WEBVTT - Jeremy Grantham Says No One Should Invest in the US

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<v Speaker 1>John Man.

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<v Speaker 2>Isn't it nice when something we've been predicting for ages

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<v Speaker 2>finally happens. When I say nice, I mean kind of

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<v Speaker 2>intellectually satisfying. I supposed to actually nice when it comes

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<v Speaker 2>to this week.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, yeah, I was saying intellectually satisfying watching the kind

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<v Speaker 1>of great bonding and busting of the Boind bubble, which

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<v Speaker 1>could have actually, I suppose very massy. Consequences are low.

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<v Speaker 1>Thankfully so far it doesn't seem to be having that

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<v Speaker 1>many because.

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<v Speaker 2>What you means so far, it's been a couple of days.

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<v Speaker 1>Yes, I know that it's happening, and I'm kind of worried.

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<v Speaker 1>That's the problem.

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<v Speaker 2>You know, for context, You've written about this in your

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<v Speaker 2>news letter and everyone should read your money distilled on this.

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<v Speaker 2>What's it called? What one?

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<v Speaker 1>It's the Boind market was in a bubble nose Boston?

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<v Speaker 1>Or was it the Boind bubble?

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<v Speaker 2>Okay?

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<v Speaker 1>There, Basically there's a Boind bubble.

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<v Speaker 2>There's a bond bubble. It's ending. It's so you know,

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<v Speaker 2>yield yields gone to high as we haven't seen for

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<v Speaker 2>ages across the board. Everything. You can't blame less trust

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<v Speaker 2>because she's got nothing to do with Germany or the

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<v Speaker 2>US as far as we know. So we're seeing bond

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<v Speaker 2>jail's going up everywhere. That's got consequences for so many things.

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<v Speaker 2>Is almost ridiculous. But of course one of the one

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<v Speaker 2>of the consequences, of course is for governments, because this

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<v Speaker 2>means that their debt payments go up and up and up.

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<v Speaker 2>We already know that across the developed world debt to

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<v Speaker 2>the GDPs is one hundred percent plus, you know, up

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<v Speaker 2>from seventy to eighty percent and eight. So you know,

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<v Speaker 2>this is this is massive. When your interest costs go

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<v Speaker 2>up on that, you're in a lot of trouble.

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<v Speaker 3>What do you cut? Well, this is it.

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<v Speaker 1>And the problem is so the same time, I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>I suppose we're seeing it here at the moment, like

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<v Speaker 1>everyone's there talking about growth, growth, growth, But at the

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<v Speaker 1>same time, it's kind of like, well, yeah, but we

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<v Speaker 1>have to cut everything at the same time. And I

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<v Speaker 1>mean with her I kind of serious kind of overhaul

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<v Speaker 1>of the actual structure of this date, which is probably

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<v Speaker 1>something we're talking a bit to do. But you know,

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<v Speaker 1>all of this the hopes that by say canceling HS two,

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<v Speaker 1>we can spend that money there. It's all kind of

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<v Speaker 1>dancing in the edge of the volcano. Because everything every

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<v Speaker 1>kind of country has got this massive can addate to

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<v Speaker 1>GDP problem. It's kind of a matter of, well, how

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<v Speaker 1>is that going to end up resolving itself? And I

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<v Speaker 1>think that's why we're going to have to have a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of inflation in the future, because that kind of

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<v Speaker 1>is the only way to resolve it.

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<v Speaker 2>We have a lot of inflation. Rates stay high, and

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<v Speaker 2>if rate stay high, that's got consequences for every single

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<v Speaker 2>asset class that has sowed on the back a very

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<v Speaker 2>low rates. And we might have seen we might have

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<v Speaker 2>seen markets fall from their highs, but they're still way

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<v Speaker 2>too high relative to this level of bondy alderm. That

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<v Speaker 2>goes for property markets across the board, equity markets across

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<v Speaker 2>the board, all that private equity or that venture capital

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<v Speaker 2>anything I haven't mentioned yet that's in trouble.

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<v Speaker 1>No, but I guess I mean this is there's kind

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<v Speaker 1>of two problems. I think when is the kind immediate

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<v Speaker 1>problem of those government dat basically setting every word based

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<v Speaker 1>on various assumptions, the assumption that it's safe, the assumption

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<v Speaker 1>that only goes up, the assumption that is constantly highly liquid,

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<v Speaker 1>and it's kind of embedded in an awful lot of

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<v Speaker 1>financial models and in an awful lot of financial structures.

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<v Speaker 1>So that's the the immediate body. And that's when people

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<v Speaker 1>are talking about something breaking, that's what they mean.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, remember that this is our you know, our defined

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<v Speaker 2>benefit pension systems are shot through with the government debt

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<v Speaker 2>and with bonds in general. And I wrote this week

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<v Speaker 2>about the cautious portfolio that every wealth man offer you

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<v Speaker 2>and the Adriginal sixty forty again, you know, very heavily

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<v Speaker 2>fixed income, and everyone believes that that's safe. This is

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<v Speaker 2>not safe. And the idea that a bond bear market

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<v Speaker 2>can last for a long time, it's something that everyone

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<v Speaker 2>is completely forgotten, despite the fact there was a thirty

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<v Speaker 2>five year bond bear market after the war. In fact,

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<v Speaker 2>if you look at the decades in which bonds have

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<v Speaker 2>not been in a bear market, depending on how you count,

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<v Speaker 2>it's like if you're than the ones when they've being

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<v Speaker 2>in a bull market.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, I mean, you know what I mean.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, No, you're right.

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<v Speaker 1>The Deutsche Bank study came out the other day and

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<v Speaker 1>it was something like six or not something like eight

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<v Speaker 1>in ten of the decades in the twentieth century Gilts

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<v Speaker 1>actually lost your money in real terms, and you know,

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<v Speaker 1>giving it we think it's a safe facet. You kind

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<v Speaker 1>of like, well where did where did it get that reputation? Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>I mean that is and also I mean I suppose

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<v Speaker 1>we've also seen a bit of a massive failure of

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<v Speaker 1>the collective imagination over the past couple of years, because

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<v Speaker 1>no one thought that bond yields could get to where

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<v Speaker 1>they are now like six months ago. I mean, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>let's not brag, but yeah, so it's kind of you

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<v Speaker 1>can see why everyone's scared. But that goes back to

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<v Speaker 1>the second point, which is the longer term problem. So

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<v Speaker 1>it's not just about stuff blowing up. It's about the

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<v Speaker 1>fact that we're now moving into a kind of environment

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<v Speaker 1>for the long run where inflation is going to continue

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<v Speaker 1>to be an issue. And so that means that all

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<v Speaker 1>the assumptions we're making for the past forty odd years

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<v Speaker 1>have kind of flipped on the head, which is something

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<v Speaker 1>everything's going to have to get used to it, which

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<v Speaker 1>means probably the markets will be a lot warbliered as

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<v Speaker 1>well a.

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<v Speaker 2>Lot of volatility. Yeah, oh so so exciting. Now listen, John,

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<v Speaker 2>on a more helpful note. We've decided, haven't we to

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<v Speaker 2>always have a personal finance tip of the week. Yes, yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>we've got one.

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<v Speaker 1>Still only the jungle law.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I'm hoping you're going to come up with that.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm working on it. I'm working on it.

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<v Speaker 2>John's going to either sing or play an instrument next

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<v Speaker 2>week to introduce the personal finance Tip of the week. Now,

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<v Speaker 2>as an I'm torn on personal finance tip of the week.

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<v Speaker 2>There are two things that are quite important at the moment. Well,

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<v Speaker 2>it's one thing that's very important, and that's our property market,

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<v Speaker 2>falling property prices, paralysis in exchanges. You know that there

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<v Speaker 2>just isn't that much going through Chaine, the back change,

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<v Speaker 2>the back. There's a house on my strap that has

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<v Speaker 2>just sold or come close to. Somebody's depended on a chain.

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<v Speaker 2>There as so many links that can fall through. Things

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<v Speaker 2>can go wrong. And I didn't even know that this existed.

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<v Speaker 2>But I've recently been reading about insurance that you can

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<v Speaker 2>buy to protect yourself from a collapsing house purchase, and

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<v Speaker 2>that seems to me like not a bad idea. I'm

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<v Speaker 2>not a great one for buying pointless insurances, but you

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<v Speaker 2>can spend a lot of money on getting into the

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<v Speaker 2>zone of buying a house, and if it then falls through,

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<v Speaker 2>you can be seriously out of pocket. You do that

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<v Speaker 2>three or four times, even twice, your deposit is seriously impacted.

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<v Speaker 2>So is it worth spending? And these insurances seem to

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<v Speaker 2>cost KD of sixty eighty quid? Is that something worth

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<v Speaker 2>looking at? I wonder if it might be.

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<v Speaker 1>Definitely what's looking any because if you can easily share

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<v Speaker 1>it a look like a couple of grind whenever you're

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<v Speaker 1>looking to buy a host and things like selves and

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<v Speaker 1>or so if it's all in league and a sexty

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<v Speaker 1>or something you quite, that probably sayings worth it.

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<v Speaker 2>The other thing I want people to look at at

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<v Speaker 2>the moment is the offset mortgage. You and I remember

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<v Speaker 2>the offset mortgage because we're getting old. There was we

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<v Speaker 2>remember it that we remember another day, long long ago

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<v Speaker 2>when interest rates were not zero, when if you had

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<v Speaker 2>savings you could offset them against the day on your

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<v Speaker 2>mortgage and that would bring down your mortgage payments every month,

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<v Speaker 2>and it was kind of useful. It's time to look

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<v Speaker 2>at those again. If you've got a mortgage and you've

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<v Speaker 2>got savings, go have a look at some of the offsets.

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<v Speaker 2>They're pretty useful, excellent tips. Welcome to Meren Talks Money,

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<v Speaker 2>the podcast in which people who know the markets explain

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<v Speaker 2>the markets. I'm merin Sumset Web. This week our guest

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<v Speaker 2>is Jeremy Grantsam, co founder of investment firm GMO. Grantham

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<v Speaker 2>is well known for his analysis of bubbles and for

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<v Speaker 2>his parish forecasts that have come at pretty useful times,

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<v Speaker 2>such as in two thousand and two thousand and eight.

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<v Speaker 2>In our conversation, we talk about where valuations are, where

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<v Speaker 2>we expect the market to go, and why this has

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<v Speaker 2>been one of the greatest bubbles of all time. Jeremy,

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<v Speaker 2>thank you so much for joining us today.

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<v Speaker 3>That's a pleasure.

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<v Speaker 2>Now, last time we talked, which was just over two

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<v Speaker 2>years ago, it was the end of twenty twenty one.

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<v Speaker 2>Later middle of aug was twenty twenty one. I think

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<v Speaker 2>you and I had a conversation where we talked about

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<v Speaker 2>how we were in one of the greatest bubbles in

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<v Speaker 2>financial history, which seemed pretty obvious to you and actually

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<v Speaker 2>pretty obvious to me at the time, not so obvious

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<v Speaker 2>to everybody else. Out with some other people, and we

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<v Speaker 2>talked about where investors could hide from the craziness of

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<v Speaker 2>that bubble, although we couldn't find very many places. And

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<v Speaker 2>the best advice you gave my listeners at the time,

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<v Speaker 2>which was purely, absolutely brilliant, and I hope that they

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<v Speaker 2>all took it, was to rush out and get the

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<v Speaker 2>longest fixed rate mortgage on their house that they possibly could.

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<v Speaker 2>So fingers crossed, lots of them did that and sitting

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<v Speaker 2>there with a ten year mortgage of one to one

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<v Speaker 2>and a half percent instead of six to six and

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<v Speaker 2>a half percent.

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<v Speaker 4>Yeah, well, if a handful of people did it, we

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<v Speaker 4>could feel justified.

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<v Speaker 2>I think so if we saved anybody. So let's talk

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<v Speaker 2>about that great bubble. It was excellent timing. And hopefully

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<v Speaker 2>the listeners also rushed out and solved their overpriced equities,

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<v Speaker 2>because twenty twenty two so the beginning of the popping

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<v Speaker 2>of that bubble. And I'm saying the beginning because I'm

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<v Speaker 2>guessing that what you're going to tell me is that

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<v Speaker 2>we are only part way through that bubble collapsing. So

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<v Speaker 2>where are we with the whole thing now?

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<v Speaker 4>Well, everything was proceeding perfectly well, and the great bubbles

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<v Speaker 4>take their time quite a few years, going up quite

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<v Speaker 4>a few years coming down, and the market suffers from

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<v Speaker 4>attention deficit disorder, so it always stinks every rally at

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<v Speaker 4>the beginning of the next great ball market and so on.

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<v Speaker 4>But there were some definitely original interferences.

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<v Speaker 3>With this deflating period.

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<v Speaker 4>The first of them was what I call the presidential cycle,

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<v Speaker 4>which I wrote about suggesting we would have a time

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<v Speaker 4>out because there's never been a serious market decline between

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<v Speaker 4>October the first of the second presidential year and the

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<v Speaker 4>end of April in the third year, because the administration

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<v Speaker 4>would like to have a strong labor market running up

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<v Speaker 4>to the election, and they realized, of course that economics

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<v Speaker 4>moves rather slowly, lot of inertia, and so they had

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<v Speaker 4>to stimulate it a year and a quarter before, and

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<v Speaker 4>so that's the period of stimulus. And since FDR there

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<v Speaker 4>has never been a big decline. And the average gain

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<v Speaker 4>in that seven month window equals the remaining.

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<v Speaker 3>Forty one months. It's amazing.

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<v Speaker 4>Of the four year presidential cycle, it seems impossible, but

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<v Speaker 4>it's true. Check it, and the average gain is about

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<v Speaker 4>fifteen percent in that window, and this time we had

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<v Speaker 4>thirteen or fourteen.

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<v Speaker 3>It was right on the nose.

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<v Speaker 4>So we had a typical presidential cycle rally, and we

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<v Speaker 4>had a strong January bounds. If you've wiped out the

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<v Speaker 4>growth stocks the following January, you always have a great bounce,

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<v Speaker 4>even if the bear market is not over. The perfect

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<v Speaker 4>example would be two thousand and one. The tech bubble

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<v Speaker 4>was huge.

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<v Speaker 3>It got the.

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<v Speaker 4>Growth stocks got hammered. In two thousand they were down

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<v Speaker 4>fifty percent, and then rallied a bit at the end

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<v Speaker 4>of the year, and then in January they had a

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<v Speaker 4>huge rally eight or nine percent, And so we should

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<v Speaker 4>have expected the same, and basically we got it a

0:11:04.840 --> 0:11:09.880
<v Speaker 4>little bit less, but a strong January rallied. Why not

0:11:10.200 --> 0:11:12.800
<v Speaker 4>because there were lots of tax losses that had been

0:11:12.880 --> 0:11:19.360
<v Speaker 4>taken and people replacing their position, investing their Christmas bonuses

0:11:19.400 --> 0:11:24.040
<v Speaker 4>and so on. So that was fairly normal, and so

0:11:24.240 --> 0:11:29.720
<v Speaker 4>was the presidential cycle effect. What was abnormal is that

0:11:29.760 --> 0:11:32.719
<v Speaker 4>they occurred in the middle of a great.

0:11:34.240 --> 0:11:36.720
<v Speaker 3>Bubble that was on the way down.

0:11:37.160 --> 0:11:39.959
<v Speaker 4>This had not happened in nineteen twenty nine, seventy two,

0:11:40.679 --> 0:11:43.800
<v Speaker 4>or two thousand or two thousand and seven. All of

0:11:43.840 --> 0:11:48.680
<v Speaker 4>them had neatly sidestepped that seven month window. But this one,

0:11:49.280 --> 0:11:52.439
<v Speaker 4>it fell right in the middle of the deflating phase.

0:11:52.800 --> 0:11:54.439
<v Speaker 2>So we got a bit of a reprieve as a

0:11:54.480 --> 0:11:54.960
<v Speaker 2>result of that.

0:11:55.160 --> 0:11:57.560
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, we got a bit of a temporary reprieve. And

0:11:57.600 --> 0:12:02.920
<v Speaker 4>then I argue back to the meat grinder, but both

0:12:02.960 --> 0:12:06.920
<v Speaker 4>the meat grinder had time to really get going. We

0:12:07.440 --> 0:12:14.560
<v Speaker 4>ran into the artificial intelligence mini rally, and yes it

0:12:14.640 --> 0:12:17.920
<v Speaker 4>was only a dozen or two stocks, but it included

0:12:18.800 --> 0:12:23.240
<v Speaker 4>some very big ones and they had huge rallies, and

0:12:23.320 --> 0:12:27.559
<v Speaker 4>even though the average stock didn't move, it sent the

0:12:27.720 --> 0:12:33.320
<v Speaker 4>smpl oh I don't know, fifteen sixteen, seventeen percent this

0:12:33.440 --> 0:12:38.679
<v Speaker 4>year year today and on the backs of these handful

0:12:38.760 --> 0:12:40.160
<v Speaker 4>of huge names.

0:12:40.320 --> 0:12:42.520
<v Speaker 2>Okay, so another little reprieve for the index.

0:12:43.280 --> 0:12:47.280
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, his artificial intelligence for real. And my answer is yes, absolutely,

0:12:47.360 --> 0:12:50.920
<v Speaker 4>it is for real. It will have huge effect. Is

0:12:50.960 --> 0:12:54.960
<v Speaker 4>it big enough soon enough to stop the deflating No,

0:12:55.040 --> 0:12:57.920
<v Speaker 4>I don't think it is. It's a ten to twenty

0:12:58.720 --> 0:13:02.840
<v Speaker 4>multi the catal effect going off into the distant future,

0:13:02.880 --> 0:13:06.120
<v Speaker 4>and it will be huge, and in what way I

0:13:06.160 --> 0:13:08.760
<v Speaker 4>don't know. It's over my pay grade, but it will

0:13:08.800 --> 0:13:12.120
<v Speaker 4>be potentially in vast in its effects.

0:13:12.559 --> 0:13:16.160
<v Speaker 3>In the meantime, it leng the the interruption.

0:13:17.200 --> 0:13:23.520
<v Speaker 4>In this deflating period, but under the surface, the economics deteriorate,

0:13:24.520 --> 0:13:30.400
<v Speaker 4>debt increases, consumers spent their stimulus program. It's all gone,

0:13:30.760 --> 0:13:33.280
<v Speaker 4>except that maybe the richest ten or fifteen percent that

0:13:33.360 --> 0:13:36.760
<v Speaker 4>don't really count because they don't spend it as desperately

0:13:36.800 --> 0:13:41.760
<v Speaker 4>as everybody else does. So, and we've taken off the

0:13:41.800 --> 0:13:46.640
<v Speaker 4>moratorium on paybacks of college loans, which is a huge

0:13:46.640 --> 0:13:49.920
<v Speaker 4>thing in the US, and the leting indicators, which have

0:13:49.960 --> 0:13:51.800
<v Speaker 4>a terrific record, continue down.

0:13:52.120 --> 0:13:54.120
<v Speaker 3>The availability of debt.

0:13:54.000 --> 0:13:59.640
<v Speaker 4>For small companies becomes increasingly difficult to get. The debt

0:13:59.720 --> 0:14:03.440
<v Speaker 4>level themselves at the government level are huge, and the

0:14:03.480 --> 0:14:07.679
<v Speaker 4>interest rates increase, putting a real burden on the budget.

0:14:08.559 --> 0:14:15.480
<v Speaker 4>And many things continue to deteriorate. And my guess is

0:14:16.800 --> 0:14:19.920
<v Speaker 4>we will have a recession. I don't know whether it

0:14:20.000 --> 0:14:23.840
<v Speaker 4>will be fairly mild or fairly serious, but it will

0:14:24.640 --> 0:14:27.560
<v Speaker 4>probably go deep into next year, as I have been

0:14:27.560 --> 0:14:29.360
<v Speaker 4>saying for three year.

0:14:29.640 --> 0:14:32.600
<v Speaker 2>Okay, but there's still a general view that this is

0:14:32.640 --> 0:14:35.840
<v Speaker 2>going to be a soft landing. And I think you

0:14:35.880 --> 0:14:38.520
<v Speaker 2>said before that all landings are soft landings until they

0:14:38.560 --> 0:14:39.640
<v Speaker 2>become hard landings.

0:14:40.240 --> 0:14:42.160
<v Speaker 3>Well, every bubble has been.

0:14:44.320 --> 0:14:48.400
<v Speaker 4>Greeted with a chorus of soft landing, and there's never

0:14:48.440 --> 0:14:54.480
<v Speaker 4>been one Japan. The greatest bubbles, both in real estate

0:14:54.560 --> 0:14:57.680
<v Speaker 4>and the stock market was followed by a last decade,

0:14:58.200 --> 0:15:02.160
<v Speaker 4>arguably a last two decades, but nineteen twenty nine, of

0:15:02.160 --> 0:15:07.240
<v Speaker 4>course was mishandled followed by depression. The nineteen seventy two

0:15:07.400 --> 0:15:11.000
<v Speaker 4>fifty to fifty was followed by a very serious recession,

0:15:11.240 --> 0:15:14.760
<v Speaker 4>and two thousand was followed by a mild recession still

0:15:14.760 --> 0:15:20.200
<v Speaker 4>allowed the NASDAK to decline seventy two percent and fifty percent,

0:15:20.880 --> 0:15:24.720
<v Speaker 4>and the housing bust of those seven was of course

0:15:24.720 --> 0:15:29.200
<v Speaker 4>followed by a potentially disastrous recession, which was counted by

0:15:29.360 --> 0:15:33.320
<v Speaker 4>biggest stimulus by far in American history up till that point,

0:15:34.000 --> 0:15:39.600
<v Speaker 4>finally exceeded amazingly by the stimulus program around COVID and

0:15:39.680 --> 0:15:42.920
<v Speaker 4>the after effects of which we we are now dealing with.

0:15:44.640 --> 0:15:46.880
<v Speaker 2>So we have a lot of people saying at the

0:15:46.960 --> 0:15:50.320
<v Speaker 2>moment that it is extraordinary and impressive how interest rates

0:15:50.320 --> 0:15:51.960
<v Speaker 2>have gone up so fast.

0:15:52.440 --> 0:15:53.200
<v Speaker 3>This is the.

0:15:53.160 --> 0:15:56.160
<v Speaker 2>Speed of the movers has not been seen for many,

0:15:56.200 --> 0:15:58.520
<v Speaker 2>well many hundreds of years. So seventeen eighty eight, someone

0:15:58.520 --> 0:16:02.160
<v Speaker 2>told me the other day, so an incredibly fast move.

0:16:02.680 --> 0:16:05.400
<v Speaker 2>And the extraordinary thing is that nothing very big has

0:16:05.480 --> 0:16:09.360
<v Speaker 2>broken yet, but everybody expects something to break, they're just

0:16:09.440 --> 0:16:11.640
<v Speaker 2>not quite sure what it will be.

0:16:12.080 --> 0:16:18.040
<v Speaker 4>Well, if they think that they're being historic historically rather literate,

0:16:19.200 --> 0:16:24.960
<v Speaker 4>because that is the pattern, something breaks and nobody seems

0:16:25.000 --> 0:16:28.640
<v Speaker 4>to know what it is. You increase the pressure on

0:16:28.680 --> 0:16:33.720
<v Speaker 4>a very complicated system until a few things snap, and

0:16:33.920 --> 0:16:38.800
<v Speaker 4>each cycle is different, so each cycle something else happens.

0:16:38.880 --> 0:16:42.040
<v Speaker 4>It's always a surprise, but you always have a surprise,

0:16:42.160 --> 0:16:45.440
<v Speaker 4>so the idea of a surprise is totally unsurprising.

0:16:45.680 --> 0:16:48.360
<v Speaker 2>Can you make any guesses as to what the surprise

0:16:48.520 --> 0:16:49.600
<v Speaker 2>might be this time?

0:16:50.800 --> 0:16:53.320
<v Speaker 4>Well, of course we did have an interesting kind of

0:16:53.360 --> 0:16:58.400
<v Speaker 4>sneak preview. Didn't weigh with the large regional banks in

0:16:58.440 --> 0:17:02.200
<v Speaker 4>America where a couple just up and went out of

0:17:02.240 --> 0:17:03.480
<v Speaker 4>business in a flash.

0:17:03.680 --> 0:17:05.920
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, but unlike most things, that turned out to actually

0:17:05.920 --> 0:17:08.600
<v Speaker 2>be contained and containable. You know, we sat there looking

0:17:08.640 --> 0:17:11.280
<v Speaker 2>at it thinking is this it is something big breaking

0:17:11.720 --> 0:17:13.960
<v Speaker 2>and it turned out that that could be cleared up.

0:17:14.680 --> 0:17:18.560
<v Speaker 4>It did indicate that the authorities are very kind of

0:17:18.600 --> 0:17:22.879
<v Speaker 4>well aware of this something breaking effect because they moved

0:17:23.000 --> 0:17:27.679
<v Speaker 4>very quickly, and one could argue open zealously gave a

0:17:27.720 --> 0:17:32.240
<v Speaker 4>blanket safety net to everybody. Maybe You could argue that

0:17:32.280 --> 0:17:36.560
<v Speaker 4>people should have been able to analyze the vulnerability of

0:17:36.960 --> 0:17:40.360
<v Speaker 4>Silicon Valley Bank and so on to the VC industry

0:17:41.080 --> 0:17:45.520
<v Speaker 4>and to the level of high years, the pain that

0:17:45.680 --> 0:17:49.920
<v Speaker 4>high yels would inflict on their large portfolio of rock

0:17:49.960 --> 0:17:56.040
<v Speaker 4>bottom investments. They had made a huge number, unprecedented actually

0:17:56.119 --> 0:17:59.280
<v Speaker 4>in the banking industry, the percentage of their portfolio that

0:17:59.359 --> 0:18:04.120
<v Speaker 4>was invested in very low yielding paper, just in time

0:18:04.840 --> 0:18:07.760
<v Speaker 4>to be hit hard by an increase in rates. The

0:18:07.800 --> 0:18:13.040
<v Speaker 4>combination of that very large component and the fact that

0:18:13.080 --> 0:18:17.440
<v Speaker 4>they were uniquely dependent on BC and VC is itself,

0:18:17.840 --> 0:18:21.320
<v Speaker 4>along with real estate, kind of guaranteed to take a

0:18:21.320 --> 0:18:25.040
<v Speaker 4>lot of pain in these kinds of cycles. The VC

0:18:25.200 --> 0:18:28.160
<v Speaker 4>industry has been the only part so far that has

0:18:28.200 --> 0:18:32.960
<v Speaker 4>moved along at a much quicker pace and is fairly

0:18:33.000 --> 0:18:39.359
<v Speaker 4>deep into a trouble. The IPOs completely ceased and the

0:18:39.400 --> 0:18:44.600
<v Speaker 4>money flowing into new PC's dropped way down, fell to

0:18:45.160 --> 0:18:46.240
<v Speaker 4>about a third.

0:18:47.640 --> 0:18:48.439
<v Speaker 3>In a real hurry.

0:18:49.080 --> 0:18:51.440
<v Speaker 4>So the VC industry acted as if there was a

0:18:51.480 --> 0:18:56.320
<v Speaker 4>major bubble breaking, and the rest of the market, particularly

0:18:56.520 --> 0:19:01.760
<v Speaker 4>the growth end and the artificial intelligence and had a

0:19:01.880 --> 0:19:03.399
<v Speaker 4>much easier time.

0:19:03.960 --> 0:19:07.040
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, does it feel like maybe it is the private

0:19:07.119 --> 0:19:09.840
<v Speaker 2>equity lest VC part of the market that is most

0:19:09.920 --> 0:19:12.320
<v Speaker 2>vulnerable at the moment, and you've got a lot of

0:19:12.320 --> 0:19:13.919
<v Speaker 2>debt piled up in there. You've got a lot of

0:19:13.960 --> 0:19:17.040
<v Speaker 2>companies that are burning cash fast and require more cash

0:19:17.080 --> 0:19:19.560
<v Speaker 2>put in. We're hearing quite a lot about private equity

0:19:19.600 --> 0:19:23.280
<v Speaker 2>businesses having to borrow at at unexpectedly high rates, and

0:19:23.440 --> 0:19:27.280
<v Speaker 2>we're wondering what happens over the next couple of years

0:19:27.320 --> 0:19:28.040
<v Speaker 2>in that industry.

0:19:28.640 --> 0:19:32.400
<v Speaker 4>It's plausible that they would feel the pain quickest. Everything

0:19:32.480 --> 0:19:35.080
<v Speaker 4>to do with real estate, of course, is pretty much certain,

0:19:35.400 --> 0:19:40.000
<v Speaker 4>although the delays and special cases there are much more impressive.

0:19:40.040 --> 0:19:42.200
<v Speaker 3>But eventually it grinds through.

0:19:43.000 --> 0:19:46.040
<v Speaker 4>When you lower the mortgage, people can afford to pay more,

0:19:46.480 --> 0:19:49.240
<v Speaker 4>and eventually they pay more and push out the prices.

0:19:49.280 --> 0:19:52.720
<v Speaker 4>So at three percent, you're paying four hundred thousand for

0:19:52.760 --> 0:19:55.280
<v Speaker 4>your house, and when the mortgage goes to six percent,

0:19:55.320 --> 0:19:57.359
<v Speaker 4>you suddenly realize you can't afford to buy the house.

0:19:57.400 --> 0:20:01.439
<v Speaker 4>You pull your bid, market backs off, and eventually the

0:20:01.480 --> 0:20:02.360
<v Speaker 4>prices come down.

0:20:02.960 --> 0:20:05.120
<v Speaker 3>So mortgages move.

0:20:05.359 --> 0:20:11.160
<v Speaker 4>To fill the available affordability, and house prices do exactly that.

0:20:11.440 --> 0:20:14.560
<v Speaker 4>They're not reliable in the short term, they're incredibly reliable

0:20:14.560 --> 0:20:18.320
<v Speaker 4>in the long term. An over forty year period of

0:20:18.400 --> 0:20:21.560
<v Speaker 4>driving down mortgage rates, of course, you drove up house

0:20:21.600 --> 0:20:26.120
<v Speaker 4>prices all over the world pretty much. And now the

0:20:26.200 --> 0:20:28.560
<v Speaker 4>rates have gone up, of course it will drive down.

0:20:29.200 --> 0:20:32.080
<v Speaker 4>And the ones that flow through quickly, some of the

0:20:32.080 --> 0:20:36.680
<v Speaker 4>Scandinavian countries side Sweden have a fairly severe housing pullback.

0:20:37.160 --> 0:20:40.840
<v Speaker 4>The ones that have more convoluted system, more locked in mortgages,

0:20:40.880 --> 0:20:45.680
<v Speaker 4>like the US, they take their time, but eventually people

0:20:45.720 --> 0:20:49.000
<v Speaker 4>can't afford to buy a house at a high mortgage

0:20:49.000 --> 0:20:50.119
<v Speaker 4>and the prices come down.

0:20:50.640 --> 0:20:51.879
<v Speaker 3>So that's pretty reliable.

0:20:52.240 --> 0:20:54.320
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, And you can see that happening across the world,

0:20:54.400 --> 0:20:56.280
<v Speaker 2>can't you. You can see house prices coming down all

0:20:56.320 --> 0:21:00.440
<v Speaker 2>over Europe, at Canada, beginning in the US, particularly in Scandina, Navier,

0:21:00.520 --> 0:21:03.359
<v Speaker 2>and in the UK is increasingly obvious as well, because

0:21:03.400 --> 0:21:05.880
<v Speaker 2>we're at that we're at that point where no one's

0:21:05.920 --> 0:21:08.720
<v Speaker 2>buying and no one's selling. We're at the paralysis stage

0:21:08.760 --> 0:21:11.200
<v Speaker 2>before you would exect prices to fall quite dramatically.

0:21:11.560 --> 0:21:14.320
<v Speaker 4>And that's exactly the same in the US. Paralysis and

0:21:14.760 --> 0:21:19.560
<v Speaker 4>house prices are worse for the ordinary household, they're worse

0:21:19.680 --> 0:21:24.479
<v Speaker 4>for the economy than stocks because they're substantially more broadly owned.

0:21:25.040 --> 0:21:29.080
<v Speaker 4>It's really an important part of the median families income

0:21:29.200 --> 0:21:33.000
<v Speaker 4>picture and capital picture, and it is not stock sunning.

0:21:33.840 --> 0:21:38.080
<v Speaker 4>And so the the motto should be don't mess with housing.

0:21:38.920 --> 0:21:43.080
<v Speaker 4>The supermato should be never have a housing bubble at

0:21:43.080 --> 0:21:44.960
<v Speaker 4>the same time as you have a stock market bubble,

0:21:45.000 --> 0:21:49.439
<v Speaker 4>which is the great mistake the Japanese made with the

0:21:49.440 --> 0:21:52.240
<v Speaker 4>biggest bubble in history on both frants at the same time.

0:21:52.720 --> 0:21:58.160
<v Speaker 4>But although although we didn't get carried away with ridiculous

0:21:58.440 --> 0:22:03.280
<v Speaker 4>subprime this time, the multiple of family income actually went

0:22:03.440 --> 0:22:07.919
<v Speaker 4>higher than it did in two thousand and seven, So

0:22:08.760 --> 0:22:13.480
<v Speaker 4>in terms of actual long term vulnerability posed by overpricing,

0:22:13.920 --> 0:22:18.240
<v Speaker 4>this housing market was more overpriced, and it was accompanied

0:22:18.359 --> 0:22:23.480
<v Speaker 4>by a much more overpriced and plastically bubbly stock market

0:22:24.600 --> 0:22:26.440
<v Speaker 4>than two thousand and seven OKA.

0:22:26.520 --> 0:22:28.600
<v Speaker 2>So we can see it working its way through the

0:22:28.920 --> 0:22:32.720
<v Speaker 2>housing market across the world. But obviously all the stock

0:22:32.760 --> 0:22:35.159
<v Speaker 2>markets are different because they've come out of this bubble

0:22:35.200 --> 0:22:37.679
<v Speaker 2>at different valuation levels, with the US, foribly being the

0:22:37.680 --> 0:22:40.600
<v Speaker 2>most expensive. So what can we expect to see happened

0:22:40.640 --> 0:22:42.399
<v Speaker 2>to the US stock market in particular?

0:22:42.520 --> 0:22:48.040
<v Speaker 4>Now the most vulnerable area in my opinion is the

0:22:48.119 --> 0:22:51.480
<v Speaker 4>Russell two thousand is a good measure of where the

0:22:51.600 --> 0:22:56.800
<v Speaker 4>vulnerabilities will be. The Russell two thousand often has no

0:22:56.960 --> 0:23:00.840
<v Speaker 4>collective earnings at all. It has a very high density

0:23:00.840 --> 0:23:05.080
<v Speaker 4>of zombies, companies that really can only pay their interest

0:23:05.119 --> 0:23:06.680
<v Speaker 4>payments by issuing more debt.

0:23:08.000 --> 0:23:08.880
<v Speaker 3>It has never been.

0:23:08.880 --> 0:23:12.320
<v Speaker 4>Higher than it is today, and they have a very

0:23:12.359 --> 0:23:15.840
<v Speaker 4>high ratio, something like forty percent, don't have positive earnings,

0:23:15.880 --> 0:23:17.640
<v Speaker 4>and they have record debt.

0:23:17.680 --> 0:23:19.080
<v Speaker 3>They have never had this kind of debt.

0:23:19.119 --> 0:23:22.199
<v Speaker 4>So they're vulnerable on the debt front, vulnerable on the

0:23:22.240 --> 0:23:25.760
<v Speaker 4>financial front, and vulnerable on a broad economic front.

0:23:26.600 --> 0:23:28.960
<v Speaker 3>And this is the interesting thing.

0:23:29.520 --> 0:23:33.880
<v Speaker 4>The Russell two thousand is not up in real terms.

0:23:33.880 --> 0:23:34.960
<v Speaker 3>For the last year.

0:23:35.560 --> 0:23:39.680
<v Speaker 4>It's not up over two years, and really surprising, it's

0:23:39.680 --> 0:23:42.240
<v Speaker 4>not up over five years. It's actually down quite a

0:23:42.320 --> 0:23:46.080
<v Speaker 4>bit over five years. So it is showing its vulnerability,

0:23:46.800 --> 0:23:51.160
<v Speaker 4>and it brings up a kind of sidebar. Why don't

0:23:51.200 --> 0:23:54.800
<v Speaker 4>people state everything inflation adjusted? We always did in the

0:23:54.880 --> 0:23:58.320
<v Speaker 4>nineteen seventies, eighties and nineties, and we have now forgotten

0:23:58.359 --> 0:24:01.800
<v Speaker 4>because we had a twenty five your window where inflation

0:24:02.080 --> 0:24:06.040
<v Speaker 4>was dribbling down towards nothing, and we've lost the habit

0:24:06.840 --> 0:24:09.440
<v Speaker 4>because people think, oh, well, the S and P five

0:24:09.520 --> 0:24:11.040
<v Speaker 4>hundred's almost that it's high.

0:24:11.640 --> 0:24:12.560
<v Speaker 3>The s and P five.

0:24:12.480 --> 0:24:16.720
<v Speaker 4>Hundred is about eighteen percent below it's high. It's high

0:24:16.920 --> 0:24:21.040
<v Speaker 4>a year and nine months ago, and there's been decent

0:24:21.119 --> 0:24:25.960
<v Speaker 4>inflation in that window at least seven maybe eight percent plus.

0:24:26.000 --> 0:24:29.760
<v Speaker 4>The market is down in any case about ten per cent.

0:24:30.200 --> 0:24:33.080
<v Speaker 4>The markets are not doing as well as people think

0:24:33.160 --> 0:24:37.320
<v Speaker 4>because they they have lost the knack of taking off inflation.

0:24:37.440 --> 0:24:40.679
<v Speaker 4>Inflation is every bit as painful as any other percentage

0:24:40.680 --> 0:24:41.560
<v Speaker 4>point loss.

0:24:42.240 --> 0:24:44.399
<v Speaker 2>But it isn't though, is it. I mean, it isn't

0:24:44.680 --> 0:24:47.399
<v Speaker 2>in people's minds. I mean, in some senses, this is

0:24:47.600 --> 0:24:50.119
<v Speaker 2>a great way for things to be brought back to

0:24:50.200 --> 0:24:53.120
<v Speaker 2>ground by a couple of years of relatively high inflation.

0:24:53.280 --> 0:24:55.960
<v Speaker 2>So people don't feel like they're losing all their hard

0:24:56.000 --> 0:25:00.320
<v Speaker 2>earned money, they don't feel as though their house prices collapse, etc.

0:25:00.600 --> 0:25:03.879
<v Speaker 2>If it only happens in real terms as opposed to

0:25:03.960 --> 0:25:07.760
<v Speaker 2>in nominal terms, generally, people seeming people feel happier about it.

0:25:08.520 --> 0:25:12.680
<v Speaker 4>You're right, they're more easily misguided in thinking they're doing fine,

0:25:12.920 --> 0:25:15.600
<v Speaker 4>except when they go to the supermarket where the reverse end.

0:25:16.160 --> 0:25:19.760
<v Speaker 4>If anything, they over respond to so they come out

0:25:19.800 --> 0:25:23.399
<v Speaker 4>of the supermarket thinking that inflation will crush them, and

0:25:23.440 --> 0:25:26.840
<v Speaker 4>they are accept a ten pounds loss on their house

0:25:27.040 --> 0:25:30.240
<v Speaker 4>from inflation without even noticing it. The other thing, though,

0:25:30.680 --> 0:25:35.320
<v Speaker 4>is it it does take down their depths inflation, so

0:25:35.960 --> 0:25:38.359
<v Speaker 4>there is an offset. If you have a very big

0:25:38.400 --> 0:25:42.119
<v Speaker 4>mortgage and you have ten percent inflation, you owe ten

0:25:42.160 --> 0:25:45.520
<v Speaker 4>percent less and that sadly has always slipped through unnoticed.

0:25:45.560 --> 0:25:48.679
<v Speaker 2>Also, yeah, and then if your salary goes up at

0:25:48.720 --> 0:25:51.800
<v Speaker 2>the same time, if your salary matches inflation, then in

0:25:51.840 --> 0:25:54.600
<v Speaker 2>some senses, for a lot of people, an inflationary environment,

0:25:54.640 --> 0:25:57.000
<v Speaker 2>as long as it doesn't get out of control in

0:25:57.040 --> 0:26:00.639
<v Speaker 2>a situation like this, isn't too bad. Adver get hit.

0:26:00.680 --> 0:26:02.040
<v Speaker 2>I'm just saying it's not too bad.

0:26:03.240 --> 0:26:05.800
<v Speaker 4>You might say that, but if you actually ask them

0:26:05.840 --> 0:26:11.160
<v Speaker 4>how they feel, the results are quite conclusively opposite. People's

0:26:11.760 --> 0:26:16.880
<v Speaker 4>confidence in the economy is very low in the UK

0:26:17.000 --> 0:26:19.760
<v Speaker 4>and the US. If you ask them do you feel

0:26:19.760 --> 0:26:25.359
<v Speaker 4>better off than last year? Almost nobody since they feel

0:26:25.400 --> 0:26:29.160
<v Speaker 4>better off, even though obviously quite a large fraction are

0:26:29.200 --> 0:26:31.960
<v Speaker 4>better off in real life. The results are the rich

0:26:32.000 --> 0:26:36.400
<v Speaker 4>and the poor are feeling a little squeezed in today's environment,

0:26:36.760 --> 0:26:40.360
<v Speaker 4>so I think you're wrong in that sense. It does

0:26:41.280 --> 0:26:45.800
<v Speaker 4>reach right through into consumer confidence. Now, if you have

0:26:46.240 --> 0:26:48.520
<v Speaker 4>a lot of money in the piggybang from the government's

0:26:48.880 --> 0:26:53.040
<v Speaker 4>program stimulus program, that's a huge offset, and that that

0:26:53.080 --> 0:26:57.520
<v Speaker 4>has been very successful in keeping keeping spending going. And

0:26:57.600 --> 0:27:01.360
<v Speaker 4>there were some other psychological factors that people were so

0:27:01.600 --> 0:27:04.840
<v Speaker 4>wildly enthusiastic to come out of COVID and get on

0:27:04.880 --> 0:27:07.119
<v Speaker 4>a plane and go to Spain again and so on

0:27:07.200 --> 0:27:11.000
<v Speaker 4>and spread their wings and have a mail out that

0:27:11.040 --> 0:27:14.440
<v Speaker 4>they have done that so enthusiastically that they've run through

0:27:14.480 --> 0:27:18.320
<v Speaker 4>all their COVID savings and now they are racking up

0:27:18.400 --> 0:27:21.400
<v Speaker 4>credit card debt like there's note tomorrow and building out

0:27:21.440 --> 0:27:25.360
<v Speaker 4>their aggregate debt level. They've never saved less in America.

0:27:25.480 --> 0:27:29.600
<v Speaker 4>You may be aware than their saving now heaven. I mean,

0:27:29.760 --> 0:27:31.840
<v Speaker 4>the savings phrase has just about disappeared.

0:27:32.000 --> 0:27:36.879
<v Speaker 2>But nonetheless, nonetheless, this inflation plus the folds in the

0:27:36.920 --> 0:27:39.840
<v Speaker 2>market do mean that. And you wrote about this in

0:27:40.400 --> 0:27:44.240
<v Speaker 2>your latest note that the meat grinder that quite a

0:27:44.280 --> 0:27:47.080
<v Speaker 2>lot of the stocks that we look at have already

0:27:47.359 --> 0:27:50.719
<v Speaker 2>come off very significantly in real terms. You say, for example,

0:27:50.720 --> 0:27:53.399
<v Speaker 2>the lakes of Amazon, Alphabet and Meta would have to

0:27:53.480 --> 0:27:56.199
<v Speaker 2>rise between seventeen one hundred and fifty percent to go

0:27:56.240 --> 0:27:58.600
<v Speaker 2>back to their twenty twenty one peaks in real terms.

0:27:59.200 --> 0:28:01.600
<v Speaker 2>So we've seen it awful lot of froth come up

0:28:01.640 --> 0:28:06.320
<v Speaker 2>the market in real terms, and I suspect there are

0:28:06.520 --> 0:28:09.320
<v Speaker 2>some groups of more enthusiastic growth infestors than perhaps you

0:28:09.400 --> 0:28:11.639
<v Speaker 2>or I are looking at those prices and saying, well,

0:28:11.640 --> 0:28:13.159
<v Speaker 2>this is a pactly good place to get back in.

0:28:13.960 --> 0:28:18.359
<v Speaker 4>Well, they typically do that, and in a multi legged

0:28:18.760 --> 0:28:22.960
<v Speaker 4>bear market, they always have plenty of people buying into

0:28:23.000 --> 0:28:25.760
<v Speaker 4>each leg, and I have no reason to think this

0:28:25.800 --> 0:28:29.880
<v Speaker 4>would be any exception. Once you've seen a stock sell

0:28:29.920 --> 0:28:33.520
<v Speaker 4>at three hundred, even if it's intrinsically worth one hundred,

0:28:34.320 --> 0:28:37.840
<v Speaker 4>you feel somehow it has a divine right to go back.

0:28:37.680 --> 0:28:38.320
<v Speaker 3>To three hundred.

0:28:38.640 --> 0:28:40.480
<v Speaker 4>So when it comes down to two hundred, you think

0:28:40.480 --> 0:28:44.400
<v Speaker 4>it's a massive bargain even though it's intrinsic value maybe

0:28:44.440 --> 0:28:46.640
<v Speaker 4>one hundred. So you go whooping in there and you

0:28:46.680 --> 0:28:48.720
<v Speaker 4>buy it, and then it comes second leg down to

0:28:48.760 --> 0:28:51.840
<v Speaker 4>one hundred and fifty still looks pretty good, and then

0:28:51.880 --> 0:28:54.760
<v Speaker 4>eventually it comes down to one hundred and you're heartbroken

0:28:54.920 --> 0:28:56.520
<v Speaker 4>and you sell it anyway, and it goes down to

0:28:56.560 --> 0:28:58.800
<v Speaker 4>eighty and it's actually cheap.

0:29:00.080 --> 0:29:02.280
<v Speaker 2>Can't buy it again because you've been too hurt.

0:29:02.920 --> 0:29:05.960
<v Speaker 3>Yes, now you're paralyzed and hurt.

0:29:07.400 --> 0:29:12.080
<v Speaker 4>And that's when I get to write to reinvesting when terrified. Yes,

0:29:12.160 --> 0:29:16.320
<v Speaker 4>two thousand and nine, and when people are so paralyzed

0:29:16.320 --> 0:29:18.560
<v Speaker 4>they don't care that it's the cheapest prices for twenty

0:29:18.560 --> 0:29:25.240
<v Speaker 4>two years. And GMO's famously allegedly bear If Forecast had

0:29:25.440 --> 0:29:31.280
<v Speaker 4>double digit real returns for seven years in everything, including

0:29:31.280 --> 0:29:32.360
<v Speaker 4>the S and P five hundred.

0:29:32.720 --> 0:29:34.680
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, but you had to be brave in two thousand

0:29:34.720 --> 0:29:37.400
<v Speaker 2>and nine, didn't you. I mean there were several starts

0:29:37.600 --> 0:29:39.960
<v Speaker 2>you were. You possibly one of the loudest voices saying

0:29:40.240 --> 0:29:42.080
<v Speaker 2>you know, if you buy now, you've got an excellent

0:29:42.160 --> 0:29:45.080
<v Speaker 2>chance of making extraordinary returns over the next decade.

0:29:45.240 --> 0:29:47.960
<v Speaker 3>It was hard to Why do you have to be brave?

0:29:48.200 --> 0:29:50.920
<v Speaker 4>I would argue you have to be brave buying when

0:29:50.960 --> 0:29:54.320
<v Speaker 4>prices are extended and high, because you're much more likely

0:29:54.360 --> 0:29:55.120
<v Speaker 4>to lose money.

0:29:55.800 --> 0:29:58.240
<v Speaker 3>It's just the perception, But the.

0:29:58.160 --> 0:30:03.120
<v Speaker 4>Real bravery requires is to buy when the market is

0:30:03.160 --> 0:30:04.880
<v Speaker 4>smashed down to a bargain.

0:30:05.440 --> 0:30:06.440
<v Speaker 3>Seems to me very.

0:30:06.280 --> 0:30:07.840
<v Speaker 2>Little, but does not now is it.

0:30:08.320 --> 0:30:09.600
<v Speaker 3>No, that is not now.

0:30:09.440 --> 0:30:11.640
<v Speaker 4>If you look at if you look at the most

0:30:11.720 --> 0:30:18.400
<v Speaker 4>predictive measures, and mister Hussman does the best of those,

0:30:19.200 --> 0:30:23.920
<v Speaker 4>very detailed history, historical record of which ones actually do

0:30:24.040 --> 0:30:28.840
<v Speaker 4>the best predictive measure. It isn't Warren Buffett's price to

0:30:28.920 --> 0:30:35.840
<v Speaker 4>book compared to GDP. It's an interesting, more sophisticated measure

0:30:36.040 --> 0:30:39.720
<v Speaker 4>of the earnings taking out financial companies and so on.

0:30:40.400 --> 0:30:44.400
<v Speaker 4>And those measures are about as high as they have

0:30:44.480 --> 0:30:47.760
<v Speaker 4>ever been today. They're in the top two or three

0:30:47.800 --> 0:30:52.280
<v Speaker 4>percent of all time. There's a spike. There's a spike

0:30:52.320 --> 0:30:56.800
<v Speaker 4>in two thousand, and there's a spike in twenty twenty one.

0:30:57.840 --> 0:31:01.600
<v Speaker 4>And this is above two thousand, but below the spike

0:31:01.640 --> 0:31:04.360
<v Speaker 4>in twenty twenty one. But we are right up there.

0:31:04.880 --> 0:31:07.680
<v Speaker 4>In order to get the market down to a level

0:31:07.720 --> 0:31:12.680
<v Speaker 4>where it would typically out yield the long bond by

0:31:12.680 --> 0:31:17.320
<v Speaker 4>five percent, which it should, which you could argue it should,

0:31:17.720 --> 0:31:21.080
<v Speaker 4>the market would just sheare arithmetic, the market would have

0:31:21.120 --> 0:31:24.000
<v Speaker 4>to drop by more than fifty percent. This is not

0:31:24.120 --> 0:31:28.800
<v Speaker 4>my forecast. I have a very genteel forecast. Anything below

0:31:28.840 --> 0:31:32.640
<v Speaker 4>three thousand would make me think that it was reasonable.

0:31:33.000 --> 0:31:36.080
<v Speaker 4>And if everything works out, badly, which it sometimes does.

0:31:36.400 --> 0:31:38.320
<v Speaker 4>I would not be amazed if it went to two

0:31:38.320 --> 0:31:42.640
<v Speaker 4>thousand on the SP, but that would that would require

0:31:44.840 --> 0:31:47.240
<v Speaker 4>a couple of wheels to fall off, and wheels tend

0:31:47.240 --> 0:31:50.240
<v Speaker 4>to fall off in the grate in the Great bubbles unraveling,

0:31:50.720 --> 0:31:54.320
<v Speaker 4>but it doesn't mean they have to so, but it

0:31:54.360 --> 0:31:58.200
<v Speaker 4>would be unlikely not to get to something close to

0:31:58.840 --> 0:32:00.880
<v Speaker 4>three three on the S and P.

0:32:01.280 --> 0:32:03.880
<v Speaker 2>Now what could turn that around, of course, is inflation

0:32:04.000 --> 0:32:06.680
<v Speaker 2>falling right back, right back to two percent or below,

0:32:06.680 --> 0:32:10.720
<v Speaker 2>which it was not impossible, and interest rates then falling

0:32:10.760 --> 0:32:13.200
<v Speaker 2>back as well, because we know, don't we let markets

0:32:13.440 --> 0:32:16.000
<v Speaker 2>really like low steady inflation. We know they really like

0:32:16.080 --> 0:32:19.000
<v Speaker 2>low steady interest rates. We know that they hate high

0:32:19.080 --> 0:32:23.120
<v Speaker 2>and volatile inflation. So and there is an expectation in

0:32:23.200 --> 0:32:25.240
<v Speaker 2>large parts of the market, although I think that's been

0:32:25.280 --> 0:32:27.680
<v Speaker 2>tested over the last couple of weeks. There has been

0:32:27.720 --> 0:32:31.040
<v Speaker 2>an expectation that eventually inflation would end up back at

0:32:31.080 --> 0:32:34.440
<v Speaker 2>target and that we would see rates begin to come off.

0:32:34.480 --> 0:32:36.720
<v Speaker 2>Now that the higher for longer story is beginning to

0:32:36.720 --> 0:32:39.520
<v Speaker 2>get a bit more traction, but that's relative the reason.

0:32:39.640 --> 0:32:42.800
<v Speaker 2>So shift in the inflation or interest rate environment would

0:32:42.880 --> 0:32:43.600
<v Speaker 2>change things.

0:32:44.000 --> 0:32:48.280
<v Speaker 4>The model that Ben Incur and I did twenty years ago.

0:32:48.360 --> 0:32:51.720
<v Speaker 4>It's got a very very high correlation explaining PE. It

0:32:51.760 --> 0:32:54.240
<v Speaker 4>doesn't predict it, It just says, how do we get here?

0:32:54.520 --> 0:32:57.959
<v Speaker 4>It turns out the market is really a coincident indicator

0:32:58.560 --> 0:33:02.800
<v Speaker 4>of comfort. What is it to make a portfolio manager

0:33:02.840 --> 0:33:07.040
<v Speaker 4>comfortable in an institution? And the answer is, as you suggest,

0:33:07.600 --> 0:33:13.520
<v Speaker 4>steady inflation around two percent. It hates inflationary spines and

0:33:13.640 --> 0:33:18.120
<v Speaker 4>very high profit margins, and profit margins have been drifting

0:33:18.160 --> 0:33:22.640
<v Speaker 4>down and more than people realize, and inflation has been

0:33:23.640 --> 0:33:24.480
<v Speaker 4>bouncing around.

0:33:24.880 --> 0:33:26.920
<v Speaker 3>But it's part of the scenery now.

0:33:27.400 --> 0:33:30.800
<v Speaker 4>And the model says a shillerpee should be about sixteen

0:33:30.840 --> 0:33:35.280
<v Speaker 4>point eight, which is decently above average and doesn't sound

0:33:35.360 --> 0:33:39.560
<v Speaker 4>ridiculously low, and that's because the profit margins are still decent.

0:33:40.720 --> 0:33:41.520
<v Speaker 3>Well, what is it?

0:33:41.800 --> 0:33:46.000
<v Speaker 4>Well, a few weeks ago it was twenty nine thirty,

0:33:46.520 --> 0:33:49.360
<v Speaker 4>so it was not responding in the normal way.

0:33:49.760 --> 0:33:52.880
<v Speaker 3>This is only the second time it had a bit

0:33:52.880 --> 0:33:53.560
<v Speaker 3>of a holiday.

0:33:53.720 --> 0:33:58.160
<v Speaker 4>In two thousand, our model said we should have the

0:33:58.240 --> 0:34:01.400
<v Speaker 4>highest pe and history everything is perfect, and the market

0:34:01.440 --> 0:34:04.360
<v Speaker 4>said you're done right and went much higher than that

0:34:04.480 --> 0:34:10.399
<v Speaker 4>even for eighteen months. That's you could argue the fire

0:34:10.400 --> 0:34:16.239
<v Speaker 4>and away out the outlier in speculative craziness. And the

0:34:16.280 --> 0:34:23.719
<v Speaker 4>second time was when inflation spiked in twenty twenty two,

0:34:23.960 --> 0:34:26.960
<v Speaker 4>or was it twenty twenty one, twenty twenty one, twenty

0:34:27.040 --> 0:34:31.600
<v Speaker 4>one not in the summer of twenty twenty one, you

0:34:31.640 --> 0:34:36.920
<v Speaker 4>had a rapidly rising, unexpected inflationary jag and the market

0:34:36.960 --> 0:34:40.080
<v Speaker 4>continued to rise for the whole half year, and so

0:34:40.120 --> 0:34:44.279
<v Speaker 4>you had a huge divergence in our model and the

0:34:44.640 --> 0:34:47.319
<v Speaker 4>first half to wipe out in the first half of

0:34:47.760 --> 0:34:51.440
<v Speaker 4>twenty twenty two was the biggest decline in the first

0:34:51.440 --> 0:34:54.480
<v Speaker 4>half of the year since nineteen thirty nine, incidentally in

0:34:54.520 --> 0:34:59.760
<v Speaker 4>real times. But it didn't close the gap because inflation.

0:35:00.320 --> 0:35:03.760
<v Speaker 4>The longer it stayed there, the worse the model god,

0:35:03.960 --> 0:35:06.799
<v Speaker 4>and the profit margins began to decline a bit.

0:35:07.080 --> 0:35:09.600
<v Speaker 2>Well, that was interesting, profit margins beginning to decline, wasn't it?

0:35:09.600 --> 0:35:11.240
<v Speaker 2>Because one of the things that we've talked about before

0:35:11.600 --> 0:35:14.440
<v Speaker 2>is how extraordinary it is that something that always mean

0:35:14.480 --> 0:35:19.279
<v Speaker 2>reverts profit margins did not mean revert, and a lot

0:35:19.360 --> 0:35:22.440
<v Speaker 2>of us have been waiting to see profit margins that

0:35:22.640 --> 0:35:24.680
<v Speaker 2>come down. They didn't, and they didn't, and they didn't

0:35:24.680 --> 0:35:26.920
<v Speaker 2>and even now. It's a pretty gradual erosion.

0:35:27.960 --> 0:35:28.560
<v Speaker 3>Yes it is.

0:35:29.120 --> 0:35:34.520
<v Speaker 4>And if you want to further narrow that story to

0:35:34.600 --> 0:35:39.359
<v Speaker 4>what they now call the Magnificence seven, there had never

0:35:39.400 --> 0:35:43.920
<v Speaker 4>been ever, ever such a divergence in favor of the

0:35:44.040 --> 0:35:49.120
<v Speaker 4>US in total corporate earnings since twenty ten, so this

0:35:49.200 --> 0:35:52.959
<v Speaker 4>is a recent event. The US has outperformed the rest

0:35:53.000 --> 0:35:56.080
<v Speaker 4>of the developed world by about.

0:35:55.760 --> 0:35:57.640
<v Speaker 3>Seventy percentage points.

0:35:57.880 --> 0:35:59.920
<v Speaker 4>So you could say, well, in that case, they should

0:35:59.920 --> 0:36:04.319
<v Speaker 4>have done seventy percentage points better, and they did more

0:36:04.360 --> 0:36:07.640
<v Speaker 4>than that because they in the market always goes in

0:36:07.640 --> 0:36:11.120
<v Speaker 4>for double counting, So if you have unexpectedly good profit margins,

0:36:11.520 --> 0:36:15.279
<v Speaker 4>you'd get an unexpected increase in price earnings ratio, which

0:36:15.320 --> 0:36:16.640
<v Speaker 4>also happened.

0:36:17.480 --> 0:36:18.719
<v Speaker 3>Any case, if you go.

0:36:18.760 --> 0:36:21.560
<v Speaker 4>Back to the seventy percent hour performance and you take

0:36:21.640 --> 0:36:27.280
<v Speaker 4>out them so called fans.

0:36:25.920 --> 0:36:26.799
<v Speaker 3>You find that.

0:36:29.080 --> 0:36:32.479
<v Speaker 4>The ninety you know, the ninety five percent or more,

0:36:32.560 --> 0:36:38.000
<v Speaker 4>the ordinary American stocks looked very much like the rest

0:36:38.000 --> 0:36:41.480
<v Speaker 4>of the world. Their performance was a little bit better,

0:36:41.800 --> 0:36:44.120
<v Speaker 4>their earnings were a little bit better, but in the

0:36:44.239 --> 0:36:49.000
<v Speaker 4>normal range. And then you have the Magnificence seven, whose

0:36:49.560 --> 0:36:54.520
<v Speaker 4>performance in earnings was unprecedented by a wide margin, and

0:36:54.560 --> 0:36:57.879
<v Speaker 4>whose performance in the stock market was even more unprecedented

0:36:57.960 --> 0:37:01.279
<v Speaker 4>because they not only had the earning, but they had

0:37:01.280 --> 0:37:04.720
<v Speaker 4>a steady rise in pe. So you've had the sudden

0:37:04.800 --> 0:37:11.640
<v Speaker 4>emergence of multi trillion dollar market caps. Quite an amazing

0:37:11.719 --> 0:37:16.959
<v Speaker 4>world and culminating in this year where if you took

0:37:17.000 --> 0:37:21.520
<v Speaker 4>out the Magnificent seven today, the S and P would

0:37:21.520 --> 0:37:24.440
<v Speaker 4>not be out for the year. It may be up

0:37:24.440 --> 0:37:31.680
<v Speaker 4>a point, but little or nothing, and all of the

0:37:31.719 --> 0:37:35.560
<v Speaker 4>ten or at twelve point rally is carried by carried

0:37:35.560 --> 0:37:38.520
<v Speaker 4>by the Magnificence seven. There has never been such a

0:37:38.600 --> 0:37:43.719
<v Speaker 4>narrow market. Now, what will happen to them is a

0:37:43.920 --> 0:37:49.719
<v Speaker 4>very interesting question, is it not? Will they continue to

0:37:49.800 --> 0:37:55.279
<v Speaker 4>grow and become seventy percent of the entire world's market cap.

0:37:56.040 --> 0:38:01.359
<v Speaker 4>Will they be attacked by governments? Will they attack each other,

0:38:01.800 --> 0:38:05.680
<v Speaker 4>grow into each other's markets and beat down their profit margins.

0:38:06.200 --> 0:38:12.360
<v Speaker 4>Will new technologies arise and n run the iPhone or whatever?

0:38:13.280 --> 0:38:13.880
<v Speaker 3>Who knows?

0:38:14.800 --> 0:38:18.240
<v Speaker 4>I noticed back in the nifty to fifty of nineteen

0:38:18.280 --> 0:38:23.560
<v Speaker 4>seventy two, that's when fifty high quality companies like Coca

0:38:23.560 --> 0:38:28.400
<v Speaker 4>Cola and IBM went to a fifty percent premium in

0:38:28.440 --> 0:38:31.000
<v Speaker 4>fair value against the market. It's the one time when

0:38:31.080 --> 0:38:33.839
<v Speaker 4>quality stocks had a huge bubble, and one of the

0:38:33.880 --> 0:38:37.080
<v Speaker 4>reasons was that none of them had failed. There were

0:38:37.120 --> 0:38:39.920
<v Speaker 4>no failures in the nifty to fifty group for fifteen

0:38:40.000 --> 0:38:44.280
<v Speaker 4>years prior to nineteen seventy two, and after nineteen seventy

0:38:44.320 --> 0:38:47.560
<v Speaker 4>two they actually started to die off like flies. We

0:38:47.640 --> 0:38:51.920
<v Speaker 4>had Avon, we had Polaroid, we had Exxon, we had

0:38:51.960 --> 0:38:56.840
<v Speaker 4>Eastman Kodak, we had IBM half wounded, seriously wounded, i

0:38:56.880 --> 0:38:57.399
<v Speaker 4>should say.

0:38:57.640 --> 0:39:00.880
<v Speaker 3>And on it went. They lost their match, and they.

0:39:00.760 --> 0:39:04.399
<v Speaker 4>Lost their huge premium uh and and they and they

0:39:04.400 --> 0:39:06.680
<v Speaker 4>did not and they underperformed badly.

0:39:06.440 --> 0:39:08.040
<v Speaker 3>For a decade.

0:39:08.960 --> 0:39:15.759
<v Speaker 4>Will that happen to these new nifty seven That's the

0:39:15.880 --> 0:39:20.560
<v Speaker 4>question that is unanswerable, I think, because each one of

0:39:20.600 --> 0:39:25.440
<v Speaker 4>them depends on a completely different slice of the economy.

0:39:25.880 --> 0:39:30.520
<v Speaker 4>Tesla has relatively little in common with Apple. Both of

0:39:30.560 --> 0:39:34.880
<v Speaker 4>them are you know, Tesla's a metal basher. Apple is

0:39:34.880 --> 0:39:36.719
<v Speaker 4>a metal basher with lots of software.

0:39:37.360 --> 0:39:42.840
<v Speaker 3>And then you move into the into the.

0:39:43.560 --> 0:39:51.560
<v Speaker 4>Software enterprises, the Googles and Amazons and facebooks. It's a

0:39:51.640 --> 0:39:55.480
<v Speaker 4>very complicated set of issues and to which I don't

0:39:55.520 --> 0:39:58.560
<v Speaker 4>have the answer, but I have pretty much faith that

0:39:58.680 --> 0:40:02.239
<v Speaker 4>in aggregate when you add them to the market and

0:40:02.640 --> 0:40:05.680
<v Speaker 4>you look at the price. You can't get blood out

0:40:05.680 --> 0:40:10.480
<v Speaker 4>of a stone if you've sent, if you've sent the

0:40:10.560 --> 0:40:17.399
<v Speaker 4>Shiller pe up towards thirty, you are unlikely to get

0:40:17.440 --> 0:40:22.040
<v Speaker 4>more than a three percent real return out of that

0:40:22.280 --> 0:40:26.520
<v Speaker 4>is the reciprocal of thirty. And the market really expect

0:40:26.680 --> 0:40:31.640
<v Speaker 4>twice there, doesn't it? So sooner or later? The simple

0:40:31.640 --> 0:40:35.800
<v Speaker 4>arithmetics suggests you'll either have a dismal return forever, or

0:40:35.840 --> 0:40:38.760
<v Speaker 4>you'll have a nice bear market and then a normal return.

0:40:39.920 --> 0:40:44.080
<v Speaker 4>And the nice bear market will be hopefully less than

0:40:44.120 --> 0:40:46.720
<v Speaker 4>a fifty percent declimb, but it won't be a huge

0:40:46.719 --> 0:40:50.120
<v Speaker 4>amount less from the peak than fifty percent in real

0:40:50.200 --> 0:40:51.120
<v Speaker 4>turn in real terms.

0:40:51.360 --> 0:40:54.040
<v Speaker 2>Okay, Well, I think we've established where the bubbles still are,

0:40:55.440 --> 0:40:59.000
<v Speaker 2>but hopefully we can discuss some opportunities. I mean, obviously

0:40:59.000 --> 0:41:01.279
<v Speaker 2>every does everyone does. Don't want to be entirely in cash,

0:41:01.320 --> 0:41:04.719
<v Speaker 2>and they wouldn't be particularly healthy either. Where should people

0:41:04.760 --> 0:41:07.239
<v Speaker 2>be putting their money at the moment? I suspect you're

0:41:07.239 --> 0:41:08.400
<v Speaker 2>going to say value.

0:41:09.960 --> 0:41:14.839
<v Speaker 4>Well, if you've spent forty years running down interest rates

0:41:14.920 --> 0:41:20.920
<v Speaker 4>until recently, you've basically spent forty years pushing up assets

0:41:21.040 --> 0:41:24.880
<v Speaker 4>led by real estate, as we've said, but everything eventually

0:41:24.880 --> 0:41:27.520
<v Speaker 4>follows for the same for the same logic. If I'm

0:41:27.560 --> 0:41:30.000
<v Speaker 4>paid a negative return in the piggy bank, I'd better

0:41:30.200 --> 0:41:34.160
<v Speaker 4>reach for yield and so on, and that game has

0:41:34.200 --> 0:41:40.200
<v Speaker 4>gone on. So global real estate is universally overpriced. Farms

0:41:40.239 --> 0:41:41.960
<v Speaker 4>and forests, you know.

0:41:42.280 --> 0:41:47.880
<v Speaker 3>Fine art universally overpriced. The aberration is the stock markets

0:41:47.960 --> 0:41:54.600
<v Speaker 3>outside the US. Why were they so ordinary? Is slightly

0:41:54.600 --> 0:41:55.600
<v Speaker 3>bewildering to me.

0:41:58.600 --> 0:42:01.960
<v Speaker 4>I suppose two thousand the tag bubble was a bit similar,

0:42:02.480 --> 0:42:06.640
<v Speaker 4>but it seems a little implausible that your typical assets

0:42:06.719 --> 0:42:11.680
<v Speaker 4>like real estate would become overpriced everywhere from Canada to Australia.

0:42:11.760 --> 0:42:14.520
<v Speaker 4>And yet in the stock market most of the most

0:42:14.560 --> 0:42:20.840
<v Speaker 4>of the markets were kind of overpriced, but ordinary, ordinarily

0:42:21.719 --> 0:42:25.919
<v Speaker 4>ordinarily overpriced, and a few were underprised then and they

0:42:25.960 --> 0:42:31.040
<v Speaker 4>were investible, and not just emerging markets. But the developed

0:42:31.080 --> 0:42:35.719
<v Speaker 4>world outside the US was investible and is investible, so.

0:42:35.880 --> 0:42:39.759
<v Speaker 2>Japan, most of Europe, the UK there is. I mean,

0:42:39.800 --> 0:42:42.080
<v Speaker 2>we always look at the UK and Japan, John, and

0:42:42.080 --> 0:42:43.960
<v Speaker 2>I think they are the cheapest markets.

0:42:44.560 --> 0:42:48.560
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, they look two amongst the cheaper ones for sure.

0:42:49.080 --> 0:42:52.759
<v Speaker 4>And emerging is of course very complicated with China, but

0:42:53.320 --> 0:42:57.759
<v Speaker 4>in general the rest of the world seems investible. Do

0:42:57.880 --> 0:43:02.200
<v Speaker 4>your analysis, you know, make your mistake, but it's reasonable.

0:43:04.000 --> 0:43:07.120
<v Speaker 4>So don't invest in real estate, don't invest in the US.

0:43:07.200 --> 0:43:09.080
<v Speaker 4>And if you have to invest in the US, and

0:43:09.160 --> 0:43:14.400
<v Speaker 4>most institutions do, I would urge you to take a

0:43:14.400 --> 0:43:18.600
<v Speaker 4>good look at quality. Quality has been the mispriced asset

0:43:19.040 --> 0:43:24.719
<v Speaker 4>for one hundred years. The triple A bond everyone understands,

0:43:24.880 --> 0:43:28.280
<v Speaker 4>will pay you one percent less. The triple A stock

0:43:28.320 --> 0:43:31.799
<v Speaker 4>has paid you half a percent more. Now, what the

0:43:31.840 --> 0:43:34.799
<v Speaker 4>heck is that? Actually, I can explain it. They are

0:43:34.840 --> 0:43:37.759
<v Speaker 4>performing band markets. They underperform in ball markets. Why do

0:43:37.800 --> 0:43:41.279
<v Speaker 4>they underperform in bullmarkes because they're boring. In a ballmarket,

0:43:41.360 --> 0:43:44.800
<v Speaker 4>you want to earn Tesla, You want to own Meme stocks,

0:43:44.800 --> 0:43:48.319
<v Speaker 4>you want to earn what's flying. You don't want to

0:43:48.360 --> 0:43:52.000
<v Speaker 4>own Coca Cola. It's just too boring. In the long run,

0:43:52.040 --> 0:43:54.440
<v Speaker 4>Coca Cola does very well in the bear markets. They

0:43:54.480 --> 0:43:58.879
<v Speaker 4>do particularly on air. But that's a free lunch. It's

0:43:58.920 --> 0:44:01.520
<v Speaker 4>the only free lunch of totally missed by the pressure

0:44:01.800 --> 0:44:05.480
<v Speaker 4>and farmers of the world. Back in the day, they

0:44:05.520 --> 0:44:08.120
<v Speaker 4>were quite correctly saying price the book wins because it's

0:44:08.120 --> 0:44:08.880
<v Speaker 4>a risk factor.

0:44:08.920 --> 0:44:10.240
<v Speaker 3>Of course, it's a risk factor.

0:44:10.800 --> 0:44:14.640
<v Speaker 4>Price the book is the marker's description of who's got

0:44:14.680 --> 0:44:20.920
<v Speaker 4>the junkiest, ugliest assets. Pe is the market's judgment on

0:44:20.960 --> 0:44:24.120
<v Speaker 4>who's got the flakeyst dourneys, et c. But when it

0:44:24.160 --> 0:44:27.279
<v Speaker 4>comes to quality, they have less risk of every kind.

0:44:27.320 --> 0:44:30.840
<v Speaker 4>They have less debt, they go bankrupt less, they have

0:44:30.920 --> 0:44:32.800
<v Speaker 4>less volatility, they have a lower beta.

0:44:33.000 --> 0:44:35.480
<v Speaker 3>Yet they outperform. That is a free lunch.

0:44:35.560 --> 0:44:37.760
<v Speaker 2>And they're not hideously overpriced at the moment.

0:44:39.080 --> 0:44:39.880
<v Speaker 3>Absolutely not.

0:44:40.160 --> 0:44:44.359
<v Speaker 4>No, they've moderately outperformed for the last year, the last

0:44:44.360 --> 0:44:46.440
<v Speaker 4>ten years, the last fifty years, and the last one

0:44:46.520 --> 0:44:52.160
<v Speaker 4>hundred years. And I'm happy to say that my firm, GMO,

0:44:52.320 --> 0:44:55.360
<v Speaker 4>has made a big fuss about them from the very beginning.

0:44:55.760 --> 0:44:58.640
<v Speaker 4>They play a big role in our value models, and

0:44:58.680 --> 0:45:01.520
<v Speaker 4>we have a fund a very good job of thinking

0:45:01.560 --> 0:45:04.480
<v Speaker 4>about how to treat them, which wants to buy and

0:45:04.520 --> 0:45:06.640
<v Speaker 4>what really constitutes quality.

0:45:07.080 --> 0:45:07.520
<v Speaker 3>Quality.

0:45:07.640 --> 0:45:10.920
<v Speaker 4>By the way, in a nutshell is your element of monopoly.

0:45:11.719 --> 0:45:16.160
<v Speaker 4>High returns, low debt. Low debt of course goes along

0:45:16.200 --> 0:45:19.840
<v Speaker 4>with the high stable returns. High stable returns is another

0:45:19.840 --> 0:45:22.800
<v Speaker 4>way of saying you're a price setter, and a price

0:45:22.840 --> 0:45:25.760
<v Speaker 4>setter is another way of saying you have a monopoly element.

0:45:27.560 --> 0:45:31.200
<v Speaker 4>And the amazing thing about the Magnificent Seven is they're

0:45:31.239 --> 0:45:34.400
<v Speaker 4>all global monopolies and they sprang out of the ground

0:45:34.400 --> 0:45:41.120
<v Speaker 4>pretty down quickly. And of course the Justice Department, the

0:45:41.360 --> 0:45:45.680
<v Speaker 4>anti monopoly element in the US and the UK, has

0:45:45.719 --> 0:45:49.680
<v Speaker 4>been largely sound asleep for the last twenty years. So

0:45:49.719 --> 0:45:52.880
<v Speaker 4>they've had a wonderful environment in which to operate, and

0:45:52.920 --> 0:45:56.480
<v Speaker 4>they had done a wonderful job of capitalizing on that

0:45:56.640 --> 0:45:57.760
<v Speaker 4>and moving very fast.

0:45:58.880 --> 0:46:01.960
<v Speaker 2>Okay, I wanted to ask you about the investing in

0:46:02.000 --> 0:46:04.720
<v Speaker 2>the energy transition. We've been looking at the renewable stocks,

0:46:04.719 --> 0:46:06.359
<v Speaker 2>and obviously you have as well, and they've been having

0:46:06.360 --> 0:46:09.480
<v Speaker 2>a fairly torrid time recently, the wind and solar companies,

0:46:09.680 --> 0:46:13.239
<v Speaker 2>and you might have expected something rather different given the

0:46:13.520 --> 0:46:16.600
<v Speaker 2>rush to zero across the world. I wondered if you

0:46:16.640 --> 0:46:18.680
<v Speaker 2>had any thoughts on how to invest or not to

0:46:18.719 --> 0:46:19.960
<v Speaker 2>invest in the transition.

0:46:21.440 --> 0:46:27.160
<v Speaker 4>The thing about transitions is they're very tricky, characterized by

0:46:27.320 --> 0:46:31.640
<v Speaker 4>even more booms and busts than anywhere else, and so

0:46:32.480 --> 0:46:37.080
<v Speaker 4>oil and alternative energy will will be a trickier area

0:46:37.160 --> 0:46:44.600
<v Speaker 4>than most climate resources. The same the thing about climate investing, however,

0:46:44.760 --> 0:46:48.480
<v Speaker 4>is that they will have an enormous top line revenue advantage.

0:46:48.560 --> 0:46:52.600
<v Speaker 4>Other things being even the countries of the world finally

0:46:53.560 --> 0:46:54.560
<v Speaker 4>have woken up.

0:46:55.120 --> 0:46:58.120
<v Speaker 3>And maybe a few of are in the process of still.

0:46:58.280 --> 0:47:03.279
<v Speaker 4>Waking up, to get the idea that climate is a

0:47:03.280 --> 0:47:05.560
<v Speaker 4>big problem and needs to be addressed, and they are

0:47:05.600 --> 0:47:08.920
<v Speaker 4>beginning to address it and throw money at it subsidies

0:47:08.960 --> 0:47:10.480
<v Speaker 4>mainly instead of a carbon tax.

0:47:10.520 --> 0:47:15.040
<v Speaker 3>But you can't expect perfection, and so going back to.

0:47:15.320 --> 0:47:18.200
<v Speaker 2>Now, I have to interrupt you there. Your preferred way

0:47:18.200 --> 0:47:20.920
<v Speaker 2>of dealing with this would be a blanket carbon tax

0:47:21.000 --> 0:47:24.000
<v Speaker 2>on everything, and that would let the market sort this

0:47:24.040 --> 0:47:26.200
<v Speaker 2>out for itself, whereas the subseas are a much more

0:47:26.200 --> 0:47:27.359
<v Speaker 2>inefficient way of doing it.

0:47:28.360 --> 0:47:32.080
<v Speaker 4>Absolutely, I'm not a great believer in economists as general.

0:47:32.120 --> 0:47:34.320
<v Speaker 4>I think they've lost the plot for the last seventy years.

0:47:34.760 --> 0:47:37.480
<v Speaker 4>They've forgotten their job description, which is to be useful.

0:47:38.239 --> 0:47:43.279
<v Speaker 4>That they drown in assumptions and closed systems, which are

0:47:43.520 --> 0:47:48.160
<v Speaker 4>largely speaking irrelevant for everything except their reputation inside their industry.

0:47:48.640 --> 0:47:51.279
<v Speaker 3>But they have gotten one thing right.

0:47:51.360 --> 0:47:56.200
<v Speaker 4>They all agree that a carbon tax is the vastly

0:47:56.239 --> 0:48:00.840
<v Speaker 4>more efficient way to address climate change produce a source

0:48:00.840 --> 0:48:04.319
<v Speaker 4>of very useful government revenue, but it's supposed by a

0:48:04.400 --> 0:48:10.320
<v Speaker 4>very powerful industry which has, particularly in America, enormous political influence,

0:48:10.800 --> 0:48:14.799
<v Speaker 4>and therefore it's very hard to do it. And each

0:48:14.840 --> 0:48:20.040
<v Speaker 4>of the oily countries have a lot of political influence,

0:48:20.920 --> 0:48:27.520
<v Speaker 4>so Australia, Canada, the UK, and of course in spades

0:48:28.000 --> 0:48:28.640
<v Speaker 4>in the US.

0:48:28.880 --> 0:48:30.520
<v Speaker 3>But I just wanted to finish that.

0:48:30.880 --> 0:48:33.200
<v Speaker 4>You asked a question what to invest in, and I said,

0:48:33.360 --> 0:48:36.040
<v Speaker 4>if you have to invest in the US, look at quality.

0:48:36.080 --> 0:48:41.200
<v Speaker 4>But also climate change is going to outgrow the rest

0:48:41.640 --> 0:48:45.000
<v Speaker 4>of the economy by a lot. It's going to dominate

0:48:45.080 --> 0:48:48.840
<v Speaker 4>investing and the need for money for the next many decades.

0:48:49.680 --> 0:48:54.000
<v Speaker 4>It doesn't mean though it won't have an element of commodities.

0:48:54.000 --> 0:48:57.959
<v Speaker 4>Commodities break your heart because just as they're doing well,

0:48:58.000 --> 0:49:01.279
<v Speaker 4>they have a wipeout for eighteen months and then they

0:49:01.320 --> 0:49:04.759
<v Speaker 4>go roaring back to a new high. It's intrinsically a difficult,

0:49:04.880 --> 0:49:10.200
<v Speaker 4>dangerous area, but it will have enormous growth potential. And

0:49:10.280 --> 0:49:14.640
<v Speaker 4>so if you can find a competent source of investors,

0:49:15.239 --> 0:49:18.600
<v Speaker 4>I would of course recommend climate change over the rest

0:49:18.680 --> 0:49:19.800
<v Speaker 4>of the US market.

0:49:20.120 --> 0:49:23.560
<v Speaker 2>Okay, And is there anything to be said for investing

0:49:23.560 --> 0:49:25.560
<v Speaker 2>in the oil companies on the basis that we're going

0:49:25.600 --> 0:49:28.120
<v Speaker 2>to need oil for many, many years to come, but

0:49:28.360 --> 0:49:32.520
<v Speaker 2>supply is constrained, and so you might get a fairly

0:49:32.600 --> 0:49:35.600
<v Speaker 2>long term supply of cash pouring off the oil companies,

0:49:35.600 --> 0:49:37.239
<v Speaker 2>possibly in the same way that you have of the

0:49:37.280 --> 0:49:40.440
<v Speaker 2>tobacco companies in the last couple of decades. That might

0:49:40.480 --> 0:49:44.160
<v Speaker 2>make a reasonable medium term investments people looking for income.

0:49:44.880 --> 0:49:50.280
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, no, it's quite possible. The trouble with commodities tobacco

0:49:50.480 --> 0:49:55.040
<v Speaker 4>was never a commodity for oil is is that everything

0:49:55.160 --> 0:49:58.000
<v Speaker 4>hinges on the marginal barrel. A couple of barrels too

0:49:58.040 --> 0:50:00.799
<v Speaker 4>many and the price goes down to thirty. Couple of

0:50:00.800 --> 0:50:03.479
<v Speaker 4>barrels too few and it goes to one hundred, and.

0:50:03.400 --> 0:50:04.760
<v Speaker 3>That will always be the case.

0:50:04.960 --> 0:50:09.800
<v Speaker 4>Now, the takeoff of evs, which represents a lot of oil,

0:50:10.840 --> 0:50:14.200
<v Speaker 4>is moving much faster than people are twiggering onto. The

0:50:14.360 --> 0:50:17.719
<v Speaker 4>US is lagging badly, but it's just left. From three

0:50:17.760 --> 0:50:20.520
<v Speaker 4>to eight this week will be eight percent of all

0:50:20.560 --> 0:50:23.359
<v Speaker 4>cart sold will be evs. But in the world at

0:50:23.360 --> 0:50:27.600
<v Speaker 4>general it's sixteen, in Europe over twenty, and in China

0:50:28.360 --> 0:50:31.879
<v Speaker 4>thirty five. It's the biggest market in the world. It's

0:50:31.880 --> 0:50:37.000
<v Speaker 4>thirty five and growing rapidly, which means within five years

0:50:37.719 --> 0:50:40.640
<v Speaker 4>oil demand will take a very big hit. And since

0:50:40.719 --> 0:50:45.160
<v Speaker 4>oil is determined on the margin, that would suggest that's

0:50:45.320 --> 0:50:49.560
<v Speaker 4>too many oil companies, too much oil capability in a

0:50:49.680 --> 0:50:53.320
<v Speaker 4>suddenly reduced demand world, which.

0:50:53.760 --> 0:50:56.680
<v Speaker 3>Typically would be absolute rack and ruin.

0:50:57.120 --> 0:51:00.520
<v Speaker 4>In the meantime, however, you have the following power paradox

0:51:00.880 --> 0:51:07.200
<v Speaker 4>that the faster you ramp up EV's wind solar, battery storage,

0:51:08.280 --> 0:51:11.560
<v Speaker 4>the faster you ramp up your demand for energy. Because

0:51:12.960 --> 0:51:18.800
<v Speaker 4>wind solar and storage are all resources upfront, energy up front,

0:51:19.000 --> 0:51:22.600
<v Speaker 4>labor upfront, capital upfront. Once you've put them in the ground,

0:51:23.000 --> 0:51:27.400
<v Speaker 4>it's practically free for the life span of the asset twenty.

0:51:27.120 --> 0:51:28.120
<v Speaker 3>Thirty forty years.

0:51:29.000 --> 0:51:33.800
<v Speaker 4>And EV's of course have the element built into their batteries,

0:51:33.840 --> 0:51:35.959
<v Speaker 4>which is a very big chunk of the total.

0:51:36.400 --> 0:51:38.840
<v Speaker 3>So they are much more money up front.

0:51:38.960 --> 0:51:42.840
<v Speaker 4>They're incidentally more affected by the rise of interest rates,

0:51:42.880 --> 0:51:44.040
<v Speaker 4>which is the.

0:51:44.000 --> 0:51:45.000
<v Speaker 3>Short term problem.

0:51:45.640 --> 0:51:48.920
<v Speaker 4>But what it means is we have an enormous demand

0:51:49.000 --> 0:51:53.399
<v Speaker 4>for resources, really outside our ability to meet it consistently.

0:51:54.239 --> 0:51:56.680
<v Speaker 4>In the next few years. We have to invent our

0:51:56.719 --> 0:52:00.759
<v Speaker 4>way around. We have to substitute for these resources. We

0:52:00.840 --> 0:52:03.560
<v Speaker 4>have to find cheaper ways of extracting them, and so

0:52:03.640 --> 0:52:07.040
<v Speaker 4>on and so forth. And even so, the prices will

0:52:07.080 --> 0:52:12.640
<v Speaker 4>be in their usual volatile way going higher, lithium, propper, cobalt,

0:52:12.719 --> 0:52:16.799
<v Speaker 4>nickel being critical four. But energy is more important even

0:52:16.880 --> 0:52:21.080
<v Speaker 4>than that, and there will be a terrible push on

0:52:21.120 --> 0:52:25.040
<v Speaker 4>the demand for energy. And a lot of that is oil,

0:52:25.120 --> 0:52:26.759
<v Speaker 4>a lot of it is gas, a lot of it

0:52:26.800 --> 0:52:31.440
<v Speaker 4>is cold, but it will be fairly remsseless pressure. And

0:52:31.480 --> 0:52:36.040
<v Speaker 4>the question is where do you go ramping up from

0:52:36.440 --> 0:52:42.120
<v Speaker 4>sixteen percent evs to the global fleet being sixties, say,

0:52:42.560 --> 0:52:47.120
<v Speaker 4>somewhere in that range. The tipping point comes where the

0:52:47.160 --> 0:52:53.200
<v Speaker 4>squeeze on oil upwards becomes a consistent squeeze.

0:52:52.760 --> 0:52:53.799
<v Speaker 3>On oil downwards.

0:52:54.800 --> 0:52:57.799
<v Speaker 4>And I don't know, it's a sensitive business. I don't

0:52:57.800 --> 0:53:01.080
<v Speaker 4>know exactly where that inflection point will come. But you

0:53:01.120 --> 0:53:03.440
<v Speaker 4>should not be surprised if the price of oil doesn't

0:53:03.440 --> 0:53:06.360
<v Speaker 4>go over one hundred maybe once or twice in the

0:53:06.400 --> 0:53:10.080
<v Speaker 4>next five years. And you should not be surprised, No,

0:53:10.600 --> 0:53:13.080
<v Speaker 4>you should be amazed if the price of oil does

0:53:13.120 --> 0:53:16.319
<v Speaker 4>not then have a long term crutch, and it will

0:53:16.440 --> 0:53:20.080
<v Speaker 4>run down to a level where the Saudi's or somebody

0:53:20.160 --> 0:53:23.720
<v Speaker 4>will be able to grind out forty five dollars oil

0:53:24.080 --> 0:53:24.800
<v Speaker 4>into the setting.

0:53:24.880 --> 0:53:28.680
<v Speaker 3>Sup. That's how I think the game will end.

0:53:28.920 --> 0:53:30.920
<v Speaker 2>It's interesting as mat you talk about this, that she

0:53:31.120 --> 0:53:33.239
<v Speaker 2>demand for resources up front, I think is something that

0:53:33.719 --> 0:53:36.520
<v Speaker 2>people are only just beginning to grasp that in order

0:53:36.560 --> 0:53:38.799
<v Speaker 2>to get to the clean side, we have to do

0:53:38.840 --> 0:53:41.440
<v Speaker 2>a lot of really really grubby stuff first.

0:53:41.840 --> 0:53:45.240
<v Speaker 4>Really really grubby stuff. And even in the long run,

0:53:45.719 --> 0:53:48.920
<v Speaker 4>you need a lot of metals which are grubby in

0:53:49.040 --> 0:53:52.560
<v Speaker 4>order to get to a green world. Sorry guys, sorry,

0:53:52.719 --> 0:53:53.480
<v Speaker 4>you purists.

0:53:54.320 --> 0:53:55.680
<v Speaker 3>There is no way around that one.

0:53:55.719 --> 0:53:57.120
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, there's no clean root to clean.

0:53:58.280 --> 0:53:59.680
<v Speaker 3>No interesting.

0:54:00.000 --> 0:54:01.359
<v Speaker 2>I let you go in to check out. I've catch

0:54:01.400 --> 0:54:02.960
<v Speaker 2>you longer than I promised, but I wanted to ask

0:54:03.000 --> 0:54:05.280
<v Speaker 2>you one last thing, which is when we last spoke,

0:54:05.960 --> 0:54:07.880
<v Speaker 2>you said the Foundation was putting an awful lot of

0:54:07.880 --> 0:54:10.200
<v Speaker 2>money into venture capital, and that was the place where

0:54:10.239 --> 0:54:15.320
<v Speaker 2>you still thought that American exceptionalism was absolutely on. Do

0:54:15.360 --> 0:54:17.600
<v Speaker 2>you still feel like that about the bench capital and industry?

0:54:17.640 --> 0:54:19.719
<v Speaker 2>And we talked about it a little earlier in our conversation,

0:54:19.800 --> 0:54:21.759
<v Speaker 2>but I wanted to come back to you and how

0:54:21.800 --> 0:54:22.640
<v Speaker 2>you've been investing.

0:54:23.880 --> 0:54:29.480
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, no, obviously, venture capital participated in the bubble, had

0:54:29.520 --> 0:54:34.040
<v Speaker 4>a huge run up in prices twenty twenty twenty twenty one,

0:54:34.360 --> 0:54:38.640
<v Speaker 4>and we'll have a fairly high price to pay over.

0:54:38.480 --> 0:54:39.799
<v Speaker 3>The next year or so.

0:54:40.239 --> 0:54:43.360
<v Speaker 4>But in the long run, it is amazing the quality

0:54:43.600 --> 0:54:48.000
<v Speaker 4>of the people the American BC industry attracts. It's getting

0:54:48.040 --> 0:54:50.080
<v Speaker 4>the best and the brightest who used to go into

0:54:50.080 --> 0:54:53.560
<v Speaker 4>consulting or Goldman SAG and now they go into VC

0:54:54.160 --> 0:54:56.800
<v Speaker 4>and startups, and they come from all over the world.

0:54:57.360 --> 0:55:00.200
<v Speaker 4>At least a quarter of the bosses of all the

0:55:00.280 --> 0:55:04.760
<v Speaker 4>VC companies we talk to were not born in America.

0:55:05.680 --> 0:55:09.560
<v Speaker 4>And what an achievement for the US. We have the

0:55:09.600 --> 0:55:13.880
<v Speaker 4>great research universities fifteen of the twenty and most of

0:55:13.920 --> 0:55:16.960
<v Speaker 4>the rest are in the UK, but the fifteen great

0:55:17.000 --> 0:55:21.319
<v Speaker 4>research universities are the bedrock for so many of these vcs.

0:55:21.480 --> 0:55:25.160
<v Speaker 4>And you add that to a societal attitude taking risk

0:55:25.239 --> 0:55:28.640
<v Speaker 4>in the US is simply much better than Europe. We

0:55:29.120 --> 0:55:32.120
<v Speaker 4>will forgive people a failure. If they go into a

0:55:32.160 --> 0:55:35.080
<v Speaker 4>startup and they fail, and they come back four years

0:55:35.120 --> 0:55:39.640
<v Speaker 4>later with another bright idea, they'll get funded and it

0:55:39.680 --> 0:55:41.919
<v Speaker 4>will hang over their heads. In most parts of the world,

0:55:42.000 --> 0:55:44.239
<v Speaker 4>if you fail but not in the US now we

0:55:44.280 --> 0:55:47.839
<v Speaker 4>have a wonderful aggressive attitude to risk taking, and we

0:55:47.880 --> 0:55:52.200
<v Speaker 4>need to because the whole future of transferring to green

0:55:52.920 --> 0:55:55.120
<v Speaker 4>is a thousand problems.

0:55:55.480 --> 0:55:56.160
<v Speaker 3>Need to solve it.

0:55:56.440 --> 0:56:00.600
<v Speaker 4>We need entrepreneurs, we need research, we need break throughs,

0:56:01.400 --> 0:56:04.839
<v Speaker 4>and we need to keep moving fast. And in the end,

0:56:05.600 --> 0:56:09.960
<v Speaker 4>the theory should be that VC, because it's riskier, has

0:56:10.000 --> 0:56:13.080
<v Speaker 4>more failures. Because it has more failures and more risk,

0:56:13.120 --> 0:56:16.600
<v Speaker 4>it should have a higher return and the practices that

0:56:16.680 --> 0:56:17.200
<v Speaker 4>it has.

0:56:18.120 --> 0:56:19.839
<v Speaker 3>If you look at the database for.

0:56:19.800 --> 0:56:24.000
<v Speaker 4>The last twenty years, VC has the highest return, as

0:56:24.040 --> 0:56:28.799
<v Speaker 4>it should of any sector in the marketplace. So to

0:56:28.880 --> 0:56:32.000
<v Speaker 4>be into GREENBC is to go into the highest return

0:56:32.120 --> 0:56:38.440
<v Speaker 4>sector with the biggest support from global governments and the US.

0:56:38.880 --> 0:56:42.680
<v Speaker 2>That's a yes, then, I think, Jered. I ask every

0:56:42.680 --> 0:56:43.400
<v Speaker 2>one of our guests.

0:56:44.280 --> 0:56:47.480
<v Speaker 3>I ask every one of my guests recommended a warm recommendation.

0:56:47.800 --> 0:56:49.759
<v Speaker 2>I ask every one of my guests before I let

0:56:49.840 --> 0:56:52.480
<v Speaker 2>them go, the same question. I'm embarrassed to ask you this,

0:56:52.560 --> 0:56:54.719
<v Speaker 2>but as I ask everybody, I have to ask you

0:56:54.760 --> 0:56:58.239
<v Speaker 2>as well. I hope you don't mind. If if I

0:56:58.320 --> 0:57:00.960
<v Speaker 2>was only going to give you one thing to keep

0:57:01.040 --> 0:57:04.120
<v Speaker 2>for ten years, and I gave you a choice of

0:57:04.480 --> 0:57:12.440
<v Speaker 2>only three things, gold, bitcoin, or cash on deposit, what

0:57:12.440 --> 0:57:12.920
<v Speaker 2>would it be?

0:57:14.360 --> 0:57:15.080
<v Speaker 3>I take gold.

0:57:15.239 --> 0:57:18.920
<v Speaker 4>I'm not happy with gold, but in a world where

0:57:18.960 --> 0:57:23.080
<v Speaker 4>inflation could come back, I think I'll take gold. Bitcoins

0:57:23.120 --> 0:57:28.600
<v Speaker 4>of course an elaborate scam. Really, but gold is the

0:57:29.040 --> 0:57:30.760
<v Speaker 4>least bad of the three.

0:57:30.760 --> 0:57:33.919
<v Speaker 2>Brilliant least bad is good enough for me. Jeremy, thank

0:57:33.920 --> 0:57:34.479
<v Speaker 2>you so much.

0:57:35.280 --> 0:57:36.800
<v Speaker 3>No, you're very welcome.

0:57:40.240 --> 0:57:42.360
<v Speaker 2>Thanks for listening to this week's Marin Talks Money. We'll

0:57:42.360 --> 0:57:45.480
<v Speaker 2>be back next week. Catch our debrief on this week's

0:57:45.480 --> 0:57:48.120
<v Speaker 2>conversation on the Merin Talks Money after show under the

0:57:48.160 --> 0:57:50.919
<v Speaker 2>Apple subscription feed in the meantime, If you like our show,

0:57:51.000 --> 0:57:53.720
<v Speaker 2>rate review and subscribe wherever you listen to your podcasts.

0:57:53.920 --> 0:57:56.400
<v Speaker 2>This episode was hosted by me Maren Sunset Web. It

0:57:56.440 --> 0:57:59.560
<v Speaker 2>was produced by some Siety. Additional editing by Blake Maple's.

0:58:00.080 --> 0:58:03.640
<v Speaker 2>Thanks of course to Jeremy grants them and to John Steppeck. Finally,

0:58:03.760 --> 0:58:06.760
<v Speaker 2>be sure to sign up to John's daily newsletter, Money Distilled.

0:58:07.000 --> 0:58:08.760
<v Speaker 2>I know I always say that you won't regret it,

0:58:08.800 --> 0:58:11.640
<v Speaker 2>but trust me, you really really won't. The link is

0:58:11.680 --> 0:58:12.520
<v Speaker 2>in this show notes