Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.
Speaker 1: Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host,
Speaker 1: Johnathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio
Speaker 1: and I love all things tech. This is the tech
Speaker 1: news for September seventh one. It's a Tuesday, and we
Speaker 1: got a ton of stuff to cover, and a lot
Speaker 1: of it is pretty heavy, so let's get to it.
Speaker 1: Tech Times reports that the Russian government has cracked down
Speaker 1: on six virtual private network services as the country is
Speaker 1: nearing a parliamentary election. And virtual private networks a k a.
Speaker 1: VPNs have lots of different uses. A lot of companies
Speaker 1: use VPNs for employees to log into before they use
Speaker 1: corporate systems. One big reason to use VPNs is that
Speaker 1: it provides a shield when browsing stuff on the Internet.
Speaker 1: So the way it works from a very high level
Speaker 1: is you log into a VPN essentially a server, and
Speaker 1: then the VPN does all the info fetching for you.
Speaker 1: So to someone who is snooping from the outside looking
Speaker 1: at your connection, all they would see is that you
Speaker 1: were connected to a VPN. They wouldn't be able to
Speaker 1: see what you were doing beyond that. So if you
Speaker 1: were researching stuff. Maybe you're researching stuff that the government
Speaker 1: would disapprove of. Let's say you're in Russia and you
Speaker 1: wanted to research something that perhaps the government wasn't in
Speaker 1: favor of, Well, using a VPN, it would be very
Speaker 1: difficult for them to figure that out. Now, this is,
Speaker 1: of course, assuming that the VPN in question is encrypting
Speaker 1: all communications that are taking place and also taking appropriate
Speaker 1: steps to protect users. So if that's all true, then yeah,
Speaker 1: it stands as a way for people to access stuff
Speaker 1: without outsiders necessarily being privy to it. Anyway, if the
Speaker 1: government feels like this is a bad thing, then the
Speaker 1: really the easiest course of action is to block VPN
Speaker 1: services in that country, and that's what Russia has done.
Speaker 1: So those services include big names. If you've been listening
Speaker 1: to podcasts or watching videos, you probably heard some of
Speaker 1: these because they often advertise on those So it includes
Speaker 1: stuff like Nord VPN, Express VPN, i p Vanish VPN,
Speaker 1: Ola VPN, keep Solid VbN, and Speedify VPN. Now, according
Speaker 1: to Russian representatives, this whole move has nothing to do
Speaker 1: with the elections. It's to block services to curb a
Speaker 1: legal activity such as the spread of child pornography, which
Speaker 1: is frequently kind of the messaging that you will hear
Speaker 1: whenever any government starts to crack down on stuff like this.
Speaker 1: Russian representatives have also threatened companies like Google and Apple
Speaker 1: for allowing an app that was created by Alexey Naval
Speaker 1: these organization. He's a critic of Vladimir Putin, and so
Speaker 1: the you know, the fact that that's also happening in
Speaker 1: line with the shutdown of vp NS starts to kind
Speaker 1: of point towards reasons other than curbing a legal activity. Um.
Speaker 1: In fact, the Russian government has said that Google and
Speaker 1: Apple are essentially interfering with Russian elections, which, you know,
Speaker 1: if I can take a moment to add some opinion,
Speaker 1: that's pretty freaking rich coming from Russia, country that has
Speaker 1: interfered with elections around the world, including US elections a
Speaker 1: few times, and will no doubt continue to do so. Anyway,
Speaker 1: it's a good idea to pay attention to these sorts
Speaker 1: of things, because while it's happening in Russia right now,
Speaker 1: that country is only one of many that has political
Speaker 1: leaders trying to get a firmer grip on the flow
Speaker 1: of information. Some of those other countries are pretty darn
Speaker 1: close to home. Some of them might actually be home.
Speaker 1: A couple of weeks ago, I talk about the n
Speaker 1: s O Group. That's a company out of Israel that
Speaker 1: groups responsible for designing malware called Pegasus, and it allows
Speaker 1: an external user access to infected devices remotely. So in
Speaker 1: other words, if you infect a device with this malware,
Speaker 1: you then can access that device in various ways, including
Speaker 1: things like accessing a smartphones, microphone, and camera. Essentially, NSO
Speaker 1: Group creates software that turns various devices into and like
Speaker 1: you know, computers and smartphones into spies. That's what it
Speaker 1: really gets down to. It it allows for surveillance. The
Speaker 1: NSO Group markets this technology to various governments and does
Speaker 1: so under the protection of the Israeli government. That means
Speaker 1: that technically the n s A Group is not supposed
Speaker 1: to market this to any country that is on unfriendly
Speaker 1: terms with Israel. The company has shown a pretty blatant
Speaker 1: disregard for accountability. It has made claims that I argue
Speaker 1: our contradictory. For example, the company says it prohibits customers
Speaker 1: from misusing the malware to target say that customer's own
Speaker 1: citizens in an effort to exert authoritary and control. In
Speaker 1: other words, n s A group says, no, this is
Speaker 1: an order for us to protect against things like acts
Speaker 1: of terrorism, but there have been numerous reports saying that
Speaker 1: n s O groups customers include uh repressive and oppressive
Speaker 1: governments that are using that technology against journalists, activists and
Speaker 1: their own citizens. However, the company also says at the
Speaker 1: same time that it has no way of monitoring how
Speaker 1: its customers actually use its products, so that that ends
Speaker 1: up being a contradiction right there, saying Okay, well, we're
Speaker 1: only going to sell it to people who are using
Speaker 1: it properly. Also, there's no way for us to know
Speaker 1: how they're using it. Well, that's like n s O
Speaker 1: groups saying all right, here you go, but don't go
Speaker 1: using this in ways we don't approve of because there's
Speaker 1: no way for us to track you. Right Like that's
Speaker 1: the message there anyway. A an organization called Citizen Lab
Speaker 1: recently released a report. In fact, they've released a few,
Speaker 1: but the most recent report shows that it had identified
Speaker 1: nine activists in Bahrain who had their devices compromised by
Speaker 1: the n s O group Pegasus malware between June of
Speaker 1: twenty and February of this year, and one thing that
Speaker 1: makes this malware particularly effective is that it can infect
Speaker 1: iOS devices through what is called a zero click attack,
Speaker 1: essentially a message in I message, which means the target
Speaker 1: does not have to click on like a malicious link
Speaker 1: or anything like that to activate the malware. That means
Speaker 1: that the whole advice of don't click on any links
Speaker 1: you don't trust doesn't even apply here because it doesn't
Speaker 1: require a link. Like I literally, the morning that I'm
Speaker 1: recording this, I received a message on a different messaging
Speaker 1: service that was a link attack, like it was trying
Speaker 1: to get me to click on a link and to
Speaker 1: enter my credentials. They're fortunately, even early in the morning,
Speaker 1: before my coffee, I recognized it as an attack. Anyway.
Speaker 1: More human rights organizations are calling on n s O
Speaker 1: group to be held accountable for facilitating authoritarian acts and
Speaker 1: furthering the capabilities of repressive regimes. They pointed out that
Speaker 1: entities like the Bahraini government could use these tools to
Speaker 1: seek out, detain, and even torture targets that the government
Speaker 1: determines are you know, a problem, and by a problem,
Speaker 1: I mean people who just happened to disagree with the government,
Speaker 1: not necessarily someone who's like a terrorist or anything like that. So,
Speaker 1: like I said, a lot of journalists and diplomats have
Speaker 1: been targets of NSO groups Pegasus malware from various customers
Speaker 1: of n s O group, and it's an ongoing problem
Speaker 1: that just seems to be getting worse. All right, let's
Speaker 1: stay on theme because this next story ties in with
Speaker 1: both of the previous ones. Pro Publica has published a piece.
Speaker 1: It's a lot of alliteration there about WhatsApp and a
Speaker 1: contradiction in WhatsApps UH brand identity as a secure messaging platform. Alright, So,
Speaker 1: just in case you're not familiar, the elevator pitch for
Speaker 1: WhatsApp is that it is an end to end encrypted
Speaker 1: messaging service. That means that if you and a buddy
Speaker 1: are messaging and you're using WhatsApp, every message you send
Speaker 1: to your buddy is encrypted and can only be decrypted
Speaker 1: on the other end of that communication channel. Your buddy
Speaker 1: is the only person who has the correct decrypt key
Speaker 1: to read those messages. And then every message your buddy
Speaker 1: sends to you is also encrypted, and only you hold
Speaker 1: the decrypt key for those messages, so no one else
Speaker 1: can read them. The same is true for any images
Speaker 1: or videos, or links or anything else that's sent on
Speaker 1: WhatsApp between the two of you. And WhatsApp is an
Speaker 1: incredibly popular messaging service, not as much in the United States,
Speaker 1: but in other parts of the world very much so.
Speaker 1: So according to the company, no one outside of you
Speaker 1: and your buddy would be able to understand what your
Speaker 1: messages are, and that Facebook, which is the owner of WhatsApp,
Speaker 1: would not be able to see those messages. WhatsApp would
Speaker 1: not be able to have any idea of what it
Speaker 1: was you were sending between the two of you, because
Speaker 1: it would be encrypted, and so it's private and secure. However,
Speaker 1: the company also has hundreds of contract workers whose job
Speaker 1: it is to moderate or police content sent across WhatsApp,
Speaker 1: And you might think, wait a minute, how is it
Speaker 1: possible to moderate or police content if no one can
Speaker 1: see the unencrypted stuff except for the users involved. Well,
Speaker 1: there is one really big exception to this. If someone
Speaker 1: were to tag an incoming message as being against WhatsApps policies,
Speaker 1: Like you tag a message and you say that it's
Speaker 1: spam or that it's abusive, or you know, something along
Speaker 1: those lines, then that sends an alert to WhatsApp to
Speaker 1: review the communication. So some contract workers somewhere, maybe Austin, Texas,
Speaker 1: because there's a lot of them there, And this is
Speaker 1: a person who technically does not work for WhatsApp or
Speaker 1: for Facebook. They work for another company that serves as
Speaker 1: the kind of the employment center for these contract workers
Speaker 1: who then are contracting with WhatsApp. That person would be
Speaker 1: sent the unencrypted offending message from the receiver, as well
Speaker 1: as the four previous messages that preceded the one that
Speaker 1: allegedly was against the policy. So in other words, you know,
Speaker 1: if you receive a message, your side un encrypts that message.
Speaker 1: From that point forward, that message is in plain text.
Speaker 1: You can read it. So if someone were to get
Speaker 1: access to your phone, they could read all that content. Right,
Speaker 1: if they try to intercept the message, it would be encrypted,
Speaker 1: but once it's on your device, they can read it. Well,
Speaker 1: that's what this system does. If you flag something in WhatsApp,
Speaker 1: it sends the unencrypted message on for review. Now I
Speaker 1: point all this out because this is a sort of
Speaker 1: back door through the security mess measures, and you can
Speaker 1: kind of understand why it exists and that any platform
Speaker 1: wants to reassure its users that those users are going
Speaker 1: to be protected from harassment and other abuse. But on
Speaker 1: the other hand, backdoors through security systems are almost always
Speaker 1: a bad idea, and that's because of the possibility that
Speaker 1: someone somewhere is going to abuse that exception to the
Speaker 1: secure system and then turn it to nefarious purposes. Moreover,
Speaker 1: since What's Apps brand is so heavily geared towards, you know,
Speaker 1: privacy and security in communication, this really undermines the brand's position.
Speaker 1: It undermines the rand's actual identity. Pro Publica also points
Speaker 1: out that Facebook analyzes tons of metadata related to WhatsApp communications.
Speaker 1: Metadata In case you're not familiar with the term, that's
Speaker 1: information about information. So really it's all the stuff about
Speaker 1: a communication except for the content of the communication itself.
Speaker 1: Meta data can include who was involved in the communication,
Speaker 1: like which were the parties that we're talking with each other?
Speaker 1: What time were messages being sent back and forth? Where
Speaker 1: were people when they were actually sending information? You know,
Speaker 1: you pair it with like geolocation data, that kind of thing,
Speaker 1: and you can determine a lot of stuff through meta
Speaker 1: data analysis. You wouldn't know what the actual content of
Speaker 1: the messages were, but you might be able to hazard
Speaker 1: a guess just by examining enough meta data to figure out,
Speaker 1: you know, what's going on, and that too, is a
Speaker 1: huge threat to privacy and security. WhatsApp users were understandably
Speaker 1: really upset when Facebook first denounced that some data collected
Speaker 1: from WhatsApp would then be shared to Facebook proper, and
Speaker 1: that the company itself would get into hot water because
Speaker 1: reps from Facebook had previously sworn to EU officials that
Speaker 1: incorporating that kind of ability was technically impossible between WhatsApp
Speaker 1: and Facebook. They said, yeah, there's no way for us
Speaker 1: to do it, even if we wanted to. We don't
Speaker 1: want to want to, but even if we wanted to,
Speaker 1: we couldn't do it. Then they turned around and said, hey,
Speaker 1: guess what we're doing. So that was not, you know, consistent,
Speaker 1: But yeah, it's just something to keep in mind, and
Speaker 1: it helps remind us that most of Facebook's revenue depends
Speaker 1: upon the company collecting and then leveraging, or if you prefer,
Speaker 1: exploiting information about users. So with that in mind, it's
Speaker 1: a really safe bet to assume that any product coming
Speaker 1: out of Facebook contributes to that pursuit that even on
Speaker 1: the face of it, if it isn't all about acting
Speaker 1: your data in order to sell more stuff to you
Speaker 1: somewhere down the line. That is what's going on, because
Speaker 1: that's Facebook's business. That's how Facebook makes money. So yeah,
Speaker 1: important to know. And it also explains why Facebook was
Speaker 1: willing to shell out billions and billions of dollars to
Speaker 1: acquire WhatsApp in the first place. So all the things
Speaker 1: that people were worried about when Facebook did that are
Speaker 1: kind of manifesting or becoming evident. Yeah, so important to remember.
Speaker 1: We're gonna have some more stories that kind of relate
Speaker 1: back to some of the themes we've already talked about.
Speaker 1: I know it gets kind of dark and oppressive, but
Speaker 1: it's important to know about them. But hey, I don't
Speaker 1: know about you, but I could use a quick break.
Speaker 1: All right, we're back and it's time to go down
Speaker 1: on in Australia. Um, sorry, that was terrible. I had
Speaker 1: to introduce a little of ity with my terrible terrible
Speaker 1: Uh not even Australian accent, you can't even give it
Speaker 1: that much. But yeah, my terrible attempt. Because there's a
Speaker 1: new bill that's introducing some troubling powers for law enforcement
Speaker 1: with regard to online information in Australia. UH, there's this
Speaker 1: piece of legislation. It's called the Surveillance Legislation Amendment UH
Speaker 1: Parentheses Identify and Disrupt INDO Parentheses Bill, and it introduces
Speaker 1: three new powers for law enforcement. The first is that
Speaker 1: law enforcement will be able to obtain a quote data
Speaker 1: disruption warrant end quote and that in turn gives law
Speaker 1: enforcement the right to copy, delete, or modify data in
Speaker 1: order to disrupt it. Now, that alone is horrifying, and
Speaker 1: I'll get to why I find it horrifying in just
Speaker 1: a bit. But second, the second power is that law
Speaker 1: enforcement will be able to apply for and obtain a
Speaker 1: quote Network activit any warrant end quote that gives them
Speaker 1: the power to collect data from networks and devices that
Speaker 1: are believed to be used or maybe used with relation
Speaker 1: to illegal activity. The third power is that they can
Speaker 1: obtain an quote account takeover warrant end quote, and that
Speaker 1: would give them the authority to do exactly what that
Speaker 1: sounds like, to take over an account entirely in order
Speaker 1: to gather information on an investigation. So, for example, if
Speaker 1: you if the Australian Police think that you know Jimmy
Speaker 1: the crook is is involved in a criminal operation, which
Speaker 1: I mean seems logical because he's called Jimmy the Crook.
Speaker 1: Then they could take over They could get a warrant
Speaker 1: to take over Jimmy the Crook's Facebook profile and post
Speaker 1: as Jimmy the Crook in an effort to gather information
Speaker 1: about Jimmy the Crooks accomplices and potentially have like a
Speaker 1: full sting operation. But yeah, as you get down to it,
Speaker 1: this is all terrible, And again I totally get that
Speaker 1: for law enforcement, online communications stand as a huge challenge.
Speaker 1: Criminals can and do use all sorts of platforms to
Speaker 1: communicate and coordinate, and it can be a challenge to
Speaker 1: disrupt that, and it sure would be valuable to be
Speaker 1: able to go in there and manipulate stuff, perhaps setting
Speaker 1: up a sting operation to catch criminals in the act
Speaker 1: and bring them to justice. But these provisions give way
Speaker 1: too much power to law enforcement. So imagine that there's
Speaker 1: a legal process for the police to get a warrant,
Speaker 1: So they do have to at least go through the
Speaker 1: steps of getting a warrant, but let's assume that it's
Speaker 1: not too difficult to do that. So they go get
Speaker 1: a warrant and then they can go in and manipulate
Speaker 1: stuff that you have posted online. They can go in
Speaker 1: and change the things you have posted. Arguably, they could
Speaker 1: manipulate the stuff you post in such a way that
Speaker 1: you appear to have posted incriminating material when in fact
Speaker 1: you did not do any such thing. So an authoritarian
Speaker 1: government could literally manufacture evidence against you, and then you
Speaker 1: could be held accountable for something you never did. This
Speaker 1: is the equivalent of the trope you see, and usually
Speaker 1: it's in a comedy where a cop drops a brown
Speaker 1: paper bag next to someone that picks it up and says, well,
Speaker 1: what do we have here? Illicit drugs? It's kind of
Speaker 1: like that, but on the data side of things. Now,
Speaker 1: that's just one scenario in which this bill becomes a nightmare.
Speaker 1: But again, it wouldn't even take an authoritarian government for
Speaker 1: this to go wrong. Building in systems that would allow
Speaker 1: law enforcement to do these sorts of things means that
Speaker 1: you have to create vulnerabilities so that the police can
Speaker 1: go in and do it. Right, you have to have
Speaker 1: a way for police to access those platforms and those
Speaker 1: accounts in order to do this data manipulation. However, if
Speaker 1: you do that, if you create those vulnerabilities. It gives
Speaker 1: the chance for other people to potentially exploit those. Now
Speaker 1: I've used this analogy many times before, but here we go.
Speaker 1: It's like you've got a gold reserve and you store
Speaker 1: tons of gold bars in that reserve, and you've got
Speaker 1: this huge vault, and you have a solid vault door
Speaker 1: with like time locks and all this complicated stuff, and
Speaker 1: it's really it's like practically impossible to break through. However,
Speaker 1: you also include a little back door in the vault
Speaker 1: that's protected by a cheap padlock because you need to
Speaker 1: occasionally get into the vault and you don't want to
Speaker 1: go through the trouble of unlocking the big door. Well,
Speaker 1: anytime you create exceptions to a secure system, you essentially
Speaker 1: nullify the security. So no matter how you shake it,
Speaker 1: this bill is bad news. It creates far too much
Speaker 1: surveillance power on the law enforcement side, and it introduces
Speaker 1: the possibility for bad actors to take advantage of a
Speaker 1: system for their own purposes. Heck, it also means people
Speaker 1: can end up with a plausible alibi for all online communications,
Speaker 1: because if there exists a way to go in and
Speaker 1: change someone else's stuff online, perhaps even to the point
Speaker 1: of fabricating messages on behalf of another person. Well that
Speaker 1: what the waters are then moneyed right when it comes
Speaker 1: to holding someone accountable for their online actions, because you
Speaker 1: could conceivably argue that you never posted something incriminating because
Speaker 1: there is a system that exists that allows others to
Speaker 1: change what you post without your consent. So, in other words,
Speaker 1: it can actually weaken legal cases rather than strengthen them. Now,
Speaker 1: there's no word yet on how big I sps and
Speaker 1: platforms are going to work within this legislation in Australia.
Speaker 1: But this is the kind of stuff that really worries me,
Speaker 1: and the hits just keep on coming. So maybe you've
Speaker 1: heard of a service called proton mail. Maybe you use it.
Speaker 1: This email service uses end to end encryption to keep
Speaker 1: communications private between users, and just like WhatsApp, the service's
Speaker 1: reputation depends heavily upon that fact, the idea that your
Speaker 1: communications are secure through proton mail, and the bottom line
Speaker 1: is that you use proton mail to protect your communication
Speaker 1: from folks snooping on you. Well, now that services kind
Speaker 1: of on the hot seat in the public eye because
Speaker 1: proton Mail recently responded to a demand from police in
Speaker 1: Switzerland to give up the IP address belonging to a
Speaker 1: climate activist in France, which Proton Mail did. So why
Speaker 1: were the Swiss concerned about a French climate activist, Well,
Speaker 1: that's because the French authorities asked the Swiss for help.
Speaker 1: It was ultimately the French authorities that wanted to track
Speaker 1: down this activist who was responsible or you know, activists
Speaker 1: who are responsible for organizing various protests in France, high
Speaker 1: profile protests, and so these authorities called up their buddies
Speaker 1: in Switzerland and they said, hey, love the chocolate, do
Speaker 1: us a solid and lean on proton mail to give
Speaker 1: us the IP address for this activist. Okay, and the
Speaker 1: Swiss dead proton Mail, I should point out, is headquartered
Speaker 1: in Switzerland, and thus when the Swiss authorities came knocking,
Speaker 1: the company didn't really have a whole lot of options,
Speaker 1: at least from a legal standpoint, and the CEO of
Speaker 1: proton said as much that the company is legally bound
Speaker 1: to follow local laws, and so there was really no
Speaker 1: recourse other than to comply with the demand from the
Speaker 1: Swiss authorities. The actual communication and the email service remains encrypted,
Speaker 1: so the company legitimately cannot read any of the materials
Speaker 1: sent through those addresses. They cannot reveal what communications were set,
Speaker 1: Nor does proton mail have information on who owns a
Speaker 1: particular email address. But they can give you an IP
Speaker 1: address associated with a specific email address. They just can't
Speaker 1: say definitively this email address belongs to you know, Joan
Speaker 1: Smith or something. But as I mentioned earlier, metadata can
Speaker 1: reveal an awful lot about a person, So it's quite
Speaker 1: probable that French authorities are using the information to try
Speaker 1: and track down activists who have arranged those really effective
Speaker 1: protests in France around issues like affordable housing and climate concerns.
Speaker 1: So pretty scary stuff. Sticking with tech and politics, but
Speaker 1: now moving to the absurd. Business Insider reports that thirteen
Speaker 1: House Republicans in the United States sent a letter to
Speaker 1: Marissa Meyer, the quote president and chief executive officer of
Speaker 1: Yahoo in quote uh and they were saying that she
Speaker 1: should better well not hand over any personal information of
Speaker 1: you know, any Republicans or anyone really over to an
Speaker 1: investigative committee that's looking into the January six insurrection in Washington,
Speaker 1: d C. Only okay, hey, House Republicans, you thirteen folks.
Speaker 1: Marissa Meyer stepped down from Yahoo back in tween, so
Speaker 1: she hasn't been in charge of that company for several years.
Speaker 1: She wasn't in charge of the company during the whole
Speaker 1: lead up to the twenty election, let alone the insurrection
Speaker 1: on January six, and the fact that no one decided
Speaker 1: to fact check that or I don't know, do a
Speaker 1: simple Internet search. I mean they could have even used
Speaker 1: Yahoo to do it. That speaks volumes not just about
Speaker 1: tech literacy, but arguably just playing literacy. It's an embarrassing
Speaker 1: display of ignorance. Anyway. At the heart of the matter
Speaker 1: is the issue of one party in government power using
Speaker 1: its authority to demand information and records about another party,
Speaker 1: and doing so with companies like I s p s
Speaker 1: and social media platforms and companies that provide email and
Speaker 1: telecommunications companies and more. And to be clear, I think
Speaker 1: there is merit in that concern. I think we do
Speaker 1: need a thorough investigation into the January six riots, including
Speaker 1: an investigation into whether or not anyone in government facil
Speaker 1: ialitated or encourage the insurrection, into what degree as to
Speaker 1: whether or not it was a criminal degree. I think
Speaker 1: all of that needs to happen. However, I also think
Speaker 1: we have to be careful in how that investigation advances.
Speaker 1: Otherwise you could imagine a future in which whichever party
Speaker 1: happens to be in power can lean on companies in
Speaker 1: order to repress political opponents. That's not good. That's authoritarian,
Speaker 1: no matter which way you you subscribe politically. And anyone
Speaker 1: who has listened to me for a little while probably
Speaker 1: has a pretty good feel for where my personal politics are.
Speaker 1: So you know, it's not easy for me to necessarily
Speaker 1: side with conservatives about data surveillance, but some things I
Speaker 1: think need to be off the table. However, I also
Speaker 1: want to make clear those rules have to apply across
Speaker 1: the board, not just two Democrats who are looking into this,
Speaker 1: but period to everyone, for all time, because otherwise it
Speaker 1: becomes a free for all, and it's a nightmare. Now.
Speaker 1: I'm pretty sure that a few weeks ago I mentioned
Speaker 1: that El Salvador representatives were announcing that the company would
Speaker 1: make bitcoin its official currency that becomes effective today, and
Speaker 1: in preparation for that, El Salvador purchase around four hundred bitcoin.
Speaker 1: Would plans to buy a lot more in order to
Speaker 1: you know, make this transition. The four hundred bitcoin that
Speaker 1: El Salvador purchased amounts to around twenty million dollars in value.
Speaker 1: The country is aiming to make bitcoin legal tender alongside
Speaker 1: the US dollar, which until today had served as the
Speaker 1: nation's official currency. Citizens in El Salvador will at least
Speaker 1: theoretically be able to use bitcoin for all financial transactions
Speaker 1: within the country, including paying taxes. While cryptocurrency fans might
Speaker 1: be excited, the same is not true for citizens inside
Speaker 1: El Salvador. The majority of citizens have expressed concern about
Speaker 1: this change. Some point to the fact that criminals often
Speaker 1: rely on bitcoin in order to launder money from their
Speaker 1: illegal exploits, and that El Salvador has a history of corruption,
Speaker 1: including with the present government, and that might mean that
Speaker 1: that corruption is about to get a whole lot worse
Speaker 1: in that country. Other people in El Salvador are worried
Speaker 1: that the change is going to have a negative impact
Speaker 1: on their personal finances. The volatility of bitcoin is well established,
Speaker 1: and so there's a legit fear that stuff like pensions
Speaker 1: could get wiped out by another big dip in the
Speaker 1: bitcoin market, just like the one we saw earlier this year. Now,
Speaker 1: the currency has recovered quite a bit since it had
Speaker 1: that dip, it hasn't gotten back to the all time
Speaker 1: highs it was in in early spring, but it has
Speaker 1: recovered a lot of the value that it lost, but
Speaker 1: not all of it, and the value still is fluctuating
Speaker 1: quite a lot. As I record this. The government in
Speaker 1: El Salvador has had to respond to emerging issues during
Speaker 1: the adoption process, including putting a hold on a digital
Speaker 1: wallet app that's backed by the government. So it's the
Speaker 1: Hill El Salvador Bitcoin app, and it's been but on
Speaker 1: hold because of a high demand, a greater demand than
Speaker 1: they expected, and that it was starting to tax the servers.
Speaker 1: A significant population within El Salvador may not even be
Speaker 1: able to access the cryptocurrency at all because there is
Speaker 1: a significant digital divide in the country. So a lot
Speaker 1: of people have no computer or smartphone. They would have
Speaker 1: no way to access a digital wallet, which means they
Speaker 1: can't even participate in that part of the economy. Now,
Speaker 1: you might wonder why El Salvador is depending upon a
Speaker 1: currency like bitcoin at all, or why it was dependent
Speaker 1: upon the US dollar beforehand. Well, some countries like they're
Speaker 1: at a point where they would not be able to
Speaker 1: offer up a stable currency. It could be a currency
Speaker 1: that is uh that fluctuates wildly in value, which is
Speaker 1: not financially stable for all the people of that country.
Speaker 1: So they in this case El Salvador was dependent upon
Speaker 1: a larger, more stable uh country that of the United States.
Speaker 1: At least when we get to the value of the dollar,
Speaker 1: it's larger and more stable, uh. And that the switch
Speaker 1: to bitcoin means that you're no longer dependent upon another
Speaker 1: nation's currency. Bitcoin, of course is you know, it's it's
Speaker 1: agnostic as far as nationality is concerned. So there's that
Speaker 1: as well. Plus there was that whole corruption stuff that
Speaker 1: was talking about. There are several reasons, none of them
Speaker 1: are necessarily great for the majority of El Salvador's population,
Speaker 1: and I am concerned about that. We've got a few
Speaker 1: more news items to cover before we close out, But
Speaker 1: before I get to that, let's take another quick break. Okay,
Speaker 1: So The Verge has an article that's titled Automated hiring
Speaker 1: software is mistakenly rejecting millions of viable job candidates. And
Speaker 1: the piece cites a study from the Harvard Business School
Speaker 1: that's looking into such software. And you've probably heard about
Speaker 1: this type of software. Employers use it to come through
Speaker 1: job applications, and they do it so that they can
Speaker 1: weed out applicants who are just not suitable for a
Speaker 1: particular position and then just focus on the ones who
Speaker 1: are quote unquote the best fit. So the whole idea
Speaker 1: is just, you know, not to eliminate folks who aren't
Speaker 1: a good fit, but really define the right people to
Speaker 1: match with the right job, which ideally is the best
Speaker 1: solution for everyone because the job applicant lands a gig
Speaker 1: for which they were best suited and the company ends
Speaker 1: up getting the best candidate to fill a position. Only
Speaker 1: that's not what's necessarily happening. According to the study. The
Speaker 1: report says that software like what I just described is
Speaker 1: actually rejecting millions of people who are qualified for the
Speaker 1: positions that they apply for, and it contributes to an
Speaker 1: issue in which there are people who are ready and
Speaker 1: able and willing to work, but they're not able to
Speaker 1: land a position because of these issues. That's bad news
Speaker 1: for everyone in this system. It's really bad news for
Speaker 1: all the people who are trying to land a job
Speaker 1: because it means they consistently can't. But it's also bad
Speaker 1: news for the employers because they are potentially missing out
Speaker 1: on hiring the perfect candidate because some AI software mistakenly
Speaker 1: put their application on the rejection pile. According to the
Speaker 1: report of U S Employers and of Fortune five companies
Speaker 1: use this kind of software to filter through job applicants.
Speaker 1: As for the reasons behind the high rejection error, those
Speaker 1: are many and they are varied. It really depends upon
Speaker 1: which criteria the software is weighing as being the most
Speaker 1: important in order to weed out unsuitable applications. So one
Speaker 1: example that the Verge points out is that the software
Speaker 1: could reject an application that includes an employment gap of
Speaker 1: six months or more. Now, that would have meant that
Speaker 1: I would have been eliminated once upon a time, because
Speaker 1: I worked for a company for seven years steadily employed.
Speaker 1: But then they eliminated my position. So I wasn't fired.
Speaker 1: I just didn't have a job anymore. I realized the
Speaker 1: distinction is a fine one, and I must admit it
Speaker 1: was lost upon me at the time and arguably still is.
Speaker 1: But anyway, you know, I was out of work for
Speaker 1: six months while trying to get another job. And it
Speaker 1: wasn't that I was unqualified. It wasn't that I wasn't
Speaker 1: looking for work. I was doing both of those things.
Speaker 1: It was just a really bad time to be out
Speaker 1: of work when it happened to me, and I was
Speaker 1: caught up in that it was just a bad job market. Well,
Speaker 1: that sort of thing happens all the time, and this
Speaker 1: type of criteria in software then exacerbates it. Right if
Speaker 1: the software just says, oh, well, this person is not
Speaker 1: reliable because they haven't had a job in six months,
Speaker 1: that doesn't necessarily reflect poorly on the person. It could
Speaker 1: reflect poorly on everything else, but then the person gets
Speaker 1: the punishment for it. Meanwhile, you have this growing pool
Speaker 1: of people who are seeking jobs who are getting rejected,
Speaker 1: so they're back in the job hunt and they're looking
Speaker 1: for more stuff, so they're more likely to apply to
Speaker 1: lots of different positions for which they're qualified in the
Speaker 1: hopes of landing something. But that means that the companies
Speaker 1: that are posting those positions are going to see even
Speaker 1: more applicants as more rejections join the job pool, and
Speaker 1: that means that they get flooded with applicants, which means
Speaker 1: that they feel like they have to rely upon this
Speaker 1: kind of software in order to do that initial sorting.
Speaker 1: And thus we see the problem get worse and it
Speaker 1: feeds upon itself. Cycle after cycle, and as the software
Speaker 1: becomes more entrenched in this hiring process, it gets harder
Speaker 1: to shift to a different approach. Now, I wish I
Speaker 1: had a happy ending to the story, but unless companies
Speaker 1: across industries make a concerted effort to change, or unless
Speaker 1: the organizations that offer these services work really hard to
Speaker 1: eliminate those errors, this is going to keep going. And yes,
Speaker 1: I recognize the irony that some of those jobs seeking
Speaker 1: companies have advertised on this show. Now, to be clear,
Speaker 1: I think their mission is admirable. The idea of let's
Speaker 1: make it easier for the right people to find the
Speaker 1: right jobs. I think that's great. That's a fantastic mission.
Speaker 1: I also think that, at least in some cases, the
Speaker 1: execution of that mission really needs some work. Analytics firm
Speaker 1: app Any reports that Android users are spending more time
Speaker 1: watching content on TikTok than on YouTube on a monthly basis,
Speaker 1: and that this has been going on since August of
Speaker 1: last year here in the United States, and over in
Speaker 1: the UK it's been going on since May of last year.
Speaker 1: So on average, users were spending around twenty two hours
Speaker 1: and forty minutes per month watching content on YouTube, but
Speaker 1: a full twenty four hours per month watching content on TikTok.
Speaker 1: That's a lot of TikTok because those videos tend to
Speaker 1: be pretty short, and YouTube has been leaning harder toward
Speaker 1: promoting long form content. So it's two totally different content strategies.
Speaker 1: So for TikTok to overtake YouTube is pretty darn impressive
Speaker 1: because that's so many videos. All I can say is
Speaker 1: that I contributed more toward YouTube because I watched maybe
Speaker 1: five or six TikTok videos a month because I'm old
Speaker 1: and I'm out of touch. That's not even really a joke.
Speaker 1: It's more of a true statement. But the report was
Speaker 1: focused solely on Android devices. I do not have any
Speaker 1: details about iOS devices, but I would be shocked if
Speaker 1: it was a much different story. I figured it's probably
Speaker 1: somewhere all on the same lines. Also, while users were
Speaker 1: spending more time on TikTok than on YouTube, I should
Speaker 1: point out YouTube still has way more active users than
Speaker 1: TikTok does, so when it comes down to overall numbers,
Speaker 1: YouTube is still well in the lead. But it was
Speaker 1: interesting to see the viewing trends are favoring TikTok. And
Speaker 1: our final story is about a man named Gilbert Michaels,
Speaker 1: who recently received a prison sentence of four years for
Speaker 1: the crime of selling printer toner for way too much
Speaker 1: money to small businesses and nonprofit organizations. The seventy nine
Speaker 1: year old had been selling Toner to these smaller entities
Speaker 1: for decades at a huge markup, sometimes up to ten
Speaker 1: times the actual market price for Toner, which if you've
Speaker 1: ever shot for Toner you know is already wicked expensive.
Speaker 1: And he is the good old telemarketer fraud approach to
Speaker 1: do it, and it was effective. He was doing this
Speaker 1: as far back as the nineteen seventies, and prosecutors said
Speaker 1: that in one six year span he made one twenty
Speaker 1: six million dollars defrauding clients and selling them Toner at
Speaker 1: elevated prices. Michaels was found guilty on charges of mail fraud,
Speaker 1: money laundering, and conspiracy back in two thousand nineteen, so
Speaker 1: this was just his sentencing trial. He had already been
Speaker 1: found guilty of the crimes and this story is pretty awful.
Speaker 1: So essentially Michael's and his conspirators would contact these various targets,
Speaker 1: these small businesses and charities, often posing as representatives for
Speaker 1: legit vendors, companies that had an established relationship with the
Speaker 1: targets and had sold them toner in the past, so
Speaker 1: they would essentially pose as these legitimate vendors, and then
Speaker 1: they would say, oh, so the price of toner has increased, however,
Speaker 1: we will continue to sell you toner at the lower price,
Speaker 1: you know, to help you out. So go ahead and
Speaker 1: agree to purchase the next box of toner, and then
Speaker 1: they would get someone to sign over on that. They
Speaker 1: would then send the toner, but they would send an
Speaker 1: invoice with an h an enormously inflated price for the toner,
Speaker 1: so instead of that lower price they had said on
Speaker 1: the phone and ends up being a much much higher price.
Speaker 1: And then they would threaten legal action and UH and
Speaker 1: collections agencies and such if the target refused to pay up,
Speaker 1: or they would charge exorbitant restocking fees if the clients
Speaker 1: returned the toner. So it was definitely shady, illegal stuff.
Speaker 1: So yeah, not all tech crime involves cryptocurrency and hacking.
Speaker 1: Sometimes it just involves good old fraud on the telephone
Speaker 1: and some insanely expensive toner. And that's the tech news
Speaker 1: for Tuesday, September seven, One if you have suggestions for
Speaker 1: things I should cover on the show, any tech companies
Speaker 1: or technologies that you're interested in, or trends in tech.
Speaker 1: Reach out to me on Twitter. The handle is tech
Speaker 1: Stuff H s W and I'll talk to you again
Speaker 1: really soon. Tech Stuff is an I Heart Radio production.
Speaker 1: For more podcasts from my Heart Radio, visit the i
Speaker 1: Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to
Speaker 1: your favorite shows.