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Speaker 1: Ridiculous Crime. It's a production of iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: Zaren Burnette. We meet again, Elizabeth Dunton. How you doing good?

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Speaker 2: So good to see you.

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Speaker 3: Interns told me you're going to be early, and I

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Speaker 3: was like, well, I'm going to be late.

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Speaker 2: You're looking sharp today in your little stress mariner's shirt.

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Speaker 3: I'm like a French mariner over here.

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Speaker 2: I love it. It's cute. I'm gonna get you a

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Speaker 2: can of sardine. Make your day quick question. Sure you

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Speaker 2: know what's ridiculous?

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Speaker 3: I do.

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Speaker 4: So.

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Speaker 3: Hearkening back to when I was telling you about the

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Speaker 3: Buddhist monks, I mentioned about Stevie Wonder going around at

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Speaker 3: the Shaolin temple and it's like, oh, he must have

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Speaker 3: been enjoying listening to the temple. If you ever heard

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Speaker 3: the theory that Stevie Wonder actually can see, I have right,

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Speaker 3: there's a lot of celebrities have talked about it.

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Speaker 2: Yeah.

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Speaker 3: So I have one here that I think is just

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Speaker 3: absolutely not proof positive.

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Speaker 2: But there's some interesting video proof.

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Speaker 3: It's interesting. Yeah. So Elton John has this evidence that

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Speaker 3: Stevie Wonder may be able to see. That I thought

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Speaker 3: was very convincing because the two of them happened to

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Speaker 3: be Colorado at the same time, and they, you know,

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Speaker 3: kind of bumped into each other. That's not the evidence

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Speaker 3: they were Basically they did a snowmobile tour. But I'll

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Speaker 3: let out and John tell the story. Quote musicians passing

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Speaker 3: through Denver or Boulder would drop by to visit. Stevie

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Speaker 3: Wonder turned up one day and took out a snowmobile,

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Speaker 3: insisting on driving it himself. Now, to preempt your question, no,

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Speaker 3: I have no idea how Stevie Wonder successfully piloted a

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Speaker 3: snowmobile through the rocky mountains of Colorado without killing himself

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Speaker 3: or indeed anyone else in the process. But he did.

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Speaker 2: And it's not like it's a Stevie's house, No, he just.

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Speaker 3: Like he doesn't know this track. He is not like, oh,

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Speaker 3: I've got this worked out. He took. Yeah, he went

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Speaker 3: out there and drove a snowmobile. Like, I don't think

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Speaker 3: I could do that that well and not run the

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Speaker 3: risk of bumping into something apparently flawless Stevie Rascal. So

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Speaker 3: I'm just saying, is there's an interesting one can.

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Speaker 2: Be like you can be like technically blind.

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Speaker 3: Right, you know, I guess varying degrees of Yeah, there's.

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Speaker 2: Different levels of blind, so it might not be completely

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Speaker 2: you know.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, so much like UFOs and UAPs. I'm keeping an

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Speaker 3: open mind about Stevie wonder whether or not.

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Speaker 2: Wow, there you go, very ridiculous, right, that is ridiculous.

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Speaker 3: John always got the.

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Speaker 2: Tea, always always. Do you want to know what else

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Speaker 2: is ridiculous?

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Speaker 3: Please?

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Speaker 2: Hacking a car? Bro This is Ridiculous Crime, A podcast

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Speaker 2: about absurd and outrageous capers. Heis and cons It's always

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Speaker 2: ninety nine percent murder free and one hundred percent ridiculous.

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Speaker 3: I know you done heard that.

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Speaker 2: I done heard it so many times. Hi, Elizabeth, Hey,

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Speaker 2: my name is Werner Brandis my voice? Is my passport?

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Speaker 2: Verify me?

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Speaker 3: Excuse me?

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Speaker 2: Do you know what that's from?

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Speaker 3: No, that's right, Zaren.

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Speaker 2: You're correct. It's one of my all time favorite movies. Sneakers.

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Speaker 2: Oh Hi, my name is Werner Brandis my voice? Is

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Speaker 2: my passport? Verify me?

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Speaker 3: Is it like a security check?

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Speaker 2: Yeah? So if you haven't seen have you seen Sneakers?

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Speaker 3: Yeah? But way back in the day, watch it again.

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Speaker 2: Because I love it so much. Yeah, it's like a

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Speaker 2: voice cod werner brandeis He's like a He's a tech guy,

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Speaker 2: uh an executive at this tech company, and so it's

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Speaker 2: a voice recognition, and so they needed to make a

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Speaker 2: recording of his voice to sneak in without him the

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Speaker 2: protagonists in this film, and anyway, they so they record him,

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Speaker 2: but they get like a honey trap. This woman has

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Speaker 2: to go and like get him to say these words

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Speaker 2: so they can piece it together on a blind date.

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Speaker 2: And so she's like, oh, you know what word, I love?

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Speaker 2: Passport And he's like, passport. So when it gets played back,

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Speaker 2: my voice is my passport. Anyway, I love that movie.

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Speaker 2: It's the story of some former and like side gig

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Speaker 2: hackers who do what's called penetration testing for tech security

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Speaker 2: at companies. White hat hackers. They use their powers for good,

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Speaker 2: although I believe they'd be gray hat hackers in some sense.

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Speaker 3: What's the distinction there?

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Speaker 2: A gray hat hacker is someone who engages in hacking

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Speaker 2: activities without permission, but their intentions are not always malicious,

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Speaker 2: and they may include reporting vulnerabilities you know, that they

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Speaker 2: find in these targeted organizations or even like to the public.

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Speaker 3: So if they break into to the Department of Defense

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Speaker 3: and then leave a note I found exactly and I

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Speaker 3: can tell you how I did.

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Speaker 2: Precisely, and they can exploit vulnerabilities for like personal gain

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Speaker 2: or demonstrate a point, you know, either way. In Sneakers,

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Speaker 2: the team which is led by Robert Redford, they go

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Speaker 2: up against Redford's old altruist college hacking buddy turned power

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Speaker 2: hungry tech villain, and there's some great hack in along

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Speaker 2: the way.

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Speaker 3: They hack it up, side it up. Oh, he's so good.

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Speaker 2: In that, Yeah, dan Ackroyd, that's right, hacking, hacking, so

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Speaker 2: much hacking, River Phoenix Hacking. I was thinking about that movie,

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Speaker 2: as I do sometimes when, and it got me thinking

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Speaker 2: about white hat hackers, those who used to hack illegally

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Speaker 2: for profit and or power, and then they go straight

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Speaker 2: and they help the authorities bust back the Yeah. I

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Speaker 2: like that idea. One of the most annoying characters on television,

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Speaker 2: Penelope on Criminal Minds, was a bad hacker. Yeah, and

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Speaker 2: then she was recruited by the FBI to hack the

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Speaker 2: world in pursuit of horrible violent criminals. And then they

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Speaker 2: also needed her to like teeter around the office in

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Speaker 2: clown costumes, Yeah, spouting out like stale slang while holding

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Speaker 2: something from the Archie McFee cap her. Oh I can't.

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Speaker 2: Like she's just running around with a rubber chicken pen

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Speaker 2: with a feather puff at the end.

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Speaker 3: What a rubber chicken?

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Speaker 2: Doesn't that sound like something she'd hash.

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Speaker 3: That's some real clan behavior.

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Speaker 2: Yeah it is. Anyway, I was poking around with the hackers,

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Speaker 2: basically hacking my way through Google's lousy search model, and

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Speaker 2: I found something. I caught a case there. I caught

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Speaker 2: a couple of cases. I think you're gonna like them. Please,

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Speaker 2: I should warn you that, just like the last time

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Speaker 2: I told you about hacking.

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Speaker 3: Crime, you got hacked.

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Speaker 2: No, I'm going to use a lot of technical language.

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Speaker 2: Much of it is going to go over your pretty

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Speaker 2: little head. Probably don't be intimidated, like some of us

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Speaker 2: are just more tech savvy and smarter.

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Speaker 3: No, it's very to true.

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Speaker 2: So I'm going to use terms like hacking and mainframe

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Speaker 2: and motherboard.

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Speaker 3: Are these terms like DJ's used like a motherboard? I'm

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Speaker 3: on my motherboard?

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Speaker 2: The ones and two, database and network? Have you heard

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Speaker 2: those before?

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Speaker 3: No? None of the all new to me keyboard keyboard?

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Speaker 3: Oh like oh yeah, like with the with the piano

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Speaker 3: correct correct USB drive?

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Speaker 2: Nope, Like I said, I don't want you to be intimidated.

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Speaker 2: The truth is that I has but a tenuous grasp

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Speaker 2: on all of those concepts and the items myself. So

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Speaker 2: we're on this digital journey together.

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Speaker 3: You do know, I have a bunch of friends who

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Speaker 3: are like hardcore, and then they talk to me about

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Speaker 3: stuff and I'm like, I use yellow legal pads. I

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Speaker 3: don't know what you're talking about.

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Speaker 2: No, I'm just like, you know, I'm like, why isn't

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Speaker 2: everything opening? Oh, I'm not connected to the internet. Cars,

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Speaker 2: I'm not talking about the Pixar movies there and back up,

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Speaker 2: I was like, you're going to I'm talking about the

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Speaker 2: things we drive down the street. Cars are full of

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Speaker 2: micro chips totally. And wasn't that part of the supply

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Speaker 2: chain issue during the early days of COVID, Remember there

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Speaker 2: was like the chip shortage for new cars and that's

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Speaker 2: like the cost of new cars.

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Speaker 3: And then cars they have all the screens.

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Speaker 2: Now they got like a forty inch television screen smack

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Speaker 2: in the middle of the dash.

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Speaker 3: Video games.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, you can't text and drive. That's good, but you

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Speaker 2: can have a small TV like in your lap drive.

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Speaker 3: You're making.

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Speaker 2: In some cars that'll remain nameless. It's on those screens.

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Speaker 2: We have to do stuff like adjust the AC or

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Speaker 2: like put on the turn signal.

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Speaker 3: I've heard about this, Yes, that's the wild one.

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Speaker 5: To screen.

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Speaker 2: You have to tell the car not to run over kids.

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Speaker 2: Run over fewer kids, you know, like we don't. We

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Speaker 2: don't have buttons anymore. I love buttons there, I like.

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Speaker 3: I even like knobs.

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Speaker 2: The best car I ever owned was in nineteen eighty

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Speaker 2: nine Ford Bronco. Yes, you're not a chip in sight.

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Speaker 3: No, I don't think so.

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Speaker 2: You could fix it with like a ball, peen hammer,

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Speaker 2: a butter knife and some electrical tape. Could It was perfect.

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Speaker 2: So now now I have this Subaru, right, I love it.

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Speaker 3: Yes, I've heard you talk about.

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Speaker 2: It has all sorts of not just chips and electronics,

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Speaker 2: but like online stuff. Oh really, I can lock and

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Speaker 2: unlock it with an app.

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Speaker 3: Do you use any of this? You know?

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Speaker 2: If I if I am already gone to bed and

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Speaker 2: I can't remember if I lock the car. Sometimes I just.

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Speaker 3: Check lock it.

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Speaker 2: I could start it remotely if I wanted from an app.

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Speaker 2: You can look on the app and see where it is.

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Speaker 2: It's like, oh it's in my driveway still, But like

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Speaker 2: if someone stole it, I can see where it was

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Speaker 2: and turn off the engine on them.

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Speaker 3: That's kind of fine like that, and then did would

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Speaker 3: they crash the car if you?

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Speaker 2: Yeah, Well, what do I care? I'm not in it?

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Speaker 3: Curious kind of like a good idea until you realize

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Speaker 3: what you've readen No.

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Speaker 2: I think it just boo powers down, no help, Okay,

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Speaker 2: I stole the wrong flashing lights come on and let's drive.

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Speaker 3: Other drivers know exactly.

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Speaker 2: It texts me when there's an.

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Speaker 3: Issue, used like a snarky tone.

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Speaker 2: I ran out of wiper fluid, and it kept reaching

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Speaker 2: out to me via text like a democratic fundraiser, totally

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Speaker 2: to let me know, like, hey, don't forget about me.

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Speaker 3: But is it like the duo lingo. It's kind of snarky,

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Speaker 3: like have you forgotten that?

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Speaker 2: It's very sincere and I just text back, wow, needy,

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Speaker 2: just keep going keyless entry peep peep. There was a

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Speaker 2: time recently here in Oakland where ladies were getting carjacked,

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Speaker 2: like up and down this very busy street near me,

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Speaker 2: and it seems to have calmed down, but it was

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Speaker 2: happening almost regularly for a while, like summer carjackings. Others

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Speaker 2: like guys would just run up, break the passenger window

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Speaker 2: and steal a purse on the seat.

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Speaker 3: Us like a spark plug break the window.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, and so for the carjacking. That's why I keep

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Speaker 2: my keys in my pocket when I'm driving instead of

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Speaker 2: like in my bag or like the cup holder, because

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Speaker 2: if I have my keys on me and they forced

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Speaker 2: me out, they aren't going to get very far because

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Speaker 2: you has to be close to the car to run, Sarah,

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Speaker 2: and you have to stay on the ball, keep your

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Speaker 2: head on a swivel. I don't think Subaru foresters are

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Speaker 2: like the hot Cardiff steal, but you never know.

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Speaker 6: So.

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Speaker 2: And that's another peril of the keiless entry fob is

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Speaker 2: that people can buy devices that clone keys to use.

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Speaker 3: For stealing the RFD.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, they walk by houses at night with a thing

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Speaker 2: and they can, you know, the hackens and they pick

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Speaker 2: up a signal from the keyfob and then they can

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Speaker 2: use that to start the car out.

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Speaker 3: They're buddy holding up like a wire and they're like

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Speaker 3: trying to get I would have thought it was a.

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Speaker 2: Total urban legend, but I've seen home like break camera

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Speaker 2: stuff of it, and it happened not a couple of times,

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Speaker 2: not too far from me. So you know what I do.

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Speaker 2: I put my keys in a Faraday box by the door.

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Speaker 3: I love it.

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Speaker 2: I probably overreacting, but whatever, it's a cute box.

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Speaker 3: I'm anyway, Yes, plants on it. You can override a

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Speaker 3: garden seed box.

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Speaker 2: Yes, no, it's very it's tasteful. It's brown and leathery.

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Speaker 2: There anyway. You can override the key with sentry. Other ways.

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Speaker 2: One involves a USB stick how so, but not in

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Speaker 2: the way you think, Zaren, I'm thinking nothing. It's physical hacking.

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Speaker 2: I'm sure you've heard of the Kia challenge.

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Speaker 3: Oh yes, okay, yes, this was a hacking.

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Speaker 2: I know, I totally did. It's a viral trend on TikTok.

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Speaker 2: In twenty twenty two is when it started. So people, okay, teens,

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Speaker 2: They learned how to steal certain Kia.

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Speaker 5: And Hyundai vehicle using only a.

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Speaker 2: USB cable and it started as this form of car theft,

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Speaker 2: but it quickly became a social media challenge, and like

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Speaker 2: vehicle thefts just surged across the US.

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Speaker 3: They just joy ride these cars, they don't write.

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Speaker 2: So they targeted Kias and Hyundais made between twenty ten

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Speaker 2: and twenty twenty one.

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Speaker 3: So that's a.

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Speaker 2: Pretty broad stretch. That's because they had traditional metal keys

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Speaker 2: not pushed to start, and the cars also didn't have immobilizers,

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Speaker 2: so those are like basic anti theft devices that keep

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Speaker 2: the engine from starting without the correct key. And apparently

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Speaker 2: the car alarm wouldn't go off if you broke the

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Speaker 2: back window.

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Speaker 3: Oh okay to know.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, what all that means is that it was possible

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Speaker 2: to get into the car without the alarm going off,

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Speaker 2: remove the steering column cover, use a USB cable or

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Speaker 2: anything shaped like it to turn the ignition switch, and

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Speaker 2: then start the car and drive away.

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Speaker 3: Oh you didn't have to like drop it down and

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Speaker 3: pull the wires out.

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Speaker 2: Oh no key. No hacking tools required. A group calling

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Speaker 2: themselves the Kia Boys posted videos anytime you put boys

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Speaker 2: in it, it's just you just took the wind out

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Speaker 2: of yourself. You know what I mean?

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Speaker 3: Kia Boys.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, I guess that is, but like proud Boys, No,

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Speaker 2: that's scary. They posted videos on TikTok and YouTube showing

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Speaker 2: how to steal the cars, like tutorials youtubes like keep

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Speaker 2: it Up Yeah Kia Boys tutorials. Other people copied them.

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Speaker 2: They turned it into this challenge. Some filmed themselves stealing

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Speaker 2: the cars and joy writing, and then they posted the

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Speaker 2: videos online.

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Speaker 3: Not only did they take the evidence that they made

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Speaker 3: it publicly avail.

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Speaker 2: Yes, we're talking about like, oh, don't write down your

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Speaker 2: plans for these guys are like watch it in four.

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Speaker 3: Kas and they were in like the shasty mass you

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Speaker 3: can't really see who they are.

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Speaker 2: Probably, so there was this huge spike in the thefts,

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Speaker 2: like I said, Milwaukee, La, Saint Louis Mania, all of them,

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Speaker 2: like some of these places that the car thefts increased

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Speaker 2: by like more than one hundred percent, and like I said,

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Speaker 2: big with the teens, a lot of the thieves were miners.

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Speaker 2: Law enforcement and community leaders went into like overdrive trying

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Speaker 2: to respond to this. My neighbor a couple of doors up,

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Speaker 2: had her Kia stolen three times, what yeah, three times,

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Speaker 2: so the cops would recover it in like an industrial

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Speaker 2: area uptown and she'd get the ignition repaired to how

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00:14:19,280 --> 00:14:21,040
Speaker 2: it was before and then we could stolen again.

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Speaker 3: So they weren't really wrecking the car enjoy right now.

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00:14:23,800 --> 00:14:26,800
Speaker 2: No, They're just scooted it around running and got trashed.

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Speaker 2: But for the most part they were just like pushing

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Speaker 2: it to Yeah, so there was a fix that the

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00:14:32,960 --> 00:14:35,280
Speaker 2: dealership could do, but there were so many that the

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00:14:35,320 --> 00:14:38,520
Speaker 2: parts were on back order for ages. Oh wow, So

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Speaker 2: then she got a club. But then one night some

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Speaker 2: ding dong broke into the car and tried to break

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Speaker 2: the club off with a rock. What. Yeah, he wasn't successful,

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Speaker 2: but he did get away. A cop came told him

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Speaker 2: to freeze, drew his weapon. Yeah, and the guy hopped

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Speaker 2: into another car and drove away around the cop.

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Speaker 3: What was the cop doing standing there.

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Speaker 2: With his weapon on it?

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00:14:59,240 --> 00:15:01,400
Speaker 3: Like, why didn't pull a weapon fingers?

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Speaker 2: I think that the guy realized that the cop was

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00:15:04,440 --> 00:15:06,840
Speaker 2: he's flying solo. He didn't have a partner with them.

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Speaker 2: The CoP's not going to open fire at two in

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Speaker 2: the morning with the possibility of hitting the houses behind

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Speaker 2: her in the air. I don't know. I watched the

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Speaker 2: whole thing from my front window and it was pretty

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Speaker 2: That was That's why I was telling you this part.

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Speaker 2: It was a ridiculous crime. It was one of the

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Speaker 2: most ridiculous things I've ever seen. And yeah, he just

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Speaker 2: swerved around and the cop put his hands down and

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Speaker 2: was just like the physical representation of dejections, Like he

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Speaker 2: just looked like now, he's got to go tell all

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Speaker 2: his pals. Yeah, so wow. There were class action lawsuits

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Speaker 2: filed against Hyundai and Kia. In twenty twenty three, the

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Speaker 2: carmakers offered free software updates to add anti theft features

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Speaker 2: like the immobilizer a longer alarm sound. They also gave

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Speaker 2: out steering wheel locks through police departments, so I guess

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Speaker 2: you could go to the cops and be like, I

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00:15:59,800 --> 00:16:03,480
Speaker 2: need to club and they eventually settled the lawsuits for

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00:16:03,480 --> 00:16:07,120
Speaker 2: around two hundred million dollars. Still going on though earlier

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Speaker 2: this year. In February of twenty twenty five, members of

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Speaker 2: Texas's Laredo Police Department Auto Theft Task Force. They detained

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Speaker 2: four boys ranging in age from thirteen to fifteen. There

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Speaker 2: was like the string of thefts. Two Kias and three

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00:16:23,240 --> 00:16:26,560
Speaker 2: Hundays were actually stolen, but there were eleven other cases

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Speaker 2: where these fools tried to steal the cars and weren't successful.

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Speaker 2: They didn't watch the video all.

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Speaker 3: The way through their junior high kids.

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Speaker 2: Most of the cars that they hit were already unlocked,

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Speaker 2: which like, come on, I don't want a victim blame.

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Speaker 2: But they had the steering columns broken, the ignition switch broken, off.

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Speaker 2: All four of these boys were involved in all sixteen

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Speaker 2: of the cases, both the five successful in the eleven.

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Speaker 2: So I mean they caught counts like criminal attempt so

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00:16:54,080 --> 00:16:57,760
Speaker 2: that's a misdemeanor, but like engaging in organized criminal activity

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Speaker 2: that's a felony left the state felonies, so they get

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Speaker 2: you know, all of these adam Yeah.

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Speaker 6: Right.

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Speaker 2: Criminal conspiracy cases like this can be found all over

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00:17:08,080 --> 00:17:12,360
Speaker 2: the country, plus Australia and Canada, even the cool places

358
00:17:12,400 --> 00:17:15,800
Speaker 2: like that. The Canada ones are interesting because Canadian law

359
00:17:15,880 --> 00:17:19,640
Speaker 2: requires immobilizers in all new vehicles sold in Canada since

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00:17:19,720 --> 00:17:22,000
Speaker 2: two thousand and seven, so that means that the ones

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Speaker 2: that were targeted were imported from the US.

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Speaker 3: How did they do I guess they just recognized.

363
00:17:28,000 --> 00:17:32,520
Speaker 2: Listen, let's pause for some ads. Brace yourself for savings.

364
00:17:33,160 --> 00:17:35,640
Speaker 2: When we come back, we're going to boost some more rides,

365
00:17:35,680 --> 00:18:01,200
Speaker 2: but this time was software, not hardware. Saren. I want

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Speaker 2: to introduce you to two dudes, two hack attackers, two

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00:18:05,080 --> 00:18:07,879
Speaker 2: gray hat hackers who technically broke the law in an

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00:18:07,920 --> 00:18:11,119
Speaker 2: effort to work for the greater good. So the first

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00:18:11,119 --> 00:18:14,119
Speaker 2: guy is Charles Alfred Miller, Charlie Miller.

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Speaker 3: He got a handle a hacker handle, No, Charlie.

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00:18:18,119 --> 00:18:22,480
Speaker 2: He's an American. He got a bachelor's in mass magna

372
00:18:22,520 --> 00:18:26,879
Speaker 2: cum loud from Northeast Misery State just now Truman State University.

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00:18:27,240 --> 00:18:31,960
Speaker 2: Got a PhD in math from Notre Dame. He's basically

374
00:18:32,080 --> 00:18:33,920
Speaker 2: and that was in two thousand and he got his PhD.

375
00:18:33,960 --> 00:18:36,120
Speaker 2: He was like early on the learned to code train

376
00:18:36,200 --> 00:18:38,919
Speaker 2: it seems like it. Yeah, So he started his professional

377
00:18:38,960 --> 00:18:42,439
Speaker 2: career at the NSA and he worked as a cryptographer

378
00:18:42,520 --> 00:18:44,680
Speaker 2: slash codebreaker there for five years.

379
00:18:44,840 --> 00:18:45,800
Speaker 3: That's got to be fun and challenging.

380
00:18:45,840 --> 00:18:48,800
Speaker 2: I guess, well, sometimes when I do my cryptogram puzzles,

381
00:18:49,000 --> 00:18:51,399
Speaker 2: I wonder if the NSA is watching me through the

382
00:18:51,400 --> 00:18:54,080
Speaker 2: camera on my iPhone, and then I wonder if they'll

383
00:18:54,080 --> 00:18:56,080
Speaker 2: see how good I am at these puzzles. And then

384
00:18:56,080 --> 00:18:58,399
Speaker 2: my phone will ring. It'll be them asking me to

385
00:18:58,480 --> 00:19:00,520
Speaker 2: join the NSA team to be a hacker.

386
00:19:00,720 --> 00:19:02,320
Speaker 3: We put out the puzzles and we look for some

387
00:19:02,320 --> 00:19:03,200
Speaker 3: of the best.

388
00:19:03,880 --> 00:19:06,760
Speaker 2: We'll tell me about insurance and benefits and is the

389
00:19:06,800 --> 00:19:09,440
Speaker 2: position remote, and then they'll hang up on me because

390
00:19:09,480 --> 00:19:11,959
Speaker 2: they're looking for true patriots who aren't focused on their

391
00:19:11,960 --> 00:19:12,439
Speaker 2: own comfort.

392
00:19:12,520 --> 00:19:13,200
Speaker 3: Yeah, that's true.

393
00:19:13,240 --> 00:19:15,040
Speaker 2: I wonder about this sometimes, I.

394
00:19:14,760 --> 00:19:15,240
Speaker 3: Bet you do.

395
00:19:15,480 --> 00:19:15,879
Speaker 2: I do so.

396
00:19:15,960 --> 00:19:19,040
Speaker 3: Do you do these, by the way, on your phone? No?

397
00:19:19,119 --> 00:19:21,880
Speaker 2: I do them on paper. I can't have the government

398
00:19:21,920 --> 00:19:23,760
Speaker 2: seeing how good I am at cryptograms.

399
00:19:24,840 --> 00:19:26,520
Speaker 3: They would draft you in automatically.

400
00:19:26,680 --> 00:19:30,240
Speaker 2: I need my privacy. When he was in the NSA,

401
00:19:30,880 --> 00:19:36,920
Speaker 2: Miller conducted offensive computer security research. Offensive like on the offense,

402
00:19:37,040 --> 00:19:44,240
Speaker 2: not like oh god, gross, yeah, but his specific operations confidential,

403
00:19:44,560 --> 00:19:48,840
Speaker 2: of course, from my eyes only. He left the NSA

404
00:19:49,760 --> 00:19:52,400
Speaker 2: and then he served as a lead analyst at Independent

405
00:19:52,480 --> 00:19:53,680
Speaker 2: Security Evaluators.

406
00:19:53,800 --> 00:19:56,200
Speaker 3: Love those times, those companies and names like that, You're like, okay,

407
00:19:56,240 --> 00:19:57,120
Speaker 3: what yeah?

408
00:19:57,160 --> 00:19:59,240
Speaker 2: And then he later he worked for like he worked

409
00:19:59,280 --> 00:20:03,160
Speaker 2: for Twitter for while contributing to the information security team.

410
00:20:03,280 --> 00:20:06,000
Speaker 3: Like for like the NSA. Background. Who knows he's like

411
00:20:07,200 --> 00:20:07,840
Speaker 3: my former age.

412
00:20:08,000 --> 00:20:11,760
Speaker 2: Listen to this. He's a four time winner of the

413
00:20:12,000 --> 00:20:17,880
Speaker 2: pone to Own security competition. It's p wn numeral two.

414
00:20:18,160 --> 00:20:19,000
Speaker 6: O w N.

415
00:20:19,840 --> 00:20:21,080
Speaker 3: Do you know what I had to do?

416
00:20:21,080 --> 00:20:21,919
Speaker 5: You know what I had to do?

417
00:20:22,000 --> 00:20:24,639
Speaker 2: I went on Google. I hacked in to the Google

418
00:20:24,800 --> 00:20:29,440
Speaker 2: mainframe and I typed in, how do you pronounce p wn?

419
00:20:31,480 --> 00:20:33,040
Speaker 2: I was like, I want to say it right.

420
00:20:33,560 --> 00:20:34,359
Speaker 3: I appreciate your.

421
00:20:34,480 --> 00:20:40,040
Speaker 2: Thorough phone to own. Okay, that's known as hacking super Bowl.

422
00:20:40,960 --> 00:20:44,040
Speaker 2: So for that, he hacked a MacBook Air in under

423
00:20:44,040 --> 00:20:46,639
Speaker 2: two minutes. In two thousand and eight, he was the

424
00:20:46,680 --> 00:20:50,800
Speaker 2: first to remotely exploit an iPhone and that's like break

425
00:20:50,840 --> 00:20:55,160
Speaker 2: in hacking style, not like exploit it, like publish pictures

426
00:20:55,160 --> 00:21:00,400
Speaker 2: of it that should be published via malicious SMS message

427
00:21:00,480 --> 00:21:01,199
Speaker 2: in two thousand and.

428
00:21:01,200 --> 00:21:03,200
Speaker 3: Seven, so he sent a text message to the phone

429
00:21:03,240 --> 00:21:03,919
Speaker 3: and then gave him.

430
00:21:04,960 --> 00:21:07,679
Speaker 2: Yeah, he was the first to hack an Android device

431
00:21:07,760 --> 00:21:11,040
Speaker 2: on its launch day, and he exped He exploited the

432
00:21:11,080 --> 00:21:12,920
Speaker 2: vulnerabilities there via web kit.

433
00:21:13,800 --> 00:21:14,399
Speaker 5: What that is?

434
00:21:15,200 --> 00:21:18,960
Speaker 3: Yeah, I know that they use often things like oh,

435
00:21:19,000 --> 00:21:22,199
Speaker 3: we'll use your calendar or like this phone is like

436
00:21:22,320 --> 00:21:24,480
Speaker 3: you don't think about right.

437
00:21:24,400 --> 00:21:28,240
Speaker 2: That's and that's basically what he does. So he has

438
00:21:28,280 --> 00:21:34,800
Speaker 2: published the iOS Hackers Handbook, the Mac Hackers Handbook, Fuzzing

439
00:21:34,880 --> 00:21:39,200
Speaker 2: for Software Security Testing and Quality Assurance. Like basically is there.

440
00:21:39,320 --> 00:21:40,480
Speaker 2: This guy's a real pan.

441
00:21:41,440 --> 00:21:42,720
Speaker 3: He wrote the books on these things.

442
00:21:42,840 --> 00:21:47,320
Speaker 2: He literally wrote the books. Foreign Policy described him as

443
00:21:47,359 --> 00:21:50,679
Speaker 2: quote one of the most technically proficient hackers on Earth.

444
00:21:52,280 --> 00:21:53,320
Speaker 3: Foreign Policy given him.

445
00:21:53,240 --> 00:21:54,840
Speaker 5: The Star Buddy.

446
00:21:54,880 --> 00:21:56,879
Speaker 2: Okay, so then we have Chris.

447
00:21:56,760 --> 00:21:59,480
Speaker 3: Thallasek Okay, so not like the pile.

448
00:22:00,160 --> 00:22:02,280
Speaker 2: It's Vallisek. That's another one.

449
00:22:02,920 --> 00:22:04,360
Speaker 5: He was born in eighty.

450
00:22:04,080 --> 00:22:07,159
Speaker 2: Two in Pennsylvania. He got a BS in computer science

451
00:22:07,160 --> 00:22:09,280
Speaker 2: from University of Pittsburgh coding.

452
00:22:09,440 --> 00:22:11,440
Speaker 3: So another early com era guy.

453
00:22:11,560 --> 00:22:16,240
Speaker 2: Yeah. He built his reputation through research into Microsoft Windows.

454
00:22:16,640 --> 00:22:17,840
Speaker 2: Heap exploitation.

455
00:22:18,400 --> 00:22:20,359
Speaker 3: Sure sounds such a simple term.

456
00:22:20,400 --> 00:22:23,439
Speaker 2: And I know you know what I'm talking about Windows.

457
00:22:25,760 --> 00:22:29,920
Speaker 2: I got a window in my room. Heap exploitation. Hap.

458
00:22:31,200 --> 00:22:31,400
Speaker 4: There.

459
00:22:32,240 --> 00:22:34,920
Speaker 2: Think of a heap as a chunk of memory your

460
00:22:34,960 --> 00:22:38,040
Speaker 2: computer uses to keep track of things a program creates

461
00:22:38,040 --> 00:22:41,000
Speaker 2: while it's running. Okay, Like when a program goes like,

462
00:22:41,080 --> 00:22:43,399
Speaker 2: hey man, I need more memory to store this new

463
00:22:44,320 --> 00:22:47,359
Speaker 2: the heap. The heap gives it space. The heap is

464
00:22:47,400 --> 00:22:51,880
Speaker 2: not alive. The heap cannot hurt you. The heap absorbs.

465
00:22:52,680 --> 00:22:56,000
Speaker 2: The heap enjoys a good cheese steak. The heap vacations

466
00:22:56,000 --> 00:23:00,560
Speaker 2: in Daytona beach. All right. So, heap exploitation is when

467
00:23:00,560 --> 00:23:04,199
Speaker 2: a hacker takes advantage of mistakes in how memory is

468
00:23:04,280 --> 00:23:07,199
Speaker 2: managed in it. So they do that in order to

469
00:23:07,280 --> 00:23:10,919
Speaker 2: corrupt data, crash program take control of a computer. Do

470
00:23:10,960 --> 00:23:12,320
Speaker 2: you understand what I just said?

471
00:23:12,520 --> 00:23:14,600
Speaker 3: Some of it, like taking control of a computer.

472
00:23:14,640 --> 00:23:17,399
Speaker 2: Man, Do I understand what I just said? Absolutely not.

473
00:23:17,680 --> 00:23:19,520
Speaker 3: I had a friend who used to you be on

474
00:23:19,560 --> 00:23:21,480
Speaker 3: your computer, and he would get on your computer from

475
00:23:21,640 --> 00:23:25,320
Speaker 3: his computer like at his house, start moving the cursor around. Yeah.

476
00:23:25,359 --> 00:23:26,919
Speaker 3: I was like, I hate this, I hate all of this.

477
00:23:27,040 --> 00:23:28,800
Speaker 2: I guys do that and it's like, what do I

478
00:23:28,840 --> 00:23:29,680
Speaker 2: have open right now?

479
00:23:29,800 --> 00:23:31,400
Speaker 3: Exactly? And he was like, oh, I got in through

480
00:23:31,440 --> 00:23:33,000
Speaker 3: this exploit. And I'm like, I swear to God, I'm

481
00:23:33,000 --> 00:23:34,199
Speaker 3: gonna come over to your house and beat you up.

482
00:23:34,640 --> 00:23:36,560
Speaker 2: They're like, you're really good at spider solitary.

483
00:23:36,920 --> 00:23:38,640
Speaker 3: Can you hack my fists? How about that?

484
00:23:40,000 --> 00:23:44,440
Speaker 2: So Valasek he became an expert in both the exploitation

485
00:23:44,640 --> 00:23:48,399
Speaker 2: of heaps and the protection of heaps. And remember, the

486
00:23:48,440 --> 00:23:49,399
Speaker 2: heap cannot hurt you.

487
00:23:49,400 --> 00:23:50,439
Speaker 3: You know, I don't want to tear It.

488
00:23:51,280 --> 00:23:54,600
Speaker 2: Can hear your thoughts, and it knows your darkest intentions,

489
00:23:54,640 --> 00:23:55,639
Speaker 2: but it cannot hurt you.

490
00:23:55,800 --> 00:23:57,800
Speaker 3: Saren, Okay, I have to trust the heap.

491
00:23:57,840 --> 00:24:00,640
Speaker 2: So this guy, he had a two thousand and nine

492
00:24:00,640 --> 00:24:04,760
Speaker 2: Black Hat presentation titled Practical Windows XP two thousand and

493
00:24:04,760 --> 00:24:07,879
Speaker 2: three Heap Exploitation, and then he did a paper in

494
00:24:07,920 --> 00:24:12,159
Speaker 2: twenty ten on Windows low fragmentation heap, good stuff. I

495
00:24:12,200 --> 00:24:14,720
Speaker 2: find myself going back to my well worn copies and

496
00:24:14,800 --> 00:24:16,119
Speaker 2: just like reading them over and over.

497
00:24:16,000 --> 00:24:18,200
Speaker 3: There low frag heap. I love that.

498
00:24:18,080 --> 00:24:20,160
Speaker 2: Each time I read them, I discover something new.

499
00:24:20,280 --> 00:24:22,200
Speaker 3: I bet you do, a little, Colonel, you'd overlooked before.

500
00:24:22,440 --> 00:24:22,600
Speaker 6: Huh.

501
00:24:22,720 --> 00:24:25,479
Speaker 2: Basically, Vallisek is like a super hacker.

502
00:24:25,760 --> 00:24:28,600
Speaker 3: He sounds like sound chair right.

503
00:24:28,840 --> 00:24:30,080
Speaker 2: He shared Summer Con.

504
00:24:30,359 --> 00:24:30,560
Speaker 3: Huh.

505
00:24:30,680 --> 00:24:33,920
Speaker 2: This is one of the US's longest running hacker conferences,

506
00:24:33,960 --> 00:24:36,640
Speaker 2: and he's been their chairman Emeritis since two thousand and three.

507
00:24:36,720 --> 00:24:38,520
Speaker 3: Do you think they have good music at the Summer Con? Oh?

508
00:24:38,640 --> 00:24:41,680
Speaker 2: You know it like hot jams. They hack into all

509
00:24:41,720 --> 00:24:46,560
Speaker 2: the music mainframes and the motherboard, Sarah. When you look

510
00:24:46,600 --> 00:24:48,680
Speaker 2: online for videos about him so you can get a

511
00:24:48,720 --> 00:24:51,879
Speaker 2: sense of how to pronounce his name, you'll find yourself

512
00:24:51,960 --> 00:24:55,480
Speaker 2: waist deep in Ted talks, like this guy is like

513
00:24:55,640 --> 00:24:59,080
Speaker 2: sixty percent Ted talk. His body is six and in

514
00:24:59,240 --> 00:25:02,600
Speaker 2: all the videos he doesn't introduce himself, I imagine because

515
00:25:02,600 --> 00:25:03,880
Speaker 2: someone has already done it before.

516
00:25:03,720 --> 00:25:04,600
Speaker 3: The recording starts.

517
00:25:04,680 --> 00:25:04,760
Speaker 6: Right.

518
00:25:05,320 --> 00:25:07,800
Speaker 2: So I watched a lot of clips of him walking

519
00:25:07,880 --> 00:25:11,000
Speaker 2: onto a stage like polite applause and one of those

520
00:25:11,080 --> 00:25:13,879
Speaker 2: nude colored mics attached to his face, like lifts up

521
00:25:13,880 --> 00:25:16,959
Speaker 2: a clicker to introduce the first slide of a PowerPoint.

522
00:25:16,480 --> 00:25:18,520
Speaker 3: And you're hoping he says his name, and he doesn't.

523
00:25:18,600 --> 00:25:20,639
Speaker 2: Yep, And I'm gonna tell you I noped out of

524
00:25:20,640 --> 00:25:23,560
Speaker 2: those so fast. I just can't. I love myself too

525
00:25:23,640 --> 00:25:24,959
Speaker 2: much to do that to myself.

526
00:25:25,000 --> 00:25:26,360
Speaker 3: Yeah, don't pone yourself like that.

527
00:25:26,760 --> 00:25:31,120
Speaker 2: I will give George Santos sixty bucks to entertain listeners,

528
00:25:31,160 --> 00:25:34,119
Speaker 2: but I won't subject myself to ted talks, especially when

529
00:25:34,119 --> 00:25:36,800
Speaker 2: they're not even six minutes, especially when they're about computers.

530
00:25:37,320 --> 00:25:41,080
Speaker 2: So Valasek, He's on video a lot. He's a recognized

531
00:25:41,119 --> 00:25:45,919
Speaker 2: speaker at all these INFOSEC conferences, Black at USA, def Con,

532
00:25:46,440 --> 00:25:47,600
Speaker 2: def Comedy.

533
00:25:47,320 --> 00:25:49,680
Speaker 3: Jam, I'm just about ask Warp Tour.

534
00:25:50,600 --> 00:25:54,000
Speaker 2: He's also widely cited in media coverage for like all

535
00:25:54,040 --> 00:25:59,120
Speaker 2: these pioneering contributions that he has to automotive cybersecurity research.

536
00:26:00,280 --> 00:26:04,200
Speaker 2: Here's a quote. Quote please, when I secure cars, now,

537
00:26:04,280 --> 00:26:06,680
Speaker 2: the first thing I look at is things that communicate

538
00:26:06,720 --> 00:26:07,959
Speaker 2: with the outside world.

539
00:26:08,640 --> 00:26:10,560
Speaker 3: So he said, I just buy old cars so people

540
00:26:10,600 --> 00:26:12,760
Speaker 3: can't do any of this stuff exactly. Pretty soon, I'm

541
00:26:12,760 --> 00:26:16,400
Speaker 3: just gonna be riding around on a penny farthing wearing clothing.

542
00:26:17,760 --> 00:26:22,360
Speaker 2: So like cars, you say, Chris and Charlie they pioneered

543
00:26:22,359 --> 00:26:27,640
Speaker 2: research together into vehicle cybersecurity. So they first demonstrated that

544
00:26:28,480 --> 00:26:31,520
Speaker 2: they got physical access to both a Ford Escape and

545
00:26:31,560 --> 00:26:34,800
Speaker 2: at Toyota Prius and were able to control their systems.

546
00:26:35,240 --> 00:26:37,400
Speaker 2: So like, once they got in physically, they could get

547
00:26:37,440 --> 00:26:41,399
Speaker 2: in through the can bus c an bus, which is

548
00:26:41,440 --> 00:26:44,919
Speaker 2: the controller area network bus. Sure, but not like a

549
00:26:45,000 --> 00:26:47,680
Speaker 2: real bus, like wheels on the bus go round and round.

550
00:26:47,800 --> 00:26:50,040
Speaker 3: Take the thing that like routes traffic for the computer.

551
00:26:50,160 --> 00:26:53,320
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's an internal communication network that lets all the

552
00:26:53,359 --> 00:26:55,639
Speaker 2: systems talk to each other. Do you have any idea

553
00:26:55,680 --> 00:26:58,120
Speaker 2: how long it took me to like condense it down

554
00:26:58,160 --> 00:27:01,359
Speaker 2: into that sentence, because I would start reading things like

555
00:27:01,520 --> 00:27:02,560
Speaker 2: I think I'm having a stroke.

556
00:27:02,840 --> 00:27:04,040
Speaker 3: Look on face gives me a hint.

557
00:27:04,200 --> 00:27:07,000
Speaker 2: Yeah, can bus, which then I'm just like, now I

558
00:27:07,080 --> 00:27:07,800
Speaker 2: sound crazy.

559
00:27:07,920 --> 00:27:11,280
Speaker 3: Can bus, the bus, cannabus, canna bus.

560
00:27:12,119 --> 00:27:15,879
Speaker 2: By twenty fifteen automakers, they're just like putting more and

561
00:27:15,960 --> 00:27:19,679
Speaker 2: more stuff with internet connectivity and like what they call

562
00:27:19,800 --> 00:27:23,800
Speaker 2: infotainment systems. Oh yes, into the car. Yeah, they want

563
00:27:23,840 --> 00:27:27,159
Speaker 2: to improve the user convenience, but then it also just

564
00:27:27,240 --> 00:27:28,520
Speaker 2: opens it up to attack.

565
00:27:28,640 --> 00:27:30,280
Speaker 3: Plenty of exploits, so many.

566
00:27:30,080 --> 00:27:32,960
Speaker 2: Weak spots for the hackers and all the hackens.

567
00:27:33,160 --> 00:27:35,400
Speaker 3: It's like a smog was just Swiss cheese belly. It's

568
00:27:35,400 --> 00:27:38,600
Speaker 3: just all these spots. You just one spot. Now he's

569
00:27:38,600 --> 00:27:39,240
Speaker 3: got tough.

570
00:27:39,320 --> 00:27:43,840
Speaker 2: All the Pokey's Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, it was one of

571
00:27:44,000 --> 00:27:48,560
Speaker 2: a bunch of manufacturers integrating you Connect, which was a

572
00:27:48,640 --> 00:27:54,359
Speaker 2: proprietary infotainment system into the cars. It had like navigation,

573
00:27:54,640 --> 00:27:58,960
Speaker 2: a Wi Fi hotspot, remote start, voice command capabilities. I

574
00:27:58,960 --> 00:28:00,480
Speaker 2: think that's basically what I got down.

575
00:28:00,720 --> 00:28:01,359
Speaker 3: That's what sounds like.

576
00:28:02,760 --> 00:28:07,160
Speaker 2: Some models also had Sprint cellular connectivity that would allow

577
00:28:07,280 --> 00:28:09,200
Speaker 2: remote access and updates.

578
00:28:08,960 --> 00:28:12,240
Speaker 3: So you like play from your phone whatever your yeah

579
00:28:12,440 --> 00:28:13,560
Speaker 3: to actually connected with the OX.

580
00:28:14,400 --> 00:28:18,520
Speaker 2: Yeah. Super futuristic and great, but also making the car

581
00:28:19,040 --> 00:28:22,720
Speaker 2: super vulnerable. It's not properly secured totally. So Miller and

582
00:28:22,840 --> 00:28:24,840
Speaker 2: vallisec right. Yeah.

583
00:28:25,240 --> 00:28:27,840
Speaker 3: I had a quick question, do they make essentially like

584
00:28:27,880 --> 00:28:30,840
Speaker 3: a Faraday skin for a car? They got into that level.

585
00:28:30,920 --> 00:28:33,440
Speaker 2: That's a really good idea. Guy's got a lead line carduse,

586
00:28:33,520 --> 00:28:35,320
Speaker 2: you know, like when they do the ad wraps on

587
00:28:35,359 --> 00:28:38,320
Speaker 2: the car. But it's just like with like a with

588
00:28:38,400 --> 00:28:40,800
Speaker 2: a guy making a mean face, like don't you dare

589
00:28:41,160 --> 00:28:43,240
Speaker 2: waving his face, buddy.

590
00:28:43,560 --> 00:28:45,680
Speaker 3: The graph the crime dog on the hood of your car.

591
00:28:47,440 --> 00:28:50,480
Speaker 2: So our guys. They made it their goal to find

592
00:28:50,520 --> 00:28:54,840
Speaker 2: a remote attack vector that wouldn't require physical access to

593
00:28:54,920 --> 00:28:57,280
Speaker 2: the vehicle like they need to before. So over the

594
00:28:57,280 --> 00:29:00,080
Speaker 2: course of twenty fourteen and twenty fifteen, they set the

595
00:29:00,240 --> 00:29:05,280
Speaker 2: sites on Fiat Chrysler's U Connect system, particularly the twenty

596
00:29:05,360 --> 00:29:09,520
Speaker 2: fourteen Jeep Cherokee. So they figured, like, okay, we can

597
00:29:09,560 --> 00:29:13,560
Speaker 2: get into you connect through that Sprint cellular connection. So

598
00:29:13,600 --> 00:29:17,880
Speaker 2: they reverse engineered the firmware, discovered open ports on the

599
00:29:17,960 --> 00:29:22,000
Speaker 2: vehicle's Internet facing IP address, and found a way to

600
00:29:22,160 --> 00:29:27,440
Speaker 2: rewrite firmware on the infotainment chip like sarahen, I sound

601
00:29:27,480 --> 00:29:28,760
Speaker 2: like I work for geek Squad.

602
00:29:28,880 --> 00:29:30,840
Speaker 3: I know you're over here. I'm like, can you fix

603
00:29:30,880 --> 00:29:31,360
Speaker 3: my laptop?

604
00:29:31,560 --> 00:29:36,360
Speaker 2: Right? And like totally, I just step on it. Are done.

605
00:29:36,720 --> 00:29:40,720
Speaker 2: Using a showdowan, which is a search engine for Internet

606
00:29:40,760 --> 00:29:47,120
Speaker 2: connected devices, Sure whatever, buddy, they identified thousands of vehicles

607
00:29:47,200 --> 00:29:50,520
Speaker 2: that could be exposed through their cellular modems and they

608
00:29:50,560 --> 00:29:53,720
Speaker 2: found this chain of exploits they I mean, they could

609
00:29:53,720 --> 00:29:57,560
Speaker 2: get into all these crazy things critical vehicle systems, and

610
00:29:57,600 --> 00:30:00,080
Speaker 2: they were eventually able to bridge the gap between the

611
00:30:00,120 --> 00:30:02,560
Speaker 2: infotainment system and the.

612
00:30:02,560 --> 00:30:04,000
Speaker 3: Can bus boom.

613
00:30:04,000 --> 00:30:09,120
Speaker 2: They got in, like I want in on that can.

614
00:30:09,440 --> 00:30:11,760
Speaker 2: This means that once they were inside, they can send

615
00:30:11,800 --> 00:30:15,360
Speaker 2: commands to like key vehicle functions like the gas, pedal,

616
00:30:15,440 --> 00:30:19,200
Speaker 2: air conditioning, and radio. They could put fake images on

617
00:30:19,240 --> 00:30:23,120
Speaker 2: a dashboard. They can control the windshield wipers, they could disable.

618
00:30:22,720 --> 00:30:26,440
Speaker 3: The brakes, disable the brakes.

619
00:30:25,440 --> 00:30:29,080
Speaker 2: The steering, misnipulate steering. And they set out to do

620
00:30:29,320 --> 00:30:33,160
Speaker 2: a very dangerous and most likely illegal demonstration of this.

621
00:30:33,360 --> 00:30:34,800
Speaker 3: Yeah, I would imagine.

622
00:30:34,440 --> 00:30:43,320
Speaker 2: Zerin close your eyes. I want you to picture it.

623
00:30:43,320 --> 00:30:46,360
Speaker 2: It's July of twenty fifteen. You are sitting in a

624
00:30:46,440 --> 00:30:50,840
Speaker 2: twenty fourteen jeep Cherokee driving down the highway in Saint Louis.

625
00:30:51,400 --> 00:30:51,680
Speaker 5: There.

626
00:30:51,760 --> 00:30:55,120
Speaker 2: You are cruising along. It's seventy miles an hour. Then

627
00:30:55,160 --> 00:30:58,440
Speaker 2: suddenly the air conditioner roars to life, blasting the car

628
00:30:58,560 --> 00:31:02,680
Speaker 2: with arctic air. Haven't touched a thing. Immediately after that,

629
00:31:02,720 --> 00:31:05,840
Speaker 2: the radio comes on. What had been a silent ride

630
00:31:05,960 --> 00:31:08,760
Speaker 2: is now one with booming hip hop at top volume.

631
00:31:09,160 --> 00:31:12,280
Speaker 2: The speakers in the back rumble. You turn the volume

632
00:31:12,360 --> 00:31:15,280
Speaker 2: knob to silence the stereo system, but nothing happens. The

633
00:31:15,280 --> 00:31:20,000
Speaker 2: song is still blaring the knob. She needs nothing. Suddenly,

634
00:31:20,080 --> 00:31:22,800
Speaker 2: the windshield wipers come on. You didn't touch those either.

635
00:31:23,200 --> 00:31:24,760
Speaker 2: Wiper fluid sprays.

636
00:31:24,400 --> 00:31:26,880
Speaker 5: The windshield while you speed down the highway. You can't

637
00:31:26,880 --> 00:31:27,800
Speaker 5: get them to stop.

638
00:31:28,480 --> 00:31:31,320
Speaker 2: Just then, an image appears on the car's digital display.

639
00:31:31,680 --> 00:31:35,320
Speaker 2: It's a photo of two guys in matching tracksuits. You

640
00:31:35,360 --> 00:31:37,680
Speaker 2: take a deep breath and try to stay calm. The

641
00:31:37,800 --> 00:31:41,880
Speaker 2: radio cuts out. That's relief, but then so does the accelerator.

642
00:31:42,160 --> 00:31:45,080
Speaker 2: The transmission is dead. You pump on the gas pedal,

643
00:31:45,160 --> 00:31:49,520
Speaker 2: but nothing. The jeep quickly loses speed, moving slower and slower.

644
00:31:50,080 --> 00:31:52,640
Speaker 2: You'd pull over onto the shoulder, but you can't because

645
00:31:52,640 --> 00:31:55,400
Speaker 2: you just got to an overpass. There's no shoulder, and

646
00:31:55,440 --> 00:31:58,720
Speaker 2: you're starting to go uphill. The cars behind you slam

647
00:31:58,760 --> 00:32:00,640
Speaker 2: on their brakes and lean on the lawrence is a

648
00:32:00,680 --> 00:32:03,080
Speaker 2: swerve around you. You look in the rear view mirror

649
00:32:03,120 --> 00:32:06,440
Speaker 2: and you see a semi truck approaching. The radio comes.

650
00:32:06,200 --> 00:32:07,760
Speaker 5: Alive again with more hip hop.

651
00:32:08,000 --> 00:32:09,880
Speaker 2: Please please please let me survive this.

652
00:32:10,000 --> 00:32:12,360
Speaker 5: You think you fubble for your phone and you make

653
00:32:12,400 --> 00:32:12,760
Speaker 5: a call.

654
00:32:13,160 --> 00:32:15,560
Speaker 2: You aren't calling the highway patrol or the cops, or

655
00:32:15,560 --> 00:32:19,240
Speaker 2: state troopers or even Triple A. You are calling Charlie

656
00:32:19,280 --> 00:32:24,840
Speaker 2: Miller and Chris Vallasek. See you are Andy Greenberg, award

657
00:32:24,840 --> 00:32:28,640
Speaker 2: winning journalist and writer for Wired magazine, and you've agreed

658
00:32:28,680 --> 00:32:31,080
Speaker 2: to be their guinea pigs. They set out to prove

659
00:32:31,240 --> 00:32:34,000
Speaker 2: just how easy it is to do bad with cars

660
00:32:34,080 --> 00:32:37,080
Speaker 2: in this current system. You beg them to stop, to

661
00:32:37,160 --> 00:32:39,600
Speaker 2: give you back control of the car. You manage to

662
00:32:39,680 --> 00:32:41,840
Speaker 2: roll the jeep to an exit ramp, turn the car

663
00:32:41,840 --> 00:32:44,560
Speaker 2: off and then on again, basically rebooting it, and then

664
00:32:44,600 --> 00:32:47,760
Speaker 2: you get to an empty lot where your experiment can continue.

665
00:32:48,440 --> 00:32:50,280
Speaker 3: Now, why did they get on the road. Why didn't

666
00:32:50,320 --> 00:32:52,080
Speaker 3: he to go to like a Walmart parking lot to

667
00:32:52,200 --> 00:32:52,520
Speaker 3: do this?

668
00:32:53,760 --> 00:32:59,600
Speaker 2: No, I got so nervous, and they told him before

669
00:32:59,600 --> 00:33:03,320
Speaker 2: he got the like, don't whatever happens, don't panic. Now

670
00:33:03,320 --> 00:33:06,240
Speaker 2: here's the thing, So Greenberg he gets the jeep to

671
00:33:06,320 --> 00:33:09,600
Speaker 2: safety and they all continue their work. The guys were

672
00:33:09,600 --> 00:33:12,800
Speaker 2: at Miller's house ten miles away, so they don't have

673
00:33:12,880 --> 00:33:16,920
Speaker 2: eyes on him. From Greenberg's Wired article quote Miller and

674
00:33:17,040 --> 00:33:21,320
Speaker 2: Vallisex full arsenal includes functions that at lower speeds fully

675
00:33:21,400 --> 00:33:25,480
Speaker 2: kill the engine, abruptly engage the brakes, or disable them altogether.

676
00:33:25,960 --> 00:33:29,080
Speaker 2: The most disturbing maneuver came when they cut the jeep's brakes,

677
00:33:29,400 --> 00:33:32,440
Speaker 2: leaving me frantically pumping the pedal as the two ton

678
00:33:32,600 --> 00:33:36,880
Speaker 2: suv slid uncontrollably into a ditch. The researchers say they're

679
00:33:36,920 --> 00:33:39,920
Speaker 2: working on perfecting their steering control. For now, they can

680
00:33:39,960 --> 00:33:42,280
Speaker 2: only hijack the wheel when the jeep is in reverse.

681
00:33:42,720 --> 00:33:46,240
Speaker 2: Their hack enables surveillance too. They can track a targeted

682
00:33:46,280 --> 00:33:50,000
Speaker 2: jeep's GPS coordinates, measure its speed, and even drop pins

683
00:33:50,040 --> 00:33:53,840
Speaker 2: on a map to trace its route. Unbelievable, So, of course,

684
00:33:53,880 --> 00:33:57,000
Speaker 2: the whole thing was done with Greenberg's consent, sure as

685
00:33:57,040 --> 00:33:59,480
Speaker 2: a way to publicize the danger of you connect and

686
00:33:59,520 --> 00:34:02,400
Speaker 2: get the Endo street to respond, let's take a break.

687
00:34:02,520 --> 00:34:05,840
Speaker 2: When we get back from this ad venture, I'll tell

688
00:34:05,920 --> 00:34:07,600
Speaker 2: you just how they responded.

689
00:34:27,920 --> 00:34:29,960
Speaker 3: Zarin, Oh, Elizabeth, we're back.

690
00:34:30,000 --> 00:34:31,960
Speaker 2: We're back in the twenty fourteen cheap.

691
00:34:31,800 --> 00:34:32,799
Speaker 3: I had to shake that one off.

692
00:34:32,880 --> 00:34:35,000
Speaker 2: I know that was a nightmare, as a total daymare.

693
00:34:35,520 --> 00:34:36,799
Speaker 3: I thought it was bad and if someone took over

694
00:34:36,840 --> 00:34:39,000
Speaker 3: my computer but being in the car they're taking over

695
00:34:39,040 --> 00:34:40,360
Speaker 3: and then like I gotta trust them. Oh yeah, I

696
00:34:40,360 --> 00:34:41,600
Speaker 3: don't worry. I'll art it all back.

697
00:34:42,080 --> 00:34:44,560
Speaker 2: Very maximum overdrive. And I don't like it one bit.

698
00:34:44,760 --> 00:34:46,640
Speaker 3: And there's not enough of Meia the West of US

699
00:34:46,640 --> 00:34:47,680
Speaker 3: in that for me I feel safe.

700
00:34:47,960 --> 00:34:51,160
Speaker 2: Yeah, there needs a whole lot more so. After that

701
00:34:51,239 --> 00:34:56,279
Speaker 2: Wired article, Fiat Chrysler, they took swift action. July twenty fourth,

702
00:34:56,360 --> 00:35:00,359
Speaker 2: twenty fifteen, they issued a voluntary safety recall for one

703
00:35:00,440 --> 00:35:04,279
Speaker 2: point four million vehicles in the US in order to

704
00:35:04,320 --> 00:35:08,319
Speaker 2: fix those software vulnerabilities. And so that was models from

705
00:35:08,320 --> 00:35:11,200
Speaker 2: twenty thirteen to twenty fifteen that had eight point four

706
00:35:11,280 --> 00:35:16,200
Speaker 2: inch touchscreen. So twenty fourteen, twenty fifteen Jeep, Cherokee, twenty

707
00:35:16,239 --> 00:35:19,000
Speaker 2: fifteen Dodge Challenger, which like, I don't want one of

708
00:35:19,040 --> 00:35:22,440
Speaker 2: those self possessed rubbing down the road, twenty fifteen, Chrysler

709
00:35:22,440 --> 00:35:25,880
Speaker 2: two hundred and others. Chrysler dodged Jeep and Ram lines.

710
00:35:27,120 --> 00:35:30,719
Speaker 2: Fiat Chrysler sent out a USB drive by mail to

711
00:35:30,800 --> 00:35:35,640
Speaker 2: affected owners with the patch like diy, I guess steal

712
00:35:35,640 --> 00:35:39,279
Speaker 2: a Kia drive that around instead the owners They could

713
00:35:39,280 --> 00:35:42,400
Speaker 2: also go to a dealership for installation if they weren't hackers,

714
00:35:42,960 --> 00:35:48,320
Speaker 2: you know. In addition, Sprint closed the open cellular ports

715
00:35:48,400 --> 00:35:50,960
Speaker 2: that the hackers had used, which like, why didn't you

716
00:35:51,000 --> 00:35:52,160
Speaker 2: do that originally?

717
00:35:52,200 --> 00:35:53,640
Speaker 3: Yeah? Did they cost a penny to do?

718
00:35:53,840 --> 00:35:57,080
Speaker 2: Now, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration they opened an

719
00:35:57,080 --> 00:36:01,000
Speaker 2: investigation and then they find Fiat Chrysler one hundred and

720
00:36:01,040 --> 00:36:02,240
Speaker 2: five million dollars.

721
00:36:02,560 --> 00:36:06,400
Speaker 3: Why did they find them for just being.

722
00:36:05,880 --> 00:36:09,520
Speaker 2: A production They're flying too close to the sun, Like

723
00:36:09,600 --> 00:36:12,959
Speaker 2: you thought you were so special, arrogance. Well, it wasn't

724
00:36:13,000 --> 00:36:14,960
Speaker 2: just for the Jeep vulnerability, but there were like a

725
00:36:15,000 --> 00:36:17,640
Speaker 2: series of recalls that were kind of mishandled leading up

726
00:36:17,680 --> 00:36:21,120
Speaker 2: to me. So like, you guys are bungling everything one

727
00:36:21,200 --> 00:36:26,520
Speaker 2: hundred and five million, but the Jeep incident was like yeah, yeah,

728
00:36:26,560 --> 00:36:30,880
Speaker 2: so the hack that had lasting implications far beyond Fiat Chrysler.

729
00:36:32,080 --> 00:36:36,239
Speaker 2: Senators Edward Markey of Massachusetts and Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut

730
00:36:36,640 --> 00:36:40,080
Speaker 2: they introduced the Security and Privacy in Your Car Act,

731
00:36:40,600 --> 00:36:41,800
Speaker 2: the Spy.

732
00:36:41,440 --> 00:36:44,040
Speaker 3: Car Act right.

733
00:36:44,400 --> 00:36:49,600
Speaker 2: The bill would require cybersecurity standards for vehicles, isolation of

734
00:36:49,680 --> 00:36:54,359
Speaker 2: critical software systems, real time hacking detection systems, and then

735
00:36:54,400 --> 00:36:57,920
Speaker 2: transparency on how car companies collect and share driver data.

736
00:36:58,200 --> 00:36:58,959
Speaker 2: It's a great bill.

737
00:36:59,360 --> 00:37:01,960
Speaker 3: Sounds like didn't pass, Oh my goodness.

738
00:37:01,560 --> 00:37:04,440
Speaker 2: Of course, not my feeling. I'm thinking the sticking point

739
00:37:04,520 --> 00:37:07,319
Speaker 2: was the transparency on how car companies collect and share

740
00:37:07,360 --> 00:37:11,000
Speaker 2: driver data, probably because that's like, you know, that's a

741
00:37:11,080 --> 00:37:11,839
Speaker 2: commodity and.

742
00:37:11,760 --> 00:37:14,400
Speaker 3: They generally avoid that for either that's our data.

743
00:37:14,239 --> 00:37:17,680
Speaker 2: Yeah, the customer like spending and travel, and then also

744
00:37:17,960 --> 00:37:20,200
Speaker 2: like how you connect to like insurance companies.

745
00:37:20,600 --> 00:37:23,640
Speaker 3: Yeah, that they didn't want like a trade secrets, like

746
00:37:23,760 --> 00:37:24,440
Speaker 3: we're selling everything.

747
00:37:24,880 --> 00:37:27,239
Speaker 2: Was just like this driver like yeah, they speed all

748
00:37:27,280 --> 00:37:30,520
Speaker 2: the time, increase their rates. Oh, they wouldn't know otherwise.

749
00:37:30,560 --> 00:37:31,560
Speaker 2: I don't know, that's my guess.

750
00:37:31,600 --> 00:37:33,120
Speaker 3: I was thinking that they were already doing that. They're

751
00:37:33,200 --> 00:37:34,920
Speaker 3: killing the insurance company for a price.

752
00:37:34,960 --> 00:37:37,160
Speaker 2: They already do. But I'm just saying like that was

753
00:37:37,280 --> 00:37:39,480
Speaker 2: that's I think that, like this is something that car

754
00:37:39,520 --> 00:37:41,800
Speaker 2: companies would kill because it's going to cost him money

755
00:37:42,800 --> 00:37:45,080
Speaker 2: beyond just like changing the tech.

756
00:37:45,080 --> 00:37:48,200
Speaker 3: It's something valuable to them. Yeah, data that is.

757
00:37:48,680 --> 00:37:49,640
Speaker 2: That's just me guessing.

758
00:37:49,920 --> 00:37:52,320
Speaker 3: I'm speculating to the BUIL didn't.

759
00:37:52,080 --> 00:37:55,680
Speaker 2: Pass, but it like spurred all these discussions about automotive

760
00:37:55,680 --> 00:38:00,960
Speaker 2: cybersecurity standards. In twenty sixteen, the Automotive Information Sharing an

761
00:38:01,000 --> 00:38:07,160
Speaker 2: Analysis Center, they released their best practices for cybersecurity, and

762
00:38:07,560 --> 00:38:10,480
Speaker 2: you know, most of the major manufacturers of automobiles they

763
00:38:10,600 --> 00:38:14,600
Speaker 2: picked that up. The gpack made it super clear infotainment

764
00:38:14,680 --> 00:38:18,560
Speaker 2: systems have to be segregated out from like the critical

765
00:38:18,640 --> 00:38:21,479
Speaker 2: vehicle control stuff. You can't have it all just riding

766
00:38:21,680 --> 00:38:26,399
Speaker 2: us together, exactly, And so Miller and Vallisek they later

767
00:38:26,440 --> 00:38:29,600
Speaker 2: got hired by Uber's Advanced Technology Center to work on

768
00:38:29,640 --> 00:38:32,919
Speaker 2: their self driving car security, and then they both worked

769
00:38:32,920 --> 00:38:37,160
Speaker 2: as principal autonomous vehicle security architects at Cruse Automation, which

770
00:38:37,200 --> 00:38:43,280
Speaker 2: was GM's self driving cars. The latest and more visible

771
00:38:43,360 --> 00:38:45,880
Speaker 2: victim of hackings is, of course Tesla.

772
00:38:49,400 --> 00:38:49,560
Speaker 4: Yeah.

773
00:38:49,640 --> 00:38:53,160
Speaker 2: Well, I should note that Tesla has a bug bounty program.

774
00:38:53,440 --> 00:38:55,839
Speaker 2: So if you can hack them and then show them how,

775
00:38:56,320 --> 00:38:59,880
Speaker 2: they'll give you cars or money or something. Of the

776
00:39:00,040 --> 00:39:02,600
Speaker 2: cyber trucks. It doesn't they can't sell you know, here

777
00:39:02,680 --> 00:39:04,600
Speaker 2: have one, you have five? Yeah, and I'm just like,

778
00:39:04,640 --> 00:39:06,440
Speaker 2: I hacked you guys. They're like, you no need to

779
00:39:06,440 --> 00:39:12,960
Speaker 2: have proof. Take a cyber's your problem now. Some of

780
00:39:13,000 --> 00:39:15,880
Speaker 2: that bacon from the diner. The whole thing, though, the

781
00:39:15,920 --> 00:39:18,920
Speaker 2: Tesla is like one big computer and the cars are

782
00:39:18,920 --> 00:39:22,000
Speaker 2: all about like connectivity and such and like you know,

783
00:39:22,800 --> 00:39:25,640
Speaker 2: things like watching YouTube while you pretend to drive while

784
00:39:25,680 --> 00:39:28,040
Speaker 2: autopilot's on and you're facetiming your buddy.

785
00:39:28,160 --> 00:39:29,720
Speaker 3: Sure important thing, yeah exactly.

786
00:39:30,080 --> 00:39:33,800
Speaker 2: In twenty sixteen, researchers from Keen Security Lab they found

787
00:39:34,120 --> 00:39:38,080
Speaker 2: multiple vulnerabilities in the Tesla model S that allowed remote

788
00:39:38,080 --> 00:39:41,000
Speaker 2: control of the car from up to twelve miles away

789
00:39:41,920 --> 00:39:45,520
Speaker 2: via the Wi Fi or cellular connection. So that's okay,

790
00:39:45,640 --> 00:39:49,200
Speaker 2: one year after this jeep thing, you know, someone's on

791
00:39:49,239 --> 00:39:53,640
Speaker 2: like an Atari sixty four driving your Tesla around. So

792
00:39:53,680 --> 00:39:57,359
Speaker 2: they found vulnerabilities in the infotainment system once again that

793
00:39:57,600 --> 00:40:03,120
Speaker 2: darned can bus access to the browser autopilot braking functions,

794
00:40:03,440 --> 00:40:05,520
Speaker 2: so they were able to like open the sun roof,

795
00:40:05,960 --> 00:40:10,360
Speaker 2: move the seats, control side mirrors, turn on the turn signal,

796
00:40:10,560 --> 00:40:12,719
Speaker 2: and then like slam on the brakes remotely while the

797
00:40:12,760 --> 00:40:13,120
Speaker 2: car was.

798
00:40:13,040 --> 00:40:16,560
Speaker 3: In so still operating like the car itself, not just the.

799
00:40:16,520 --> 00:40:19,160
Speaker 2: Features, yeah, but then like oh and the break ps

800
00:40:19,280 --> 00:40:22,760
Speaker 2: the brakes. Tesla saw this and then pushed an over

801
00:40:22,800 --> 00:40:26,960
Speaker 2: the air software update within ten days of the disclosure,

802
00:40:27,400 --> 00:40:30,200
Speaker 2: and then they also improved isolation between the systems like

803
00:40:30,239 --> 00:40:33,280
Speaker 2: we you know, infotatement and critical components.

804
00:40:32,880 --> 00:40:34,320
Speaker 3: Separated firewall that stuff.

805
00:40:34,400 --> 00:40:38,120
Speaker 2: Yes, talk, I love that, that's firewall.

806
00:40:38,400 --> 00:40:39,200
Speaker 3: That's good, thank you.

807
00:40:39,400 --> 00:40:43,440
Speaker 2: I just learned that one myself. In twenty twenty, fluoro

808
00:40:43,480 --> 00:40:44,520
Speaker 2: Acetate struck.

809
00:40:45,640 --> 00:40:46,200
Speaker 3: That's a hacker.

810
00:40:46,280 --> 00:40:50,080
Speaker 2: It's a well known security research team. So they share

811
00:40:50,160 --> 00:40:55,000
Speaker 2: a call sign Richard Zoo and amacamma. They were at

812
00:40:55,200 --> 00:40:59,279
Speaker 2: pone to own once again Vancouver hacking. Remember, yeah, the

813
00:40:59,280 --> 00:41:02,200
Speaker 2: super Bowl hack exactly, And that's where they exploited a

814
00:41:02,280 --> 00:41:07,000
Speaker 2: vulnerability in the Tesla Model threes infotainment system using a

815
00:41:07,480 --> 00:41:14,280
Speaker 2: JavaScript jit just in time jure in the WebKit engine.

816
00:41:14,280 --> 00:41:18,439
Speaker 2: We're back with webkits. The exploit allowed them to gain

817
00:41:18,520 --> 00:41:21,759
Speaker 2: control of the system when the driver visited a specially

818
00:41:21,840 --> 00:41:25,880
Speaker 2: crafted web page, so like if you're browsing around, you

819
00:41:25,960 --> 00:41:28,160
Speaker 2: have to put the web page into the giant screen

820
00:41:28,200 --> 00:41:31,600
Speaker 2: inside the car. And it gave them access to display messages.

821
00:41:32,080 --> 00:41:35,120
Speaker 2: They could control infotainment features like I'm going to put

822
00:41:35,160 --> 00:41:40,960
Speaker 2: on a different channel, interact with subsystems connected via the can,

823
00:41:41,120 --> 00:41:44,600
Speaker 2: but they couldn't directly control the driving, so.

824
00:41:44,560 --> 00:41:46,759
Speaker 3: They can make you watch criminal minds against your will.

825
00:41:47,760 --> 00:41:50,480
Speaker 2: Hundred percent, and so that was like purely infotainment. They

826
00:41:50,520 --> 00:41:54,160
Speaker 2: couldn't direct the actual car. But this was part of

827
00:41:54,200 --> 00:41:56,640
Speaker 2: a challenge at the competition, not a rogue mission to

828
00:41:56,680 --> 00:42:00,880
Speaker 2: embarrass Tesla. So Tesla awarded the hackers a Tesla Model

829
00:42:00,920 --> 00:42:03,320
Speaker 2: three and forty thousand dollars in prize money.

830
00:42:03,360 --> 00:42:05,200
Speaker 3: So it was like a sponsored hackophone.

831
00:42:04,960 --> 00:42:07,200
Speaker 2: Sponsored hackaphone. And then they patched that.

832
00:42:07,200 --> 00:42:09,080
Speaker 3: Vulnerability quickly they should.

833
00:42:08,880 --> 00:42:10,920
Speaker 2: You know, be via a software update.

834
00:42:11,000 --> 00:42:13,160
Speaker 3: So this is like their version of beta testing, is like, hey,

835
00:42:13,160 --> 00:42:14,759
Speaker 3: we're going to put the car out, then you find

836
00:42:14,800 --> 00:42:16,680
Speaker 3: the flaws and we'll fix those exactly.

837
00:42:17,120 --> 00:42:19,880
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's sort of like self check out. Suddenly I

838
00:42:20,000 --> 00:42:23,480
Speaker 2: work for the supermarket. Yeah, suddenly you work for Tesla.

839
00:42:24,080 --> 00:42:26,000
Speaker 2: So like, hold on, do you have Bluetooth in your

840
00:42:26,000 --> 00:42:27,520
Speaker 2: carp Yeah? See I do.

841
00:42:27,760 --> 00:42:30,320
Speaker 3: Yeah, I wasn't kidding about I buy older cars.

842
00:42:30,400 --> 00:42:33,840
Speaker 2: One time I let someone, someone who's a co host

843
00:42:33,960 --> 00:42:37,920
Speaker 2: of a murder free true crime podcast, connect his bluetooth

844
00:42:37,920 --> 00:42:42,600
Speaker 2: in my car. Yes, and now I know this fellow connected.

845
00:42:42,680 --> 00:42:45,440
Speaker 2: If I'm near you and your phone, you connect to

846
00:42:45,480 --> 00:42:47,799
Speaker 2: my car. So like you'll be in the parking lot

847
00:42:47,840 --> 00:42:51,080
Speaker 2: at headquarters on a phone call. I'm parked near you.

848
00:42:51,200 --> 00:42:53,640
Speaker 2: I go to start my car and suddenly your call

849
00:42:53,840 --> 00:42:54,240
Speaker 2: is in.

850
00:42:54,120 --> 00:42:55,960
Speaker 3: My bluetoth You're talking to my mother.

851
00:42:55,920 --> 00:42:59,560
Speaker 2: And I've got someone saying hello, Hello, or I'm suddenly

852
00:42:59,560 --> 00:43:02,759
Speaker 2: listening to the serious XM Radio Classics episode that you've

853
00:43:02,760 --> 00:43:04,120
Speaker 2: got playing on the radio Classic.

854
00:43:04,160 --> 00:43:06,560
Speaker 3: Oh yeah, you like Jack Benny. I hope you do.

855
00:43:06,239 --> 00:43:09,640
Speaker 2: What I'm saying is that I think my car likes

856
00:43:09,640 --> 00:43:11,560
Speaker 2: you better, which doesn't seem fair.

857
00:43:11,680 --> 00:43:14,239
Speaker 3: So your your phone doesn't connect to the bluetooth, it.

858
00:43:14,200 --> 00:43:18,440
Speaker 2: Gets kicked off by yours. Like you've basically hacked me.

859
00:43:19,080 --> 00:43:23,000
Speaker 2: You're a hacker, now hack Yeah, anyway, This dude, Leonard

860
00:43:23,040 --> 00:43:28,040
Speaker 2: Wooters is a security research at ku Leuvin University in Belgium.

861
00:43:28,280 --> 00:43:33,359
Speaker 2: June twenty twenty two, he exploited vulnerabilities in Tesla's Bluetooth

862
00:43:33,960 --> 00:43:37,880
Speaker 2: low energy keyless entry system. So we've gone through all

863
00:43:37,920 --> 00:43:40,480
Speaker 2: these other ways in now we got Bluetooth. So he

864
00:43:40,520 --> 00:43:43,160
Speaker 2: had like what's called a relay attack. He could unlock

865
00:43:43,239 --> 00:43:46,200
Speaker 2: and start a Tesla both model three and Model y

866
00:43:46,960 --> 00:43:49,880
Speaker 2: by relaying signals from the owner's phone or key card.

867
00:43:50,440 --> 00:43:53,120
Speaker 2: And he could do this even if it was inside

868
00:43:53,120 --> 00:43:56,000
Speaker 2: a nearby building. Obviously not in a fair date box.

869
00:43:57,239 --> 00:44:01,880
Speaker 2: So the bl systems there intercepted using cheap off the

870
00:44:01,880 --> 00:44:05,080
Speaker 2: shelf hard where like the Oakland car thieves use. And

871
00:44:05,320 --> 00:44:07,440
Speaker 2: it's basically the same thing. You get there, you pick

872
00:44:07,520 --> 00:44:10,080
Speaker 2: up the signal, you clone it. So he's unlocking doors,

873
00:44:10,080 --> 00:44:13,520
Speaker 2: you start in the car driving away. Tesla, though, didn't

874
00:44:13,560 --> 00:44:17,800
Speaker 2: consider it a flaw in its system, because the ble

875
00:44:18,040 --> 00:44:21,360
Speaker 2: relay attacks are a known risk with passive entry systems.

876
00:44:21,400 --> 00:44:25,440
Speaker 2: They're like, it's not just us all through the Oakland Hills.

877
00:44:26,400 --> 00:44:29,200
Speaker 2: So he was like, this guy, this hacker recommended that

878
00:44:29,200 --> 00:44:32,360
Speaker 2: people turn off passive entry or use in a Tesla

879
00:44:32,520 --> 00:44:36,440
Speaker 2: pin to drive like a personal identification number, requiring a

880
00:44:36,480 --> 00:44:37,480
Speaker 2: code to be able to drive.

881
00:44:37,600 --> 00:44:39,799
Speaker 3: I need like two factor authentication to get into my car.

882
00:44:40,000 --> 00:44:43,760
Speaker 2: Is such a hassle to get in the car. Nobody

883
00:44:43,800 --> 00:44:46,319
Speaker 2: listened to this guy. Everyone's like, whatever, I.

884
00:44:46,320 --> 00:44:48,360
Speaker 3: Will leave websites if I have to get on my iPad.

885
00:44:48,400 --> 00:44:50,279
Speaker 3: I'm like, Daily Beast, why are you making me go

886
00:44:50,320 --> 00:44:51,000
Speaker 3: to my iPad?

887
00:44:51,040 --> 00:44:53,319
Speaker 2: No, big, nope, how about do.

888
00:44:53,280 --> 00:44:55,680
Speaker 3: I want to read this story to own? They're back

889
00:44:55,760 --> 00:44:56,720
Speaker 3: the super Bowl of hacks.

890
00:44:57,040 --> 00:45:00,480
Speaker 2: They went after Tesla again in twenty twenty five. The

891
00:45:00,880 --> 00:45:07,080
Speaker 2: Sinactive team, that's Thomas Imbert, Vincent Dehores, David Barrard. They

892
00:45:07,120 --> 00:45:13,719
Speaker 2: targeted Tesla's vehicle control system Electronic controller VC secure. It's

893
00:45:13,760 --> 00:45:17,040
Speaker 2: a critical module in the Tesla Model three that's responsible

894
00:45:17,080 --> 00:45:21,680
Speaker 2: for security functions like immobilization, door locking and then handling

895
00:45:21,800 --> 00:45:24,240
Speaker 2: data from the tire pressure monitoring system.

896
00:45:24,360 --> 00:45:29,400
Speaker 3: So they turned the security specialist into the vulnerability. Yes, interesting, And.

897
00:45:29,400 --> 00:45:32,080
Speaker 2: They did that at pone to Own Automotive twenty twenty

898
00:45:32,080 --> 00:45:33,280
Speaker 2: five in Tokyo.

899
00:45:32,920 --> 00:45:33,640
Speaker 3: Twenty twenty five.

900
00:45:34,520 --> 00:45:36,400
Speaker 2: This is recent, this is earlier this year. So just

901
00:45:36,440 --> 00:45:39,000
Speaker 2: like in the other cases, they used Bluetooth, they got

902
00:45:39,040 --> 00:45:40,640
Speaker 2: into the can.

903
00:45:40,360 --> 00:45:41,840
Speaker 3: But got that can bus.

904
00:45:42,160 --> 00:45:45,200
Speaker 2: Get all on the bus. Maybe if they'd had some

905
00:45:45,360 --> 00:45:48,000
Speaker 2: heap exploitation going on, we wouldn't be in this situation.

906
00:45:48,040 --> 00:45:48,920
Speaker 3: Yeah, that's what I'm thinking.

907
00:45:49,719 --> 00:45:52,920
Speaker 2: If you can access the ratchet router with the VPN

908
00:45:53,040 --> 00:45:57,319
Speaker 2: card and so on, case closed. So now there was

909
00:45:57,360 --> 00:46:00,360
Speaker 2: also a time that Tesla itself, not the cars, got ACKed.

910
00:46:00,880 --> 00:46:04,800
Speaker 2: Two former Tesla employees who were unnamed in public filings.

911
00:46:04,800 --> 00:46:08,480
Speaker 2: They leaked over one hundred gigabytes of internal data to

912
00:46:08,560 --> 00:46:11,399
Speaker 2: a German media outlet, and that all came to light

913
00:46:11,400 --> 00:46:13,680
Speaker 2: in August of twenty twenty three, but the breach had

914
00:46:13,719 --> 00:46:14,839
Speaker 2: occurred earlier that year.

915
00:46:14,880 --> 00:46:16,480
Speaker 3: Did they use a car to hack Tesla?

916
00:46:16,640 --> 00:46:18,360
Speaker 2: They hacked Tesla with a Tesla?

917
00:46:18,680 --> 00:46:18,960
Speaker 3: Wow?

918
00:46:19,080 --> 00:46:23,040
Speaker 2: No, I don't know. Anyway, they got into the Tesla servers.

919
00:46:23,680 --> 00:46:30,600
Speaker 2: They leaked autopilot system secrets. Oh, good for them, customer secrets,

920
00:46:31,000 --> 00:46:38,080
Speaker 2: customer personally identifiable information. That's bad, employee records that's not good.

921
00:46:38,520 --> 00:46:41,640
Speaker 2: And then some of the leaked documents allegedly detailed quote

922
00:46:41,680 --> 00:46:46,400
Speaker 2: Tesla crash reports, I'm happier with that internal discussions on

923
00:46:46,520 --> 00:46:51,960
Speaker 2: auto pilot related accident. No, the internal discussions about them.

924
00:46:52,000 --> 00:46:54,120
Speaker 2: So they're like whatever, They could look like a loser anyway,

925
00:46:54,160 --> 00:46:56,319
Speaker 2: you know what I mean, Like I'm guessing. I don't know.

926
00:46:57,200 --> 00:47:00,759
Speaker 2: So Tesla immediately took legal action. They four the ex

927
00:47:00,760 --> 00:47:04,960
Speaker 2: employees to surrender devices and data, and they notified affected

928
00:47:05,000 --> 00:47:07,600
Speaker 2: individuals of the breach. I mean, this isn't like a

929
00:47:07,600 --> 00:47:11,680
Speaker 2: traditional software hack, but it exposed highly sensitive vehicle systems

930
00:47:11,680 --> 00:47:17,440
Speaker 2: and customer data, major insider cybersecurity threat Sounds like it's

931
00:47:17,520 --> 00:47:22,000
Speaker 2: like our cars are now rolling cybersecurity threats, Like we

932
00:47:22,120 --> 00:47:23,880
Speaker 2: basically drive around in big computers.

933
00:47:23,960 --> 00:47:26,680
Speaker 3: Yours are. Yeah, I'm over here in a seventy eight

934
00:47:26,680 --> 00:47:27,480
Speaker 3: catalyg I know.

935
00:47:27,440 --> 00:47:30,240
Speaker 2: It's You're so lucky. It's not just the physical actions

936
00:47:30,280 --> 00:47:32,360
Speaker 2: of the car that's vulnerable. Like we have all this

937
00:47:32,480 --> 00:47:35,440
Speaker 2: personal information. Look at me, I'm getting text messages.

938
00:47:36,160 --> 00:47:37,040
Speaker 3: Text with your car.

939
00:47:37,640 --> 00:47:39,759
Speaker 2: I think that's wild to me. Yeah, I think that's

940
00:47:39,760 --> 00:47:42,800
Speaker 2: where the Democratic Party keeps getting my information to text

941
00:47:42,800 --> 00:47:49,080
Speaker 2: mealy anytime anything happens. So cars they collect GPS, location history,

942
00:47:49,160 --> 00:47:51,880
Speaker 2: call logs, contacts. You know, you can load your contacts

943
00:47:51,880 --> 00:47:54,040
Speaker 2: from your phone into your car, so your car can

944
00:47:54,120 --> 00:47:56,160
Speaker 2: call I guess voice recordings.

945
00:47:56,280 --> 00:47:57,960
Speaker 5: They can log your behavior and give.

946
00:47:57,840 --> 00:47:59,280
Speaker 2: It to insurance companies.

947
00:47:59,480 --> 00:47:59,719
Speaker 3: Wow.

948
00:48:00,320 --> 00:48:02,319
Speaker 2: The biggest thread of this, I think is having your

949
00:48:02,320 --> 00:48:04,680
Speaker 2: information sold to marketers and corporations.

950
00:48:04,719 --> 00:48:05,680
Speaker 3: Sure, that too.

951
00:48:06,400 --> 00:48:08,880
Speaker 2: Ripe for criminal tinkering, of course, but it could go

952
00:48:08,960 --> 00:48:11,960
Speaker 2: beyond street crime because think about it, like nation state

953
00:48:12,000 --> 00:48:14,880
Speaker 2: actors could target infrastructure like fleet vehicles.

954
00:48:15,000 --> 00:48:17,480
Speaker 3: Oh yeah, I're also like the partner of somebody who

955
00:48:17,480 --> 00:48:19,520
Speaker 3: works for the government, and then they can just be

956
00:48:19,600 --> 00:48:21,880
Speaker 3: in the car talking on their phone making safe and

957
00:48:21,920 --> 00:48:23,040
Speaker 3: all of a sudden, other cars.

958
00:48:22,840 --> 00:48:26,200
Speaker 2: Listening to Oh yeah, terrorists could hijack cars for sabotage.

959
00:48:26,680 --> 00:48:28,759
Speaker 2: What I'm trying to say is that we need to

960
00:48:28,800 --> 00:48:31,440
Speaker 2: go back to an agrarian society and all ride bikes.

961
00:48:32,000 --> 00:48:32,480
Speaker 3: I love that.

962
00:48:32,680 --> 00:48:34,560
Speaker 2: Make it stop, everyone on a bike. I don't want

963
00:48:34,560 --> 00:48:36,279
Speaker 2: to do this anymore. That's what I'm trying to say.

964
00:48:37,160 --> 00:48:39,040
Speaker 2: And with that, I'm going to go get into my car,

965
00:48:39,560 --> 00:48:42,640
Speaker 2: listen to satellite radio, call my mom via bluetooth on

966
00:48:42,719 --> 00:48:45,680
Speaker 2: the stereosystem unless you hijacket, and then I'm going to

967
00:48:45,800 --> 00:48:47,840
Speaker 2: use my GPS to go do crimes in the woods.

968
00:48:48,160 --> 00:48:51,520
Speaker 2: So just take the edge off, Zarin. What's your ridiculous takeaway?

969
00:48:52,000 --> 00:48:54,400
Speaker 3: You know, as I've complained about it often exact to

970
00:48:54,440 --> 00:48:57,359
Speaker 3: deal with them. Both of my parents are Luddites, right.

971
00:48:57,480 --> 00:49:00,400
Speaker 3: They neither one has an iPhone or any Android. They

972
00:49:00,440 --> 00:49:02,920
Speaker 3: both have flip phones. They won't do email. My mother

973
00:49:03,040 --> 00:49:06,200
Speaker 3: still has an Aol account, like you know, their total

974
00:49:06,280 --> 00:49:08,759
Speaker 3: bloods with the fact that they have computers is like

975
00:49:08,840 --> 00:49:14,759
Speaker 3: a major step and unfortunately I think they're right well

976
00:49:15,280 --> 00:49:18,800
Speaker 3: kills me right. Yeah, she pays like whatever, fifty dollars

977
00:49:18,840 --> 00:49:21,239
Speaker 3: a month to do like four things or whatever. I'm like,

978
00:49:21,400 --> 00:49:24,160
Speaker 3: what is wrong with you? What is your ridiculous take away? Elizabeth?

979
00:49:24,239 --> 00:49:27,880
Speaker 2: Where did this takeaway? Is that computers bad that I

980
00:49:28,000 --> 00:49:31,600
Speaker 2: need them. We all do, so, Dave, can I please

981
00:49:31,680 --> 00:49:32,439
Speaker 2: have a talk back?

982
00:49:32,719 --> 00:49:35,960
Speaker 3: Oh yeah, oh.

983
00:49:37,960 --> 00:49:42,879
Speaker 4: My god, I love get.

984
00:49:47,080 --> 00:49:50,000
Speaker 6: Hi Elizabeth Saron and producer d This is Ali from

985
00:49:50,040 --> 00:49:53,759
Speaker 6: South Carolina. I have loved the show for years now

986
00:49:53,840 --> 00:49:57,520
Speaker 6: and I just listened to the wig jacking episode and

987
00:49:58,520 --> 00:50:01,600
Speaker 6: then about a day later, happy to come across an

988
00:50:01,680 --> 00:50:04,920
Speaker 6: image of the painting a Sundae on lagrange jat or

989
00:50:04,960 --> 00:50:07,920
Speaker 6: however you pronounce it. Who knows who cares? And as

990
00:50:07,960 --> 00:50:10,920
Speaker 6: I'm sure you know, in the bottom corner of that painting,

991
00:50:11,320 --> 00:50:14,320
Speaker 6: there is a little monkey on a leash and a

992
00:50:14,480 --> 00:50:18,600
Speaker 6: small dog staring out. And all I could think about

993
00:50:18,880 --> 00:50:21,480
Speaker 6: from that little monkey and little dog is that they

994
00:50:21,840 --> 00:50:24,880
Speaker 6: were scoping out the scene looking for their next heist

995
00:50:25,040 --> 00:50:27,120
Speaker 6: because they'd had to move on from.

996
00:50:27,000 --> 00:50:27,759
Speaker 2: Their wig work.

997
00:50:27,880 --> 00:50:31,040
Speaker 6: So maybe they were on hat stealing or just there

998
00:50:31,160 --> 00:50:33,880
Speaker 6: to cause general ruckus. I don't know, but I support

999
00:50:33,920 --> 00:50:37,399
Speaker 6: them either way. Anyways, Love you guys, love your show.

1000
00:50:37,520 --> 00:50:39,880
Speaker 6: Thanks so much for all you do, and see you

1001
00:50:39,920 --> 00:50:40,800
Speaker 6: again next crime.

1002
00:50:42,840 --> 00:50:43,600
Speaker 3: I love that.

1003
00:50:43,800 --> 00:50:46,040
Speaker 2: This is this is what the power of good art

1004
00:50:46,200 --> 00:50:50,160
Speaker 2: right that tells you this story And I love this.

1005
00:50:50,400 --> 00:50:52,680
Speaker 2: I love your your so perceptive picking up all the

1006
00:50:52,719 --> 00:50:58,720
Speaker 2: little bits and bobs and the sool. That's it for today.

1007
00:50:59,239 --> 00:51:01,839
Speaker 2: You can find us online at ridiculous Crime dot com.

1008
00:51:02,160 --> 00:51:02,840
Speaker 5: This just in.

1009
00:51:03,800 --> 00:51:08,040
Speaker 2: The website won the Hollywood Foreign Press Hackproof Award. They

1010
00:51:08,120 --> 00:51:12,239
Speaker 2: have declared our website hackproof. Nice I know, good job team.

1011
00:51:12,760 --> 00:51:16,000
Speaker 2: We're also at Ridiculous Crime on both Blue Sky Instagram.

1012
00:51:16,120 --> 00:51:19,640
Speaker 2: We're on YouTube at Ridiculous Crime Pod. You can email

1013
00:51:19,760 --> 00:51:22,160
Speaker 2: us at ridiculous Crime at gmail dot com, leave a

1014
00:51:22,239 --> 00:51:31,279
Speaker 2: talkback on the iHeart app reach out. Ridiculous Crime is

1015
00:51:31,320 --> 00:51:34,560
Speaker 2: hosted by Elizabeth Dutton and Zaren Burnett, produced and edited

1016
00:51:34,600 --> 00:51:39,640
Speaker 2: by HackMaster Dave Cousten, starring Analys Rutger. This Judith research

1017
00:51:39,760 --> 00:51:43,759
Speaker 2: is by aftermarket Penny Farthing Bluetooth installer Marissa Brown. The

1018
00:51:43,880 --> 00:51:47,040
Speaker 2: theme song is by hacking duo The Bongo Boys aka

1019
00:51:47,280 --> 00:51:50,600
Speaker 2: Thomas Lee and Travis Dutton. Post wardrobe is provided by

1020
00:51:50,680 --> 00:51:54,239
Speaker 2: Botany five hundred guest here and makeup by Sparkleshot and

1021
00:51:54,560 --> 00:51:59,800
Speaker 2: Mister Audrey. Executive producers are Exhausted Tesla Legal Team, Ben Bowen.

1022
00:52:00,080 --> 00:52:11,600
Speaker 4: That's Old Brad, Ridicous Crime, Say it one more Timequeous Crime.

1023
00:52:12,640 --> 00:52:15,960
Speaker 1: Ridiculous Crime is a production of iHeartRadio four more podcasts

1024
00:52:15,960 --> 00:52:19,040
Speaker 1: from my heart Radio. Visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts,

1025
00:52:19,160 --> 00:52:20,920
Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.