Speaker 1: Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio news.
Speaker 2: Elizabeth Economy, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University changed our
Speaker 2: dialogue on China where their Michigan graduate school book The
Speaker 2: River Runs Black, and has done the rarest thing. She
Speaker 2: had a triumph in graduate school and then continued forward
Speaker 2: with book after book after a book. She's the only
Speaker 2: one who has read all of James Torregian on g
Speaker 2: as well. Doctor Economy, thank you so much for joining us.
Speaker 2: Because of you, I am buried in a Nern book,
Speaker 2: Joel Wulfnow in Philip Saunders China's Quest for Military Supremacy,
Speaker 2: Elizabeth Economy, do you have any idea the makeup and
Speaker 2: the power of president She's China military force.
Speaker 1: I mean, if you're reading the book, then you know
Speaker 1: that she didn't. Ping has made radical changes to Chime's
Speaker 1: military over the past thirteen years since he came into power.
Speaker 1: He's reorganized it. Certainly, he's reshuffled the top Chinese military.
Speaker 1: He's modeled it in many cases on the US sort
Speaker 1: of joint structure, and he's certainly increased and advanced Chinese
Speaker 1: military hardware capabilities. So he's transformed. He's been a transformative
Speaker 1: military leader. That being said, of course, we've also watched
Speaker 1: these purges of the senior military leadership, most recently at
Speaker 1: the Fourth Plenum, and it's very unclear, you know, sort
Speaker 1: of the readiness of the Chinese military, certainly at the top,
Speaker 1: to take any kind of military action moving forward. So
Speaker 1: just the constant roiling of the senior Chinese military leadership,
Speaker 1: I think is a real challenge for the fsigent Ping
Speaker 1: and the party leadership.
Speaker 2: Liz Paul Sweeten brought this up brilliantly this morning. The
Speaker 2: basic idea is we all have a perspective of Taiwan,
Speaker 2: and maybe it's Sean Kaishek and missus Shang Kaishek coming
Speaker 2: to Washington and then on to this and Nixon and
Speaker 2: Kissinger in all that, is this a full crom point
Speaker 2: where Taiwan is actually under threat.
Speaker 1: Look, there's no doubt that Taiwan is under threat, and
Speaker 1: over the past several years, the rhetoric out of Beijing
Speaker 1: and the sort of the military activity around Taiwan, the
Speaker 1: air flights, the sort of crossings in the Taiwan straight
Speaker 1: over the Median Line have only increased. And I think
Speaker 1: what we saw, you know, just over the past few
Speaker 1: weeks was Prime Minister of Japan Takaichi when she said
Speaker 1: that if China were to take military action against Taiwan,
Speaker 1: Japan could be forced itself to take.
Speaker 3: Some sort of military action.
Speaker 1: That China came out very hot and said Japan acrossed
Speaker 1: the red line and that you know, it started, you know,
Speaker 1: the banning, you know, boycotting Japanese sea food, Japanese films,
Speaker 1: et cetera. And so I think there's no doubt, you know,
Speaker 1: Si Jinping has said he wants the Chinese military to
Speaker 1: be prepared to take action by twenty twenty seven. That
Speaker 1: doesn't mean that they're going to launch any kind of
Speaker 1: military invasion in twenty twenty seven. He's just put that
Speaker 1: down as a marker for when he would want the
Speaker 1: military to be prepared to take Taiwan.
Speaker 3: So I'll just say I was in tai in mainland China.
Speaker 1: Just came back Saturday, and one of the things that
Speaker 1: our delegation heard was from a retired senior foreign policy
Speaker 1: official that China is not prepared to wait two hundred
Speaker 1: years and that it is prepared to take any form
Speaker 1: of military action. So I think, you know, the heat is,
Speaker 1: you know, it's only getting hotter for Taiwan at.
Speaker 4: This point, Elizabeth, President Trump and President and She have
Speaker 4: been on again, off again having discussions on trade. What's
Speaker 4: the perception within China of President Trump, this administration and
Speaker 4: maybe the policy as a religiou to China.
Speaker 1: I think, look that there's still a sense within China
Speaker 1: that President Trump can be very unpredictable. They see some
Speaker 1: openings with President Trump, and I think the recent phone
Speaker 1: call that was initiated by Sijin Ping is evidence that,
Speaker 1: you know, Cijin Ping wanted to send a message about Taiwan,
Speaker 1: certainly that Taiwan is part of China and doesn't want
Speaker 1: the United States to wade into this you know, Japan.
Speaker 3: Mainland China bruhaha.
Speaker 1: But I think he was also probing to see whether
Speaker 1: President Trump might be willing to do something on Taiwan,
Speaker 1: especially in the wake of this, you know, US Russia
Speaker 1: negotiation over Ukraine and that initial peace plan that they
Speaker 1: put forth.
Speaker 3: You know, is there something.
Speaker 1: That President Trump and President She could discuss on Taiwan
Speaker 1: when they meet in April. So I think, you know,
Speaker 1: the perception in China is that President Trump is a
Speaker 1: deal maker, that he's willing to put everything on the
Speaker 1: table and to trade things in and out, and so
Speaker 1: I think that's what they're looking to assess. Now, do you.
Speaker 4: Believe from the US perspective that putting things on the
Speaker 4: table would include Taiwan? Do we have any indication in
Speaker 4: President Trump would consider that?
Speaker 1: You know, I think there's always concern when it comes
Speaker 1: to President Trump's commitment to Taiwan. He's never come out
Speaker 1: and said that Taiwan is a very valuable partner for
Speaker 1: the United States.
Speaker 3: You know, He's been.
Speaker 1: Critical of Taiwan on some front. I think what we
Speaker 1: do know is that Secretary Rubio and Secretary Hegseth have
Speaker 1: been very strong in their support of Taiwan, very strong
Speaker 1: in their commitment to our Indo Pacific allies and partners
Speaker 1: and to sort of a continued US dominant presence in
Speaker 1: the Indo Pacific in the security space. So, you know,
Speaker 1: it's unclear. You know, I think we've seen a fracturing
Speaker 1: to some extent of this administration on the Russia issue.
Speaker 1: It's not impossible that we'd have a similar fracturing on
Speaker 1: the China Taiwan China issue.
Speaker 2: Elizabeth economy with US an extended conversation of course with
Speaker 2: the Hoover Institution in Stanford University. Mark you, Petel, Chris
Speaker 2: Whalen coming up, and later we'll be looking at the
Speaker 2: gambling across America, Doctor Economy, the world according to China
Speaker 2: your must read, you say, rewriting the rules of the game,
Speaker 2: myke China one oh one also learned at the altar
Speaker 2: of Elizabeth Economy. Is it presidents have a four year window,
Speaker 2: an eight year window, China has a twenty thirty year
Speaker 2: x axis Rewriting the rules of the game one of
Speaker 2: your chapters here, does President g is he shortened the
Speaker 2: China exit or are they playing the long game each
Speaker 2: and every day?
Speaker 1: He's certainly playing a long game, as you say, each
Speaker 1: and every day. And you know, they continue to invest
Speaker 1: in all the resources and capabilities that they need to
Speaker 1: you know, win the game over to twenty thirty five
Speaker 1: to twenty forty nine. And you see this in all
Speaker 1: the targets and timetables that they put forth, for example,
Speaker 1: in you know, how they're going to achieve global technology dominance.
Speaker 1: But it also plays out across you know, a range
Speaker 1: of areas, whether we're talking about the Arctic or space
Speaker 1: or deep sea bed mining or dedollarizing the global economy.
Speaker 1: They're constantly putting, you know, markers out for the future
Speaker 1: five years, ten years, fifteen years out. What do they
Speaker 1: want to achieve? How are they going to get there?
Speaker 1: They have a long term vision and a long term
Speaker 1: strategy to achieve that vision.
Speaker 3: So this is the long game.
Speaker 1: And you know, Sheidin Ping doesn't see himself exiting anytime soon.
Speaker 1: So I think we can count on at least another
Speaker 1: five year term beginning in twenty twenty seven for cigen Pin,
Speaker 1: and after that, I imagine he'll still want to, you know,
Speaker 1: at least be in the background, you know, guiding the
Speaker 1: next leaders of China.
Speaker 4: So I Jijenping seems secure for the foreseeable future. How
Speaker 4: does the average Chinese person on the ground feel about
Speaker 4: the world. Are they comfortable with China becoming, I guess
Speaker 4: ever more ostracized from the West. Do they want to
Speaker 4: integrate with the West? What's the feeling on the ground.
Speaker 1: I mean, I think, look, there are as many different
Speaker 1: opinions within China as there are, you know, in the
Speaker 1: United States, and I think there are people who continue
Speaker 1: to advocate and desire that China be more open politically,
Speaker 1: even more open economically these days to the West. There
Speaker 1: were people who said, you know, she Didn'tping made a
Speaker 1: mistake when he decided to align with Russia as opposed
Speaker 1: to the West after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. And then
Speaker 1: there are people that are very comfortable with China's more
Speaker 1: sort of robust posture on the global stage. It's more
Speaker 1: wolf Weyer diplomacy. So it's not one particular view I
Speaker 1: think within China, but I think we see how Sijinping,
Speaker 1: you know, his approach is is you know, the much
Speaker 1: more activist and expansionist and ambitious China and one that's
Speaker 1: not afraid to take on the West and to assert
Speaker 1: Chinese interest, Chinese values and Chinese priorities tetor economy.
Speaker 2: And the time we've got left, I've got to go
Speaker 2: to what you led with, which is this new tension
Speaker 2: between a new government in Japan and with China and folks.
Speaker 2: I'm ignorant of this, Okay, I got it. We're doing
Speaker 2: Can we do some surveillance geography now? Yeah, Google, which
Speaker 2: is seared in the memory of all Americans, and you
Speaker 2: come down southwest, there's a Mia Kayama, Tarama Ishigaki, Taka
Speaker 2: Toni and Paul helped me. Here there's a little piece
Speaker 2: of lends. Sweeny nailed this at Lawrence years ago Yonagooni
Speaker 2: and on a clear day from Yonaguni sometimes you can
Speaker 2: see Taiwan.
Speaker 4: Can you, okay?
Speaker 2: Japan is that close to China? Liz, what is our
Speaker 2: biggest ignorance about the modern Chinese Japanese relationship?
Speaker 1: I mean, there are there continue to be tensions between
Speaker 1: China and Japan. There are important trading partners, but yeah,
Speaker 1: I think the distance between the closest point of Japan
Speaker 1: and China is only seventy miles. They continue they have
Speaker 1: their own territorial conflict that over the dah Use in
Speaker 1: Kacku Islands, which Japan administers but China claims, and China
Speaker 1: as assertive as it's been toward Taiwan militarily over the
Speaker 1: past few years, it's been equally assertive an aggressive militarily
Speaker 1: toward Japan around this particular you know, dispute. So I
Speaker 1: think from the perspective of Japan, they're concern for Taiwan.
Speaker 1: Taiwan used to be a colony of Japan. Many people
Speaker 1: in Taiwan actually speak Japanese feel close to Japan, so
Speaker 1: they have their own concerns about Taiwan. They have concerns
Speaker 1: about you know, China dominating the you know, Taiwan straight
Speaker 1: and trade routes there that Japan depends on. But they're
Speaker 1: also concerned about their own security. And if you know,
Speaker 1: China takes action against Taiwan is successful, you know, is
Speaker 1: Japan next.
Speaker 3: So I think there are a number of issues.
Speaker 1: Sitting back in the minds of the Japanese when it
Speaker 1: comes to Chinese military action against Taiwan.
Speaker 3: That prompted Prime Minister Takaichi's.
Speaker 4: Comment, Elizabeth, how do you think Japan and our other
Speaker 4: allies and that part of the world did they view
Speaker 4: the commitment from the United States these days? Are they
Speaker 4: as confident as maybe they have been in past years
Speaker 4: or is that wavering?
Speaker 1: No? I think, you know that the commitment starts from
Speaker 1: the top, and you know, President Biden was very clear
Speaker 1: on a number of occasions he said that the United
Speaker 1: States would come to the defense of Taiwan if China
Speaker 1: were to, you know, attempt a blockade or a military
Speaker 1: you know, invasion. President Trump has not reiterated that commitment.
Speaker 1: He's gone back to the policy of strategic ambiguity. But
Speaker 1: I think more than that, there's a sense, you know
Speaker 1: that everything was under review at the outset of the
Speaker 1: Trump administration. You know, were they going to continue to
Speaker 1: support the aufue right, the nuclear submarine deal between Australia,
Speaker 1: the UK and the US. There was a lot of uncertainty.
Speaker 1: Ultimately we did support it, but everything seems to be,
Speaker 1: you know, up for grabs. You know, with President Trump again,
Speaker 1: Secretary high Seth, Secretary Rubio have been very firm from
Speaker 1: the minute that the administration took office that there was
Speaker 1: going to be continuity in the US commitment to the
Speaker 1: Indo Pacific. But with President Trump, you know, there there's
Speaker 1: a much higher degree of uncertainty about our commitment to
Speaker 1: our allies and partners than right, you know, not only Democrats,
Speaker 1: but but Republicans in the past.
Speaker 2: Doctor Economy, thank you so much for the generous time
Speaker 2: this morning. Really really appreciated, Elizabeth Economy, therefolks from Hoover
Speaker 2: and from Stanford as well,