1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:03,000 Speaker 1: You know. I don't know if we've ever done this, 2 00:00:03,120 --> 00:00:06,280 Speaker 1: but this week's classic is the second installment of our 3 00:00:06,320 --> 00:00:09,840 Speaker 1: two part series on the Sony Hack, and so much 4 00:00:09,840 --> 00:00:12,160 Speaker 1: has happened since that. I think a lot of people 5 00:00:12,440 --> 00:00:16,400 Speaker 1: have forgotten just how weird this was, and uh, the 6 00:00:16,520 --> 00:00:21,360 Speaker 1: kind of precedent. It's set for cyber warfare of the future. Yes, 7 00:00:21,520 --> 00:00:24,200 Speaker 1: just like the President our first episode on this topic 8 00:00:24,239 --> 00:00:26,840 Speaker 1: set for how excited you are to be hearing this 9 00:00:26,880 --> 00:00:31,640 Speaker 1: episode right now? So so, but without any further ado, 10 00:00:31,920 --> 00:00:35,760 Speaker 1: let's get into it. From UFOs two, Ghosts and government 11 00:00:35,800 --> 00:00:39,559 Speaker 1: cover ups. History is writtled with unexplained events. You can 12 00:00:39,600 --> 00:00:42,440 Speaker 1: turn back now or learn the stuff they don't want 13 00:00:42,440 --> 00:00:50,239 Speaker 1: you to now previously other stuff they don't want you 14 00:00:50,320 --> 00:00:53,600 Speaker 1: to know. Stay away from that datamat. It's gonna blow. 15 00:00:54,160 --> 00:00:57,320 Speaker 1: The movie of terrorism must be stopped. But what if 16 00:00:57,360 --> 00:01:00,840 Speaker 1: someone tried to censor pants? Hey guys, it's Jonathan Strickland. 17 00:01:01,120 --> 00:01:03,360 Speaker 1: I'm from Tech Stuff, and I'm still in this room 18 00:01:03,400 --> 00:01:06,200 Speaker 1: with you. Yes, this is part two of our episodes. 19 00:01:06,319 --> 00:01:09,160 Speaker 1: Let's just hop in that you know who we are. 20 00:01:09,280 --> 00:01:11,760 Speaker 1: I'm Matt, that's Ben, this is Jonathan. We're having a 21 00:01:11,760 --> 00:01:15,199 Speaker 1: great time and it's getting hacky and kind of North 22 00:01:15,280 --> 00:01:23,759 Speaker 1: Korea in here. Yeah. Another thing to remember about this, uh, 23 00:01:24,000 --> 00:01:26,800 Speaker 1: something else that that doesn't necessarily point the finger at 24 00:01:26,800 --> 00:01:30,039 Speaker 1: North Korea, but to show the magnitude of this attack. 25 00:01:30,080 --> 00:01:34,319 Speaker 1: It wasn't just the information with stolen. They white computers 26 00:01:34,360 --> 00:01:37,080 Speaker 1: at Sony Pictures. So people who came in to work 27 00:01:37,080 --> 00:01:39,800 Speaker 1: on that Monday. I read uh an interview with guy 28 00:01:40,720 --> 00:01:43,840 Speaker 1: he wasn't named, but he wasn't employee son the aftermath 29 00:01:43,880 --> 00:01:46,319 Speaker 1: at Sony Yes, where he said, Yeah, we come in 30 00:01:46,360 --> 00:01:48,840 Speaker 1: to work on Monday, we turn on our computers, we're working. 31 00:01:48,840 --> 00:01:51,600 Speaker 1: Suddenly all the computers go black. We figure there's just 32 00:01:51,680 --> 00:01:55,120 Speaker 1: some sort of network error or something. We realize that 33 00:01:55,240 --> 00:01:58,240 Speaker 1: there's a real problem, and we go home, not thinking 34 00:01:58,280 --> 00:01:59,640 Speaker 1: it's a big deal because it was the week of 35 00:01:59,680 --> 00:02:01,560 Speaker 1: thanks Living, which is a holiday week here in the 36 00:02:01,640 --> 00:02:04,440 Speaker 1: United States. So they went home thinking, oh, well, we'll 37 00:02:04,480 --> 00:02:05,920 Speaker 1: just come back and it will just be an extra 38 00:02:05,960 --> 00:02:08,760 Speaker 1: long holiday. We hurry for us. They come back the 39 00:02:08,760 --> 00:02:12,800 Speaker 1: following Monday, there's still problems, and then they realize there 40 00:02:12,800 --> 00:02:16,120 Speaker 1: could be a lot of personal information about the employees 41 00:02:16,120 --> 00:02:19,000 Speaker 1: of Sony that was wrapped up as part of this attack, 42 00:02:19,080 --> 00:02:23,200 Speaker 1: and it could involve things like insurance claim just really 43 00:02:23,240 --> 00:02:26,200 Speaker 1: personal stuff that could impact real human beings who have 44 00:02:26,360 --> 00:02:30,960 Speaker 1: real lives. Social security numbers, yeah, yeah, social security numbers. 45 00:02:31,240 --> 00:02:34,720 Speaker 1: That means that opens the door for possibility of medical information. 46 00:02:35,040 --> 00:02:37,200 Speaker 1: And I have a little bit of a theory about 47 00:02:37,200 --> 00:02:39,040 Speaker 1: this stuff, but I'm gonna hold it until we get 48 00:02:39,040 --> 00:02:41,519 Speaker 1: through the rest of this story. On December four, and 49 00:02:41,560 --> 00:02:45,040 Speaker 1: North Korea officially denies any involvement in the Sony hack. 50 00:02:45,360 --> 00:02:48,120 Speaker 1: Like Shaggy and MC. Some of the older members of 51 00:02:48,160 --> 00:02:53,320 Speaker 1: our audience may remember he said it wasn't me. Wow, 52 00:02:53,400 --> 00:02:56,960 Speaker 1: that's not bad. Hey, Shaggy formally a marine as well. 53 00:02:57,560 --> 00:03:04,200 Speaker 1: But I didn't see that coming. It wasn't But this, uh, 54 00:03:04,360 --> 00:03:07,919 Speaker 1: these leaked emails are still coming out. Journalists are all 55 00:03:08,040 --> 00:03:12,880 Speaker 1: over this, scouring the documents. Uh the spokesperson and I 56 00:03:12,960 --> 00:03:16,240 Speaker 1: remember we said that December four, right, North Korea officially 57 00:03:16,280 --> 00:03:19,440 Speaker 1: says it wasn't me and uh. December eighth, however, a 58 00:03:19,440 --> 00:03:23,440 Speaker 1: spokesperson for North Korea says the cyber attack might have 59 00:03:23,560 --> 00:03:28,600 Speaker 1: been a righteous deed of supporters and sympathizers, but it 60 00:03:28,720 --> 00:03:32,680 Speaker 1: wasn't directly linked to us, which is very similar to 61 00:03:33,240 --> 00:03:36,760 Speaker 1: some of the stuff we've heard from state sponsored cyber 62 00:03:36,760 --> 00:03:42,480 Speaker 1: attacks via Moscow via Beijing. Um, and I'm sure that 63 00:03:42,840 --> 00:03:48,680 Speaker 1: you know, I'm sure that Uncle Sam's doing a couple too. Yeah. Hey, 64 00:03:48,720 --> 00:03:53,400 Speaker 1: that was officially not the United States. That's the old 65 00:03:53,400 --> 00:03:55,360 Speaker 1: plank in the eye thing and get the spec out 66 00:03:55,400 --> 00:03:57,560 Speaker 1: of your eye. But there's a plank in mind, right, 67 00:03:57,640 --> 00:04:01,000 Speaker 1: So this continues though. Yeah, and then on December ninth, 68 00:04:01,120 --> 00:04:03,480 Speaker 1: there was a message posted to get hub which was 69 00:04:03,560 --> 00:04:07,120 Speaker 1: allegedly from the Guardians of Peace. Now, it is extremely 70 00:04:07,160 --> 00:04:11,120 Speaker 1: difficult to verify whether or not, and an anonymous message 71 00:04:11,200 --> 00:04:13,480 Speaker 1: like that is from the same person that posted the 72 00:04:13,520 --> 00:04:16,360 Speaker 1: other anonymous thing. This is this is like attributing anything 73 00:04:16,400 --> 00:04:20,240 Speaker 1: to the group Anonymous, where where Anonymous itself is not 74 00:04:20,320 --> 00:04:23,680 Speaker 1: a cohesive group with a single leader. It's actually a 75 00:04:23,880 --> 00:04:28,000 Speaker 1: sort of a morphous semi organization. And you could even 76 00:04:28,120 --> 00:04:31,440 Speaker 1: have one group of people within that organization want to 77 00:04:31,480 --> 00:04:37,040 Speaker 1: do something. Yeah, exactly, So well in that light, since 78 00:04:37,080 --> 00:04:39,600 Speaker 1: we're not sure if this message came from the same 79 00:04:39,640 --> 00:04:42,919 Speaker 1: people that you did the Voice of Ben, would you 80 00:04:42,960 --> 00:04:46,600 Speaker 1: mind doing an evil voice or like an evil voice, 81 00:04:46,640 --> 00:04:49,960 Speaker 1: or however you want to spend it, stop immediately showing 82 00:04:50,000 --> 00:04:52,200 Speaker 1: the movie of terrorism which could back the regional peace 83 00:04:52,279 --> 00:04:54,880 Speaker 1: then cause the war. See added that sea at the end, 84 00:04:55,560 --> 00:04:57,760 Speaker 1: we know nothing about the darting email or see by 85 00:04:57,839 --> 00:05:00,679 Speaker 1: Sony staff see, but you should judge why it's by yourself, 86 00:05:00,720 --> 00:05:03,000 Speaker 1: why such things are happening and who is responsible for 87 00:05:03,040 --> 00:05:09,040 Speaker 1: what you Sony and FBI cannot find us amazing. So 88 00:05:09,040 --> 00:05:14,240 Speaker 1: so this, this supposed representative of Guardians of Peace, denies 89 00:05:14,360 --> 00:05:19,680 Speaker 1: knowledge of a previous message also supposedly from Guardians of Peace. 90 00:05:20,560 --> 00:05:23,640 Speaker 1: But it's also for the first time in the messages 91 00:05:23,680 --> 00:05:27,000 Speaker 1: from these guys saying stop the movie of terrorism. It 92 00:05:27,040 --> 00:05:31,360 Speaker 1: does not say the interview, right, but it's specifically talking 93 00:05:31,400 --> 00:05:34,000 Speaker 1: about a movie. Else is a stop immediately showing and 94 00:05:34,040 --> 00:05:37,760 Speaker 1: the movie hadn't come out yet. Uh December ten, though 95 00:05:37,800 --> 00:05:40,839 Speaker 1: they get this message gets a little bit of street 96 00:05:40,880 --> 00:05:45,480 Speaker 1: cred courtesy of Joe Demost, assistant director for the FBI 97 00:05:45,600 --> 00:05:49,560 Speaker 1: Cyber Division. Yeah, he was talking at a cybersecurity conference 98 00:05:49,560 --> 00:05:52,240 Speaker 1: when he said, quote, there is no this is on 99 00:05:52,279 --> 00:05:55,920 Speaker 1: December tenth, quote there is no attribution to North Korea 100 00:05:56,040 --> 00:06:00,960 Speaker 1: at this point. The speaking of the attack the Sony hack, right, 101 00:06:01,080 --> 00:06:04,360 Speaker 1: And it's been described by a private security firm named 102 00:06:04,680 --> 00:06:08,080 Speaker 1: fire Eye as an unparalleled, well planned crime carried out 103 00:06:08,080 --> 00:06:11,680 Speaker 1: by an organized group for which neither spe nor any 104 00:06:11,720 --> 00:06:14,600 Speaker 1: other companies could have been fully prepared. So that's Sony 105 00:06:14,600 --> 00:06:18,160 Speaker 1: Picture Entertainment. So they say there's no way to prepare 106 00:06:18,279 --> 00:06:21,040 Speaker 1: for this sort of level. Uh, this sort of cyberus, 107 00:06:21,040 --> 00:06:25,440 Speaker 1: you know. But they also discussed how they were criticizing 108 00:06:25,520 --> 00:06:29,800 Speaker 1: Sony for their security. Um, they're saying that there were 109 00:06:29,800 --> 00:06:34,000 Speaker 1: a lot of backdoors and and essentially little uh let's 110 00:06:34,000 --> 00:06:36,880 Speaker 1: just I don't know if you call loopholes, but fairly 111 00:06:36,920 --> 00:06:40,120 Speaker 1: easy ways of gaining access. Sure, I mean backdoors is 112 00:06:40,120 --> 00:06:42,840 Speaker 1: probably the best way of putting it. Like, the two 113 00:06:42,880 --> 00:06:45,719 Speaker 1: things you've got to worry about with your your online 114 00:06:45,720 --> 00:06:48,920 Speaker 1: security is just the value of the security system and 115 00:06:48,960 --> 00:06:51,280 Speaker 1: then the value of the people who use it. Those 116 00:06:51,320 --> 00:06:54,400 Speaker 1: are the two elements. Well, we know that for instance, 117 00:06:54,400 --> 00:06:56,800 Speaker 1: with I Love they brought up steck stucks Net earlier 118 00:06:56,960 --> 00:07:00,320 Speaker 1: because one of the things that was abundantly clear about 119 00:07:00,400 --> 00:07:05,160 Speaker 1: stucks net this this was this was a program most 120 00:07:05,200 --> 00:07:08,720 Speaker 1: likely created by Israel and the United States working together, right, 121 00:07:09,000 --> 00:07:12,400 Speaker 1: And what it did was it altered the speed of 122 00:07:12,560 --> 00:07:17,480 Speaker 1: center fuges in the nuclear processing in or on and uh. 123 00:07:17,800 --> 00:07:22,840 Speaker 1: And then screwed up the entire nuclear UH facility, or 124 00:07:22,880 --> 00:07:27,040 Speaker 1: at least the process of refining this. Those computers, however, 125 00:07:27,120 --> 00:07:29,960 Speaker 1: were offline, which means that the only way that stucks 126 00:07:29,960 --> 00:07:32,560 Speaker 1: net could be introduced into that system would be what 127 00:07:32,720 --> 00:07:36,040 Speaker 1: via USB driving thumb thumb drive of some sort or 128 00:07:36,280 --> 00:07:38,960 Speaker 1: some other some other physical delivery system, which would mean 129 00:07:38,960 --> 00:07:42,440 Speaker 1: getting physical access to those machines, which would mean either 130 00:07:42,840 --> 00:07:48,160 Speaker 1: infiltrating the the system entirely, well as in having a 131 00:07:48,480 --> 00:07:51,560 Speaker 1: like a cover agent going in and becoming part of this, 132 00:07:51,720 --> 00:07:56,200 Speaker 1: or more likely using social engineering to get access UH, 133 00:07:56,520 --> 00:08:00,400 Speaker 1: using just simple lying to people. It's really see if 134 00:08:00,440 --> 00:08:04,320 Speaker 1: I walk into a company and I tell an overworked 135 00:08:04,320 --> 00:08:08,000 Speaker 1: receptionist that I'm there because there was an I t 136 00:08:08,240 --> 00:08:10,800 Speaker 1: issue that and I need access to a certain floor 137 00:08:11,320 --> 00:08:16,840 Speaker 1: more nine times ten I get that access. Really well, 138 00:08:18,520 --> 00:08:20,240 Speaker 1: why do you think I'm not my desk so much 139 00:08:20,320 --> 00:08:22,920 Speaker 1: during the day? What happened to the old janitor buddy? 140 00:08:24,480 --> 00:08:27,040 Speaker 1: That's that's a really good point that the human element 141 00:08:27,200 --> 00:08:30,760 Speaker 1: is often going to be what compromises a system. Sure, 142 00:08:31,000 --> 00:08:34,600 Speaker 1: and we also know that Seth Rogan and James Franco 143 00:08:34,640 --> 00:08:36,719 Speaker 1: of course have some stuff to say about this. I mean, 144 00:08:36,840 --> 00:08:38,920 Speaker 1: I don't know if they still get paid if the 145 00:08:38,960 --> 00:08:42,200 Speaker 1: movie doesn't come out the way it was supposed to. Um. 146 00:08:42,240 --> 00:08:45,000 Speaker 1: I yeah, I don't know if the full contract was 147 00:08:45,040 --> 00:08:47,040 Speaker 1: released in the hacks. If it was, I have not 148 00:08:47,160 --> 00:08:49,319 Speaker 1: read it. I just talked about the money that they 149 00:08:49,360 --> 00:08:51,880 Speaker 1: made for the films. But one thing I do know 150 00:08:51,920 --> 00:08:53,960 Speaker 1: is that they went on Howard Sterns Show on the 151 00:08:54,040 --> 00:08:59,840 Speaker 1: fifte of December and in discussions with Mr Stern, I 152 00:09:00,040 --> 00:09:02,560 Speaker 1: just wanted to read this one quote from Seth Rogan. 153 00:09:03,400 --> 00:09:05,800 Speaker 1: He says, I can't do an impression. Seth Rogan, man, 154 00:09:05,840 --> 00:09:09,680 Speaker 1: I wish I could. All Right, I believe in you, dude, 155 00:09:09,800 --> 00:09:14,080 Speaker 1: he says, Now, no one has definitively told us that 156 00:09:14,160 --> 00:09:17,040 Speaker 1: North Korea is who did that. One day, I'm like, 157 00:09:17,320 --> 00:09:19,120 Speaker 1: it's for sure them, And the next day I'm like, 158 00:09:19,200 --> 00:09:22,440 Speaker 1: there's no way it's them. It seems too it seems 159 00:09:22,480 --> 00:09:26,040 Speaker 1: too savvy of Hollywood politics. And he's speaking as a 160 00:09:26,040 --> 00:09:29,640 Speaker 1: producer of the film, um, you know, and director and writer. 161 00:09:30,120 --> 00:09:32,760 Speaker 1: And when they were talking about this stuff, they were 162 00:09:32,800 --> 00:09:35,920 Speaker 1: just speaking about some of the more insider information that 163 00:09:36,040 --> 00:09:39,120 Speaker 1: was leaked, and why would they leak all of that stuff? 164 00:09:39,160 --> 00:09:42,199 Speaker 1: Why would North Korea care about that. Why would North 165 00:09:42,280 --> 00:09:46,360 Speaker 1: Korea be aware that that itself would be the key 166 00:09:46,520 --> 00:09:52,680 Speaker 1: to UH to causing action to happen, especially since North 167 00:09:52,760 --> 00:09:55,920 Speaker 1: Korea didn't if it were, if it was in fact 168 00:09:55,920 --> 00:09:58,120 Speaker 1: North Korea and the interview was in fact the reason 169 00:09:58,240 --> 00:10:01,160 Speaker 1: for it, why wasn't that at ever part of the 170 00:10:01,240 --> 00:10:05,000 Speaker 1: messaging at the initial messaging? Right? Why is the messaging 171 00:10:05,160 --> 00:10:09,160 Speaker 1: seemed to evolve? And uh, speaking of evolving, we know 172 00:10:09,240 --> 00:10:12,800 Speaker 1: in December sixteen they up the stakes and specified the 173 00:10:12,880 --> 00:10:16,199 Speaker 1: interview itself when they said that movie theaters showing this 174 00:10:16,320 --> 00:10:20,000 Speaker 1: feature would be attacked in a quote here nine eleven 175 00:10:20,080 --> 00:10:22,480 Speaker 1: style and what they said, and that, I mean, if 176 00:10:22,520 --> 00:10:25,960 Speaker 1: you want to hit a hot button like nerve in 177 00:10:26,120 --> 00:10:28,839 Speaker 1: the American psychling, that's all you have to say. And 178 00:10:28,880 --> 00:10:32,640 Speaker 1: as Jon Stewart said, I had no idea that was 179 00:10:32,679 --> 00:10:37,360 Speaker 1: a style. Now, yeah, and yes, And then you you 180 00:10:37,400 --> 00:10:40,280 Speaker 1: go back to our recent memory, you think about the 181 00:10:40,320 --> 00:10:44,720 Speaker 1: Batman shooting at a movie theater in Colorado, Yeah, and 182 00:10:44,760 --> 00:10:48,000 Speaker 1: you just it kind of conjures a lot of images. Well, yeah, 183 00:10:48,000 --> 00:10:52,120 Speaker 1: there there have been actual acts of terror, depending upon 184 00:10:52,320 --> 00:10:54,400 Speaker 1: you know, how you look at at the definition. But 185 00:10:54,440 --> 00:10:56,320 Speaker 1: there have been acts of terror that have taken place 186 00:10:56,440 --> 00:11:02,720 Speaker 1: inside UH movie theaters in the United States, and so 187 00:11:03,120 --> 00:11:06,679 Speaker 1: this was a very evocative kind of message. It's one 188 00:11:06,720 --> 00:11:10,040 Speaker 1: that a lot of companies took very serious for for 189 00:11:10,600 --> 00:11:13,080 Speaker 1: understandable reasons. I mean, there was a lot of backlash 190 00:11:13,160 --> 00:11:16,000 Speaker 1: for the for their their actions, that action being that 191 00:11:16,360 --> 00:11:20,480 Speaker 1: Car Mike theaters began to cancel screenings of the Interview 192 00:11:20,480 --> 00:11:25,360 Speaker 1: and that was followed by every other major UH theater chain, 193 00:11:25,679 --> 00:11:27,880 Speaker 1: to the point where it would looked like the only 194 00:11:27,920 --> 00:11:29,760 Speaker 1: place you were going to see The Interview for a 195 00:11:29,760 --> 00:11:32,640 Speaker 1: while was going to be in these tiny, little independent 196 00:11:32,800 --> 00:11:35,120 Speaker 1: arthouse theaters, which is the weirdest thing in the world. 197 00:11:35,520 --> 00:11:39,600 Speaker 1: This is a major film from a major motion picture 198 00:11:39,679 --> 00:11:42,960 Speaker 1: studio that would only get seen in art house pictures 199 00:11:43,120 --> 00:11:46,560 Speaker 1: at artnhouse theaters. And then you don't even get that. 200 00:11:48,160 --> 00:11:52,120 Speaker 1: So Sony announces the cancelation of the whole theatrical release. 201 00:11:52,160 --> 00:11:55,040 Speaker 1: And mind you, this is after car Mike begins sets 202 00:11:55,040 --> 00:11:59,080 Speaker 1: off that domino, after they canceled the premiere on summary 203 00:11:59,200 --> 00:12:02,040 Speaker 1: team right right, And not only did they announce the 204 00:12:02,040 --> 00:12:05,319 Speaker 1: cancelation of the theatrical release, they went further than that. 205 00:12:05,400 --> 00:12:07,800 Speaker 1: They said that this movie would not be released in 206 00:12:07,840 --> 00:12:12,800 Speaker 1: any format for at least the foreseeable future. So they 207 00:12:12,800 --> 00:12:15,320 Speaker 1: were saying at that time, they were saying it's not 208 00:12:15,320 --> 00:12:16,920 Speaker 1: going to come out in video on demand because a 209 00:12:16,920 --> 00:12:18,439 Speaker 1: lot of people said, why don't you just release a 210 00:12:18,559 --> 00:12:21,840 Speaker 1: video on demand? Yeah, they can't attack us all and 211 00:12:21,840 --> 00:12:23,920 Speaker 1: then yeah, they're not going to come into our homes, 212 00:12:24,840 --> 00:12:27,800 Speaker 1: but there's there's not gonna be that you could or 213 00:12:27,880 --> 00:12:29,880 Speaker 1: you could do it as uh, you know, DVD or 214 00:12:29,880 --> 00:12:31,600 Speaker 1: blue ray. But they were saying, no, we have no 215 00:12:31,720 --> 00:12:34,520 Speaker 1: plans to release this film in any form and read 216 00:12:34,600 --> 00:12:36,720 Speaker 1: it even banned a couple of users. That's how you 217 00:12:36,720 --> 00:12:40,840 Speaker 1: know stuff's getting real for sharing some leaked documents and 218 00:12:41,320 --> 00:12:47,199 Speaker 1: I think for possibly trying to find the actual interview 219 00:12:47,800 --> 00:12:51,160 Speaker 1: the the actual movie. So so remember back on the tenth, 220 00:12:51,360 --> 00:12:54,240 Speaker 1: the FBI said there is no link, no attribution right 221 00:12:55,080 --> 00:12:59,160 Speaker 1: then on the UM and I hate to use this 222 00:12:59,440 --> 00:13:02,200 Speaker 1: quote on anymous White House officials, but that's how the 223 00:13:02,200 --> 00:13:06,320 Speaker 1: Guardian reported it. UM anonymous White House officials say that 224 00:13:06,360 --> 00:13:09,920 Speaker 1: the US has evidence that the hack was coordinated by 225 00:13:10,000 --> 00:13:13,920 Speaker 1: North Korea. Now there's some words in there that they're 226 00:13:13,920 --> 00:13:17,160 Speaker 1: a little vague I think on purpose. Yeah, coordinated could 227 00:13:17,280 --> 00:13:22,160 Speaker 1: mean that North Korea could have been essentially the the 228 00:13:22,600 --> 00:13:24,400 Speaker 1: if you want to think about the money behind the 229 00:13:24,440 --> 00:13:30,160 Speaker 1: attacks attack, and then they essentially hire out our contract 230 00:13:30,160 --> 00:13:33,560 Speaker 1: out hackers, possibly in some place like China or Russia 231 00:13:33,640 --> 00:13:35,520 Speaker 1: where we know there are a lot of state sponsored 232 00:13:35,559 --> 00:13:40,720 Speaker 1: hackers and already um and use them to perpetuate this attack. 233 00:13:41,200 --> 00:13:43,719 Speaker 1: And then yet still could come come out and say, hey, 234 00:13:43,760 --> 00:13:47,959 Speaker 1: we didn't do it right, and we see what's funny 235 00:13:47,960 --> 00:13:50,200 Speaker 1: about the statement too. I think you make a great 236 00:13:50,240 --> 00:13:54,960 Speaker 1: case for the word coordinated. Folks, ladies, and gentlemen. Whenever 237 00:13:55,080 --> 00:13:59,600 Speaker 1: you read a report that says anonymous White House officials 238 00:13:59,720 --> 00:14:03,080 Speaker 1: or a government official who did not want to be named, 239 00:14:03,520 --> 00:14:06,960 Speaker 1: that means that they're giving a leak with the with 240 00:14:07,040 --> 00:14:11,439 Speaker 1: the blessing of whichever institution they originate from. And also 241 00:14:12,080 --> 00:14:16,120 Speaker 1: it's meant to avoid some responsibility of an official statement, 242 00:14:16,360 --> 00:14:21,600 Speaker 1: so that anonymous White House official who said that everybody 243 00:14:21,640 --> 00:14:26,080 Speaker 1: everybody in the White House was like, yeah, that's fine, 244 00:14:27,000 --> 00:14:29,600 Speaker 1: but you know, don't say your name, don't say you 245 00:14:29,640 --> 00:14:32,840 Speaker 1: said it. Yeah, it's so weird how that works. The 246 00:14:32,880 --> 00:14:35,920 Speaker 1: strategic leaking of information like that. I wish I could 247 00:14:36,000 --> 00:14:40,240 Speaker 1: strategically leak information like that, just strategically leak I've just 248 00:14:40,280 --> 00:14:45,600 Speaker 1: been leaving a trail all of the time. So yeah, 249 00:14:45,680 --> 00:14:48,280 Speaker 1: so we've solved one mystery on the show already. Um, 250 00:14:48,320 --> 00:14:52,120 Speaker 1: we know that President Obama says he has a problem 251 00:14:52,160 --> 00:14:55,880 Speaker 1: with Sony refusing to release the interview. You know, it's 252 00:14:55,920 --> 00:15:01,360 Speaker 1: bowing to terrorism, so he officially something later. Well, and 253 00:15:01,400 --> 00:15:03,840 Speaker 1: this was the backlash I was talking about earlier, right, Yet, 254 00:15:03,880 --> 00:15:06,720 Speaker 1: there were a lot of people who immediately criticized the 255 00:15:06,720 --> 00:15:09,280 Speaker 1: theater chains for for pulling it out, and then later 256 00:15:09,480 --> 00:15:11,640 Speaker 1: criticizing Sony for saying that they were not going to 257 00:15:11,680 --> 00:15:14,480 Speaker 1: release it under any format. And these were people, and 258 00:15:14,520 --> 00:15:17,440 Speaker 1: I include myself in this, who didn't necessarily have any 259 00:15:17,480 --> 00:15:20,200 Speaker 1: desire to see the movie. They just didn't like the 260 00:15:20,240 --> 00:15:23,800 Speaker 1: precedent this was setting. Personally, I didn't like the precedent 261 00:15:24,320 --> 00:15:29,040 Speaker 1: of saying your threats are effective and therefore you can 262 00:15:29,080 --> 00:15:33,080 Speaker 1: affect me. Because here two thousand fourteen was the year 263 00:15:33,120 --> 00:15:36,880 Speaker 1: of the security breach you had. You had so many 264 00:15:36,920 --> 00:15:41,440 Speaker 1: companies hit by different security breaches andsoft eBay, mount Cox 265 00:15:42,560 --> 00:15:47,000 Speaker 1: Target whether that was technically to but but the fallout continued. 266 00:15:47,480 --> 00:15:50,880 Speaker 1: The CEO of Targets stepped down because of those. So 267 00:15:51,520 --> 00:15:54,680 Speaker 1: we've had a whole year of security breaches, and then 268 00:15:54,720 --> 00:15:57,080 Speaker 1: when you have this happen and you have a threat, 269 00:15:57,240 --> 00:16:00,640 Speaker 1: a non specific threat come in and then you see 270 00:16:00,640 --> 00:16:03,520 Speaker 1: this dramatic reaction to it. The message that sends out 271 00:16:03,520 --> 00:16:07,480 Speaker 1: to everybody, the perpetrators and everybody else is that with 272 00:16:07,560 --> 00:16:11,680 Speaker 1: some effort, you, an individual or small group of individuals, 273 00:16:11,720 --> 00:16:16,520 Speaker 1: can impact an enormous number of people, an entire industry 274 00:16:16,520 --> 00:16:21,280 Speaker 1: of people. And that opens the floodgates for people to say, well, heck, 275 00:16:21,720 --> 00:16:24,720 Speaker 1: I could do that. I mean, even just for for 276 00:16:24,720 --> 00:16:29,359 Speaker 1: for giggles, Like, I don't have any ideological problem with anybody, 277 00:16:29,400 --> 00:16:32,000 Speaker 1: but the thought of being able to affect that many 278 00:16:32,040 --> 00:16:36,520 Speaker 1: people is really appealing to a certain group of folks. Yeah, 279 00:16:36,560 --> 00:16:38,840 Speaker 1: I mean, how far are we are we from a 280 00:16:39,000 --> 00:16:43,000 Speaker 1: supervillain just co opting YouTube and appearing and being like, 281 00:16:43,080 --> 00:16:47,239 Speaker 1: you know, attention America, if you do not immediately reassemble 282 00:16:47,320 --> 00:16:50,920 Speaker 1: the cast of Night Cart, that will be grave consequences. Yeah, 283 00:16:51,000 --> 00:16:54,760 Speaker 1: I'm I'm going after Pauti Pie. That's what I'm'm just 284 00:16:54,760 --> 00:16:59,560 Speaker 1: gonna appear in. From of all so well, I'd just 285 00:16:59,600 --> 00:17:02,920 Speaker 1: like to say that it's not releasing this movie at all. 286 00:17:02,960 --> 00:17:05,480 Speaker 1: If that is indeed what happens, which it doesn't seem 287 00:17:05,520 --> 00:17:07,840 Speaker 1: to be, you know what's going to happen. But if 288 00:17:07,840 --> 00:17:11,280 Speaker 1: they did that, then it would be effectively paying a 289 00:17:11,400 --> 00:17:13,680 Speaker 1: forty seven million dollar ransom or however much it costs 290 00:17:13,720 --> 00:17:15,919 Speaker 1: to create the film, plus whatever money they would have 291 00:17:16,040 --> 00:17:20,359 Speaker 1: made opening day on Christmas when everybody goes to see movies, 292 00:17:21,000 --> 00:17:24,000 Speaker 1: and having the cancel those public appearances too, Oh yeah, 293 00:17:24,000 --> 00:17:25,679 Speaker 1: like the Night Show they didn't go on there, all 294 00:17:25,680 --> 00:17:28,280 Speaker 1: those things. It's just crazy to think if you cave 295 00:17:28,359 --> 00:17:31,080 Speaker 1: to this, just what you're giving up and the FBI 296 00:17:31,200 --> 00:17:34,360 Speaker 1: comes back around and now we're getting closer and closer 297 00:17:34,400 --> 00:17:37,760 Speaker 1: to the present day, because they say In a statement 298 00:17:37,800 --> 00:17:40,600 Speaker 1: released on Friday this via The Guardian, the FBI said 299 00:17:40,600 --> 00:17:44,840 Speaker 1: a technical analysis of the malignant software known as malware 300 00:17:47,160 --> 00:17:49,960 Speaker 1: that used in the attack has been linked to other 301 00:17:50,400 --> 00:17:55,240 Speaker 1: malware uh that the FBI knows North Korean actors previously developed. 302 00:17:55,560 --> 00:17:59,040 Speaker 1: There were similarities and specific lines of code, encryption algorithms, 303 00:17:59,160 --> 00:18:02,639 Speaker 1: data deletion methods, and compromise networks. The FBI said, I 304 00:18:02,720 --> 00:18:08,359 Speaker 1: like how they explain malware, but not encryption algorithms. Hware. 305 00:18:08,520 --> 00:18:11,000 Speaker 1: You know, that's what we used to call viruses because 306 00:18:11,200 --> 00:18:13,119 Speaker 1: I use that accent because it was the Guardian. So 307 00:18:13,600 --> 00:18:17,840 Speaker 1: so there's another interesting phase here, North Korean actors. This 308 00:18:17,920 --> 00:18:22,160 Speaker 1: is all a slow bill towards my theory. North Korean actors. Uh, 309 00:18:22,400 --> 00:18:26,520 Speaker 1: that's not necessarily a member of the North Korean government. No, 310 00:18:26,640 --> 00:18:29,920 Speaker 1: it could be someone who appears in a theatrical production 311 00:18:29,960 --> 00:18:36,440 Speaker 1: of the Makado North Korea, or perform one super adamant 312 00:18:36,520 --> 00:18:39,520 Speaker 1: North Korean dude. It's like, no, you can't have that movie. 313 00:18:39,640 --> 00:18:43,240 Speaker 1: So yeah. This is also something else I should point 314 00:18:43,280 --> 00:18:47,080 Speaker 1: out is that code, whether or not it originates in 315 00:18:47,200 --> 00:18:50,800 Speaker 1: a particular country, doesn't belong there. Like as soon as 316 00:18:50,840 --> 00:18:52,680 Speaker 1: it gets out in the wild, it's out there and 317 00:18:53,119 --> 00:18:55,760 Speaker 1: people will make use of whatever works. So it's possible 318 00:18:55,800 --> 00:18:58,919 Speaker 1: to impersonate code. It's it's well, it's impossible to to 319 00:18:59,080 --> 00:19:02,600 Speaker 1: appropriate and then use it for your own purposes. In fact, 320 00:19:02,920 --> 00:19:05,960 Speaker 1: there are hackers out there, and I use hackers very 321 00:19:06,000 --> 00:19:10,359 Speaker 1: loosely in this sense, that don't ever write any code themselves. 322 00:19:10,480 --> 00:19:13,720 Speaker 1: With script kitties, they get hold of code that's been 323 00:19:13,720 --> 00:19:17,200 Speaker 1: previously written and they repurpose it for something else, and 324 00:19:17,520 --> 00:19:20,920 Speaker 1: often they do it with minimum alteration or maybe no 325 00:19:21,000 --> 00:19:24,159 Speaker 1: alteration at all. This is a great way of saying 326 00:19:24,160 --> 00:19:28,240 Speaker 1: how the Sony hack was inherently different from the d 327 00:19:28,359 --> 00:19:31,240 Speaker 1: D o S attacks that brought down Microsoft Xbox Live 328 00:19:31,560 --> 00:19:34,359 Speaker 1: during the same time frame, because that was a simple 329 00:19:34,440 --> 00:19:36,840 Speaker 1: d D o S attack, which I was telling Matt earlier, 330 00:19:36,960 --> 00:19:39,600 Speaker 1: that's that's kind of like the equivalent of me walking 331 00:19:39,680 --> 00:19:41,040 Speaker 1: up to one of you while you're trying to work 332 00:19:41,040 --> 00:19:42,600 Speaker 1: and go, hey, what you're doing, what you're doing, Hey, 333 00:19:42,600 --> 00:19:43,720 Speaker 1: what you're doing. What you're doing, what you're doing, what 334 00:19:43,760 --> 00:19:45,520 Speaker 1: you're doing, what you're working on, what you're doing, and 335 00:19:45,640 --> 00:19:47,760 Speaker 1: just doing that all day long. You can't get anything 336 00:19:47,800 --> 00:19:53,200 Speaker 1: done because I'm irritating you. And that's exactly what happens 337 00:19:53,200 --> 00:19:55,720 Speaker 1: with the d d S attack. Well, that's a that's 338 00:19:55,720 --> 00:19:59,520 Speaker 1: a very unsophisticated attack, right, It's it's just throwing a 339 00:19:59,560 --> 00:20:05,440 Speaker 1: hammer at somebody. This attack was much more robust, much 340 00:20:05,480 --> 00:20:09,199 Speaker 1: more It involved way more levels than just ADDS attacks, 341 00:20:09,240 --> 00:20:12,480 Speaker 1: much more sophisticated, exactly. And it's like sneaking in at night, 342 00:20:12,600 --> 00:20:15,400 Speaker 1: setting up and booby trapping your entire house and then 343 00:20:15,400 --> 00:20:17,000 Speaker 1: waiting till you're at work the next day and just 344 00:20:17,119 --> 00:20:23,040 Speaker 1: setting it it's home alone. It's McCauley Culkins possibly involved. No, 345 00:20:23,160 --> 00:20:25,280 Speaker 1: he was not involved. Was that kids think Kevin? Was 346 00:20:25,320 --> 00:20:28,439 Speaker 1: he Kevin and Home Alone? Yeah, so now we know 347 00:20:28,480 --> 00:20:34,840 Speaker 1: what Kevin's doing. He's hacking. He's hacking into Home Alone seven. 348 00:20:34,920 --> 00:20:38,080 Speaker 1: That's but no, I mean, this is the reason why 349 00:20:38,119 --> 00:20:41,480 Speaker 1: I bring all that up is that it is possible 350 00:20:41,480 --> 00:20:43,960 Speaker 1: that someone could be using code that does in fact 351 00:20:44,040 --> 00:20:47,960 Speaker 1: have code coming from North Korea and not be connected 352 00:20:47,960 --> 00:20:50,760 Speaker 1: to North Korea. It's also possible the other ways, or 353 00:20:50,800 --> 00:20:53,000 Speaker 1: maybe using you on purpose because it did come from 354 00:20:53,080 --> 00:20:57,520 Speaker 1: North Korea. And in the murky world of espionage, those 355 00:20:57,640 --> 00:21:00,760 Speaker 1: kind of things are not impossible. I mean, I don't 356 00:21:00,760 --> 00:21:04,119 Speaker 1: know if they're they are possible. I think it's a 357 00:21:04,160 --> 00:21:07,320 Speaker 1: leap to say they're plausible. But what what about this? 358 00:21:07,520 --> 00:21:12,320 Speaker 1: Here's an interesting statistic. North Korea has about a thousand 359 00:21:12,960 --> 00:21:17,760 Speaker 1: email addresses, and for comparison, you can find about that 360 00:21:17,800 --> 00:21:20,520 Speaker 1: many according to a recent story by MPR, you can 361 00:21:20,520 --> 00:21:23,359 Speaker 1: find a thousand email addresses in maybe a block of 362 00:21:23,400 --> 00:21:26,080 Speaker 1: New York City. Yeah, I mean, I've got like four 363 00:21:26,160 --> 00:21:32,960 Speaker 1: year fifty myself. That's true, that's probably that's probably an exaggeration, right, 364 00:21:33,080 --> 00:21:38,560 Speaker 1: So on the whole Uh, the North Korean population is 365 00:21:38,640 --> 00:21:42,920 Speaker 1: not full of you know tech literati, Well they're they're 366 00:21:43,040 --> 00:21:45,720 Speaker 1: most of them are not allowed to have any connection 367 00:21:45,760 --> 00:21:48,400 Speaker 1: to the internet. This there's a couple of other interesting 368 00:21:48,440 --> 00:21:52,160 Speaker 1: points that have kind of unraveled over the last couple 369 00:21:52,160 --> 00:21:56,200 Speaker 1: of days as we record this. One is that the uh, 370 00:21:56,359 --> 00:22:00,680 Speaker 1: the Internet in North Korea suffered some major slowing down 371 00:22:00,800 --> 00:22:02,880 Speaker 1: to the point where people were saying no one would 372 00:22:02,880 --> 00:22:05,800 Speaker 1: be able to connect, and that raised questions and we 373 00:22:05,840 --> 00:22:08,119 Speaker 1: don't have answers for this. They raised the question of 374 00:22:08,280 --> 00:22:11,520 Speaker 1: is this at all connected to this sony hack? Was 375 00:22:11,560 --> 00:22:14,760 Speaker 1: it a retaliation because there was a statement of there 376 00:22:14,760 --> 00:22:18,399 Speaker 1: would be a proportional response to any attack that was 377 00:22:18,400 --> 00:22:21,159 Speaker 1: against the United States, So how do you what's a 378 00:22:21,560 --> 00:22:27,120 Speaker 1: what's proportionate to having a company have this North Korean film? 379 00:22:27,480 --> 00:22:31,520 Speaker 1: Do you do you shut down the military and government 380 00:22:31,560 --> 00:22:34,399 Speaker 1: access to the Internet because that's that's pretty much the 381 00:22:34,440 --> 00:22:37,040 Speaker 1: only people in North Korea who have the access we're 382 00:22:37,080 --> 00:22:42,320 Speaker 1: talking about, or was it some totally unrelated group that 383 00:22:42,400 --> 00:22:44,400 Speaker 1: decided to take it upon themselves kind of the way 384 00:22:44,440 --> 00:22:47,080 Speaker 1: North Korea was saying, Hey, it wasn't us, but whoever 385 00:22:47,119 --> 00:22:50,840 Speaker 1: it was, you guys are awesome, So is it the 386 00:22:50,880 --> 00:22:54,040 Speaker 1: same thing? But now going against North Korea or could 387 00:22:54,119 --> 00:22:58,280 Speaker 1: it just be a system failure that has nothing to 388 00:22:58,320 --> 00:23:01,119 Speaker 1: do with any of this, And the the pure answer 389 00:23:01,200 --> 00:23:04,120 Speaker 1: is that we do not know. Only the people who 390 00:23:04,200 --> 00:23:08,080 Speaker 1: would be responsible would know if in fact someone's responsible. 391 00:23:08,400 --> 00:23:11,520 Speaker 1: You know. There's also the there's also the possibility that 392 00:23:11,760 --> 00:23:19,240 Speaker 1: due to international tensions between the triumvirates here of North Korea, China, 393 00:23:19,359 --> 00:23:23,240 Speaker 1: the United States, we shall also had South Korea and Japan. Uh. 394 00:23:23,280 --> 00:23:26,560 Speaker 1: There there's a possibility that this might be handled in 395 00:23:26,600 --> 00:23:30,480 Speaker 1: backdoor channels differently than it's handled in the public sphere. 396 00:23:30,520 --> 00:23:35,639 Speaker 1: And this is something that quite often happens um in 397 00:23:35,640 --> 00:23:41,000 Speaker 1: in dealings between North Korea and many other many other countries. UH. 398 00:23:41,040 --> 00:23:44,760 Speaker 1: And I know this because during the nuclear during the 399 00:23:44,840 --> 00:23:49,960 Speaker 1: last round of failed nuclear talks, a North Korean um, 400 00:23:50,040 --> 00:23:52,520 Speaker 1: a member of the North Korean Foreign Ministry and his 401 00:23:53,080 --> 00:23:56,960 Speaker 1: entourage visited the school I was at at the time, 402 00:23:57,359 --> 00:24:03,359 Speaker 1: and their conversation was completely different worlds away from what 403 00:24:03,680 --> 00:24:07,040 Speaker 1: you would see on North Korea's official website, which you 404 00:24:07,119 --> 00:24:09,720 Speaker 1: can't visit and is in English and Korea. Yeah, he 405 00:24:09,760 --> 00:24:12,159 Speaker 1: was telling me about that. I don't know if you 406 00:24:12,160 --> 00:24:13,880 Speaker 1: want to read it. I mean, I think, I think 407 00:24:13,880 --> 00:24:15,480 Speaker 1: part of that is, like, you know, the idea of 408 00:24:15,520 --> 00:24:19,920 Speaker 1: saving face, the whole idea of how can we diffuse 409 00:24:20,000 --> 00:24:23,800 Speaker 1: the situation where no one looks like they are backing 410 00:24:23,840 --> 00:24:27,640 Speaker 1: down or apologizing or weak. No one can look weak. 411 00:24:27,960 --> 00:24:32,840 Speaker 1: Speaking of that, on December nineteen, we were talking about this, Jonathan, 412 00:24:33,040 --> 00:24:36,119 Speaker 1: North Korea offered to set up a joint inquiry with 413 00:24:36,119 --> 00:24:39,200 Speaker 1: the United States to find out who was behind this hack. Yeah, 414 00:24:39,200 --> 00:24:41,960 Speaker 1: they said, we don't. We don't approve of all the 415 00:24:42,000 --> 00:24:44,520 Speaker 1: things that have happened. We do think that they had 416 00:24:44,520 --> 00:24:47,000 Speaker 1: a noble goal in the sense that this movie is 417 00:24:47,040 --> 00:24:50,560 Speaker 1: an insult. But we didn't. We weren't responsible, and we 418 00:24:50,600 --> 00:24:52,200 Speaker 1: will help you find out who is in the United 419 00:24:52,240 --> 00:24:55,840 Speaker 1: States said, thanks, no thanks, But but here's the here's 420 00:24:55,840 --> 00:24:58,760 Speaker 1: the thing. There are so many different layers here, right, 421 00:24:59,000 --> 00:25:02,560 Speaker 1: the layer of there's the perception of whether or not 422 00:25:03,080 --> 00:25:05,800 Speaker 1: North Korea is being sincere, and it's offer whether whether 423 00:25:05,840 --> 00:25:10,240 Speaker 1: they're being whether they are trustworthy, whether we genuinely believe 424 00:25:10,280 --> 00:25:13,320 Speaker 1: North Korea to be behind the attacks, and we we 425 00:25:13,880 --> 00:25:17,080 Speaker 1: we in this room, can't say whether or not the 426 00:25:17,160 --> 00:25:20,960 Speaker 1: US government genuinely believes that. Um. One of the things 427 00:25:21,000 --> 00:25:23,359 Speaker 1: that that came up in the discussion Matt and I 428 00:25:23,400 --> 00:25:28,360 Speaker 1: had was that a lot of the there's no smoking 429 00:25:28,400 --> 00:25:32,119 Speaker 1: gun pointing at North pointing from North Korea for this 430 00:25:32,160 --> 00:25:35,480 Speaker 1: particular incident that we are aware of, but that doesn't 431 00:25:35,480 --> 00:25:38,399 Speaker 1: mean there isn't one. There could be one that the 432 00:25:38,440 --> 00:25:41,119 Speaker 1: FBI is fully aware of but has not made at 433 00:25:41,119 --> 00:25:44,159 Speaker 1: all public, and therefore there it could They could be 434 00:25:44,200 --> 00:25:47,399 Speaker 1: completely sincere when they say we believe North Korea to 435 00:25:47,440 --> 00:25:50,520 Speaker 1: be behind this right and what would the relationship be? 436 00:25:50,640 --> 00:25:54,560 Speaker 1: I love that point because there is not an easy 437 00:25:54,720 --> 00:25:58,000 Speaker 1: black and white answer. I have a little bit of 438 00:25:58,000 --> 00:25:59,480 Speaker 1: a theory. If you guys would like to hear, I 439 00:25:59,480 --> 00:26:01,120 Speaker 1: would love to or your theory. I've got a theory 440 00:26:01,119 --> 00:26:05,960 Speaker 1: of my own. So so Japan Right has a part 441 00:26:06,000 --> 00:26:10,040 Speaker 1: of it. Yes, you're familiar with its work. Japan has 442 00:26:10,520 --> 00:26:14,840 Speaker 1: um a large ethnic Korean population, some of whom are 443 00:26:15,000 --> 00:26:19,960 Speaker 1: DPRK sympathizers, and UH DPRK has to add a little 444 00:26:20,000 --> 00:26:23,680 Speaker 1: bit to its muddy reputation abroad. Uh it's often been 445 00:26:23,760 --> 00:26:29,480 Speaker 1: found as the ringleader for illegal activity such as smuggling 446 00:26:29,560 --> 00:26:33,840 Speaker 1: or creation of methamphetamine, creation of the so called Supernoes, 447 00:26:33,880 --> 00:26:36,800 Speaker 1: which were fake hundred dollar bills that were really, really 448 00:26:36,840 --> 00:26:42,119 Speaker 1: well done, and uh. It is completely possible that one uh, 449 00:26:42,320 --> 00:26:45,680 Speaker 1: that one or more ethnic Koreans working in Japan worked 450 00:26:45,760 --> 00:26:49,840 Speaker 1: for Sony let open the door, or there was some 451 00:26:49,920 --> 00:26:53,920 Speaker 1: sort of exploit that was passed along to hackers. What 452 00:26:54,160 --> 00:26:58,439 Speaker 1: I don't think happened. I just don't think that given 453 00:26:58,960 --> 00:27:02,480 Speaker 1: all of the other concerns that DPRK has right now, 454 00:27:02,520 --> 00:27:05,399 Speaker 1: and it has a lot the relationship with the Soviet 455 00:27:05,440 --> 00:27:08,440 Speaker 1: unions pretty much well, the relationship with Russia is pretty 456 00:27:08,480 --> 00:27:13,600 Speaker 1: much non existent. The relationship with China is deteriorating, especially 457 00:27:13,640 --> 00:27:16,200 Speaker 1: in the wake of Kim Jong Ill's death. I think 458 00:27:16,359 --> 00:27:20,800 Speaker 1: this was maybe state approved, but I don't think it 459 00:27:20,880 --> 00:27:26,800 Speaker 1: was state spearheaded. If it was, the priorities have to 460 00:27:26,840 --> 00:27:29,960 Speaker 1: be way off. It's not necessarily the behavior of a 461 00:27:30,080 --> 00:27:32,679 Speaker 1: rational actor unless there's more to the story. So I 462 00:27:32,720 --> 00:27:36,600 Speaker 1: think what we're looking at would be contractors, maybe sympathetic 463 00:27:36,720 --> 00:27:41,080 Speaker 1: activists of some sort, because there are there are, even 464 00:27:41,119 --> 00:27:43,600 Speaker 1: though a lot of people don't know this, there are 465 00:27:43,720 --> 00:27:49,639 Speaker 1: quite a few um sympathetic North Korea sympathizers in South 466 00:27:49,720 --> 00:27:52,720 Speaker 1: Korea in Japan, some of who are legit spies, but 467 00:27:52,800 --> 00:27:55,399 Speaker 1: many of whom I just grew up there and are 468 00:27:55,480 --> 00:27:58,560 Speaker 1: just supportive of it. Fun fact, the web master from 469 00:27:58,560 --> 00:28:03,440 Speaker 1: North Korea is from Spain. He is a Spanish national 470 00:28:02,640 --> 00:28:06,080 Speaker 1: m's and North Korea has three web hosts, so I 471 00:28:06,119 --> 00:28:08,879 Speaker 1: think it's much more likely that this attack originated from 472 00:28:08,880 --> 00:28:12,680 Speaker 1: a country with better equipment. I agree with that. I 473 00:28:12,720 --> 00:28:16,679 Speaker 1: think I'll go a step further based upon the fact 474 00:28:16,720 --> 00:28:20,560 Speaker 1: that we see no real mention of the interview the 475 00:28:20,600 --> 00:28:24,760 Speaker 1: movie of terrorism in these early attempts where the it 476 00:28:24,760 --> 00:28:27,560 Speaker 1: seems like it's more of extortion, pay us or this 477 00:28:27,560 --> 00:28:32,600 Speaker 1: stuff gets released, not stop doing this horrible thing. There's 478 00:28:32,600 --> 00:28:34,960 Speaker 1: no like the reason why we're doing this is because 479 00:28:35,000 --> 00:28:37,520 Speaker 1: of this, Now give us money or else were releases. 480 00:28:37,840 --> 00:28:42,520 Speaker 1: None of that was there. I think that this, to me, 481 00:28:42,600 --> 00:28:44,560 Speaker 1: it seems like it could be at least partially an 482 00:28:44,600 --> 00:28:47,280 Speaker 1: inside job that, like you were saying, it's someone who 483 00:28:47,320 --> 00:28:50,880 Speaker 1: is familiar with Sony systems. A lot of the information 484 00:28:50,920 --> 00:28:54,120 Speaker 1: I've read seems to indicate that the attackers at least 485 00:28:54,120 --> 00:28:58,000 Speaker 1: had some password access to certain systems at the get go, 486 00:28:58,600 --> 00:29:00,960 Speaker 1: which is not the easiest thing to get unless you 487 00:29:01,040 --> 00:29:04,800 Speaker 1: already have it, because they went through multiple systems, So 488 00:29:05,400 --> 00:29:08,680 Speaker 1: I'm I'm thinking that it was at least partially an 489 00:29:08,720 --> 00:29:15,520 Speaker 1: inside job, probably not directly related to anything with the interview. 490 00:29:15,640 --> 00:29:18,400 Speaker 1: At the beginning, it was only to me. It seems 491 00:29:18,440 --> 00:29:21,760 Speaker 1: like that was a leap on opportunity. After after the 492 00:29:22,280 --> 00:29:25,000 Speaker 1: after other people started bringing it up, they're like, oh, wow, crap, 493 00:29:25,040 --> 00:29:29,760 Speaker 1: we should totally say that's the reason. Yeah, that was 494 00:29:29,840 --> 00:29:34,120 Speaker 1: that was our plan the whole time. Yeah. Now, now again, 495 00:29:34,360 --> 00:29:36,920 Speaker 1: this is based on the information that's available to us, right, 496 00:29:37,040 --> 00:29:40,120 Speaker 1: and so we're only we're drawing some conclusions based upon 497 00:29:40,240 --> 00:29:43,600 Speaker 1: limited amounts of information. If this were office space, we 498 00:29:43,640 --> 00:29:45,840 Speaker 1: would have the leap to conclusions Matt out and we 499 00:29:45,880 --> 00:29:49,840 Speaker 1: would be shopping away. So I want to stress that 500 00:29:49,880 --> 00:29:52,160 Speaker 1: because even though that's something that I personally kind of 501 00:29:52,160 --> 00:29:55,200 Speaker 1: have a gut feeling about, I'm also more than happy 502 00:29:55,200 --> 00:29:58,880 Speaker 1: to I'm ready to say, Look, I could totally be 503 00:29:58,960 --> 00:30:01,720 Speaker 1: wrong and it not take a lot to prove that 504 00:30:01,760 --> 00:30:05,720 Speaker 1: I'm wrong. However, just from my own perspective this whole time, 505 00:30:06,240 --> 00:30:09,280 Speaker 1: I've been a little skeptical of the North Korea connection. 506 00:30:09,560 --> 00:30:12,920 Speaker 1: I guess it could be like a North Korea approved thing, 507 00:30:13,080 --> 00:30:16,680 Speaker 1: or even a North Korea sponsored thing, but it just 508 00:30:17,320 --> 00:30:21,800 Speaker 1: it seems like it seems like the actual attack and 509 00:30:21,880 --> 00:30:25,960 Speaker 1: the language used as extortion at the beginning, and the 510 00:30:26,080 --> 00:30:29,840 Speaker 1: method of embarrassing the company comes from a much more 511 00:30:29,960 --> 00:30:35,640 Speaker 1: insider perspective than at another country that's upset. It seems 512 00:30:35,760 --> 00:30:42,400 Speaker 1: personal to me. So then we've got some other possibilities here. 513 00:30:42,520 --> 00:30:45,960 Speaker 1: Right now, you're not gonna let me have my theory. No, 514 00:30:46,120 --> 00:30:48,000 Speaker 1: that was the intro to your theory. Oh man, thank 515 00:30:48,040 --> 00:30:51,840 Speaker 1: you for trying my theory. I apology. I apologize. So 516 00:30:51,880 --> 00:30:57,040 Speaker 1: I want to bring in the overall digital rights management 517 00:30:57,240 --> 00:30:59,719 Speaker 1: arguments and argument. This is someone who's upset that they 518 00:30:59,720 --> 00:31:01,760 Speaker 1: put the Sony c D way back in the day, 519 00:31:02,240 --> 00:31:04,840 Speaker 1: the back door attack on their computer. No, no, okay, 520 00:31:04,960 --> 00:31:07,280 Speaker 1: the idea of this guy has been a hard a 521 00:31:07,320 --> 00:31:12,480 Speaker 1: grudge since. Oh yeah, that's true. I mean no. So 522 00:31:12,640 --> 00:31:16,200 Speaker 1: the idea of structure controls over the Internet that have 523 00:31:16,320 --> 00:31:19,000 Speaker 1: been attempted to be put into legislation in the United 524 00:31:19,040 --> 00:31:23,520 Speaker 1: States several times and shot down spectacularly by the Internet 525 00:31:23,760 --> 00:31:26,880 Speaker 1: a couple of times. You're talking about it in the leaks, right, 526 00:31:26,960 --> 00:31:28,840 Speaker 1: they were talking about in the leaks and the m 527 00:31:28,920 --> 00:31:33,000 Speaker 1: p a A in general trying to work kind of 528 00:31:33,040 --> 00:31:37,320 Speaker 1: against Google. I don't know if you've seen Goliath. Oh yeah, 529 00:31:37,320 --> 00:31:40,520 Speaker 1: I mean Goliath. Yeah, come on, yes, no, I haven't heard. 530 00:31:41,200 --> 00:31:44,680 Speaker 1: Can tell me more about it, tell the tech guy 531 00:31:44,720 --> 00:31:47,480 Speaker 1: more about Okay, Well that's why. That's this is the 532 00:31:47,520 --> 00:31:49,600 Speaker 1: main reason I wanted you to be in this room. 533 00:31:49,720 --> 00:31:53,000 Speaker 1: Besides having all the other knowledge, shanthan to talk about 534 00:31:53,000 --> 00:31:55,800 Speaker 1: Goliath because I don't know enough about it. I've barely 535 00:31:55,800 --> 00:31:57,480 Speaker 1: touched the surface on it, and Ben and I will 536 00:31:57,520 --> 00:32:00,480 Speaker 1: have to do another full show just on that subject. Absolutely, 537 00:32:01,320 --> 00:32:05,360 Speaker 1: so there is to me. And this is just Matt 538 00:32:05,480 --> 00:32:10,240 Speaker 1: Frederick's opinion. Everybody, This seems like a an opportunity. Whether 539 00:32:10,360 --> 00:32:13,240 Speaker 1: or not who did it doesn't matter, um, an opportunity 540 00:32:13,320 --> 00:32:17,680 Speaker 1: for those people who want stricter controls and security controls 541 00:32:17,680 --> 00:32:21,640 Speaker 1: over the Internet and search controls through Google for pirate 542 00:32:21,640 --> 00:32:24,000 Speaker 1: of material and all this stuff. It seems like a 543 00:32:24,040 --> 00:32:26,680 Speaker 1: great opportunity for them to really say, hey, guys, look 544 00:32:26,720 --> 00:32:28,240 Speaker 1: at all the damage this cause. Look at all the 545 00:32:28,240 --> 00:32:33,200 Speaker 1: monetary and personal just damage that's been caused here. We 546 00:32:33,240 --> 00:32:38,080 Speaker 1: need your help, please secure the Internet for freedom. This 547 00:32:38,120 --> 00:32:40,920 Speaker 1: is uh, this is absolutely what's gonna happen. You're gonna 548 00:32:40,960 --> 00:32:43,120 Speaker 1: see lots of companies that have a vested interest in 549 00:32:43,240 --> 00:32:47,400 Speaker 1: keeping their intellectual property private from you know, jumping at 550 00:32:47,480 --> 00:32:51,840 Speaker 1: every single possible opportunity to do so to to protect themselves, 551 00:32:52,480 --> 00:32:56,520 Speaker 1: even at the expense of the ability for the rest 552 00:32:56,520 --> 00:32:58,160 Speaker 1: of us to use the Internet the way we've become 553 00:32:58,200 --> 00:33:01,440 Speaker 1: accustomed to. However, that being set and it's a very 554 00:33:01,480 --> 00:33:05,440 Speaker 1: difficult argument to make from that perspective, simply because the 555 00:33:05,520 --> 00:33:08,840 Speaker 1: damage that was done to Sony went well beyond a 556 00:33:08,880 --> 00:33:11,680 Speaker 1: few movies being linked to the Internet. In fact, if 557 00:33:11,680 --> 00:33:15,000 Speaker 1: you were to argue that that was the major cost 558 00:33:15,040 --> 00:33:18,480 Speaker 1: of the damages, everyone would laugh at you, because you 559 00:33:18,520 --> 00:33:23,040 Speaker 1: know it's it's hundreds of millions of dollars potentially. And 560 00:33:23,240 --> 00:33:25,600 Speaker 1: you know, we've had this discussion before too that that 561 00:33:25,760 --> 00:33:28,600 Speaker 1: a stolen movie doesn't necessarily mean a lost ticket sale. 562 00:33:29,080 --> 00:33:31,240 Speaker 1: Like one, you can't guarantee that the person wouldn't go 563 00:33:31,280 --> 00:33:33,480 Speaker 1: and see it anyway, or two that the person would 564 00:33:33,480 --> 00:33:36,840 Speaker 1: have seen it had they not pirateed it. That's another argument. 565 00:33:37,680 --> 00:33:39,600 Speaker 1: I think that it's one of those things that's going 566 00:33:39,640 --> 00:33:43,960 Speaker 1: to ramp up the discussion about Internet security. It's going 567 00:33:44,000 --> 00:33:48,200 Speaker 1: to end up having a lot of companies propose changes 568 00:33:48,280 --> 00:33:52,640 Speaker 1: that would be restrictive, but I don't think it's gonna 569 00:33:52,640 --> 00:33:54,560 Speaker 1: go much further than that. And part of the reason 570 00:33:54,600 --> 00:33:58,400 Speaker 1: for that is also that we have, simultaneously going on 571 00:33:58,600 --> 00:34:03,080 Speaker 1: while this hack is unfolding, the ongoing discussion about reclassifying 572 00:34:03,240 --> 00:34:06,520 Speaker 1: Internet in the United States as a utility, which would 573 00:34:06,520 --> 00:34:11,799 Speaker 1: give the FCC the authority to actually impose net neutrality 574 00:34:11,880 --> 00:34:14,160 Speaker 1: rules which were struck down at the beginning of two 575 00:34:14,200 --> 00:34:17,319 Speaker 1: thousand fourteen. Well, yeah, but the problem there is going 576 00:34:17,400 --> 00:34:20,839 Speaker 1: to be job security. I mean, who's the FEC gonna 577 00:34:21,080 --> 00:34:24,680 Speaker 1: work for. Like the individuals in the FCC, I have 578 00:34:24,800 --> 00:34:27,560 Speaker 1: to think about their career traject right. They have to 579 00:34:27,560 --> 00:34:29,799 Speaker 1: figure out how where am I going to get those 580 00:34:29,880 --> 00:34:33,320 Speaker 1: huge bags of money that they left at my stup? 581 00:34:33,520 --> 00:34:35,920 Speaker 1: You can't walk around with an empty burlap sack in 582 00:34:36,040 --> 00:34:38,400 Speaker 1: it and a cash sign on it. If anyone for 583 00:34:38,440 --> 00:34:42,240 Speaker 1: the FCC is listening, I don't necessarily abscribe abscribe to this, uh, 584 00:34:42,280 --> 00:34:45,440 Speaker 1: this scenario that Mr Boland is putting forward. I do 585 00:34:45,920 --> 00:34:49,479 Speaker 1: I get the I'll get the email where uh they'll say, 586 00:34:49,480 --> 00:34:53,080 Speaker 1: don't release this podcast or you will be destroyed. Like 587 00:34:54,520 --> 00:34:56,640 Speaker 1: do you understand how the internet works? It's already out 588 00:34:56,640 --> 00:34:59,440 Speaker 1: there right right, I know, I know I'm ribbing the 589 00:34:59,480 --> 00:35:02,719 Speaker 1: FEC a little bit and the people at that agency 590 00:35:02,960 --> 00:35:06,120 Speaker 1: have at times done fantastic work, and it can be 591 00:35:06,160 --> 00:35:08,879 Speaker 1: really difficult when there's so much money involved. Let's talk 592 00:35:08,880 --> 00:35:12,160 Speaker 1: about Project Goliath, though, because you're really interested in this, 593 00:35:12,280 --> 00:35:16,359 Speaker 1: and it's it's a strange it's a strange actual conspiracy, 594 00:35:16,520 --> 00:35:19,840 Speaker 1: not a theory, but a group of individuals coming together 595 00:35:20,239 --> 00:35:23,080 Speaker 1: to make a move on what they call Goliath. Yeah, 596 00:35:23,200 --> 00:35:26,319 Speaker 1: using code words, whatever that is. Well, I mean you've 597 00:35:26,320 --> 00:35:29,080 Speaker 1: got to use co words because you never know when 598 00:35:29,120 --> 00:35:32,920 Speaker 1: your communications are going to get leaked to the public. 599 00:35:33,040 --> 00:35:35,240 Speaker 1: And if you are not covering your tracks and everyone 600 00:35:35,280 --> 00:35:39,480 Speaker 1: automatically knows you're talking about Google, then and credit the 601 00:35:39,480 --> 00:35:42,839 Speaker 1: the secrecy, the veil of secrecy that Goliath provided was 602 00:35:42,880 --> 00:35:45,799 Speaker 1: not terribly thick. I mean, all of Jonathan's emails are 603 00:35:45,800 --> 00:35:49,440 Speaker 1: in code. Yeah, that's why. That's why you know the 604 00:35:49,520 --> 00:35:52,120 Speaker 1: subject red dog flies at one and you're like, oh, 605 00:35:52,160 --> 00:35:55,640 Speaker 1: it's that art I asked for for that article. Uh yeah, 606 00:35:55,680 --> 00:35:58,040 Speaker 1: it's hey, it's a red dog flying at one o'clock. 607 00:35:58,080 --> 00:35:59,560 Speaker 1: I thought it was lunch. I thought we were getting 608 00:35:59,560 --> 00:36:01,440 Speaker 1: hot talks. But you know I always eat it like 609 00:36:02,480 --> 00:36:08,239 Speaker 1: eat or yeah. Yeah, so that's red bull at um. Yeah. No, 610 00:36:08,320 --> 00:36:12,400 Speaker 1: it's it's so the Goliath. The Goliath story is only 611 00:36:13,040 --> 00:36:16,720 Speaker 1: partially related, partly because some of the information was gathered 612 00:36:16,760 --> 00:36:20,400 Speaker 1: from this league. But it is a collection of different 613 00:36:21,160 --> 00:36:28,400 Speaker 1: really big entities mostly Yeah, yeah, that are all concerned. Disney, 614 00:36:28,560 --> 00:36:36,080 Speaker 1: isn't there too, I believe, concerned about Goliath's uh influence 615 00:36:36,360 --> 00:36:40,880 Speaker 1: on their industry and how they can somehow mitigate that. Um, 616 00:36:40,960 --> 00:36:42,839 Speaker 1: and you're right, it would go there'd be a whole 617 00:36:42,840 --> 00:36:45,440 Speaker 1: episode when we'd have to go into a whole episode 618 00:36:45,440 --> 00:36:47,720 Speaker 1: to really talk about it. Well, maybe this is where 619 00:36:47,800 --> 00:36:50,680 Speaker 1: we kind of tease that sometime in the future we're 620 00:36:50,719 --> 00:36:53,120 Speaker 1: gonna have a Goliath episode. Yeah, would you like to 621 00:36:53,120 --> 00:36:56,520 Speaker 1: come back? We have to, We'd love to have you because, uh, 622 00:36:56,800 --> 00:36:59,560 Speaker 1: this this is an interesting thing, and I want to 623 00:36:59,600 --> 00:37:02,600 Speaker 1: just do the quick and dirty in the interest of 624 00:37:02,640 --> 00:37:06,440 Speaker 1: fairness thing that we have to say. Sure Goliath and 625 00:37:06,480 --> 00:37:09,400 Speaker 1: I can't finger quote hard enough there and the studios 626 00:37:09,520 --> 00:37:11,600 Speaker 1: opposing it, along with the m p A. M p 627 00:37:11,719 --> 00:37:15,200 Speaker 1: A A have different goals, but it's not so much 628 00:37:15,320 --> 00:37:19,080 Speaker 1: moral argument on either side as it is which environment 629 00:37:19,120 --> 00:37:22,480 Speaker 1: is better for our current business. Yeah, so it's no, 630 00:37:22,600 --> 00:37:25,440 Speaker 1: I mean not like there's a hero in a villain Google. 631 00:37:25,680 --> 00:37:29,759 Speaker 1: Google's slogan is don't be evil, but it is a 632 00:37:29,800 --> 00:37:34,320 Speaker 1: business and we we are the product. Just like in Facebook, 633 00:37:34,480 --> 00:37:36,520 Speaker 1: you are the product. Same thing with Google. I mean, 634 00:37:36,520 --> 00:37:40,240 Speaker 1: Google is not a search engine company, it's an ad company. 635 00:37:40,280 --> 00:37:43,040 Speaker 1: But Jonathan, isn't money the root of all evil? I 636 00:37:43,080 --> 00:37:48,280 Speaker 1: swear you are wrong. It is the love of money 637 00:37:48,520 --> 00:37:50,759 Speaker 1: that is the root of all evil. Money itself is 638 00:37:50,800 --> 00:37:53,080 Speaker 1: not the root of all you But what, okay, then, 639 00:37:53,080 --> 00:37:56,520 Speaker 1: what is correctly? I'd like to point out while you're 640 00:37:56,560 --> 00:37:59,200 Speaker 1: while you're percultly know, I'd like to point out that 641 00:37:59,360 --> 00:38:02,399 Speaker 1: don't be well is a very very different statement from 642 00:38:02,520 --> 00:38:07,320 Speaker 1: be good. Sure you could be totally immoral, Isn't that 643 00:38:07,320 --> 00:38:15,359 Speaker 1: that is the don't be evil well? To be fair though, 644 00:38:15,400 --> 00:38:18,080 Speaker 1: I mean, we're making it sound really really sinister, but 645 00:38:18,480 --> 00:38:22,560 Speaker 1: keep in mind it was a couple of college students 646 00:38:22,600 --> 00:38:25,400 Speaker 1: who started Google, and they were trying to keep in 647 00:38:25,440 --> 00:38:29,759 Speaker 1: mind certain values as this thing they had created ballooned 648 00:38:29,920 --> 00:38:34,040 Speaker 1: well beyond their there even their ambition. I mean they 649 00:38:34,040 --> 00:38:38,560 Speaker 1: were they are really smart, really hard working guys. But 650 00:38:38,600 --> 00:38:40,080 Speaker 1: I think they'd be the first to tell you, like, 651 00:38:40,440 --> 00:38:42,440 Speaker 1: you know, if you went back in time and told 652 00:38:42,480 --> 00:38:45,040 Speaker 1: Sarah Gey and Larry. Hey, guys, this thing you're working 653 00:38:45,040 --> 00:38:48,120 Speaker 1: on is going to turn you into multibillionaires. They be. 654 00:38:48,640 --> 00:38:50,960 Speaker 1: They look at you and say what I mean, like, 655 00:38:51,040 --> 00:38:54,560 Speaker 1: this is going to take up a sizeable part of 656 00:38:54,600 --> 00:38:57,240 Speaker 1: a city in California. I've been to the Google campus. 657 00:38:57,320 --> 00:39:01,279 Speaker 1: It is enormous. Um You've got to have a car 658 00:39:01,480 --> 00:39:03,440 Speaker 1: or a bike to get around from building to building 659 00:39:03,440 --> 00:39:07,000 Speaker 1: because that's how big it is. And this is one company, 660 00:39:07,800 --> 00:39:09,360 Speaker 1: you know, it's It's one of those things where I 661 00:39:09,360 --> 00:39:11,799 Speaker 1: think they created that slogan at a time when they 662 00:39:11,800 --> 00:39:14,560 Speaker 1: were just trying to, you know, keep themselves grounded. It's 663 00:39:14,600 --> 00:39:18,080 Speaker 1: just now with the benefit of hindsight, now that we 664 00:39:18,120 --> 00:39:22,520 Speaker 1: see Google as this enormous entity, don't be evil, starts 665 00:39:22,520 --> 00:39:25,320 Speaker 1: to take on a different connotation to us. So we 666 00:39:25,440 --> 00:39:27,640 Speaker 1: just got to remember the perspective. So I want to 667 00:39:27,640 --> 00:39:29,560 Speaker 1: add one more thing to the fire here, all right, 668 00:39:29,719 --> 00:39:33,920 Speaker 1: Do you think that the people responsible for the two 669 00:39:33,960 --> 00:39:37,279 Speaker 1: thousand and eleven heck were also involved in this one? 670 00:39:37,760 --> 00:39:40,320 Speaker 1: Could there be an inside person who just hasn't been 671 00:39:40,360 --> 00:39:45,160 Speaker 1: caught h R check your employment records. I mean, you 672 00:39:45,200 --> 00:39:47,160 Speaker 1: never say never. It just seems to me like this 673 00:39:47,320 --> 00:39:52,960 Speaker 1: was something that if if I stick with my insider theory. 674 00:39:53,640 --> 00:39:55,440 Speaker 1: It feels to me like this was something that had 675 00:39:55,480 --> 00:39:59,560 Speaker 1: been building up for a while for the person or 676 00:39:59,600 --> 00:40:03,880 Speaker 1: persons responsible, and there was something that was a tipping 677 00:40:03,920 --> 00:40:06,640 Speaker 1: point that caused the person to say, like, all right, 678 00:40:06,719 --> 00:40:09,440 Speaker 1: that I'm doing it. I can't. I'm not gonna I'm 679 00:40:09,440 --> 00:40:12,319 Speaker 1: not gonna let this happen anymore. I'm not gonna. Um, 680 00:40:12,719 --> 00:40:16,360 Speaker 1: you know, I I'm tired of working with a company 681 00:40:16,400 --> 00:40:20,000 Speaker 1: that has these policies. Again, that only works if it 682 00:40:20,040 --> 00:40:23,640 Speaker 1: fits my theory of what happened. It could obviously be 683 00:40:23,719 --> 00:40:26,400 Speaker 1: something totally different, that is I'm completely off base for 684 00:40:26,520 --> 00:40:28,759 Speaker 1: and then my answer doesn't make sense. I mean, yeah, 685 00:40:28,880 --> 00:40:31,840 Speaker 1: if we're with lack of information, I think it's I 686 00:40:31,880 --> 00:40:34,960 Speaker 1: think it's plausible that there was an inside person. Um. 687 00:40:35,040 --> 00:40:39,520 Speaker 1: But I'm also very curious about the evolution of this 688 00:40:40,000 --> 00:40:44,839 Speaker 1: North Korean conversation because the FBI seems pretty publicly convinced, 689 00:40:45,320 --> 00:40:48,480 Speaker 1: and I told Matt, I said, this could be indicative 690 00:40:48,520 --> 00:40:50,880 Speaker 1: of one of two things. In my mind, One is 691 00:40:50,920 --> 00:40:53,960 Speaker 1: that they in fact do have very compelling evidence that 692 00:40:54,000 --> 00:40:56,400 Speaker 1: we are just not aware of, and that North Korea 693 00:40:56,520 --> 00:40:58,759 Speaker 1: is in fact responsible. They can't release it because they 694 00:40:58,800 --> 00:41:02,919 Speaker 1: illegally gathered it. Whatever, whatever the reasoning behind it, they 695 00:41:02,960 --> 00:41:05,279 Speaker 1: have it, they know it, and we just can't be 696 00:41:05,320 --> 00:41:08,000 Speaker 1: privy as to how or why. The second part is 697 00:41:08,719 --> 00:41:11,640 Speaker 1: to me, the second idea is that the FBI releases 698 00:41:11,680 --> 00:41:14,040 Speaker 1: this information in an effort to actually lure out the 699 00:41:14,080 --> 00:41:17,520 Speaker 1: people who really did do it. The idea being that, well, 700 00:41:17,560 --> 00:41:21,040 Speaker 1: if we put pressure on this group by saying that 701 00:41:21,080 --> 00:41:23,880 Speaker 1: it is North Korea, then North Korea is going to 702 00:41:24,000 --> 00:41:28,560 Speaker 1: respond in a very antagonistic way. It's going to escalate matters. 703 00:41:28,840 --> 00:41:31,680 Speaker 1: It's going to start bringing a lot more pressure on 704 00:41:31,719 --> 00:41:34,640 Speaker 1: the group actually responsible. And I don't know about you, 705 00:41:34,680 --> 00:41:37,360 Speaker 1: but if I were a hacker and I had caused 706 00:41:37,360 --> 00:41:41,280 Speaker 1: this kind of chaos, at first, I'd be thinking, man, 707 00:41:41,960 --> 00:41:44,399 Speaker 1: look at Look at what a bad hacker I am. Man, 708 00:41:44,520 --> 00:41:47,400 Speaker 1: I look at what I affected. And then, as it 709 00:41:47,440 --> 00:41:51,080 Speaker 1: would snowball, I think, WHOA, things are getting out of control. 710 00:41:51,120 --> 00:41:52,560 Speaker 1: And then if I get to the point where there's 711 00:41:52,640 --> 00:41:56,359 Speaker 1: there are people talking about using words like war and terrorism, 712 00:41:56,880 --> 00:42:00,239 Speaker 1: I'm thinking this went way out of proportion of what 713 00:42:00,280 --> 00:42:02,920 Speaker 1: I was expecting. I wanted to cause this company problems, 714 00:42:02,920 --> 00:42:05,640 Speaker 1: so I didn't want to capitulate the war the world 715 00:42:05,680 --> 00:42:09,000 Speaker 1: into war and death. So then you get but then 716 00:42:09,040 --> 00:42:12,160 Speaker 1: you have this FBI group saying, well, you know, it's 717 00:42:12,200 --> 00:42:15,520 Speaker 1: clearly North Korea. Meanwhile they're thinking, all right, let's see 718 00:42:15,560 --> 00:42:19,600 Speaker 1: who squirms. Yeah, yeah, right, let's see which dog barks. Guys. 719 00:42:19,640 --> 00:42:21,879 Speaker 1: I'm so happy that we covered this. Yeah, I know, 720 00:42:22,560 --> 00:42:24,399 Speaker 1: especially for Ben and I, it's a little different because 721 00:42:24,440 --> 00:42:27,319 Speaker 1: we generally don't cover things that are happening now like 722 00:42:27,360 --> 00:42:30,200 Speaker 1: this is still happening. There's gonna be a more information 723 00:42:30,239 --> 00:42:33,640 Speaker 1: that comes out here this. There may be evidence that 724 00:42:33,760 --> 00:42:35,480 Speaker 1: ends up making a lot of the things I said, 725 00:42:35,560 --> 00:42:41,560 Speaker 1: mood it was Bhutan the whole time. But thank you 726 00:42:41,600 --> 00:42:44,760 Speaker 1: so much for joining us for this conversation. Everybody, um 727 00:42:44,800 --> 00:42:48,279 Speaker 1: and especially Jonathan. Yeah, where can people see more of 728 00:42:48,280 --> 00:42:50,839 Speaker 1: your stuff? Well, they could go to If you want 729 00:42:50,920 --> 00:42:54,759 Speaker 1: the super optimistic, happy version of the future, you should 730 00:42:54,800 --> 00:42:57,839 Speaker 1: go to fw thinking dot com. That's forward thinking dot com. 731 00:42:57,960 --> 00:43:00,520 Speaker 1: That's where I I look at the future in all 732 00:43:00,560 --> 00:43:03,640 Speaker 1: different aspects, not just science and technology, but culture, and 733 00:43:03,719 --> 00:43:06,680 Speaker 1: it is uh, you know, kind of the bright shiny version, 734 00:43:06,719 --> 00:43:08,520 Speaker 1: not the dark gloomy version. If you want the dark 735 00:43:08,520 --> 00:43:10,719 Speaker 1: gloomy version, sometimes I cover that on my other show 736 00:43:10,760 --> 00:43:13,600 Speaker 1: Tex Stuff, which is a podcast you can subscribe to 737 00:43:14,160 --> 00:43:17,680 Speaker 1: publishes twice a week, which several times Ben has been 738 00:43:17,680 --> 00:43:21,279 Speaker 1: on several times. Yes, we did an excellent episode about ambulances. 739 00:43:21,320 --> 00:43:23,759 Speaker 1: We've had a lot of positive feedback from people in 740 00:43:23,800 --> 00:43:26,960 Speaker 1: the industry on that one. Yeah, that's great. And then 741 00:43:27,280 --> 00:43:29,560 Speaker 1: also you can catch me on brain Stuff and What 742 00:43:29,680 --> 00:43:33,319 Speaker 1: the Stuff where I end up being a dude on 743 00:43:33,520 --> 00:43:37,879 Speaker 1: video who talks about things and weird locations occasionally. Yeah, 744 00:43:37,920 --> 00:43:40,000 Speaker 1: and you can visit you can visit those sites at 745 00:43:40,040 --> 00:43:43,680 Speaker 1: house stuff Works as YouTube page. There's a there's a 746 00:43:43,719 --> 00:43:46,360 Speaker 1: great one you did recently for brain Stuff on Old 747 00:43:46,360 --> 00:43:50,520 Speaker 1: Timey Voices. That was a ton of fun, the Transatlantic accent, 748 00:43:50,680 --> 00:43:53,360 Speaker 1: and as it got a lot of really great feedback, 749 00:43:53,400 --> 00:43:56,480 Speaker 1: it was featured quite a few times in different places. Uh. 750 00:43:56,520 --> 00:43:59,319 Speaker 1: And also keep an eye out there will be a 751 00:43:59,520 --> 00:44:03,680 Speaker 1: What the Stuff that comes out in which Ben and 752 00:44:03,880 --> 00:44:07,600 Speaker 1: I both appear in the same episode. Oh yeah, I 753 00:44:07,760 --> 00:44:12,520 Speaker 1: just saw that picture. That's so. Speaking of feedback, we 754 00:44:12,520 --> 00:44:16,719 Speaker 1: would love to hear your take on the North Korea. Uh, well, 755 00:44:16,800 --> 00:44:21,560 Speaker 1: the alleged North Korea hacks in in Sony. So find 756 00:44:21,640 --> 00:44:24,680 Speaker 1: us on Facebook and Twitter where we are Conspiracy Stuff. 757 00:44:24,800 --> 00:44:28,760 Speaker 1: Check out our podcast on our blog or iTunes. However, 758 00:44:28,800 --> 00:44:32,319 Speaker 1: you get there, and that's the end of this classic episode. 759 00:44:32,360 --> 00:44:36,239 Speaker 1: If you have any thoughts or questions about this episode, 760 00:44:36,560 --> 00:44:38,640 Speaker 1: you can get into contact with us in a number 761 00:44:38,680 --> 00:44:40,680 Speaker 1: of different ways. One of the best is to give 762 00:44:40,719 --> 00:44:43,320 Speaker 1: us a call. Our number is one eight three three 763 00:44:43,640 --> 00:44:46,480 Speaker 1: std w y t K. If you don't want to 764 00:44:46,520 --> 00:44:49,120 Speaker 1: do that, you can send us a good old fashioned email. 765 00:44:49,360 --> 00:44:54,000 Speaker 1: We are conspiracy at i heart radio dot com. Stuff 766 00:44:54,040 --> 00:44:55,920 Speaker 1: they Don't want you to Know is a production of 767 00:44:56,000 --> 00:44:58,960 Speaker 1: I heart Radio. For more podcasts from my heart Radio, 768 00:44:59,080 --> 00:45:01,520 Speaker 1: visit the i heart radio a app, Apple Podcasts, or 769 00:45:01,520 --> 00:45:03,320 Speaker 1: wherever you listen to your favorite shows.