WEBVTT - Why the Short Volatility Trade Is Back and Bigger Than Ever

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<v Speaker 1>Hello, and welcome to another episode of The Odd Lots Podcast.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Tracy Alloway.

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<v Speaker 2>And I'm Joe Wisenthal.

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<v Speaker 1>Joe, do you know what's coming up?

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<v Speaker 2>The Odd Lots pub quiz?

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<v Speaker 1>That's true? Also Valentine's Day?

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<v Speaker 2>This a little bit later on. What else? What else

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<v Speaker 2>do you have in mind?

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<v Speaker 1>Do you do you celebrate the anniversary of Vollmageddon.

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<v Speaker 2>Do I celebrate it?

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah?

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<v Speaker 2>I mean who doesn't. No, I don't celebrate it. But

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<v Speaker 2>that was such a formative moment. So that was February when.

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<v Speaker 1>Was the twenty eighteen six year anniversary.

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<v Speaker 2>That was one of our first like really good episodes

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<v Speaker 2>where we sort of had a good We talked about

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<v Speaker 2>what blew up the short vall etf XIV. I feel

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<v Speaker 2>like we go back through our history. That was like

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<v Speaker 2>an important episode.

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<v Speaker 1>Wait, don't say that was one of the first good ones,

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<v Speaker 1>because we're doing this for your years before twenty eighteen.

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<v Speaker 2>You're right, We've had many good I think that was

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<v Speaker 2>like a it was a highlight. It was a highlight.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, yes, okay, Well, I do in fact celebrate the

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<v Speaker 1>anniversary of Valmageddon because I always enjoy going back to

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<v Speaker 1>tweets around that time, because there are a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>volatility traders on social media who have very strong and

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<v Speaker 1>often erroneous opinions, and one of the opinions they were

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<v Speaker 1>holding around January twenty eighteen was that everything was fine. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>shortfall was this perpetual money maker, no issues with the

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<v Speaker 1>two volatility exchange traded notes that eventually ended up blowing up,

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<v Speaker 1>one of which was XIV, as you pointed out, and

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<v Speaker 1>I remember tweeting things in January of twenty eighteen, stuff

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<v Speaker 1>like if the VICS curve inverts, which was about to happen,

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<v Speaker 1>this would be an absolute disaster for XIV, and I

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<v Speaker 1>had a bunch of people pushing back complaining about the

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<v Speaker 1>axis on my chart, and lo and behold, about a

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<v Speaker 1>week later, XIV not only blew up, but was dead

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<v Speaker 1>within a couple of days and actually royaled the market

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<v Speaker 1>as well.

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<v Speaker 2>I remember there it was very popular XIV, this vehicle,

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<v Speaker 2>and there was a sound intuition about it, I think,

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<v Speaker 2>which is that you know, is this basically betting against

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<v Speaker 2>the VIX And you start with the assumption that Okay,

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<v Speaker 2>people systematically and perpetually overpay for downside protection. Understandable people

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<v Speaker 2>pay for insurance and so you can harvest that premium

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<v Speaker 2>basically by taking the other side, and that by and large,

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<v Speaker 2>shorting VALL is a sort of like a good way

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<v Speaker 2>to a way that people super charge their returns and

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<v Speaker 2>look like a core thing is that when we talk

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<v Speaker 2>about VALL, I think like we are mostly in life shortfall.

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<v Speaker 2>Anyone who owned stocks for a long period or any

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<v Speaker 2>period is SHORTVALL, where sort of like VALL is bad

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<v Speaker 2>for portfolios, et cetera. So like when we talk about

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<v Speaker 2>specifically shorting VALL though, then that's where it gets interesting.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, So this is one of the things that I

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<v Speaker 1>find very remarkable about our current moment, which is that

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<v Speaker 1>you know, shorting VALL post the two thousand and eight

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<v Speaker 1>financial crisis became a very popular strategy because you had

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<v Speaker 1>low interest rates, so people wanted to pick up yield

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<v Speaker 1>wherever they could. Yeah, you also had central banks out

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<v Speaker 1>there in the market literally crushing volatility, So you knew

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<v Speaker 1>that there was the put that sort of existed over

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<v Speaker 1>the overall market, so why not try to monetize it.

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<v Speaker 1>There wasn't a lot going on up until twenty eighteen,

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<v Speaker 1>so it made sense to bet on nothing, basically on

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<v Speaker 1>things not happening. But what I find really fascinating about

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<v Speaker 1>the current moment is we seem to be seeing a

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<v Speaker 1>return of that short volatility trade. So you and I

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<v Speaker 1>have discussed on this podcast these shorter dated options, one

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<v Speaker 1>or zero dated options becoming incredibly popular, absolutely exploded voting

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<v Speaker 1>in terms of volume. There's other types of derivatives that

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<v Speaker 1>are also becoming more popular. And yet when I look

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<v Speaker 1>around at the market, it seems like there is so

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<v Speaker 1>much potential for one off events. You know, the FED

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<v Speaker 1>is hiking rates, we have geopolitical risk, as you know

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<v Speaker 1>we always talk about, joke about on this show, supply

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<v Speaker 1>chain disruptions. The chance of one off events actually happening

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<v Speaker 1>seems greater than ever, and yet shorting fall is popular

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<v Speaker 1>and measures of aall itself remain pretty low. The VIX

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<v Speaker 1>is pretty low, the volatility of the VIX index, the

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<v Speaker 1>VVIX is really low. So I think we need to

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<v Speaker 1>ask why is shortfall back, and why is it particularly

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<v Speaker 1>popular at this moment in time, and what does it

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<v Speaker 1>mean for the wider market.

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<v Speaker 2>Let's do it.

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<v Speaker 1>I am very happy to say that we do, in

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<v Speaker 1>fact have the perfect guest. We're going to be speaking

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<v Speaker 1>to Chris Sidel. We've had him on the podcast before.

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<v Speaker 1>He is the co cio of Ambrose Group, and he

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<v Speaker 1>is now officially one of my favorite guests ever because

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<v Speaker 1>he brought us donuts. And if I sound more energetic

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<v Speaker 1>than normal, it's because I'm currently on a sugar rush.

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<v Speaker 1>And also I'm talking about volatility and you took us

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<v Speaker 1>in this morning. I did not, although you tried to

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<v Speaker 1>get me on. Can you imagine if I had a

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<v Speaker 1>donut ends in at the same time.

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<v Speaker 2>That would be bad?

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, Chris, thank you so much for coming back.

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<v Speaker 3>On odd Lots. Thank you so much for having me.

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<v Speaker 3>So when we.

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<v Speaker 1>Talk about short volatility, you know, Joe and I discussed

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<v Speaker 1>it a little bit in the intro, but what is

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<v Speaker 1>the expression of going short volatility?

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, the expression of going short volatility is taking a

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<v Speaker 3>bet that the normality will continue, right, So effectively, if

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<v Speaker 3>you are betting on long volatility, you are pretty much

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<v Speaker 3>betting on the abnormality taking place.

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<v Speaker 2>So, I mean, I said it in the beginning, but

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<v Speaker 2>I sort of think that most life and investing is

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<v Speaker 2>implicitly short. Well, if you have spy in your retirement account,

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<v Speaker 2>then you know you think it's just generally going to

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<v Speaker 2>go up very time. That is normal. That is so

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<v Speaker 2>as you but per your definition, that is an implicit

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<v Speaker 2>short volatility. How does it get expressed in the options market?

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<v Speaker 2>And or maybe a question is why do people make

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<v Speaker 2>that bet in the options market rather than just going

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<v Speaker 2>the implicit route of being long risk assets.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, because I think it's something that generally pays off

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<v Speaker 3>the majority of the time. Within the spread as to

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<v Speaker 3>how you can trade it, there's this embedded risk premium

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<v Speaker 3>that I mean, sure people could argue that there's an

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<v Speaker 3>equity risk premium as well, but the expression towards how

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<v Speaker 3>you apply this, whether it's short s and p puts,

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<v Speaker 3>short mixed calls, short variant swaps, it has a tendency

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<v Speaker 3>to win the majority of the time, and this expression

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<v Speaker 3>lulls market participants into very poor habits of expressing the training.

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<v Speaker 3>Imagine you have taken a trade and you're going to

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<v Speaker 3>win ninety percent of the time, and when the trade

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<v Speaker 3>is working against you, you're adding more size and you're

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<v Speaker 3>adding more conviction. Over the course of years, when the

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<v Speaker 3>trade is beginning to work against you, you have a

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<v Speaker 3>tendency to believe that this is just another one of

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<v Speaker 3>those cases right, It's like being rewarded for buying the dip.

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<v Speaker 3>If you do it over and over again, you're going

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<v Speaker 3>to feel this conviction towards it. But in short volatility terms,

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<v Speaker 3>eventually it catches up and it all goes wrong at once.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah. The journalistic euphemism that was usually deployed is picking

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<v Speaker 1>up pennies in front of a steamroller. Right, So why

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<v Speaker 1>don't you talk to us about the numbers that you're

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<v Speaker 1>seeing in the market. We say, shortfall seems to be

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<v Speaker 1>back and bigger than ever. What are the actual figures

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<v Speaker 1>around that?

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, So I think it's important for listeners to have

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<v Speaker 3>a little bit of an understanding of my background and

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<v Speaker 3>why it is we track these numbers. So I was

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<v Speaker 3>a prop trader on two different desks camera securities in

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<v Speaker 3>Xanthis Capital, and then I went to a large Canadian

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<v Speaker 3>investment bank. I spent three and a half years there

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<v Speaker 3>and most of my time was spent trading exotic derivatives.

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<v Speaker 3>Then myself and a couple of my partners who are

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<v Speaker 3>XCTC excitadel guys, we got together and we said, hey,

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<v Speaker 3>we could run this carriy neutral tail restrategy, which effectively

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<v Speaker 3>when volatility is exploding, it's going to have this massive return.

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<v Speaker 3>But when markets are dormant, we use a lot of

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<v Speaker 3>short term proprietary trading to be flat. So you'll have foundations,

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<v Speaker 3>high networked individuals, family offices that will use something like

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<v Speaker 3>this as a hedge in their portfolio.

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<v Speaker 1>Right.

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<v Speaker 3>Because of that, we need to understand the derivative market

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<v Speaker 3>microstructure and also the ecosystem, understanding how certain agents in

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<v Speaker 3>that ecosystem are participating with one another. So over the

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<v Speaker 3>last year, would start to come up in the data

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<v Speaker 3>was that the short volatility trade was coming back in

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<v Speaker 3>huge size. So when you think about the SMP complex,

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<v Speaker 3>in the VIX complex, the net short VEGA notional today

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<v Speaker 3>is two times higher than when it was during January

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<v Speaker 3>of twenty eighteen, which was the month right before VALLMA,

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<v Speaker 3>get it.

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<v Speaker 1>This is when we're going to have to define vega.

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<v Speaker 1>We should just do all the Greek letters, just cut

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<v Speaker 1>them out of the way right now, but vega.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, So in VALL terms, right, think one point of

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<v Speaker 3>a VALL move and how much you'll make or lose. Okay, right,

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<v Speaker 3>So if your net long a million bucks of vega

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<v Speaker 3>and volatility moves up one vall point you'll make a

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<v Speaker 3>million bucks vice versa. Right, So what that's saying today

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<v Speaker 3>that number the netting short exposure is two times higher

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<v Speaker 3>than where it was during January of twenty eighteen, which

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<v Speaker 3>is right before vallom again. Additionally, and I sent you

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<v Speaker 3>guys this chart from Morning STARU, which is such a

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<v Speaker 3>crucial chart in my opinion. These derivative income generating funds,

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<v Speaker 3>the AUM in these have increased by over ten x

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<v Speaker 3>since January twenty eighteen. Right, that's another sort of fact

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<v Speaker 3>that's pretty insane to think about.

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<v Speaker 1>What's the definition of a derivative income fund?

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, so it's the same thing as to what we

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<v Speaker 3>were talking about at the beginning of the pod, where

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<v Speaker 3>we said different expressions towards harvesting these volatility versus premium traits.

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<v Speaker 2>It's intuitive to me why there was so much interest

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<v Speaker 2>in these income generating deriative strategies during the ZERP years

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<v Speaker 2>when you couldn't just generate income by going out and

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<v Speaker 2>buying a government bond. But now you can get five

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<v Speaker 2>percent or whatever. So why is the like, why do

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<v Speaker 2>people go to the exotic route for income generation when

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<v Speaker 2>they are very plain, vanilla things that actually pay yield

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<v Speaker 2>these days.

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<v Speaker 3>I think twenty twenty one is a year that will

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<v Speaker 3>go down in the derivative history books because what happened

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<v Speaker 3>during that year was you had a slew of new

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<v Speaker 3>mandate additions between large foundations, pensions, rias, endowments, mainly because

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<v Speaker 3>of what transpired in twenty twenty. You had a really

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<v Speaker 3>big ball move in twenty twenty, and then also in

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<v Speaker 3>Q one of twenty twenty one, you had the whole

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<v Speaker 3>Meme Stock sort of debacle. So if you were a

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<v Speaker 3>large institution that did not have exposure to derivatives and

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<v Speaker 3>that type of mandate, you almost looked at as archaic

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<v Speaker 3>in a way, right, So at that time, a lot

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<v Speaker 3>of these institutions said we want we want to start

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<v Speaker 3>trading options. Simultaneously, what was going on was the exchanges

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<v Speaker 3>started listing more and more tenors, right, so you started

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<v Speaker 3>having seven days till expiration options, five days till expiration,

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<v Speaker 3>zero days till expiration, and a lot of the consultants

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<v Speaker 3>at these larger institutions started realizing, well, back in the day,

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<v Speaker 3>if we wanted to sell a twenty percent out the

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<v Speaker 3>money SMP put, we have to wait one quarter to

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<v Speaker 3>collect five bucks in premium terms. Right today, we could

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<v Speaker 3>sell a zero DT option for fifty cents and do

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<v Speaker 3>that twenty times over and over and over. And what

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<v Speaker 3>this does on paper is that it changes the path dependency, right,

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<v Speaker 3>so you really won't get hurt for one little thing

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<v Speaker 3>happening at the end of the month or the end

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<v Speaker 3>of the quarter. The problem with that is that on

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<v Speaker 3>paper it looks like that, but when you run certain

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<v Speaker 3>correlations you realize that you're still taking the same exact trait.

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<v Speaker 3>Because if you wake up tomorrow and you say balls

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<v Speaker 3>are up five ball points across the wall surface and

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<v Speaker 3>the term structure, you're going to realize that seven days

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<v Speaker 3>till expiration option and the one month till expiration option

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<v Speaker 3>are both going to be negatively impacted.

0:13:22.400 --> 0:13:25.120
<v Speaker 1>Maybe this is a good chance to talk about the

0:13:25.200 --> 0:13:30.119
<v Speaker 1>ecosystem of the options world. So, setting aside the derivative

0:13:30.280 --> 0:13:33.680
<v Speaker 1>funds which are buying these things, someone is also selling

0:13:33.720 --> 0:13:37.400
<v Speaker 1>them the options. Usually the market makers are the dealers,

0:13:37.440 --> 0:13:40.840
<v Speaker 1>So what is the role of market makers in this process?

0:13:40.920 --> 0:13:44.800
<v Speaker 1>And then also I'm curious how cheap it is to

0:13:44.880 --> 0:13:48.000
<v Speaker 1>go short volatility in general now, because this was also

0:13:48.040 --> 0:13:51.440
<v Speaker 1>a hallmark of the twenty tens, which was it was

0:13:51.440 --> 0:13:54.320
<v Speaker 1>pretty cheap to do these trades, right, and so that

0:13:54.480 --> 0:13:56.920
<v Speaker 1>was also another part of the appeal, like why not

0:13:57.160 --> 0:13:59.560
<v Speaker 1>just pick up a little extra yield for not that

0:13:59.640 --> 0:14:00.000
<v Speaker 1>much more?

0:14:00.960 --> 0:14:04.679
<v Speaker 3>Right? So, in the ecosystem, the market makers play a

0:14:04.800 --> 0:14:08.680
<v Speaker 3>very unique role because if you look at some of

0:14:08.720 --> 0:14:12.000
<v Speaker 3>the data that some cell side research doesthks put out,

0:14:12.120 --> 0:14:16.199
<v Speaker 3>it's not really entirely correct because a lot of these

0:14:16.240 --> 0:14:20.760
<v Speaker 3>deaths like to take a certain narrative, but that positioning

0:14:20.920 --> 0:14:23.880
<v Speaker 3>changes day by day with these market makers. So it's

0:14:23.880 --> 0:14:27.960
<v Speaker 3>not to say that at every single day their long

0:14:28.000 --> 0:14:31.400
<v Speaker 3>gamma or short camera. It's at certain moments where that

0:14:31.440 --> 0:14:36.960
<v Speaker 3>positioning becomes unbalanced and can really create that more cascading

0:14:37.000 --> 0:14:42.520
<v Speaker 3>effect in cheapness and richness in volatility terms. We're seeing

0:14:42.720 --> 0:14:46.080
<v Speaker 3>one of the lowest levels of tail exposure that we've

0:14:46.120 --> 0:14:49.200
<v Speaker 3>ever seen, huh. And this is something that is really

0:14:49.200 --> 0:14:55.080
<v Speaker 3>surprising because everybody understands you shouldn't sell teals. That was

0:14:55.120 --> 0:14:59.640
<v Speaker 3>something that people learned in two thousand and eight, twenty eighteen,

0:15:00.000 --> 0:15:05.000
<v Speaker 3>twenty twenty. Yet that exposure keeps making its way back

0:15:05.040 --> 0:15:08.920
<v Speaker 3>into the market and right now forward skew that like

0:15:09.280 --> 0:15:12.400
<v Speaker 3>thirty days out skew and I'm not trying to get

0:15:12.440 --> 0:15:16.520
<v Speaker 3>super esoteric with the VALL terminology, but just that type

0:15:16.520 --> 0:15:22.520
<v Speaker 3>of WINGI exposure has been oversupplied over the last let's

0:15:22.560 --> 0:15:24.600
<v Speaker 3>call it six to nine months.

0:15:24.800 --> 0:15:28.440
<v Speaker 2>Wait, sorry, just to be clear, there is not currently

0:15:28.680 --> 0:15:33.360
<v Speaker 2>a lot of people buying de facto tail insurance right now.

0:15:33.400 --> 0:15:34.440
<v Speaker 3>Correct, not at all.

0:15:34.480 --> 0:15:37.120
<v Speaker 2>It's weird. I mean, I guess on some level, I'm

0:15:37.280 --> 0:15:41.480
<v Speaker 2>surprised because right like things seem crazy, and there's wars

0:15:41.520 --> 0:15:43.880
<v Speaker 2>going on, and people are concerned about what the Fed

0:15:43.960 --> 0:15:46.480
<v Speaker 2>is going to do, and the economic environment is uncertain,

0:15:46.480 --> 0:15:49.320
<v Speaker 2>and the political environment is uncertain. On one level, it

0:15:49.320 --> 0:15:51.480
<v Speaker 2>feels like it would be an environment that would be oh,

0:15:51.520 --> 0:15:53.560
<v Speaker 2>I want to grab tails, I want to buy insurance.

0:15:53.920 --> 0:15:55.920
<v Speaker 2>On the other hand, the stock market is at all

0:15:55.960 --> 0:16:00.600
<v Speaker 2>time highs volatility is low. Clearly, just looking at financials,

0:16:01.000 --> 0:16:03.680
<v Speaker 2>this is not a market environment in which many people

0:16:03.760 --> 0:16:05.800
<v Speaker 2>seem particularly concerned about very much.

0:16:06.120 --> 0:16:09.880
<v Speaker 3>Well, why would you buy tails up? Think about this,

0:16:11.040 --> 0:16:13.760
<v Speaker 3>It's been four years since the last real fall move.

0:16:14.280 --> 0:16:18.600
<v Speaker 3>So in the face of rising inflation, in the face

0:16:18.680 --> 0:16:22.440
<v Speaker 3>of a declining SMP in twenty twenty two, in the

0:16:22.480 --> 0:16:25.840
<v Speaker 3>face of a mini banking crisis, in the face of

0:16:25.920 --> 0:16:28.680
<v Speaker 3>all those things, you've been able to sell vall make money.

0:16:29.000 --> 0:16:31.560
<v Speaker 3>This is why. So some of the data that we

0:16:31.680 --> 0:16:36.120
<v Speaker 3>track is like US equity short ball hedge funds that

0:16:36.200 --> 0:16:40.880
<v Speaker 3>AUM has grown six times since twenty eighteen. Why would

0:16:40.880 --> 0:16:45.120
<v Speaker 3>that AUM grow because those funds are doing insanely well

0:16:45.320 --> 0:16:48.320
<v Speaker 3>because you've been able to sell volatility left and right

0:16:48.840 --> 0:16:51.720
<v Speaker 3>and really just get away with it. A generic straddle

0:16:51.760 --> 0:16:56.640
<v Speaker 3>selling program, like without having any sort of true quantitative input,

0:16:56.720 --> 0:16:58.960
<v Speaker 3>you just wake up every day and sell straddles has

0:16:59.000 --> 0:17:02.480
<v Speaker 3>made money handle for FIST over the last four years.

0:17:03.200 --> 0:17:07.040
<v Speaker 1>Could it be the case you mentioned the shorter tenors

0:17:07.119 --> 0:17:09.880
<v Speaker 1>that are now available, and this has been a much

0:17:09.920 --> 0:17:14.280
<v Speaker 1>discussed point among market commentators, the impact of zero and

0:17:14.560 --> 0:17:19.119
<v Speaker 1>one day options ODT and one DTE. Could it be

0:17:19.160 --> 0:17:23.119
<v Speaker 1>the case that people are buying less tail risk exposure

0:17:23.760 --> 0:17:29.240
<v Speaker 1>or extreme downside protection in favor of maybe hedging themselves

0:17:29.320 --> 0:17:31.920
<v Speaker 1>on a day to day basis with the shorter dated options.

0:17:32.080 --> 0:17:35.879
<v Speaker 3>So what we're seeing is that during certain events that's

0:17:35.920 --> 0:17:40.919
<v Speaker 3>the case. However, that doesn't take away for the reach

0:17:41.240 --> 0:17:44.919
<v Speaker 3>that you have in that thirty day exposure because when

0:17:45.000 --> 0:17:49.040
<v Speaker 3>you look at the volume across the VIX complex, and

0:17:49.080 --> 0:17:52.120
<v Speaker 3>you look at the volume traded in that thirty day exposure,

0:17:52.200 --> 0:17:55.760
<v Speaker 3>it's still heavy. It's still there. So people that are saying, well,

0:17:56.040 --> 0:17:58.880
<v Speaker 3>nobody's going to hedge with thirty day options anymore because

0:17:58.920 --> 0:18:01.760
<v Speaker 3>they're hedging with zero DP so the vics won't go up,

0:18:02.000 --> 0:18:06.879
<v Speaker 3>that's really a bad view. And there's one real point

0:18:06.920 --> 0:18:09.280
<v Speaker 3>that I'll bring up that will push back on that

0:18:09.480 --> 0:18:12.480
<v Speaker 3>in a pretty large way. If you are an institution,

0:18:12.760 --> 0:18:16.520
<v Speaker 3>a multi billion dollar institution, and tomorrow, god forbid, there's

0:18:16.560 --> 0:18:19.600
<v Speaker 3>a geopolitical event, are you going to hedge a multi

0:18:19.600 --> 0:18:23.480
<v Speaker 3>billion dollar book with zero DT options. There's no way

0:18:24.200 --> 0:18:28.240
<v Speaker 3>any sophisticated fund is going to realize, well, I probably

0:18:28.280 --> 0:18:30.800
<v Speaker 3>need to extend my duration on that hedge, so that

0:18:30.960 --> 0:18:34.520
<v Speaker 3>reach for one to let's call it three month old

0:18:34.720 --> 0:18:38.440
<v Speaker 3>will always be there. It's just that in the recent environment,

0:18:38.880 --> 0:18:41.520
<v Speaker 3>again over the last four years, that has not been

0:18:41.520 --> 0:18:44.199
<v Speaker 3>the case because we really have not been met with

0:18:44.320 --> 0:18:47.760
<v Speaker 3>a catalyst that has tested the broad market just real.

0:18:47.680 --> 0:18:50.000
<v Speaker 2>Quickly going back to a short straddle trade, which are

0:18:50.080 --> 0:18:52.000
<v Speaker 2>very popular or it has been a big money maker.

0:18:52.000 --> 0:18:55.440
<v Speaker 2>As you said, that's just betting that markets won't move much,

0:18:55.600 --> 0:18:57.720
<v Speaker 2>but selling a call and selling a put at the

0:18:57.720 --> 0:19:00.119
<v Speaker 2>same time. Implicitly, it's just like you're just betting that

0:19:00.200 --> 0:19:01.920
<v Speaker 2>things basically stay in a neuro range.

0:19:02.000 --> 0:19:02.840
<v Speaker 3>Correct, you're selling.

0:19:02.920 --> 0:19:07.320
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, how did shortvall make money in twenty twenty two

0:19:07.359 --> 0:19:08.720
<v Speaker 2>when the stock market.

0:19:08.480 --> 0:19:11.480
<v Speaker 3>Was going down? That was the main point of twenty

0:19:11.520 --> 0:19:14.439
<v Speaker 3>twenty two. If you were a VALL trader, and you

0:19:14.440 --> 0:19:16.360
<v Speaker 3>don't need to take my word for it, you could

0:19:16.359 --> 0:19:19.480
<v Speaker 3>look at how well shortfall funds did in twenty twenty two,

0:19:19.600 --> 0:19:22.640
<v Speaker 3>really because there was not a pickup in equity fall

0:19:23.080 --> 0:19:27.520
<v Speaker 3>and a lot of people misunderstand this because rates VALL moved,

0:19:28.480 --> 0:19:31.720
<v Speaker 3>fx fall moved. It was almost like every fall in

0:19:31.800 --> 0:19:36.040
<v Speaker 3>every aspect move except for US equity VALL. So when

0:19:36.119 --> 0:19:38.080
<v Speaker 3>you look at and you can look at just the

0:19:38.160 --> 0:19:42.080
<v Speaker 3>VIX to begin with, right, nix is a great representation

0:19:42.160 --> 0:19:44.240
<v Speaker 3>of something like that because it's variance right, So it's

0:19:44.280 --> 0:19:47.000
<v Speaker 3>really VALL squared. SMP fall squared is going to give

0:19:47.000 --> 0:19:51.840
<v Speaker 3>you VIX. So SMP thirty implied. VALL always stayed in

0:19:51.840 --> 0:19:54.560
<v Speaker 3>that range from like twenty to I believe the high

0:19:54.600 --> 0:19:58.560
<v Speaker 3>end was like thirty something. It's really difficult to get

0:19:58.800 --> 0:20:02.359
<v Speaker 3>VALL to move up when you have a lack of

0:20:02.680 --> 0:20:07.159
<v Speaker 3>realize move and panic that's coming in. So a slow

0:20:07.240 --> 0:20:11.200
<v Speaker 3>grind down every day, going down one percent, half a percent,

0:20:11.600 --> 0:20:15.040
<v Speaker 3>two percent, that's not really going to get people panicking

0:20:15.440 --> 0:20:17.119
<v Speaker 3>to bid for that insurance protection.

0:20:18.840 --> 0:20:22.439
<v Speaker 1>Let's go back to the sort of worst case scenario

0:20:22.840 --> 0:20:26.240
<v Speaker 1>that you were touching on earlier. But just before Christmas,

0:20:26.440 --> 0:20:29.240
<v Speaker 1>I think it was like a Wednesday or a Tuesday,

0:20:29.440 --> 0:20:31.320
<v Speaker 1>there was a sharp drop in the S and P

0:20:31.440 --> 0:20:35.320
<v Speaker 1>five hundred, and this kicked off a wave of speculation

0:20:35.880 --> 0:20:40.120
<v Speaker 1>about the degree to which shorter dated options had exacerbated

0:20:40.160 --> 0:20:44.040
<v Speaker 1>that fall into the close. And the thinking here is that, well,

0:20:44.040 --> 0:20:46.679
<v Speaker 1>when stocks start to move down like that, all the

0:20:46.720 --> 0:20:50.160
<v Speaker 1>market makers have to go out and hedge their exposure,

0:20:50.280 --> 0:20:53.080
<v Speaker 1>and so you can get this sort of doom feedback

0:20:53.119 --> 0:20:56.439
<v Speaker 1>loop in the market where stocks keep going down because

0:20:56.440 --> 0:20:59.280
<v Speaker 1>dealers have to hedge the fact that stocks are going down.

0:21:00.119 --> 0:21:03.120
<v Speaker 1>Walk us through that dynamic, and then how much are

0:21:03.160 --> 0:21:06.280
<v Speaker 1>you actually seeing an impact in the wider market from

0:21:06.440 --> 0:21:09.360
<v Speaker 1>these shorter dated options on a day to day basis.

0:21:09.600 --> 0:21:13.480
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, So we wrote a paper early on in twenty

0:21:13.520 --> 0:21:16.240
<v Speaker 3>twenty three. They got a lot of attention. Surprisingly, it

0:21:16.320 --> 0:21:22.399
<v Speaker 3>got attention from regulators and central banks, and I think

0:21:22.960 --> 0:21:25.840
<v Speaker 3>when some of the regulators reached out to us, it

0:21:25.960 --> 0:21:30.479
<v Speaker 3>was because they understood as well just how severe a

0:21:30.520 --> 0:21:34.040
<v Speaker 3>certain situation can end up being, and they want to

0:21:34.080 --> 0:21:37.080
<v Speaker 3>collect data on that as well. So when you talk

0:21:37.119 --> 0:21:41.080
<v Speaker 3>about zero DT, it usually falls into two camps. You

0:21:41.119 --> 0:21:45.720
<v Speaker 3>have Camp A that says, oh, no, nothing's going to happen.

0:21:46.520 --> 0:21:49.400
<v Speaker 3>The positioning off sets one another, this is not a risk.

0:21:49.760 --> 0:21:53.000
<v Speaker 3>And then you have Camp BE that says this is

0:21:53.000 --> 0:21:56.320
<v Speaker 3>going to create a massive catastrophe. This kind of stuff, right,

0:21:56.359 --> 0:22:00.200
<v Speaker 3>this is a black Swan event, And I don't think

0:22:00.240 --> 0:22:01.119
<v Speaker 3>either or are true.

0:22:01.440 --> 0:22:01.640
<v Speaker 1>Right.

0:22:02.280 --> 0:22:06.840
<v Speaker 3>This becomes a problem when dealers are hedging their exposure

0:22:06.920 --> 0:22:09.800
<v Speaker 3>in a high ball environment. So what ends up happening

0:22:09.920 --> 0:22:13.560
<v Speaker 3>is during normal conditions, when you have most of the

0:22:13.560 --> 0:22:16.680
<v Speaker 3>flow that's leaned to sell these shorter data and options,

0:22:16.960 --> 0:22:21.199
<v Speaker 3>that is stabilizing to the broad market. However, when volatility

0:22:21.240 --> 0:22:24.400
<v Speaker 3>is going up and these end users are not only

0:22:24.440 --> 0:22:27.960
<v Speaker 3>closing their position but opening new ones, that puts dealers

0:22:28.080 --> 0:22:31.320
<v Speaker 3>under pressure where they now need to hedge their exposure

0:22:31.359 --> 0:22:34.680
<v Speaker 3>and reflexively that could drive the asset price lower or

0:22:35.160 --> 0:22:39.560
<v Speaker 3>instant cases higher as well. So in this situation, it's

0:22:39.640 --> 0:22:44.200
<v Speaker 3>not really a case of the SMP going from zero

0:22:44.240 --> 0:22:47.080
<v Speaker 3>percent on the day to down five percent. It's what

0:22:47.119 --> 0:22:49.760
<v Speaker 3>does this look like if the SMP is down five

0:22:49.800 --> 0:22:53.000
<v Speaker 3>percent and then could escalate to down ten percent. The

0:22:53.119 --> 0:22:56.040
<v Speaker 3>second point to that that I'll bring up, and this

0:22:56.080 --> 0:22:59.280
<v Speaker 3>is a very valid point. If you are a hedge

0:22:59.280 --> 0:23:02.919
<v Speaker 3>fund or or an asset manager, you understand that the

0:23:03.040 --> 0:23:07.600
<v Speaker 3>larger primes are concerned with trading with their clients trading

0:23:07.600 --> 0:23:11.160
<v Speaker 3>this stuff because of the lack of visibility around certain

0:23:11.200 --> 0:23:14.399
<v Speaker 3>intra day margin requirements. So if you're a hedge fund,

0:23:15.480 --> 0:23:19.520
<v Speaker 3>you have a certain EMS that may be outsourced somewhere else.

0:23:20.720 --> 0:23:24.040
<v Speaker 3>It's just like an execution management system, right, So you

0:23:24.119 --> 0:23:27.760
<v Speaker 3>might be trading somewhere else and those positions are settling

0:23:27.800 --> 0:23:30.480
<v Speaker 3>at the end of the day. The PB is not

0:23:30.640 --> 0:23:33.640
<v Speaker 3>really able to see that. So if those positions go

0:23:34.280 --> 0:23:36.800
<v Speaker 3>against you, you may be on the hook for certain

0:23:36.880 --> 0:23:43.199
<v Speaker 3>exposure that is not accurately assessed for That's really the

0:23:43.240 --> 0:23:45.120
<v Speaker 3>second Yeah, that's the second problem there.

0:23:45.160 --> 0:23:47.480
<v Speaker 1>I have so many questions already, but I do think

0:23:48.000 --> 0:23:50.080
<v Speaker 1>this is actually an important point, which is that in

0:23:50.119 --> 0:23:53.280
<v Speaker 1>a lot of the commentary on shorter dated options and

0:23:53.400 --> 0:23:58.040
<v Speaker 1>zero TTE, there's an implication that it's all these stupid

0:23:58.040 --> 0:24:01.199
<v Speaker 1>retail traders who are using these things. And you know,

0:24:01.240 --> 0:24:03.240
<v Speaker 1>people talk a lot about Wall Street bets, and it

0:24:03.359 --> 0:24:05.840
<v Speaker 1>is true that you can find some out there stories

0:24:05.880 --> 0:24:08.879
<v Speaker 1>about people on Wall Street bets losing and also making

0:24:08.920 --> 0:24:11.600
<v Speaker 1>money on shorter dated options, But a big portion of

0:24:11.640 --> 0:24:17.080
<v Speaker 1>this is huge institutional ostensibly sophisticated investors.

0:24:17.160 --> 0:24:19.000
<v Speaker 2>I'm glad you brought that up, because actually this brought

0:24:19.040 --> 0:24:22.159
<v Speaker 2>me back to something that I wanted to return to,

0:24:22.480 --> 0:24:26.439
<v Speaker 2>the sophisticatid investor. Talk more about what happened in twenty

0:24:26.480 --> 0:24:29.960
<v Speaker 2>twenty one with the introduction of these mandates, because I

0:24:29.960 --> 0:24:33.040
<v Speaker 2>do think that feels like a very important element that like,

0:24:33.320 --> 0:24:35.800
<v Speaker 2>we can always talk about market environments and we are

0:24:35.840 --> 0:24:39.040
<v Speaker 2>in a high wall environment or a high rates environment

0:24:39.160 --> 0:24:42.560
<v Speaker 2>or a low rates environment, but if the allocation is

0:24:42.640 --> 0:24:45.640
<v Speaker 2>going to change and new products exist, we see how

0:24:45.680 --> 0:24:49.080
<v Speaker 2>that affects the market. What specifically were these decisions that

0:24:49.160 --> 0:24:51.800
<v Speaker 2>were made where these big institutions felt that they had to,

0:24:51.880 --> 0:24:54.879
<v Speaker 2>like tell us a little bit more about some of

0:24:54.920 --> 0:24:55.480
<v Speaker 2>these decisions.

0:24:55.600 --> 0:24:59.080
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, so think of twenty twenty. Twenty twenty was a

0:24:59.200 --> 0:25:02.879
<v Speaker 3>year that option trading did very well on both sides.

0:25:03.000 --> 0:25:06.159
<v Speaker 3>Hedging programs did very well. And then also when the

0:25:06.200 --> 0:25:11.120
<v Speaker 3>market rebounded, certain stock replacement programs did extremely well. When

0:25:11.160 --> 0:25:15.360
<v Speaker 3>twenty twenty one came Q one and the memestock craze hit,

0:25:16.240 --> 0:25:19.399
<v Speaker 3>that was almost like the nail in the coffin, where

0:25:19.480 --> 0:25:24.960
<v Speaker 3>you had certain investors and boards that started pounding on

0:25:25.000 --> 0:25:28.440
<v Speaker 3>the door and saying, why are we not exposed to options?

0:25:28.600 --> 0:25:31.639
<v Speaker 3>Because look, everybody's making money, not in the sense that

0:25:31.720 --> 0:25:34.639
<v Speaker 3>they want exposure to MEME stocks, but they're saying, hey,

0:25:35.160 --> 0:25:38.359
<v Speaker 3>we should have long call tech exposure, you know, or

0:25:38.400 --> 0:25:43.800
<v Speaker 3>we should have vultility risk premium harvesting programs. And ultimately

0:25:44.320 --> 0:25:47.800
<v Speaker 3>that put a lot of pressure on certain consultants. It

0:25:47.880 --> 0:25:51.520
<v Speaker 3>put a lot of pressure on certain teams. But as

0:25:51.560 --> 0:25:55.639
<v Speaker 3>I said, simultaneously, when the exchanges began listing more and

0:25:55.680 --> 0:26:01.080
<v Speaker 3>more tenors, people started realizing that, well, idly, we probably

0:26:01.119 --> 0:26:05.679
<v Speaker 3>want to engage in these volatility risk premium harvesting programs

0:26:05.720 --> 0:26:09.280
<v Speaker 3>because look, if this is what the S and P

0:26:09.400 --> 0:26:11.840
<v Speaker 3>is doing, look how much more we can make by

0:26:11.880 --> 0:26:15.600
<v Speaker 3>selling Vault. And now the path dependency has completely changed,

0:26:15.600 --> 0:26:18.920
<v Speaker 3>so ideally this becomes an easier trade for everybody.

0:26:19.760 --> 0:26:22.400
<v Speaker 2>Tracy, now I am reminded it's so funny all these

0:26:22.440 --> 0:26:24.159
<v Speaker 2>things I forgot from that time. But there was like

0:26:24.200 --> 0:26:26.879
<v Speaker 2>that big thing with like soft Bank, because you know,

0:26:27.359 --> 0:26:30.920
<v Speaker 2>a massive buyer of just like long call options. Yeah,

0:26:30.960 --> 0:26:33.840
<v Speaker 2>on tech Is. If it weren't already exposed enough to

0:26:33.920 --> 0:26:36.600
<v Speaker 2>tech Beta, they also bought a bunch of call options

0:26:36.600 --> 0:26:38.000
<v Speaker 2>on tech Stock got to double down.

0:26:38.240 --> 0:26:41.840
<v Speaker 1>Now, I do find it remarkable that they're like everyone

0:26:41.880 --> 0:26:45.360
<v Speaker 1>thinks Wall Street bets and that retail craziness was sort

0:26:45.400 --> 0:26:48.280
<v Speaker 1>of people trying to imitate Wall Street, But now we

0:26:48.359 --> 0:26:51.959
<v Speaker 1>basically have Wall Street trying to imitate the retail crowd

0:26:52.040 --> 0:26:54.400
<v Speaker 1>and the sort of yolo mindset of let's just try

0:26:54.400 --> 0:26:56.560
<v Speaker 1>to make as much money as possible on a sort

0:26:56.600 --> 0:26:59.840
<v Speaker 1>of in as short an amount of time as possible.

0:27:00.400 --> 0:27:03.040
<v Speaker 1>I want to go back to the impact on markets,

0:27:03.080 --> 0:27:06.879
<v Speaker 1>and I take the point about the doom loop scenario,

0:27:06.960 --> 0:27:09.600
<v Speaker 1>although as you say, you don't think it's as bad

0:27:09.720 --> 0:27:12.320
<v Speaker 1>as you know, getting a sort of Black Shoals esque

0:27:13.000 --> 0:27:17.720
<v Speaker 1>kind of crash. But one thing I guess I don't

0:27:17.800 --> 0:27:21.199
<v Speaker 1>quite understand in this argument is people are not going

0:27:21.280 --> 0:27:24.840
<v Speaker 1>to keep doing the same stuff if the market is

0:27:24.960 --> 0:27:28.080
<v Speaker 1>falling significantly. So if someone has a put that went

0:27:28.240 --> 0:27:31.639
<v Speaker 1>up five hundred percent, they're probably going to sell some

0:27:31.760 --> 0:27:35.040
<v Speaker 1>of it, right, So if you have people selling puts,

0:27:35.160 --> 0:27:38.879
<v Speaker 1>then wouldn't that bring in buying from the market makers,

0:27:38.920 --> 0:27:43.080
<v Speaker 1>which could actually stabilize the market in that scenario.

0:27:43.520 --> 0:27:48.600
<v Speaker 3>No, No, So when an end user is short the put,

0:27:48.960 --> 0:27:53.840
<v Speaker 3>the market maker is effectively long the put, right, So

0:27:54.160 --> 0:27:56.760
<v Speaker 3>at that time, if they're long the put, they're going

0:27:56.840 --> 0:27:59.440
<v Speaker 3>to be long the underlying on the other side, so

0:27:59.560 --> 0:28:03.160
<v Speaker 3>long stop. It changes when the end user is now

0:28:03.840 --> 0:28:07.000
<v Speaker 3>long the put, that puts the dealer short the put.

0:28:07.280 --> 0:28:09.919
<v Speaker 3>If they're short the put, that's bullish, which means that

0:28:09.960 --> 0:28:13.760
<v Speaker 3>they now need to sell the underlying on the other side. So,

0:28:15.240 --> 0:28:17.080
<v Speaker 3>and this is where this comes into like a second

0:28:17.160 --> 0:28:20.520
<v Speaker 3>order effect. Naturally, if the end user is selling this,

0:28:21.200 --> 0:28:25.480
<v Speaker 3>the market maker is stabilizing this. When that position starts

0:28:25.520 --> 0:28:27.879
<v Speaker 3>to move against them, what's the what is the end

0:28:27.920 --> 0:28:30.000
<v Speaker 3>user going to do? They're either going to close off

0:28:30.000 --> 0:28:32.800
<v Speaker 3>that position, right, or they're going to close it off

0:28:32.840 --> 0:28:34.600
<v Speaker 3>and then take more of the other side. So they're

0:28:34.640 --> 0:28:36.440
<v Speaker 3>going to say, Okay, we're closing this off and maybe

0:28:36.440 --> 0:28:37.800
<v Speaker 3>we're going to bat on long volatility.

0:28:37.920 --> 0:28:38.760
<v Speaker 1>Oh I see, okay.

0:28:38.960 --> 0:28:42.680
<v Speaker 3>That is when the market maker begins to get put

0:28:42.760 --> 0:28:46.640
<v Speaker 3>under pressure. And just to be clear, this has existed

0:28:47.560 --> 0:28:51.000
<v Speaker 3>since derivatives started trading. I think people think that gamma

0:28:51.040 --> 0:28:54.200
<v Speaker 3>heaging is something that came about six years ago. That's

0:28:54.200 --> 0:28:55.960
<v Speaker 3>not the case. If you were a market maker in

0:28:56.000 --> 0:28:59.160
<v Speaker 3>the early two thousands in the nineties, you realized that, hey,

0:28:59.200 --> 0:29:02.520
<v Speaker 3>this is how we hedge of a derivatives book. So

0:29:03.440 --> 0:29:07.160
<v Speaker 3>that second order effect only becomes more relevant because the

0:29:07.200 --> 0:29:12.080
<v Speaker 3>sheer size of what you're trading is so much larger.

0:29:12.160 --> 0:29:15.400
<v Speaker 3>So now you have back in the day, you had

0:29:15.400 --> 0:29:19.320
<v Speaker 3>twenty market makers. Today you have four, right, four main

0:29:19.440 --> 0:29:22.040
<v Speaker 3>market maker or let's go it, five that really control

0:29:22.120 --> 0:29:23.520
<v Speaker 3>the flow in the US equity mark.

0:29:23.400 --> 0:29:26.040
<v Speaker 2>These are really big bank trading desks.

0:29:26.320 --> 0:29:27.840
<v Speaker 1>Are these not just banks?

0:29:27.880 --> 0:29:30.880
<v Speaker 3>Not just banks? I probably I'm not going to name them,

0:29:30.920 --> 0:29:31.320
<v Speaker 3>but like.

0:29:31.400 --> 0:29:32.959
<v Speaker 2>Well, just like what are the nature of these, like

0:29:33.040 --> 0:29:33.800
<v Speaker 2>the four or five?

0:29:34.160 --> 0:29:36.720
<v Speaker 1>I'll whisper to them to you after the show, but

0:29:36.760 --> 0:29:39.240
<v Speaker 1>I don't wait, we could I mean, we have no

0:29:39.360 --> 0:29:44.960
<v Speaker 1>limitations on market Yeah, okay, so people like JP Morgan, Citadel,

0:29:46.680 --> 0:29:47.400
<v Speaker 1>that kind of thing.

0:29:47.720 --> 0:29:51.120
<v Speaker 2>So just big trading shops, yeah, okay, so some bank

0:29:51.160 --> 0:29:53.320
<v Speaker 2>but not necessarily bank, yes, okay.

0:29:53.480 --> 0:29:58.680
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, So going back to the numbers right index option

0:29:58.760 --> 0:30:03.920
<v Speaker 3>trading has grown two times since twenty eighteen, and equity

0:30:03.920 --> 0:30:06.760
<v Speaker 3>option trading has grown almost two and a half times

0:30:06.800 --> 0:30:10.800
<v Speaker 3>in totality. So when you think about the concentration risk here,

0:30:11.280 --> 0:30:14.360
<v Speaker 3>you have less market makers and more options being traded.

0:30:14.680 --> 0:30:18.400
<v Speaker 3>So of course it's natural to think that those market

0:30:18.400 --> 0:30:22.520
<v Speaker 3>makers will get caught all sizes on positioning, especially when

0:30:22.560 --> 0:30:26.160
<v Speaker 3>the end user is so dogmatic in their application of

0:30:26.200 --> 0:30:41.760
<v Speaker 3>this shortfall trade.

0:30:43.160 --> 0:30:47.280
<v Speaker 1>You know you mentioned was it ems earlier? What is

0:30:47.400 --> 0:30:52.800
<v Speaker 1>the underlying risk management architecture for managing these positions? Because

0:30:53.560 --> 0:30:56.680
<v Speaker 1>it has to be there must be so many numbers

0:30:56.720 --> 0:30:59.920
<v Speaker 1>involved with this, and like the values are constantly changing,

0:31:00.120 --> 0:31:03.520
<v Speaker 1>so things like gamma and delta are changing along with

0:31:03.600 --> 0:31:06.680
<v Speaker 1>the market. And if you are one of the market makers,

0:31:07.240 --> 0:31:10.520
<v Speaker 1>I can only imagine all the different exposures you have

0:31:10.640 --> 0:31:12.440
<v Speaker 1>at any one point in time that you are trying

0:31:12.440 --> 0:31:15.320
<v Speaker 1>to calculate in real time as well, how do people

0:31:15.400 --> 0:31:16.120
<v Speaker 1>actually do it?

0:31:16.840 --> 0:31:21.360
<v Speaker 3>So if you are a sophisticated vall arbitraasure, you will

0:31:21.440 --> 0:31:25.680
<v Speaker 3>have certain in house systems that monitor certain second order

0:31:25.760 --> 0:31:30.920
<v Speaker 3>Greek exposure like vallavall right spot moves in gamma exposure

0:31:31.160 --> 0:31:34.400
<v Speaker 3>van A exposure. Very few people in the world who

0:31:34.440 --> 0:31:37.600
<v Speaker 3>need to care about that. You know, for the most part,

0:31:38.040 --> 0:31:41.360
<v Speaker 3>if you are an RIA or even like a macro

0:31:41.400 --> 0:31:44.600
<v Speaker 3>hedge fund that's trading options, you're probably going to be

0:31:44.640 --> 0:31:47.920
<v Speaker 3>on like a certain bank platform, and that's going to

0:31:47.960 --> 0:31:51.240
<v Speaker 3>be okay, right, because you really don't need to care

0:31:51.280 --> 0:31:54.440
<v Speaker 3>about second order Greek exposure. But if you are more

0:31:54.440 --> 0:31:58.040
<v Speaker 3>so a dynamic ball shop, those things become more important.

0:31:58.800 --> 0:32:02.080
<v Speaker 3>I think when you're thinking about the problems of an

0:32:02.120 --> 0:32:04.800
<v Speaker 3>ems and how that translates to something like this, and

0:32:04.800 --> 0:32:08.680
<v Speaker 3>then also the applications of shortfall, really you have to

0:32:08.760 --> 0:32:12.960
<v Speaker 3>understand that the majority of the world and how they

0:32:13.000 --> 0:32:16.880
<v Speaker 3>trade is not like a sophisticated ball shop. It's like

0:32:17.080 --> 0:32:20.960
<v Speaker 3>an RIA that's going to wake up and say, hey,

0:32:21.000 --> 0:32:24.160
<v Speaker 3>we need to make fifty basis points every month, so

0:32:24.360 --> 0:32:27.520
<v Speaker 3>sell these options, and if the position begins to move

0:32:27.560 --> 0:32:31.080
<v Speaker 3>against them, they're gonna say, oh well great, sell some more,

0:32:32.000 --> 0:32:34.800
<v Speaker 3>and then it moves against them. Sell some more, and

0:32:34.840 --> 0:32:38.080
<v Speaker 3>then it moves against them, and then maybe they'll capitulate

0:32:38.080 --> 0:32:41.880
<v Speaker 3>the position. So it's not really the bulk of the

0:32:41.920 --> 0:32:45.720
<v Speaker 3>world is not really dynamically trading these things. They're more

0:32:45.760 --> 0:32:50.360
<v Speaker 3>so dogmatically taking a one sided view on this, and

0:32:50.360 --> 0:32:51.880
<v Speaker 3>that's why you get those ball blow ups.

0:32:52.000 --> 0:32:56.840
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, who is longfall these days? Because you know, again

0:32:56.920 --> 0:32:59.680
<v Speaker 2>in my mind, I just think, you know, very my, very.

0:32:59.640 --> 0:33:02.400
<v Speaker 1>Root of my theoretically they should net right, the amount

0:33:02.400 --> 0:33:04.600
<v Speaker 1>of people shortening ball should be offset by the amount

0:33:04.640 --> 0:33:06.400
<v Speaker 1>of people going to And.

0:33:06.400 --> 0:33:08.400
<v Speaker 2>Also I just think like, if I had a lot

0:33:08.400 --> 0:33:11.360
<v Speaker 2>of money, I would want to take out some insurance

0:33:11.760 --> 0:33:13.600
<v Speaker 2>against some sort of law. But if the people with

0:33:13.680 --> 0:33:16.160
<v Speaker 2>the money, even them, are sort of like sort of

0:33:16.400 --> 0:33:21.400
<v Speaker 2>changing their strategies, is there anyone who's structurally long vall

0:33:21.640 --> 0:33:24.400
<v Speaker 2>in there in parts of their portfolio or like the

0:33:24.440 --> 0:33:25.680
<v Speaker 2>sort of the hedging aspect.

0:33:26.040 --> 0:33:29.680
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, So for what we do, it's called carry neutral

0:33:29.680 --> 0:33:33.800
<v Speaker 3>tail risk hedging, and this is more so a tactical approach. However,

0:33:34.240 --> 0:33:38.640
<v Speaker 3>the majority of what you call strategic or solutions based

0:33:39.520 --> 0:33:43.320
<v Speaker 3>long ball or tail risk hedging has done insanely poor

0:33:43.520 --> 0:33:46.120
<v Speaker 3>over the last three to four years. It's been right,

0:33:46.160 --> 0:33:51.600
<v Speaker 3>it's been obliteration. And we're you know, we're pretty outspoken

0:33:51.680 --> 0:33:55.120
<v Speaker 3>that those type of applications don't work. Because what you'll

0:33:55.120 --> 0:33:57.880
<v Speaker 3>see at an asset management firm, they'll say, okay, great,

0:33:57.960 --> 0:34:00.200
<v Speaker 3>you have if you're a family office, you have five

0:34:00.240 --> 0:34:03.240
<v Speaker 3>hundred million dollars in equities, Let's take one percent a

0:34:03.320 --> 0:34:07.200
<v Speaker 3>year and allocate it to some long fall and then

0:34:07.520 --> 0:34:10.080
<v Speaker 3>over the course of years you realize that, well, that's

0:34:10.080 --> 0:34:12.880
<v Speaker 3>really destroying my portfolio. I can't just lose a percent

0:34:12.920 --> 0:34:18.399
<v Speaker 3>a year. That's why you're seeing more sophisticated institutions go

0:34:18.719 --> 0:34:22.920
<v Speaker 3>or lean towards tactical defensive hedging as opposed to the

0:34:22.960 --> 0:34:26.520
<v Speaker 3>solutions based defensive hedging, because those just really do not

0:34:26.600 --> 0:34:29.879
<v Speaker 3>work over the long run. So you just can't wake

0:34:29.960 --> 0:34:31.960
<v Speaker 3>up and say, yeah, I'm gonna buy a put and

0:34:32.000 --> 0:34:33.400
<v Speaker 3>just keep rolling it and rolling.

0:34:33.160 --> 0:34:35.520
<v Speaker 2>It right, That eventually costs a lot of money.

0:34:35.560 --> 0:34:37.359
<v Speaker 3>Exactly Who are the.

0:34:37.280 --> 0:34:42.360
<v Speaker 1>Big winners from the explosion in shortfall and derivatives in general?

0:34:42.400 --> 0:34:45.359
<v Speaker 1>I have to imagine that the CBOE would be in there,

0:34:45.440 --> 0:34:48.440
<v Speaker 1>given that they're the ones selling the shorter dated options.

0:34:48.480 --> 0:34:51.640
<v Speaker 1>Maybe some of the market makers who's making tons of

0:34:51.680 --> 0:34:52.279
<v Speaker 1>money from this.

0:34:53.920 --> 0:34:58.160
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, so definitely the exchanges are doing quite well. Market

0:34:58.239 --> 0:35:02.120
<v Speaker 3>makers generally do quite well when you have big ball environments.

0:35:02.280 --> 0:35:05.319
<v Speaker 3>For the most part, it's important to note, and I

0:35:05.360 --> 0:35:08.160
<v Speaker 3>think that this goes over a lot of it goes

0:35:08.160 --> 0:35:10.120
<v Speaker 3>over a lot of people's heads when they're going through

0:35:10.120 --> 0:35:16.879
<v Speaker 3>the research. Se Bow is incentivized to make sure that

0:35:16.960 --> 0:35:21.440
<v Speaker 3>the data that they're showing you is pretty right. So

0:35:21.480 --> 0:35:24.359
<v Speaker 3>Sebow's never really going to come out and say, hey,

0:35:24.680 --> 0:35:27.360
<v Speaker 3>all these options traded is a hazard because it just

0:35:27.400 --> 0:35:29.160
<v Speaker 3>goes against what they're trying to do as a business.

0:35:29.200 --> 0:35:31.520
<v Speaker 3>And for what it's where I like the guys at SEBO,

0:35:31.760 --> 0:35:35.160
<v Speaker 3>respect them clearly doing extremely well from a business standpoint,

0:35:35.239 --> 0:35:38.320
<v Speaker 3>But yeah, the exchanges are doing quite well. Market makers

0:35:38.360 --> 0:35:41.400
<v Speaker 3>are doing quite well. But when whenever you're reading research

0:35:41.520 --> 0:35:46.200
<v Speaker 3>or data about these options or zero DT, it's important

0:35:46.239 --> 0:35:47.920
<v Speaker 3>to take it with a grain of salt. When you're

0:35:47.920 --> 0:35:50.359
<v Speaker 3>getting the research from people who have been doing well.

0:35:51.440 --> 0:35:54.239
<v Speaker 2>I just have one more question, and it kind of

0:35:54.239 --> 0:35:56.440
<v Speaker 2>goes back to what I was saying, like, how you

0:35:56.480 --> 0:36:01.200
<v Speaker 2>know I understood the value of in come generating strategies

0:36:01.239 --> 0:36:03.520
<v Speaker 2>through derivatives, particularly in the zurb era when there was

0:36:03.600 --> 0:36:06.400
<v Speaker 2>not many sources of just sort of like income. You know,

0:36:06.520 --> 0:36:10.080
<v Speaker 2>the market complexion is obviously changed quite a bit because

0:36:10.239 --> 0:36:13.920
<v Speaker 2>although now you know there's yield, but also like traditional

0:36:14.040 --> 0:36:18.320
<v Speaker 2>like sort of natural hedges in the market don't work anymore.

0:36:18.320 --> 0:36:20.040
<v Speaker 2>So if you had you know this, the old sixty

0:36:20.080 --> 0:36:22.440
<v Speaker 2>forty portfolio, at least for a while, was like terrible

0:36:22.480 --> 0:36:24.560
<v Speaker 2>and so like this idea like, oh, a hedge by

0:36:24.560 --> 0:36:26.600
<v Speaker 2>having a little bit along here and long here, and

0:36:26.719 --> 0:36:29.200
<v Speaker 2>they do differently like that doesn't work. How has that

0:36:29.800 --> 0:36:34.000
<v Speaker 2>changed the vault trading business, These sort of reversals of

0:36:34.040 --> 0:36:37.480
<v Speaker 2>some long standing just sort of correlations of bread and

0:36:37.520 --> 0:36:38.240
<v Speaker 2>butter assets.

0:36:38.480 --> 0:36:41.239
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, I think it's it's for the good of the

0:36:41.239 --> 0:36:46.759
<v Speaker 3>ecosystem because I think it is cycled out. The bad managers,

0:36:47.200 --> 0:36:50.680
<v Speaker 3>the managers who have not been able to navigate this

0:36:50.840 --> 0:36:54.759
<v Speaker 3>environment have been really taken to the woodshed, And I

0:36:54.760 --> 0:36:58.120
<v Speaker 3>think that's important. You need a healthy cycle out of

0:36:58.160 --> 0:37:02.879
<v Speaker 3>those bad products and those bad managers, because look, everybody's

0:37:02.880 --> 0:37:06.319
<v Speaker 3>a hedge fund these days. Everybody manages some sort of

0:37:06.400 --> 0:37:10.640
<v Speaker 3>assets these days, and the reality is that that alpha

0:37:10.719 --> 0:37:15.640
<v Speaker 3>doesn't exist everywhere. So when you have poor products, after

0:37:15.719 --> 0:37:19.200
<v Speaker 3>a while, people start realizing just how poor they are,

0:37:19.719 --> 0:37:22.480
<v Speaker 3>and then those participants get cycled out. So I think

0:37:22.520 --> 0:37:26.040
<v Speaker 3>it's healthy that this sort of stuff has come to light,

0:37:26.480 --> 0:37:29.880
<v Speaker 3>because yeah, you shouldn't just be able to put somebody

0:37:29.960 --> 0:37:33.279
<v Speaker 3>in some generic put buying program you charge twenty five

0:37:33.320 --> 0:37:36.160
<v Speaker 3>basis points and you know five percent CENTI fee on that.

0:37:36.160 --> 0:37:37.279
<v Speaker 3>That doesn't just jibe. Well.

0:37:38.080 --> 0:37:40.719
<v Speaker 1>I have one more question, which is, how do you

0:37:41.280 --> 0:37:46.719
<v Speaker 1>prove that the explosion and options is having an impact

0:37:46.840 --> 0:37:50.560
<v Speaker 1>in the market, because so far, the observable pattern that

0:37:50.640 --> 0:37:52.920
<v Speaker 1>I have seen is that something like a December twenty

0:37:52.920 --> 0:37:57.160
<v Speaker 1>first happens where the market falls. JP Morgan publishes a

0:37:57.200 --> 0:38:00.600
<v Speaker 1>note saying part of this was because of short dated options,

0:38:00.640 --> 0:38:03.520
<v Speaker 1>and then the CBOE comes out and says, no, no, no,

0:38:03.520 --> 0:38:05.440
<v Speaker 1>we didn't see any evidence of that, and you have

0:38:05.520 --> 0:38:10.200
<v Speaker 1>all this polarized commentary. It feels like in something as

0:38:10.239 --> 0:38:14.200
<v Speaker 1>mathematical as options trading and finance, we should be able

0:38:14.239 --> 0:38:17.320
<v Speaker 1>to point to concrete evidence, but we are still having

0:38:17.320 --> 0:38:19.640
<v Speaker 1>this debate about the overall impact. So what do you

0:38:19.719 --> 0:38:21.920
<v Speaker 1>look at to prove that this is happening.

0:38:23.040 --> 0:38:25.440
<v Speaker 3>So the way how we trade is literally a second

0:38:25.520 --> 0:38:28.680
<v Speaker 3>by second basis, and I think unless you're trading like that,

0:38:29.239 --> 0:38:32.560
<v Speaker 3>you won't be able to have a good picture as

0:38:32.600 --> 0:38:35.920
<v Speaker 3>to what's going on. So we have certain agency desks

0:38:36.120 --> 0:38:39.560
<v Speaker 3>and market makers that cover our flow, and you talk

0:38:39.640 --> 0:38:41.560
<v Speaker 3>to these guys, you go out to eat with them,

0:38:42.080 --> 0:38:45.479
<v Speaker 3>you build relationships with them, and there's an ongoing joke

0:38:46.120 --> 0:38:49.760
<v Speaker 3>that we have with one of them, and they say, listen,

0:38:50.239 --> 0:38:55.719
<v Speaker 3>every time volatility spikes, we have five clients that will

0:38:55.719 --> 0:38:58.080
<v Speaker 3>come in and fight with each other to sell it.

0:38:59.360 --> 0:39:03.480
<v Speaker 3>They are jumping over one another to sell volatility. Now,

0:39:03.920 --> 0:39:06.640
<v Speaker 3>it's hard when you don't have that color or you're

0:39:06.920 --> 0:39:11.920
<v Speaker 3>only seeing a price on screens, But when you understand

0:39:12.000 --> 0:39:17.040
<v Speaker 3>the ecosystem and what's transpiring under the hood, it paints

0:39:17.200 --> 0:39:21.520
<v Speaker 3>a cleaner mosaic to understand that we've only seen one

0:39:21.560 --> 0:39:26.680
<v Speaker 3>side of the equation, which is yeah, volatility being stabilizing

0:39:26.920 --> 0:39:31.120
<v Speaker 3>and just not really performing endorment markets. But there will

0:39:31.120 --> 0:39:35.080
<v Speaker 3>come a day when there's a catalyst that pushes this

0:39:35.120 --> 0:39:39.040
<v Speaker 3>thing through. And it's very similar to like Vallmageddon, where

0:39:39.719 --> 0:39:44.279
<v Speaker 3>everybody who was trading vault during that time understood the

0:39:44.360 --> 0:39:48.239
<v Speaker 3>exposures were baked into the etpis, and then after it

0:39:48.280 --> 0:39:51.480
<v Speaker 3>occurs they'll say, oh, yeah, it was so obvious. Didn't

0:39:51.520 --> 0:39:55.759
<v Speaker 3>you know that everybody was short volatility in the ETPs H.

0:39:55.760 --> 0:39:58.000
<v Speaker 1>I swear to god, it was not obvious to everyone.

0:39:58.080 --> 0:40:00.160
<v Speaker 1>Chris sid You'll thank you so much again for me

0:40:00.200 --> 0:40:03.680
<v Speaker 1>back on all thoughts that was a fantastic explanation of

0:40:03.880 --> 0:40:06.080
<v Speaker 1>you know, a pretty technical change in the markets, but

0:40:06.160 --> 0:40:07.480
<v Speaker 1>an important one. So thank you.

0:40:08.520 --> 0:40:09.799
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, that was great, Thank you so much.

0:40:22.560 --> 0:40:25.440
<v Speaker 1>Joe. That was so good. That was really interesting. I

0:40:25.440 --> 0:40:29.520
<v Speaker 1>have a joke. It's not as good as Chris's joke,

0:40:29.560 --> 0:40:30.879
<v Speaker 1>though maybe I shouldn't tell it.

0:40:31.280 --> 0:40:33.279
<v Speaker 2>Tell it, tell it, tell it.

0:40:34.000 --> 0:40:37.560
<v Speaker 1>What is a risk manager with a science degree at

0:40:37.760 --> 0:40:41.840
<v Speaker 1>a large market maker say when he wants a salary increase?

0:40:45.800 --> 0:40:47.720
<v Speaker 1>Tell me he asks for a Gamma raise.

0:40:48.400 --> 0:40:49.520
<v Speaker 2>That's good. Yeah, it's good.

0:40:50.520 --> 0:40:51.959
<v Speaker 1>That's good, Gama raise.

0:40:52.000 --> 0:40:52.359
<v Speaker 3>It's good.

0:40:52.360 --> 0:40:56.239
<v Speaker 1>It's good for Gamma raise. I'll work a workshop.

0:40:57.480 --> 0:40:57.560
<v Speaker 2>No.

0:40:57.680 --> 0:41:02.239
<v Speaker 1>I thought that was really interesting. He's sort of Chris crystallized. Oh,

0:41:02.400 --> 0:41:05.440
<v Speaker 1>Chris crystallized something in my head which was about the

0:41:05.480 --> 0:41:09.719
<v Speaker 1>exact mechanism of the feedback loop. Because I had assumed

0:41:09.840 --> 0:41:13.400
<v Speaker 1>that as the market moves around, like people are lessening

0:41:13.520 --> 0:41:16.000
<v Speaker 1>their exposure, but as he put it, like the thing

0:41:16.040 --> 0:41:19.319
<v Speaker 1>they're doing to lessen the exposure can also lead to

0:41:19.440 --> 0:41:22.640
<v Speaker 1>market maker behavior that is not ideal. In the stock's

0:41:22.680 --> 0:41:25.640
<v Speaker 1>going down, everyone scrambling all together a scenario.

0:41:26.000 --> 0:41:27.719
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I thought that was very interesting. I also just

0:41:27.719 --> 0:41:31.000
<v Speaker 2>thought like the sort of big picture if you have

0:41:31.040 --> 0:41:36.800
<v Speaker 2>a lot of money, you just cannot buy insurance trivially.

0:41:36.880 --> 0:41:38.600
<v Speaker 2>It's not like he's like, oh, I'm just gonna like,

0:41:38.760 --> 0:41:40.839
<v Speaker 2>as you pointed out, like you know, you take one

0:41:40.880 --> 0:41:43.720
<v Speaker 2>percent of your assets a year and roll it into

0:41:43.760 --> 0:41:46.840
<v Speaker 2>some fun that supposedly is going to deliver major returns

0:41:46.880 --> 0:41:49.840
<v Speaker 2>every time there's a pandemic or some major thing, like

0:41:49.880 --> 0:41:53.040
<v Speaker 2>you're just gonna lose too much money that way. And

0:41:53.120 --> 0:41:54.719
<v Speaker 2>so then the idea of like, okay, well, like these

0:41:54.760 --> 0:41:58.320
<v Speaker 2>institutions take the other side and see opportunities in shorting

0:41:58.400 --> 0:42:01.680
<v Speaker 2>vall and so you sort of see how how this

0:42:01.800 --> 0:42:04.280
<v Speaker 2>trade can just get so large on one side.

0:42:04.400 --> 0:42:07.440
<v Speaker 1>I also like the point that, okay, this is not nothing.

0:42:07.680 --> 0:42:10.920
<v Speaker 1>It's not a trivial evolution of the market. But at

0:42:10.920 --> 0:42:14.280
<v Speaker 1>the same time, it's not a black Monday black shoals

0:42:14.520 --> 0:42:16.799
<v Speaker 1>reducts where this is going to lead to like a

0:42:16.880 --> 0:42:19.480
<v Speaker 1>massive crash because at the end of the day one

0:42:19.560 --> 0:42:22.440
<v Speaker 1>day options expire. At the end of the day, the

0:42:22.560 --> 0:42:26.560
<v Speaker 1>options are ended. The end day options end. Okay, I

0:42:26.560 --> 0:42:26.799
<v Speaker 1>need to.

0:42:26.800 --> 0:42:29.759
<v Speaker 2>Work that work, thank you, But there's something there.

0:42:29.800 --> 0:42:32.000
<v Speaker 1>But no, I like that point. I thought it was

0:42:32.000 --> 0:42:34.840
<v Speaker 1>a very clear description of the ecosystem. Yeah, and it

0:42:34.960 --> 0:42:38.520
<v Speaker 1>is amazing to me, given everything that's sort of gone on,

0:42:38.760 --> 0:42:42.719
<v Speaker 1>how much the vault trading environment has changed, because you

0:42:42.719 --> 0:42:46.520
<v Speaker 1>would have thought after twenty eighteen, after the wildness of

0:42:46.600 --> 0:42:49.800
<v Speaker 1>the post pandemic period, that things would have gone in

0:42:49.840 --> 0:42:52.120
<v Speaker 1>the other direction, but nope, no.

0:42:52.280 --> 0:42:55.279
<v Speaker 2>And also we knew because of you know, we took

0:42:55.400 --> 0:42:59.839
<v Speaker 2>in twenty twenty one. We talked a lot about retail obviously,

0:43:00.600 --> 0:43:02.960
<v Speaker 2>but it really is telling and then that fell off,

0:43:03.320 --> 0:43:05.280
<v Speaker 2>and then you know, you could see, you know, Cibo

0:43:05.440 --> 0:43:07.600
<v Speaker 2>as a stock kind of peaked at the end of

0:43:07.640 --> 0:43:10.000
<v Speaker 2>twenty twenty one for a while and then fell and everything.

0:43:10.320 --> 0:43:14.600
<v Speaker 2>But obviously there's just so much more than retail. And

0:43:14.680 --> 0:43:16.360
<v Speaker 2>so when we're talking, you know, I think if people

0:43:16.400 --> 0:43:18.960
<v Speaker 2>hear zero day options or any of these options, you know,

0:43:19.000 --> 0:43:20.640
<v Speaker 2>they just sort of think about people like on their

0:43:20.680 --> 0:43:24.240
<v Speaker 2>apps gambling. But the idea that it's not necessarily gambling,

0:43:24.280 --> 0:43:27.960
<v Speaker 2>but there's sort of like very dynamic intentional hedging participation

0:43:28.080 --> 0:43:30.280
<v Speaker 2>in these markets from big money is pretty astounding.

0:43:30.360 --> 0:43:33.399
<v Speaker 1>Sometimes it is gambling though, and there's gambling all right, well,

0:43:33.880 --> 0:43:36.640
<v Speaker 1>at the end of the day, one day options expire,

0:43:36.760 --> 0:43:40.239
<v Speaker 1>that's what it is. But the conversation and the controversy

0:43:40.280 --> 0:43:43.160
<v Speaker 1>over them certainly does not. It goes on forever.

0:43:43.560 --> 0:43:44.120
<v Speaker 2>Sounds good.

0:43:44.160 --> 0:43:44.840
<v Speaker 1>Shall we leave it there?

0:43:44.960 --> 0:43:45.640
<v Speaker 2>Let's leave it there.

0:43:46.000 --> 0:43:48.800
<v Speaker 1>This has been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast.

0:43:49.080 --> 0:43:52.280
<v Speaker 1>I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway.

0:43:52.040 --> 0:43:54.160
<v Speaker 2>And I'm Jill Wisenthal. You could have followed me at

0:43:54.160 --> 0:43:57.279
<v Speaker 2>the Stalwart. Follow our guest Chris Sidiel, He's at CA

0:43:57.600 --> 0:44:02.400
<v Speaker 2>sid I. I Hello our producers Kerman Rodriguez at Kerman

0:44:02.560 --> 0:44:06.200
<v Speaker 2>armand dash Ol Bennett at Dashbot and Kelbrooks at Kelbrooks.

0:44:06.600 --> 0:44:10.000
<v Speaker 2>Thank you to our producer Moses Ondem. For more Oddlots content,

0:44:10.040 --> 0:44:12.360
<v Speaker 2>go to Bloomberg dot com slash odd Lots, where we

0:44:12.400 --> 0:44:15.719
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<v Speaker 1>Thanks for listening. Stood in the Eiler