WEBVTT - This Man’s Murder Might Get Solved by Amazon’s Alexa

0:00:00.600 --> 0:00:03.120
<v Speaker 1>Decrypted is brought to you by red Hat, whose broad

0:00:03.160 --> 0:00:06.520
<v Speaker 1>portfolio of open source technologies for the enterprise helps you

0:00:06.559 --> 0:00:08.760
<v Speaker 1>get from where you are to where you want to be.

0:00:09.560 --> 0:00:12.879
<v Speaker 1>Red Hat the open technology to help you realize your vision.

0:00:13.320 --> 0:00:16.079
<v Speaker 1>Learn more at red hat dot com, slash open tech,

0:00:25.360 --> 0:00:30.680
<v Speaker 1>and November. A group of friends in Bentonville, Arkansas. We're

0:00:30.760 --> 0:00:34.400
<v Speaker 1>hanging out watching a college football game. They were drinking beer,

0:00:34.720 --> 0:00:37.640
<v Speaker 1>taken vodka shots. Nothing out of the ordinary for a

0:00:37.680 --> 0:00:41.400
<v Speaker 1>bunch of guys watching TV. As the night drawn, three

0:00:41.440 --> 0:00:43.839
<v Speaker 1>of them moved the party to the hot tub. Around midnight.

0:00:44.040 --> 0:00:46.680
<v Speaker 1>One of them went home, but in the morning, one

0:00:46.760 --> 0:00:50.360
<v Speaker 1>member of the group, Victor Collins, was found face down

0:00:50.520 --> 0:00:53.960
<v Speaker 1>in the hot tub, apparently strangled and drowned in dark

0:00:54.120 --> 0:00:58.080
<v Speaker 1>red water. The jacuzzis, head, wrists, and knobs were scattered

0:00:58.080 --> 0:01:01.480
<v Speaker 1>on the ground covered with blood. Victor's left eye and

0:01:01.560 --> 0:01:04.360
<v Speaker 1>lips were dark and swollen, and there was blood and

0:01:04.440 --> 0:01:08.440
<v Speaker 1>pink foam coming out of his nose. I just find

0:01:08.440 --> 0:01:12.200
<v Speaker 1>it hard to believe that injuries such as that to

0:01:12.280 --> 0:01:15.640
<v Speaker 1>cause a man's death, especially a guy like Vick, were needed.

0:01:15.680 --> 0:01:20.600
<v Speaker 1>I just it shocks me, it really does. That's Victor's friend,

0:01:20.840 --> 0:01:24.640
<v Speaker 1>Jamie Gianfala. And when he says especially a guy like Vic,

0:01:25.160 --> 0:01:27.639
<v Speaker 1>what he means is that Victor was a big, tall,

0:01:28.000 --> 0:01:32.360
<v Speaker 1>intimidating man. And Bentonville is a small, sleepy town with

0:01:32.440 --> 0:01:34.880
<v Speaker 1>a very low crime rate. This is a kind of

0:01:34.920 --> 0:01:38.560
<v Speaker 1>thing that's never supposed to happen there. It shocks me,

0:01:38.600 --> 0:01:41.360
<v Speaker 1>It really does. The homeowner, the thirty one year old

0:01:41.360 --> 0:01:44.880
<v Speaker 1>Walmart employee, called James Andrew Bates, says he went to

0:01:44.920 --> 0:01:48.000
<v Speaker 1>bed at one am and discovered the body. After sunrise,

0:01:48.320 --> 0:01:50.880
<v Speaker 1>he called the cops, who came over to find the

0:01:50.880 --> 0:01:56.680
<v Speaker 1>back patio dripping with water. Now fifteen police responded to

0:01:56.720 --> 0:01:59.640
<v Speaker 1>Southwest elm Manor Avenue after nine one. One call reported

0:01:59.680 --> 0:02:02.480
<v Speaker 1>a body laying in a hot tub, but it didn't

0:02:02.520 --> 0:02:05.320
<v Speaker 1>seem like the water was coming from the hot tub.

0:02:05.880 --> 0:02:17.120
<v Speaker 1>The police suspected foul play homicide. Then if the cops

0:02:17.120 --> 0:02:21.800
<v Speaker 1>saw something in the kitchen, a voice activated Amazon Echo speaker,

0:02:22.360 --> 0:02:25.720
<v Speaker 1>they thought it might have special significance. If Alexa, which

0:02:25.760 --> 0:02:28.680
<v Speaker 1>is the virtual assistant the powers the echo, had been listening,

0:02:28.960 --> 0:02:33.160
<v Speaker 1>she might just help investigators discover who killed Victor Collins.

0:02:43.919 --> 0:02:47.800
<v Speaker 1>Hi Amaki Ito and I'm Nicole brand And this week

0:02:47.840 --> 0:02:52.640
<v Speaker 1>on Decrypted we're exploring the proliferation of Internet connected devices

0:02:53.080 --> 0:02:55.960
<v Speaker 1>like the Amazon Echo, the Google Home, and the just

0:02:56.240 --> 0:02:59.639
<v Speaker 1>announced Apple HomePod. As more and more of the things

0:02:59.680 --> 0:03:02.320
<v Speaker 1>around us get connected to the Internet, they're helping us

0:03:02.320 --> 0:03:05.480
<v Speaker 1>at every turn, ordering us pizza, reminding us of our

0:03:05.520 --> 0:03:09.560
<v Speaker 1>friend's birthdays, playing our favorite podcast. At the same time,

0:03:09.639 --> 0:03:13.200
<v Speaker 1>they're watching and recording our every move, which is bringing

0:03:13.280 --> 0:03:16.360
<v Speaker 1>up all kinds of uncomfortable questions around our rights to

0:03:16.440 --> 0:03:20.760
<v Speaker 1>digital privacy. How should this data be used and by whom?

0:03:21.120 --> 0:03:24.240
<v Speaker 1>Will ask if it's even possible to own and use

0:03:24.280 --> 0:03:28.000
<v Speaker 1>one of these gasgets without having to give up your privacy,

0:03:28.040 --> 0:03:31.160
<v Speaker 1>and see what users can do to stay protected. Stay

0:03:31.160 --> 0:03:36.400
<v Speaker 1>with us, Sinico. Take us back to that hot tub

0:03:36.440 --> 0:03:39.960
<v Speaker 1>in Bentonville. Well, there were two broken bottles that were

0:03:39.960 --> 0:03:43.160
<v Speaker 1>found near the jacuzzi, and also spots of blood all

0:03:43.200 --> 0:03:46.800
<v Speaker 1>over nearby. Investigators thought that they were signs of struggle.

0:03:47.200 --> 0:03:51.520
<v Speaker 1>So in February, which was three months later, James Bates

0:03:51.560 --> 0:03:54.360
<v Speaker 1>was arrested for the crime. And what do we know

0:03:54.440 --> 0:03:57.840
<v Speaker 1>about the victim? Victor? He was forty seven when he died.

0:03:58.240 --> 0:04:02.120
<v Speaker 1>He left behind his wife, Christine, and five children. Vick

0:04:02.280 --> 0:04:08.240
<v Speaker 1>was probably six three six pounds This is Victor's friend Jamie.

0:04:08.360 --> 0:04:12.120
<v Speaker 1>He looked very intimidating, always had a haircut, real short um,

0:04:12.160 --> 0:04:14.560
<v Speaker 1>but honestly, when you sat down and you talked to him,

0:04:14.560 --> 0:04:16.599
<v Speaker 1>he was he was a ball lass. I mean, the

0:04:16.600 --> 0:04:19.479
<v Speaker 1>guy always you know. It was good for having a

0:04:19.480 --> 0:04:22.280
<v Speaker 1>good time in terms of laid back and and just

0:04:22.440 --> 0:04:26.120
<v Speaker 1>real relaxing and real fun to talk with and hang

0:04:26.160 --> 0:04:28.599
<v Speaker 1>out with. Victor and Jamie met when they were both

0:04:28.600 --> 0:04:32.000
<v Speaker 1>police officers in Cherokee County, Georgia, which is a mountainous

0:04:32.040 --> 0:04:35.760
<v Speaker 1>area not far from Atlanta. Victor Collins was my first

0:04:35.800 --> 0:04:39.039
<v Speaker 1>training officer. I was able to ride with him and

0:04:39.240 --> 0:04:41.680
<v Speaker 1>I got to learn the tricks of the trade from him,

0:04:41.720 --> 0:04:45.239
<v Speaker 1>and we began a friendship almost immediately. As a cop,

0:04:45.520 --> 0:04:49.280
<v Speaker 1>Jamie has investigated homicides before and says he's very interested

0:04:49.279 --> 0:04:52.719
<v Speaker 1>by the presence of an Amazon Echo at the crime scene. Right.

0:04:52.800 --> 0:04:56.159
<v Speaker 1>This is the voice activated speaker that the police found

0:04:56.200 --> 0:04:59.520
<v Speaker 1>in James Bates home. And just very quickly for a

0:04:59.560 --> 0:05:02.560
<v Speaker 1>listener who have never seen an echo before. It's this

0:05:02.720 --> 0:05:06.719
<v Speaker 1>black cylinder shaped speaker that connects to the Internet and

0:05:06.839 --> 0:05:09.800
<v Speaker 1>you can have it play music or answer random questions

0:05:09.839 --> 0:05:13.719
<v Speaker 1>like this. Alexa will it be cold tomorrow. Tomorrow in

0:05:13.760 --> 0:05:16.840
<v Speaker 1>New York, you'll see some sun in thunderstorms, and you

0:05:16.920 --> 0:05:18.880
<v Speaker 1>can expect to high of eighty and a low of

0:05:18.920 --> 0:05:21.960
<v Speaker 1>sixty four. Anyway, you can imagine the kind of audio

0:05:22.040 --> 0:05:24.200
<v Speaker 1>it might pick up if it were just sitting there

0:05:24.240 --> 0:05:27.480
<v Speaker 1>the whole time, right next to a crime scene. Bentonville

0:05:27.480 --> 0:05:30.480
<v Speaker 1>police got a search warrant to confiscate the echo is evidence,

0:05:31.040 --> 0:05:33.159
<v Speaker 1>but the echo by itself couldn't tell the full story

0:05:33.600 --> 0:05:35.960
<v Speaker 1>because none of the data is saved on the device.

0:05:36.680 --> 0:05:39.400
<v Speaker 1>Amazon told me that records are stored in the cloud,

0:05:39.920 --> 0:05:44.159
<v Speaker 1>in other words, on Amazon servers, which are scattered across

0:05:44.240 --> 0:05:47.720
<v Speaker 1>the country and around the world. So the lead detective

0:05:47.720 --> 0:05:51.080
<v Speaker 1>got a court order to get Amazon to share its information. Now,

0:05:51.080 --> 0:05:54.479
<v Speaker 1>an important thing to know about these virtual assistance is

0:05:54.520 --> 0:05:57.040
<v Speaker 1>that you know whether it's a speaker like the Echo

0:05:57.200 --> 0:06:00.240
<v Speaker 1>or on the phone like Apple Syrie. There does trying

0:06:00.320 --> 0:06:03.040
<v Speaker 1>to wake up only when they're prompted to do so,

0:06:03.480 --> 0:06:06.880
<v Speaker 1>otherwise they'd annoy you all the time. So the Echo

0:06:06.920 --> 0:06:11.640
<v Speaker 1>will only start recording once someone calls it by its name, Alexa.

0:06:11.839 --> 0:06:15.440
<v Speaker 1>Amazon told me that saying the word Alexa also turns

0:06:15.480 --> 0:06:17.880
<v Speaker 1>on the blue light that's on the speaker, so the

0:06:17.960 --> 0:06:21.360
<v Speaker 1>echoes only streaming audio to the cloud when that blue

0:06:21.400 --> 0:06:24.760
<v Speaker 1>light is on. In theory, this could still be useful

0:06:24.800 --> 0:06:29.320
<v Speaker 1>to investigators. Someone may have been agitated and yelled at

0:06:29.360 --> 0:06:32.240
<v Speaker 1>the Amazon to shut up because the music was playing.

0:06:32.680 --> 0:06:36.080
<v Speaker 1>That's Craig Ball, a forensic technologist and former trial lawyer.

0:06:36.240 --> 0:06:39.560
<v Speaker 1>Craig is what's called a court master in the legal system.

0:06:39.640 --> 0:06:42.120
<v Speaker 1>Instead of being an expert witness for one side or

0:06:42.160 --> 0:06:44.840
<v Speaker 1>the other, he's hired by the judges to help them

0:06:44.839 --> 0:06:48.560
<v Speaker 1>interpret digital evidence. You'll know the time, You'll know the

0:06:48.640 --> 0:06:51.200
<v Speaker 1>voice because there's an actual recording of the boys. I'll

0:06:51.240 --> 0:06:55.440
<v Speaker 1>repeat this since it's important. There's an actual recording of

0:06:55.480 --> 0:06:58.560
<v Speaker 1>your voice. Every time you ask Alexa for something. Amazon

0:06:58.720 --> 0:07:02.160
<v Speaker 1>keeps that audio and hill a user manually deletes their

0:07:02.200 --> 0:07:05.960
<v Speaker 1>command history. Plus, because it's triggered to record and transmit,

0:07:06.320 --> 0:07:11.360
<v Speaker 1>you not only hear the commands, you also hear anything

0:07:11.440 --> 0:07:13.920
<v Speaker 1>in the way of ambient noise at the time, So

0:07:14.000 --> 0:07:16.440
<v Speaker 1>you might hear if the hot tub was running, you

0:07:16.520 --> 0:07:20.960
<v Speaker 1>might hear if someone was groaning, crying, fighting in the background.

0:07:21.640 --> 0:07:25.520
<v Speaker 1>The court order started a legal standoff with Amazon, and

0:07:25.800 --> 0:07:29.240
<v Speaker 1>the company handed over James's account information and records of

0:07:29.280 --> 0:07:32.920
<v Speaker 1>his transactions, but it didn't hand over data from James's

0:07:32.960 --> 0:07:37.760
<v Speaker 1>Echo device. Amazon told me in a statement that quote

0:07:38.320 --> 0:07:42.160
<v Speaker 1>Amazon will not release customer information without a valid and

0:07:42.320 --> 0:07:47.120
<v Speaker 1>binding legal demand properly served on us. Amazon objects to

0:07:47.240 --> 0:07:51.560
<v Speaker 1>overbroad or otherwise inappropriate demands as a matter of course,

0:07:51.880 --> 0:07:55.600
<v Speaker 1>and quote in pushing back against the search warrant, Amazon

0:07:55.680 --> 0:07:59.080
<v Speaker 1>side did both the company's First Amendment rights. In other words,

0:07:59.360 --> 0:08:02.600
<v Speaker 1>the companies to free speech as well as the customers.

0:08:03.120 --> 0:08:08.000
<v Speaker 1>There are certain kinds of speech that are protected constitutionally

0:08:08.000 --> 0:08:11.120
<v Speaker 1>in the United States. We begin to bump into that

0:08:11.240 --> 0:08:15.120
<v Speaker 1>as we look at your interactions with new devices. Ultimately,

0:08:15.280 --> 0:08:18.760
<v Speaker 1>it was the defendant James who gave law enforcement permission

0:08:18.800 --> 0:08:21.520
<v Speaker 1>to access as data, which ended the stand off before

0:08:21.520 --> 0:08:30.160
<v Speaker 1>it fully played out. Ever since, tech companies have been

0:08:30.200 --> 0:08:32.960
<v Speaker 1>in this tug of war with the government over how

0:08:33.360 --> 0:08:37.280
<v Speaker 1>and when they should release customer data. For the industry,

0:08:37.320 --> 0:08:41.040
<v Speaker 1>it's been this delicate balance between protecting their users from

0:08:41.120 --> 0:08:45.640
<v Speaker 1>government intrusion and helping the government chase down criminals. It's

0:08:45.679 --> 0:08:49.240
<v Speaker 1>something that Apple CEO Tim Cook just talked about last

0:08:49.240 --> 0:08:51.560
<v Speaker 1>week in an interview with Bloomberg TV. In the wake

0:08:51.640 --> 0:08:56.719
<v Speaker 1>of the London terror attack. We've been cooperating with the

0:08:56.840 --> 0:09:02.840
<v Speaker 1>UK government in uh, not only in law enforcement kind

0:09:02.880 --> 0:09:07.720
<v Speaker 1>of matters, but on on some of the attacks. And

0:09:07.760 --> 0:09:11.760
<v Speaker 1>I can't speak in detail about that, but in cases

0:09:11.840 --> 0:09:15.800
<v Speaker 1>where we have information uh and they've gone through the

0:09:15.920 --> 0:09:21.160
<v Speaker 1>lawful process, we uh not just give it, but we

0:09:21.920 --> 0:09:25.400
<v Speaker 1>uh you know, we do it very very promptly. The

0:09:25.480 --> 0:09:29.360
<v Speaker 1>public controversy, of course, all started with Edward Snowden's revelations.

0:09:29.840 --> 0:09:32.400
<v Speaker 1>That's when we saw for the first time this scale

0:09:32.720 --> 0:09:36.080
<v Speaker 1>at which the US government, through the National Security Agency,

0:09:36.559 --> 0:09:40.520
<v Speaker 1>was monitoring the communications of its own citizens. People are

0:09:40.600 --> 0:09:42.960
<v Speaker 1>in fact outrage. They don't like the idea of this

0:09:43.000 --> 0:09:45.520
<v Speaker 1>in any way, shape or form. It's very big brother feeling.

0:09:45.960 --> 0:09:49.240
<v Speaker 1>On July four, there were protests against the n s

0:09:49.320 --> 0:09:52.360
<v Speaker 1>A in eighty cities across the US. There were also

0:09:52.400 --> 0:10:01.800
<v Speaker 1>demonstrations in other countries around the world. Today, so a

0:10:01.800 --> 0:10:04.239
<v Speaker 1>lot of people all over the world have been demanding

0:10:04.280 --> 0:10:08.520
<v Speaker 1>greater privacy protections, and at the same time, these smart

0:10:08.559 --> 0:10:11.840
<v Speaker 1>devices that promised to make our lives more convenient have

0:10:11.960 --> 0:10:16.160
<v Speaker 1>gotten really popular. According to an industry report from Voice Labs,

0:10:16.280 --> 0:10:20.040
<v Speaker 1>almost twenty five million smart speakers are expected to ship

0:10:20.080 --> 0:10:23.240
<v Speaker 1>this year. And these two movements have overlapped. You know,

0:10:23.800 --> 0:10:26.680
<v Speaker 1>there are these young urban people who pushed back against

0:10:26.720 --> 0:10:29.960
<v Speaker 1>government intrusion, would like to be early adopters of new tech.

0:10:30.480 --> 0:10:33.040
<v Speaker 1>I can't tell you how many people I went to

0:10:33.040 --> 0:10:36.000
<v Speaker 1>school with would buy the latest smart gadgets but stick

0:10:36.080 --> 0:10:38.840
<v Speaker 1>tape over their laptop cameras so the n s A

0:10:38.920 --> 0:10:42.360
<v Speaker 1>won't check in. I think I've done that more than once.

0:10:47.840 --> 0:10:51.640
<v Speaker 1>But now, four years after the Snowden revelations, things are

0:10:51.679 --> 0:10:54.880
<v Speaker 1>shifting again. At first, the government told us that the

0:10:54.960 --> 0:10:59.360
<v Speaker 1>surveillance was necessary for national security. But as we generate

0:10:59.440 --> 0:11:03.120
<v Speaker 1>more and more data on more and more devices, judges

0:11:03.240 --> 0:11:06.079
<v Speaker 1>and law enforcement agencies are seeing a lot of potential

0:11:06.200 --> 0:11:08.760
<v Speaker 1>for those records to be used as evidence in more

0:11:08.840 --> 0:11:12.800
<v Speaker 1>routine criminal and civil cases. Here's Craig again. He's the

0:11:12.800 --> 0:11:16.640
<v Speaker 1>guy who helps judges interpret digital evidence. The government will

0:11:16.679 --> 0:11:19.880
<v Speaker 1>be able to go to a court be able to show,

0:11:19.920 --> 0:11:24.120
<v Speaker 1>in many instances a compelling reason, clearing convincing evidence could

0:11:24.240 --> 0:11:29.760
<v Speaker 1>cause depending upon the standard applied um and the government

0:11:29.800 --> 0:11:32.959
<v Speaker 1>may be able to obtain a court order compelling an

0:11:32.960 --> 0:11:36.960
<v Speaker 1>individual to release certain information or compelling a third party

0:11:37.120 --> 0:11:42.599
<v Speaker 1>holder of information, a bank of business, a financial transaction

0:11:42.840 --> 0:11:50.800
<v Speaker 1>app company to turn over that information. And there was

0:11:50.840 --> 0:11:54.839
<v Speaker 1>actually an interesting case of investigators using the popular online

0:11:54.920 --> 0:11:57.800
<v Speaker 1>video game World of Warcraft to help solve a murder

0:11:57.840 --> 0:12:01.760
<v Speaker 1>back and how did that work. So, the sixteen year

0:12:01.800 --> 0:12:06.000
<v Speaker 1>old in British Columbia, Canada, CRUs Wellwood, raped and killed

0:12:06.120 --> 0:12:10.319
<v Speaker 1>one of his classmates, Kim Proctor. Okay, he played World

0:12:10.320 --> 0:12:13.120
<v Speaker 1>of Warcraft a lot and used the game's internal messaging

0:12:13.160 --> 0:12:16.720
<v Speaker 1>system to confess his guilt to his online girlfriend. A

0:12:16.760 --> 0:12:19.720
<v Speaker 1>local tech crimes unit got legal access to his communications

0:12:19.720 --> 0:12:22.040
<v Speaker 1>on the platform. So that sounds like a pretty legit

0:12:22.160 --> 0:12:24.400
<v Speaker 1>use case for this kind of data. But there's a

0:12:24.520 --> 0:12:27.880
<v Speaker 1>lot more to this that and what ended up happening

0:12:27.920 --> 0:12:31.680
<v Speaker 1>in the Bentonville murder investigation is coming up right after

0:12:31.760 --> 0:12:37.840
<v Speaker 1>this word from our sponsor. You know where you want

0:12:37.880 --> 0:12:41.120
<v Speaker 1>to be? Red Hat has the broad portfolio of open

0:12:41.160 --> 0:12:44.840
<v Speaker 1>source technologies to get you there. Meet your evolving business

0:12:44.920 --> 0:12:48.760
<v Speaker 1>challenges head on with secure solutions for the enterprise, including

0:12:49.120 --> 0:12:55.079
<v Speaker 1>Linux platforms and containers, hybrid cloud infrastructure, application integration and development,

0:12:55.480 --> 0:13:00.000
<v Speaker 1>operations management, and beyond. Visit red hat, dot com, slash

0:13:00.040 --> 0:13:03.840
<v Speaker 1>and tech to learn more. Redhead the open technology to

0:13:03.920 --> 0:13:10.160
<v Speaker 1>help you realize your vision. Hi, I'm Pagat Cary, a

0:13:10.280 --> 0:13:14.000
<v Speaker 1>producer here undecrypted. We hear a lot about the possibility

0:13:14.080 --> 0:13:17.319
<v Speaker 1>that robots and algorithms could take away our jobs, but

0:13:17.520 --> 0:13:21.199
<v Speaker 1>how real is this threat? If you're seeing or experiencing

0:13:21.280 --> 0:13:24.600
<v Speaker 1>automation at work or suspect your job will be impacted,

0:13:24.760 --> 0:13:27.400
<v Speaker 1>please get in touch with us. We want to hear

0:13:27.520 --> 0:13:31.240
<v Speaker 1>your story, even use it for a future episode. Record

0:13:31.280 --> 0:13:34.040
<v Speaker 1>a voice message on your smartphone and email it to

0:13:34.280 --> 0:13:43.800
<v Speaker 1>decrypted at Bloomberg dot net. Okay, we're back. Before the break,

0:13:43.880 --> 0:13:47.319
<v Speaker 1>we told you that police investigators and judges are seeing

0:13:47.400 --> 0:13:50.880
<v Speaker 1>the data that we generate on these voice activated devices

0:13:51.400 --> 0:13:53.600
<v Speaker 1>as a new kind of evidence they can use in trial,

0:13:54.120 --> 0:13:56.199
<v Speaker 1>kind of like how they might seize and search the

0:13:56.280 --> 0:14:00.160
<v Speaker 1>information on your smartphone or your laptop. When you talked

0:14:00.160 --> 0:14:02.679
<v Speaker 1>about the Internet of things, and there's a very fine

0:14:02.800 --> 0:14:06.920
<v Speaker 1>line between creepy and cool, and that really boils down

0:14:07.000 --> 0:14:11.440
<v Speaker 1>to whether or not the organization got consent from their customers.

0:14:11.760 --> 0:14:15.680
<v Speaker 1>That's Christina Bergmann, the CEO of Integrists Software, a data

0:14:15.720 --> 0:14:19.120
<v Speaker 1>privacy startup that advises tech companies on how to comply

0:14:19.280 --> 0:14:23.360
<v Speaker 1>with the European Union's new privacy regulations. She was previously

0:14:23.520 --> 0:14:27.600
<v Speaker 1>a group product manager at Microsoft with devices like Alexa,

0:14:27.840 --> 0:14:32.720
<v Speaker 1>and while that has some very compelling scenarios for making

0:14:32.840 --> 0:14:36.480
<v Speaker 1>things a lot easier, it also means that you're really

0:14:36.600 --> 0:14:42.120
<v Speaker 1>losing your privacy in in in your home, which for

0:14:42.360 --> 0:14:45.400
<v Speaker 1>a lot of people is an uncomfortable feeling, and that

0:14:45.720 --> 0:14:48.720
<v Speaker 1>that really boils down to consent as well. If you've

0:14:48.760 --> 0:14:53.040
<v Speaker 1>got consent to listen on an ongoing basis, and the

0:14:53.120 --> 0:14:56.400
<v Speaker 1>consumer has the ability to shut it off when they

0:14:56.480 --> 0:14:59.080
<v Speaker 1>want to have that privacy, then then that creates a

0:14:59.200 --> 0:15:03.520
<v Speaker 1>nice barrier. Okay, so maybe customers understand what they're signing

0:15:03.600 --> 0:15:06.760
<v Speaker 1>up for when they buy an echo, but some companies

0:15:06.800 --> 0:15:10.760
<v Speaker 1>haven't been so transparent. So a good example of a

0:15:11.120 --> 0:15:14.800
<v Speaker 1>company that did not get consent before listening to what

0:15:14.960 --> 0:15:18.080
<v Speaker 1>goes on in people's homes is Visio TVs. It would

0:15:18.120 --> 0:15:21.600
<v Speaker 1>be pretty creepy. It's the equivalent of having a technological

0:15:21.720 --> 0:15:24.480
<v Speaker 1>peeping tom in your living room. I wouldn't be comfortable

0:15:24.560 --> 0:15:27.840
<v Speaker 1>with it at all. So what Christina is referring to

0:15:28.040 --> 0:15:31.240
<v Speaker 1>here is a case that Video had settled in February

0:15:31.440 --> 0:15:35.040
<v Speaker 1>for two point two million dollars with the Federal Trade

0:15:35.080 --> 0:15:38.400
<v Speaker 1>Commission in the state of New Jersey. The company smart

0:15:38.480 --> 0:15:43.680
<v Speaker 1>TVs collected viewing data on eleven million customers since without

0:15:43.720 --> 0:15:47.680
<v Speaker 1>consumers knowledge or consent, including what people watched on cable

0:15:47.720 --> 0:15:50.720
<v Speaker 1>and streaming services. That's according to a statement from the FTC.

0:15:51.440 --> 0:15:53.920
<v Speaker 1>And that's really what a lot of this boils down

0:15:54.000 --> 0:15:57.800
<v Speaker 1>to is people being able to trust the companies they're

0:15:57.880 --> 0:16:01.560
<v Speaker 1>engaging with and buying products and services from. So you

0:16:01.720 --> 0:16:04.960
<v Speaker 1>should be able to make an informed decision about whether

0:16:05.040 --> 0:16:08.720
<v Speaker 1>the Internet of Things is right for you, although I

0:16:08.880 --> 0:16:11.760
<v Speaker 1>do doubt most customers actually read the fine print on

0:16:11.840 --> 0:16:15.920
<v Speaker 1>those agreements. I know, I don't. And Christina also told

0:16:16.000 --> 0:16:18.800
<v Speaker 1>me that the rise of big data, meaning companies could

0:16:18.800 --> 0:16:22.760
<v Speaker 1>store lots of information cheaply and crunch it quickly, has

0:16:22.800 --> 0:16:26.240
<v Speaker 1>some knock on effects, including the Internet of things the

0:16:26.960 --> 0:16:31.560
<v Speaker 1>data that people are collecting and organizations are collecting about

0:16:31.600 --> 0:16:35.080
<v Speaker 1>their customers. It's much more personal than it ever was before.

0:16:35.280 --> 0:16:38.040
<v Speaker 1>Ten fifty years ago, if you didn't want people to

0:16:38.760 --> 0:16:40.240
<v Speaker 1>collect data on you, all you had to do with

0:16:40.840 --> 0:16:43.320
<v Speaker 1>with close your laptop and walk away from your computer.

0:16:44.200 --> 0:16:46.600
<v Speaker 1>The difference today is that you can't ever walk away

0:16:46.680 --> 0:16:50.120
<v Speaker 1>from data collection. Your phone is always on you, and

0:16:50.360 --> 0:16:54.280
<v Speaker 1>after constantly collecting information. People are wearing wearables. There are

0:16:54.400 --> 0:16:57.560
<v Speaker 1>censors in homes and on streets and cars and in

0:16:57.720 --> 0:17:03.880
<v Speaker 1>office buildings through spatial recognition to technology. So basically, massive

0:17:03.960 --> 0:17:07.720
<v Speaker 1>storage capacity allows companies to collect and process all the

0:17:07.800 --> 0:17:10.679
<v Speaker 1>data they have on you. Information that's now more intimate

0:17:10.760 --> 0:17:13.720
<v Speaker 1>than ever before. And let's talk about what these companies

0:17:13.800 --> 0:17:17.000
<v Speaker 1>are actually doing with the data. There's a lot of

0:17:17.119 --> 0:17:21.920
<v Speaker 1>information that can be inferred when uh, when data is

0:17:21.960 --> 0:17:27.000
<v Speaker 1>collected about an individual. The real value of data is

0:17:27.200 --> 0:17:32.320
<v Speaker 1>not in the actual initial data collected. What's really valuable

0:17:32.480 --> 0:17:35.359
<v Speaker 1>is what can be inferred based on that initial data.

0:17:35.560 --> 0:17:39.639
<v Speaker 1>For instance, just by knowing something like your geolocation on

0:17:39.800 --> 0:17:43.840
<v Speaker 1>your fitbit, somebody could determine without too much work and

0:17:43.960 --> 0:17:46.680
<v Speaker 1>without too much time, where your home was and where

0:17:46.720 --> 0:17:50.199
<v Speaker 1>your work was just based on location. And here's why

0:17:50.280 --> 0:17:53.240
<v Speaker 1>that could be problematic. You can start to understand people's

0:17:53.280 --> 0:17:56.720
<v Speaker 1>patterns of behavior and look at that type of information

0:17:56.840 --> 0:17:59.639
<v Speaker 1>to know if somebody's home or not. In the past,

0:17:59.680 --> 0:18:01.199
<v Speaker 1>if some do you wanted to rub your house, all

0:18:01.240 --> 0:18:02.359
<v Speaker 1>you had to do is sit on the front of

0:18:02.400 --> 0:18:04.320
<v Speaker 1>the street and figure out when you leave for work

0:18:04.560 --> 0:18:06.760
<v Speaker 1>and when you go home. They could look at things

0:18:06.840 --> 0:18:09.399
<v Speaker 1>like how often or how recently you've opened up the

0:18:09.480 --> 0:18:14.240
<v Speaker 1>fridge door or your washing machine, or how how often

0:18:14.400 --> 0:18:16.640
<v Speaker 1>you've used the lock on your front door. As those

0:18:16.680 --> 0:18:20.920
<v Speaker 1>become increasingly digitized. Of course, tech companies are trying very

0:18:21.000 --> 0:18:23.359
<v Speaker 1>hard to protect all of the data they're collecting on us,

0:18:23.920 --> 0:18:27.160
<v Speaker 1>and Christina says devices from larger firms are more likely

0:18:27.240 --> 0:18:35.960
<v Speaker 1>to have better privacy protections built into their products. So

0:18:36.119 --> 0:18:40.120
<v Speaker 1>let's talk about how these electronic records are collected now, well,

0:18:40.359 --> 0:18:43.520
<v Speaker 1>I asked Craig, was the legal and tech expert, whether

0:18:43.600 --> 0:18:47.560
<v Speaker 1>the government could forcibly extract records if individuals and companies

0:18:47.640 --> 0:18:51.680
<v Speaker 1>don't cooperate. I'm a little area of the word forcibly,

0:18:51.840 --> 0:18:55.680
<v Speaker 1>but let's just say and compel apart from the Fifth

0:18:55.720 --> 0:19:00.320
<v Speaker 1>Amendment considerations in a criminal investigation, Yes, the government would

0:19:00.359 --> 0:19:03.160
<v Speaker 1>have to jump through some procedural hoops. We want those

0:19:03.200 --> 0:19:06.520
<v Speaker 1>procedural hoops to protect us, but we also want people

0:19:06.640 --> 0:19:09.240
<v Speaker 1>to be able to be charged with crimes, and if

0:19:09.280 --> 0:19:12.280
<v Speaker 1>they're guilty, be convicted of crimes. You know, but not

0:19:12.480 --> 0:19:15.000
<v Speaker 1>everyone is going to be investigated for this kind of

0:19:15.119 --> 0:19:19.719
<v Speaker 1>violent crime. Certainly I hope I never will. So how

0:19:19.760 --> 0:19:23.119
<v Speaker 1>do you think this big brotherness would affect just a

0:19:23.480 --> 0:19:27.600
<v Speaker 1>normal law abiding person like me. Yeah. So, let's say

0:19:27.600 --> 0:19:30.159
<v Speaker 1>you're being audited by the u S Tax authority, the

0:19:30.240 --> 0:19:34.080
<v Speaker 1>Internal Revenue Service for potential tax evasion. Craig says that

0:19:34.200 --> 0:19:37.240
<v Speaker 1>the process could get even more high tech and invasive

0:19:37.800 --> 0:19:39.400
<v Speaker 1>when we come to the i r S. There's there's

0:19:39.520 --> 0:19:42.560
<v Speaker 1>very little off limits in that regard, and the i

0:19:42.760 --> 0:19:46.359
<v Speaker 1>r S, in issuing an audit notice, can demand that

0:19:46.480 --> 0:19:49.359
<v Speaker 1>you bring forward certain information. And so the i r

0:19:49.520 --> 0:19:52.600
<v Speaker 1>S may look at your Amazon transactions, they may look

0:19:52.720 --> 0:19:57.400
<v Speaker 1>at your transactions on PayPal, and a variety of other

0:19:57.720 --> 0:20:03.160
<v Speaker 1>what we might call digital or non traditional banking channels. Okay,

0:20:03.200 --> 0:20:06.960
<v Speaker 1>So let's say you've reported earnings of fifty dollars, but

0:20:07.480 --> 0:20:10.879
<v Speaker 1>you actually spent a hundred thousand dollars online. The i

0:20:11.080 --> 0:20:14.159
<v Speaker 1>r S could use that to catch you for tax fraud, right,

0:20:14.640 --> 0:20:17.840
<v Speaker 1>But to be clear, the agency will notify you when

0:20:17.840 --> 0:20:21.320
<v Speaker 1>you're being audited and asks for your cooperation. Okay, So

0:20:21.440 --> 0:20:24.720
<v Speaker 1>there's basically no room for lying to the government, and

0:20:24.840 --> 0:20:28.080
<v Speaker 1>Craig says the same technology also means that powerful people

0:20:28.119 --> 0:20:32.000
<v Speaker 1>in corporations will also leave behind digital traces of their actions.

0:20:32.560 --> 0:20:34.680
<v Speaker 1>So when they do something wrong, it's going to be

0:20:34.680 --> 0:20:36.960
<v Speaker 1>a lot easier to catch them and make them accountable

0:20:37.000 --> 0:20:44.520
<v Speaker 1>to NICA. What do you think this all means for

0:20:44.600 --> 0:20:47.400
<v Speaker 1>the kind of future that we're heading into. Well, it's

0:20:47.400 --> 0:20:49.640
<v Speaker 1>pretty clear that it will all be documented, right, will

0:20:49.640 --> 0:20:53.160
<v Speaker 1>all be recorded at all times, including in our car

0:20:53.800 --> 0:20:57.040
<v Speaker 1>when we're on the highway, and so if our cars

0:20:57.080 --> 0:21:00.480
<v Speaker 1>are smart, they can drive themselves. Can we speak? Not

0:21:00.640 --> 0:21:02.720
<v Speaker 1>just can we you know, get away with it, but

0:21:02.960 --> 0:21:05.720
<v Speaker 1>can we will the cars stop us? Yeah? And that

0:21:05.760 --> 0:21:10.520
<v Speaker 1>would mean that we would actually reduce traffic fatalities. Right, Yeah,

0:21:10.840 --> 0:21:14.080
<v Speaker 1>we'll do that. We'll catch more criminals. I mean, in

0:21:14.200 --> 0:21:16.480
<v Speaker 1>some ways it could be good for public safety, but

0:21:16.960 --> 0:21:19.920
<v Speaker 1>it does worry me, especially for people who live in

0:21:20.200 --> 0:21:25.320
<v Speaker 1>authoritarian regimes around the world. I'm specifically thinking about the

0:21:25.400 --> 0:21:28.359
<v Speaker 1>fact that I'm gay and that's illegal in a lot

0:21:28.400 --> 0:21:30.560
<v Speaker 1>of countries. If I was trying to keep that a

0:21:30.640 --> 0:21:34.000
<v Speaker 1>secret from my government, um, with all these devices around,

0:21:34.040 --> 0:21:36.640
<v Speaker 1>I probably wouldn't be able to keep that a secret anymore.

0:21:37.000 --> 0:21:39.960
<v Speaker 1>And that's some really scary stuff. You know. Before I've

0:21:40.040 --> 0:21:43.399
<v Speaker 1>never been very ideological about privacy, but have known other

0:21:43.480 --> 0:21:45.760
<v Speaker 1>people who have been, and I have to say that

0:21:45.920 --> 0:21:48.679
<v Speaker 1>reporting this story, I started to get it. I started

0:21:48.720 --> 0:21:52.359
<v Speaker 1>to understand why people are scared. I mean, it starts

0:21:52.400 --> 0:22:02.600
<v Speaker 1>to feel invasive. So James Bates, the man in Arkansas

0:22:02.720 --> 0:22:05.720
<v Speaker 1>who hosted the hot tub party, is being tried for

0:22:05.920 --> 0:22:10.520
<v Speaker 1>first degree murder. Nico, did they find anything on Amazon servers?

0:22:10.800 --> 0:22:14.200
<v Speaker 1>I wish I knew, but unfortunately we don't know. Not yet.

0:22:14.840 --> 0:22:17.480
<v Speaker 1>Law enforcement only got access to the Echo Dada in March,

0:22:17.920 --> 0:22:21.200
<v Speaker 1>and the prosecution hasn't made its case, so any information

0:22:21.359 --> 0:22:24.480
<v Speaker 1>that was gleaned from Amazon's records won't be made public

0:22:24.560 --> 0:22:28.480
<v Speaker 1>until later this year. What investigators did find, though, was

0:22:28.560 --> 0:22:31.720
<v Speaker 1>that the Amazon Echo was not the only smart device

0:22:31.760 --> 0:22:35.760
<v Speaker 1>in James's house. A central part of the lead detective's

0:22:35.840 --> 0:22:38.560
<v Speaker 1>argument to get an arrest warrant for the suspect is

0:22:38.600 --> 0:22:41.360
<v Speaker 1>the records from a smart water meter at the defendant's home.

0:22:41.920 --> 0:22:45.240
<v Speaker 1>Its data showed that someone used a lot of water

0:22:45.400 --> 0:22:48.400
<v Speaker 1>in the middle of the night, like one forty gallons

0:22:48.720 --> 0:22:51.960
<v Speaker 1>of water. The detective said the water was used to

0:22:52.040 --> 0:22:54.399
<v Speaker 1>hose down the hot tub area and get rid of

0:22:54.480 --> 0:22:58.280
<v Speaker 1>evidence of the crime. That would certainly explain the deck

0:22:58.400 --> 0:23:02.240
<v Speaker 1>dripping with water. James's lawyer says Victor's death was a

0:23:02.359 --> 0:23:05.600
<v Speaker 1>tragic accident that could have been caused by alcohol poisoning.

0:23:06.240 --> 0:23:09.240
<v Speaker 1>She claims his blood alcohol content is point three two,

0:23:09.760 --> 0:23:12.440
<v Speaker 1>which is four times the legal limit to drive in Arkansas.

0:23:13.680 --> 0:23:16.640
<v Speaker 1>The trial will start after a status conference in July.

0:23:17.200 --> 0:23:20.399
<v Speaker 1>Both sides will meet with the judge to schedule future hearings,

0:23:20.960 --> 0:23:23.920
<v Speaker 1>but in the meantime, Victor's loved ones are still processing

0:23:24.119 --> 0:23:34.600
<v Speaker 1>what happened that night. Just the things that surrounded I mean,

0:23:34.680 --> 0:23:38.119
<v Speaker 1>the guy's you know, my age, if not maybe a

0:23:38.240 --> 0:23:41.760
<v Speaker 1>year older than me. You know, you know, it puts

0:23:41.840 --> 0:23:44.879
<v Speaker 1>things kind of kind of hit home, you know, Uh,

0:23:45.119 --> 0:23:47.080
<v Speaker 1>if it could happen to him, could have happened to me.

0:23:48.520 --> 0:23:50.320
<v Speaker 1>It's just kind of, you know, it's kind of section

0:23:50.400 --> 0:23:51.919
<v Speaker 1>of faith that makes you wake up a little bit,

0:23:52.080 --> 0:23:55.320
<v Speaker 1>you know, you kind of stop taking things for granted

0:23:55.359 --> 0:24:00.560
<v Speaker 1>a little bit and kind of look at things. Yeah,

0:24:06.520 --> 0:24:09.280
<v Speaker 1>and that's it for this week's episode of Decrypton. Thanks

0:24:09.320 --> 0:24:11.800
<v Speaker 1>for listening. What do you think about this brave new

0:24:11.880 --> 0:24:14.800
<v Speaker 1>world we're entering? Please get in touch. You can record

0:24:14.920 --> 0:24:18.560
<v Speaker 1>a voice message and send it to Decrypted at Bloomberg

0:24:18.640 --> 0:24:21.879
<v Speaker 1>dot net. Also, I'm on Twitter at me go a

0:24:22.040 --> 0:24:25.560
<v Speaker 1>Grant and I'm at aki Eta seven. If you haven't already,

0:24:25.640 --> 0:24:29.040
<v Speaker 1>please subscribe to our show wherever you get your podcasts.

0:24:29.320 --> 0:24:32.000
<v Speaker 1>While you're there, please leave us a rating and a review.

0:24:32.240 --> 0:24:35.840
<v Speaker 1>It really helps more listeners Finder Show. This episode was

0:24:35.920 --> 0:24:39.480
<v Speaker 1>produced by Pio gott Kari, Liz Smith, and Magnus Hendrickson.

0:24:40.000 --> 0:24:43.240
<v Speaker 1>Alec McCabe is head of Bloomberg Podcasts. We'll see you

0:24:43.359 --> 0:24:50.240
<v Speaker 1>next Week. Decrypted is brought to you by red Hat,

0:24:50.400 --> 0:24:53.880
<v Speaker 1>whose broad portfolio of open source technologies for the enterprise

0:24:54.000 --> 0:24:56.080
<v Speaker 1>helps you get from where you are to where you

0:24:56.160 --> 0:24:59.520
<v Speaker 1>want to be. Red Hat the open technology to help

0:24:59.600 --> 0:25:02.240
<v Speaker 1>you real as your vision. Learn more at red hat

0:25:02.320 --> 0:25:03.840
<v Speaker 1>dot com, slash open tech