WEBVTT - Tech News: Tech and the Surveillance State 0:00:04.400 --> 0:00:07.800 Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio. 0:00:12.160 --> 0:00:15.040 Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, 0:00:15.200 --> 0:00:17.960 Johnathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio 0:00:18.079 --> 0:00:21.599 and I love all things tech. This is the tech 0:00:21.680 --> 0:00:27.360 news for September seventh one. It's a Tuesday, and we 0:00:27.480 --> 0:00:29.640 got a ton of stuff to cover, and a lot 0:00:29.680 --> 0:00:31.920 of it is pretty heavy, so let's get to it. 0:00:32.479 --> 0:00:36.040 Tech Times reports that the Russian government has cracked down 0:00:36.240 --> 0:00:41.000 on six virtual private network services as the country is 0:00:41.120 --> 0:00:46.240 nearing a parliamentary election. And virtual private networks a k a. 0:00:46.440 --> 0:00:50.800 VPNs have lots of different uses. A lot of companies 0:00:50.920 --> 0:00:54.360 use VPNs for employees to log into before they use 0:00:54.760 --> 0:00:58.840 corporate systems. One big reason to use VPNs is that 0:00:58.920 --> 0:01:02.240 it provides a shield when browsing stuff on the Internet. 0:01:02.600 --> 0:01:04.839 So the way it works from a very high level 0:01:04.959 --> 0:01:09.280 is you log into a VPN essentially a server, and 0:01:09.319 --> 0:01:13.319 then the VPN does all the info fetching for you. 0:01:13.720 --> 0:01:16.280 So to someone who is snooping from the outside looking 0:01:16.319 --> 0:01:19.200 at your connection, all they would see is that you 0:01:19.240 --> 0:01:22.039 were connected to a VPN. They wouldn't be able to 0:01:22.080 --> 0:01:25.760 see what you were doing beyond that. So if you 0:01:25.800 --> 0:01:29.679 were researching stuff. Maybe you're researching stuff that the government 0:01:29.720 --> 0:01:32.320 would disapprove of. Let's say you're in Russia and you 0:01:32.360 --> 0:01:35.560 wanted to research something that perhaps the government wasn't in 0:01:35.640 --> 0:01:38.920 favor of, Well, using a VPN, it would be very 0:01:38.920 --> 0:01:41.760 difficult for them to figure that out. Now, this is, 0:01:41.840 --> 0:01:45.720 of course, assuming that the VPN in question is encrypting 0:01:45.800 --> 0:01:49.840 all communications that are taking place and also taking appropriate 0:01:49.840 --> 0:01:53.280 steps to protect users. So if that's all true, then yeah, 0:01:53.680 --> 0:01:57.080 it stands as a way for people to access stuff 0:01:57.120 --> 0:02:01.120 without outsiders necessarily being privy to it. Anyway, if the 0:02:01.160 --> 0:02:05.120 government feels like this is a bad thing, then the 0:02:05.240 --> 0:02:07.640 really the easiest course of action is to block VPN 0:02:07.720 --> 0:02:11.280 services in that country, and that's what Russia has done. 0:02:11.639 --> 0:02:15.320 So those services include big names. If you've been listening 0:02:15.360 --> 0:02:18.480 to podcasts or watching videos, you probably heard some of 0:02:18.520 --> 0:02:21.640 these because they often advertise on those So it includes 0:02:21.680 --> 0:02:26.639 stuff like Nord VPN, Express VPN, i p Vanish VPN, 0:02:26.760 --> 0:02:32.399 Ola VPN, keep Solid VbN, and Speedify VPN. Now, according 0:02:32.440 --> 0:02:35.760 to Russian representatives, this whole move has nothing to do 0:02:35.840 --> 0:02:40.320 with the elections. It's to block services to curb a 0:02:40.400 --> 0:02:45.000 legal activity such as the spread of child pornography, which 0:02:45.040 --> 0:02:47.839 is frequently kind of the messaging that you will hear 0:02:47.880 --> 0:02:51.160 whenever any government starts to crack down on stuff like this. 0:02:51.880 --> 0:02:55.600 Russian representatives have also threatened companies like Google and Apple 0:02:56.080 --> 0:02:59.120 for allowing an app that was created by Alexey Naval 0:02:59.280 --> 0:03:04.600 these organization. He's a critic of Vladimir Putin, and so 0:03:05.760 --> 0:03:09.680 the you know, the fact that that's also happening in 0:03:10.400 --> 0:03:13.239 line with the shutdown of vp NS starts to kind 0:03:13.240 --> 0:03:18.760 of point towards reasons other than curbing a legal activity. Um. 0:03:18.880 --> 0:03:21.600 In fact, the Russian government has said that Google and 0:03:21.639 --> 0:03:24.880 Apple are essentially interfering with Russian elections, which, you know, 0:03:25.080 --> 0:03:27.280 if I can take a moment to add some opinion, 0:03:27.760 --> 0:03:31.160 that's pretty freaking rich coming from Russia, country that has 0:03:31.200 --> 0:03:35.280 interfered with elections around the world, including US elections a 0:03:35.280 --> 0:03:38.800 few times, and will no doubt continue to do so. Anyway, 0:03:39.200 --> 0:03:41.840 it's a good idea to pay attention to these sorts 0:03:41.840 --> 0:03:44.880 of things, because while it's happening in Russia right now, 0:03:46.000 --> 0:03:49.040 that country is only one of many that has political 0:03:49.120 --> 0:03:50.960 leaders trying to get a firmer grip on the flow 0:03:50.960 --> 0:03:53.680 of information. Some of those other countries are pretty darn 0:03:53.720 --> 0:03:57.400 close to home. Some of them might actually be home. 0:03:58.320 --> 0:04:00.840 A couple of weeks ago, I talk about the n 0:04:01.000 --> 0:04:04.040 s O Group. That's a company out of Israel that 0:04:04.080 --> 0:04:08.240 groups responsible for designing malware called Pegasus, and it allows 0:04:08.280 --> 0:04:12.440 an external user access to infected devices remotely. So in 0:04:12.440 --> 0:04:16.440 other words, if you infect a device with this malware, 0:04:17.000 --> 0:04:20.239 you then can access that device in various ways, including 0:04:20.279 --> 0:04:25.160 things like accessing a smartphones, microphone, and camera. Essentially, NSO 0:04:25.240 --> 0:04:28.640 Group creates software that turns various devices into and like 0:04:28.720 --> 0:04:31.919 you know, computers and smartphones into spies. That's what it 0:04:32.000 --> 0:04:36.080 really gets down to. It it allows for surveillance. The 0:04:36.200 --> 0:04:39.520 NSO Group markets this technology to various governments and does 0:04:39.560 --> 0:04:43.599 so under the protection of the Israeli government. That means 0:04:43.640 --> 0:04:46.080 that technically the n s A Group is not supposed 0:04:46.120 --> 0:04:49.320 to market this to any country that is on unfriendly 0:04:49.480 --> 0:04:52.960 terms with Israel. The company has shown a pretty blatant 0:04:53.000 --> 0:04:57.920 disregard for accountability. It has made claims that I argue 0:04:57.960 --> 0:05:02.400 our contradictory. For example, the company says it prohibits customers 0:05:02.440 --> 0:05:07.960 from misusing the malware to target say that customer's own 0:05:08.120 --> 0:05:11.080 citizens in an effort to exert authoritary and control. In 0:05:11.120 --> 0:05:13.320 other words, n s A group says, no, this is 0:05:13.360 --> 0:05:16.080 an order for us to protect against things like acts 0:05:16.120 --> 0:05:21.640 of terrorism, but there have been numerous reports saying that 0:05:21.839 --> 0:05:27.720 n s O groups customers include uh repressive and oppressive 0:05:28.760 --> 0:05:34.440 governments that are using that technology against journalists, activists and 0:05:34.480 --> 0:05:37.680 their own citizens. However, the company also says at the 0:05:37.680 --> 0:05:40.440 same time that it has no way of monitoring how 0:05:40.480 --> 0:05:45.240 its customers actually use its products, so that that ends 0:05:45.279 --> 0:05:47.800 up being a contradiction right there, saying Okay, well, we're 0:05:47.839 --> 0:05:49.640 only going to sell it to people who are using 0:05:49.640 --> 0:05:52.040 it properly. Also, there's no way for us to know 0:05:52.080 --> 0:05:54.640 how they're using it. Well, that's like n s O 0:05:54.720 --> 0:05:57.120 groups saying all right, here you go, but don't go 0:05:57.240 --> 0:05:59.360 using this in ways we don't approve of because there's 0:05:59.400 --> 0:06:03.760 no way for us to track you. Right Like that's 0:06:03.800 --> 0:06:07.760 the message there anyway. A an organization called Citizen Lab 0:06:07.880 --> 0:06:10.640 recently released a report. In fact, they've released a few, 0:06:11.000 --> 0:06:14.839 but the most recent report shows that it had identified 0:06:15.000 --> 0:06:19.880 nine activists in Bahrain who had their devices compromised by 0:06:20.000 --> 0:06:24.360 the n s O group Pegasus malware between June of 0:06:24.440 --> 0:06:27.839 twenty and February of this year, and one thing that 0:06:27.920 --> 0:06:32.240 makes this malware particularly effective is that it can infect 0:06:32.279 --> 0:06:36.400 iOS devices through what is called a zero click attack, 0:06:37.480 --> 0:06:40.359 essentially a message in I message, which means the target 0:06:40.400 --> 0:06:43.200 does not have to click on like a malicious link 0:06:43.320 --> 0:06:46.320 or anything like that to activate the malware. That means 0:06:46.360 --> 0:06:49.400 that the whole advice of don't click on any links 0:06:49.440 --> 0:06:52.239 you don't trust doesn't even apply here because it doesn't 0:06:52.240 --> 0:06:55.400 require a link. Like I literally, the morning that I'm 0:06:55.400 --> 0:06:59.360 recording this, I received a message on a different messaging 0:06:59.440 --> 0:07:03.279 service that was a link attack, like it was trying 0:07:03.320 --> 0:07:05.240 to get me to click on a link and to 0:07:05.480 --> 0:07:10.360 enter my credentials. They're fortunately, even early in the morning, 0:07:10.440 --> 0:07:14.520 before my coffee, I recognized it as an attack. Anyway. 0:07:14.960 --> 0:07:18.520 More human rights organizations are calling on n s O 0:07:18.640 --> 0:07:23.000 group to be held accountable for facilitating authoritarian acts and 0:07:23.440 --> 0:07:27.120 furthering the capabilities of repressive regimes. They pointed out that 0:07:27.280 --> 0:07:30.320 entities like the Bahraini government could use these tools to 0:07:30.360 --> 0:07:34.440 seek out, detain, and even torture targets that the government 0:07:34.480 --> 0:07:37.320 determines are you know, a problem, and by a problem, 0:07:37.360 --> 0:07:40.640 I mean people who just happened to disagree with the government, 0:07:40.640 --> 0:07:45.160 not necessarily someone who's like a terrorist or anything like that. So, 0:07:45.480 --> 0:07:48.600 like I said, a lot of journalists and diplomats have 0:07:48.680 --> 0:07:53.360 been targets of NSO groups Pegasus malware from various customers 0:07:53.360 --> 0:07:57.120 of n s O group, and it's an ongoing problem 0:07:57.160 --> 0:08:01.120 that just seems to be getting worse. All right, let's 0:08:01.120 --> 0:08:04.280 stay on theme because this next story ties in with 0:08:04.320 --> 0:08:08.200 both of the previous ones. Pro Publica has published a piece. 0:08:08.320 --> 0:08:12.240 It's a lot of alliteration there about WhatsApp and a 0:08:12.280 --> 0:08:18.160 contradiction in WhatsApps UH brand identity as a secure messaging platform. Alright, So, 0:08:18.280 --> 0:08:21.000 just in case you're not familiar, the elevator pitch for 0:08:21.080 --> 0:08:24.920 WhatsApp is that it is an end to end encrypted 0:08:25.200 --> 0:08:28.640 messaging service. That means that if you and a buddy 0:08:28.680 --> 0:08:31.960 are messaging and you're using WhatsApp, every message you send 0:08:31.960 --> 0:08:35.199 to your buddy is encrypted and can only be decrypted 0:08:35.240 --> 0:08:38.080 on the other end of that communication channel. Your buddy 0:08:38.120 --> 0:08:41.679 is the only person who has the correct decrypt key 0:08:41.720 --> 0:08:44.800 to read those messages. And then every message your buddy 0:08:44.800 --> 0:08:48.360 sends to you is also encrypted, and only you hold 0:08:48.440 --> 0:08:51.400 the decrypt key for those messages, so no one else 0:08:51.440 --> 0:08:54.160 can read them. The same is true for any images 0:08:54.280 --> 0:08:57.120 or videos, or links or anything else that's sent on 0:08:57.240 --> 0:09:00.240 WhatsApp between the two of you. And WhatsApp is an 0:09:00.240 --> 0:09:05.760 incredibly popular messaging service, not as much in the United States, 0:09:05.760 --> 0:09:08.679 but in other parts of the world very much so. 0:09:08.679 --> 0:09:12.280 So according to the company, no one outside of you 0:09:12.400 --> 0:09:14.559 and your buddy would be able to understand what your 0:09:14.559 --> 0:09:17.880 messages are, and that Facebook, which is the owner of WhatsApp, 0:09:18.640 --> 0:09:21.319 would not be able to see those messages. WhatsApp would 0:09:21.320 --> 0:09:23.560 not be able to have any idea of what it 0:09:23.640 --> 0:09:25.320 was you were sending between the two of you, because 0:09:25.320 --> 0:09:29.160 it would be encrypted, and so it's private and secure. However, 0:09:29.520 --> 0:09:33.520 the company also has hundreds of contract workers whose job 0:09:33.559 --> 0:09:37.360 it is to moderate or police content sent across WhatsApp, 0:09:37.720 --> 0:09:41.480 And you might think, wait a minute, how is it 0:09:41.520 --> 0:09:46.160 possible to moderate or police content if no one can 0:09:46.240 --> 0:09:50.960 see the unencrypted stuff except for the users involved. Well, 0:09:51.000 --> 0:09:54.800 there is one really big exception to this. If someone 0:09:54.840 --> 0:09:59.160 were to tag an incoming message as being against WhatsApps policies, 0:09:59.559 --> 0:10:02.480 Like you tag a message and you say that it's 0:10:02.520 --> 0:10:05.840 spam or that it's abusive, or you know, something along 0:10:05.880 --> 0:10:09.600 those lines, then that sends an alert to WhatsApp to 0:10:09.720 --> 0:10:15.200 review the communication. So some contract workers somewhere, maybe Austin, Texas, 0:10:15.200 --> 0:10:17.360 because there's a lot of them there, And this is 0:10:17.400 --> 0:10:20.560 a person who technically does not work for WhatsApp or 0:10:20.600 --> 0:10:24.640 for Facebook. They work for another company that serves as 0:10:24.679 --> 0:10:30.520 the kind of the employment center for these contract workers 0:10:30.720 --> 0:10:34.560 who then are contracting with WhatsApp. That person would be 0:10:34.600 --> 0:10:39.240 sent the unencrypted offending message from the receiver, as well 0:10:39.280 --> 0:10:42.600 as the four previous messages that preceded the one that 0:10:42.720 --> 0:10:47.240 allegedly was against the policy. So in other words, you know, 0:10:47.320 --> 0:10:51.040 if you receive a message, your side un encrypts that message. 0:10:51.080 --> 0:10:54.080 From that point forward, that message is in plain text. 0:10:54.280 --> 0:10:55.920 You can read it. So if someone were to get 0:10:55.920 --> 0:10:59.320 access to your phone, they could read all that content. Right, 0:10:59.360 --> 0:11:01.680 if they try to intercept the message, it would be encrypted, 0:11:01.840 --> 0:11:04.959 but once it's on your device, they can read it. Well, 0:11:05.000 --> 0:11:08.360 that's what this system does. If you flag something in WhatsApp, 0:11:09.240 --> 0:11:14.440 it sends the unencrypted message on for review. Now I 0:11:14.720 --> 0:11:18.000 point all this out because this is a sort of 0:11:18.040 --> 0:11:21.560 back door through the security mess measures, and you can 0:11:21.640 --> 0:11:25.000 kind of understand why it exists and that any platform 0:11:25.080 --> 0:11:27.920 wants to reassure its users that those users are going 0:11:27.960 --> 0:11:31.160 to be protected from harassment and other abuse. But on 0:11:31.200 --> 0:11:35.160 the other hand, backdoors through security systems are almost always 0:11:35.160 --> 0:11:38.000 a bad idea, and that's because of the possibility that 0:11:38.120 --> 0:11:42.120 someone somewhere is going to abuse that exception to the 0:11:42.160 --> 0:11:46.120 secure system and then turn it to nefarious purposes. Moreover, 0:11:46.520 --> 0:11:51.600 since What's Apps brand is so heavily geared towards, you know, 0:11:51.920 --> 0:11:58.760 privacy and security in communication, this really undermines the brand's position. 0:11:59.080 --> 0:12:03.560 It undermines the rand's actual identity. Pro Publica also points 0:12:03.600 --> 0:12:09.080 out that Facebook analyzes tons of metadata related to WhatsApp communications. 0:12:09.400 --> 0:12:12.240 Metadata In case you're not familiar with the term, that's 0:12:12.320 --> 0:12:17.200 information about information. So really it's all the stuff about 0:12:17.240 --> 0:12:21.280 a communication except for the content of the communication itself. 0:12:21.800 --> 0:12:25.199 Meta data can include who was involved in the communication, 0:12:25.400 --> 0:12:27.680 like which were the parties that we're talking with each other? 0:12:28.040 --> 0:12:31.400 What time were messages being sent back and forth? Where 0:12:31.440 --> 0:12:34.000 were people when they were actually sending information? You know, 0:12:34.040 --> 0:12:37.280 you pair it with like geolocation data, that kind of thing, 0:12:37.559 --> 0:12:40.040 and you can determine a lot of stuff through meta 0:12:40.120 --> 0:12:43.640 data analysis. You wouldn't know what the actual content of 0:12:43.679 --> 0:12:45.880 the messages were, but you might be able to hazard 0:12:45.920 --> 0:12:49.000 a guess just by examining enough meta data to figure out, 0:12:49.040 --> 0:12:52.719 you know, what's going on, and that too, is a 0:12:52.800 --> 0:12:58.040 huge threat to privacy and security. WhatsApp users were understandably 0:12:58.160 --> 0:13:02.360 really upset when Facebook first denounced that some data collected 0:13:02.440 --> 0:13:06.880 from WhatsApp would then be shared to Facebook proper, and 0:13:06.920 --> 0:13:09.640 that the company itself would get into hot water because 0:13:10.200 --> 0:13:14.880 reps from Facebook had previously sworn to EU officials that 0:13:15.480 --> 0:13:20.559 incorporating that kind of ability was technically impossible between WhatsApp 0:13:20.600 --> 0:13:22.560 and Facebook. They said, yeah, there's no way for us 0:13:22.600 --> 0:13:24.280 to do it, even if we wanted to. We don't 0:13:24.280 --> 0:13:26.000 want to want to, but even if we wanted to, 0:13:26.040 --> 0:13:28.280 we couldn't do it. Then they turned around and said, hey, 0:13:28.320 --> 0:13:33.120 guess what we're doing. So that was not, you know, consistent, 0:13:33.720 --> 0:13:35.800 But yeah, it's just something to keep in mind, and 0:13:35.840 --> 0:13:40.280 it helps remind us that most of Facebook's revenue depends 0:13:40.360 --> 0:13:43.640 upon the company collecting and then leveraging, or if you prefer, 0:13:44.200 --> 0:13:49.199 exploiting information about users. So with that in mind, it's 0:13:49.200 --> 0:13:53.120 a really safe bet to assume that any product coming 0:13:53.120 --> 0:13:57.600 out of Facebook contributes to that pursuit that even on 0:13:57.640 --> 0:14:00.240 the face of it, if it isn't all about acting 0:14:00.280 --> 0:14:02.400 your data in order to sell more stuff to you 0:14:03.559 --> 0:14:06.520 somewhere down the line. That is what's going on, because 0:14:06.640 --> 0:14:11.679 that's Facebook's business. That's how Facebook makes money. So yeah, 0:14:12.040 --> 0:14:14.480 important to know. And it also explains why Facebook was 0:14:14.520 --> 0:14:18.080 willing to shell out billions and billions of dollars to 0:14:18.240 --> 0:14:21.360 acquire WhatsApp in the first place. So all the things 0:14:21.360 --> 0:14:24.560 that people were worried about when Facebook did that are 0:14:25.360 --> 0:14:31.280 kind of manifesting or becoming evident. Yeah, so important to remember. 0:14:31.480 --> 0:14:34.040 We're gonna have some more stories that kind of relate 0:14:34.120 --> 0:14:36.240 back to some of the themes we've already talked about. 0:14:36.280 --> 0:14:38.600 I know it gets kind of dark and oppressive, but 0:14:38.600 --> 0:14:41.960 it's important to know about them. But hey, I don't 0:14:41.960 --> 0:14:44.520 know about you, but I could use a quick break. 0:14:52.120 --> 0:14:54.120 All right, we're back and it's time to go down 0:14:54.200 --> 0:14:58.800 on in Australia. Um, sorry, that was terrible. I had 0:14:58.800 --> 0:15:02.280 to introduce a little of ity with my terrible terrible 0:15:03.200 --> 0:15:05.720 Uh not even Australian accent, you can't even give it 0:15:05.760 --> 0:15:08.640 that much. But yeah, my terrible attempt. Because there's a 0:15:08.640 --> 0:15:12.400 new bill that's introducing some troubling powers for law enforcement 0:15:12.440 --> 0:15:17.440 with regard to online information in Australia. UH, there's this 0:15:17.760 --> 0:15:21.960 piece of legislation. It's called the Surveillance Legislation Amendment UH 0:15:22.160 --> 0:15:27.479 Parentheses Identify and Disrupt INDO Parentheses Bill, and it introduces 0:15:27.560 --> 0:15:30.960 three new powers for law enforcement. The first is that 0:15:31.280 --> 0:15:34.360 law enforcement will be able to obtain a quote data 0:15:34.440 --> 0:15:38.200 disruption warrant end quote and that in turn gives law 0:15:38.320 --> 0:15:43.000 enforcement the right to copy, delete, or modify data in 0:15:43.120 --> 0:15:48.400 order to disrupt it. Now, that alone is horrifying, and 0:15:48.720 --> 0:15:51.000 I'll get to why I find it horrifying in just 0:15:51.080 --> 0:15:54.480 a bit. But second, the second power is that law 0:15:54.600 --> 0:15:58.400 enforcement will be able to apply for and obtain a 0:15:58.560 --> 0:16:02.440 quote Network activit any warrant end quote that gives them 0:16:02.440 --> 0:16:06.040 the power to collect data from networks and devices that 0:16:06.080 --> 0:16:09.200 are believed to be used or maybe used with relation 0:16:09.280 --> 0:16:13.720 to illegal activity. The third power is that they can 0:16:13.760 --> 0:16:18.520 obtain an quote account takeover warrant end quote, and that 0:16:18.560 --> 0:16:20.800 would give them the authority to do exactly what that 0:16:20.880 --> 0:16:25.240 sounds like, to take over an account entirely in order 0:16:25.320 --> 0:16:28.000 to gather information on an investigation. So, for example, if 0:16:28.040 --> 0:16:33.040 you if the Australian Police think that you know Jimmy 0:16:33.120 --> 0:16:38.280 the crook is is involved in a criminal operation, which 0:16:38.280 --> 0:16:42.360 I mean seems logical because he's called Jimmy the Crook. 0:16:42.720 --> 0:16:44.880 Then they could take over They could get a warrant 0:16:44.920 --> 0:16:48.520 to take over Jimmy the Crook's Facebook profile and post 0:16:48.960 --> 0:16:51.840 as Jimmy the Crook in an effort to gather information 0:16:51.880 --> 0:16:55.840 about Jimmy the Crooks accomplices and potentially have like a 0:16:55.880 --> 0:17:00.760 full sting operation. But yeah, as you get down to it, 0:17:00.800 --> 0:17:03.880 this is all terrible, And again I totally get that 0:17:03.960 --> 0:17:08.080 for law enforcement, online communications stand as a huge challenge. 0:17:08.400 --> 0:17:12.359 Criminals can and do use all sorts of platforms to 0:17:12.440 --> 0:17:15.560 communicate and coordinate, and it can be a challenge to 0:17:15.640 --> 0:17:18.399 disrupt that, and it sure would be valuable to be 0:17:18.480 --> 0:17:21.800 able to go in there and manipulate stuff, perhaps setting 0:17:21.880 --> 0:17:24.080 up a sting operation to catch criminals in the act 0:17:24.359 --> 0:17:28.040 and bring them to justice. But these provisions give way 0:17:28.080 --> 0:17:32.800 too much power to law enforcement. So imagine that there's 0:17:32.840 --> 0:17:35.600 a legal process for the police to get a warrant, 0:17:35.760 --> 0:17:37.399 So they do have to at least go through the 0:17:37.480 --> 0:17:39.480 steps of getting a warrant, but let's assume that it's 0:17:39.520 --> 0:17:41.680 not too difficult to do that. So they go get 0:17:41.720 --> 0:17:44.240 a warrant and then they can go in and manipulate 0:17:44.359 --> 0:17:47.080 stuff that you have posted online. They can go in 0:17:47.160 --> 0:17:51.800 and change the things you have posted. Arguably, they could 0:17:51.840 --> 0:17:55.360 manipulate the stuff you post in such a way that 0:17:55.440 --> 0:17:58.720 you appear to have posted incriminating material when in fact 0:17:58.760 --> 0:18:02.680 you did not do any such thing. So an authoritarian 0:18:02.760 --> 0:18:07.879 government could literally manufacture evidence against you, and then you 0:18:07.880 --> 0:18:11.200 could be held accountable for something you never did. This 0:18:11.280 --> 0:18:14.920 is the equivalent of the trope you see, and usually 0:18:14.920 --> 0:18:18.119 it's in a comedy where a cop drops a brown 0:18:18.160 --> 0:18:20.880 paper bag next to someone that picks it up and says, well, 0:18:20.920 --> 0:18:24.159 what do we have here? Illicit drugs? It's kind of 0:18:24.200 --> 0:18:26.600 like that, but on the data side of things. Now, 0:18:26.640 --> 0:18:30.639 that's just one scenario in which this bill becomes a nightmare. 0:18:30.920 --> 0:18:33.959 But again, it wouldn't even take an authoritarian government for 0:18:33.960 --> 0:18:37.160 this to go wrong. Building in systems that would allow 0:18:37.240 --> 0:18:40.840 law enforcement to do these sorts of things means that 0:18:40.920 --> 0:18:44.359 you have to create vulnerabilities so that the police can 0:18:44.400 --> 0:18:46.320 go in and do it. Right, you have to have 0:18:46.359 --> 0:18:50.200 a way for police to access those platforms and those 0:18:50.200 --> 0:18:53.440 accounts in order to do this data manipulation. However, if 0:18:53.480 --> 0:18:56.960 you do that, if you create those vulnerabilities. It gives 0:18:57.000 --> 0:19:01.360 the chance for other people to potentially exploit those. Now 0:19:01.359 --> 0:19:04.600 I've used this analogy many times before, but here we go. 0:19:05.160 --> 0:19:08.200 It's like you've got a gold reserve and you store 0:19:08.320 --> 0:19:11.640 tons of gold bars in that reserve, and you've got 0:19:11.640 --> 0:19:15.360 this huge vault, and you have a solid vault door 0:19:15.480 --> 0:19:19.199 with like time locks and all this complicated stuff, and 0:19:19.280 --> 0:19:23.160 it's really it's like practically impossible to break through. However, 0:19:23.920 --> 0:19:26.280 you also include a little back door in the vault 0:19:26.440 --> 0:19:29.080 that's protected by a cheap padlock because you need to 0:19:29.160 --> 0:19:31.520 occasionally get into the vault and you don't want to 0:19:31.520 --> 0:19:34.600 go through the trouble of unlocking the big door. Well, 0:19:34.640 --> 0:19:40.520 anytime you create exceptions to a secure system, you essentially 0:19:40.600 --> 0:19:43.359 nullify the security. So no matter how you shake it, 0:19:43.400 --> 0:19:46.480 this bill is bad news. It creates far too much 0:19:46.600 --> 0:19:50.439 surveillance power on the law enforcement side, and it introduces 0:19:50.480 --> 0:19:53.000 the possibility for bad actors to take advantage of a 0:19:53.119 --> 0:19:56.879 system for their own purposes. Heck, it also means people 0:19:57.040 --> 0:20:01.560 can end up with a plausible alibi for all online communications, 0:20:02.000 --> 0:20:05.360 because if there exists a way to go in and 0:20:05.520 --> 0:20:09.960 change someone else's stuff online, perhaps even to the point 0:20:10.000 --> 0:20:13.760 of fabricating messages on behalf of another person. Well that 0:20:13.880 --> 0:20:16.200 what the waters are then moneyed right when it comes 0:20:16.240 --> 0:20:19.639 to holding someone accountable for their online actions, because you 0:20:19.680 --> 0:20:24.560 could conceivably argue that you never posted something incriminating because 0:20:24.600 --> 0:20:28.080 there is a system that exists that allows others to 0:20:28.200 --> 0:20:31.879 change what you post without your consent. So, in other words, 0:20:32.160 --> 0:20:36.640 it can actually weaken legal cases rather than strengthen them. Now, 0:20:36.640 --> 0:20:38.960 there's no word yet on how big I sps and 0:20:39.000 --> 0:20:43.560 platforms are going to work within this legislation in Australia. 0:20:43.640 --> 0:20:46.000 But this is the kind of stuff that really worries me, 0:20:46.880 --> 0:20:50.480 and the hits just keep on coming. So maybe you've 0:20:50.520 --> 0:20:53.760 heard of a service called proton mail. Maybe you use it. 0:20:54.080 --> 0:20:57.240 This email service uses end to end encryption to keep 0:20:57.240 --> 0:21:01.680 communications private between users, and just like WhatsApp, the service's 0:21:01.760 --> 0:21:06.360 reputation depends heavily upon that fact, the idea that your 0:21:06.400 --> 0:21:10.720 communications are secure through proton mail, and the bottom line 0:21:10.760 --> 0:21:13.719 is that you use proton mail to protect your communication 0:21:13.760 --> 0:21:17.159 from folks snooping on you. Well, now that services kind 0:21:17.200 --> 0:21:19.920 of on the hot seat in the public eye because 0:21:19.920 --> 0:21:23.280 proton Mail recently responded to a demand from police in 0:21:23.359 --> 0:21:26.960 Switzerland to give up the IP address belonging to a 0:21:27.040 --> 0:21:32.880 climate activist in France, which Proton Mail did. So why 0:21:32.920 --> 0:21:37.040 were the Swiss concerned about a French climate activist, Well, 0:21:37.080 --> 0:21:40.040 that's because the French authorities asked the Swiss for help. 0:21:40.480 --> 0:21:43.560 It was ultimately the French authorities that wanted to track 0:21:43.600 --> 0:21:47.920 down this activist who was responsible or you know, activists 0:21:48.160 --> 0:21:53.160 who are responsible for organizing various protests in France, high 0:21:53.200 --> 0:21:56.879 profile protests, and so these authorities called up their buddies 0:21:56.880 --> 0:22:01.639 in Switzerland and they said, hey, love the chocolate, do 0:22:01.800 --> 0:22:04.320 us a solid and lean on proton mail to give 0:22:04.400 --> 0:22:07.240 us the IP address for this activist. Okay, and the 0:22:07.320 --> 0:22:11.440 Swiss dead proton Mail, I should point out, is headquartered 0:22:11.640 --> 0:22:15.000 in Switzerland, and thus when the Swiss authorities came knocking, 0:22:15.200 --> 0:22:17.360 the company didn't really have a whole lot of options, 0:22:17.400 --> 0:22:20.359 at least from a legal standpoint, and the CEO of 0:22:20.400 --> 0:22:23.720 proton said as much that the company is legally bound 0:22:23.840 --> 0:22:27.119 to follow local laws, and so there was really no 0:22:27.240 --> 0:22:30.320 recourse other than to comply with the demand from the 0:22:30.359 --> 0:22:35.280 Swiss authorities. The actual communication and the email service remains encrypted, 0:22:35.600 --> 0:22:39.120 so the company legitimately cannot read any of the materials 0:22:39.119 --> 0:22:43.320 sent through those addresses. They cannot reveal what communications were set, 0:22:43.840 --> 0:22:46.560 Nor does proton mail have information on who owns a 0:22:46.600 --> 0:22:50.359 particular email address. But they can give you an IP 0:22:50.560 --> 0:22:54.480 address associated with a specific email address. They just can't 0:22:54.480 --> 0:22:58.920 say definitively this email address belongs to you know, Joan 0:22:59.119 --> 0:23:02.840 Smith or something. But as I mentioned earlier, metadata can 0:23:02.880 --> 0:23:05.480 reveal an awful lot about a person, So it's quite 0:23:05.480 --> 0:23:09.680 probable that French authorities are using the information to try 0:23:09.720 --> 0:23:12.640 and track down activists who have arranged those really effective 0:23:12.680 --> 0:23:17.679 protests in France around issues like affordable housing and climate concerns. 0:23:18.520 --> 0:23:22.040 So pretty scary stuff. Sticking with tech and politics, but 0:23:22.119 --> 0:23:26.440 now moving to the absurd. Business Insider reports that thirteen 0:23:26.520 --> 0:23:29.560 House Republicans in the United States sent a letter to 0:23:29.680 --> 0:23:33.359 Marissa Meyer, the quote president and chief executive officer of 0:23:33.440 --> 0:23:37.560 Yahoo in quote uh and they were saying that she 0:23:37.600 --> 0:23:42.200 should better well not hand over any personal information of 0:23:42.720 --> 0:23:45.959 you know, any Republicans or anyone really over to an 0:23:46.000 --> 0:23:50.639 investigative committee that's looking into the January six insurrection in Washington, 0:23:50.720 --> 0:23:55.960 d C. Only okay, hey, House Republicans, you thirteen folks. 0:23:56.359 --> 0:24:00.080 Marissa Meyer stepped down from Yahoo back in tween, so 0:24:00.200 --> 0:24:02.800 she hasn't been in charge of that company for several years. 0:24:03.040 --> 0:24:05.520 She wasn't in charge of the company during the whole 0:24:05.560 --> 0:24:08.800 lead up to the twenty election, let alone the insurrection 0:24:08.800 --> 0:24:12.320 on January six, and the fact that no one decided 0:24:12.359 --> 0:24:15.280 to fact check that or I don't know, do a 0:24:15.359 --> 0:24:17.880 simple Internet search. I mean they could have even used 0:24:17.960 --> 0:24:21.719 Yahoo to do it. That speaks volumes not just about 0:24:21.840 --> 0:24:27.160 tech literacy, but arguably just playing literacy. It's an embarrassing 0:24:27.200 --> 0:24:30.480 display of ignorance. Anyway. At the heart of the matter 0:24:30.800 --> 0:24:34.480 is the issue of one party in government power using 0:24:34.480 --> 0:24:39.080 its authority to demand information and records about another party, 0:24:39.200 --> 0:24:41.560 and doing so with companies like I s p s 0:24:41.640 --> 0:24:44.760 and social media platforms and companies that provide email and 0:24:45.080 --> 0:24:49.440 telecommunications companies and more. And to be clear, I think 0:24:49.480 --> 0:24:52.119 there is merit in that concern. I think we do 0:24:52.320 --> 0:24:57.000