1 00:00:00,480 --> 00:00:05,720 Speaker 1: You're listening to Bloomberg Law with June Grasso from Bloomberg Radio. 2 00:00:07,800 --> 00:00:10,680 Speaker 1: A judge in Boston has signaled he may authorize the 3 00:00:10,760 --> 00:00:14,440 Speaker 1: ex tradition of two Americans to face criminal charges in 4 00:00:14,520 --> 00:00:18,160 Speaker 1: Japan for their alleged role in engineering the daring escape 5 00:00:18,200 --> 00:00:21,959 Speaker 1: of former Nissan chairman Carlos Scone out of Japan in 6 00:00:22,000 --> 00:00:25,680 Speaker 1: a box last year. Former Green Beret Michael Taylor and 7 00:00:25,720 --> 00:00:28,360 Speaker 1: his son Peter have not denied that they helped go 8 00:00:28,440 --> 00:00:32,240 Speaker 1: and flee while he was awaiting trial on financial misconduct charges, 9 00:00:32,520 --> 00:00:35,680 Speaker 1: but they say their actions are in crimes under Japan's 10 00:00:35,720 --> 00:00:39,360 Speaker 1: penal code. Their defense attorney, Abby Lowell told the judge 11 00:00:39,400 --> 00:00:42,360 Speaker 1: that before the Tailor's case, the law has never been 12 00:00:42,360 --> 00:00:45,920 Speaker 1: applied to someone who helped another person flee while on bail. 13 00:00:46,560 --> 00:00:50,000 Speaker 1: Joining me is an expert on Japanese law, Mark Ramzer, 14 00:00:50,040 --> 00:00:54,640 Speaker 1: a professor at Harvard Law School. So the attorney for 15 00:00:54,800 --> 00:00:59,640 Speaker 1: the Tailor's Abby Lowell, argued that under Japanese law, in 16 00:00:59,720 --> 00:01:02,440 Speaker 1: the is the game of hide and seek, that to 17 00:01:02,520 --> 00:01:05,240 Speaker 1: help someone hide, there has to be someone seeking. In 18 00:01:05,280 --> 00:01:09,240 Speaker 1: other words, he argued that their actions weren't crimes under 19 00:01:09,360 --> 00:01:13,000 Speaker 1: Japanese law. Can you explain that further why they might 20 00:01:13,040 --> 00:01:17,040 Speaker 1: not be crimes under Japanese law. It sounds like, uh, 21 00:01:17,160 --> 00:01:22,280 Speaker 1: they're saying, Look, he was under how it's arrest. I 22 00:01:22,280 --> 00:01:26,320 Speaker 1: thought he had to stay um in a limited sphere 23 00:01:26,360 --> 00:01:29,880 Speaker 1: of places. If he's under how it's arrest, then nobody's 24 00:01:29,920 --> 00:01:33,240 Speaker 1: looking for him because he's staying in his house. UM. 25 00:01:33,319 --> 00:01:36,680 Speaker 1: And if nobody's looking for him, then you can't help 26 00:01:36,720 --> 00:01:42,160 Speaker 1: anyone escape. This theory strikes me as uh just downright silly. 27 00:01:43,360 --> 00:01:49,760 Speaker 1: Helping someone escape um who's committed a crime? Uh, is 28 00:01:49,800 --> 00:01:52,520 Speaker 1: itself a crime. It's a crime in the US, it's 29 00:01:52,560 --> 00:01:57,000 Speaker 1: a crime in Japan. Uh. And this would apply for example, 30 00:01:57,080 --> 00:02:02,040 Speaker 1: if you have a friend who has just ordered somebody uh, 31 00:02:02,080 --> 00:02:06,800 Speaker 1: and you keep this person in your house or you 32 00:02:07,440 --> 00:02:11,440 Speaker 1: pick him up in your car and drive him to 33 00:02:11,480 --> 00:02:16,760 Speaker 1: another state. UM, that's that's a crime as a crime 34 00:02:16,760 --> 00:02:20,440 Speaker 1: here at the crime there. UM. My understanding as a 35 00:02:20,520 --> 00:02:24,400 Speaker 1: Japanese statute is um, that's what it's about. Now. If 36 00:02:24,440 --> 00:02:31,520 Speaker 1: you have somebody who has been arrested for a crime 37 00:02:32,280 --> 00:02:37,960 Speaker 1: and has been uh told to um he wants he 38 00:02:38,760 --> 00:02:42,000 Speaker 1: wants to get out of jail. Uh, and so they 39 00:02:42,080 --> 00:02:47,440 Speaker 1: let him stay in his house provided that he has 40 00:02:47,600 --> 00:02:53,880 Speaker 1: posted bond. Um. He is being held there because he 41 00:02:54,200 --> 00:03:00,360 Speaker 1: they expect him to come back and show up at trial. Uh. 42 00:03:00,400 --> 00:03:05,720 Speaker 1: And uh he's actually is he being pursued. He's not 43 00:03:05,760 --> 00:03:09,320 Speaker 1: being pursued. Um. Although, as I understand, if the Japanese 44 00:03:09,520 --> 00:03:14,120 Speaker 1: police were watching his house from multiple directions, and that's why, 45 00:03:14,200 --> 00:03:17,120 Speaker 1: uh they had to be as surreptitious as they were 46 00:03:17,280 --> 00:03:22,600 Speaker 1: in transporting going out. If you know, believing what I 47 00:03:22,680 --> 00:03:26,120 Speaker 1: want we read in the newspapers. Um, so does that. 48 00:03:26,560 --> 00:03:29,600 Speaker 1: The question, as I understand it, is whether that fits 49 00:03:29,639 --> 00:03:35,640 Speaker 1: the statute um? And you know in UM it's it's 50 00:03:35,680 --> 00:03:40,320 Speaker 1: sort of basic law that it's true here in the US, 51 00:03:40,400 --> 00:03:42,480 Speaker 1: and it's true in Japan, that the law says what 52 00:03:42,520 --> 00:03:46,000 Speaker 1: a judge says, it says. UM and um. You know 53 00:03:46,080 --> 00:03:50,520 Speaker 1: Title nine covers sexual assault. Uh. If you read uh 54 00:03:50,720 --> 00:03:53,520 Speaker 1: Title nine, I don't think you'll find a single sexual 55 00:03:53,560 --> 00:03:56,760 Speaker 1: assault in it. But it covers it, and he covers 56 00:03:56,800 --> 00:04:00,960 Speaker 1: it because that's the way in which it's been applied. Uh. 57 00:04:01,000 --> 00:04:07,200 Speaker 1: And Uh if it would be a bizarre interpretation of 58 00:04:07,480 --> 00:04:13,400 Speaker 1: a statute um designed to prevent people from helping UM 59 00:04:14,120 --> 00:04:17,760 Speaker 1: criminals escape from the police to say that, well, if 60 00:04:17,760 --> 00:04:20,520 Speaker 1: you're Um, if you post a bond and you're sitting 61 00:04:20,520 --> 00:04:24,800 Speaker 1: in your house, uh, and then somebody helps you run away, 62 00:04:24,880 --> 00:04:30,120 Speaker 1: that that's not covered. Uh. They have I gather a 63 00:04:30,200 --> 00:04:34,920 Speaker 1: theory based on the the language of the statute. Um. 64 00:04:35,279 --> 00:04:38,360 Speaker 1: I looked at the statute and I didn't see anything 65 00:04:38,440 --> 00:04:41,960 Speaker 1: that particularly supported their theory. But be that as it may, 66 00:04:42,040 --> 00:04:44,960 Speaker 1: they have a theory, uh, and it is that this 67 00:04:45,400 --> 00:04:48,360 Speaker 1: statute doesn't cover their case. Well, if that's the case, 68 00:04:48,400 --> 00:04:51,599 Speaker 1: then the right person to decide this is a judge. Um. 69 00:04:51,760 --> 00:04:54,240 Speaker 1: And they can present their theory and the judge can 70 00:04:54,279 --> 00:04:57,760 Speaker 1: decide whether it applies or not. Uh. It would seem 71 00:04:57,800 --> 00:05:01,240 Speaker 1: to be pretty bizarre to say that, Uh, the American 72 00:05:01,360 --> 00:05:07,000 Speaker 1: judge is the one who decides whether this Japanese statute 73 00:05:07,080 --> 00:05:10,719 Speaker 1: covers uh, the their case or not. I would have 74 00:05:10,760 --> 00:05:13,680 Speaker 1: thought the proper place to make it is in the 75 00:05:13,760 --> 00:05:18,760 Speaker 1: Japanese courtroom. If these men are extradited, then their subject 76 00:05:18,880 --> 00:05:21,760 Speaker 1: to the Japanese legal system, where the conviction rate I 77 00:05:21,760 --> 00:05:28,320 Speaker 1: believe is are the proceedings waited in favor of the prosecution. No, 78 00:05:28,560 --> 00:05:32,120 Speaker 1: I wouldn't think so. Um. There are a couple of 79 00:05:32,200 --> 00:05:38,160 Speaker 1: reasons why the the conviction rate is high. It depends 80 00:05:38,200 --> 00:05:42,560 Speaker 1: on what you're counting. Japan does not have, or at 81 00:05:42,640 --> 00:05:46,800 Speaker 1: least until very recently, did not have, flea bargains um. 82 00:05:47,080 --> 00:05:51,279 Speaker 1: And so the way in which with the courts and 83 00:05:51,320 --> 00:05:56,800 Speaker 1: the prosecutors handled the vast numbers of cases per person 84 00:05:57,760 --> 00:06:03,000 Speaker 1: was that the defendant pleaded guilty, uh, and they went 85 00:06:03,040 --> 00:06:07,320 Speaker 1: to the judge uh, and he or she pleaded guilty, 86 00:06:07,560 --> 00:06:11,600 Speaker 1: and the judge gave a sentence. And the sentences if 87 00:06:11,640 --> 00:06:15,840 Speaker 1: somebody pleads guilty tend to be more lenient than one 88 00:06:15,920 --> 00:06:22,480 Speaker 1: where the person contests his or her innocence uh. And um, 89 00:06:22,560 --> 00:06:26,120 Speaker 1: that counts as a conviction. Uh. The so you you 90 00:06:26,480 --> 00:06:28,360 Speaker 1: can see what's going on, right, I mean, there is 91 00:06:28,400 --> 00:06:32,159 Speaker 1: an implicit deal. It's not an explicit deal and in 92 00:06:32,240 --> 00:06:35,320 Speaker 1: any sense, but the implicitly judges are more lenient if 93 00:06:35,360 --> 00:06:38,479 Speaker 1: you confess. So if you figure you're going to be convicted, 94 00:06:39,480 --> 00:06:42,160 Speaker 1: you confess and you get a slight of somewhat more 95 00:06:42,240 --> 00:06:45,400 Speaker 1: lenient sent in the United States is to be counted 96 00:06:45,440 --> 00:06:49,599 Speaker 1: as a plea bargain uh. And so the person would 97 00:06:49,640 --> 00:06:54,440 Speaker 1: explicitly cut a deal uh and UH plead guilty and 98 00:06:54,760 --> 00:07:00,359 Speaker 1: in exchange would get a negotiated lighter sentence. Uh. And 99 00:07:00,560 --> 00:07:05,479 Speaker 1: so there are it is to a confession um in 100 00:07:05,560 --> 00:07:10,040 Speaker 1: Japan is not um exactly the same as a plea 101 00:07:10,120 --> 00:07:15,080 Speaker 1: bargain in the US, but there are very clear parallels. UM. 102 00:07:15,080 --> 00:07:18,680 Speaker 1: And when you calculate conviction rates in the United States, 103 00:07:18,680 --> 00:07:23,560 Speaker 1: one typically throws out plea bargains, But the functional analog 104 00:07:23,640 --> 00:07:27,120 Speaker 1: in Japan is a confession. Uh. And since that technically 105 00:07:27,240 --> 00:07:30,960 Speaker 1: is a trial, uh, it doesn't get thrown out. So 106 00:07:31,080 --> 00:07:34,840 Speaker 1: that's one way in which the conviction rate in Japan 107 00:07:35,000 --> 00:07:38,400 Speaker 1: is one reason why the conviction rate in Japan is 108 00:07:38,480 --> 00:07:42,280 Speaker 1: higher than it is here. UM. There's another, which is 109 00:07:42,800 --> 00:07:48,040 Speaker 1: simply that prosecutors in Japan uh throw out huge numbers 110 00:07:48,120 --> 00:07:53,360 Speaker 1: of people who are uh forwarded to them from the police. Uh. 111 00:07:53,440 --> 00:07:58,720 Speaker 1: They simply don't prosecute them. Uh. They um they obviously 112 00:07:58,760 --> 00:08:01,160 Speaker 1: interrogate the person they out to them, They talked to 113 00:08:01,240 --> 00:08:06,080 Speaker 1: the victims of the crimes, but UH they're selective about 114 00:08:06,120 --> 00:08:11,040 Speaker 1: who they prosecute and uh pushed through the system. Uh 115 00:08:11,080 --> 00:08:14,600 Speaker 1: and so uh it will tend to be the more 116 00:08:14,760 --> 00:08:18,840 Speaker 1: in uh incorrigible defendants. It will tend to be the 117 00:08:18,880 --> 00:08:23,360 Speaker 1: people who proved uh committed with the most heinous crimes. 118 00:08:23,560 --> 00:08:28,320 Speaker 1: Uh and UH. There are huge numbers of cases where 119 00:08:29,000 --> 00:08:31,840 Speaker 1: if the prosecutor looks at it and looks at it 120 00:08:31,880 --> 00:08:35,000 Speaker 1: hard and decide, you know, I sure think this person 121 00:08:35,040 --> 00:08:38,120 Speaker 1: did it, but I'm not really sure, uh, that the 122 00:08:38,160 --> 00:08:42,360 Speaker 1: prosecutor will just say, we'll just try to make sure 123 00:08:42,400 --> 00:08:44,559 Speaker 1: that the person understands the gravity of what he or 124 00:08:44,679 --> 00:08:48,360 Speaker 1: she did. Uh, and the person will not be prosecutor. Uh. 125 00:08:48,360 --> 00:08:51,080 Speaker 1: So there's a selection going on. Uh. And it's a 126 00:08:51,120 --> 00:08:54,320 Speaker 1: selection at the level of the prosecutor in terms of 127 00:08:54,360 --> 00:09:00,600 Speaker 1: who the prosecutor chooses uh to uh to prosecute. And 128 00:09:00,760 --> 00:09:06,720 Speaker 1: if the prosecutor is um tending to select only the 129 00:09:06,720 --> 00:09:12,480 Speaker 1: most uh slam dunk cases for prosecution, then you'll end 130 00:09:12,559 --> 00:09:17,040 Speaker 1: up with a very high conviction rate. What that misses 131 00:09:17,400 --> 00:09:21,760 Speaker 1: are the people who the prosecutor has chosen not to 132 00:09:21,880 --> 00:09:25,800 Speaker 1: prosecute at all. What about the conditions in Japanese prisons 133 00:09:26,200 --> 00:09:29,720 Speaker 1: during his incarceration, going complained about how he was treated 134 00:09:29,920 --> 00:09:34,880 Speaker 1: and the interrogations by Japanese prosecutors, because it's hard not 135 00:09:35,040 --> 00:09:40,840 Speaker 1: to chuckle. Uh if the notion is um, you know, 136 00:09:40,880 --> 00:09:47,480 Speaker 1: our Japanese prisons more inhumane than American prisons. Uh. Anybody 137 00:09:47,520 --> 00:09:51,800 Speaker 1: with any um any sense, would vastly prefer to be 138 00:09:51,880 --> 00:09:55,880 Speaker 1: imprisoned in Japan's and American state prisons. The American prisons 139 00:09:55,880 --> 00:09:58,960 Speaker 1: are brutal, prisoners are not kept from each other. Japanese 140 00:09:58,960 --> 00:10:04,959 Speaker 1: are are petrified of American prisons. UM. And the Japanese 141 00:10:04,960 --> 00:10:09,480 Speaker 1: constitution protects the right to an attorney, as does the 142 00:10:09,520 --> 00:10:13,240 Speaker 1: American The American courts interpret that to mean that you 143 00:10:13,320 --> 00:10:17,480 Speaker 1: do not have to UH submit to interrogation unless the 144 00:10:17,520 --> 00:10:22,680 Speaker 1: attorney is present. The Japanese UH Supreme Court interprets this 145 00:10:22,840 --> 00:10:27,080 Speaker 1: to mean that you have a right to consult an 146 00:10:27,080 --> 00:10:30,200 Speaker 1: attorney regularly, but you do not have a right to 147 00:10:30,320 --> 00:10:35,760 Speaker 1: have the attorney present actor interrogation. And that seems to me, A, 148 00:10:36,480 --> 00:10:38,960 Speaker 1: you know, it's a it's a plausible interpretation. It's not 149 00:10:39,040 --> 00:10:42,160 Speaker 1: clearly wrong. UM, I would prefer to be in a 150 00:10:42,240 --> 00:10:46,160 Speaker 1: system where I could not be interrogated unless my attorney 151 00:10:46,200 --> 00:10:50,000 Speaker 1: was present. But UM, you now, it's not a particularly 152 00:10:50,080 --> 00:10:54,720 Speaker 1: undemocratic or heinous sort of system to say that, UH, 153 00:10:54,840 --> 00:10:57,920 Speaker 1: you can be interrogated without your journey as long as 154 00:10:57,960 --> 00:11:00,000 Speaker 1: you have the right to talk to him or her 155 00:11:00,600 --> 00:11:03,000 Speaker 1: from time to time. Thanks for being on the Bloomberg 156 00:11:03,080 --> 00:11:06,760 Speaker 1: Lass Show. That's Professor Mark Ramzer of Harvard Law School. 157 00:11:08,600 --> 00:11:13,120 Speaker 1: Teva Pharmaceutical Industries is fighting charges of conspiring with competitors 158 00:11:13,160 --> 00:11:18,120 Speaker 1: to fix prices for generic drugs and allocate customers between competitors, 159 00:11:18,440 --> 00:11:21,679 Speaker 1: allegedly leading to at least three hundred fifty million dollars 160 00:11:21,679 --> 00:11:24,680 Speaker 1: in over charges to patients in a little over two years. 161 00:11:25,080 --> 00:11:28,160 Speaker 1: Teva says it's not guilty of the charges and refused 162 00:11:28,200 --> 00:11:30,720 Speaker 1: to admit guilt when offered a settlement agreement by the 163 00:11:30,720 --> 00:11:34,679 Speaker 1: Department of Justice. Unlike five other generic drug companies who 164 00:11:34,800 --> 00:11:37,920 Speaker 1: settled for a total of four hundred twenty six million dollars, 165 00:11:38,280 --> 00:11:41,559 Speaker 1: Teva and other generic drug makers are also facing civil 166 00:11:41,640 --> 00:11:45,359 Speaker 1: lawsuits filed by state attorneys general. Joining me is Bloomberg's 167 00:11:45,400 --> 00:11:50,160 Speaker 1: David McLaughlin start by telling us about the charges against 168 00:11:50,240 --> 00:11:55,360 Speaker 1: Teva involving three alleged conspiracies. Yes, that's right, three h 169 00:11:55,600 --> 00:12:00,839 Speaker 1: three conspiracies involving different drugs. Have a the cues of 170 00:12:01,200 --> 00:12:07,840 Speaker 1: colluding with pre competitors to fix the prices for generic drugs, 171 00:12:07,840 --> 00:12:10,720 Speaker 1: and this is part of an investigation that's been going 172 00:12:10,760 --> 00:12:13,360 Speaker 1: on for for many years and the generic drug industry 173 00:12:13,600 --> 00:12:16,719 Speaker 1: that resulted in charges against the number of companies that 174 00:12:16,840 --> 00:12:20,120 Speaker 1: have a is definitely the most high profile one to 175 00:12:20,520 --> 00:12:24,480 Speaker 1: come out of the investigation. Does the governments say how 176 00:12:24,600 --> 00:12:27,840 Speaker 1: much the prices of the generic drugs were hiked by 177 00:12:27,920 --> 00:12:31,920 Speaker 1: these conspiracies. They don't go into that much detail, and 178 00:12:32,040 --> 00:12:35,440 Speaker 1: unfortunately the indictment doesn't have a kind of detail Eader. 179 00:12:35,520 --> 00:12:38,600 Speaker 1: But the Justice Department said, and when they announced these 180 00:12:38,679 --> 00:12:44,880 Speaker 1: charges that consumers overpaid by about three hundred and fifty 181 00:12:45,160 --> 00:12:48,200 Speaker 1: million dollars, you know, and this is over a period 182 00:12:48,320 --> 00:12:52,600 Speaker 1: of two years. You know, we have some insight into 183 00:12:53,160 --> 00:12:56,680 Speaker 1: the percentage increases of the drug prices from a separate 184 00:12:57,440 --> 00:13:01,800 Speaker 1: lawsuit or several separate lawsuits that were filed by state 185 00:13:01,840 --> 00:13:06,960 Speaker 1: attorneys general. In those cases, alleged price increases of you know, 186 00:13:06,960 --> 00:13:09,800 Speaker 1: in some cases a thousand percent, you know, so really 187 00:13:09,840 --> 00:13:13,520 Speaker 1: really big increases as a result of this conduct. Was 188 00:13:13,600 --> 00:13:16,680 Speaker 1: this I'll call it an explicit conspiracy where they got 189 00:13:16,720 --> 00:13:19,480 Speaker 1: together and said, you know, we'll fix the price to 190 00:13:19,600 --> 00:13:23,680 Speaker 1: this or so. The government says that, you know, in fact, 191 00:13:24,000 --> 00:13:29,040 Speaker 1: they explicitly agreed to raise prices and allocate customers, and 192 00:13:29,080 --> 00:13:33,280 Speaker 1: that this conduct I think generally happens over phone calls. 193 00:13:33,720 --> 00:13:40,080 Speaker 1: The states also talk about some meetings, industry conferences and 194 00:13:40,200 --> 00:13:43,920 Speaker 1: text messages that the state cases are more detailed in 195 00:13:44,040 --> 00:13:46,960 Speaker 1: terms of all the contexts, but it's clear from from 196 00:13:47,040 --> 00:13:49,920 Speaker 1: those cases at least that there was a lot of 197 00:13:50,000 --> 00:13:57,040 Speaker 1: contact between regular contact between executives at these companies, really 198 00:13:57,080 --> 00:14:02,200 Speaker 1: across the industry, where you know, one company, we're basically 199 00:14:02,240 --> 00:14:05,160 Speaker 1: the company agreed that one company would raise price or 200 00:14:05,160 --> 00:14:08,160 Speaker 1: not did for a customer and then when a when 201 00:14:08,160 --> 00:14:11,320 Speaker 1: an increase by the competitor was made, the other company 202 00:14:11,360 --> 00:14:15,080 Speaker 1: would follow. So is that sort of thing, and the 203 00:14:15,120 --> 00:14:18,520 Speaker 1: state cases made very clear that this went on for years, 204 00:14:18,600 --> 00:14:22,920 Speaker 1: there was tons of communication between the executives. What's tavis defense, 205 00:14:23,440 --> 00:14:26,280 Speaker 1: is it saying it just didn't commit the crimes. Yes, 206 00:14:26,360 --> 00:14:30,920 Speaker 1: Kevin CEO did an interview with my colleague Riley Griffin, 207 00:14:31,000 --> 00:14:35,520 Speaker 1: and he said that the reason why that the company 208 00:14:35,560 --> 00:14:39,320 Speaker 1: did not um agree with settlement because it looked into 209 00:14:39,320 --> 00:14:44,880 Speaker 1: the allegations and decided that it did not engage in 210 00:14:44,880 --> 00:14:48,160 Speaker 1: in price six thing. He left open the possibility that 211 00:14:48,240 --> 00:14:51,520 Speaker 1: the company could settle at some point in the future, 212 00:14:51,720 --> 00:14:55,680 Speaker 1: but at this point it rejected a settlement offer that 213 00:14:56,160 --> 00:14:59,800 Speaker 1: the Justice Department offered. You know, we reported that agreement. 214 00:15:00,080 --> 00:15:04,840 Speaker 1: The was a deferred prosecution agreement, which would have essentially 215 00:15:04,880 --> 00:15:08,600 Speaker 1: suspended the charges but would have required the company to 216 00:15:08,720 --> 00:15:14,400 Speaker 1: admit wrongdoing, and that would have exposed the company probably 217 00:15:14,480 --> 00:15:17,400 Speaker 1: do some very big damages and in the private litigation 218 00:15:17,480 --> 00:15:20,560 Speaker 1: that's done ongoing, so that's one of their their heres. 219 00:15:20,640 --> 00:15:23,640 Speaker 1: And so the CEO said, what, we didn't engage in this, 220 00:15:23,720 --> 00:15:26,920 Speaker 1: so we weren't going to take that route, you know. 221 00:15:26,960 --> 00:15:29,400 Speaker 1: And that's surprising because most of the company so far 222 00:15:29,560 --> 00:15:32,360 Speaker 1: have agreed to d p A all except one. So 223 00:15:32,480 --> 00:15:35,640 Speaker 1: really Keeva is only the second company to reject the 224 00:15:35,720 --> 00:15:38,960 Speaker 1: d p A. The others there have been five of them. 225 00:15:38,960 --> 00:15:41,240 Speaker 1: Five other companies that have agreed to c p a 226 00:15:41,360 --> 00:15:45,280 Speaker 1: s and have paid money to settle up the government. 227 00:15:45,600 --> 00:15:50,120 Speaker 1: Are those five other companies cooperating with the government. I 228 00:15:50,120 --> 00:15:53,240 Speaker 1: mean they say that they were involved in a conspiracy 229 00:15:53,520 --> 00:15:57,000 Speaker 1: with Teva, and Teva says no, they weren't. Would they 230 00:15:57,080 --> 00:16:00,480 Speaker 1: testify against Teva in court? Yeah, So the d p 231 00:16:00,640 --> 00:16:04,880 Speaker 1: as require their cooperation. That's just a general requirement for 232 00:16:05,240 --> 00:16:08,840 Speaker 1: entering into one of these agreements, so their executives could testify. 233 00:16:09,360 --> 00:16:14,840 Speaker 1: The indictment refers to numerous cooperating witnesses that are working 234 00:16:14,840 --> 00:16:18,160 Speaker 1: with the government. Not clear whether they're at Teva or 235 00:16:18,240 --> 00:16:21,920 Speaker 1: at other companies, but those all could be potential witnesses. 236 00:16:22,000 --> 00:16:24,880 Speaker 1: It just does end up going to trial. I think 237 00:16:25,200 --> 00:16:28,880 Speaker 1: that for Teva, the real calculation here that taking it 238 00:16:28,960 --> 00:16:33,280 Speaker 1: deferred prosecution agreement would have required in being wrongdoing, and 239 00:16:33,320 --> 00:16:37,960 Speaker 1: so that potentially could be very costly, and so they 240 00:16:38,080 --> 00:16:42,440 Speaker 1: might be calculating that it's just better to challenge the 241 00:16:42,520 --> 00:16:45,880 Speaker 1: government or to go to court against the government, rather 242 00:16:46,000 --> 00:16:50,520 Speaker 1: than accept an agreement that could end up costing them 243 00:16:50,920 --> 00:16:53,720 Speaker 1: a lot of money down the road. That's David McLaughlin 244 00:16:53,760 --> 00:16:57,240 Speaker 1: and Bloomberg who reports on corporate influence. And that's it 245 00:16:57,320 --> 00:16:59,680 Speaker 1: for this edition of the Bloomberg Law Show. I'm June 246 00:16:59,720 --> 00:17:02,440 Speaker 1: grow So, thanks so much for listening, and remember to 247 00:17:02,480 --> 00:17:04,439 Speaker 1: tune in to The Bloomberg Last Show every weeknight at 248 00:17:04,480 --> 00:17:06,880 Speaker 1: ten pm Eastern right here on Bloomberg Radio.