 1: a little bit more comfortable looking at new ideas.

582
00:30:05,840 --> 00:30:08,600
Speaker 2: And we've had a few IPOs trickle out this year, right,

583
00:30:08,840 --> 00:30:09,920
Speaker 2: anything catch your eye?

584
00:30:10,000 --> 00:30:11,720
Speaker 1: You know, I don't look at the public markets quite

585
00:30:11,760 --> 00:30:14,080
Speaker 1: as closely, but had you had a cadre of companies

586
00:30:14,120 --> 00:30:17,120
Speaker 1: come public several weeks ago with Clavio, which is in

587
00:30:17,160 --> 00:30:20,640
Speaker 1: a very interesting space in kind of the ad tech area,

588
00:30:21,280 --> 00:30:24,080
Speaker 1: and Instacart, which obviously was a down round but still

589
00:30:24,080 --> 00:30:26,800
Speaker 1: has an eight nine billion dollar market cap, and of

590
00:30:26,840 --> 00:30:29,200
Speaker 1: course arm which was a much larger play and a

591
00:30:29,280 --> 00:30:33,080
Speaker 1: spin out being respun out from Intel. And so to me,

592
00:30:33,720 --> 00:30:37,040
Speaker 1: they've traded fine, which is like a nice little indication

593
00:30:37,560 --> 00:30:41,400
Speaker 1: that the health of the IPO market is beginning to improve.

594
00:30:41,400 --> 00:30:42,920
Speaker 1: And of course I don't have a crystal ball, so

595
00:30:42,960 --> 00:30:44,440
Speaker 1: I don't know if the markets are up or down,

596
00:30:44,480 --> 00:30:47,760
Speaker 1: but let's assume that they're stable over the next couple

597
00:30:47,840 --> 00:30:50,400
Speaker 1: of quarters or several quarters. I think that there's a

598
00:30:50,520 --> 00:30:55,000
Speaker 1: reasonable backlog of companies that will start seeing being surfaced

599
00:30:55,000 --> 00:30:56,880
Speaker 1: and starting to come to the IPO markets. We know

600
00:30:56,920 --> 00:30:59,640
Speaker 1: we have companies in our portfolio that are beginning that

601
00:30:59,680 --> 00:31:03,760
Speaker 1: prep So I think my guess right now is that

602
00:31:03,800 --> 00:31:07,400
Speaker 1: twenty twenty four begins to normalize and we'll we'll see

603
00:31:07,400 --> 00:31:11,479
Speaker 1: improvements in the IPO market after two years of really

604
00:31:12,160 --> 00:31:13,240
Speaker 1: very very low volume.

605
00:31:13,400 --> 00:31:17,600
Speaker 2: So a decade ago, you identify private companies are going

606
00:31:17,640 --> 00:31:19,880
Speaker 2: to stay private for longer, which means there's going to

607
00:31:19,880 --> 00:31:24,200
Speaker 2: be a delay going public, and then a decade goes

608
00:31:24,200 --> 00:31:27,800
Speaker 2: by and more or less proves your thesis correct. Over

609
00:31:27,840 --> 00:31:32,160
Speaker 2: that ensuing decade, How has the IPO market changed? What's

610
00:31:32,280 --> 00:31:36,160
Speaker 2: different about a company going public in twenty twenty four

611
00:31:36,720 --> 00:31:39,800
Speaker 2: than you when you were first making these observations in

612
00:31:39,840 --> 00:31:40,680
Speaker 2: twenty fourteen.

613
00:31:41,320 --> 00:31:43,719
Speaker 1: So I think generally what we're seeing as companies are

614
00:31:43,760 --> 00:31:46,960
Speaker 1: going public later. So instead of being like four or

615
00:31:46,960 --> 00:31:50,000
Speaker 1: five six years into their existence, it's more like eight, nine,

616
00:31:50,120 --> 00:31:53,080
Speaker 1: ten years into their existence. And so by definition, these

617
00:31:53,080 --> 00:31:55,760
Speaker 1: companies tend to be more mature and tend to be

618
00:31:56,200 --> 00:31:59,200
Speaker 1: larger than they were a decade ago. And particularly when

619
00:31:59,240 --> 00:32:01,760
Speaker 1: I started in the business and was managing money back

620
00:32:01,920 --> 00:32:06,560
Speaker 1: in the nineteen nineties, and so these companies hopefully should

621
00:32:06,760 --> 00:32:10,240
Speaker 1: have more sustainable performance and be a little bit less violatile.

622
00:32:10,560 --> 00:32:13,600
Speaker 1: Albeit in twenty one we had a rush for a

623
00:32:13,600 --> 00:32:16,320
Speaker 1: lot of companies to come public and that class has

624
00:32:16,360 --> 00:32:19,080
Speaker 1: not performed well, which is probably a good cautionary tale

625
00:32:19,320 --> 00:32:21,440
Speaker 1: that you should be more mature when you hit the

626
00:32:21,440 --> 00:32:22,280
Speaker 1: public markets.

627
00:32:22,440 --> 00:32:25,400
Speaker 2: So in the nineties, when you were running public funds,

628
00:32:26,320 --> 00:32:30,480
Speaker 2: that IPO process was very much a dog and pony show.

629
00:32:31,320 --> 00:32:33,800
Speaker 2: You would have the investment bank and the founders and

630
00:32:33,800 --> 00:32:36,920
Speaker 2: a whole bunch of folks do these giant road shows

631
00:32:36,920 --> 00:32:39,720
Speaker 2: and they would go from New York to Boston, they'd

632
00:32:39,760 --> 00:32:42,720
Speaker 2: go out to San Francisco. They would go all around

633
00:32:42,800 --> 00:32:47,040
Speaker 2: the country showing off the company before the big wedding.

634
00:32:48,080 --> 00:32:50,160
Speaker 2: How is it today, Do we still go through that

635
00:32:50,200 --> 00:32:54,440
Speaker 2: same process or have capital markets evolved for taking companies

636
00:32:54,480 --> 00:32:55,120
Speaker 2: public today?

637
00:32:55,200 --> 00:32:58,040
Speaker 3: Well, the biggest difference is it's now zoom, zoom and zoom.

638
00:32:58,120 --> 00:32:59,800
Speaker 1: Right. It's just a lot of zoom meetings, so they're

639
00:33:00,040 --> 00:33:02,880
Speaker 1: running all over the world anymore, which is probably really

640
00:33:02,920 --> 00:33:07,560
Speaker 1: good for more efficient, for sure, massively more efficient. We

641
00:33:08,000 --> 00:33:10,520
Speaker 1: do have a couple of different directions we can take.

642
00:33:10,600 --> 00:33:13,400
Speaker 1: Although the majority of the companies are still doing a

643
00:33:13,440 --> 00:33:16,640
Speaker 1: direct IPO. Right, you have direct listings that got a

644
00:33:16,640 --> 00:33:19,320
Speaker 1: lot of play a few years ago. Obviously we saw

645
00:33:19,400 --> 00:33:22,000
Speaker 1: a lot from the spack market a couple of years ago.

646
00:33:22,120 --> 00:33:25,320
Speaker 1: I think that trend is in the rear view mirror.

647
00:33:25,440 --> 00:33:29,120
Speaker 1: I always felt SPACs makes sense in very specific cases.

648
00:33:29,160 --> 00:33:32,240
Speaker 1: But if you're a really solid company, you can go

649
00:33:32,360 --> 00:33:34,920
Speaker 1: public through an IPO, you don't need to do a spack.

650
00:33:35,000 --> 00:33:38,000
Speaker 1: So I don't see SPACs coming back. So a lot

651
00:33:38,040 --> 00:33:41,880
Speaker 1: has not really changed in that regard, other than the

652
00:33:41,920 --> 00:33:46,080
Speaker 1: fact that that companies now can do a lot more

653
00:33:46,160 --> 00:33:49,280
Speaker 1: meetings in a lot more locations, in the comfort of

654
00:33:49,320 --> 00:33:50,600
Speaker 1: their offices or their home.

655
00:33:51,040 --> 00:33:53,840
Speaker 2: So let's talk a little bit about how you guys

656
00:33:53,880 --> 00:33:57,480
Speaker 2: work with later stage companies. How do you think about

657
00:33:57,480 --> 00:34:01,440
Speaker 2: these firms versus either in early stage company where you

658
00:34:01,520 --> 00:34:04,920
Speaker 2: really don't have a sense of product and client base,

659
00:34:05,520 --> 00:34:08,760
Speaker 2: and companies that have gone public where they're fairly mature

660
00:34:08,800 --> 00:34:11,080
Speaker 2: and it's pretty clear, hey, we have a sense of

661
00:34:11,120 --> 00:34:13,920
Speaker 2: what the next five years might look like. These sort

662
00:34:13,920 --> 00:34:17,200
Speaker 2: of straddle that gray zone in between.

663
00:34:17,200 --> 00:34:19,960
Speaker 1: Correct, and the value that we add is very different

664
00:34:19,960 --> 00:34:22,520
Speaker 1: than an early stage company. Right, when you're an early

665
00:34:22,520 --> 00:34:25,080
Speaker 1: stage investor, you're going to help them hire their first

666
00:34:25,440 --> 00:34:28,080
Speaker 1: chief marketing officer, their first head of R and D,

667
00:34:28,640 --> 00:34:32,040
Speaker 1: and many other, many other positions, and you're going to

668
00:34:32,120 --> 00:34:35,680
Speaker 1: work with that founding team on their product market fit.

669
00:34:35,800 --> 00:34:39,040
Speaker 1: By the time we get involved, the company has been built,

670
00:34:39,080 --> 00:34:43,720
Speaker 1: they've had they've achieved escape velocity, and it's really about

671
00:34:43,920 --> 00:34:47,680
Speaker 1: how well they can scale. And that's where we come in,

672
00:34:47,800 --> 00:34:50,160
Speaker 1: is really being able to help them. As I noted

673
00:34:50,200 --> 00:34:53,400
Speaker 1: earlier on that last mile. So for instance, we have

674
00:34:53,480 --> 00:34:56,040
Speaker 1: an ESG team, and so we have a team led

675
00:34:56,040 --> 00:34:59,200
Speaker 1: by Hillary Flynn that steps in and works with the

676
00:34:59,239 --> 00:35:01,560
Speaker 1: company on what they're going to need to do from

677
00:35:01,600 --> 00:35:04,000
Speaker 1: today to the time they go public to be at

678
00:35:04,040 --> 00:35:06,160
Speaker 1: a level that's going to make them attractive to the

679
00:35:06,200 --> 00:35:08,520
Speaker 1: most investors on the public side, since, as we know

680
00:35:08,640 --> 00:35:12,279
Speaker 1: the public side, many investors care about issues around ESG,

681
00:35:12,440 --> 00:35:15,560
Speaker 1: particularly around corporate governance, so what the composition of the

682
00:35:15,600 --> 00:35:19,520
Speaker 1: board of directors should look like, and and many other

683
00:35:19,640 --> 00:35:22,520
Speaker 1: issues around that. We're going to help them really think

684
00:35:22,640 --> 00:35:26,880
Speaker 1: about strategically and tactically the things that they're doing today

685
00:35:27,280 --> 00:35:29,520
Speaker 1: that are going to have ramifications when they are a

686
00:35:29,560 --> 00:35:33,560
Speaker 1: public company, whether they're introducing products that have lower gross margins,

687
00:35:33,560 --> 00:35:35,560
Speaker 1: so optically, gross margins are going to start going down

688
00:35:35,600 --> 00:35:38,840
Speaker 1: and that could have an impact on their multiples relative

689
00:35:38,880 --> 00:35:40,360
Speaker 1: to things that they can do that can be gross

690
00:35:40,400 --> 00:35:44,839
Speaker 1: margining enhanceome and what can they do to sustain their

691
00:35:44,920 --> 00:35:47,759
Speaker 1: level of growth for the longest period of time. And

692
00:35:47,840 --> 00:35:51,640
Speaker 1: as we talked about also IPO timing. Sometimes we've suggested

693
00:35:51,680 --> 00:35:54,440
Speaker 1: that companies delay their IPO because we think that they

694
00:35:54,440 --> 00:35:57,960
Speaker 1: don't have the visibility to go public today. Others we've

695
00:35:58,040 --> 00:36:00,400
Speaker 1: suggested that they should go public sooner be to what

696
00:36:00,440 --> 00:36:03,759
Speaker 1: we talked about about not getting past their expiration date

697
00:36:04,040 --> 00:36:06,640
Speaker 1: of having an attractiveness to public investors.

698
00:36:06,840 --> 00:36:09,839
Speaker 2: So private equity firms tend to come in and take

699
00:36:09,880 --> 00:36:13,759
Speaker 2: over running these companies. They manage them, not what you

700
00:36:13,800 --> 00:36:18,680
Speaker 2: guys do. The description of how you approach late stage

701
00:36:18,719 --> 00:36:23,320
Speaker 2: companies almost sounds like finishing school. You put the final

702
00:36:23,400 --> 00:36:26,399
Speaker 2: touches and get them ready to send them out into

703
00:36:26,400 --> 00:36:29,400
Speaker 2: the world. Is that to glib or is that a

704
00:36:29,400 --> 00:36:30,400
Speaker 2: fair way to describe them?

705
00:36:30,480 --> 00:36:30,560
Speaker 1: No?

706
00:36:30,600 --> 00:36:31,400
Speaker 3: I like that description.

707
00:36:31,520 --> 00:36:33,359
Speaker 1: I think that's what we're doing is really helping them

708
00:36:33,640 --> 00:36:37,000
Speaker 1: with finishing school. And importantly we want them to be

709
00:36:37,040 --> 00:36:41,400
Speaker 1: attractive to the public side of Wellington. Subsequent to their IPO.

710
00:36:41,480 --> 00:36:44,200
Speaker 1: There's no guarantee. We always tell our companies, we don't

711
00:36:44,239 --> 00:36:46,480
Speaker 1: tell our public side what to do. But we've had

712
00:36:46,520 --> 00:36:49,000
Speaker 1: a lot of success and in fact, when you look

713
00:36:49,000 --> 00:36:51,640
Speaker 1: at the numbers over the first year of those companies

714
00:36:51,640 --> 00:36:55,160
Speaker 1: have gone public, we have bought massively more on the

715
00:36:55,160 --> 00:36:58,400
Speaker 1: public side than we originally bought out of our private portfolios.

716
00:36:58,400 --> 00:37:01,280
Speaker 1: And so that to me suggests that our finishing school

717
00:37:01,320 --> 00:37:05,440
Speaker 1: is working very effectively and creating companies that are attractive

718
00:37:05,440 --> 00:37:07,560
Speaker 1: to not just the public side broadly, but to many

719
00:37:07,560 --> 00:37:09,880
Speaker 1: of the investors on Wellington's public.

720
00:37:09,760 --> 00:37:12,279
Speaker 2: So I'm thinking about the tax consequences of what you

721
00:37:12,400 --> 00:37:15,799
Speaker 2: just said. Can you own a company while they're still

722
00:37:15,800 --> 00:37:19,920
Speaker 2: private and then shift that over to the public funds

723
00:37:20,080 --> 00:37:21,879
Speaker 2: or does it have to go to the process of

724
00:37:22,320 --> 00:37:25,720
Speaker 2: the IPO and then you're buying shares in the secondary market.

725
00:37:25,960 --> 00:37:26,359
Speaker 3: We can't.

726
00:37:26,440 --> 00:37:28,680
Speaker 1: It has to be it always has to be arms length,

727
00:37:28,680 --> 00:37:30,800
Speaker 1: and so we cannot take what we've done on the

728
00:37:30,800 --> 00:37:33,680
Speaker 1: private side, and that's in dedicated funds and transfer that

729
00:37:33,719 --> 00:37:36,280
Speaker 1: to any of the other portfolios at Wellington. So everybody

730
00:37:36,320 --> 00:37:39,959
Speaker 1: needs to make an independent decision, and we can't use

731
00:37:40,320 --> 00:37:43,680
Speaker 1: our fund as a reservoir for the funds on the public.

732
00:37:43,440 --> 00:37:46,400
Speaker 2: I was just thinking of the tax consequences of having

733
00:37:46,440 --> 00:37:49,840
Speaker 2: to sell the privately held shares out into the market

734
00:37:50,160 --> 00:37:52,600
Speaker 2: and then someone else in the same under the same

735
00:37:52,680 --> 00:37:56,160
Speaker 2: roof goes out and buys those publicly shares. Seems like

736
00:37:57,000 --> 00:37:59,640
Speaker 2: there's a tax arbitrage to be had, But that might

737
00:37:59,680 --> 00:38:01,080
Speaker 2: be a litle little too cute by half.

738
00:38:01,120 --> 00:38:03,560
Speaker 1: No, but you talking about a product that I think

739
00:38:03,600 --> 00:38:06,600
Speaker 1: is very interesting in terms of the hybrid space where

740
00:38:06,640 --> 00:38:09,560
Speaker 1: you have public private products, and so it's something that

741
00:38:09,880 --> 00:38:13,040
Speaker 1: we have actually in our fintech product. We have a

742
00:38:13,040 --> 00:38:16,239
Speaker 1: public private product that can do just that, and we're

743
00:38:16,280 --> 00:38:18,799
Speaker 1: thinking about additional ways that we can take advantage of

744
00:38:18,840 --> 00:38:22,160
Speaker 1: our public and private market expertise to create products for

745
00:38:22,200 --> 00:38:25,080
Speaker 1: our clients that can do exactly what you're saying is

746
00:38:25,120 --> 00:38:28,360
Speaker 1: we can invest prior to the IPO and then we

747
00:38:28,400 --> 00:38:31,080
Speaker 1: can hold for the long term subsequent to the IPO.

748
00:38:31,920 --> 00:38:35,480
Speaker 2: Really interesting. So let's talk a little bit about valuation.

749
00:38:36,280 --> 00:38:39,040
Speaker 2: What metrics are you looking at when you're thinking about

750
00:38:39,400 --> 00:38:41,520
Speaker 2: elite stage venture investment.

751
00:38:41,640 --> 00:38:43,920
Speaker 1: It depends on the company and every company. We're going

752
00:38:44,000 --> 00:38:48,320
Speaker 1: to use different metrics in healthcare versus tech, versus consumer

753
00:38:48,800 --> 00:38:52,160
Speaker 1: and fintech. Many of our companies are still burning cash

754
00:38:52,280 --> 00:38:54,680
Speaker 1: when we get involved, and so a lot of times

755
00:38:54,680 --> 00:38:57,439
Speaker 1: we're going to be thinking about normalized margins, and those

756
00:38:57,480 --> 00:39:00,680
Speaker 1: normalized margins are going to dictate how we think about

757
00:39:00,719 --> 00:39:03,640
Speaker 1: that price to revenue multiple that we're willing to put

758
00:39:03,680 --> 00:39:05,400
Speaker 1: on that company at the time we invest. And a

759
00:39:05,400 --> 00:39:08,719
Speaker 1: company ultimately is going to have ten percent margins, then

760
00:39:09,200 --> 00:39:11,680
Speaker 1: that's going to be much lower relative to a company

761
00:39:11,719 --> 00:39:14,560
Speaker 1: that can have thirty forty percent margins. And what I've

762
00:39:14,560 --> 00:39:16,640
Speaker 1: done is really ported what I used to do on

763
00:39:16,680 --> 00:39:19,480
Speaker 1: the public side to the private side. In terms of

764
00:39:19,560 --> 00:39:22,319
Speaker 1: thinking about ranges, I always like to think about what's

765
00:39:22,320 --> 00:39:25,759
Speaker 1: my downside risk and what's my upside potential. And we

766
00:39:25,800 --> 00:39:28,239
Speaker 1: want to skew our investments to those that we believe

767
00:39:28,280 --> 00:39:31,200
Speaker 1: we have a lot more upside relative to our downside.

768
00:39:31,280 --> 00:39:36,920
Speaker 2: So whenever I see forget, even seed like Series A companies,

769
00:39:37,320 --> 00:39:40,239
Speaker 2: it feels like everybody's just making up numbers. Hey, there

770
00:39:40,280 --> 00:39:43,239
Speaker 2: is no product, there are no customers. How to even

771
00:39:43,280 --> 00:39:46,000
Speaker 2: come up with a multiple? This has to be very,

772
00:39:46,120 --> 00:39:50,200
Speaker 2: very different than either seed or a stage venture investments.

773
00:39:50,440 --> 00:39:53,600
Speaker 1: Absolutely, because as we've noted, we have companies with one

774
00:39:53,640 --> 00:39:55,720
Speaker 1: hundred two hundred, three hundred million dollars revenues.

775
00:39:55,840 --> 00:39:58,719
Speaker 2: So these are real companies, real products, real customers, real

776
00:39:59,080 --> 00:40:00,239
Speaker 2: businesses are.

777
00:40:00,239 --> 00:40:03,520
Speaker 1: Real businesses, and so we can really look at this

778
00:40:03,719 --> 00:40:06,920
Speaker 1: in terms of having a little bit more confidence. I

779
00:40:06,920 --> 00:40:09,960
Speaker 1: always like to say that these are not riskless, but

780
00:40:09,960 --> 00:40:12,400
Speaker 1: they've been de risked, right. You know it's a company.

781
00:40:12,800 --> 00:40:14,880
Speaker 1: What we don't know is we'll it's scale from one

782
00:40:14,920 --> 00:40:17,319
Speaker 1: hundred million to five hundred to a billion, or is

783
00:40:17,320 --> 00:40:19,000
Speaker 1: it going to be one hundred and make its way

784
00:40:19,040 --> 00:40:19,920
Speaker 1: to two to three hundred.

785
00:40:19,960 --> 00:40:24,080
Speaker 2: So these aren't binary outcomes. Either they work or they don't.

786
00:40:24,280 --> 00:40:27,719
Speaker 2: It's hey, is this going to continue along or as

787
00:40:27,760 --> 00:40:30,000
Speaker 2: it is? Or can we get them to the next level?

788
00:40:30,239 --> 00:40:30,600
Speaker 3: Correct?

789
00:40:30,600 --> 00:40:32,920
Speaker 1: And when you look at our portfolio over the last

790
00:40:32,920 --> 00:40:35,920
Speaker 1: ten years and all the outcomes we've had, we've gotten

791
00:40:35,960 --> 00:40:38,800
Speaker 1: back our money or made money on about eighty percent

792
00:40:39,200 --> 00:40:41,359
Speaker 1: of the deals that we've done, So it's a higher

793
00:40:41,400 --> 00:40:43,080
Speaker 1: hit rate. I always think of it this as a

794
00:40:43,120 --> 00:40:45,759
Speaker 1: little bit more of a fat pitch portfolio, is that

795
00:40:45,840 --> 00:40:48,640
Speaker 1: we stay away from binary events. We're looking for the

796
00:40:48,680 --> 00:40:52,600
Speaker 1: events that the outcomes could be less good or they

797
00:40:52,600 --> 00:40:53,759
Speaker 1: can be really good.

798
00:40:53,920 --> 00:40:55,880
Speaker 2: You're not looking for the moonshots. You're not looking for

799
00:40:55,880 --> 00:40:58,640
Speaker 2: one hundred to one and the other ninety five percent

800
00:40:58,640 --> 00:41:00,520
Speaker 2: of the portfolios go to zero.

801
00:41:00,719 --> 00:41:03,640
Speaker 1: No, we we underwrite to a two to three x

802
00:41:03,719 --> 00:41:06,239
Speaker 1: return on our investment. And when you look at the

803
00:41:06,239 --> 00:41:09,520
Speaker 1: performance of our funds that are more mature Fund one

804
00:41:09,520 --> 00:41:12,200
Speaker 1: and fun two, we're right in that camp about net

805
00:41:12,280 --> 00:41:14,880
Speaker 1: two x or so. But we're doing it over a

806
00:41:14,880 --> 00:41:18,719
Speaker 1: shorter period of time in terms of how long it

807
00:41:18,760 --> 00:41:21,279
Speaker 1: takes we have we have a shallower J curve because

808
00:41:21,320 --> 00:41:24,640
Speaker 1: we're returning capital more quickly and so and that's so

809
00:41:24,640 --> 00:41:27,560
Speaker 1: that's how we're thinking about this category. Is that to

810
00:41:27,600 --> 00:41:30,240
Speaker 1: your point, the range of outcomes are a little narrower.

811
00:41:30,280 --> 00:41:33,279
Speaker 1: We're never going to have one hundred x, but it's

812
00:41:33,280 --> 00:41:34,920
Speaker 1: going to be very rare when we get when we

813
00:41:34,960 --> 00:41:35,880
Speaker 1: get back zero.

814
00:41:36,080 --> 00:41:39,920
Speaker 2: Right. So what leads you to a yes, is it

815
00:41:40,000 --> 00:41:44,040
Speaker 2: is it a certain comfort level that with understanding the business.

816
00:41:44,520 --> 00:41:47,120
Speaker 2: Is it the management team? Because you know, in my

817
00:41:47,239 --> 00:41:49,919
Speaker 2: office we've joked if it's not an obvious yes, it's

818
00:41:49,920 --> 00:41:52,520
Speaker 2: a no. I don't know if you think of it

819
00:41:52,680 --> 00:41:55,920
Speaker 2: in the same way when you're looking at late stage.

820
00:41:56,160 --> 00:41:58,160
Speaker 1: I think it's more in that camp that it's got

821
00:41:58,200 --> 00:42:01,120
Speaker 1: to be a more obvious, yes, but it's a lot.

822
00:42:01,239 --> 00:42:05,080
Speaker 1: It's I always think about investing as matching the qualitative

823
00:42:05,120 --> 00:42:07,560
Speaker 1: and the quantitative. Right is that I've always said to

824
00:42:07,640 --> 00:42:09,239
Speaker 1: analysts when I was on the public side that we

825
00:42:09,280 --> 00:42:12,440
Speaker 1: could always make the numbers work, but we have to

826
00:42:12,560 --> 00:42:15,799
Speaker 1: have a management team that could execute. And so we

827
00:42:15,880 --> 00:42:19,120
Speaker 1: spend a lot of time with our management teams. In fact,

828
00:42:19,160 --> 00:42:22,040
Speaker 1: on average, we know our management teams for over a

829
00:42:22,160 --> 00:42:25,520
Speaker 1: year before we invest with them. We want to understand

830
00:42:25,600 --> 00:42:27,680
Speaker 1: how did they execute from the first time we met

831
00:42:27,680 --> 00:42:29,200
Speaker 1: them to now. Did they say they were going to

832
00:42:29,239 --> 00:42:32,160
Speaker 1: do X and they did X? Or above X or

833
00:42:32,200 --> 00:42:34,400
Speaker 1: was it point five x? Right? So we want to

834
00:42:34,440 --> 00:42:37,120
Speaker 1: see what their credibility is. We want to understand how

835
00:42:37,160 --> 00:42:40,439
Speaker 1: they've built their team around them. Are they the type

836
00:42:40,440 --> 00:42:42,239
Speaker 1: of management teams that want to hire people that are

837
00:42:42,280 --> 00:42:44,319
Speaker 1: smarter than them or people that just want to say

838
00:42:44,360 --> 00:42:47,400
Speaker 1: yes to them? And so we need to understand those dynamics.

839
00:42:47,480 --> 00:42:50,440
Speaker 1: And so management is very, very important. I've always said

840
00:42:50,440 --> 00:42:53,400
Speaker 1: in my career that I'd rather have an A management

841
00:42:53,440 --> 00:42:56,200
Speaker 1: team running a C business than a C management team

842
00:42:56,239 --> 00:42:58,440
Speaker 1: running an A business, because that team will figure out

843
00:42:58,440 --> 00:43:01,040
Speaker 1: how to mess it up and always want the former,

844
00:43:01,320 --> 00:43:03,600
Speaker 1: and so that is a really really important part of it.

845
00:43:03,960 --> 00:43:06,600
Speaker 1: Then once we distinguish that we believe we have a

846
00:43:06,600 --> 00:43:09,040
Speaker 1: good management team, then we have the ability to dig

847
00:43:09,080 --> 00:43:12,719
Speaker 1: into the numbers and see if the numbers match what

848
00:43:12,760 --> 00:43:14,920
Speaker 1: we're hearing from the team, because typically we don't have

849
00:43:15,040 --> 00:43:17,680
Speaker 1: numbers early on, we're just building a relationship, and so

850
00:43:17,719 --> 00:43:20,840
Speaker 1: now we're going to see if the numbers are matching

851
00:43:20,960 --> 00:43:23,680
Speaker 1: the hype and the conversations that we've had with the teams.

852
00:43:23,719 --> 00:43:26,160
Speaker 1: And it's amazing to me how many times that is

853
00:43:26,200 --> 00:43:28,480
Speaker 1: not the case. But in the times that it is

854
00:43:28,520 --> 00:43:30,319
Speaker 1: the case, then those are the deals that we're going

855
00:43:30,360 --> 00:43:33,400
Speaker 1: to want to lean into and really determine if we

856
00:43:33,480 --> 00:43:36,719
Speaker 1: believe this is a sustainable business. How big is the

857
00:43:36,760 --> 00:43:40,920
Speaker 1: TAM the total available market or are they creating a

858
00:43:41,000 --> 00:43:43,799
Speaker 1: new market. How fast are they growing today relative to

859
00:43:43,840 --> 00:43:47,239
Speaker 1: other companies that were of similar scale, How sticky are

860
00:43:47,280 --> 00:43:50,520
Speaker 1: their clients, what is their long term value to customer

861
00:43:50,560 --> 00:43:54,279
Speaker 1: acquisition costs? All of those dynamics to figure out if

862
00:43:54,320 --> 00:43:57,040
Speaker 1: this company can be a lot larger in the future

863
00:43:57,080 --> 00:43:59,400
Speaker 1: than it is today. Because generally we're looking for an

864
00:43:59,440 --> 00:44:02,960
Speaker 1: IPO of two to four years after we invest, and importantly,

865
00:44:03,160 --> 00:44:04,960
Speaker 1: we have to look at it through the lens of

866
00:44:05,239 --> 00:44:08,480
Speaker 1: can this eventually be a public company? Does this make

867
00:44:08,520 --> 00:44:11,840
Speaker 1: sense that that public market investors will be enamored and

868
00:44:11,880 --> 00:44:14,680
Speaker 1: excited about seeing this company in the public market someday

869
00:44:14,680 --> 00:44:15,240
Speaker 1: in the future.

870
00:44:15,680 --> 00:44:18,759
Speaker 2: So do you work with other co investors? Do you

871
00:44:19,000 --> 00:44:22,160
Speaker 2: work with other firms or are these just one off

872
00:44:22,200 --> 00:44:23,960
Speaker 2: investments just with Wellington?

873
00:44:24,400 --> 00:44:27,520
Speaker 1: So I'd say that almost every deal we do has

874
00:44:27,560 --> 00:44:30,680
Speaker 1: a variety of investors in the cap table. We're not exclusive.

875
00:44:31,080 --> 00:44:32,759
Speaker 1: Very rarely have we been. I don't know if we've

876
00:44:32,800 --> 00:44:35,160
Speaker 1: ever been the only investor in the cap table in

877
00:44:35,239 --> 00:44:39,200
Speaker 1: our round. One is we'd love to see insider involvement.

878
00:44:39,239 --> 00:44:41,480
Speaker 1: We want to see insiders taking a pro rauter or

879
00:44:41,520 --> 00:44:43,919
Speaker 1: a super pro rauter of the round because that there's

880
00:44:43,920 --> 00:44:46,120
Speaker 1: a lot of information in that If all the insiders

881
00:44:46,120 --> 00:44:49,640
Speaker 1: aren't playing, or an insider is selling, then we generally

882
00:44:49,680 --> 00:44:50,120
Speaker 1: don't want to.

883
00:44:50,120 --> 00:44:52,479
Speaker 2: Be a part of that different vibe there.

884
00:44:52,640 --> 00:44:56,080
Speaker 1: Correct, And then generally there'll be other investors that invest

885
00:44:56,120 --> 00:45:00,520
Speaker 1: alongside us, But importantly we're not generally working a alongside

886
00:45:00,560 --> 00:45:03,680
Speaker 1: them because these are competitive deals and we want to

887
00:45:03,719 --> 00:45:06,920
Speaker 1: get the maximum allocation that we need for our clients,

888
00:45:07,120 --> 00:45:09,120
Speaker 1: and so we don't want to draw other people in

889
00:45:09,400 --> 00:45:11,839
Speaker 1: during that process. We might help on the backside if

890
00:45:11,840 --> 00:45:14,719
Speaker 1: we're leading the deal and there's other investors looking at it.

891
00:45:14,920 --> 00:45:18,560
Speaker 1: But job one is making is figuring out for ourselves

892
00:45:18,600 --> 00:45:21,280
Speaker 1: independently if we think this would be a good idea

893
00:45:21,400 --> 00:45:24,200
Speaker 1: and making sure if we want, say our average check

894
00:45:24,239 --> 00:45:26,080
Speaker 1: size now and our funds is about seventy five to

895
00:45:26,080 --> 00:45:28,399
Speaker 1: one hundred million, let's make sure that we can get

896
00:45:28,400 --> 00:45:31,120
Speaker 1: that check. And we have co investors that we work

897
00:45:31,160 --> 00:45:33,480
Speaker 1: with that are clients of ours that we want to

898
00:45:33,520 --> 00:45:35,839
Speaker 1: be able to offer them the opportunity to invest also,

899
00:45:36,280 --> 00:45:39,040
Speaker 1: and so we kind of stay very stealth when we're

900
00:45:39,080 --> 00:45:42,640
Speaker 1: in the due diligence process, and then generally we'll see

901
00:45:42,680 --> 00:45:45,080
Speaker 1: other investors come in to fill out a round. Probably

902
00:45:45,120 --> 00:45:48,239
Speaker 1: our average rounds are somewhere between two hundred to three

903
00:45:48,320 --> 00:45:52,279
Speaker 1: hundred million dollars total rounds, and we're doing just under

904
00:45:52,320 --> 00:45:52,719
Speaker 1: half of that.

905
00:45:53,000 --> 00:45:55,320
Speaker 2: So where does your deal flow come from? It sounds

906
00:45:55,400 --> 00:45:58,719
Speaker 2: like very competitive space. How do you find your way

907
00:45:58,760 --> 00:46:02,040
Speaker 2: to some of these some of these late stage venture investments?

908
00:46:02,120 --> 00:46:04,799
Speaker 1: Yeah, which is the most important part of what we

909
00:46:04,840 --> 00:46:06,799
Speaker 1: do because the old adage is you don't see it,

910
00:46:06,840 --> 00:46:09,719
Speaker 1: you can't do it, and so in on our team

911
00:46:10,000 --> 00:46:12,759
Speaker 1: on my product, which is called Hadley Harbor, we have

912
00:46:12,800 --> 00:46:15,520
Speaker 1: eleven investors on our team and they are out there

913
00:46:15,560 --> 00:46:17,680
Speaker 1: every day sourcing. I always think of it as kind

914
00:46:17,719 --> 00:46:21,279
Speaker 1: of forty forty twenty. Forty percent of the skill is onsourcing,

915
00:46:21,360 --> 00:46:24,000
Speaker 1: forty percent is due diligence, and twenty percent is the

916
00:46:24,000 --> 00:46:27,920
Speaker 1: ongoing support of the companies, but probably close to seventy

917
00:46:27,920 --> 00:46:30,480
Speaker 1: five percent of the time is really going out and

918
00:46:30,520 --> 00:46:34,239
Speaker 1: looking for deals. Our biggest source of deals are from

919
00:46:34,280 --> 00:46:37,600
Speaker 1: our network of early stage investors that we have cultivated

920
00:46:37,680 --> 00:46:42,040
Speaker 1: over the last decade, hundreds of investors who have invested

921
00:46:42,239 --> 00:46:45,080
Speaker 1: in early stage companies that can help us get warm

922
00:46:45,120 --> 00:46:47,839
Speaker 1: introductions to these companies, and by the time we get

923
00:46:47,880 --> 00:46:51,319
Speaker 1: into our round, it's very common that we know the

924
00:46:51,360 --> 00:46:54,240
Speaker 1: majority of the board that's in that company, which generally

925
00:46:54,400 --> 00:46:58,560
Speaker 1: consists of early stage investors that are very important proponents

926
00:46:58,640 --> 00:47:00,759
Speaker 1: of having us being in bold with the company, that

927
00:47:00,800 --> 00:47:03,279
Speaker 1: people believe that we can add value and that we're

928
00:47:03,320 --> 00:47:05,919
Speaker 1: going to be additive to that company over the time

929
00:47:05,960 --> 00:47:08,560
Speaker 1: that we invest, because we bring a much different angle

930
00:47:08,680 --> 00:47:11,759
Speaker 1: given that we have the public market expertise relative to

931
00:47:11,920 --> 00:47:14,080
Speaker 1: earlier stage investors, and I have had a lot of

932
00:47:14,120 --> 00:47:16,839
Speaker 1: IPO outcomes and so we understand what it's going to take.

933
00:47:17,160 --> 00:47:21,400
Speaker 1: But a lot of our sourcing comes from early stage seed,

934
00:47:21,600 --> 00:47:25,319
Speaker 1: Series A and even Series B investors who are are

935
00:47:25,400 --> 00:47:26,520
Speaker 1: part of our network.

936
00:47:27,080 --> 00:47:30,200
Speaker 2: Let me throw a curveball at you. You previously served

937
00:47:30,280 --> 00:47:34,640
Speaker 2: as the first male advisory board member of the Wellington's

938
00:47:35,080 --> 00:47:37,560
Speaker 2: Women's Network. Do I have that right?

939
00:47:37,960 --> 00:47:38,920
Speaker 3: You do have that right.

940
00:47:39,400 --> 00:47:41,799
Speaker 2: I love the research, So tell us a little bit

941
00:47:41,880 --> 00:47:45,480
Speaker 2: about why you were the first male member of the

942
00:47:45,520 --> 00:47:47,799
Speaker 2: Wellington's Women's Network.

943
00:47:48,160 --> 00:47:50,080
Speaker 1: Well, thank you for pointing that out, and it's something

944
00:47:50,080 --> 00:47:53,239
Speaker 1: I'm actually very proud of because this was probably back

945
00:47:53,280 --> 00:47:55,480
Speaker 1: in two thousand and seven, in two thousand and eight,

946
00:47:55,840 --> 00:47:59,440
Speaker 1: and I believe that was our first internal business network,

947
00:47:59,840 --> 00:48:03,439
Speaker 1: and a couple of the heads of that network came

948
00:48:03,520 --> 00:48:05,560
Speaker 1: to me and asked if I was served, and I was.

949
00:48:05,600 --> 00:48:07,839
Speaker 1: I was very honored, and I think it was a

950
00:48:07,880 --> 00:48:12,960
Speaker 1: testament to my advocacy for women in the firm, and

951
00:48:12,960 --> 00:48:14,680
Speaker 1: and so they felt that I could be a really

952
00:48:14,760 --> 00:48:18,920
Speaker 1: strong advocate for them as we were trying to elevate

953
00:48:19,000 --> 00:48:21,640
Speaker 1: and get more women as a part on the investment

954
00:48:21,640 --> 00:48:25,160
Speaker 1: side and the business side and really level the playing

955
00:48:25,160 --> 00:48:27,120
Speaker 1: field over the longer term, and so I was I

956
00:48:27,160 --> 00:48:29,840
Speaker 1: was super happy to do it, and so I served

957
00:48:30,120 --> 00:48:32,760
Speaker 1: on that, I think for about six or so years.

958
00:48:32,800 --> 00:48:37,120
Speaker 1: And then interestingly today, as I mentioned earlier, General O'Reilly

959
00:48:37,160 --> 00:48:40,520
Speaker 1: who's my co head, obviously a woman, but our whole

960
00:48:40,520 --> 00:48:43,680
Speaker 1: our management team on the private side, consists of me

961
00:48:44,080 --> 00:48:47,040
Speaker 1: and all women. I'm the only guy on our private

962
00:48:47,120 --> 00:48:49,920
Speaker 1: on our private team management team, which is which is

963
00:48:50,080 --> 00:48:53,399
Speaker 1: just great that that we've come to a point where

964
00:48:53,400 --> 00:48:56,120
Speaker 1: where we can really have that much talent on our

965
00:48:56,160 --> 00:48:58,040
Speaker 1: team that could help us build the business.

966
00:48:58,160 --> 00:49:02,120
Speaker 2: And if I recall correctly, you're EO correct, Gene Heinz right,

967
00:49:02,880 --> 00:49:04,880
Speaker 2: aren't a lot of women in the world running a

968
00:49:04,920 --> 00:49:06,160
Speaker 2: trillion dollar company.

969
00:49:06,520 --> 00:49:08,799
Speaker 1: She's one of them, correct, And Geane and I have

970
00:49:08,920 --> 00:49:12,080
Speaker 1: grown up in the firm. Jen's story. She always talks

971
00:49:12,120 --> 00:49:16,160
Speaker 1: about that she started as an assistant out of Wellesley

972
00:49:16,400 --> 00:49:18,759
Speaker 1: and worked a way up to being a global industry

973
00:49:19,080 --> 00:49:21,600
Speaker 1: analyst and then managing partner, and then in twenty one

974
00:49:21,880 --> 00:49:24,040
Speaker 1: she took over a CEO of the firm. And so

975
00:49:24,160 --> 00:49:27,680
Speaker 1: to your point, she is she is still in the minority,

976
00:49:27,560 --> 00:49:32,839
Speaker 1: but an increasing percentage of the minority, and so it's

977
00:49:32,880 --> 00:49:35,279
Speaker 1: getting everything is getting better over the longer term.

978
00:49:35,560 --> 00:49:37,600
Speaker 2: Really interesting. All right, I know I only have you

979
00:49:37,600 --> 00:49:40,200
Speaker 2: for a limited amount of time, so let's jump to

980
00:49:40,239 --> 00:49:43,600
Speaker 2: our favorite questions that we ask all of our guests,

981
00:49:43,640 --> 00:49:47,000
Speaker 2: starting with what's keeping you entertained these days? What are

982
00:49:47,000 --> 00:49:49,120
Speaker 2: you streaming, watching or listening to?

983
00:49:49,560 --> 00:49:52,120
Speaker 1: Sure, so right now I'm streaming The Crown, so I

984
00:49:52,160 --> 00:49:54,120
Speaker 1: know I'm a little behind the eight ball at hour,

985
00:49:54,400 --> 00:49:58,280
Speaker 1: though it's I love it because there's so much about

986
00:49:58,520 --> 00:50:01,399
Speaker 1: the UK that I don't know, particularly kind of pre

987
00:50:01,600 --> 00:50:04,479
Speaker 1: Charles and Diana. And so I'm now on season four.

988
00:50:04,560 --> 00:50:07,040
Speaker 1: So the first three seasons were really early in Queen

989
00:50:07,040 --> 00:50:09,160
Speaker 1: Elizabeth Rayn and there was just a lot of information

990
00:50:09,239 --> 00:50:12,040
Speaker 1: and just super well done. The acting is is great.

991
00:50:12,120 --> 00:50:13,920
Speaker 1: And then the one that I just finished that by

992
00:50:13,920 --> 00:50:14,239
Speaker 1: the way, I.

993
00:50:14,239 --> 00:50:16,759
Speaker 2: Think there's one more season coming of the ground.

994
00:50:17,040 --> 00:50:19,520
Speaker 3: Great because I'm I'm slowly catching up.

995
00:50:19,520 --> 00:50:22,880
Speaker 1: I got you know, it's my it's my treadmill entertainment,

996
00:50:22,960 --> 00:50:25,160
Speaker 1: so I'm slowly catching up. And then the one that

997
00:50:25,200 --> 00:50:28,160
Speaker 1: I watched recently that I absolutely loved was The Bear

998
00:50:28,880 --> 00:50:32,560
Speaker 1: so good, and season two, which I just finished recently

999
00:50:32,640 --> 00:50:35,880
Speaker 1: my wife and I finished was phenomenal and episode six

1000
00:50:36,120 --> 00:50:37,360
Speaker 1: might be one of the best.

1001
00:50:37,520 --> 00:50:39,960
Speaker 2: Was that Copenhagen or was that the Forks No.

1002
00:50:40,320 --> 00:50:43,040
Speaker 1: Episode six was well when Jamie Lee Curtis and Bob

1003
00:50:43,080 --> 00:50:44,480
Speaker 1: Odenkirk and it was the I.

1004
00:50:44,400 --> 00:50:47,640
Speaker 2: Think, oh the family Chrissmily Christ that was painful, that

1005
00:50:47,719 --> 00:50:52,440
Speaker 2: was difficult to watch. That was real time family meltdown. Yes,

1006
00:50:52,719 --> 00:50:54,960
Speaker 2: I mean my wife walked out in the middle of

1007
00:50:55,000 --> 00:50:57,000
Speaker 2: that and said, let me know when it's over. She

1008
00:50:57,040 --> 00:50:58,040
Speaker 2: could not sit through that.

1009
00:50:58,080 --> 00:50:59,680
Speaker 1: But I think I think it was some of the

1010
00:50:59,680 --> 00:51:03,319
Speaker 1: best acting. Jamie Lee Curtis was just unbelievable, and the

1011
00:51:03,360 --> 00:51:05,879
Speaker 1: acting and the whole situation. I mean, I'm sure many

1012
00:51:05,880 --> 00:51:11,000
Speaker 1: many families can relate to the dysfunction and just incredibly well.

1013
00:51:10,840 --> 00:51:14,160
Speaker 2: Done, really really interesting stuff. So let's talk about mentors

1014
00:51:14,400 --> 00:51:15,960
Speaker 2: who helped shape your career.

1015
00:51:16,200 --> 00:51:18,600
Speaker 1: Sure, so there's so many. I'm always afraid that I'm

1016
00:51:18,640 --> 00:51:21,080
Speaker 1: going to forget people. But two of the people at

1017
00:51:21,120 --> 00:51:23,960
Speaker 1: Wellington who I co managed money with when I first

1018
00:51:24,000 --> 00:51:27,880
Speaker 1: got there and with just phenomenal investors. One was Bob Brands,

1019
00:51:27,920 --> 00:51:30,399
Speaker 1: who was we always referred to as the godfather of growth.

1020
00:51:30,440 --> 00:51:33,160
Speaker 1: He was only one of the first true growth investors

1021
00:51:33,160 --> 00:51:37,120
Speaker 1: at Wellington. Just a phenomenal investor in keeping it super simple,

1022
00:51:37,600 --> 00:51:40,880
Speaker 1: having just a great feel for the markets, but just

1023
00:51:41,040 --> 00:51:43,400
Speaker 1: being able to meet with a management team and evaluate

1024
00:51:43,440 --> 00:51:47,359
Speaker 1: them and making decisions based on those evaluations. And then

1025
00:51:47,400 --> 00:51:51,560
Speaker 1: the other one was Saul Panel who ran the run

1026
00:51:51,600 --> 00:51:54,799
Speaker 1: the Hertford Capital Appreciation Fund from inception to I think

1027
00:51:54,800 --> 00:51:58,120
Speaker 1: about twenty fifteen. Had just phenomenal performance. But he was

1028
00:51:58,440 --> 00:52:00,720
Speaker 1: like an old school go any way where a capital

1029
00:52:00,760 --> 00:52:04,080
Speaker 1: appreciation manager. There were times where he could be positioned

1030
00:52:04,360 --> 00:52:07,840
Speaker 1: incredibly aggressively in growth companies, and then there were times

1031
00:52:08,040 --> 00:52:10,600
Speaker 1: that he could be very value oriented. And so I

1032
00:52:10,600 --> 00:52:13,320
Speaker 1: don't think anybody I worked with did as good a

1033
00:52:13,440 --> 00:52:16,080
Speaker 1: job as navigating the tech bubble back in two thousand

1034
00:52:16,480 --> 00:52:19,200
Speaker 1: as he did and having great performance in nineteen ninety

1035
00:52:19,280 --> 00:52:22,680
Speaker 1: nine and then also having amazing performance in two thousand

1036
00:52:23,040 --> 00:52:27,440
Speaker 1: and He's just an amazing, amazing investor. So I say

1037
00:52:27,480 --> 00:52:29,800
Speaker 1: those would be two that were very important in my career.

1038
00:52:30,040 --> 00:52:32,360
Speaker 2: Let's talk about books. What are some of your favorites

1039
00:52:32,440 --> 00:52:34,000
Speaker 2: and what are you reading right now?

1040
00:52:34,320 --> 00:52:37,560
Speaker 1: Sure, so, a couple of books that I've really enjoyed

1041
00:52:37,560 --> 00:52:40,000
Speaker 1: over the last few years one was The Silent Patient

1042
00:52:40,400 --> 00:52:44,440
Speaker 1: by Alex Michael Ladies that just was kind of like

1043
00:52:44,480 --> 00:52:47,239
Speaker 1: a psycho thriller story and just had one of the

1044
00:52:47,239 --> 00:52:50,239
Speaker 1: most amazing twists towards the end that I.

1045
00:52:51,920 --> 00:52:54,200
Speaker 3: This is fiction, so that's a fiction book.

1046
00:52:54,200 --> 00:52:55,680
Speaker 1: And then the other one that I read, which is

1047
00:52:55,719 --> 00:52:57,479
Speaker 1: an older book, I think it was written twenty twenty

1048
00:52:57,480 --> 00:52:59,799
Speaker 1: five years ago, was A Human Stain by Philip Roth

1049
00:53:00,239 --> 00:53:03,160
Speaker 1: that was just also incredibly well written. A matter of fact,

1050
00:53:03,200 --> 00:53:04,840
Speaker 1: they just I was a part of something that everybody

1051
00:53:04,920 --> 00:53:06,839
Speaker 1: had to record. Bring a book, You had to literally

1052
00:53:06,880 --> 00:53:08,440
Speaker 1: bring a book, right And that was the book that

1053
00:53:09,280 --> 00:53:11,479
Speaker 1: I brought. And then the one I'm reading right now

1054
00:53:11,520 --> 00:53:14,360
Speaker 1: that I'm on my kindle supposedly seventy percent of the

1055
00:53:14,360 --> 00:53:17,120
Speaker 1: way through is a book called The Color of Water

1056
00:53:17,239 --> 00:53:20,360
Speaker 1: by James McBride, which was recommended to me. My favorite

1057
00:53:20,400 --> 00:53:23,840
Speaker 1: book recommended, which is My Friend Susie, and it's a

1058
00:53:23,880 --> 00:53:28,160
Speaker 1: biography slash autobiography, and it's written by a black man

1059
00:53:28,520 --> 00:53:31,719
Speaker 1: who was brought up by his white mother who grew

1060
00:53:31,760 --> 00:53:34,800
Speaker 1: up as an Orthodox Jew, okay, and so he learns

1061
00:53:34,880 --> 00:53:37,000
Speaker 1: later in life that he didn't know that he was

1062
00:53:37,120 --> 00:53:40,480
Speaker 1: actually Jewish, and his mother would never tell him anything,

1063
00:53:40,480 --> 00:53:43,280
Speaker 1: and he finally got his mother to tell him his story.

1064
00:53:43,560 --> 00:53:46,600
Speaker 1: And so the story is like one chapter of his life,

1065
00:53:46,920 --> 00:53:49,480
Speaker 1: him telling his life, and then another chapter of his

1066
00:53:49,520 --> 00:53:53,360
Speaker 1: mom talking about her life, juxtaposition between their two lives.

1067
00:53:53,400 --> 00:53:57,120
Speaker 1: And so it's an incredibly fascinating book. And so that's

1068
00:53:57,120 --> 00:53:58,200
Speaker 1: what I'm reading right now.

1069
00:53:58,400 --> 00:54:01,520
Speaker 2: Our final two questions, what advice would you give a

1070
00:54:01,520 --> 00:54:06,319
Speaker 2: recent college grad interested in a career in either finance,

1071
00:54:06,800 --> 00:54:10,759
Speaker 2: mutual funds, private placements, late stage venture. What sort of

1072
00:54:10,800 --> 00:54:11,560
Speaker 2: advice would.

1073
00:54:11,320 --> 00:54:12,840
Speaker 3: You give them? Yeah, well, part of the answer is

1074
00:54:12,880 --> 00:54:16,160
Speaker 3: what you just said. There's so much more variety of what.

1075
00:54:16,000 --> 00:54:19,520
Speaker 1: You can do in the investment world than say, when

1076
00:54:19,520 --> 00:54:22,080
Speaker 1: I got out of school close to forty years ago,

1077
00:54:22,200 --> 00:54:23,719
Speaker 1: which was you know, it was kind of one game.

1078
00:54:23,760 --> 00:54:25,040
Speaker 3: It was really public markets.

1079
00:54:25,080 --> 00:54:29,680
Speaker 1: But now with private credit and private equity and ETFs

1080
00:54:29,680 --> 00:54:32,000
Speaker 1: as well as the public markets, it's just a variety

1081
00:54:32,040 --> 00:54:34,160
Speaker 1: of things that you can do. And so the advice

1082
00:54:34,200 --> 00:54:36,720
Speaker 1: I would get somebody coming out of school is figure

1083
00:54:36,800 --> 00:54:40,000
Speaker 1: out where your passion is, figure out what your investment

1084
00:54:40,080 --> 00:54:41,920
Speaker 1: style and what works for you. Do you want to

1085
00:54:41,960 --> 00:54:44,120
Speaker 1: be at a hedge fund and really be in the

1086
00:54:44,200 --> 00:54:46,399
Speaker 1: day by day and have to make basically a lot

1087
00:54:46,400 --> 00:54:48,520
Speaker 1: of decisions in short amount of time, or do you

1088
00:54:48,520 --> 00:54:51,479
Speaker 1: want to have a much longer timeframe. Are you more

1089
00:54:51,520 --> 00:54:53,960
Speaker 1: in the growth mindset versus the value mindset?

1090
00:54:54,000 --> 00:54:54,880
Speaker 3: So you need to think.

1091
00:54:54,680 --> 00:54:57,759
Speaker 1: About all this and head towards the direction that really

1092
00:54:57,800 --> 00:55:00,600
Speaker 1: fits your personality. Like for me, I know, I always

1093
00:55:00,640 --> 00:55:03,040
Speaker 1: tell the story that my moment was when I saw

1094
00:55:03,160 --> 00:55:07,640
Speaker 1: Rod Canyon of Compact unveil the first true laptop back

1095
00:55:07,680 --> 00:55:10,200
Speaker 1: in nineteen I think eighty eight or eighty nine.

1096
00:55:10,280 --> 00:55:11,640
Speaker 3: I was getting tingles.

1097
00:55:11,280 --> 00:55:14,719
Speaker 2: When you say laptop. I remember those because they were

1098
00:55:14,800 --> 00:55:19,160
Speaker 2: like these big giant suitcases. The monitor were like the

1099
00:55:19,200 --> 00:55:22,160
Speaker 2: lid of a suitcase with a handle sticking out, and

1100
00:55:22,200 --> 00:55:23,560
Speaker 2: they weighed like one hundred pounds.

1101
00:55:23,600 --> 00:55:24,840
Speaker 3: Luggable, they call them luggable.

1102
00:55:24,920 --> 00:55:25,400
Speaker 2: Luggable.

1103
00:55:25,640 --> 00:55:27,719
Speaker 1: You knew it was going to be the creation of

1104
00:55:27,760 --> 00:55:30,680
Speaker 1: a market, right because this is a totally new market,

1105
00:55:30,719 --> 00:55:32,760
Speaker 1: and you think about you know, fast forward to today.

1106
00:55:33,400 --> 00:55:37,120
Speaker 1: I think most people have laptops versus versus desktop. Like

1107
00:55:37,120 --> 00:55:39,480
Speaker 1: at Wellington, we all have laptops now, we just plug

1108
00:55:39,480 --> 00:55:41,320
Speaker 1: it in when we go. We don't have any desktops

1109
00:55:41,320 --> 00:55:44,280
Speaker 1: in the entire almost the entire organization, and so it's

1110
00:55:44,400 --> 00:55:47,560
Speaker 1: it was the beginning of a major, major trend, right,

1111
00:55:47,640 --> 00:55:48,640
Speaker 1: just like the iPhone.

1112
00:55:48,640 --> 00:55:50,520
Speaker 3: When the iPhone was introduced.

1113
00:55:50,560 --> 00:55:53,840
Speaker 1: Think about like nobody had a computer in their pocket.

1114
00:55:53,920 --> 00:55:57,600
Speaker 1: You had these blackberries or you had these these flip phones,

1115
00:55:57,920 --> 00:55:59,680
Speaker 1: but you didn't have you didn't have the Internet in

1116
00:55:59,680 --> 00:56:02,440
Speaker 1: your hand, and at that moment in time, So seeing

1117
00:56:02,520 --> 00:56:08,319
Speaker 1: those develop and understanding that sometimes these trends are overestimated

1118
00:56:08,320 --> 00:56:10,319
Speaker 1: in the short term and underestimated in the long term,

1119
00:56:10,400 --> 00:56:13,000
Speaker 1: and really trying to find those inflection points. That's what

1120
00:56:13,080 --> 00:56:16,640
Speaker 1: I always loved about investing, is being ahead of the

1121
00:56:16,640 --> 00:56:19,000
Speaker 1: crowd and trying to figure out where the puck is

1122
00:56:19,040 --> 00:56:22,200
Speaker 1: going to go before massively before it gets there.

1123
00:56:22,480 --> 00:56:25,000
Speaker 2: And our final question, what do you know about the

1124
00:56:25,040 --> 00:56:28,960
Speaker 2: world of investing today? You wish you knew thirty or

1125
00:56:28,960 --> 00:56:31,680
Speaker 2: so years ago when you were first getting started.

1126
00:56:32,200 --> 00:56:33,799
Speaker 1: So I think I was thinking about it from the

1127
00:56:33,800 --> 00:56:36,400
Speaker 1: context of like over the last kind of two decades,

1128
00:56:36,440 --> 00:56:39,200
Speaker 1: and I think I wish I knew interest rates were

1129
00:56:39,200 --> 00:56:42,000
Speaker 1: going to stay low for as long as they did.

1130
00:56:41,880 --> 00:56:44,200
Speaker 2: Because just forty years wasn't that big a deal.

1131
00:56:44,160 --> 00:56:46,719
Speaker 1: Exactly if you knew that, right, if you knew it

1132
00:56:46,760 --> 00:56:48,359
Speaker 1: was just going to be down into the right from

1133
00:56:48,440 --> 00:56:52,200
Speaker 1: nineteen eighty two to twenty twenty one, you would have

1134
00:56:52,239 --> 00:56:56,520
Speaker 1: been massively more aggressive in terms of your investments. I

1135
00:56:56,560 --> 00:56:58,880
Speaker 1: mean I was. I've been an aggressive investor. I've been

1136
00:56:58,880 --> 00:57:01,880
Speaker 1: a growth investor. That's not been bad. It wasn't because

1137
00:57:01,880 --> 00:57:03,560
Speaker 1: I knew interest rates were going to go down. But

1138
00:57:03,600 --> 00:57:07,600
Speaker 1: think about all the trends around buyout and everything in

1139
00:57:07,640 --> 00:57:11,239
Speaker 1: the investment universe that's benefited from that that it would

1140
00:57:11,239 --> 00:57:12,960
Speaker 1: have been great to know. Now, I think that that

1141
00:57:13,360 --> 00:57:17,320
Speaker 1: lesson was obviously two generations, but I don't think that

1142
00:57:17,320 --> 00:57:19,440
Speaker 1: that's going to help you over the next couple of

1143
00:57:19,480 --> 00:57:22,320
Speaker 1: decades because I think interest rates going to zero is

1144
00:57:22,360 --> 00:57:24,080
Speaker 1: probably a thing of the past.

1145
00:57:24,440 --> 00:57:27,640
Speaker 2: Huh, very very very interesting, Michael, Thank you for being

1146
00:57:27,640 --> 00:57:31,120
Speaker 2: so generous with your time. We have been speaking with

1147
00:57:31,200 --> 00:57:35,280
Speaker 2: Michael Carmen, co head of Private Markets at Wellington Management.

1148
00:57:35,920 --> 00:57:38,840
Speaker 2: If you enjoy this conversation, well be sure and check

1149
00:57:38,840 --> 00:57:43,000
Speaker 2: out any of our previous five hundred discussions we've had

1150
00:57:43,080 --> 00:57:46,320
Speaker 2: over the past nine years. You can find those at

1151
00:57:46,880 --> 00:57:52,520
Speaker 2: Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, wherever you find your favorite podcasts.

1152
00:57:53,160 --> 00:57:56,400
Speaker 2: Sign up for my daily reading list at ridults dot com.

1153
00:57:56,680 --> 00:58:00,600
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1154
00:58:00,640 --> 00:58:05,000
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1155
00:58:05,360 --> 00:58:08,920
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1156
00:58:08,920 --> 00:58:11,800
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1157
00:58:11,800 --> 00:58:16,760
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1158
00:58:16,800 --> 00:58:20,880
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1159
00:58:21,200 --> 00:58:25,760
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1160
00:58:25,800 --> 00:58:28,880
Speaker 2: listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio.