1 00:00:02,040 --> 00:00:04,680 Speaker 1: You're listening to the iHeartRadio and Coast to Coast DAM 2 00:00:04,800 --> 00:00:09,840 Speaker 1: Paranormal podcast network, where we offer you podcasts of the paranormal, supernatural, 3 00:00:09,960 --> 00:00:13,760 Speaker 1: and the unexplained. Get ready now for Beyond Contact with 4 00:00:13,920 --> 00:00:14,680 Speaker 1: Captain Ron. 5 00:00:21,360 --> 00:00:24,639 Speaker 2: Welcome to our podcast. Please be aware the thoughts and 6 00:00:24,720 --> 00:00:28,680 Speaker 2: opinions expressed by the host are their thoughts and opinions 7 00:00:28,720 --> 00:00:33,920 Speaker 2: only and do not reflect those of iHeartMedia, iHeartRadio, Coast 8 00:00:33,960 --> 00:00:38,400 Speaker 2: to Coast AM, employees of Premier Networks, or their sponsors 9 00:00:38,400 --> 00:00:41,600 Speaker 2: and associates. We would like to encourage you to do 10 00:00:41,680 --> 00:00:45,320 Speaker 2: your own research and discover the subject matter for yourself. 11 00:00:56,160 --> 00:01:00,240 Speaker 3: Hey everyone, it's Captain Ron and each week on Beyond Content. 12 00:01:00,440 --> 00:01:04,200 Speaker 4: We'll explore the latest news in ufology, discuss some of 13 00:01:04,240 --> 00:01:07,800 Speaker 4: the classic cases, and bring you the latest information from 14 00:01:07,840 --> 00:01:10,840 Speaker 4: the newest cases as we talked with the top experts. 15 00:01:13,319 --> 00:01:15,840 Speaker 3: Welcome back to another episode of Beyond Contact. I am 16 00:01:15,880 --> 00:01:17,720 Speaker 3: Captain Ron, and today we're going to be speaking with 17 00:01:17,840 --> 00:01:22,280 Speaker 3: aviation safety engineer and educator doctor Todd Curtis. Doctor Curtis 18 00:01:22,319 --> 00:01:24,800 Speaker 3: has spent most of his career in some aspect of 19 00:01:24,880 --> 00:01:31,240 Speaker 3: aviation safety, particularly analyzing aviation safety data and understanding aviation risks. 20 00:01:31,760 --> 00:01:33,880 Speaker 3: While he's been aware of the UFO and the UAP 21 00:01:34,120 --> 00:01:37,080 Speaker 3: issue for decades, it was the famous case in two 22 00:01:37,120 --> 00:01:40,080 Speaker 3: thousand and six at the Chicago O'Hare Airport, and in 23 00:01:40,120 --> 00:01:43,679 Speaker 3: particular the lack of any real official response to that 24 00:01:43,760 --> 00:01:47,400 Speaker 3: event that made him realize that this phenomenon had both 25 00:01:47,480 --> 00:01:51,640 Speaker 3: an aviation safety issue and a national security dimension that 26 00:01:51,720 --> 00:01:55,360 Speaker 3: deserved more of a serious approach. How you doing, Todd, 27 00:01:55,360 --> 00:01:55,920 Speaker 3: Good to see you. 28 00:01:56,120 --> 00:01:57,760 Speaker 5: I'm doing just fine. Thanks for having me. 29 00:01:58,040 --> 00:02:01,400 Speaker 3: So we saw you at the twenty twenty for contacting 30 00:02:01,440 --> 00:02:03,880 Speaker 3: the Desert conference. Would you think of that? I know 31 00:02:03,920 --> 00:02:06,559 Speaker 3: you're a bit outside the UFO community and you're firmly 32 00:02:06,720 --> 00:02:09,560 Speaker 3: entrenched in the aviation safety Would you think of the conference? 33 00:02:09,680 --> 00:02:12,640 Speaker 5: Well, I was quite impressed by it because I knew 34 00:02:12,680 --> 00:02:14,680 Speaker 5: of the subject in general for quite some time, and 35 00:02:14,720 --> 00:02:17,959 Speaker 5: in fact, back in twenty fourteen, I was actually electronically 36 00:02:18,440 --> 00:02:21,320 Speaker 5: on the same show with Nick Pope, on a show 37 00:02:21,600 --> 00:02:24,560 Speaker 5: dealing with UFOs and airliners. So seeing these folks in 38 00:02:24,600 --> 00:02:26,160 Speaker 5: the flesh was a bit of a revelation. 39 00:02:26,560 --> 00:02:28,440 Speaker 3: It's a lot of fun. I saw your lecture there, 40 00:02:28,480 --> 00:02:30,679 Speaker 3: which was great, by the way, and it's nice to 41 00:02:30,680 --> 00:02:33,960 Speaker 3: get the perspective from an aviation safety expert like yourself 42 00:02:34,240 --> 00:02:37,400 Speaker 3: on this phenomenon. This issue comes up from time to 43 00:02:37,400 --> 00:02:39,799 Speaker 3: time for us as we hear these different reports from 44 00:02:39,919 --> 00:02:44,400 Speaker 3: airline pilots and from military personnel, and we genuinely wonder, 45 00:02:44,919 --> 00:02:47,600 Speaker 3: you know, if the Pentagon really has this a tip 46 00:02:47,680 --> 00:02:51,080 Speaker 3: program they've admitted they have, and if these pilots really 47 00:02:51,120 --> 00:02:55,240 Speaker 3: are seeing these objects. As Ryan Grave says all the time, 48 00:02:55,919 --> 00:02:58,080 Speaker 3: isn't there a genuine risk to flying? 49 00:02:58,400 --> 00:03:01,360 Speaker 5: Well, certainly there's a risk either direct whereas, for example, 50 00:03:01,360 --> 00:03:03,560 Speaker 5: if you have some kind of aerospace vehicle I don't 51 00:03:03,560 --> 00:03:05,960 Speaker 5: care what it is in the same airspace as you, 52 00:03:06,040 --> 00:03:07,359 Speaker 5: and you don't know they're there, you can have a 53 00:03:07,440 --> 00:03:11,760 Speaker 5: mid air collision. But more likely is someone sees something 54 00:03:12,080 --> 00:03:15,480 Speaker 5: or the instruments send something and decisions are made and 55 00:03:15,520 --> 00:03:18,120 Speaker 5: actions are taken which don't have to be taken, and 56 00:03:18,160 --> 00:03:20,520 Speaker 5: you might have a situation where oh, my gosh, something's 57 00:03:20,560 --> 00:03:23,200 Speaker 5: coming at me when it's not and you lose control 58 00:03:23,240 --> 00:03:26,960 Speaker 5: of the aircraft. So regardless of what was causing that reaction, 59 00:03:27,280 --> 00:03:29,600 Speaker 5: whether it was a solid object, whether it was a projection, 60 00:03:29,960 --> 00:03:33,440 Speaker 5: it doesn't really matter. My concern from the aviation safety 61 00:03:33,520 --> 00:03:36,680 Speaker 5: perspective is how does it affect the people in the system, 62 00:03:37,080 --> 00:03:40,240 Speaker 5: the technology in the system, or the infrastructure in general, 63 00:03:40,280 --> 00:03:44,520 Speaker 5: whether that's losing power, losing control, making poor decisions, etc. 64 00:03:45,280 --> 00:03:48,200 Speaker 3: Would you say that some people in the aviation community 65 00:03:48,640 --> 00:03:51,760 Speaker 3: take this more seriously than let's say, the government may 66 00:03:51,880 --> 00:03:55,680 Speaker 3: lead on or the perception may be, not even jumping 67 00:03:55,680 --> 00:03:58,360 Speaker 3: to the speculation that these could be et craft or anything, 68 00:03:58,400 --> 00:04:00,320 Speaker 3: but just the fact that there seems to be stuff 69 00:04:00,360 --> 00:04:03,160 Speaker 3: flying around that I would think any pilot would be 70 00:04:03,160 --> 00:04:04,560 Speaker 3: concerned about whatever it is. 71 00:04:05,000 --> 00:04:07,760 Speaker 5: Well, certainly that sort of thing is taken seriously, but 72 00:04:08,280 --> 00:04:11,840 Speaker 5: not formally in a sense of Even in my experience 73 00:04:11,840 --> 00:04:14,840 Speaker 5: in aviation, both military and civilian, I've heard stories for years. 74 00:04:15,240 --> 00:04:17,960 Speaker 5: I thought, Okay, they saw something. It was really weird. 75 00:04:18,080 --> 00:04:21,320 Speaker 5: But there's nowhere to go with this. In the military context, 76 00:04:21,360 --> 00:04:22,960 Speaker 5: when I was in the Air Force, if it didn't 77 00:04:22,960 --> 00:04:25,839 Speaker 5: affect the mission, didn't affect the equipment or the people 78 00:04:25,880 --> 00:04:28,800 Speaker 5: involved with the mission, it wasn't something that you would report. 79 00:04:28,960 --> 00:04:31,679 Speaker 5: It was an interesting thing, but not really our concern. 80 00:04:31,880 --> 00:04:35,000 Speaker 5: In a civilian world as well, unless it has something 81 00:04:35,040 --> 00:04:38,560 Speaker 5: to do with a reportable event, for example, an accent 82 00:04:38,640 --> 00:04:41,920 Speaker 5: or incident or it had something to do with interrupting 83 00:04:41,960 --> 00:04:45,280 Speaker 5: whatever the civilian mission is, for example, an airline flight 84 00:04:45,360 --> 00:04:48,440 Speaker 5: landing on time, you wouldn't necessarily report it. And here's 85 00:04:48,480 --> 00:04:51,400 Speaker 5: the important thing. It might be reported. It might be 86 00:04:51,480 --> 00:04:56,080 Speaker 5: talked about within a company, within an organization, within even 87 00:04:56,279 --> 00:04:59,680 Speaker 5: the whole geographical area. But if there's no formal re 88 00:05:00,000 --> 00:05:02,920 Speaker 5: wire meant to report it, the rest of the industry 89 00:05:03,120 --> 00:05:05,600 Speaker 5: would have no idea about it, including myself. Even though 90 00:05:05,640 --> 00:05:08,479 Speaker 5: I keep close track of all sorts of safety databases 91 00:05:08,520 --> 00:05:12,000 Speaker 5: and aviation news. Unless someone reports it formally, I really 92 00:05:12,040 --> 00:05:13,080 Speaker 5: can't go anywhere with it. 93 00:05:13,200 --> 00:05:15,080 Speaker 3: Well, as a pilot, I would think, you know, you've 94 00:05:15,120 --> 00:05:17,159 Speaker 3: got to wonder to yourself, do you report it? Like 95 00:05:17,200 --> 00:05:18,800 Speaker 3: you said, if it doesn't affect my flight and it 96 00:05:18,800 --> 00:05:21,880 Speaker 3: doesn't affect my mission, do you report this? Should you 97 00:05:21,960 --> 00:05:25,040 Speaker 3: report this? It doesn't seem like there's any incentive really 98 00:05:25,120 --> 00:05:28,120 Speaker 3: to do so. In fact, there may be some reasons 99 00:05:28,160 --> 00:05:28,800 Speaker 3: not to do so. 100 00:05:29,000 --> 00:05:32,000 Speaker 5: Right well, some of the reasons might be a common 101 00:05:32,040 --> 00:05:35,320 Speaker 5: sense and I talked about this in my presentation. The 102 00:05:35,480 --> 00:05:39,080 Speaker 5: FAA actually has in one of their regulations a specific 103 00:05:39,240 --> 00:05:41,680 Speaker 5: suggestion if you see a UFO, and they did use 104 00:05:41,760 --> 00:05:44,719 Speaker 5: UFO in this documentation. You can report it either to 105 00:05:45,320 --> 00:05:49,000 Speaker 5: a civilion orization, and they specifically mentioned the National UFO 106 00:05:49,080 --> 00:05:52,000 Speaker 5: Reporting Center, which is run by Peter Davenport, who was 107 00:05:52,080 --> 00:05:55,160 Speaker 5: also aut contact in the Desert You. I wrote to 108 00:05:55,200 --> 00:05:57,360 Speaker 5: them many times by email over the years. I had 109 00:05:57,360 --> 00:05:59,479 Speaker 5: a nice long talk with him. That was probably the 110 00:05:59,520 --> 00:06:00,640 Speaker 5: highlight of my time. 111 00:06:00,760 --> 00:06:02,560 Speaker 3: Oh, I'm so happy to hear that he's such a 112 00:06:02,640 --> 00:06:03,120 Speaker 3: nice man. 113 00:06:03,600 --> 00:06:07,640 Speaker 5: Oh he is. And it's great that the FA says 114 00:06:07,720 --> 00:06:09,920 Speaker 5: to go to him because he is a stand up guy. 115 00:06:10,000 --> 00:06:14,600 Speaker 5: He's done fantastic work for decades compiling the things that 116 00:06:14,600 --> 00:06:17,320 Speaker 5: he compiles. But the problem with that is he is 117 00:06:17,400 --> 00:06:20,000 Speaker 5: not in the government. He is not supported by the government. 118 00:06:20,279 --> 00:06:23,280 Speaker 5: There is no formalized process to keep that database up 119 00:06:23,320 --> 00:06:26,839 Speaker 5: and running when for whatever reason, mister Davenport no longer 120 00:06:26,920 --> 00:06:29,880 Speaker 5: is able or willing to keep that database up. That's 121 00:06:29,920 --> 00:06:32,360 Speaker 5: one part. But the second part that really got me upset. 122 00:06:32,640 --> 00:06:35,679 Speaker 5: Reported to your local law enforcement and I thought, Okay, 123 00:06:35,800 --> 00:06:38,120 Speaker 5: I'm not a lawyer when it comes to aviation, but 124 00:06:38,320 --> 00:06:42,719 Speaker 5: anything in the sky above the United States is federal responsibility, 125 00:06:42,800 --> 00:06:45,440 Speaker 5: the FAA, the Department of Defense, what have you. The 126 00:06:45,480 --> 00:06:49,080 Speaker 5: sky belongs to Uncle Sam, not to the states, not 127 00:06:49,160 --> 00:06:51,680 Speaker 5: to the local community. So let's say I'm flying around 128 00:06:51,680 --> 00:06:54,920 Speaker 5: the Bay Area and again presentation. I had an example 129 00:06:55,040 --> 00:06:57,320 Speaker 5: where one of my flights in the Bay Area said, look, 130 00:06:57,520 --> 00:07:01,960 Speaker 5: I'm going in this area. There's several jurisdictions I'm flying over, state, local, 131 00:07:02,000 --> 00:07:04,440 Speaker 5: and federal. If I see something outside of my window, 132 00:07:04,520 --> 00:07:08,000 Speaker 5: outside of my windscreen, I might not know which organization 133 00:07:08,040 --> 00:07:10,840 Speaker 5: to call. And if I call the city, the county, 134 00:07:10,920 --> 00:07:13,880 Speaker 5: the state, and the federal jurisdiction of that piece of territory, 135 00:07:14,120 --> 00:07:16,000 Speaker 5: would they laugh in my face or would they take 136 00:07:16,000 --> 00:07:18,920 Speaker 5: me seriously? They would do neither. It'll probably say things 137 00:07:18,920 --> 00:07:22,600 Speaker 5: I can't say after contact and hang up in my face. 138 00:07:23,000 --> 00:07:26,440 Speaker 5: So that was not useful. And in my world the 139 00:07:26,560 --> 00:07:29,679 Speaker 5: years I've studied aviation safety, one of the most useful 140 00:07:29,720 --> 00:07:34,640 Speaker 5: things is to have solid objective data, preferably something that's 141 00:07:34,680 --> 00:07:38,240 Speaker 5: been vetted by an organization that's trusted by the aviation community. 142 00:07:38,360 --> 00:07:40,400 Speaker 5: So the rest of the community can take that data 143 00:07:40,760 --> 00:07:43,880 Speaker 5: and analyze it to whatever ends they have in mind. 144 00:07:44,000 --> 00:07:47,960 Speaker 5: But the first step is, after something is encountered or seen, 145 00:07:48,600 --> 00:07:50,440 Speaker 5: is it going to be put in a place where 146 00:07:50,440 --> 00:07:52,000 Speaker 5: it can be seen by the rest of the community. 147 00:07:52,280 --> 00:07:55,480 Speaker 3: Isn't there possibly some repercussions for some of these pilots. 148 00:07:55,600 --> 00:07:57,200 Speaker 3: Maybe they don't want to say that. 149 00:07:57,520 --> 00:07:59,960 Speaker 5: Well, certainly, and there have been many many cases over 150 00:07:59,920 --> 00:08:02,240 Speaker 5: the years. Probably the most famous was I believe it 151 00:08:02,280 --> 00:08:05,440 Speaker 5: was nineteen eighty six over Alaska where was a Japan 152 00:08:05,480 --> 00:08:08,680 Speaker 5: Airlines where the crew there was a three person flight crew. 153 00:08:08,840 --> 00:08:12,880 Speaker 5: They saw some extraordinary things over Alaska at night in 154 00:08:12,920 --> 00:08:15,760 Speaker 5: the vicinity of Anchorage. Not only that they were communicating 155 00:08:15,760 --> 00:08:18,160 Speaker 5: with the FAA, the FA the air traffic controllers were 156 00:08:18,160 --> 00:08:22,560 Speaker 5: apparently communicating with military assets as well. It was very 157 00:08:22,560 --> 00:08:25,880 Speaker 5: well documented, so well documented that there was a fairly 158 00:08:26,080 --> 00:08:30,040 Speaker 5: decent analysis done by the FAA. And as the story goes, 159 00:08:30,160 --> 00:08:32,240 Speaker 5: this was one that was told by I believe his 160 00:08:32,320 --> 00:08:34,559 Speaker 5: name is Jim Callahan, who was the FA official who 161 00:08:34,559 --> 00:08:37,400 Speaker 5: was running the presentation. They had a presentation a lot 162 00:08:37,480 --> 00:08:42,320 Speaker 5: of government representatives, including apparently someone from the National Intelligence area, 163 00:08:42,400 --> 00:08:45,080 Speaker 5: and after the meeting he was sold everything in this room, 164 00:08:45,280 --> 00:08:47,640 Speaker 5: we're taking it with us. Well, everything in the room 165 00:08:47,760 --> 00:08:50,320 Speaker 5: was given, he followed orders, but everything that was in 166 00:08:50,360 --> 00:08:52,640 Speaker 5: his office or not in that room was not taken. 167 00:08:52,720 --> 00:08:55,800 Speaker 5: And he has four years gone out and said to 168 00:08:55,880 --> 00:09:00,000 Speaker 5: anyone who's willing to listen what they saw, what they analyzed, 169 00:09:00,720 --> 00:09:03,480 Speaker 5: and just so, I mean, the useful information that was 170 00:09:03,520 --> 00:09:06,800 Speaker 5: from that analysis was fantastic, the best I'd ever seen. 171 00:09:07,280 --> 00:09:10,920 Speaker 3: Absolutely. He specifically said he described that the pilot as 172 00:09:11,000 --> 00:09:14,240 Speaker 3: two small ships and a mothership. He used that word, 173 00:09:14,240 --> 00:09:16,960 Speaker 3: which is unique. There was no sign of anything else 174 00:09:17,040 --> 00:09:20,040 Speaker 3: on his radar or ground control's radar even though they 175 00:09:20,080 --> 00:09:21,400 Speaker 3: saw these three craft. 176 00:09:21,679 --> 00:09:24,280 Speaker 5: This is nineteen eighty six. This was years before the 177 00:09:24,320 --> 00:09:27,040 Speaker 5: first still aircraft was known to the public, So to 178 00:09:27,200 --> 00:09:31,559 Speaker 5: have something that was apparently solid and not reflecting radar 179 00:09:31,600 --> 00:09:35,559 Speaker 5: imagery was not something that was common. That was very anomalous, 180 00:09:35,800 --> 00:09:38,880 Speaker 5: although they didn't use the word back then and going forward, 181 00:09:39,360 --> 00:09:42,600 Speaker 5: this is something where that pilot, the captain, who was 182 00:09:42,679 --> 00:09:46,400 Speaker 5: very public about what he had seen, was actually grounded 183 00:09:46,440 --> 00:09:48,480 Speaker 5: by his airline for a year more because he was 184 00:09:48,480 --> 00:09:51,320 Speaker 5: public with what he saw. So, yes, there are professional 185 00:09:51,480 --> 00:09:55,520 Speaker 5: repercussions now going back further in aviation history, this is 186 00:09:55,800 --> 00:09:58,640 Speaker 5: something that started in the nineteen fifties and sixties high 187 00:09:58,679 --> 00:10:02,680 Speaker 5: altitude pilot's military pilots who saw unusual phenomena high in 188 00:10:02,679 --> 00:10:05,680 Speaker 5: the sky. Fast forward to the eighties. It wasn't until 189 00:10:05,679 --> 00:10:08,200 Speaker 5: the Space Shuttle era that they actually started studying what 190 00:10:08,240 --> 00:10:11,800 Speaker 5: they call jets and sprites, upper atmospheric lightning that goes 191 00:10:11,840 --> 00:10:14,200 Speaker 5: from the upper part of thunderstorms to the lower reaches 192 00:10:14,240 --> 00:10:15,520 Speaker 5: of space. Bizarre looking. 193 00:10:15,600 --> 00:10:18,000 Speaker 3: I've seen pictures of it. That's crazy. It looks like 194 00:10:18,360 --> 00:10:20,880 Speaker 3: almost like an X ray kind of gone bad. Like 195 00:10:20,960 --> 00:10:22,079 Speaker 3: it's it's kind of crazy. 196 00:10:22,200 --> 00:10:24,320 Speaker 5: In the day, if you reported that, you'd be grounded. 197 00:10:24,360 --> 00:10:27,240 Speaker 5: But now it's like, oh, we understand this, we'll note 198 00:10:27,240 --> 00:10:29,079 Speaker 5: it when it happens, and we'll see if there's any 199 00:10:29,080 --> 00:10:31,319 Speaker 5: effects on the aircraft, and that's the way it should 200 00:10:31,360 --> 00:10:33,880 Speaker 5: go when it comes to unusual phenomena in the sky. 201 00:10:34,160 --> 00:10:36,280 Speaker 3: Yeah, it's interesting that those guys got grounded, and like 202 00:10:36,320 --> 00:10:38,880 Speaker 3: you said, here, this guy got grounded if you reported 203 00:10:38,920 --> 00:10:41,320 Speaker 3: such a thing, you know, I can add anecdotally that 204 00:10:41,400 --> 00:10:43,640 Speaker 3: I've spoke to a couple of pilots myself and an 205 00:10:43,679 --> 00:10:48,040 Speaker 3: astronaut actually, who each have given me incredible sightings, and 206 00:10:48,120 --> 00:10:50,760 Speaker 3: yet they didn't talk about it publicly or on the air. 207 00:10:51,040 --> 00:10:53,720 Speaker 3: So there's still, you know, something about people not wanting 208 00:10:53,760 --> 00:10:56,600 Speaker 3: to report that stuff in this field. When we come back, Todd, 209 00:10:56,600 --> 00:10:59,240 Speaker 3: we're going to talk about a few more cases similar 210 00:10:59,280 --> 00:11:01,120 Speaker 3: to the one we just told about. You are listening 211 00:11:01,120 --> 00:11:03,720 Speaker 3: to Beyond Contact on the iHeartRadio on Coast to Coast 212 00:11:03,760 --> 00:11:27,120 Speaker 3: AM Paranormal podcast network. We are back on Beyond Contact. 213 00:11:27,120 --> 00:11:31,200 Speaker 3: It's Captain on talking to doctor Todd Curtis. Doctor Curtis, 214 00:11:31,280 --> 00:11:34,040 Speaker 3: let's talk about some of these famous UFO cases that 215 00:11:34,080 --> 00:11:37,720 Speaker 3: have involved other aircraft, starting with the case I mentioned 216 00:11:37,760 --> 00:11:40,360 Speaker 3: in your intro, which is the two thousand and six 217 00:11:40,920 --> 00:11:44,600 Speaker 3: UFO case that happened at Chicago O'Hare Airport where at 218 00:11:44,679 --> 00:11:47,760 Speaker 3: least a dozen employees claim to have witnessed a metallic 219 00:11:47,840 --> 00:11:51,600 Speaker 3: saucer shaped craft hovering over gatesse Do you remember that case. 220 00:11:51,920 --> 00:11:55,480 Speaker 5: I remember well. In fact, that case was the tricking 221 00:11:55,520 --> 00:11:59,959 Speaker 5: event that maybe become professionally interested in whatever was going on, 222 00:12:00,400 --> 00:12:03,360 Speaker 5: because this was November two thousand and six, nearly six 223 00:12:03,480 --> 00:12:06,280 Speaker 5: years after nine to eleven, four or five years after 224 00:12:06,360 --> 00:12:09,040 Speaker 5: TSA was up and running, after Homeland security was up 225 00:12:09,080 --> 00:12:12,120 Speaker 5: and running, where airport and aviation security was top of 226 00:12:12,160 --> 00:12:15,120 Speaker 5: mine with the government, and you have something to this day, 227 00:12:15,400 --> 00:12:17,200 Speaker 5: I don't know what it is, and neither does anyone 228 00:12:17,200 --> 00:12:20,760 Speaker 5: else that was violating the airspace, not over an airport, 229 00:12:21,000 --> 00:12:23,600 Speaker 5: but one of the most important airports in the world, 230 00:12:23,679 --> 00:12:25,800 Speaker 5: the busiest airports in the world, one of the top 231 00:12:25,800 --> 00:12:29,280 Speaker 5: five or ten, and nothing officially was done. Covering over 232 00:12:29,760 --> 00:12:33,080 Speaker 5: a terminal in full view of personnel on the ground, 233 00:12:33,280 --> 00:12:37,040 Speaker 5: no investigation by the FAA or the FBI or whomever. 234 00:12:37,280 --> 00:12:39,439 Speaker 5: I said to myself, Look, there have been hundreds of 235 00:12:39,480 --> 00:12:43,240 Speaker 5: millions of tax sellers going to these organizations. Here is 236 00:12:43,400 --> 00:12:47,320 Speaker 5: a humongous example of Hey, investigate this because check it out. 237 00:12:47,360 --> 00:12:49,880 Speaker 5: If I'm a bad guy or bad woman sitting over 238 00:12:50,000 --> 00:12:52,160 Speaker 5: across the world thinking, if I want to attack an 239 00:12:52,160 --> 00:12:54,240 Speaker 5: airport in America, all I have to do is make 240 00:12:54,240 --> 00:12:56,200 Speaker 5: it look like a flying saucer and I can just 241 00:12:56,280 --> 00:12:58,800 Speaker 5: waltz right in. No one's going to touch me. So 242 00:12:58,920 --> 00:13:01,720 Speaker 5: again I got mad, and instead of writing an angry 243 00:13:01,800 --> 00:13:03,800 Speaker 5: letter to the editor, I said, what can I do 244 00:13:03,840 --> 00:13:07,160 Speaker 5: about this? From my professional perspective? So I started to 245 00:13:07,520 --> 00:13:11,360 Speaker 5: ask questions, questions like what's the risk? And risk is 246 00:13:11,400 --> 00:13:14,520 Speaker 5: a very specific term in the regulatory world of aviation. 247 00:13:14,800 --> 00:13:17,240 Speaker 5: Risk is something you can measure. It's a combination of 248 00:13:17,520 --> 00:13:22,160 Speaker 5: some likelihood of an unwanted event, the consequences of that event, 249 00:13:22,480 --> 00:13:25,360 Speaker 5: and the magnitude of those things put together. For example, 250 00:13:25,600 --> 00:13:28,600 Speaker 5: chance of plane crashing very very low, the consequence many 251 00:13:28,600 --> 00:13:31,439 Speaker 5: people killed. So yes, that is a risk. You can 252 00:13:31,480 --> 00:13:33,160 Speaker 5: measure it, you can hang a number on it. What 253 00:13:33,280 --> 00:13:35,599 Speaker 5: is the action, what was the effect on the aircraft, 254 00:13:35,640 --> 00:13:37,720 Speaker 5: what was the damage to the system. So looking at 255 00:13:37,760 --> 00:13:40,000 Speaker 5: it from that perspective, I began to get a much 256 00:13:40,000 --> 00:13:43,199 Speaker 5: better feel for it. And subsequent to Chicago, the next 257 00:13:43,280 --> 00:13:45,839 Speaker 5: triggering event was Leslie King. She had her book in 258 00:13:45,880 --> 00:13:50,000 Speaker 5: twenty ten about UFOs generals, and she had documented cases 259 00:13:50,000 --> 00:13:53,760 Speaker 5: from around the world where you had high level officials France, US, 260 00:13:54,000 --> 00:13:58,040 Speaker 5: Ron elsewhere who spoke in detail and sometimes in their 261 00:13:58,080 --> 00:14:00,760 Speaker 5: own words about what they had experienced. I was so 262 00:14:00,880 --> 00:14:02,720 Speaker 5: impressed with that I actually reached out to her and 263 00:14:02,920 --> 00:14:05,400 Speaker 5: this is what twenty thirteen, which actually came on my 264 00:14:05,480 --> 00:14:08,800 Speaker 5: podcast on my website. We had a lovely conversation. It's 265 00:14:08,800 --> 00:14:10,920 Speaker 5: still out there on the internet you can and. 266 00:14:10,840 --> 00:14:13,640 Speaker 3: I, yeah, it's great. Actually, that's when her UFO book 267 00:14:13,640 --> 00:14:14,000 Speaker 3: came up. 268 00:14:14,160 --> 00:14:17,280 Speaker 5: And my attitude really hasn't changed since then. What has 269 00:14:17,400 --> 00:14:19,560 Speaker 5: changed is my ability to go out there and see 270 00:14:19,560 --> 00:14:23,000 Speaker 5: if there's any additional evidence out there, not just evidence 271 00:14:23,040 --> 00:14:26,120 Speaker 5: from people talking online or whatever, but are there formal 272 00:14:26,200 --> 00:14:29,320 Speaker 5: reports in any sort of database that's reputable that has 273 00:14:29,400 --> 00:14:32,400 Speaker 5: these things, and there is one database funded by the 274 00:14:32,480 --> 00:14:35,600 Speaker 5: United States government which has in my opinion, bona fide 275 00:14:35,720 --> 00:14:38,440 Speaker 5: UFO slash UAP cases in them. Some of them are 276 00:14:38,520 --> 00:14:42,240 Speaker 5: just pretty stunning as well. This is NASA's Aviation Safety 277 00:14:42,280 --> 00:14:45,320 Speaker 5: Reporting System database, something that's been up and running since 278 00:14:45,320 --> 00:14:49,400 Speaker 5: the late nineteen seventies, where the purpose is to encourage 279 00:14:49,440 --> 00:14:52,600 Speaker 5: pilot's mechanics and others to send in reports that affect 280 00:14:52,640 --> 00:14:56,360 Speaker 5: aviation safety. And the thing about this is anonymous you 281 00:14:56,480 --> 00:14:58,640 Speaker 5: send in a report, it ends up on their database. 282 00:14:58,800 --> 00:15:01,520 Speaker 5: Your name's not associated with it, the aircraft tail number 283 00:15:01,560 --> 00:15:04,440 Speaker 5: isn't associated with it, your company name isn't associated with 284 00:15:04,760 --> 00:15:06,840 Speaker 5: And NASA is very proud of the fact they've had 285 00:15:06,920 --> 00:15:08,640 Speaker 5: I think it's something like one and a half to 286 00:15:08,720 --> 00:15:11,720 Speaker 5: two million reports over the years. They've never had the 287 00:15:11,960 --> 00:15:16,200 Speaker 5: privacy of the reporting people violated. And here's the big end. 288 00:15:16,320 --> 00:15:18,800 Speaker 5: They have a staff of people who review all these 289 00:15:19,000 --> 00:15:22,280 Speaker 5: experts in aviation air traffic control mechanics. So if you 290 00:15:22,320 --> 00:15:24,680 Speaker 5: put in some report, they'll look it over. They might 291 00:15:24,680 --> 00:15:26,960 Speaker 5: even call you up again ask you more questions. So 292 00:15:27,440 --> 00:15:30,000 Speaker 5: is it possible you can put in a bogus report, sure, 293 00:15:30,080 --> 00:15:33,920 Speaker 5: But professionally, if you're a pilot or mechanic, air traffic controller, 294 00:15:34,040 --> 00:15:36,960 Speaker 5: flight attendant, anyone who has to be certified by the FAA, 295 00:15:37,520 --> 00:15:40,480 Speaker 5: and you lie to the FAA via NASA, many things 296 00:15:40,520 --> 00:15:43,120 Speaker 5: can happen to you, none of them good, So there's 297 00:15:43,160 --> 00:15:45,440 Speaker 5: a huge incentive to tell it to them straight. 298 00:15:45,800 --> 00:15:48,520 Speaker 3: It's great that you have plausible deniability by using that 299 00:15:48,560 --> 00:15:50,160 Speaker 3: system if you don't have to put your name on it. 300 00:15:50,480 --> 00:15:52,960 Speaker 5: Absolutely as good as the database is, and I did 301 00:15:53,000 --> 00:15:56,400 Speaker 5: find literally thirteen events which I talked about the presentation 302 00:15:56,680 --> 00:15:59,000 Speaker 5: that I thought fit the criteria that I have for 303 00:15:59,280 --> 00:16:02,640 Speaker 5: what a UAP is. I didn't see any events around events, 304 00:16:02,800 --> 00:16:05,560 Speaker 5: around times and places you would think. For example, I 305 00:16:05,600 --> 00:16:07,880 Speaker 5: went into the database which goes back to nineteen eighty eight, 306 00:16:07,920 --> 00:16:10,800 Speaker 5: I said, okay, what about the month of November two 307 00:16:10,880 --> 00:16:14,320 Speaker 5: thousand and six by the way right there? Yeah, exactly. 308 00:16:14,360 --> 00:16:15,800 Speaker 5: They give you the month, they don't give you the day. 309 00:16:15,800 --> 00:16:17,400 Speaker 5: So I said, all right, let me give the month 310 00:16:17,400 --> 00:16:21,120 Speaker 5: of November, State of Illinois. How many reports were in there? 311 00:16:21,520 --> 00:16:23,960 Speaker 5: I went through every report. None of them had something 312 00:16:24,000 --> 00:16:27,160 Speaker 5: to do with the o'haravan Stephenville, Texas, which was during 313 00:16:27,200 --> 00:16:29,840 Speaker 5: the George W. Bush administration where there was no wait, 314 00:16:30,160 --> 00:16:32,880 Speaker 5: that's no way, Stephenville, Texas. I went through the entire 315 00:16:32,960 --> 00:16:37,320 Speaker 5: month nothing. Phoenix Lights ninety seven. I did Phoenix, Arizona, 316 00:16:37,360 --> 00:16:40,200 Speaker 5: and Nevada for that entire month. Nothing. By the way, 317 00:16:40,400 --> 00:16:44,000 Speaker 5: Phoenix Lights reportedly Kurt Russell, who was a licensed pilot 318 00:16:44,080 --> 00:16:47,520 Speaker 5: at the time he saw whatever this object was, has 319 00:16:47,600 --> 00:16:49,840 Speaker 5: talked about it in public since then. But to the 320 00:16:49,840 --> 00:16:52,840 Speaker 5: best my analogy, hasn't filed a formal report or informal report. 321 00:16:52,880 --> 00:16:54,680 Speaker 3: Well, he called it in. There's a recording. You can 322 00:16:54,680 --> 00:16:56,680 Speaker 3: actually find the recording of him calling it in. We 323 00:16:56,680 --> 00:16:58,480 Speaker 3: were going to invite him to contact in the desert. 324 00:16:58,520 --> 00:17:00,360 Speaker 3: Because of that, I don't think he filed with this. 325 00:17:00,400 --> 00:17:03,160 Speaker 3: It doesn't seem like people are filing using this system. 326 00:17:03,200 --> 00:17:05,320 Speaker 3: You just named all these things and there are no 327 00:17:05,480 --> 00:17:06,520 Speaker 3: reports about this. 328 00:17:06,960 --> 00:17:10,240 Speaker 5: Well. The aviation saftory reporting system is something that if 329 00:17:10,280 --> 00:17:12,080 Speaker 5: you are in aviation, you may or may not be 330 00:17:12,119 --> 00:17:15,479 Speaker 5: aware of, in part because there are two kinds of 331 00:17:15,600 --> 00:17:17,840 Speaker 5: data you tend to have when it comes to aviation 332 00:17:17,960 --> 00:17:20,760 Speaker 5: saftry reporting, that which is required to be reported, that 333 00:17:20,800 --> 00:17:23,720 Speaker 5: which is voluntary. If you have an accident, as defined 334 00:17:23,720 --> 00:17:26,439 Speaker 5: by the NTSB, you're required to report it within so 335 00:17:26,520 --> 00:17:28,520 Speaker 5: many days where you'll be in big trouble, and if 336 00:17:28,520 --> 00:17:31,000 Speaker 5: it's a serious incident also it has to be reported. 337 00:17:31,480 --> 00:17:34,480 Speaker 5: Just About everything else is voluntary. For example, there's a 338 00:17:34,560 --> 00:17:37,960 Speaker 5: database called the Near Midair Collision System Database. Where you 339 00:17:38,000 --> 00:17:40,200 Speaker 5: didn't have a midair collision, you might not have even 340 00:17:40,280 --> 00:17:43,720 Speaker 5: been in a situation where traffic controllers reported it. But 341 00:17:43,800 --> 00:17:45,800 Speaker 5: if you're a pilot and you're in a situation, it's like, 342 00:17:45,840 --> 00:17:49,160 Speaker 5: oh my gosh, non report this almost accident that happened. 343 00:17:49,200 --> 00:17:52,439 Speaker 5: There's another database for wildlife strikes aircraft, another one for 344 00:17:52,520 --> 00:17:56,399 Speaker 5: laser encounters, another one for errant drones drones are misbehaving. 345 00:17:56,680 --> 00:17:59,960 Speaker 5: These are all voluntary, as is the ASRS system of now. 346 00:18:00,320 --> 00:18:02,960 Speaker 3: I see very interesting, Todd. I actually remember this case 347 00:18:03,000 --> 00:18:04,919 Speaker 3: that we were talking about earlier, about the two thousand 348 00:18:04,920 --> 00:18:07,280 Speaker 3: and six oh Hair case, and I remember it came 349 00:18:07,320 --> 00:18:09,000 Speaker 3: out and then it just sort of went away and 350 00:18:09,000 --> 00:18:11,119 Speaker 3: we never really got an explanation. You know. This is 351 00:18:11,160 --> 00:18:15,119 Speaker 3: another example of the government not acknowledging anything about anything 352 00:18:15,200 --> 00:18:18,480 Speaker 3: unidentified in the sky. I recently mentioned on the air 353 00:18:18,600 --> 00:18:21,800 Speaker 3: how there's this disconnect somehow in our government On one hand, 354 00:18:21,880 --> 00:18:25,200 Speaker 3: they've come out recently and acknowledged the Advanced Aerospace Threat 355 00:18:25,240 --> 00:18:28,000 Speaker 3: Identification program that they had, that that they were doing. That, 356 00:18:28,040 --> 00:18:31,080 Speaker 3: they acknowledged that several of these leaked videos are authentic 357 00:18:31,200 --> 00:18:34,280 Speaker 3: military videos. They acknowledged in two thousand and one that 358 00:18:34,320 --> 00:18:37,240 Speaker 3: the Director of the National Intelligence released a report saying 359 00:18:37,240 --> 00:18:39,040 Speaker 3: they couldn't explain one hundred and forty three out of 360 00:18:39,040 --> 00:18:41,840 Speaker 3: one hundred and forty four UAP cases that it looked at. Yet, 361 00:18:41,880 --> 00:18:44,720 Speaker 3: on the other hand, we have this long history from 362 00:18:44,720 --> 00:18:47,359 Speaker 3: the government of blaytant denial of anything to do with 363 00:18:47,480 --> 00:18:51,720 Speaker 3: UFO phenomenon, going back to Project sign Grunge Blue Book, 364 00:18:51,880 --> 00:18:54,480 Speaker 3: the other so called reports, the Robertson Panel, the kind 365 00:18:54,520 --> 00:18:56,600 Speaker 3: of committee, all of these things. Then in twenty twenty 366 00:18:56,640 --> 00:18:59,360 Speaker 3: four we get this new department called the All Domain 367 00:18:59,480 --> 00:19:02,439 Speaker 3: Anomaly Resolution Office, and we thought we're going to get 368 00:19:02,480 --> 00:19:04,639 Speaker 3: some real information here, But they came out with this 369 00:19:04,840 --> 00:19:08,400 Speaker 3: ridiculous conclusion that there's absolutely nothing to see, not even 370 00:19:08,440 --> 00:19:10,679 Speaker 3: acknowledging that there might be objects in the sky that 371 00:19:10,720 --> 00:19:13,879 Speaker 3: we can't explain. It's just simply not realistic. How do 372 00:19:13,960 --> 00:19:16,000 Speaker 3: you feel about the government responses like this? 373 00:19:16,600 --> 00:19:19,200 Speaker 5: Well, the government at which full disclosure used to be 374 00:19:19,240 --> 00:19:21,320 Speaker 5: a part of. I was an Air Force officer and 375 00:19:21,359 --> 00:19:24,080 Speaker 5: I was assigned both the Flight Test Center at Edwards 376 00:19:24,080 --> 00:19:26,600 Speaker 5: and I was actually at the National Security Agency last 377 00:19:26,640 --> 00:19:28,600 Speaker 5: part of my service, so I got a look to 378 00:19:28,600 --> 00:19:31,359 Speaker 5: see at the intelligence community from the inside. So the 379 00:19:31,400 --> 00:19:33,840 Speaker 5: government has many parts when it comes to aviation, and 380 00:19:34,080 --> 00:19:36,359 Speaker 5: generally you have the civilian part and you have the 381 00:19:36,400 --> 00:19:39,479 Speaker 5: military part, and many of their safety programs and reporting 382 00:19:39,520 --> 00:19:42,159 Speaker 5: systems are quite separate from one another. If you're in 383 00:19:42,200 --> 00:19:45,240 Speaker 5: a civilian aircraft something goes seriously wrong and there's a crash, 384 00:19:45,400 --> 00:19:48,520 Speaker 5: there'll be an investigation, there'll be a detailed report. Anyone 385 00:19:48,720 --> 00:19:51,760 Speaker 5: around the world can download that report and the supporting 386 00:19:51,800 --> 00:19:54,480 Speaker 5: documents of it. The same sort of accident happens in 387 00:19:54,520 --> 00:19:56,320 Speaker 5: the military. You'll be lucky if you get a one 388 00:19:56,359 --> 00:19:59,119 Speaker 5: paid summary saying this is the accident and this is 389 00:19:59,200 --> 00:20:02,000 Speaker 5: kind of what happened, and that's it. My colleagues and 390 00:20:02,000 --> 00:20:04,480 Speaker 5: I did a podcast about an accident on Air Force 391 00:20:04,560 --> 00:20:07,359 Speaker 5: one about five years ago that cost four million dollars 392 00:20:07,400 --> 00:20:09,600 Speaker 5: worth of damage. Someone used the wrong tools on an 393 00:20:09,600 --> 00:20:12,680 Speaker 5: auction system. The average person would think this is crazy. 394 00:20:12,880 --> 00:20:16,199 Speaker 5: There was only a one page report available to the public. 395 00:20:16,400 --> 00:20:18,840 Speaker 5: The details were in the military file somewhere it can 396 00:20:19,000 --> 00:20:21,320 Speaker 5: access to them. But let's go back in time to 397 00:20:21,440 --> 00:20:24,399 Speaker 5: Chicago two thousand and six. Was their requirement for the 398 00:20:24,520 --> 00:20:27,320 Speaker 5: FA to report this event to the best of my knowledge, 399 00:20:27,400 --> 00:20:31,040 Speaker 5: or was not a formal regulatory requirement in the regulations 400 00:20:31,040 --> 00:20:33,879 Speaker 5: that dictate how the FA behaves that required them to 401 00:20:33,920 --> 00:20:36,639 Speaker 5: report it. Could you, as a civilian ask for a 402 00:20:36,640 --> 00:20:39,439 Speaker 5: Freedom of Information Act request for things like air traffic 403 00:20:39,440 --> 00:20:42,280 Speaker 5: control tapes in a reports, et cetera. You could have 404 00:20:42,880 --> 00:20:45,840 Speaker 5: you put it on a public database online, easily accessible. 405 00:20:46,080 --> 00:20:48,399 Speaker 5: You put it behind a foil wall. It's available put 406 00:20:48,440 --> 00:20:51,000 Speaker 5: you have to work for it. So, in my opinion, 407 00:20:51,160 --> 00:20:53,439 Speaker 5: there was no reporting of it because there is no 408 00:20:53,560 --> 00:20:54,879 Speaker 5: requirement to report it. 409 00:20:55,040 --> 00:20:56,720 Speaker 3: Well, we're going to take a break there. You're listening 410 00:20:56,800 --> 00:20:59,359 Speaker 3: to Beyond Contact and the iHeartRadio and Coast to Coast 411 00:20:59,440 --> 00:21:20,959 Speaker 3: AM or normal podcast network. We are back on Beyond Contact. 412 00:21:21,000 --> 00:21:23,480 Speaker 3: We're talking with doctor Todd Curtis. Doctor Curtis, do you 413 00:21:23,560 --> 00:21:26,200 Speaker 3: know of any cases involving a plane hitting one of 414 00:21:26,240 --> 00:21:28,639 Speaker 3: these unknown objects like a UAP or even like a 415 00:21:28,640 --> 00:21:29,600 Speaker 3: close call with one. 416 00:21:29,960 --> 00:21:32,800 Speaker 5: I don't, and I've literally looked at thousands of accident 417 00:21:32,880 --> 00:21:35,440 Speaker 5: instant reports over the decades I've been in the business, 418 00:21:36,040 --> 00:21:39,440 Speaker 5: and this for one of two reasons. A it never happened, 419 00:21:39,600 --> 00:21:42,680 Speaker 5: or b it happened, and whoever wrote the reports rooted 420 00:21:42,800 --> 00:21:45,000 Speaker 5: in such a way to write around the fact that 421 00:21:45,040 --> 00:21:48,600 Speaker 5: this was something highly unusual and more full disclosure. Had 422 00:21:48,640 --> 00:21:51,320 Speaker 5: I been in well, I was billing for a number 423 00:21:51,359 --> 00:21:53,640 Speaker 5: of years as a safety engineer, which I've never seen 424 00:21:53,640 --> 00:21:56,600 Speaker 5: a reported going. But had we seen one, I'm pretty 425 00:21:56,600 --> 00:21:58,840 Speaker 5: confident we would have done exactly that. It's like, Okay, 426 00:21:59,040 --> 00:22:02,040 Speaker 5: is there a plane crash, the reports are something really 427 00:22:02,040 --> 00:22:05,320 Speaker 5: bizarre hit it, We'll write a full report and do 428 00:22:05,560 --> 00:22:08,119 Speaker 5: our level best not to mention the bizarre part, because 429 00:22:08,200 --> 00:22:11,199 Speaker 5: otherwise it would not be seen as credible for our 430 00:22:11,240 --> 00:22:15,119 Speaker 5: home colleagues. And also we might cause some bad blood 431 00:22:15,119 --> 00:22:17,480 Speaker 5: with people we have to have a long term relationship 432 00:22:17,520 --> 00:22:20,280 Speaker 5: with in the government, so there is incentive to I 433 00:22:20,280 --> 00:22:23,320 Speaker 5: wouldn't say lie, but I would say tell as little 434 00:22:23,320 --> 00:22:29,600 Speaker 5: truth as possible. And again, well, but yeah, that's not 435 00:22:29,640 --> 00:22:32,920 Speaker 5: a conspiracy, that's just you know, organizational and bureaucratic survival 436 00:22:32,960 --> 00:22:33,320 Speaker 5: at work. 437 00:22:33,560 --> 00:22:35,719 Speaker 3: I'm going to use that in my dating world. I 438 00:22:35,840 --> 00:22:38,520 Speaker 3: was like, I think that's a good one, Todd. I 439 00:22:38,600 --> 00:22:41,080 Speaker 3: like that, Hey, do you feel any of these things 440 00:22:41,119 --> 00:22:43,800 Speaker 3: could be anomalous? Where do you sit? Do you feel 441 00:22:43,880 --> 00:22:46,000 Speaker 3: like any of this could be something unknown? 442 00:22:46,640 --> 00:22:46,760 Speaker 4: Well? 443 00:22:46,800 --> 00:22:50,040 Speaker 5: Absolutely, there is one of the thirteen that were in 444 00:22:50,080 --> 00:22:53,919 Speaker 5: the ASRS database. I talked about my presentation. There were 445 00:22:53,920 --> 00:22:57,000 Speaker 5: a couple where what I would call conventional objects in 446 00:22:57,200 --> 00:23:01,360 Speaker 5: very unconventional places. For example, flying fifteen or so miles 447 00:23:01,400 --> 00:23:04,600 Speaker 5: from New York and you see a missile go by, 448 00:23:04,640 --> 00:23:07,399 Speaker 5: and the pilot reported I could see that the missile 449 00:23:07,440 --> 00:23:09,320 Speaker 5: had a rounded shape in the front. And I thought 450 00:23:09,359 --> 00:23:11,399 Speaker 5: to myself, Okay, I've been around a few missiles here 451 00:23:11,440 --> 00:23:14,240 Speaker 5: and there in the military. How close do you have 452 00:23:14,320 --> 00:23:16,600 Speaker 5: to be or how big does this missile have to 453 00:23:16,640 --> 00:23:19,960 Speaker 5: be for you to know what shape it was? And 454 00:23:20,000 --> 00:23:21,879 Speaker 5: by the way, you're like fifteen miles out of New 455 00:23:21,960 --> 00:23:25,000 Speaker 5: York City. There are no military test ranges anywhere near 456 00:23:25,080 --> 00:23:29,440 Speaker 5: that territory. Having a missile flying without everyone knowing about it, 457 00:23:29,640 --> 00:23:31,679 Speaker 5: the FA says, hey, we have missile tests going on 458 00:23:31,760 --> 00:23:34,359 Speaker 5: between this hour and this hour. Avoid this space. To 459 00:23:34,440 --> 00:23:38,439 Speaker 5: have someone fire this without going through the protocols would 460 00:23:38,440 --> 00:23:41,800 Speaker 5: put that program, whatever that program is in jeopardy, not 461 00:23:42,040 --> 00:23:44,440 Speaker 5: to mention all the flights that were put in jeopardy. 462 00:23:44,680 --> 00:23:46,760 Speaker 5: So yeah, that's one kind of anomenally in that it's 463 00:23:46,840 --> 00:23:50,359 Speaker 5: a conventional object and an unconventional space. There was at 464 00:23:50,400 --> 00:23:52,240 Speaker 5: least one other one in there. It's like, I have 465 00:23:52,359 --> 00:23:55,000 Speaker 5: no idea what this is. This looks like nothing I've 466 00:23:55,000 --> 00:23:59,000 Speaker 5: ever seen. And whatever was flying this thing had extraordinary 467 00:23:59,000 --> 00:24:02,280 Speaker 5: piloting skills, well beyond what you expect from even an 468 00:24:02,320 --> 00:24:03,320 Speaker 5: above average pilot. 469 00:24:03,720 --> 00:24:05,520 Speaker 3: What do you speculate that could be? Do you think 470 00:24:05,520 --> 00:24:07,879 Speaker 3: it could be a test military craft? Do you think 471 00:24:07,920 --> 00:24:10,120 Speaker 3: it could be drones? Could it be a foreign government? 472 00:24:10,240 --> 00:24:11,840 Speaker 3: Could it be something off world? 473 00:24:12,000 --> 00:24:13,760 Speaker 5: I'll give you a very short description of the most 474 00:24:13,760 --> 00:24:16,080 Speaker 5: bizarre one, and I'll let you tell me what you think. 475 00:24:16,640 --> 00:24:19,400 Speaker 5: A sailplane pilot, which is no engine on it. He's 476 00:24:19,440 --> 00:24:21,440 Speaker 5: flying near all but in New York. He's about thirty 477 00:24:21,440 --> 00:24:24,240 Speaker 5: five hundred feet above of the ground. There's another person 478 00:24:24,280 --> 00:24:26,800 Speaker 5: in back, this person's first flight in the glider. He 479 00:24:26,920 --> 00:24:29,639 Speaker 5: sees something that's about six foot tall, too small to 480 00:24:29,680 --> 00:24:31,960 Speaker 5: have a person side of it has like a speckled 481 00:24:32,000 --> 00:24:35,160 Speaker 5: shiny rainbowy thing on the top, A couple of antenna 482 00:24:35,240 --> 00:24:37,840 Speaker 5: thing he's sticking out on the bottom and he sees 483 00:24:37,880 --> 00:24:40,560 Speaker 5: it flying in my estimation, about three hundred miles an hour, 484 00:24:40,800 --> 00:24:44,320 Speaker 5: very close to the ground. Okay, drones existed in twenty fifteen. 485 00:24:44,800 --> 00:24:47,040 Speaker 5: Drones going three hundred miles an hour. I don't think so. 486 00:24:47,680 --> 00:24:50,600 Speaker 5: But it gets worse or more bizarre. It goes toward 487 00:24:50,960 --> 00:24:54,760 Speaker 5: this distant mountain. Then it comes directly at this glider, 488 00:24:55,200 --> 00:24:59,200 Speaker 5: passes by his right wing, does a U turn, ends 489 00:24:59,280 --> 00:25:02,120 Speaker 5: up forming all about fifty feet off his left way. 490 00:25:02,720 --> 00:25:04,880 Speaker 5: That's an airshow kind of maneuver that you would see 491 00:25:04,880 --> 00:25:07,440 Speaker 5: the Blue Angels of the Thunderbirds do, and you would 492 00:25:07,520 --> 00:25:10,600 Speaker 5: not see them do it unless everyone involved knew exactly 493 00:25:10,640 --> 00:25:13,680 Speaker 5: what was going on. This was a sailplane pilot who 494 00:25:13,680 --> 00:25:16,080 Speaker 5: does not have the ability to do juking and driving 495 00:25:16,080 --> 00:25:18,200 Speaker 5: maneuvers to get out of the way, and this thing 496 00:25:18,280 --> 00:25:22,280 Speaker 5: with extraordinary capability is flying in formation and I love it. 497 00:25:22,359 --> 00:25:24,600 Speaker 5: The statement said in the right up. This is why 498 00:25:24,640 --> 00:25:26,440 Speaker 5: I decided to go back to the airport, and I thought, 499 00:25:26,760 --> 00:25:28,520 Speaker 5: this is a smart pilot. He's getting the heck out 500 00:25:28,520 --> 00:25:32,120 Speaker 5: of datage the waight. There's more two similar objects about 501 00:25:32,119 --> 00:25:34,600 Speaker 5: six foot all come out of the clouds form up 502 00:25:34,600 --> 00:25:37,840 Speaker 5: with the first one flies off into the distance. Now 503 00:25:38,000 --> 00:25:40,600 Speaker 5: any one small part of that could be a conventional 504 00:25:40,960 --> 00:25:46,120 Speaker 5: craft of some kind. Everything put together makes no sense whatsoever. 505 00:25:46,560 --> 00:25:49,040 Speaker 3: That what about you, I ask a UAP case. I 506 00:25:49,119 --> 00:25:52,639 Speaker 3: mean that is by definition right there, that's an unidentified 507 00:25:52,720 --> 00:25:55,359 Speaker 3: phenomenon going on right there. I think that's a great one. 508 00:25:55,480 --> 00:25:56,440 Speaker 3: I've never read it. 509 00:25:56,600 --> 00:26:02,359 Speaker 5: Well, it's a certified, vetted, government sponsored database that is 510 00:26:02,440 --> 00:26:04,600 Speaker 5: open to the entire world to go look at. And 511 00:26:04,680 --> 00:26:07,480 Speaker 5: again in my presentation I had linked to the actual 512 00:26:07,600 --> 00:26:10,119 Speaker 5: code number. You can go in there yourself, download this, 513 00:26:10,359 --> 00:26:13,640 Speaker 5: look at yourself, scratch your head and say, what's going on? Right? 514 00:26:13,680 --> 00:26:15,800 Speaker 3: How often do you stumble across things that are of 515 00:26:15,880 --> 00:26:16,719 Speaker 3: interest like that? 516 00:26:17,440 --> 00:26:21,520 Speaker 5: Very rarely? Because again I very specifically said to myself, 517 00:26:21,880 --> 00:26:24,560 Speaker 5: as a little research project, is there anything in any 518 00:26:24,600 --> 00:26:27,000 Speaker 5: formal database that lexis bizarre? I would go to the 519 00:26:27,080 --> 00:26:30,080 Speaker 5: NTSB database, do searches for the word UFO or UAP 520 00:26:30,200 --> 00:26:32,920 Speaker 5: and whatnot. I thought, let me try the Aviation Safety 521 00:26:33,000 --> 00:26:35,760 Speaker 5: Reporting System. That's when I hit paydart. I only did 522 00:26:35,800 --> 00:26:38,320 Speaker 5: three searchers when one had a single word missile. About 523 00:26:38,320 --> 00:26:41,200 Speaker 5: four hundred events, like three or four of them were legitimate. 524 00:26:41,560 --> 00:26:45,000 Speaker 5: Another single word UAV, which is the acronym for a 525 00:26:45,080 --> 00:26:48,520 Speaker 5: drone unmanned aerospace vehicle. They were like sixty of those, 526 00:26:48,560 --> 00:26:51,879 Speaker 5: and four of them were legit, and there was actually 527 00:26:51,920 --> 00:26:55,120 Speaker 5: a coded variable in the database for UFO. So I did, okay, 528 00:26:55,200 --> 00:26:57,199 Speaker 5: let me do a general search UFO. You wop on 529 00:26:57,240 --> 00:27:01,200 Speaker 5: adentified flight object, etc. CEAE of them six for legit 530 00:27:01,400 --> 00:27:03,320 Speaker 5: and I quit doing a search after that. Hey, I 531 00:27:03,359 --> 00:27:07,119 Speaker 5: did three searches in like twenty minutes and I found 532 00:27:07,119 --> 00:27:09,960 Speaker 5: thirteen events. If I spent a whole lot more time 533 00:27:10,040 --> 00:27:13,600 Speaker 5: doing this, I'll probably find more in that specific database. 534 00:27:13,640 --> 00:27:16,080 Speaker 5: So this is my challenge to the audience. Go check 535 00:27:16,119 --> 00:27:18,800 Speaker 5: out the Aviation saftory reporting system, figure out how to 536 00:27:18,880 --> 00:27:21,959 Speaker 5: use their search process, which is very easy. See if 537 00:27:21,960 --> 00:27:23,680 Speaker 5: you can find something, please. 538 00:27:23,640 --> 00:27:25,479 Speaker 3: That is awesome. We should all take a look at 539 00:27:25,480 --> 00:27:27,040 Speaker 3: that and see if we can't come up with more. 540 00:27:27,880 --> 00:27:30,919 Speaker 3: Doctor Curtis, let's talk about that San Francisco case at 541 00:27:30,960 --> 00:27:31,760 Speaker 3: twenty thirteen. 542 00:27:32,480 --> 00:27:35,400 Speaker 5: This was a conventional accident. This was a triple seven 543 00:27:35,520 --> 00:27:38,600 Speaker 5: on July sixth, twenty thirteen, happened to be a Saturday, 544 00:27:38,760 --> 00:27:41,440 Speaker 5: and it crashed, killing three people on board. I'd been 545 00:27:41,480 --> 00:27:44,800 Speaker 5: a Boeing engineer years before working on the Triple seven project. 546 00:27:45,000 --> 00:27:48,320 Speaker 5: This is the very first fatal crash of a Triple seven. 547 00:27:48,440 --> 00:27:50,000 Speaker 5: And I was out of Boeing at that time and 548 00:27:50,080 --> 00:27:52,320 Speaker 5: did the occasional media interview. And as soon as I 549 00:27:52,400 --> 00:27:54,800 Speaker 5: found out that Saturday morning it's a crash, I said 550 00:27:54,840 --> 00:27:57,000 Speaker 5: to myself, my god, it's Triple seven. And no one 551 00:27:57,000 --> 00:27:59,280 Speaker 5: called me. Typically when there's a major airline crash in 552 00:27:59,280 --> 00:28:01,640 Speaker 5: the US, I get sorts of phone calls, emails, text 553 00:28:01,720 --> 00:28:04,760 Speaker 5: mess I had nothing. I called around to producers I knew, 554 00:28:05,040 --> 00:28:06,560 Speaker 5: and I called down to atlant I say, hey, you 555 00:28:06,560 --> 00:28:08,399 Speaker 5: know I'm in New York. Is there a studio I 556 00:28:08,400 --> 00:28:10,240 Speaker 5: can go to? Somebody won't ask me a question? I said, 557 00:28:10,240 --> 00:28:12,560 Speaker 5: oh yeah, I go down the road Columbus Circle. We 558 00:28:12,600 --> 00:28:15,199 Speaker 5: have a studio there. I hadn't followed CNN, so I 559 00:28:15,240 --> 00:28:18,040 Speaker 5: didn't realize they had basically move their major operations in 560 00:28:18,119 --> 00:28:20,760 Speaker 5: New York. So I walk into this big room, fifty desk. 561 00:28:21,520 --> 00:28:23,760 Speaker 5: Don Lemon's off in the corner, little studio giving us talk. 562 00:28:23,800 --> 00:28:25,159 Speaker 5: A said, oh my god, I thought i'd be a 563 00:28:25,200 --> 00:28:27,680 Speaker 5: little room for five minutes. I'll have five minutes of 564 00:28:27,760 --> 00:28:30,520 Speaker 5: Don Lemon. This will make my day. It's a tragic event. 565 00:28:30,760 --> 00:28:32,879 Speaker 5: People had died, but I had a job to do. 566 00:28:33,240 --> 00:28:35,639 Speaker 5: Give some information, then go out and party. It's like 567 00:28:35,680 --> 00:28:38,520 Speaker 5: Saturday in New York. Why did they call me and 568 00:28:38,600 --> 00:28:41,840 Speaker 5: let me come in? Because everyone was on vacation. Their 569 00:28:41,880 --> 00:28:44,800 Speaker 5: producers couldn't be caught called up. There are all sorts 570 00:28:44,840 --> 00:28:47,280 Speaker 5: of experts who they couldn't call. It's like I showed up. 571 00:28:47,280 --> 00:28:49,760 Speaker 5: It's like, okay, my five minutes were up. I'm about 572 00:28:49,760 --> 00:28:51,560 Speaker 5: to leave this, Oh, doctor Curtis, would you like to 573 00:28:51,600 --> 00:28:54,200 Speaker 5: stay a little bit longer. Six hours later, I leave 574 00:28:54,240 --> 00:28:58,400 Speaker 5: the studio and all day I'm thinking, okay, we're on live. 575 00:28:58,560 --> 00:29:02,320 Speaker 5: I have to give some useful information, very little information 576 00:29:02,560 --> 00:29:06,920 Speaker 5: starting off, and I try to keep it my usual 577 00:29:07,520 --> 00:29:10,800 Speaker 5: modem is I'm going to stick with facts and data. 578 00:29:11,440 --> 00:29:13,520 Speaker 5: If i have an opinion, I'll stay in an opinion. 579 00:29:14,120 --> 00:29:17,600 Speaker 5: I'll try and give some context to similar accidents in 580 00:29:18,000 --> 00:29:21,200 Speaker 5: that city or in that aircraft type, etc. And it 581 00:29:21,280 --> 00:29:24,760 Speaker 5: was an eye opening experience seeing media work in real 582 00:29:24,800 --> 00:29:28,239 Speaker 5: time at CNN. I thought, my god, this is like 583 00:29:28,440 --> 00:29:31,480 Speaker 5: the pinnacle of live news. And I'm the only guy 584 00:29:31,560 --> 00:29:33,000 Speaker 5: that got you gotta be kidding. 585 00:29:32,720 --> 00:29:37,360 Speaker 3: Me, You are mister fax and data. That is for sure. 586 00:29:37,440 --> 00:29:41,480 Speaker 3: You absolutely could be like that investigator. It's great, fascinating stuff. 587 00:29:41,520 --> 00:29:44,120 Speaker 3: We'll be right back here talking more with doctor Todd Curtis. 588 00:29:44,240 --> 00:29:46,960 Speaker 3: You're listening to Beyond Contact on the iHeartRadio and Coast 589 00:29:47,000 --> 00:30:10,880 Speaker 3: to Coast AM Paranormal podcast network. We are back on 590 00:30:10,960 --> 00:30:14,360 Speaker 3: Beyond Contact. We're talking with doctor Todd Curtis here. Todd, 591 00:30:14,600 --> 00:30:17,240 Speaker 3: you brought up Boeing man in twenty twenty four. There's 592 00:30:17,280 --> 00:30:19,680 Speaker 3: been a lot of stuff happening with Boeing. They had 593 00:30:19,720 --> 00:30:22,360 Speaker 3: the door fall off, they had the wheel fall off. 594 00:30:23,240 --> 00:30:24,440 Speaker 3: What do you feel about. 595 00:30:24,160 --> 00:30:27,040 Speaker 5: All that respect of Boeing or any entity. If you 596 00:30:27,080 --> 00:30:28,720 Speaker 5: have a crash of a certain type with a certain 597 00:30:28,760 --> 00:30:31,320 Speaker 5: aircraft type, a certain airline, or in a certain country, 598 00:30:31,400 --> 00:30:34,280 Speaker 5: there tends to be heightened awareness of anything happening in 599 00:30:34,320 --> 00:30:37,200 Speaker 5: that same context. So Boeing after their seven three seven 600 00:30:37,240 --> 00:30:41,120 Speaker 5: MAX events, there's a heightened awareness when anything happens. For example, 601 00:30:41,160 --> 00:30:43,840 Speaker 5: will falling off an airliner happens multiple times a year 602 00:30:43,840 --> 00:30:46,760 Speaker 5: around the world. Very rarely is it national news, but 603 00:30:46,800 --> 00:30:50,200 Speaker 5: if it involves a Boeing aircraft, it's national news. Anything 604 00:30:50,240 --> 00:30:52,560 Speaker 5: dealing with the seven three seven MAX people could have 605 00:30:52,600 --> 00:30:55,320 Speaker 5: a hangnail in coach. It'll be national news if it's 606 00:30:55,360 --> 00:30:57,560 Speaker 5: on the seven three seven Max. So I got a call. 607 00:30:57,640 --> 00:30:59,000 Speaker 5: This is one of those cases where I did get 608 00:30:59,000 --> 00:31:01,000 Speaker 5: a call. They said, well, doctor Curtis, what do you 609 00:31:01,000 --> 00:31:03,560 Speaker 5: think about what just happened? Now? About two days before 610 00:31:03,560 --> 00:31:05,960 Speaker 5: there'd been a crash in Japan. No one got killed, 611 00:31:05,960 --> 00:31:08,280 Speaker 5: but it was like a spectacular crash. Everything burned up. 612 00:31:08,320 --> 00:31:10,760 Speaker 5: I start talking about the Japan crashes. Oh no, it's 613 00:31:10,760 --> 00:31:13,440 Speaker 5: a seven three seven Max. It's like, what door fell off? 614 00:31:13,480 --> 00:31:16,000 Speaker 5: What are you talking about? I look up that model 615 00:31:16,040 --> 00:31:18,520 Speaker 5: of the seven thirty seven. This was a later model 616 00:31:18,520 --> 00:31:20,840 Speaker 5: of the seven three seven. They actually put a different 617 00:31:21,120 --> 00:31:23,120 Speaker 5: door in an area of the aircraft that wasn't on 618 00:31:23,160 --> 00:31:24,920 Speaker 5: the earlier model. So it took me like a half 619 00:31:24,960 --> 00:31:26,680 Speaker 5: hour to get my head around the fact that there's 620 00:31:26,720 --> 00:31:29,400 Speaker 5: another door here. What's a plug door? Oh, it's supposed 621 00:31:29,400 --> 00:31:31,880 Speaker 5: to be an emergency exit door unless you don't have 622 00:31:31,960 --> 00:31:33,880 Speaker 5: that many seats and you're not required to put an 623 00:31:33,880 --> 00:31:36,520 Speaker 5: emergency acup, so you put what they call a plug door. 624 00:31:36,680 --> 00:31:39,600 Speaker 5: It's a simple fix. He basically bolted in. It stays 625 00:31:39,640 --> 00:31:43,320 Speaker 5: there permanently. This is a no brainer technology. I'd never 626 00:31:43,360 --> 00:31:46,120 Speaker 5: heard of a plug door coming out. I called up 627 00:31:46,120 --> 00:31:48,760 Speaker 5: a former NTSV board number. I said, have you ever 628 00:31:48,800 --> 00:31:50,640 Speaker 5: heard of a plug door coming off of an aircraft? 629 00:31:50,720 --> 00:31:53,000 Speaker 5: He said now, and he was a former mechanic. He'd 630 00:31:53,000 --> 00:31:56,400 Speaker 5: been working on airplanes for decades. So yeah, and it 631 00:31:56,520 --> 00:31:58,600 Speaker 5: happened to be bowing in the seven three seven max. 632 00:31:58,640 --> 00:32:03,560 Speaker 5: So everybody, right, so knows about this plug door? BOI rightfully? 633 00:32:03,680 --> 00:32:08,200 Speaker 5: So is being taken to the woodshed and the company 634 00:32:08,560 --> 00:32:11,719 Speaker 5: was convicted of a crime, but no individuals were So 635 00:32:12,040 --> 00:32:14,719 Speaker 5: is the CEO going to jail now? Unfortunately he has 636 00:32:14,760 --> 00:32:17,720 Speaker 5: a golden parachute and he's out the door. That's an opinion. 637 00:32:18,000 --> 00:32:21,480 Speaker 3: Yeah, no, we saw that. Yeah, absolutely, todd do you you? 638 00:32:21,600 --> 00:32:23,719 Speaker 3: I think said? As of May twenty twenty four, the 639 00:32:23,800 --> 00:32:26,080 Speaker 3: FAA and the Department Defense still do not have a 640 00:32:26,120 --> 00:32:30,720 Speaker 3: systematic or comprehensive process for collecting and organizing UAP reports. 641 00:32:31,040 --> 00:32:32,840 Speaker 3: Is that still the case? I'm assuming it is. 642 00:32:33,320 --> 00:32:36,720 Speaker 5: Let me add that there is no publicly acknowledge systematic 643 00:32:36,800 --> 00:32:40,480 Speaker 5: method methodology on the military or the national security side, 644 00:32:40,560 --> 00:32:43,240 Speaker 5: and there is definitely nothing public on the FA side. 645 00:32:43,480 --> 00:32:46,520 Speaker 5: And by systematic we're talking something as simple as what 646 00:32:46,680 --> 00:32:49,880 Speaker 5: is the definition of a UAP, the military and National 647 00:32:49,920 --> 00:32:52,520 Speaker 5: security side of the House have as a working definition. 648 00:32:52,840 --> 00:32:56,560 Speaker 5: NASA actually did an independent study team back in twenty 649 00:32:56,680 --> 00:32:59,080 Speaker 5: twenty three, and they published the report in twenty twenty 650 00:32:59,080 --> 00:33:03,280 Speaker 5: four to generalize definition of what a UAP is, and 651 00:33:03,760 --> 00:33:07,080 Speaker 5: absent one from the FAA or the NTSP actually put 652 00:33:07,120 --> 00:33:09,360 Speaker 5: together for the purpose of the presentation, what I think 653 00:33:09,440 --> 00:33:13,520 Speaker 5: is a reasonable definition of a UAP, which would, among 654 00:33:13,560 --> 00:33:16,520 Speaker 5: other things, include a classic UFO, and like I said 655 00:33:16,560 --> 00:33:19,960 Speaker 5: earlier in our discussion, a conventional aircraft and an unconventional 656 00:33:20,040 --> 00:33:25,120 Speaker 5: location or a phenomena that is simply unknown and unexplainable. 657 00:33:25,200 --> 00:33:28,480 Speaker 5: I would like them to follow something not exactly mine, 658 00:33:28,480 --> 00:33:31,920 Speaker 5: but something where it's comprehensive, it's objected. It's something where 659 00:33:32,040 --> 00:33:34,440 Speaker 5: if you're a pilot or an air traffic controller and 660 00:33:34,480 --> 00:33:36,600 Speaker 5: you see a UAP, you'd like to look up in 661 00:33:36,640 --> 00:33:39,000 Speaker 5: the REGs and say, Okay, does this fit the definition? 662 00:33:39,360 --> 00:33:42,320 Speaker 5: Yes or no? If yes, I go recorded over here 663 00:33:42,640 --> 00:33:44,200 Speaker 5: that system does not yet exist. 664 00:33:44,440 --> 00:33:47,440 Speaker 3: And you say that this information, forget all this alien 665 00:33:47,480 --> 00:33:50,760 Speaker 3: et curant whatever you say that just compiling all this 666 00:33:50,880 --> 00:33:54,760 Speaker 3: information using that data, you are saying even old data 667 00:33:54,800 --> 00:33:58,400 Speaker 3: from fifty years ago can help us with safety in 668 00:33:58,440 --> 00:33:59,720 Speaker 3: flight today. Correct. 669 00:34:00,040 --> 00:34:03,720 Speaker 5: Absolutely, Aviation safety is what I like to describe as 670 00:34:03,720 --> 00:34:06,800 Speaker 5: something that does not care about time or space. There 671 00:34:06,800 --> 00:34:09,719 Speaker 5: are events that happen almost one hundred years ago. For example, 672 00:34:09,880 --> 00:34:11,840 Speaker 5: everyone in the world has seen the famous picture of 673 00:34:11,880 --> 00:34:16,160 Speaker 5: the Zeppelin going up in lakehrsh Jersey Brandenberg classic case, 674 00:34:16,560 --> 00:34:19,319 Speaker 5: and some of the elements of that you can still 675 00:34:19,400 --> 00:34:21,480 Speaker 5: learn from today if you're in the aviation safety business. 676 00:34:21,520 --> 00:34:23,600 Speaker 5: So yes, if you have an encounter from fifty years ago, 677 00:34:23,600 --> 00:34:26,480 Speaker 5: there's certain characteristics, you have one from fifty minutes ago, 678 00:34:26,600 --> 00:34:31,080 Speaker 5: certain characteristics. Are there similarities? Is there a pattern that 679 00:34:31,120 --> 00:34:33,400 Speaker 5: one should look for? And if you have this certain pattern, 680 00:34:33,440 --> 00:34:36,360 Speaker 5: does that inform you as to what counter moves a 681 00:34:36,560 --> 00:34:39,279 Speaker 5: pilot should make should they encounter something like this. If 682 00:34:39,360 --> 00:34:41,920 Speaker 5: you knew nothing about starlink, you're flying along and you 683 00:34:42,000 --> 00:34:45,640 Speaker 5: see fifty lights in a row going across the sky 684 00:34:45,920 --> 00:34:48,920 Speaker 5: above you. You're flying at thirty thousand feet, your first 685 00:34:48,920 --> 00:34:52,560 Speaker 5: thought might be that's at fifty thousand feet because actually, 686 00:34:52,640 --> 00:34:55,319 Speaker 5: because of the speed and the distance, looks like the 687 00:34:55,320 --> 00:34:58,319 Speaker 5: speed of a stratospheric airline are going over. You say, 688 00:34:58,680 --> 00:35:00,960 Speaker 5: who the heck is flying? If the airliners in a 689 00:35:01,040 --> 00:35:07,080 Speaker 5: row without reporting for sure. So again, if no one 690 00:35:07,320 --> 00:35:10,799 Speaker 5: feels that they have the ability or we respect it 691 00:35:10,840 --> 00:35:13,160 Speaker 5: if they report this. If no one reports this, you 692 00:35:13,239 --> 00:35:15,479 Speaker 5: cannot analyze it. If you can't analyze it, you can't 693 00:35:15,520 --> 00:35:18,080 Speaker 5: make rational decisions as to what to do next. You 694 00:35:18,120 --> 00:35:22,640 Speaker 5: can't assess the risk and therefore assess the potential safety 695 00:35:22,680 --> 00:35:24,280 Speaker 5: impacts without the data. 696 00:35:24,440 --> 00:35:27,000 Speaker 3: You've mentioned these drones several times today. Do you know 697 00:35:27,040 --> 00:35:29,600 Speaker 3: where we're at with the drone technology? Because it feels 698 00:35:29,640 --> 00:35:31,680 Speaker 3: to me, like, you know, these things seem like they 699 00:35:31,680 --> 00:35:34,759 Speaker 3: could be quiet, they run on hydrogen or electric, there's 700 00:35:34,800 --> 00:35:37,880 Speaker 3: different things they're proposing. It seems like we're on the 701 00:35:37,920 --> 00:35:41,800 Speaker 3: cusp of these drones becoming more manned drones I'm talking 702 00:35:41,800 --> 00:35:44,640 Speaker 3: about coming out soon. This might lead to a whole 703 00:35:44,680 --> 00:35:47,280 Speaker 3: bunch of uaper reports because people won't know what they're seeing. 704 00:35:47,480 --> 00:35:50,400 Speaker 5: Well, for that, I recommend that people look at all 705 00:35:50,440 --> 00:35:52,640 Speaker 5: the many, many, many videos that are coming out out 706 00:35:52,680 --> 00:35:57,520 Speaker 5: of Ukraine. The evolution of drone technique and technology is 707 00:35:57,600 --> 00:36:00,440 Speaker 5: like massive going on over there. There are things I 708 00:36:00,480 --> 00:36:02,600 Speaker 5: look at that and it's like, yeah, this is conventional 709 00:36:02,719 --> 00:36:05,759 Speaker 5: technology being used in ways that the military minds and 710 00:36:05,800 --> 00:36:09,040 Speaker 5: the Pentagon never thought of because they have to rapidly 711 00:36:09,080 --> 00:36:12,760 Speaker 5: evolve their technique and their skills in the field. So yes, 712 00:36:13,040 --> 00:36:17,680 Speaker 5: this will inform the design of future technology and how 713 00:36:17,719 --> 00:36:20,480 Speaker 5: that future technology is used. Right now today you or 714 00:36:20,520 --> 00:36:23,440 Speaker 5: I can off the shelf, go to Amazon get a 715 00:36:23,480 --> 00:36:26,520 Speaker 5: semi autonomous droom where you can program it to fly 716 00:36:26,600 --> 00:36:29,640 Speaker 5: at certain place, take pictures and come back. It's only 717 00:36:29,680 --> 00:36:32,560 Speaker 5: a small hop, skip and a jump to program it 718 00:36:32,600 --> 00:36:34,879 Speaker 5: to do something other than take pictures. And you see 719 00:36:34,880 --> 00:36:36,400 Speaker 5: that happening in Ukraine as we speak. 720 00:36:36,600 --> 00:36:38,640 Speaker 3: I can imagine this is going to get get even 721 00:36:38,680 --> 00:36:42,040 Speaker 3: more convoluted than it is already. Before I let you go, 722 00:36:42,080 --> 00:36:44,279 Speaker 3: I definitely want to ask you about You've been in 723 00:36:44,360 --> 00:36:47,080 Speaker 3: aviation for a long time, obviously, have you looked at 724 00:36:47,120 --> 00:36:50,719 Speaker 3: these different videos, the famous military videos that came out, 725 00:36:50,760 --> 00:36:54,520 Speaker 3: like the TikTok video, Tiktak video and they go fast 726 00:36:54,560 --> 00:36:56,840 Speaker 3: and gimbal. Have you seen those and what are your 727 00:36:56,880 --> 00:36:57,640 Speaker 3: thoughts on those? 728 00:36:58,080 --> 00:37:00,280 Speaker 5: I have, and I sort of casually looked at them 729 00:37:00,400 --> 00:37:05,080 Speaker 5: until the military the government said yes, these are authentic 730 00:37:05,160 --> 00:37:07,680 Speaker 5: videos and we don't know what they are. It's like, 731 00:37:07,880 --> 00:37:11,680 Speaker 5: what you're acknowledging that this multi billion dollar over decades, 732 00:37:11,719 --> 00:37:17,560 Speaker 5: technology caught something that you can't explain. Now I'm really intrigued. Yes, 733 00:37:17,640 --> 00:37:21,640 Speaker 5: I have seen those and seen many others, and some 734 00:37:21,800 --> 00:37:24,200 Speaker 5: of them it's like, okay, I've been around aviation for 735 00:37:24,239 --> 00:37:27,000 Speaker 5: a while. In fact, when nineteen eighties, when I was 736 00:37:27,000 --> 00:37:30,839 Speaker 5: at Edwards, I was working at a test facility where 737 00:37:30,840 --> 00:37:34,880 Speaker 5: they had some of the early infrared targeting systems for aircraft. 738 00:37:34,880 --> 00:37:37,800 Speaker 5: This is like what eighty for eighty five and crewed 739 00:37:37,840 --> 00:37:40,640 Speaker 5: by today's standards, But even back then it was like 740 00:37:40,680 --> 00:37:44,600 Speaker 5: a revelation to see what this technology could do. And 741 00:37:44,640 --> 00:37:48,360 Speaker 5: again we've had forty years of improving computers and microchips 742 00:37:48,360 --> 00:37:52,640 Speaker 5: and everything else. So not just infrared, not just visible light. 743 00:37:53,160 --> 00:37:56,759 Speaker 5: You also have electromagnetic sensing systems on board aircraft. You 744 00:37:56,840 --> 00:38:01,040 Speaker 5: also have multiple platforms. You might have space base assets 745 00:38:01,920 --> 00:38:05,480 Speaker 5: combined with land based assets and you know, in the 746 00:38:05,520 --> 00:38:09,600 Speaker 5: atmosphere assets and human eyeballs looking at the same thing. 747 00:38:09,960 --> 00:38:13,680 Speaker 5: Compiling that information and then coming to a conclusion way 748 00:38:13,760 --> 00:38:17,080 Speaker 5: more complex than just a single tic TAC video. This 749 00:38:17,120 --> 00:38:20,719 Speaker 5: happens on a daily basis. Oh wow, if something big 750 00:38:20,760 --> 00:38:25,480 Speaker 5: happens like another Phoenix Lights. Phoenix Lights was ninety seven 751 00:38:25,960 --> 00:38:29,160 Speaker 5: Chicago's two thousand and six. This is before the iPhone era. 752 00:38:29,640 --> 00:38:32,080 Speaker 5: If it happens today, it'll be like Kobe's helicopter crash. 753 00:38:32,440 --> 00:38:35,960 Speaker 5: You got all kinds of door cams, you know, audio crams, 754 00:38:36,320 --> 00:38:38,439 Speaker 5: you can go on the flight tracking systems and flight 755 00:38:38,480 --> 00:38:41,759 Speaker 5: the track. We'll have more information you can shake a 756 00:38:41,800 --> 00:38:43,240 Speaker 5: stick at. So if something happ. 757 00:38:43,160 --> 00:38:45,600 Speaker 3: I think about that now. When Roswell happened, nobody had 758 00:38:45,640 --> 00:38:48,400 Speaker 3: a camera and nobody knew it. Now, my god, I 759 00:38:48,440 --> 00:38:50,200 Speaker 3: think if something did happen, we're going to have a 760 00:38:50,200 --> 00:38:53,200 Speaker 3: lot of footage. Oh yeah, wow, Well we're gonna have 761 00:38:53,239 --> 00:38:55,799 Speaker 3: to stop there, Todd. I really really appreciate it. I've 762 00:38:55,800 --> 00:38:58,319 Speaker 3: really enjoyed talking to you about this stuff. So thanks 763 00:38:58,360 --> 00:38:58,920 Speaker 3: for coming on. 764 00:38:59,239 --> 00:39:01,160 Speaker 5: Well, thanks for having me absolutely brother. 765 00:39:01,560 --> 00:39:03,680 Speaker 3: Thanks for listening to Beyond Contact. We're going to be 766 00:39:03,680 --> 00:39:05,759 Speaker 3: back next week with an all new episode. You can 767 00:39:05,760 --> 00:39:09,359 Speaker 3: follow me Captain Ron on Twitter and Instagram at CID 768 00:39:09,600 --> 00:39:13,120 Speaker 3: Underscore Captain Ron. Stay connected by checking out Contact intheesert 769 00:39:13,120 --> 00:39:16,360 Speaker 3: dot com. Stay open minded and rational as we explore 770 00:39:16,400 --> 00:39:18,880 Speaker 3: the unknown right here on the iHeartRadio and Coast to 771 00:39:18,920 --> 00:39:21,080 Speaker 3: Coast am Paranormal Podcast Network. 772 00:39:31,840 --> 00:39:34,359 Speaker 1: Thanks for listening to the iHeartRadio and Coast to Coast 773 00:39:34,400 --> 00:39:37,399 Speaker 1: Day and Paranormal Podcast Network. Make sure and check out 774 00:39:37,440 --> 00:39:40,719 Speaker 1: all our shows on the iHeartRadio app or by going 775 00:39:40,719 --> 00:39:47,560 Speaker 1: to iHeartRadio dot com