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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 1: production of iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: Welcome back to the show. I Know I need to shave.

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Speaker 2: My name is Matt.

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Speaker 3: Now you look like a gorgeous adonis of a man.

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Speaker 4: They call me Ben. We're joined with our super producer

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Speaker 4: Max the freight train Williams because our compatriot, the Tennessee

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Speaker 4: Pal is on an adventure and will be returning soon.

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Speaker 4: Most importantly, you are you. You are here. That makes

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Speaker 4: this the stuff they don't want you to know. And look,

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Speaker 4: a lot of stuff is happening, folks. The Russian invasion

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Speaker 4: of Ukraine continues. It's been going on for years.

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Speaker 3: That whole thing I thought we'd moved on. No, I'm joking.

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Speaker 3: I'm obviously joking. Just doesn't seem like it's front page

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Speaker 3: news as much anymore with all the other invasions taking place.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, and that's a good point, because a lot of

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Speaker 4: Western media has slowly begun looking the other way, or

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Speaker 4: as you said, finding new stories, at least in the

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Speaker 4: United States. But amid all this chaos, we are returning

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Speaker 4: to a continual fascination of hours. It's one that dates

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Speaker 4: back to before the harrowing days of the earlier Cold War.

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Speaker 4: You see, in recent years, folks, Russia has made great

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Speaker 4: hay about the existence of new unparalleled toys, weapons of

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Speaker 4: mass destruction, weapons of war. So we clocked this a

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Speaker 4: few years back, and we're still asking is there any

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Speaker 4: sand to this? Does Russia really have? As Daddy V said,

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Speaker 4: new super weapons?

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Speaker 3: Are we talking like doomsday device material, the stuff of

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Speaker 3: bond villains?

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Speaker 4: Yeah, like specter level zar bamba stuff.

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Speaker 2: Well, it's mostly new missile systems, right, missile systems that

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Speaker 2: are designed to get past missile defense systems. Right, That's

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Speaker 2: mostly what it is. But there's all kinds of stealthy

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Speaker 2: boys in there, and all kinds of other new toys

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Speaker 2: we're going to talk about.

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Speaker 4: I'm excited about the submarines, for instance. Yeah. It's kind

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Speaker 4: of like a picture, at least the way Rush is

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Speaker 4: presenting it. Picture it like a fancy box of chocolates

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Speaker 4: hashtag no Forst. Gump or Gump if you want. But

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Speaker 4: remember the fancy boxes of chocolates where you open them

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Speaker 4: up and there'd be a little diagram of what kind

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Speaker 4: of chocolate each one.

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Speaker 3: Was a legend, the chocolate box legend, the chocolate box end,

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Speaker 3: legend of the chocolate box legend. Yeah, I think we're

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Speaker 3: get my favorite lore.

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Speaker 4: So per Russian statements for several years now, the idea

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Speaker 4: is that they have a secret box of very dangerous chocolates,

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Speaker 4: most of which, to that earlier point, seem to be

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Speaker 4: new iterations on existing technology. Well, you always got to

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Speaker 4: wonder if the bear has more badgers in its bag.

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Speaker 4: So that's what we're getting into tonight.

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Speaker 3: We got a bear with a bag of badgers and

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Speaker 3: swinging it around willy and or nilly. This is scary stuff, y'all.

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Speaker 3: It takes a village. We'll be right back.

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Speaker 4: Here are the facts, you guys. We all know the

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Speaker 4: term paper tiger, right. Have you guys heard that one?

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Speaker 3: Yeah, it's like a little origami guy that you fold

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Speaker 3: up and you put on your windows sill. It keeps

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Speaker 3: you company.

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Speaker 4: There we go. It's also slaying, at least in English,

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Speaker 4: for a thing that appears to be very threatening but

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Speaker 4: maybe doesn't deliver in practice. Bark versus bite situation.

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Speaker 5: For sure, like like vaporware, but different and yeah, You

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Speaker 5: may have seen this trope played with a lot in

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Speaker 5: cinema where there will be a shadow of a giant,

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Speaker 5: terrifying looking thing coming towards you, but in fact it's

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Speaker 5: just a little toy or something, or it's a small

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Speaker 5: little critter, but it looks huge because of the placement

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Speaker 5: of the light in the shadow. Right, very similar concept

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Speaker 5: that can be played with here. The countries, countries all

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Speaker 5: the time, do all of them do this?

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Speaker 3: Just can get every There can be bad way, there

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Speaker 3: can only bad be? How does it go?

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Speaker 4: Sorry?

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Speaker 3: Please continue?

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Speaker 4: There can only bad be.

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Speaker 3: No, it's the thing Trump said, He said, there can

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Speaker 3: there it can only good happen. It can only ye ye,

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Speaker 3: well sorry, no, no, no, We'll keep it. It can

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Speaker 3: only bad be.

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Speaker 4: That's the opposite it happen. As a fan of Yoda

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Speaker 4: from the Star Wars universe, I agree with that syntax.

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Speaker 4: I mean, yeah, it's true.

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Speaker 2: Though.

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Speaker 4: I think we nailed the definition of paper tiger. And

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Speaker 4: it is a incredibly important point that every country spends

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Speaker 4: a lot of time thinking about its international posture. Right.

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Speaker 4: Every country wants to say, we're the ones who could

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Speaker 4: do this stuff. But you see, we're so cool that

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Speaker 4: we're not doing it. But we do have magic powers,

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Speaker 4: we're just not doing it.

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Speaker 2: Also, it feels like a bunch of folks gathered around

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Speaker 2: a bar and everybody's drinking, and everybody's pretty drunk, and

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Speaker 2: there are a couple of guys that will always be like, huh,

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Speaker 2: what we want some of this? You don't want some

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Speaker 2: of this?

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Speaker 4: You would have done this. I got the biggest knife.

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Speaker 2: Oh are you just I'm not going to show it

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Speaker 2: to you because we're at a bar.

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Speaker 4: No, you only saw this here. You only saw my

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Speaker 4: regular knife, not my secret knife, my secret knie.

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Speaker 1: Yeah.

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Speaker 4: For a lot of we know this. For a lot

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Speaker 4: of modern history, folks, Russia was considered to have one

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Speaker 4: of the world's most powerful militaries operating on one of

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Speaker 4: the planet's most brutal environments. And I think we all

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Speaker 4: remember during the halcyon days of the Soviet Union, there

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Speaker 4: was this empire stretching across Eurasia, was increasingly influencing the

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Speaker 4: Middle East, North Africa, having a bit of a dalliance

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Speaker 4: in Southeast Asia.

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Speaker 2: I've seen it in pictures right, it represented, But I

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Speaker 2: don't remember a time when I viewed the Soviet Union

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Speaker 2: as this massive empire just because I never got I

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Speaker 2: guess I didn't have the cognitive ability to even think

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Speaker 2: about it as such when I was so young. It

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Speaker 2: is weird because I suppose my view of Russia and

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Speaker 2: the USSR really hasn't changed that much. I just didn't,

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Speaker 2: you know, we didn't get that experience of looking at

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Speaker 2: the newspapers when you know USSR does so and so,

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Speaker 2: like being blazoned across the top.

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Speaker 3: Yeah.

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Speaker 4: So for earlier generations, right, like they're saying, the Cold

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Speaker 4: War was more of an ever present thing in the zeitgeist, right,

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Speaker 4: like the Cuban missile crisis and so on.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, yeah, And the.

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Speaker 4: Soviet Union had this well deserved reputation for doing what

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Speaker 4: we call throwing bodies at the problem in conflicts, right,

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Speaker 4: a vast number of people in their armed services. But

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Speaker 4: we can't forget the Soviet Union. Despite Cold War propaganda

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Speaker 4: on both sides, the Soviet Union also heralded a great

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Speaker 4: many innovations that changed warfare and therefore the world at large.

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Speaker 4: Remember when we talked about the dead Hands system. That's

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Speaker 4: sup that supervillain bond level stuff.

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Speaker 2: There you go, that's still terrifying. Well, I mean it

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Speaker 2: has to be it's obviously right, especially the fact that

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Speaker 2: they're not the only country that then developed a similar

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Speaker 2: dead hands indrome syndrome. What is that? What is the

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Speaker 2: impostor hands alien hand syndrome? Is that the thing?

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Speaker 4: I believe that's correct? You like, let your hand fall

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Speaker 4: asleep and Jersey, where's that's just the stranger?

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Speaker 3: Okay, thank you.

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Speaker 4: The the impostor hand or whatever it's called syndrome is

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Speaker 4: a psychological condition where people believe that one or more

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Speaker 4: of their limbs are not part of them.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, it's like operating on its own or something like that.

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Speaker 2: But sorry, I'd start for that aside, just knowing that

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Speaker 2: multiple countries now have a system like the one that

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Speaker 2: the USSR developed, which is, if everybody dies in our country,

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Speaker 2: the missile systems still function and will still strike you.

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Speaker 4: Right, Yeah, that's correct, and please do check out our

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Speaker 4: previous episode on that where we go we go deep

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Speaker 4: into what that thing is, how it may or may

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Speaker 4: not work, and whether it actually works today, which is

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Speaker 4: all the big question for the Russian military. I mean,

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Speaker 4: this civilization puts spot Nick into space, they put the

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Speaker 4: first known satellite in orbit. They put Uri Gagard into space,

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Speaker 4: and brought that poor Poorlika or like like y'a.

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Speaker 3: Without making it a spoiler, I'm just gonna say, there's

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Speaker 3: a thing that I've been enjoying a piece of media

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Speaker 3: where there is a plot point involving a fail safe

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Speaker 3: for the fail safe, where if there were mutually assured

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Speaker 3: destruction taking place, there is some sort of satellite mounted

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Speaker 3: e MP that would essentially shut out or knock out

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Speaker 3: all electrical devices on the entire planet, therefore preventing mutually

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Speaker 3: assured destruction where that to happen. And I thought that

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Speaker 3: was super cools.

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Speaker 2: Can we do that?

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Speaker 3: Yes, exactly. But I'm just saying I'm not gonna say

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Speaker 3: what show it was because it is a little bit

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Speaker 3: of a plot point. Don't want to be a spoiler,

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Speaker 3: but I thought it was a new thought experiment.

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Speaker 4: It is tune into season six of Community.

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Speaker 3: Exactly the movie, which I think is finally in the words, you.

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Speaker 2: Know, if that did work, though, I imagine all of the

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Speaker 2: nuclear reactors around the world for power, they would all

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Speaker 2: go offline.

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Speaker 3: Oh, it's a problem that's adressed in It's a problem

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Speaker 3: that's addressed in the show.

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Speaker 4: It really really is.

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Speaker 3: Oh yeah, oh big time yep.

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Speaker 4: And let's not forget things like the humble AK forty seven,

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Speaker 4: another Soviet innovation that is one of the planet's most

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Speaker 4: well known firearms and pretty affordable at this point due

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Speaker 4: to economy of scale.

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Speaker 2: The rifle that keeps on giving, huh, Like, so many

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Speaker 2: conflicts arout the world have been fueled by that weapon.

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Speaker 4: Actually, the AK forty seven has, in limited regions been

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Speaker 4: used as a form of currency in the past. That's

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Speaker 4: how ubiquitous this firearm has become. Scary stuff everybody. We

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Speaker 4: do know that the Soviet Union fell, right, it dissolved,

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Speaker 4: but Russia, the Federated States thereof soldiered on and this

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Speaker 4: government was diplomatically is diplomatically put imperfect. But the world

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Speaker 4: at large, until just a few years ago, considered the

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Speaker 4: Russian army to be one of the absolute best on

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Speaker 4: the planet, second only to that of the United States.

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Speaker 4: So for decades, the rest of the world, especially the West,

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Speaker 4: especially NATO countries, all took great pains to avoid doing

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Speaker 4: what we call poking the bear too much or too often.

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Speaker 3: Right, And you know, the bear is also just as

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Speaker 3: perfect analogy for Russia are pretty bear like.

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Speaker 2: Just like the restaurant, but like what you mean there

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Speaker 2: is to avoid deliberate provocation, right, Or if Russia does

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Speaker 2: something that appears to be a little off, Let's say

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Speaker 2: NATO might consider Russia doing something that's a little that's

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Speaker 2: if the concept here is that NATO wouldn't come down

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Speaker 2: and do anything physical, you might have a resolution that says, hey,

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Speaker 2: we kind of don't we don't like that Russia did.

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Speaker 4: That, guys, But no, Olivia Newton John right, it's not

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Speaker 4: let's get physical just yet.

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Speaker 3: I mean exactly, it doesn't. I mean, it seems like

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Speaker 3: we're seeing so many aggressive tests of what NATO can

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Speaker 3: actually do these days, and it doesn't feel like it's

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Speaker 3: passing them very well. It feels like we're exposing just

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Speaker 3: how kind of again a matter of decorum something like

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Speaker 3: NATO actually is.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, you never know until the rubber hits the road

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Speaker 4: or the ICBMs hit the horizon. It's funny because going

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Speaker 4: back to that earlier analogy about people hanging out with

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Speaker 4: agro folks at a restaurant or a bar, NATO was

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Speaker 4: NATO is like a crowd of people also in the

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Speaker 4: same establishment, and they're whispering to each other. They're like, oh, no,

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Speaker 4: don't mess with secret knife guy. You know, he's trying

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Speaker 4: to scoot over and call other seats at the don't

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Speaker 4: let him do it.

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Speaker 2: Somebody within the group stands up, I call for a

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Speaker 2: resolution that secret knife guy be scolded immediately and yeah,

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Speaker 2: and then someone leans.

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Speaker 4: Back and they're like, secret knife guy, you got you

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Speaker 4: got a weird vibe. No, don't come over here, No,

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Speaker 4: just it's your ViBe's off.

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Speaker 2: Somebody stands up and like quietly just walks over to

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Speaker 2: secret knife guy and hands him a seat like a

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Speaker 2: little note.

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Speaker 3: And immediately knifed.

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Speaker 4: You're mad at you? Oh wait? Or are you mad

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Speaker 4: at us? Check? Yes or no?

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Speaker 3: That's it.

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Speaker 4: That's it.

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Speaker 2: And this isn't to completely crap on, you know, initiatives

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Speaker 2: like the United Nations, like NATO and like these these

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Speaker 2: treaty organizations and attempts to work together and be more

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Speaker 2: unified right as a planet with governing bodies and that

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Speaker 2: kind of thing, because that is kind of the best

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Speaker 2: thing we've got going when it comes to cooperation and

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Speaker 2: seeing everybody as one species that's going through this whole

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Speaker 2: thing together. It's just in action. Maybe they're just not

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Speaker 2: as effective as we would hope they would be. Otherwise

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Speaker 2: we would right have the green revolution thing where pollution

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Speaker 2: is no longer even a concept on the planet. Would

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Speaker 2: have happened in the eighties.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, exactly. You know, if every, if everything that modern

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Speaker 4: civilization put on paper with noble intent ended up one

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Speaker 4: hundred percent being put into practice, the world would be

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Speaker 4: a much better place. Right. But the thing is, what

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Speaker 4: we're saying is like a lot of these agreements, they

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Speaker 4: don't have teeth and they don't have the same funding

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Speaker 4: that bad faith actors have. That's ultimately, I think our

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Speaker 4: point like, they don't have.

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Speaker 3: Teeth, but they lacking teeth they more than make up

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Speaker 3: for in gums too.

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Speaker 4: They've got They've got gummy gummy words. And so let's

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Speaker 4: go back to Russia. We see here the ascension of

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Speaker 4: a guy named Vladimir Putin, the longtime effective ruler of

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Speaker 4: the new Russia. Please check out if you're having a

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Speaker 4: depressing time today when this episode publishes and you want

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Speaker 4: to have a little bit of a gallows chuckle, please

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Speaker 4: please please check out our classic episode on a weird

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Speaker 4: flex that Vladimir Putin did when he pushed through a

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Speaker 4: law that said any Russian president, whomever they may be,

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Speaker 4: is immune from any prosecution forever, no take.

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Speaker 2: Back seats as long as this stuff they did while president. Yeah,

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Speaker 2: I think I think.

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Speaker 4: That's an important caveat. Yeah, I think you're right.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, And it's the same one that we currently have

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Speaker 2: in this country. Any official duties, you're immune, baby.

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Speaker 4: Yeah. It's weird because the findings OFIS and the language

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Speaker 4: of that Russian law are kind of similar. Far be

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Speaker 4: it for me to say people were plagiarizing or drinking

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Speaker 4: from the same inspirational well, but the language is kind

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Speaker 4: of similar to your point. I mean, I don't we know.

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Speaker 4: Putin never thought the Cold War ended, like pretty much

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Speaker 4: everybody else on the planet until quite recently, had a

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Speaker 4: very high opinion of Russia's military might. And you can

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Speaker 4: hie thee to YouTube for instance, or your favorite video

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Speaker 4: platform of choice, and you can see multiple instances where

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Speaker 4: the Russian government, led by Putin or Medgev, has been

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Speaker 4: showcasing missile defense systems, stuff like the SM three hundred

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Speaker 4: or big contingents of troops marching through, tanks rolling through

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Speaker 4: And these are massive parades, right, Who doesn't love a

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Speaker 4: massive parade? There our events, guys, I'm sorry, I'm laughing,

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Speaker 4: not to get political, but do you remember when our

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Speaker 4: administration tried to have one of those parades.

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Speaker 2: Do you guys remember that, Yeah, to celebrate the president

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Speaker 2: and his birthday.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, nothing new.

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Speaker 2: It was like a history of the military on display.

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Speaker 2: And there was a part of it that was interesting

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Speaker 2: to see the different the evolution, let's say, of the

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Speaker 2: weaponry and things like that were cool. Yeah, yeah, but

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Speaker 2: we didn't exactly, you know, roll through with the new

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Speaker 2: versions of the B two bomber or the stuff that

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Speaker 2: DARPA was working on, or the new stealth aircraft, or

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Speaker 2: we didn't do any of that, you know, and then

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Speaker 2: you see what what happened. It's twenty eighteen, right when

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Speaker 2: the big announcement occurs where Weimer putin is like, hey

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Speaker 2: we've got these super baby yes, right, yeah, that was

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Speaker 2: years ago. And then when we have one of these things,

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Speaker 2: it's just it didn't seem that impressive unfortunately. And I

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Speaker 2: don't mean, I don't mean to downplay the work of

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Speaker 2: any of the you know, military personnel or people who

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Speaker 2: are involved in the actual parade part. It's just it

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Speaker 2: didn't have that same thing like here's all our here's

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Speaker 2: all our ICBMs right that you know China would do maybe.

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Speaker 4: Right, we didn't show the whole chocolate box. Going back

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Speaker 4: to that earlier in comparison, we said, here's some of

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Speaker 4: our good, old fashioned chocolate, and then we really want it.

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Speaker 4: And the world was saying, I know, beat me here

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Speaker 4: freight training. The world was saying, I know those motherers

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Speaker 4: have a gob stopper somewhere. They're just not putting it

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Speaker 4: out in the public. I mean, because we all know

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Speaker 4: that world powers are not content to stick with old

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Speaker 4: conventional goodies. Old conventional warfare. Research in Russia was a

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Speaker 4: huge leader in this. That during the days of the

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Speaker 4: Soviet Union and now they pioneered these bold, strange experiments

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Speaker 4: into unconventional and asymmetric initiatives, things like more exotic weaponry. Notably,

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Speaker 4: there's some of the best at propaganda and information compromise.

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Speaker 4: This had huge impact in foreign countries, including the United States.

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Speaker 4: It resulted in favorable policies for Russia abroad, and in

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Speaker 4: some cases it resulted in outright vassal states and regime change.

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Speaker 4: I mean, good luck voting in Moldova or Belarus. Honestly,

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Speaker 4: be careful, actually, if you're there, if you're listening now,

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Speaker 4: be careful.

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Speaker 2: Oh yeah, really quickly. I'm just thinking about this as

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Speaker 2: you were talking. There have been when we think about

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Speaker 2: new weapons and militaries trying to stay on the cutting edge, right,

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Speaker 2: we often think about it being because they want a

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Speaker 2: technological advantage over any opponent and he perceived opponent who's

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Speaker 2: at that bar, right, they want the bigger knife or

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Speaker 2: the faster realistic missile or whatever. There's this other thing

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Speaker 2: that exists for every other country, and that is the

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Speaker 2: intertwining of that military sector, the official government sector, but

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Speaker 2: then the private sector that's actually manufacturing most of those weapons.

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Speaker 2: Even in Russia and anywhere in the country, there are

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Speaker 2: private sectors corporations that are involved with all this stuff

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Speaker 2: that need those sweet sweet quarterly profits in order to

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Speaker 2: stay afloat. And you can't not keep that in your

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Speaker 2: mind while you're thinking about this stuff, because it's way

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Speaker 2: more complicated than just a country wanting to be the

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Speaker 2: most powerful.

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Speaker 4: There are a lot of calculations that go into it,

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Speaker 4: and some of them the public will never see unless

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Speaker 4: things go disastrously wrong for one actor or another. I

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Speaker 4: mean again, folks, the Putin administration has never considered the

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Speaker 4: Cold War over. In their opinion, stuff still isn't sweet.

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Speaker 4: And in recent years Russia has been in practice attempting

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Speaker 4: to resurrect the Soviet Empire of old. We're talking about

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Speaker 4: coordinated series of campaigns, especially in its former sphere of influence,

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Speaker 4: rigging elections, touching politicians, turning nearby nations into puppet states.

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Speaker 4: A most notable example of this attempt to resurrect the

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Speaker 4: Soviet Empire is the invasion of Ukraine, which began so

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Speaker 4: long ago now, February twenty fourth, twenty twenty two. It's

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Speaker 4: been going on for years at this point, and it

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Speaker 4: doesn't really show any signs of stopping unless I'm missing something.

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Speaker 2: No, not at all. We saw the Ukrainian president putting

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Speaker 2: out public statements about how worried he is that the

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Speaker 2: Iran conflict is going to so overshadow what's occurring in Ukraine,

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Speaker 2: that his country is going to lose all support from

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Speaker 2: the West, which is you know, all of Europe, the

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Speaker 2: United States, that all these folks that have been providing

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Speaker 2: aid to Ukraine. It's that thing we talked about the

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Speaker 2: top of the show, right, So much stuff going on,

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Speaker 2: the public interest kind of just moves away for a while,

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Speaker 2: and now it's well, how do we get aid to

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Speaker 2: another country, right, or how do we protect a different

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Speaker 2: group of people.

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Speaker 3: It's a lot of that flooding the zone stuff where

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Speaker 3: we can literally hold so many things in our minds

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Speaker 3: at one time. And whether it's by design or just

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Speaker 3: the nature of events stacking upon events, I think we

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Speaker 3: all kind of think it might be partially by design,

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Speaker 3: but yeah, it's a lot.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, And we know that even leading up to the

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Speaker 4: current conflict in Ukraine, there were known economic strains, sanctions,

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Speaker 4: a lot of corruption and maintenance issues throughout the Russian infrastructure,

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Speaker 4: military and civilian alike. So there was already a great

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Speaker 4: deal of festering skepticism about whether Russia was a real

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Speaker 4: tiger militarily or a paper tiger. But a lot of

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Speaker 4: folks still, despite the skepticism leading up to twenty twenty two,

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Speaker 4: they believe that Russia's foray into Ukraine unilateral and rationalized

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Speaker 4: by several different announcements. They thought this conflict, this invasion,

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Speaker 4: would be swift and decisive, and they said, in less

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Speaker 4: the West intervenes, the Russian army is going to roll

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Speaker 4: through Ukraine like lightning. The locals are outnumbered, outmatched, out gunned.

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Speaker 4: But this was not the case, like Russia's army really

397
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Speaker 4: fumbled the bag. The military had all these has these

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Speaker 4: serious issues that impede its performance. Supply chains breakdown, inadequate training,

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Speaker 4: bad opsec, outdated equipment. They're running out of munitions. I mean,

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Speaker 4: for Pete's sake, they had to conscript some soldiers from

401
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Speaker 4: DPRK just to be cannon fodder. Essentially. I don't know.

402
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Speaker 4: I don't think they were as good as we thought

403
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Speaker 4: they were. But maybe that's also a conspiracy, because maybe

404
00:24:13,920 --> 00:24:18,240
Speaker 4: our military industrial complex during the Cold War was embellishing

405
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Speaker 4: or over selling Soviet capabilities in order to get more funding.

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Speaker 3: The evil empire of it all, there's certain optics that

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Speaker 3: goes into having a relatively well matched rival.

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Speaker 2: You know, it's so puzzling to me that there could

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Speaker 2: be a conflict like what's happening in Ukraine go on

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Speaker 2: for so long, and that a large country like Russia

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Speaker 2: would just continue that waging war in that way and

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Speaker 2: pumping millions and billions of dollars into it. And we've

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Speaker 2: I feel as though all of us have learned lessons

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Speaker 2: about what occurred during the Cold War where there are

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Speaker 2: all of these different fronts right where there's all kinds

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Speaker 2: of conflict that's occurring that's not actually you know about

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Speaker 2: what's going on in Afghanistan at the time. It's actually

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Speaker 2: these two countries pouring resources in and attempting to be

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Speaker 2: victorious in some kind of weird war of attrition kind

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Speaker 2: of thing. It feels like that is happening now in Ukraine,

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Speaker 2: Like it's got to be happening to some extent in

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Speaker 2: the whole conflict with the Ukraine, and it's also now

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Speaker 2: happening with the United States in Iran where we're just

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Speaker 2: pumping money into it.

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Speaker 3: Both of which seemed to have been conflicts that were

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Speaker 3: cast as like it will be in and out type situations. Yeah,

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Speaker 3: I mean, at least from a public relations standpoint, that

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Speaker 3: seems to be what Russia wanted the world to think

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Speaker 3: about what was going to happen in Ukraine, that they

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Speaker 3: were you know, outmatched and outgunned, and that fully ended

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Speaker 3: up not being the case.

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Speaker 2: Well, it appears to be the same thing with the

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Speaker 2: United States right in Iran, so like yeah, yeah, so

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Speaker 2: it's just so puzzling to me if it's not just

435
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Speaker 2: a play to manufacture more missiles and more a munitions

436
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Speaker 2: and more weapons. If it's not that, then I don't

437
00:26:12,960 --> 00:26:14,320
Speaker 2: get it understood.

438
00:26:14,480 --> 00:26:17,199
Speaker 4: I mean, this is definitely not to say that the

439
00:26:17,359 --> 00:26:23,800
Speaker 4: Russian military isn't dangerous. It is still ranked as the

440
00:26:23,920 --> 00:26:27,119
Speaker 4: number two military in the world currently by all the

441
00:26:27,160 --> 00:26:31,000
Speaker 4: boffins and all our fellow war nerds. And the conflict,

442
00:26:31,119 --> 00:26:34,200
Speaker 4: as we said, it's it's definitely a quagmire. A continued

443
00:26:34,480 --> 00:26:38,280
Speaker 4: hashtag no family guy, it continues to rage. We've seen

444
00:26:38,320 --> 00:26:43,760
Speaker 4: a revolution in drone warfare, electronic warfare, energy based war.

445
00:26:44,480 --> 00:26:48,119
Speaker 4: We've also heard a lot of cryptic announcements coming out

446
00:26:48,200 --> 00:26:52,080
Speaker 4: of Russia, some by Daddy V himself, alluding to what

447
00:26:52,119 --> 00:26:58,000
Speaker 4: they call new unprecedented super weapons, things that, according to

448
00:26:58,040 --> 00:27:03,400
Speaker 4: the pr and thes, if deployed these things, these new

449
00:27:03,440 --> 00:27:08,200
Speaker 4: toys could fundamentally alter the course of conflict. But what

450
00:27:08,400 --> 00:27:13,800
Speaker 4: are they exactly? Does Russia really have quote unquote new

451
00:27:13,960 --> 00:27:17,800
Speaker 4: super weapons. We'll tell you after word from our sponsor.

452
00:27:23,000 --> 00:27:27,920
Speaker 4: Here's where it gets crazy. Yeah, kind of depending on

453
00:27:28,000 --> 00:27:31,639
Speaker 4: what we mean by new and what we mean by super.

454
00:27:31,960 --> 00:27:35,720
Speaker 4: At least we tease this a little bit earlier. There

455
00:27:35,840 --> 00:27:40,359
Speaker 4: was a twenty eighteen presidential address to the Federal Assembly

456
00:27:40,960 --> 00:27:46,000
Speaker 4: of Russia, and while speaking there, Putin had what the

457
00:27:46,000 --> 00:27:49,720
Speaker 4: West calls a fiery rant. You know, he was coming

458
00:27:49,760 --> 00:27:54,200
Speaker 4: in hot, he was dropping bars. He publicly announced six

459
00:27:54,480 --> 00:28:02,119
Speaker 4: new weapons systems that were potentially dual use or explicitly

460
00:28:02,240 --> 00:28:07,440
Speaker 4: designed to deliver nuclear payloads. We can get into those

461
00:28:07,480 --> 00:28:11,120
Speaker 4: six again, it's twenty eighteen, just so you know, when

462
00:28:11,160 --> 00:28:14,800
Speaker 4: he was doing this, most of them had not seen

463
00:28:15,600 --> 00:28:16,719
Speaker 4: actual combat.

464
00:28:16,920 --> 00:28:19,800
Speaker 2: Yeah, but some of them had been in development for

465
00:28:19,840 --> 00:28:22,399
Speaker 2: a long long time, like the first one we're going

466
00:28:22,480 --> 00:28:26,919
Speaker 2: to talk about here, the avant Garde, the avant Garde

467
00:28:27,520 --> 00:28:31,320
Speaker 2: hypersonic glide missile. This is this is a piece of

468
00:28:31,359 --> 00:28:34,199
Speaker 2: technology that was developed way back in the eighties, or

469
00:28:34,200 --> 00:28:38,520
Speaker 2: at least the hypers The concept of a hypersonic missile

470
00:28:39,000 --> 00:28:43,360
Speaker 2: started back in the eighties. And this one has this

471
00:28:43,400 --> 00:28:47,960
Speaker 2: one's been tested were there have been approximately fourteen flights

472
00:28:48,360 --> 00:28:51,920
Speaker 2: test flights, let's say, of this avant Garde system between

473
00:28:52,000 --> 00:28:57,680
Speaker 2: nineteen ninety and twenty eighteen, which there have been likely

474
00:28:58,160 --> 00:29:01,920
Speaker 2: many more since that time looking at reporting that occurred

475
00:29:01,960 --> 00:29:05,280
Speaker 2: around the time that these were announced by Daddy've lad there,

476
00:29:06,160 --> 00:29:10,120
Speaker 2: but it is it is potentially a very scary, extremely

477
00:29:10,280 --> 00:29:14,760
Speaker 2: fast missile that could potentially get past some of the

478
00:29:14,760 --> 00:29:17,880
Speaker 2: more conventional defenses that exist throughout the planet.

479
00:29:17,720 --> 00:29:20,720
Speaker 4: Right like he could screw up an iron dome, for instance.

480
00:29:21,640 --> 00:29:25,080
Speaker 4: It also it's very tricky to catch stuff this fast

481
00:29:25,120 --> 00:29:28,560
Speaker 4: and this sophisticated in mid air. So shout out to

482
00:29:28,600 --> 00:29:33,520
Speaker 4: anybody who's ever accidentally rolled a NAT twenty on dexterity

483
00:29:33,880 --> 00:29:37,160
Speaker 4: reaction and had something thrown at you and you catch

484
00:29:37,200 --> 00:29:42,200
Speaker 4: it without looking. That's what missile interceptor systems are designed

485
00:29:42,200 --> 00:29:46,680
Speaker 4: to do. And all of these things become especially important

486
00:29:46,840 --> 00:29:50,360
Speaker 4: as the United States withdraws from another what do you

487
00:29:50,400 --> 00:29:54,800
Speaker 4: call it, no, A gummy mouthed treaty, the Anti Ballistic

488
00:29:54,880 --> 00:30:00,840
Speaker 4: Missile Treaty. The US ghosted that one and Russia said, cool,

489
00:30:01,440 --> 00:30:04,600
Speaker 4: I'm down. Let me show you some of my secret knives,

490
00:30:05,120 --> 00:30:07,840
Speaker 4: which to that earlier point have been in development for

491
00:30:07,880 --> 00:30:12,440
Speaker 4: a long time. Most of the six publicly announced quote

492
00:30:12,520 --> 00:30:16,720
Speaker 4: unquote super weapons from twenty eighteen were missiles, and they

493
00:30:16,720 --> 00:30:21,800
Speaker 4: were building on earlier research, So nothing like Shyamalan plot twisting.

494
00:30:21,840 --> 00:30:23,280
Speaker 3: I gotta say, I really dig the name of this

495
00:30:23,320 --> 00:30:25,400
Speaker 3: first one, but I keep reading it as the avant

496
00:30:25,440 --> 00:30:30,240
Speaker 3: garde hypersonic like as some sort of like theater project. No,

497
00:30:30,320 --> 00:30:33,520
Speaker 3: it is, in fact the avant garde hypersonic glide vehicle.

498
00:30:33,560 --> 00:30:36,800
Speaker 3: What's that about? That sounds like a batmobile type situation.

499
00:30:36,760 --> 00:30:39,120
Speaker 4: Right, Like as Matt was saying, this has been this

500
00:30:39,160 --> 00:30:43,440
Speaker 4: one was in development before the nineties, like this is

501
00:30:43,480 --> 00:30:47,080
Speaker 4: a Cold War boy that they figured out how to

502
00:30:47,560 --> 00:30:51,800
Speaker 4: how to make work. But I don't believe. I can't

503
00:30:51,840 --> 00:30:54,640
Speaker 4: remember if that's one of the two that was actively

504
00:30:54,720 --> 00:30:57,320
Speaker 4: deployed in combat yet. I don't think that's one.

505
00:30:57,520 --> 00:30:57,560
Speaker 3: No.

506
00:30:59,120 --> 00:31:03,959
Speaker 2: According to Missile Threat, which is a website you can

507
00:31:04,040 --> 00:31:07,320
Speaker 2: visit and check out, they're talking about in December twenty eighteen,

508
00:31:07,480 --> 00:31:11,480
Speaker 2: how it was test fired and it traveled six thousand

509
00:31:11,600 --> 00:31:16,360
Speaker 2: kilometers before striking a test target just quickly. As a

510
00:31:16,400 --> 00:31:18,840
Speaker 2: primer here we kind of know this. I needed to

511
00:31:18,880 --> 00:31:21,960
Speaker 2: remind myself what it means. The concept of a ballistic

512
00:31:22,040 --> 00:31:26,280
Speaker 2: missile versus like a surface to air missile or there

513
00:31:26,280 --> 00:31:30,680
Speaker 2: are all kinds of different ones. Air to surface. A

514
00:31:30,720 --> 00:31:33,800
Speaker 2: ballistic missile is designed to go on a very steep

515
00:31:34,000 --> 00:31:38,040
Speaker 2: arc into the air, sometimes reaching almost into space, if

516
00:31:38,080 --> 00:31:41,120
Speaker 2: not into space, and then come down at a very

517
00:31:41,160 --> 00:31:45,080
Speaker 2: steep arc to hit a target somewhere. The concept with

518
00:31:45,200 --> 00:31:48,520
Speaker 2: these like a hypersonic glide missile. That word glide is

519
00:31:48,600 --> 00:31:52,360
Speaker 2: very important because it can get up to extremely high altitudes,

520
00:31:52,440 --> 00:31:55,600
Speaker 2: then glide to where it needs to go. Then as

521
00:31:55,640 --> 00:31:58,240
Speaker 2: it's coming down to its target, it can make maneuvers

522
00:31:58,880 --> 00:32:02,960
Speaker 2: while it's getting there, theoretically evade being struck by let's say,

523
00:32:03,000 --> 00:32:04,040
Speaker 2: a missile defense system.

524
00:32:04,120 --> 00:32:07,160
Speaker 3: Okay, because in the illustration for this it looks almost

525
00:32:07,200 --> 00:32:09,440
Speaker 3: like a stealth bomber. But this is an unmanned thing,

526
00:32:09,600 --> 00:32:14,040
Speaker 3: Like the vehicle is a little misleading here, vehicle.

527
00:32:13,800 --> 00:32:19,440
Speaker 4: In terms of non human passengers. So vehicle for a payload.

528
00:32:19,480 --> 00:32:19,840
Speaker 3: There you go.

529
00:32:20,320 --> 00:32:24,880
Speaker 4: It could be it could be outfitted with nuclear capability,

530
00:32:25,000 --> 00:32:26,480
Speaker 4: which a lot of people are worried.

531
00:32:26,800 --> 00:32:27,280
Speaker 3: Understood.

532
00:32:28,440 --> 00:32:31,280
Speaker 4: Oh oh, and while we're talking about nuclear powered stuff,

533
00:32:31,720 --> 00:32:36,640
Speaker 4: let's go to the second super weapon that Putin was pitching,

534
00:32:37,000 --> 00:32:40,480
Speaker 4: the nine seven point thirty. Make sure you get this right,

535
00:32:40,960 --> 00:32:44,840
Speaker 4: buravist Nick nuclear powered cruise missile.

536
00:32:45,360 --> 00:32:46,880
Speaker 2: Yeah.

537
00:32:46,960 --> 00:32:50,680
Speaker 4: Yeah, a lot of fun at parties, is our buddy Vlad? Actually,

538
00:32:50,680 --> 00:32:52,280
Speaker 4: I bet he's pretty wild at parties.

539
00:32:52,480 --> 00:32:56,880
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, taking that shirt off Steeler, stealing people's watches

540
00:32:56,880 --> 00:32:57,640
Speaker 2: and rings.

541
00:32:58,960 --> 00:33:02,280
Speaker 4: Angela Merkele you don't like dogs. That's funny because I

542
00:33:02,280 --> 00:33:04,600
Speaker 4: have several for us right now in the meeting.

543
00:33:04,920 --> 00:33:10,880
Speaker 2: Yeah, there we go of this one. This one theoretically

544
00:33:11,200 --> 00:33:14,360
Speaker 2: is pretty scary because the I was going to say,

545
00:33:14,360 --> 00:33:17,560
Speaker 2: I'd say the propaganda around it, the announcements around it,

546
00:33:17,640 --> 00:33:24,360
Speaker 2: are that it can reach anywhere on Earth. So ballistic

547
00:33:24,440 --> 00:33:28,280
Speaker 2: missiles or one thing, intercontinental ballistic missiles are the ones

548
00:33:28,320 --> 00:33:34,080
Speaker 2: that can go thousands of miles or you know, many

549
00:33:34,120 --> 00:33:38,880
Speaker 2: thousand kilometers something like this. Theoretically, if it existed, you

550
00:33:38,880 --> 00:33:41,400
Speaker 2: could launch it and then it could go almost, if

551
00:33:41,440 --> 00:33:43,000
Speaker 2: not all the way around the world.

552
00:33:43,280 --> 00:33:49,800
Speaker 4: Yeah, because a cruise missile is it's staying within Earth's atmosphere.

553
00:33:49,840 --> 00:33:53,400
Speaker 4: But think of it like a small airplane, right, and

554
00:33:53,480 --> 00:33:58,240
Speaker 4: all the passengers on that airplane are munitions of some sort,

555
00:33:58,320 --> 00:34:01,960
Speaker 4: so all the passengers suck. You don't want them to land.

556
00:34:03,480 --> 00:34:09,759
Speaker 4: But because it is sophisticated enough to fly like small aircraft,

557
00:34:10,400 --> 00:34:14,360
Speaker 4: it is more difficult to intercept and it can do

558
00:34:14,880 --> 00:34:21,840
Speaker 4: complex maneuvers. Because okay, so unlike ballistic missiles, a cruise missile,

559
00:34:21,840 --> 00:34:26,120
Speaker 4: if I remember correctly, will use jet engines for sustained

560
00:34:26,120 --> 00:34:29,799
Speaker 4: flight at low altitudes, which also makes it tougher for

561
00:34:30,040 --> 00:34:33,920
Speaker 4: radar to detect them. Pretty nasty stuff. I mean, it's

562
00:34:33,960 --> 00:34:38,800
Speaker 4: definitely no. Three m twenty two zir Con. What a segue.

563
00:34:39,080 --> 00:34:42,279
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, let's get to that, but really quickly, just

564
00:34:42,280 --> 00:34:44,560
Speaker 2: to send people if they want to learn about this

565
00:34:44,719 --> 00:34:47,520
Speaker 2: and how this specific well keep saying the name one

566
00:34:47,520 --> 00:34:49,879
Speaker 2: more time than the one we were just talking about.

567
00:34:49,920 --> 00:34:56,040
Speaker 2: Oh thenk okay, this one has talked about in November

568
00:34:56,040 --> 00:34:59,440
Speaker 2: twenty twenty five by Al Jazeera. You can look this

569
00:34:59,560 --> 00:35:05,719
Speaker 2: up revolutionary about Russia's nuclear powered missile experts, and you

570
00:35:05,760 --> 00:35:08,520
Speaker 2: can just see how people are talking about or thinking

571
00:35:08,560 --> 00:35:12,600
Speaker 2: about it versus the way Russia would, you know, would

572
00:35:12,640 --> 00:35:16,399
Speaker 2: present it when it's coming out. But I think there's

573
00:35:16,520 --> 00:35:20,240
Speaker 2: probably a reality somewhere between those two, you know, visions

574
00:35:20,280 --> 00:35:24,280
Speaker 2: of reality. There's something in there where it's a crazy

575
00:35:24,360 --> 00:35:27,840
Speaker 2: dangerous thing if you get it right. It's just testing

576
00:35:28,040 --> 00:35:31,960
Speaker 2: it enough times successfully that it would be trustworthy in

577
00:35:32,000 --> 00:35:33,480
Speaker 2: a combat situation.

578
00:35:33,360 --> 00:35:37,040
Speaker 4: Right, and bleeding money the entire time you're doing that,

579
00:35:37,280 --> 00:35:41,200
Speaker 4: R and D if you what a I think a

580
00:35:41,239 --> 00:35:45,600
Speaker 4: pretty fair read on this comes from Parth Satam writing

581
00:35:45,680 --> 00:35:50,320
Speaker 4: for The Aviationist in October twenty twenty five, where he

582
00:35:50,800 --> 00:35:54,719
Speaker 4: puts in some of the same caveats. Russia claims the

583
00:35:54,760 --> 00:36:00,880
Speaker 4: Buddhaivist nuclear powered missile flew fourteen thousand clicks in fifteen hours.

584
00:36:01,040 --> 00:36:04,080
Speaker 4: So Russia is making a lot of big claims. You know,

585
00:36:04,840 --> 00:36:07,560
Speaker 4: they're that guy at the restaurant saying I do have

586
00:36:07,600 --> 00:36:11,160
Speaker 4: a secret knife, and other people are saying, yeah, we

587
00:36:11,320 --> 00:36:14,759
Speaker 4: know about knives. Man, you're not. You're not like King

588
00:36:14,840 --> 00:36:15,480
Speaker 4: of the Knives.

589
00:36:15,520 --> 00:36:17,840
Speaker 3: But how you heard of knife hands?

590
00:36:18,520 --> 00:36:19,800
Speaker 4: Right? You heard it.

591
00:36:19,880 --> 00:36:22,800
Speaker 3: That's got hand discussion from the time of the knife.

592
00:36:22,960 --> 00:36:27,359
Speaker 4: Yeah, nailed it, nailed it. Uh. The third thing here,

593
00:36:27,440 --> 00:36:33,040
Speaker 4: the three M twenty two Zircon SS in thirty three. Uh.

594
00:36:33,080 --> 00:36:38,480
Speaker 4: It is an anti ship hypersonic cruise missile, so working

595
00:36:38,640 --> 00:36:43,000
Speaker 4: like the Bavistnik. Obviously they're taking some of the same

596
00:36:43,080 --> 00:36:46,400
Speaker 4: research and applying it to different things. This bad boy

597
00:36:46,600 --> 00:36:51,839
Speaker 4: is supposed to wallop watercraft. Okay, So they're saying, oh,

598
00:36:52,080 --> 00:36:55,960
Speaker 4: nice job building your carriers, thank you for spending billions

599
00:36:56,000 --> 00:37:00,279
Speaker 4: of dollars on that pop pop.

600
00:37:00,440 --> 00:37:05,680
Speaker 2: Again in theory terrifying because those aircraft carriers are they

601
00:37:05,719 --> 00:37:11,360
Speaker 2: do represent the blue water superiority of the United States, right, yeah.

602
00:37:11,120 --> 00:37:13,560
Speaker 4: And we can't those are not things that we can

603
00:37:15,200 --> 00:37:18,600
Speaker 4: fart out replacements for on like four thirty Friday evening.

604
00:37:18,840 --> 00:37:19,080
Speaker 3: You know.

605
00:37:19,440 --> 00:37:21,880
Speaker 2: No, we're talking years build.

606
00:37:22,719 --> 00:37:26,960
Speaker 4: Yeah, yeah, and you have to it takes so long

607
00:37:27,000 --> 00:37:30,520
Speaker 4: to build these that you also have to have bipartisan

608
00:37:30,880 --> 00:37:36,040
Speaker 4: support from two political parties that clearly don't like each other.

609
00:37:37,280 --> 00:37:40,799
Speaker 2: Oh hey, but didn't they just didn't the government in

610
00:37:40,840 --> 00:37:46,239
Speaker 2: this country just pass something at least to help TSA. Yeah,

611
00:37:46,320 --> 00:37:48,799
Speaker 2: they are trying to.

612
00:37:48,840 --> 00:37:51,600
Speaker 3: Know, well, they didn't pass it, but it's going for

613
00:37:51,680 --> 00:37:52,120
Speaker 3: a vote.

614
00:37:52,160 --> 00:37:54,800
Speaker 4: It's going for a vote. It's also occurring in step

615
00:37:54,880 --> 00:37:58,799
Speaker 4: with the plans for the current president to have his

616
00:37:58,880 --> 00:38:04,960
Speaker 4: signature on all currency going forward. I know, I wish

617
00:38:05,080 --> 00:38:08,400
Speaker 4: I was like, how could I dollars be more legitimate?

618
00:38:09,760 --> 00:38:13,400
Speaker 4: I got to stop forging the president's signature on these.

619
00:38:13,239 --> 00:38:16,560
Speaker 3: Every time, and now signed by a king.

620
00:38:17,239 --> 00:38:20,239
Speaker 4: Oh boy, there we have it. You could have that

621
00:38:20,280 --> 00:38:23,400
Speaker 4: one for free, current president. Uh. The next one is

622
00:38:23,440 --> 00:38:26,279
Speaker 4: the k H four seven M two. We can run

623
00:38:26,320 --> 00:38:30,719
Speaker 4: through these quickly. Kinsol. It is a hypersonic air launched

624
00:38:30,760 --> 00:38:36,200
Speaker 4: ballistic missile. So this comes from planes, right, This is

625
00:38:36,800 --> 00:38:39,399
Speaker 4: this is pretty cool. This is not surface to air.

626
00:38:40,200 --> 00:38:44,960
Speaker 4: They're already in the air. Again, if it works. It works.

627
00:38:46,080 --> 00:38:49,160
Speaker 4: The one, guys, the one I'm most excited about, for

628
00:38:49,320 --> 00:38:54,719
Speaker 4: very nerdy reasons, is the Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle. So

629
00:38:54,760 --> 00:38:59,239
Speaker 4: it's a submarine drone and I have high hopes for that.

630
00:39:00,560 --> 00:39:03,120
Speaker 4: I shouldn't say it that way, we'll keep it in,

631
00:39:03,320 --> 00:39:06,600
Speaker 4: but I mean the technology is very interesting for sure.

632
00:39:06,719 --> 00:39:11,319
Speaker 3: It's a great name too, the Poseidon Adventure. The unmanned

633
00:39:11,400 --> 00:39:15,920
Speaker 3: underwater vehicle. This is something that is like a a

634
00:39:16,000 --> 00:39:18,319
Speaker 3: submarine drone that is said to be able to like

635
00:39:18,920 --> 00:39:22,600
Speaker 3: manipulate the weather in a way. I mean it creates tsunamis.

636
00:39:22,600 --> 00:39:24,600
Speaker 3: That's not really a manipulat in the weather, but it's

637
00:39:24,640 --> 00:39:29,560
Speaker 3: recreating a feature of weather that's kind of intense.

638
00:39:29,640 --> 00:39:32,600
Speaker 4: Man. Yeah, we I think we talked about this a

639
00:39:32,640 --> 00:39:36,399
Speaker 4: few years ago and the news first broke. But the

640
00:39:36,400 --> 00:39:40,640
Speaker 4: the idea here is that this thing can, as you said, Noel,

641
00:39:41,239 --> 00:39:47,000
Speaker 4: literally create tsunamis. Underwater unmanned vehicles are only going to

642
00:39:47,000 --> 00:39:51,319
Speaker 4: become more important in the near to mid horizon. I

643
00:39:51,320 --> 00:39:53,879
Speaker 4: think we all saw the news as well about how

644
00:39:54,000 --> 00:39:59,240
Speaker 4: China is using subs to create a very comprehensive map

645
00:39:59,560 --> 00:40:00,440
Speaker 4: of the Arctic.

646
00:40:00,840 --> 00:40:03,960
Speaker 3: Remember those German U boats that were such a huge

647
00:40:04,000 --> 00:40:07,280
Speaker 3: part of that war effort. I mean, gosh, history repeating

648
00:40:07,880 --> 00:40:11,120
Speaker 3: like it's a covert. They're small, they're able to really

649
00:40:11,120 --> 00:40:14,279
Speaker 3: get in there, and now they can make tsunamis. So

650
00:40:15,040 --> 00:40:15,959
Speaker 3: what's not to love?

651
00:40:16,320 --> 00:40:20,360
Speaker 4: What's not to love? Ten ted No notes, great hustle

652
00:40:20,560 --> 00:40:26,719
Speaker 4: everybody radioactive tsunamis. Oh yeah, yeah we should mention that part. Yeah,

653
00:40:27,200 --> 00:40:29,480
Speaker 4: I would join forces with the radioactive wasps.

654
00:40:29,560 --> 00:40:30,760
Speaker 3: We'd have a good.

655
00:40:30,680 --> 00:40:34,240
Speaker 4: Time the radioactive feral hogs.

656
00:40:34,280 --> 00:40:37,760
Speaker 2: You know what I mean, it's just insane. Two hundred

657
00:40:37,880 --> 00:40:41,760
Speaker 2: kilometers per hour, that's one hundred and twenty miles per hour, zigzagging,

658
00:40:42,120 --> 00:40:46,520
Speaker 2: avoiding detection, creating radioactive tsunami.

659
00:40:46,920 --> 00:40:50,360
Speaker 4: Yeah, nothing weird. If you want to learn more, go

660
00:40:50,480 --> 00:40:54,680
Speaker 4: to Army Recognition dot com, where you'll see an announcement

661
00:40:54,760 --> 00:40:59,279
Speaker 4: from Naval News the headline Russia claims successful launch of

662
00:40:59,400 --> 00:41:04,600
Speaker 4: Poseidon nuclear submarine drone said to create tsunamis. So that

663
00:41:04,760 --> 00:41:09,360
Speaker 4: was a banger in the address he gave in twenty eighteen,

664
00:41:09,680 --> 00:41:11,280
Speaker 4: and he had one more closer.

665
00:41:11,360 --> 00:41:12,960
Speaker 3: But before we get to that, just.

666
00:41:12,920 --> 00:41:18,520
Speaker 2: Pointing out the superiority that is on display here theoretically

667
00:41:19,000 --> 00:41:23,000
Speaker 2: every time is this concept of a scramjet that you

668
00:41:23,120 --> 00:41:26,800
Speaker 2: add to your cruise missile that allows that cruise missile

669
00:41:26,880 --> 00:41:30,840
Speaker 2: to actually move and maneuver. You're adding the gliding capability

670
00:41:30,880 --> 00:41:34,279
Speaker 2: to your ICBM so that it can make maneuvers and

671
00:41:34,400 --> 00:41:36,960
Speaker 2: get away from those brand new f thirty fives or

672
00:41:36,960 --> 00:41:38,960
Speaker 2: whatever you're trying to throw at it. And in this

673
00:41:39,080 --> 00:41:43,680
Speaker 2: case with Poseidon, it can zigzag around as people are

674
00:41:43,680 --> 00:41:47,840
Speaker 2: trying to intercept it. That is I think the scary

675
00:41:47,960 --> 00:41:52,240
Speaker 2: thing because there are a ton of anti ballistic missile

676
00:41:52,400 --> 00:41:55,959
Speaker 2: anti all types of missile technologies that are out there,

677
00:41:56,280 --> 00:42:00,960
Speaker 2: and they range from everything to these micro microwave weapons,

678
00:42:01,040 --> 00:42:06,320
Speaker 2: laser weapons, conventional weapons with other missiles that are designed

679
00:42:06,360 --> 00:42:08,719
Speaker 2: to go up and catch one as it's coming in.

680
00:42:08,760 --> 00:42:11,799
Speaker 2: We're seeing those on display a ton right now with

681
00:42:11,840 --> 00:42:17,200
Speaker 2: what's going on with Iran. It's just if these things

682
00:42:17,239 --> 00:42:23,960
Speaker 2: are real, they are so representative of superiority over other abilities.

683
00:42:24,400 --> 00:42:30,319
Speaker 4: Yeah. Yeah, because they're greased pigs. That's the thing, like

684
00:42:30,360 --> 00:42:34,680
Speaker 4: the old country trope of people getting together and trying

685
00:42:34,680 --> 00:42:37,600
Speaker 4: to catch a greased pig. Because these things are nimble

686
00:42:37,640 --> 00:42:41,359
Speaker 4: and agile. If they work the way they're supposed to work,

687
00:42:41,719 --> 00:42:46,560
Speaker 4: then they are out matching current interception capabilities, and the

688
00:42:46,640 --> 00:42:50,040
Speaker 4: Russian government was quite explicit about this. They were saying,

689
00:42:50,160 --> 00:42:54,080
Speaker 4: Uncle Sam can't get us. Like, guys, we know all

690
00:42:54,160 --> 00:42:57,680
Speaker 4: the tennis rackets you have, right, we know all the

691
00:42:57,920 --> 00:42:59,960
Speaker 4: what are those things in lacrosse they used to catch

692
00:43:00,160 --> 00:43:01,760
Speaker 4: the ball shuttlecocks.

693
00:43:02,120 --> 00:43:02,680
Speaker 3: No, that.

694
00:43:04,200 --> 00:43:05,040
Speaker 4: That's the scoop.

695
00:43:05,280 --> 00:43:06,240
Speaker 3: It's called the scoop.

696
00:43:06,440 --> 00:43:08,080
Speaker 4: The scoop. They're like, we thank you.

697
00:43:08,320 --> 00:43:15,000
Speaker 3: I wish maybe that's true descriptive, it's true.

698
00:43:15,400 --> 00:43:18,879
Speaker 4: Yes, yeah, they say, we've we know Uncle Sam, all

699
00:43:18,960 --> 00:43:22,239
Speaker 4: the scoopy nets you have, and you will not be

700
00:43:22,320 --> 00:43:25,680
Speaker 4: able to scoopy net these bad balls we're gonna throw

701
00:43:25,719 --> 00:43:29,279
Speaker 4: at you. And it this leads to stuff like the

702
00:43:29,440 --> 00:43:33,360
Speaker 4: RS twenty eight. This was Putin's closer, the r S

703
00:43:33,400 --> 00:43:38,680
Speaker 4: twenty eight Sarmat Liquid fueled in I r V equipped

704
00:43:39,200 --> 00:43:43,440
Speaker 4: super heavy ICBM. Now one problem with that name. I

705
00:43:43,440 --> 00:43:47,080
Speaker 4: don't think it's fair to our buddy Sarmat to body

706
00:43:47,080 --> 00:43:51,080
Speaker 4: shame them super heavy. Come on, come on, that's rude.

707
00:43:51,120 --> 00:43:52,680
Speaker 4: Maybe there's a translation thing.

708
00:43:53,680 --> 00:43:57,239
Speaker 2: Well, I've seen the new season of South Park and

709
00:43:58,040 --> 00:44:01,719
Speaker 2: this thing's also known as Satan too, and Satan's a

710
00:44:01,760 --> 00:44:02,520
Speaker 2: beefy boy.

711
00:44:03,000 --> 00:44:05,759
Speaker 4: He's a chalky boy. He's a choky boy. He makes

712
00:44:05,800 --> 00:44:06,480
Speaker 4: an impression.

713
00:44:07,160 --> 00:44:08,320
Speaker 3: He's also a kept woman.

714
00:44:09,960 --> 00:44:12,120
Speaker 4: Yes, yeah in South part.

715
00:44:12,680 --> 00:44:15,360
Speaker 3: Yeah, I don't know, and you can apply that to

716
00:44:15,440 --> 00:44:19,000
Speaker 3: Satan a large nose that I don't know.

717
00:44:19,360 --> 00:44:22,000
Speaker 2: I just trying to make a joke just because this

718
00:44:22,120 --> 00:44:24,359
Speaker 2: is Saing is known in the West as the Satan Too,

719
00:44:24,760 --> 00:44:28,440
Speaker 2: which is you know, it's a very metal name.

720
00:44:28,480 --> 00:44:32,080
Speaker 3: It's Satan Too. It's it's like the first Baptist church.

721
00:44:32,120 --> 00:44:33,919
Speaker 3: There can only be one, but yet there are many.

722
00:44:34,520 --> 00:44:38,560
Speaker 4: Yeah, I mean the SS eighteen Satan is an ICBM

723
00:44:38,800 --> 00:44:41,920
Speaker 4: that's been around for a while, and it was aging.

724
00:44:42,120 --> 00:44:47,200
Speaker 4: So this closer super weapon pitch is really just say

725
00:44:47,840 --> 00:44:49,839
Speaker 4: we're replacing the earlier thing.

726
00:44:50,040 --> 00:44:52,000
Speaker 2: Can we talk about why this one is so terrifying though?

727
00:44:52,280 --> 00:44:52,640
Speaker 3: Sure?

728
00:44:53,880 --> 00:44:57,960
Speaker 2: This is another one of these intercontinental ballistic missiles, and

729
00:44:58,120 --> 00:45:04,879
Speaker 2: it is designed to kloy sixteen independently targetable nuclear warheads.

730
00:45:05,560 --> 00:45:09,840
Speaker 2: So you shoot one off, then sixteen targets in different

731
00:45:09,840 --> 00:45:12,040
Speaker 2: places can be hit with a nuke.

732
00:45:12,560 --> 00:45:16,920
Speaker 4: Yeah, and those are sixteen is the the upper limit

733
00:45:17,080 --> 00:45:20,640
Speaker 4: of the distinct warheads it can deploy. It can also

734
00:45:20,800 --> 00:45:26,120
Speaker 4: just do ten large warheads, but overall it can carry

735
00:45:26,760 --> 00:45:32,280
Speaker 4: ultimately ten tons of payload. So if they wish ten

736
00:45:32,440 --> 00:45:35,399
Speaker 4: tons of nuclear weaponry, this is a world ending thing,

737
00:45:35,560 --> 00:45:38,040
Speaker 4: or a region ending thing at the very least.

738
00:45:38,200 --> 00:45:40,400
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, and what region are we worried about?

739
00:45:40,440 --> 00:45:40,600
Speaker 4: Oh?

740
00:45:40,640 --> 00:45:44,120
Speaker 2: This thing can go eleven thousand miles and can easily

741
00:45:44,160 --> 00:45:45,840
Speaker 2: reach Europe in the United States?

742
00:45:46,120 --> 00:45:51,640
Speaker 4: Yeah, so what region, folks? Most of them, most of them,

743
00:45:51,680 --> 00:45:55,040
Speaker 4: most of them North Sentinel Island. Don't poke the bear,

744
00:45:55,239 --> 00:45:57,760
Speaker 4: all right, that's not going to be your first international friend.

745
00:45:57,960 --> 00:46:02,239
Speaker 4: But as we said, only two of these six wishless

746
00:46:02,280 --> 00:46:06,319
Speaker 4: things from twenty eighteen have seen combat. The rest are

747
00:46:06,400 --> 00:46:11,480
Speaker 4: still under or in some phase of development. This sounds

748
00:46:11,520 --> 00:46:16,839
Speaker 4: good or terrifying in a pr speech or a propaganda initiative.

749
00:46:17,040 --> 00:46:21,200
Speaker 4: But here is the billiant ruble question, fellow conspiracy realist.

750
00:46:22,640 --> 00:46:27,319
Speaker 4: Do these things actually work? And what else are they

751
00:46:27,320 --> 00:46:35,240
Speaker 4: building in there? We'll be back afterword from our sponsors.

752
00:46:36,560 --> 00:46:40,400
Speaker 4: We've returned, guys. It's so weird. We think about asymmetry

753
00:46:41,080 --> 00:46:46,960
Speaker 4: quite a bit. Right. Ever since the behavior of colonists

754
00:46:46,960 --> 00:46:50,440
Speaker 4: in the American Revolution, right when they deployed Gettia tactics,

755
00:46:51,120 --> 00:46:55,279
Speaker 4: we have seen great advantage in flipping the script of

756
00:46:55,480 --> 00:47:00,520
Speaker 4: conventional warfare. These things aren't really flipping the script. Yeah,

757
00:47:00,640 --> 00:47:05,160
Speaker 4: they don't appear to have radically altered the calculations involved

758
00:47:05,160 --> 00:47:08,680
Speaker 4: in war, or they definitely haven't done it to the

759
00:47:08,800 --> 00:47:12,200
Speaker 4: level that cheaply made drones have. I think we can

760
00:47:12,280 --> 00:47:18,840
Speaker 4: agree that cyber warfare and drone warfare are two of

761
00:47:18,880 --> 00:47:22,719
Speaker 4: the biggest game changers in modern conflicts today. Right.

762
00:47:23,760 --> 00:47:26,120
Speaker 2: Oh, yeah, We've been talking about a lot, especially in

763
00:47:26,160 --> 00:47:31,080
Speaker 2: the Ukraine conflict, and then now way on these relatively

764
00:47:31,320 --> 00:47:35,560
Speaker 2: cheap drones that are essentially just missiles that you know,

765
00:47:35,640 --> 00:47:38,560
Speaker 2: can go and explode any anywhere, and it costs like

766
00:47:38,600 --> 00:47:41,520
Speaker 2: fifty five thousand dollars versus you know, a million dollars

767
00:47:41,600 --> 00:47:45,000
Speaker 2: to shoot one down if you're using the defense shield systems.

768
00:47:45,680 --> 00:47:49,120
Speaker 2: But there is stuff that Russia's been developing. Did you

769
00:47:49,160 --> 00:47:53,880
Speaker 2: see this thing that s seventy ocotnik ok h O

770
00:47:54,040 --> 00:47:59,240
Speaker 2: t n I k B. It looks like it looks

771
00:47:59,280 --> 00:48:02,480
Speaker 2: like one of these stealth planes that you know, Lockeyed

772
00:48:02,600 --> 00:48:06,120
Speaker 2: creator or whoever on this side created, But it's a

773
00:48:06,200 --> 00:48:11,839
Speaker 2: stealth drone and it's it's huge, sixty five foot wingspan.

774
00:48:12,200 --> 00:48:15,560
Speaker 2: And there was one that allegedly went into Ukrainian airspace

775
00:48:15,600 --> 00:48:19,279
Speaker 2: and then you know, crashed and was recovered, but then

776
00:48:19,400 --> 00:48:23,400
Speaker 2: Russian forces like shot a missile to attack it to

777
00:48:23,400 --> 00:48:27,160
Speaker 2: make sure the other side didn't get their technology. Uh yeah, yeah,

778
00:48:27,200 --> 00:48:29,480
Speaker 2: but it looks it looks scary like a stealth drone.

779
00:48:29,640 --> 00:48:31,600
Speaker 2: Thing that looks like a stealth bomber.

780
00:48:32,920 --> 00:48:36,160
Speaker 4: Yeah. And some of these, not just that one, but

781
00:48:36,280 --> 00:48:41,160
Speaker 4: like the shah Head and I think the Saga a

782
00:48:41,200 --> 00:48:45,760
Speaker 4: couple other ones there. We suspect that they were built

783
00:48:45,920 --> 00:48:50,640
Speaker 4: at least partially inspired by captured US drone technology or

784
00:48:50,800 --> 00:48:55,080
Speaker 4: UAV technology. It's it's the hot new thing in war

785
00:48:55,520 --> 00:48:59,839
Speaker 4: and unmanned drone they're much to your point, they're much

786
00:49:00,080 --> 00:49:05,360
Speaker 4: easier and cheaper to construct, and they also have the

787
00:49:05,560 --> 00:49:10,480
Speaker 4: added advantage of bleeding out your opponent's resources. Right, so

788
00:49:10,640 --> 00:49:13,920
Speaker 4: even if they catch one of the drones you have launched,

789
00:49:14,400 --> 00:49:18,320
Speaker 4: they have lost millions of dollars. You lost fifty five grand.

790
00:49:18,840 --> 00:49:24,640
Speaker 4: You know, eventually those numbers add up. Got to say, though,

791
00:49:25,560 --> 00:49:28,880
Speaker 4: part of the reason that these super weapons from twenty

792
00:49:28,920 --> 00:49:32,799
Speaker 4: eighteen have yet to create super results is due to

793
00:49:32,840 --> 00:49:36,040
Speaker 4: the fact that Russia has not used these in a

794
00:49:36,120 --> 00:49:42,080
Speaker 4: wartime nuclear capability. It seems that nuclear warfare is still

795
00:49:42,120 --> 00:49:44,799
Speaker 4: a rubicon. It's still a red line that no one,

796
00:49:44,920 --> 00:49:47,800
Speaker 4: not even Russia, has the appetite to cross.

797
00:49:49,320 --> 00:49:52,640
Speaker 3: So far, so far, May the Cold War rage on.

798
00:49:53,120 --> 00:49:56,560
Speaker 4: We're recorded on Friday, March twenty seventh. We don't know

799
00:49:56,800 --> 00:49:58,360
Speaker 4: how that statement will age.

800
00:49:58,640 --> 00:50:02,600
Speaker 2: Stop, Ben, I'm scared. I just don't like saying things

801
00:50:02,600 --> 00:50:03,200
Speaker 2: out loud here.

802
00:50:03,239 --> 00:50:08,440
Speaker 3: Sometimes I'm not not scared. But you know, we persevere,

803
00:50:10,719 --> 00:50:14,440
Speaker 3: keep on, yeah.

804
00:50:13,120 --> 00:50:17,359
Speaker 4: Yeah, stay calm and carry We know that analysts are

805
00:50:17,600 --> 00:50:24,280
Speaker 4: increasingly afraid that after some unknown threshold of stress, because

806
00:50:24,400 --> 00:50:29,560
Speaker 4: Russia is not doing well domestically, after some unknown stress threshold,

807
00:50:29,920 --> 00:50:33,160
Speaker 4: Russia might simply say screw it and let the bombs fly.

808
00:50:33,960 --> 00:50:38,359
Speaker 4: Their nuclear strategy is an episode all its own. But

809
00:50:38,840 --> 00:50:41,640
Speaker 4: I think one of the big worries is that these

810
00:50:41,680 --> 00:50:44,799
Speaker 4: super weapons don't stop with the six toys we name.

811
00:50:45,000 --> 00:50:48,719
Speaker 4: Twenty eighteen was the better part of ten years ago.

812
00:50:49,040 --> 00:50:52,040
Speaker 4: And it's not like people in Russia put their pencils

813
00:50:52,080 --> 00:50:56,640
Speaker 4: down and sat on their laurels. They are still doing stuff.

814
00:50:56,880 --> 00:51:01,479
Speaker 2: Oh what okay, you guys off topic. Recently on Strange News,

815
00:51:01,520 --> 00:51:03,840
Speaker 2: we talked about an update to the General McCastle and

816
00:51:04,080 --> 00:51:07,839
Speaker 2: missing Missing General Mcastle and story we target.

817
00:51:07,520 --> 00:51:08,799
Speaker 3: It keeps coming up.

818
00:51:08,880 --> 00:51:13,000
Speaker 2: Yeah, Multie, sorry, I one note recently with that whole thing.

819
00:51:13,320 --> 00:51:16,240
Speaker 2: But the the thing we talked about is that supposed

820
00:51:16,920 --> 00:51:19,200
Speaker 2: X account that may have been his and talking about

821
00:51:19,200 --> 00:51:23,920
Speaker 2: another general that allegedly took his own life, and the

822
00:51:23,960 --> 00:51:26,399
Speaker 2: allegations there, at least from the X account, were that

823
00:51:26,400 --> 00:51:28,360
Speaker 2: that person took their life because they didn't want to

824
00:51:28,400 --> 00:51:33,360
Speaker 2: allow nuclear weapons into private sector hands and that should

825
00:51:33,400 --> 00:51:36,759
Speaker 2: only be done from you know, Department of Energy to

826
00:51:36,840 --> 00:51:41,400
Speaker 2: military handoff. I don't think we even talked about much, guys,

827
00:51:41,680 --> 00:51:45,319
Speaker 2: but thinking about why would maybe a private company want

828
00:51:45,360 --> 00:51:49,480
Speaker 2: to get their hands on a nuke? Can you can

829
00:51:49,520 --> 00:51:50,680
Speaker 2: you guys think of a reason?

830
00:51:51,200 --> 00:51:52,120
Speaker 3: Think of a bunch?

831
00:51:53,520 --> 00:51:57,240
Speaker 2: Well, I could think of one. Yeah, if a private

832
00:51:57,280 --> 00:52:00,319
Speaker 2: company gets a hold of it and then set one

833
00:52:00,360 --> 00:52:05,640
Speaker 2: off somewhere on the planet that a military officially didn't do,

834
00:52:06,600 --> 00:52:10,960
Speaker 2: you could maybe blame that on any military you wanted to.

835
00:52:13,080 --> 00:52:15,799
Speaker 2: I don't know that that that terrifies me because we're

836
00:52:15,800 --> 00:52:19,240
Speaker 2: talking about this as you know, potential enemies with Russia

837
00:52:19,280 --> 00:52:21,760
Speaker 2: against other you know, countries of the United States against

838
00:52:21,800 --> 00:52:24,680
Speaker 2: other countries. What if it's a third party actor that

839
00:52:24,800 --> 00:52:27,880
Speaker 2: does it on behalf of somebody as a way to

840
00:52:28,000 --> 00:52:30,040
Speaker 2: begin the varrage.

841
00:52:30,120 --> 00:52:32,080
Speaker 3: Well, sure, like in like inn Watchmen.

842
00:52:32,520 --> 00:52:37,280
Speaker 4: A nuclear power, a nuclear powered Haliburton Tonkin. The false

843
00:52:37,320 --> 00:52:39,719
Speaker 4: flag is right, the false flag of it all.

844
00:52:39,760 --> 00:52:41,880
Speaker 3: But also, like I mean, isn't the reason we're so

845
00:52:41,920 --> 00:52:44,680
Speaker 3: against nuclear proliferation is because if you have the nukes,

846
00:52:44,680 --> 00:52:46,680
Speaker 3: then you're sort of on an equal playing field in

847
00:52:46,760 --> 00:52:49,320
Speaker 3: terms of that mutually assured destruction. And as we already

848
00:52:49,320 --> 00:52:52,080
Speaker 3: start to see corporations taking on the role of government,

849
00:52:52,840 --> 00:52:54,840
Speaker 3: is it that far of a walk for a corporation

850
00:52:55,000 --> 00:52:57,319
Speaker 3: to say we've got nukes now to y'all.

851
00:52:57,320 --> 00:53:02,919
Speaker 4: Like Grobolgar are on the way. We're getting very shadow run,

852
00:53:03,160 --> 00:53:04,840
Speaker 4: very cyberpunk, very quickly.

853
00:53:05,920 --> 00:53:09,160
Speaker 3: Oh very fallout none, I said, And the nukes are

854
00:53:09,160 --> 00:53:10,360
Speaker 3: being sold to the highest bidder.

855
00:53:10,760 --> 00:53:14,440
Speaker 4: I mean, oh yeah, broken arrows, rogue nukes. Right, It's

856
00:53:14,480 --> 00:53:19,640
Speaker 4: a fear that is as old as as old as

857
00:53:19,719 --> 00:53:24,160
Speaker 4: back when Oakridge, Tennessee was a secret city. We know

858
00:53:24,360 --> 00:53:28,040
Speaker 4: that Russia. Look, we're in a glasshouse, all right, folks

859
00:53:28,320 --> 00:53:32,960
Speaker 4: are wearing a glass daka. All the world powers are

860
00:53:33,120 --> 00:53:40,719
Speaker 4: conducting research into secretive technology. The US, China, European countries,

861
00:53:40,920 --> 00:53:43,680
Speaker 4: they all do similar things to one degree or another,

862
00:53:43,760 --> 00:53:47,080
Speaker 4: and they're all very careful not to spill the beans

863
00:53:47,239 --> 00:53:50,759
Speaker 4: on their latest homework. So then our question has to

864
00:53:50,760 --> 00:53:52,320
Speaker 4: be coom. I don't know how deep we want to

865
00:53:52,360 --> 00:53:56,160
Speaker 4: get into this. Would Russia have other stuff we don't

866
00:53:56,200 --> 00:53:59,799
Speaker 4: know about aside from the publicly announced breakthroughs. Does the

867
00:54:00,280 --> 00:54:02,680
Speaker 4: have more super weapons up at sleeve?

868
00:54:03,000 --> 00:54:05,680
Speaker 2: Okay, so we're talking about a lot of unmanned aircraft,

869
00:54:05,680 --> 00:54:11,000
Speaker 2: a lot of ballistic missiles that have pretty extensive electronics

870
00:54:11,040 --> 00:54:15,319
Speaker 2: going on signals that you are coming from either satellites

871
00:54:15,400 --> 00:54:21,600
Speaker 2: or ground based radar systems. We're talking about advanced toys

872
00:54:21,680 --> 00:54:24,680
Speaker 2: that use a lot of signals. Another thing that Russia

873
00:54:24,719 --> 00:54:27,040
Speaker 2: has been working on as well as the United States

874
00:54:27,120 --> 00:54:31,120
Speaker 2: are electronic warfare systems. We've looked at some of those

875
00:54:31,239 --> 00:54:34,600
Speaker 2: that use microwaves, some of them that just disrupt all

876
00:54:34,600 --> 00:54:37,319
Speaker 2: of the electronics or the radar signals, so you can

877
00:54:37,600 --> 00:54:39,880
Speaker 2: knock let's say a group of drones out of the sky,

878
00:54:40,200 --> 00:54:43,560
Speaker 2: or potentially a ballistic missile that is being using a

879
00:54:43,600 --> 00:54:47,839
Speaker 2: targeting system, right, you could disable that with some kind

880
00:54:47,840 --> 00:54:51,120
Speaker 2: of electronic warfare. And Russia's been doing that stuff for

881
00:54:51,239 --> 00:54:55,640
Speaker 2: a long time as well as the US and other superpowers.

882
00:54:55,640 --> 00:54:58,040
Speaker 2: But you can look up something called, I think it's

883
00:54:58,080 --> 00:55:03,760
Speaker 2: a Krasuka. There's a Krasuka four, which is this really

884
00:55:03,800 --> 00:55:07,960
Speaker 2: interesting looking wheels based system that you just aim at

885
00:55:07,960 --> 00:55:12,320
Speaker 2: places and disrupt all the electronics. It sounds very similar

886
00:55:12,400 --> 00:55:15,920
Speaker 2: to the things Donald Trump described when we went into Venezuela,

887
00:55:16,040 --> 00:55:20,920
Speaker 2: allegedly not only using this discompopulator thing to disrupt the

888
00:55:21,000 --> 00:55:24,960
Speaker 2: human beings, but disrupt all of the electronics, including the

889
00:55:25,000 --> 00:55:25,840
Speaker 2: electrical grid.

890
00:55:26,080 --> 00:55:33,359
Speaker 4: Yeah, and this goes into things like emp or energy interference. Right,

891
00:55:33,800 --> 00:55:37,759
Speaker 4: Why should we spend billions of dollars making a thing

892
00:55:38,120 --> 00:55:41,600
Speaker 4: when we can just spend you know, a million or

893
00:55:41,600 --> 00:55:43,560
Speaker 4: so building something that can.

894
00:55:43,440 --> 00:55:44,160
Speaker 3: Break your toy?

895
00:55:44,600 --> 00:55:49,040
Speaker 4: Right, It's again, it's a symmetry. There's something beautiful to

896
00:55:49,120 --> 00:55:52,720
Speaker 4: it for students of the greatest art. But this does

897
00:55:52,920 --> 00:55:58,400
Speaker 4: also inevitably result in the loss of human lives, often

898
00:55:58,560 --> 00:56:02,239
Speaker 4: innocent people. So the stakes are very high. I mean,

899
00:56:02,560 --> 00:56:06,680
Speaker 4: don't we don't have to relitigate one of our favorite

900
00:56:06,719 --> 00:56:11,720
Speaker 4: examples of possible superweapons, the directed energy weapons. We talked

901
00:56:11,719 --> 00:56:15,600
Speaker 4: about the stunning expos a led by sixty Minutes that

902
00:56:15,680 --> 00:56:20,480
Speaker 4: makes a pretty persuasive case about Havana syndrome. We should

903
00:56:20,520 --> 00:56:23,719
Speaker 4: probably we should probably talk a little bit about the

904
00:56:23,960 --> 00:56:31,239
Speaker 4: cyber warfare, because missiles aside, right, missile killers aside, and

905
00:56:31,320 --> 00:56:36,640
Speaker 4: nuclear weaponry aside. In the age of ubiquitous information, in

906
00:56:36,680 --> 00:56:40,680
Speaker 4: the age where people are always online, it is impossible

907
00:56:40,719 --> 00:56:45,400
Speaker 4: to overstate the massive influence of Russia's info and cyber

908
00:56:45,560 --> 00:56:50,759
Speaker 4: warfare initiatives. I mean, they've compromised so many things. I

909
00:56:50,760 --> 00:56:53,200
Speaker 4: don't know if you guys saw the news, but about

910
00:56:53,400 --> 00:56:55,720
Speaker 4: I want to say, two or three days ago before

911
00:56:55,760 --> 00:57:01,520
Speaker 4: we recorded, the FBI publicly confirmed that Russian hackers who

912
00:57:01,560 --> 00:57:07,120
Speaker 4: are totally not state supported, have hijacked Signal and WhatsApp accounts.

913
00:57:07,280 --> 00:57:10,520
Speaker 4: Do you guys who use Signal or WhatsApp? I like WhatsApp, Yeah,

914
00:57:10,560 --> 00:57:11,319
Speaker 4: I've got what's app.

915
00:57:11,320 --> 00:57:14,080
Speaker 3: It's great for international travel and communication, and like it

916
00:57:14,120 --> 00:57:17,080
Speaker 3: does a lot of robust features that regular old texting

917
00:57:17,080 --> 00:57:19,800
Speaker 3: doesn't do. It sends much higher resolution images, and you

918
00:57:19,840 --> 00:57:23,280
Speaker 3: can do really cool sorting. Signal Signal I don't know,

919
00:57:23,320 --> 00:57:25,120
Speaker 3: I don't really mess with I don't really have a

920
00:57:25,400 --> 00:57:26,360
Speaker 3: use case for that one.

921
00:57:26,560 --> 00:57:29,440
Speaker 4: They're both supposed to be encrypted, though, is the pickle

922
00:57:29,480 --> 00:57:34,240
Speaker 4: of it? You know, That's why people who might be

923
00:57:34,560 --> 00:57:38,080
Speaker 4: having an organic protest. Love this kind of stuff where

924
00:57:38,120 --> 00:57:41,320
Speaker 4: people who are worried about big government cracking down on them.

925
00:57:41,480 --> 00:57:44,600
Speaker 4: I mean, these guys definitely are state supported in practice,

926
00:57:44,800 --> 00:57:48,760
Speaker 4: but officially kind of like Chinese hackers, they're working on

927
00:57:48,800 --> 00:57:53,680
Speaker 4: their own steam, inspired by patriotism. Camera see cut into

928
00:57:53,720 --> 00:57:55,480
Speaker 4: me here so we can see the eye roll.

929
00:57:58,800 --> 00:58:00,880
Speaker 2: Oh my god, I went all the way back and

930
00:58:00,960 --> 00:58:02,320
Speaker 2: around to the front again.

931
00:58:02,560 --> 00:58:06,200
Speaker 4: Oh I'm just patriotic. Well that's why I'm the best

932
00:58:06,200 --> 00:58:09,640
Speaker 4: hacker in this. Oh no, I'm not paid. This is

933
00:58:09,760 --> 00:58:18,600
Speaker 4: just my hobby. This is my Saturday. What guys, that's wonderful.

934
00:58:19,200 --> 00:58:21,400
Speaker 2: Could we jump to the Moon really fast?

935
00:58:21,600 --> 00:58:23,200
Speaker 3: Sure? I don't know. Do we have the technology?

936
00:58:23,240 --> 00:58:28,400
Speaker 2: Matt, It seems like maybe we don't.

937
00:58:28,600 --> 00:58:31,760
Speaker 3: I think it's the Moon jump. Let's just do it, yeah, figuratively.

938
00:58:33,080 --> 00:58:37,480
Speaker 2: It is kind of weird to see this renewed desire

939
00:58:37,600 --> 00:58:40,560
Speaker 2: from the US, China, and Russia to get to the Moon,

940
00:58:40,640 --> 00:58:44,920
Speaker 2: to create a base, to have superiority in space, so

941
00:58:44,960 --> 00:58:48,400
Speaker 2: that you know, whoever you are, you get to control

942
00:58:48,480 --> 00:58:49,840
Speaker 2: who gets to come up and do what.

943
00:58:51,040 --> 00:58:51,920
Speaker 4: It'll just be called.

944
00:58:51,840 --> 00:58:52,920
Speaker 3: Moon Base one.

945
00:58:53,680 --> 00:58:55,840
Speaker 4: I hope they come up with a cooler name. I'd

946
00:58:55,920 --> 00:59:01,040
Speaker 4: like something from Greco Roman or Chinese mythology. But yeah,

947
00:59:01,120 --> 00:59:09,480
Speaker 4: But the thing is, sometimes these entities will spend a

948
00:59:09,520 --> 00:59:13,840
Speaker 4: lot of blood, sweat and treasure, not because they would

949
00:59:13,960 --> 00:59:17,160
Speaker 4: ordinarily want a thing, but because they don't want the

950
00:59:17,280 --> 00:59:21,080
Speaker 4: other people to have it right very highland or rules.

951
00:59:21,120 --> 00:59:24,200
Speaker 4: So you might not be excited about your moon base,

952
00:59:24,480 --> 00:59:27,320
Speaker 4: but then you hear you know, uncle, she is doing it,

953
00:59:27,400 --> 00:59:29,360
Speaker 4: and you're going, ah, I hate that guy. He was

954
00:59:29,400 --> 00:59:32,880
Speaker 4: so mean to me at Chili's earlier. I'm going to

955
00:59:32,920 --> 00:59:35,960
Speaker 4: get a moon base. That's kind of what's happening, because.

956
00:59:35,760 --> 00:59:40,120
Speaker 2: That's there, and that seems way far off, like honestly,

957
00:59:40,160 --> 00:59:43,000
Speaker 2: not even something to necessarily worry about at this moment.

958
00:59:43,080 --> 00:59:45,760
Speaker 2: But the thing that does worry me some of the

959
00:59:45,800 --> 00:59:48,000
Speaker 2: stuff we were looking at several years ago on this

960
00:59:48,120 --> 00:59:53,920
Speaker 2: show about rogue satellites and stuff like X thirty seven

961
00:59:53,960 --> 00:59:56,120
Speaker 2: B that can you know, be in orbit for four

962
00:59:56,200 --> 00:59:59,280
Speaker 2: hundred days and potentially move around and interact with other

963
00:59:59,320 --> 01:00:03,640
Speaker 2: satellites or stuff that I think I do believe it

964
01:00:03,680 --> 01:00:09,320
Speaker 2: was stuff that the United States officially observed, gosh before

965
01:00:09,400 --> 01:00:13,320
Speaker 2: twenty twenty five, where there were Russian satellites that grouped

966
01:00:13,400 --> 01:00:17,120
Speaker 2: together they moved and grouped together around other satellites and

967
01:00:17,160 --> 01:00:21,880
Speaker 2: were able to target other things in orbit, which again

968
01:00:22,000 --> 01:00:26,360
Speaker 2: is pretty scary, especially given the ambitions that we've been

969
01:00:26,400 --> 01:00:28,680
Speaker 2: hearing about whether or not it's real or true or

970
01:00:28,680 --> 01:00:31,320
Speaker 2: how close anybody is. But the concept of putting some

971
01:00:31,560 --> 01:00:36,760
Speaker 2: type of nuclear weapon, whether it's just on a satellite

972
01:00:36,840 --> 01:00:40,240
Speaker 2: that's orbiting around, that you could detonate after getting it

973
01:00:40,280 --> 01:00:42,680
Speaker 2: close to another target and then take out a whole

974
01:00:42,720 --> 01:00:46,440
Speaker 2: group of satellites that say the US controls, and then

975
01:00:46,480 --> 01:00:51,000
Speaker 2: you take down all the GPS capabilities. I mean, that

976
01:00:51,040 --> 01:00:56,080
Speaker 2: stuff's kind of scary because it doesn't just affect militaries. Guys.

977
01:00:56,080 --> 01:00:59,240
Speaker 2: Imagine a nuclear explosion in orbit right now that's already

978
01:00:59,320 --> 01:01:02,400
Speaker 2: so congested that we've talked about so many times, and

979
01:01:02,520 --> 01:01:07,280
Speaker 2: just exploding parts all around, like in a huge swath

980
01:01:07,440 --> 01:01:07,920
Speaker 2: in orbit.

981
01:01:08,080 --> 01:01:11,080
Speaker 3: Have we modeled out I'm sure someone has what that

982
01:01:11,160 --> 01:01:14,520
Speaker 3: would look like, like, yeah, okay, I'm curious. It seems

983
01:01:14,520 --> 01:01:19,120
Speaker 3: like it would have a very deleterious effect on the atmosphere,

984
01:01:19,280 --> 01:01:22,520
Speaker 3: and you know, yeah, corresponding layers and such.

985
01:01:23,000 --> 01:01:25,560
Speaker 4: Absolutely, that's a great way to put it, because then

986
01:01:25,640 --> 01:01:30,919
Speaker 4: we're so we study this a lot in academia, and

987
01:01:31,120 --> 01:01:35,680
Speaker 4: I'm sure the boffins in the US or Western military

988
01:01:35,800 --> 01:01:40,160
Speaker 4: study this as well. China certainly does. The issue is

989
01:01:40,200 --> 01:01:44,240
Speaker 4: that that becomes what we call total war. Total war

990
01:01:44,800 --> 01:01:51,560
Speaker 4: is a situation in which all enemy forces are treated

991
01:01:51,640 --> 01:01:58,440
Speaker 4: as combatants. All infrastructure, all resource, all resources, all institutions

992
01:01:58,520 --> 01:02:02,880
Speaker 4: are up for grabs, are all considered viable targets. And

993
01:02:03,000 --> 01:02:06,520
Speaker 4: when you run the I mean, the UN spent a

994
01:02:06,520 --> 01:02:09,360
Speaker 4: lot of time trying to get people to not weaponize space.

995
01:02:09,680 --> 01:02:14,320
Speaker 4: We'll see how that gummy toothed agreement goes. But when

996
01:02:14,360 --> 01:02:18,840
Speaker 4: you do something like this, you're detonated a bomb in traffic,

997
01:02:19,320 --> 01:02:22,160
Speaker 4: which means that all the other things, even if they're

998
01:02:22,160 --> 01:02:24,680
Speaker 4: not directly hit by the explosion, all the other things

999
01:02:24,720 --> 01:02:30,160
Speaker 4: on those orbital paths, if they cannot modify their trajectory

1000
01:02:30,840 --> 01:02:32,680
Speaker 4: or you know, if they don't have a little thrusters

1001
01:02:32,800 --> 01:02:35,800
Speaker 4: or some kind of mechanism to get themselves away from

1002
01:02:35,800 --> 01:02:38,640
Speaker 4: the car accident, then they're going to get screwed up too.

1003
01:02:38,960 --> 01:02:41,440
Speaker 4: So there will be an add on effect. It's a

1004
01:02:41,480 --> 01:02:42,840
Speaker 4: domino effect in space.

1005
01:02:43,680 --> 01:02:47,440
Speaker 2: Very yeah, well, not to mention. In twenty twenty one,

1006
01:02:47,560 --> 01:02:52,160
Speaker 2: China launched a hypersonic missile from space, right from space,

1007
01:02:52,880 --> 01:02:56,840
Speaker 2: and at that time US generals called it very concerning.

1008
01:02:58,680 --> 01:03:00,840
Speaker 3: I would agree with that prognosis.

1009
01:03:01,840 --> 01:03:06,240
Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean, you know, we just I don't know, man,

1010
01:03:06,360 --> 01:03:10,600
Speaker 2: the ambitions of these folks which just astonishing.

1011
01:03:11,160 --> 01:03:15,640
Speaker 4: Right, Well, while we're talking about space in general, let's

1012
01:03:15,640 --> 01:03:18,880
Speaker 4: return to the digital space, because there is something that

1013
01:03:18,920 --> 01:03:22,480
Speaker 4: we do have to talk about, which is the concept

1014
01:03:22,680 --> 01:03:29,000
Speaker 4: of influencing elections and the concept of influencing officials. Right,

1015
01:03:29,520 --> 01:03:32,680
Speaker 4: you don't need a Manchurian candidate if you can just

1016
01:03:32,840 --> 01:03:37,160
Speaker 4: get some compromitt I would say, that's another Russian super weapon.

1017
01:03:37,240 --> 01:03:40,040
Speaker 4: It's as old as the Soviet Union. But I think

1018
01:03:40,120 --> 01:03:43,000
Speaker 4: AI is going to change it. I think machine learning

1019
01:03:43,480 --> 01:03:48,760
Speaker 4: and big data are going to trigger a renaissance in

1020
01:03:49,080 --> 01:03:53,840
Speaker 4: compromat activities. How would we define compromat. It's a cool word,

1021
01:03:53,880 --> 01:03:54,800
Speaker 4: but we all know what it means.

1022
01:03:54,840 --> 01:03:55,760
Speaker 3: Blackmail stuff.

1023
01:03:55,960 --> 01:04:00,640
Speaker 4: Yeah, blackmail stuff. We know numerous political things have been

1024
01:04:00,680 --> 01:04:06,040
Speaker 4: targeted by Russian compromat operations, and even more people, including

1025
01:04:06,080 --> 01:04:08,640
Speaker 4: people in the United States, have been accused of playing

1026
01:04:08,680 --> 01:04:12,400
Speaker 4: into Russian hands. I mean, guys, am I am I

1027
01:04:12,480 --> 01:04:15,800
Speaker 4: off base? Am I bubbled in saying that it is

1028
01:04:15,880 --> 01:04:20,000
Speaker 4: now a relatively common belief that the current US president

1029
01:04:20,120 --> 01:04:22,840
Speaker 4: has somehow been compromised by Russia.

1030
01:04:22,880 --> 01:04:28,120
Speaker 3: It's definitely a pretty broadly held belief. The question is,

1031
01:04:28,160 --> 01:04:31,800
Speaker 3: you know, what percentage and what affiliation those who believe

1032
01:04:31,880 --> 01:04:37,840
Speaker 3: that are. I certainly do, and evidence seems to point

1033
01:04:37,880 --> 01:04:40,560
Speaker 3: to that day in and day out. But you know,

1034
01:04:41,040 --> 01:04:44,880
Speaker 3: there's a lot of really mentally flexible folks that are

1035
01:04:44,880 --> 01:04:46,120
Speaker 3: making some arguments against it.

1036
01:04:46,200 --> 01:04:48,960
Speaker 2: So you know, the question is, how do you prove it? Well, exactly,

1037
01:04:49,160 --> 01:04:52,080
Speaker 2: We've seen allegations against like Tulci, Gabbard and a bunch

1038
01:04:52,080 --> 01:04:55,800
Speaker 2: of other folks who appear to have been taking actions

1039
01:04:55,840 --> 01:04:59,400
Speaker 2: that would benefit Russia. Let's say we have seen the

1040
01:04:59,400 --> 01:05:04,840
Speaker 2: administration doing that, right, But it's like, you know, can

1041
01:05:04,880 --> 01:05:06,120
Speaker 2: we actually prove it?

1042
01:05:06,440 --> 01:05:08,960
Speaker 4: No? Yeah, And it doesn't help that so many of

1043
01:05:09,000 --> 01:05:14,040
Speaker 4: the investigations into these allegations get bogged down and buried.

1044
01:05:15,520 --> 01:05:20,840
Speaker 4: It's you know, like the Steel dossier for example. This

1045
01:05:20,880 --> 01:05:24,360
Speaker 4: stuff just creates more questions than answers. But what's the

1046
01:05:24,440 --> 01:05:29,080
Speaker 4: Russia Russia Russia hoax? Right? Well, it's it's the idea

1047
01:05:29,280 --> 01:05:33,080
Speaker 4: that it's the idea of the years before the current

1048
01:05:33,120 --> 01:05:40,400
Speaker 4: administration entered its second term, operators in Russia somehow compromised

1049
01:05:41,120 --> 01:05:45,280
Speaker 4: high level US political figures. But the pickle of it

1050
01:05:45,360 --> 01:05:47,080
Speaker 4: is the badger in the bag is how do we

1051
01:05:47,200 --> 01:05:49,520
Speaker 4: prove that? What's our smoking gun?

1052
01:05:49,800 --> 01:05:50,000
Speaker 1: You know?

1053
01:05:50,240 --> 01:05:54,479
Speaker 4: And look right now. Even though these compromat cyber war

1054
01:05:55,200 --> 01:05:58,920
Speaker 4: technologies are very good and the patterns and tactics are

1055
01:05:58,960 --> 01:06:02,520
Speaker 4: quite sophisticated, they're probably not going to come for you

1056
01:06:03,560 --> 01:06:07,840
Speaker 4: yet because it's going to take a couple more leaps

1057
01:06:07,840 --> 01:06:11,680
Speaker 4: and big data and machine learning and data brokers to

1058
01:06:11,960 --> 01:06:15,400
Speaker 4: create a system pallunteer esque where they can gather up

1059
01:06:15,440 --> 01:06:18,960
Speaker 4: tons of information about the public and other countries. Once

1060
01:06:19,120 --> 01:06:23,520
Speaker 4: that happens, it's easier than ever before for these operators,

1061
01:06:23,560 --> 01:06:28,080
Speaker 4: these actors to build an influenced profile of you, you know,

1062
01:06:28,160 --> 01:06:32,960
Speaker 4: like an advertising persona what is max freight train? Williams like?

1063
01:06:33,600 --> 01:06:38,000
Speaker 4: How can we push freight train to agree with pro

1064
01:06:38,080 --> 01:06:40,000
Speaker 4: Russian things? How can we nudge them?

1065
01:06:40,160 --> 01:06:43,880
Speaker 3: We're talking about palunteer levels of scaling this kind of

1066
01:06:43,960 --> 01:06:47,080
Speaker 3: thing where the typical historical versions of this would be

1067
01:06:47,120 --> 01:06:50,920
Speaker 3: exclusively pointed at high level targets. But if you scaled

1068
01:06:50,960 --> 01:06:53,280
Speaker 3: it and pointed at a lot of low level or

1069
01:06:53,320 --> 01:06:56,800
Speaker 3: mid level or even just everyday average targets. Taken as

1070
01:06:56,840 --> 01:06:59,600
Speaker 3: a whole, it would be just as effective and powerful

1071
01:06:59,600 --> 01:07:03,120
Speaker 3: and and sing events as messing with the high level ones.

1072
01:07:03,480 --> 01:07:06,600
Speaker 4: Just so and well put, now it becomes a question

1073
01:07:06,680 --> 01:07:09,920
Speaker 4: of interest, appetite, and resources. So we don't want to

1074
01:07:09,960 --> 01:07:13,000
Speaker 4: alarm anybody, and thank you for tuning in on Netflix

1075
01:07:13,120 --> 01:07:16,400
Speaker 4: or your podcast platform of choice, but we do want

1076
01:07:16,440 --> 01:07:19,480
Speaker 4: you to be aware. You should be careful when you're

1077
01:07:19,520 --> 01:07:23,760
Speaker 4: poking the bear right because the eye of souron could

1078
01:07:23,800 --> 01:07:27,240
Speaker 4: turn on you now more easily than ever before.

1079
01:07:27,480 --> 01:07:29,800
Speaker 2: What are we doing? What's going on?

1080
01:07:29,920 --> 01:07:32,360
Speaker 3: That's the question, man, That is the question.

1081
01:07:32,920 --> 01:07:36,880
Speaker 4: When my family started a frozen food empire, I said,

1082
01:07:37,280 --> 01:07:43,640
Speaker 4: I'm going to be on TV. So, oh, you scamp guys.

1083
01:07:43,720 --> 01:07:46,960
Speaker 4: I know we're running long, but if it's okay, I

1084
01:07:47,000 --> 01:07:51,600
Speaker 4: think there's something our fellow conspiracy realists need to understand.

1085
01:07:51,760 --> 01:07:55,840
Speaker 4: It doesn't get brought up often when we talk about

1086
01:07:55,880 --> 01:08:01,120
Speaker 4: super weapons on the Russian side, but super weapons include biowarfare,

1087
01:08:01,840 --> 01:08:04,640
Speaker 4: and we're going to bracket Wuhan Right, We're going to

1088
01:08:04,720 --> 01:08:09,080
Speaker 4: bracket plandemic conspiracies just for a second, because we do

1089
01:08:09,200 --> 01:08:15,120
Speaker 4: have to acknowledge that Russia has been getting some bad

1090
01:08:15,320 --> 01:08:22,439
Speaker 4: press recently about two years ago for resurrecting the forty

1091
01:08:22,479 --> 01:08:27,519
Speaker 4: eighth Central Scientific Research Institute, which is, by the way,

1092
01:08:28,000 --> 01:08:34,120
Speaker 4: one of their spoopiest, dupiest biological warfare labs from the

1093
01:08:34,200 --> 01:08:35,400
Speaker 4: days of the Cold War.

1094
01:08:36,240 --> 01:08:39,519
Speaker 2: Oh dear, yeah, I wonder if they're going to develop

1095
01:08:39,680 --> 01:08:43,960
Speaker 2: COVID twenty six just like the US. Oh, I mean

1096
01:08:44,360 --> 01:08:46,200
Speaker 2: NISI I mean uh never.

1097
01:08:48,720 --> 01:08:50,760
Speaker 4: Sorry, guys, there's a lot of pollen in the air

1098
01:08:51,400 --> 01:08:53,280
Speaker 4: bat populations, population.

1099
01:08:56,200 --> 01:08:56,800
Speaker 3: Are you guys?

1100
01:08:56,800 --> 01:08:57,200
Speaker 4: Okay?

1101
01:08:57,240 --> 01:08:57,880
Speaker 2: What's happening?

1102
01:08:59,600 --> 01:09:03,960
Speaker 4: Marcus got what? Markets got wet? So by now, it's

1103
01:09:04,040 --> 01:09:07,559
Speaker 4: no secret that both the USSR and the US went

1104
01:09:07,880 --> 01:09:13,519
Speaker 4: very deep into extremely dangerous bioweapon research. And the thing is,

1105
01:09:13,680 --> 01:09:18,200
Speaker 4: of all the bioweaponry programs that we can prove to

1106
01:09:18,280 --> 01:09:22,519
Speaker 4: have existed, proved not suspect the ones we know definitely happened,

1107
01:09:23,000 --> 01:09:26,280
Speaker 4: there was only one that was able to weaponize a

1108
01:09:26,560 --> 01:09:31,960
Speaker 4: pandemic capable virus. It is the Soviet bioweapons program that

1109
01:09:32,240 --> 01:09:36,200
Speaker 4: was originally established way back in nineteen twenty eight. And

1110
01:09:36,240 --> 01:09:41,040
Speaker 4: I think most of us assume that despite agreements, this

1111
01:09:41,680 --> 01:09:45,960
Speaker 4: bioweapon research never really stopped in the US and Russia.

1112
01:09:46,120 --> 01:09:49,960
Speaker 4: In China, Russia denies these allegations. And here's the thing,

1113
01:09:50,920 --> 01:09:54,840
Speaker 4: and they said, yeah, they were speaking in public statements.

1114
01:09:54,960 --> 01:09:58,599
Speaker 4: After the Washington Post exposed this to the West, the

1115
01:09:58,640 --> 01:10:02,439
Speaker 4: head of the site said, of course we're building new stuff.

1116
01:10:02,800 --> 01:10:06,360
Speaker 4: Of course we're back in production. But guys, what we're

1117
01:10:06,400 --> 01:10:10,559
Speaker 4: doing is defensive research. We're trying to figure out how

1118
01:10:10,640 --> 01:10:14,240
Speaker 4: to protect the Russian military and the Russian public from

1119
01:10:14,280 --> 01:10:19,120
Speaker 4: biological attacks. And indeed, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, one

1120
01:10:19,160 --> 01:10:22,080
Speaker 4: of the reasons they gave for it was they said

1121
01:10:22,120 --> 01:10:26,839
Speaker 4: there was an imminent attack, a bioweapon attack from Ukraine

1122
01:10:27,040 --> 01:10:27,960
Speaker 4: on the way to Russia.

1123
01:10:28,080 --> 01:10:32,439
Speaker 2: Doesn't that sound a little familiar to the reasoning behind

1124
01:10:32,520 --> 01:10:36,280
Speaker 2: gain of function research in the United States and the

1125
01:10:36,720 --> 01:10:42,920
Speaker 2: scientific establishment across the world. We need to protect ourselves,

1126
01:10:42,920 --> 01:10:45,639
Speaker 2: so let us make the most virulent version of all

1127
01:10:45,680 --> 01:10:48,120
Speaker 2: of the world's worst viruses possible.

1128
01:10:48,200 --> 01:10:54,040
Speaker 4: Yeah, to stop buildings in America from burning, we need

1129
01:10:54,080 --> 01:10:58,480
Speaker 4: to make a secret place where we build better fires.

1130
01:10:57,960 --> 01:11:02,480
Speaker 4: That's the thing, because research how to stop by a warfare,

1131
01:11:03,040 --> 01:11:05,640
Speaker 4: if you're good at researching how to stop it, it

1132
01:11:05,680 --> 01:11:09,200
Speaker 4: gets really close to researching how to cause it, you

1133
01:11:09,240 --> 01:11:09,800
Speaker 4: know what I mean.

1134
01:11:10,120 --> 01:11:12,599
Speaker 2: It's because you have to know what you're gonna fight

1135
01:11:12,920 --> 01:11:14,080
Speaker 2: ten years from now.

1136
01:11:14,120 --> 01:11:17,959
Speaker 4: Right, build a better fire to protect us from fires?

1137
01:11:18,040 --> 01:11:21,000
Speaker 4: I mean, look, did you have it? Folks? Thank you

1138
01:11:21,000 --> 01:11:24,880
Speaker 4: for tuning in. Does Russia have super weapons? Yes, and

1139
01:11:25,000 --> 01:11:27,519
Speaker 4: we're going to learn more about these projects as time

1140
01:11:27,560 --> 01:11:30,760
Speaker 4: goes on, hopefully in enough time to prevent them from

1141
01:11:30,840 --> 01:11:34,160
Speaker 4: creating a disaster in the field. But we also have

1142
01:11:34,200 --> 01:11:38,320
Speaker 4: to remember, despite all the speculation, despite all the breathless headlines,

1143
01:11:38,840 --> 01:11:44,280
Speaker 4: Russia already has the world's most dangerous known super weapon.

1144
01:11:44,680 --> 01:11:47,679
Speaker 4: They have nukes. They have a lot of them. Do

1145
01:11:47,720 --> 01:11:50,880
Speaker 4: they work? That's an open question, and for now that's

1146
01:11:51,000 --> 01:11:53,360
Speaker 4: the stuff Russia doesn't want you to know.

1147
01:11:54,360 --> 01:11:56,320
Speaker 2: Only one really has to work, right.

1148
01:11:56,479 --> 01:11:59,240
Speaker 4: That's the thing. It's not the ten that don't, it's

1149
01:11:59,280 --> 01:12:05,439
Speaker 4: the one man. Well, folks, we have big Friday energy.

1150
01:12:05,600 --> 01:12:09,160
Speaker 4: We can't wait to hear your thoughts. Super weapons? Are

1151
01:12:09,160 --> 01:12:11,800
Speaker 4: they real? How do we define them? What kind of

1152
01:12:11,800 --> 01:12:15,439
Speaker 4: stuff do you think these world governments are building in secret?

1153
01:12:15,520 --> 01:12:17,360
Speaker 4: Let us know. You can find us on the lines.

1154
01:12:17,439 --> 01:12:19,719
Speaker 4: You can call us on a phone, You can always

1155
01:12:19,760 --> 01:12:20,639
Speaker 4: send us an email.

1156
01:12:20,680 --> 01:12:22,520
Speaker 3: That's right, you can find us at the handle Conspiracy

1157
01:12:22,520 --> 01:12:25,759
Speaker 3: stuff or conspiracy stuff show on your social media platform

1158
01:12:25,760 --> 01:12:27,840
Speaker 3: of choice, depending what else we got.

1159
01:12:28,040 --> 01:12:30,920
Speaker 2: We have a phone number. It's one eight three three

1160
01:12:30,960 --> 01:12:35,680
Speaker 2: std WYTK. When you call in, tell us who you

1161
01:12:35,680 --> 01:12:39,120
Speaker 2: think the head of the Russian compermount system is. You know,

1162
01:12:39,160 --> 01:12:42,240
Speaker 2: in the US and Israel we had Epstein. Who is

1163
01:12:42,280 --> 01:12:45,519
Speaker 2: the Russian version of that? Hmm? Let us know what

1164
01:12:45,560 --> 01:12:47,320
Speaker 2: you think when you call, and give yourself a cool nickname,

1165
01:12:47,320 --> 01:12:48,400
Speaker 2: and let us know if we can use your name

1166
01:12:48,439 --> 01:12:49,960
Speaker 2: and message on the air. If you want to send

1167
01:12:50,000 --> 01:12:51,120
Speaker 2: us an email, you can do that too.

1168
01:12:51,200 --> 01:12:54,480
Speaker 4: We are the entities to read each piece of correspondence

1169
01:12:54,520 --> 01:12:57,600
Speaker 4: we receive. Be well aware, yet to unafraid. Sometimes the

1170
01:12:57,720 --> 01:13:03,240
Speaker 4: void rides back. One of my favorite authors in the

1171
01:13:03,439 --> 01:13:07,639
Speaker 4: entirety of canon is Vladimir Nabokov. So please don't think

1172
01:13:07,680 --> 01:13:09,120
Speaker 4: we're angry at Russia.

1173
01:13:09,240 --> 01:13:09,800
Speaker 3: Overall.

1174
01:13:10,280 --> 01:13:13,360
Speaker 4: We'll see out here in the dark conspiracy at iHeartRadio

1175
01:13:13,560 --> 01:13:31,920
Speaker 4: dot com.

1176
01:13:32,080 --> 01:13:34,120
Speaker 2: Stuff they don't want you to know. Is a production

1177
01:13:34,240 --> 01:13:38,760
Speaker 2: of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app,

1178
01:13:38,840 --> 01:13:42,160
Speaker 2: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.