1 00:00:13,600 --> 00:00:16,599 Speaker 1: Hello, and welcome to the Credit Edge of Weekly Markets podcast. 2 00:00:16,840 --> 00:00:19,480 Speaker 1: My name is James Crombie. I'm a senior editor at Bloomberg. 3 00:00:20,000 --> 00:00:23,079 Speaker 1: Today's guests are Reshmi Basu, who covers distressed debt for 4 00:00:23,120 --> 00:00:25,360 Speaker 1: Bloomberg News in New York. We're delighted to have you 5 00:00:25,400 --> 00:00:25,840 Speaker 1: on the show. 6 00:00:26,480 --> 00:00:29,400 Speaker 2: James, thank you so much for having me here. I 7 00:00:29,480 --> 00:00:30,360 Speaker 2: love your podcast. 8 00:00:31,120 --> 00:00:34,080 Speaker 1: Thank you. We're also very pleased to welcome Himanshu Bakshi, 9 00:00:34,240 --> 00:00:37,320 Speaker 1: who covers banks for Bloomberg Intelligence, also in New York. 10 00:00:37,600 --> 00:00:39,280 Speaker 3: Hi, James, thank you for having me today. 11 00:00:39,640 --> 00:00:42,000 Speaker 1: We'll be coming right back to Himanshu a little bit 12 00:00:42,080 --> 00:00:45,400 Speaker 1: later in the show, but before we do. Reshmi Basu 13 00:00:45,440 --> 00:00:48,840 Speaker 1: with Bloomberg News, you cover distressed debt in the US. 14 00:00:49,320 --> 00:00:51,440 Speaker 1: A lot of companies are running into trouble at the moment, 15 00:00:51,479 --> 00:00:55,120 Speaker 1: with interest rates rising and the economy slowing, potentially tipping 16 00:00:55,120 --> 00:00:58,760 Speaker 1: into a recession, maybe a hard landing. Stagflation, inflation and 17 00:00:58,840 --> 00:01:02,080 Speaker 1: volatility in the financial don't help. A lot of regional 18 00:01:02,080 --> 00:01:04,720 Speaker 1: banks are really struggling right now. What's the level of 19 00:01:04,760 --> 00:01:07,319 Speaker 1: distress in credit markets at the moment? Resh me, How 20 00:01:07,319 --> 00:01:09,080 Speaker 1: worried should we be? Well? 21 00:01:09,120 --> 00:01:11,840 Speaker 2: The days of cheap money are over as the FED 22 00:01:11,880 --> 00:01:15,520 Speaker 2: has steadily increased interest rates, and higher interest rates are 23 00:01:15,520 --> 00:01:18,480 Speaker 2: putting pressure on the cash flow for companies, especially for 24 00:01:18,560 --> 00:01:20,680 Speaker 2: tech names, and this is where we're seeing quite a 25 00:01:20,760 --> 00:01:24,800 Speaker 2: bit of distressed activity. You know, global default rates have 26 00:01:24,920 --> 00:01:27,840 Speaker 2: now reached the highest level since the twenty twenty pandemic, 27 00:01:27,959 --> 00:01:30,319 Speaker 2: and now over the last few months, we've seen several 28 00:01:30,400 --> 00:01:33,520 Speaker 2: high profile bankruptcies as you mentioned, you know, from banks 29 00:01:33,520 --> 00:01:37,160 Speaker 2: such as Silicon Valley to bed Bath and beyond. We're 30 00:01:37,160 --> 00:01:40,479 Speaker 2: seeing a number of companies entering into negotiations with their 31 00:01:40,600 --> 00:01:44,280 Speaker 2: lenders to extend the twenty twenty four maturity wall. You know, 32 00:01:44,319 --> 00:01:47,480 Speaker 2: for instance, data center operator six Terra is looking at 33 00:01:47,560 --> 00:01:51,600 Speaker 2: multiple options ranging from selling assets to our capital raised 34 00:01:51,680 --> 00:01:54,520 Speaker 2: to tackle heavy debtload. If they can't do that, then 35 00:01:54,520 --> 00:01:56,360 Speaker 2: it's going to end up filing for bankruptcy. 36 00:01:56,880 --> 00:01:58,760 Speaker 1: So the companies you mentioned they're in trouble, what are 37 00:01:58,760 --> 00:02:00,240 Speaker 1: they doing to sort of buy them? That has a 38 00:02:00,280 --> 00:02:02,000 Speaker 1: bit more time here, right. 39 00:02:01,880 --> 00:02:04,960 Speaker 2: This is a market where it's extremely challenging for people 40 00:02:05,040 --> 00:02:07,480 Speaker 2: to make money, and what we are seeing is that 41 00:02:07,560 --> 00:02:12,880 Speaker 2: some lenders, private equity owners, companies themselves are exploiting loopholes 42 00:02:12,919 --> 00:02:16,760 Speaker 2: in the credit agreements that allows for these contentious debt 43 00:02:16,840 --> 00:02:21,920 Speaker 2: maneuvers to take place. So, in industry terms, there's a termination. 44 00:02:22,080 --> 00:02:25,720 Speaker 2: There's a term called designation of an unrestricted subsidiary or 45 00:02:25,760 --> 00:02:28,480 Speaker 2: a drop down box, and that is something no one 46 00:02:28,840 --> 00:02:31,800 Speaker 2: ever wants to hear. But in layman terms, this means 47 00:02:31,840 --> 00:02:35,320 Speaker 2: that the company is moving assets from the collateral package 48 00:02:35,680 --> 00:02:39,520 Speaker 2: backing lenders loans away from their reach. So basically what 49 00:02:39,560 --> 00:02:42,000 Speaker 2: it kind of means is like, let's say I agree 50 00:02:42,040 --> 00:02:44,680 Speaker 2: to give a company a loan, and I believe there 51 00:02:44,680 --> 00:02:47,760 Speaker 2: were five businesses in this package. All of a sudden, 52 00:02:47,800 --> 00:02:50,760 Speaker 2: the company says, oops, no, not so fast, We're going 53 00:02:50,840 --> 00:02:54,359 Speaker 2: to take away two businesses from that enemy. And now 54 00:02:54,360 --> 00:02:58,040 Speaker 2: your recovery values are going to go down and those 55 00:02:58,080 --> 00:03:00,000 Speaker 2: assets have been taken away from you. 56 00:03:00,080 --> 00:03:03,440 Speaker 1: Let me just start you there, the collateral package, unrestricted subsidiary. 57 00:03:03,480 --> 00:03:05,920 Speaker 1: There's lots of quite complicated terms in there. I just 58 00:03:05,919 --> 00:03:08,600 Speaker 1: wanted to break it down even more. We're saying that 59 00:03:09,280 --> 00:03:12,639 Speaker 1: when a company borrows money, they essentially they have something 60 00:03:12,639 --> 00:03:15,800 Speaker 1: that is worth something that the lenders will attach as 61 00:03:15,880 --> 00:03:19,600 Speaker 1: collateral and they expect that that will remain in their 62 00:03:19,639 --> 00:03:22,440 Speaker 1: reach when you know, when they're in this lending agreement, 63 00:03:22,800 --> 00:03:25,000 Speaker 1: and the companies are essentially taking this collateral and putting 64 00:03:25,000 --> 00:03:25,560 Speaker 1: it somewhere else. 65 00:03:25,720 --> 00:03:28,880 Speaker 2: Yeah exactly. So when you know a company does a 66 00:03:28,960 --> 00:03:32,760 Speaker 2: leverage buyout, you as a lender, we're a lend money 67 00:03:32,760 --> 00:03:36,040 Speaker 2: to the company, and you're believing that when you do 68 00:03:36,120 --> 00:03:41,400 Speaker 2: this loan that you have the amount of assets. And 69 00:03:41,440 --> 00:03:45,040 Speaker 2: now what the companies are doing are saying not again, 70 00:03:45,520 --> 00:03:47,440 Speaker 2: We're going to take away some of these assets and 71 00:03:47,480 --> 00:03:48,720 Speaker 2: give it to other lenders. 72 00:03:48,960 --> 00:03:51,600 Speaker 1: Okay, So the word drop down, the phrase drop down 73 00:03:51,720 --> 00:03:52,760 Speaker 1: does that what does that apply to? 74 00:03:53,360 --> 00:03:56,640 Speaker 2: Job down basically means that you are the company is 75 00:03:56,680 --> 00:04:00,320 Speaker 2: moving collateral away from the reach of lenders and putting 76 00:04:00,320 --> 00:04:03,640 Speaker 2: it into a separate legal entity, and at that entity 77 00:04:04,160 --> 00:04:05,720 Speaker 2: they can raise financing. 78 00:04:06,160 --> 00:04:09,080 Speaker 1: Okay, So lenders are not only losing the collateral, but 79 00:04:09,080 --> 00:04:11,760 Speaker 1: they're also kind of being exposed to the risk of 80 00:04:11,800 --> 00:04:14,440 Speaker 1: the company taking on more debt at another level of 81 00:04:14,440 --> 00:04:14,840 Speaker 1: the company. 82 00:04:14,880 --> 00:04:16,880 Speaker 2: Is that Yeah exactly, and they're kind of going to 83 00:04:16,920 --> 00:04:20,279 Speaker 2: be primed, which basically means that those lenders who lose 84 00:04:20,320 --> 00:04:23,480 Speaker 2: those assets are being pushed down to be payment line. 85 00:04:23,800 --> 00:04:25,880 Speaker 1: Okay, so where is this happening? Can you give us 86 00:04:25,880 --> 00:04:28,440 Speaker 1: any examples of what we're seeing right now. 87 00:04:28,800 --> 00:04:29,000 Speaker 3: Yeah. 88 00:04:29,040 --> 00:04:33,000 Speaker 2: You know, for instance, we covered a company Club Corp, 89 00:04:33,120 --> 00:04:38,719 Speaker 2: which is Apollo as Apollo is the private equity owner 90 00:04:39,120 --> 00:04:44,360 Speaker 2: and Club Corp operates private clubs and golf courses. And 91 00:04:44,520 --> 00:04:48,640 Speaker 2: the company recently informed lenders that it was moving to 92 00:04:48,960 --> 00:04:54,640 Speaker 2: business entities into legal and into like legal subsidiaries, which 93 00:04:54,720 --> 00:04:58,200 Speaker 2: basically means it's basically a precursor that the company is 94 00:04:58,240 --> 00:05:02,760 Speaker 2: going to probably raise financing at that box, and those 95 00:05:02,920 --> 00:05:06,920 Speaker 2: businesses have been kind of stripped array from lenders. And 96 00:05:07,080 --> 00:05:10,560 Speaker 2: reason why this is so interesting is because the company 97 00:05:10,680 --> 00:05:15,600 Speaker 2: was actually in negotiations with lenders to extend on near 98 00:05:15,720 --> 00:05:21,159 Speaker 2: term maturity. That deal fell apart, and shortly after the 99 00:05:21,360 --> 00:05:25,920 Speaker 2: company created an unrestricted box drop down box or basically 100 00:05:26,000 --> 00:05:29,400 Speaker 2: moved to business says Interleegal a different legal entity. 101 00:05:29,760 --> 00:05:32,280 Speaker 1: And is this quite common now, this drop down transaction? 102 00:05:32,520 --> 00:05:33,800 Speaker 1: Is it widespread in the industry. 103 00:05:34,000 --> 00:05:37,440 Speaker 2: Yeah, it's becoming common enough that we are seeing situations 104 00:05:37,480 --> 00:05:40,920 Speaker 2: where the lenders were banned together in a preventive move 105 00:05:41,040 --> 00:05:46,560 Speaker 2: with law firms and signed cooperation agreements, which basically is 106 00:05:46,800 --> 00:05:51,560 Speaker 2: telling a company we are united, don't try to do 107 00:05:51,640 --> 00:05:53,359 Speaker 2: these kind of aggressive debt maneuvers. 108 00:05:53,800 --> 00:05:56,640 Speaker 1: But it's not entirely new. We've seen these in the past, right, Yeah. 109 00:05:56,720 --> 00:05:59,960 Speaker 2: We saw it in twenty twenty seventeen with Jay krue 110 00:06:00,279 --> 00:06:02,839 Speaker 2: where it moved Made Well but at the time, which 111 00:06:03,000 --> 00:06:06,880 Speaker 2: was its kind of crown jewel into a drop down box, 112 00:06:07,080 --> 00:06:09,760 Speaker 2: and there's a lot of legal action that took place. 113 00:06:11,560 --> 00:06:14,599 Speaker 2: And then shortly after we saw you know, pet Smart 114 00:06:14,600 --> 00:06:17,680 Speaker 2: do the same thing where it moved Chruey it's online 115 00:06:17,800 --> 00:06:23,720 Speaker 2: pet Stow retailer into a different box, and Nieman Marcus 116 00:06:23,760 --> 00:06:27,840 Speaker 2: moved My Teresa again an online retailer, into a different box. 117 00:06:28,480 --> 00:06:31,800 Speaker 2: But you know, with pet Smart and My Teresa, we 118 00:06:31,880 --> 00:06:38,240 Speaker 2: actually saw those entities do go public. And in these 119 00:06:38,360 --> 00:06:42,000 Speaker 2: kind of more recent situations, we're not seeing those new 120 00:06:42,040 --> 00:06:44,440 Speaker 2: businesses go into like you know, be spun off into 121 00:06:44,440 --> 00:06:48,600 Speaker 2: a publicly listed company. We're actually seeing those companies such 122 00:06:48,600 --> 00:06:50,359 Speaker 2: as like a curt of Simmons, which it did a 123 00:06:50,440 --> 00:06:54,760 Speaker 2: deal in twenty twenty going to Chapter eleven. 124 00:06:55,160 --> 00:06:57,800 Speaker 1: But so in the past, these these maneuvers have actually 125 00:06:57,800 --> 00:06:59,279 Speaker 1: worked and they've saved companies. 126 00:06:59,600 --> 00:07:02,000 Speaker 2: They and you actually saw them being able to spend 127 00:07:02,000 --> 00:07:07,279 Speaker 2: off those assets into a publiclisted company and those proceeds 128 00:07:07,279 --> 00:07:09,240 Speaker 2: would then be used to pay off the lenders. 129 00:07:09,600 --> 00:07:13,119 Speaker 1: But in this case, because the IPO market isn't as hot, 130 00:07:13,280 --> 00:07:14,840 Speaker 1: we think that these won't work this time. 131 00:07:14,960 --> 00:07:17,480 Speaker 2: Yeah, and we're seeing, you know, in Kora, which is 132 00:07:17,520 --> 00:07:19,920 Speaker 2: an aerospace supply, or we're seeing you know, we're hearing 133 00:07:20,280 --> 00:07:22,720 Speaker 2: you know, we're hearing that they're having liquidity issues. Obviously 134 00:07:22,760 --> 00:07:27,000 Speaker 2: we had sort of semons and Envision is another company. 135 00:07:27,080 --> 00:07:31,440 Speaker 1: So the main difference is then between prior use of 136 00:07:31,480 --> 00:07:34,000 Speaker 1: the dropdown and what we're seeing now is just the 137 00:07:34,200 --> 00:07:35,600 Speaker 1: exit to the IPO. Is that right? 138 00:07:35,920 --> 00:07:35,960 Speaker 3: No? 139 00:07:36,160 --> 00:07:37,840 Speaker 2: I think we saw that quite a bit in the 140 00:07:37,880 --> 00:07:41,400 Speaker 2: beginning that you know, the companies would say like, look like, 141 00:07:42,000 --> 00:07:45,200 Speaker 2: even though we're removing these assets from you, eventually we're 142 00:07:45,200 --> 00:07:47,680 Speaker 2: going to do some type of we'll make it a 143 00:07:47,720 --> 00:07:50,800 Speaker 2: publicly traded company and you're going to see value from 144 00:07:50,840 --> 00:07:51,480 Speaker 2: this IPO. 145 00:07:52,520 --> 00:07:56,920 Speaker 1: So we're talking about something that is really not very 146 00:07:56,920 --> 00:07:58,920 Speaker 1: good for the creditor. Right, So how are they reacting 147 00:07:58,920 --> 00:08:00,840 Speaker 1: to this other than organizing, what are they doing to 148 00:08:01,000 --> 00:08:03,000 Speaker 1: be able to protect themselves in these situations? 149 00:08:03,080 --> 00:08:07,040 Speaker 2: They're filing lawsuits. We saw that with Mike Tell, We've 150 00:08:07,560 --> 00:08:10,360 Speaker 2: seen it with in Kora, that there's a lot of 151 00:08:10,400 --> 00:08:14,400 Speaker 2: lawsuits coming and they're basically calling these deals as kind 152 00:08:14,400 --> 00:08:18,680 Speaker 2: of sham transactions, and they're not done in good faith negotiations, 153 00:08:19,040 --> 00:08:21,960 Speaker 2: and they are a complete manipulation of the documents that 154 00:08:22,000 --> 00:08:23,640 Speaker 2: they initially agree to. 155 00:08:24,120 --> 00:08:26,320 Speaker 1: Have we seen any of these lawsuits succeed orre they 156 00:08:26,400 --> 00:08:27,520 Speaker 1: still working their way through the courts. 157 00:08:27,800 --> 00:08:29,680 Speaker 2: They're still working their race through the court. So we 158 00:08:29,680 --> 00:08:33,560 Speaker 2: don't have a great amount of case law. But one 159 00:08:33,559 --> 00:08:37,320 Speaker 2: thing we did see in Certi Simmon's bankruptcy court is 160 00:08:37,360 --> 00:08:40,319 Speaker 2: that the bankruptcy judge did kind of give a nod 161 00:08:40,960 --> 00:08:44,920 Speaker 2: to the aggressive or egregious debt maneuvers. 162 00:08:45,320 --> 00:08:48,840 Speaker 1: Very interesting. So before we talked to Himanshubacshi at Bloomberg Intelligence, 163 00:08:49,200 --> 00:08:52,200 Speaker 1: what's the next big story to watch on your beat? Reshmi? 164 00:08:52,360 --> 00:08:53,360 Speaker 1: What are we looking for next? 165 00:08:54,120 --> 00:08:57,640 Speaker 2: I think we're going to be seeing more cooperation agreements. 166 00:08:57,679 --> 00:09:00,960 Speaker 2: That's something that we're working on for tech company, and 167 00:09:01,520 --> 00:09:05,960 Speaker 2: we're definitely going to see more drop downs for many companies. 168 00:09:06,000 --> 00:09:07,959 Speaker 2: In particular, we're seeing a lot of it in the 169 00:09:07,960 --> 00:09:09,080 Speaker 2: tech software space. 170 00:09:09,320 --> 00:09:10,800 Speaker 1: So cooperation agreements, what are they? 171 00:09:10,960 --> 00:09:13,160 Speaker 2: Cooperation agreements are just basically when the lender is kind 172 00:09:13,160 --> 00:09:17,040 Speaker 2: of bound together for a united front, and you know 173 00:09:17,080 --> 00:09:20,040 Speaker 2: you basically kind of have to inform your lenders if 174 00:09:20,080 --> 00:09:23,120 Speaker 2: you plan to sell your loan. 175 00:09:23,600 --> 00:09:26,120 Speaker 1: Great stuff, Rashmi Bessie from Bloomberg News, thanks so much 176 00:09:26,160 --> 00:09:28,960 Speaker 1: for joining us. Thanks for having me read all of 177 00:09:29,040 --> 00:09:31,600 Speaker 1: Reshmi's scoops on the Bloomberg terminal and of course at 178 00:09:31,640 --> 00:09:35,320 Speaker 1: Bloomberg dot Com. Moving on to another key part of 179 00:09:35,360 --> 00:09:37,840 Speaker 1: credit markets. As I mentioned earlier, we're delighted to have 180 00:09:37,880 --> 00:09:41,800 Speaker 1: on the show Haymanschu Bakshi, who covers banks at Bloomberg Intelligence. 181 00:09:42,600 --> 00:09:44,880 Speaker 1: What's going on with the banks, Himanshu was We've discussed 182 00:09:44,920 --> 00:09:47,320 Speaker 1: a few times already on this show. In March, there 183 00:09:47,320 --> 00:09:50,280 Speaker 1: were serious issues, a regional banking crisis in the US, 184 00:09:50,520 --> 00:09:53,440 Speaker 1: the downfall of Silicon Valley Bank, a niche lender in 185 00:09:53,480 --> 00:09:56,040 Speaker 1: the tech sector, and also to the wineries in California. 186 00:09:56,200 --> 00:09:59,360 Speaker 1: Then much more worrying Credit Swiss imploded, one of the 187 00:09:59,400 --> 00:10:02,240 Speaker 1: biggest fans institutions in the world, heavily involved in all 188 00:10:02,280 --> 00:10:05,160 Speaker 1: parts of the credit markets, brought down and forced into 189 00:10:05,160 --> 00:10:08,800 Speaker 1: a fire sale with ubs. Now First Republic is teaching. 190 00:10:09,280 --> 00:10:10,880 Speaker 1: Is the banking crisis over in your view? 191 00:10:11,080 --> 00:10:14,880 Speaker 3: Manchu, Hey, Gems, thanks again for having me today. So 192 00:10:15,080 --> 00:10:18,240 Speaker 3: is the banking crisis over. I think the answer is 193 00:10:18,400 --> 00:10:22,280 Speaker 3: the worst of the crisis is over, but the banking 194 00:10:22,400 --> 00:10:25,800 Speaker 3: system remains under pressure. And the reason I say that 195 00:10:25,920 --> 00:10:29,880 Speaker 3: is because inflation, even though it's easy, it still remains high, 196 00:10:29,960 --> 00:10:34,160 Speaker 3: which means the Federal Reserve will need to continue to 197 00:10:34,240 --> 00:10:38,040 Speaker 3: raise interest rates, which means that the issue we save 198 00:10:38,120 --> 00:10:41,360 Speaker 3: with some of the banks that failed in March was 199 00:10:42,720 --> 00:10:46,240 Speaker 3: rising losses on the investment portfolio. That will continue to increase. 200 00:10:47,760 --> 00:10:51,920 Speaker 3: But the change we are seeing now is that the 201 00:10:52,000 --> 00:10:55,480 Speaker 3: focus has shifted from all banks globally to a few 202 00:10:55,520 --> 00:10:59,120 Speaker 3: banks with those radiosyncratic risk So even though it'll take 203 00:10:59,200 --> 00:11:03,080 Speaker 3: some time for positors, investors confidence to come back, I 204 00:11:03,160 --> 00:11:05,240 Speaker 3: think most of the crisis is behind us. 205 00:11:06,080 --> 00:11:08,280 Speaker 1: So you look at the eighty one market, that's the 206 00:11:08,360 --> 00:11:12,160 Speaker 1: riskiest form of bank debt credit Swiss wrote there's down 207 00:11:12,200 --> 00:11:16,040 Speaker 1: to zero, even though equity holders got something back. That 208 00:11:16,240 --> 00:11:19,000 Speaker 1: was a major event for that market, and we saw, 209 00:11:19,520 --> 00:11:20,760 Speaker 1: you know, a lot of panic and a lot of 210 00:11:20,760 --> 00:11:24,600 Speaker 1: people saying that the market had been killed by that transaction. 211 00:11:24,720 --> 00:11:27,360 Speaker 1: But more recently we saw a deal in Asia, so 212 00:11:27,880 --> 00:11:30,040 Speaker 1: the market, you know, it's not completely dead. What about 213 00:11:30,080 --> 00:11:31,160 Speaker 1: in the countries that you cover? 214 00:11:31,880 --> 00:11:35,000 Speaker 3: So I cover Canadian and Australian banks. These are among 215 00:11:35,000 --> 00:11:37,840 Speaker 3: the highest rated banks in the world, from mid singlely 216 00:11:37,920 --> 00:11:40,880 Speaker 3: to high double A. I think the market remains open 217 00:11:41,000 --> 00:11:46,720 Speaker 3: for these highly rated institutions, and we saw that in March. 218 00:11:47,280 --> 00:11:50,840 Speaker 3: If you looked at Australian or Canadian banks eighty one securities, 219 00:11:51,720 --> 00:11:54,360 Speaker 3: they widened along with all the market, although all the 220 00:11:54,360 --> 00:11:58,520 Speaker 3: other financial institutions, but they widened less than most banks globally, 221 00:11:59,480 --> 00:12:02,200 Speaker 3: and so I think markets will remain open. But one 222 00:12:02,200 --> 00:12:05,080 Speaker 3: thing that I would like to highlight is additional Tier 223 00:12:05,080 --> 00:12:09,559 Speaker 3: one capital is not a requirement for banks. The optimal 224 00:12:09,640 --> 00:12:13,120 Speaker 3: level the regulator asked banks to hold is about one 225 00:12:13,160 --> 00:12:15,920 Speaker 3: point five percent of their risk created assets. Most of 226 00:12:15,960 --> 00:12:18,960 Speaker 3: the banks under my coverage already are at that level 227 00:12:19,080 --> 00:12:21,920 Speaker 3: or exceed that level, so they don't have an urgent 228 00:12:22,080 --> 00:12:24,439 Speaker 3: need to come to market to issue eighty one securities. 229 00:12:25,000 --> 00:12:28,200 Speaker 3: Uh And because these banks are so well capitalized, they 230 00:12:28,200 --> 00:12:32,160 Speaker 3: don't need to issue because as I said, the one 231 00:12:32,160 --> 00:12:35,400 Speaker 3: point eighty one as a percentage of risk created assets, 232 00:12:35,400 --> 00:12:39,240 Speaker 3: it's not a requirement. Is it's an optimal level. But 233 00:12:39,280 --> 00:12:42,040 Speaker 3: if you have enough core equity, core capital, you don't 234 00:12:42,080 --> 00:12:43,200 Speaker 3: even need to issue that much. 235 00:12:43,640 --> 00:12:46,240 Speaker 1: You've talked a bit about extension risk in what you've 236 00:12:46,280 --> 00:12:47,959 Speaker 1: been writing. What does that mean and why should we 237 00:12:48,040 --> 00:12:48,600 Speaker 1: care about it? 238 00:12:48,840 --> 00:12:52,000 Speaker 3: So extension risk is basically, when you buy an eighty 239 00:12:52,040 --> 00:12:55,360 Speaker 3: one security of a bank, you are assuming that the 240 00:12:55,360 --> 00:12:57,240 Speaker 3: bank will call those security on the first called it 241 00:12:58,040 --> 00:13:03,439 Speaker 3: and banks under my cover, for example Australia. Australian banks 242 00:13:03,440 --> 00:13:05,599 Speaker 3: in the past have always called eighty one securities on 243 00:13:05,640 --> 00:13:09,000 Speaker 3: the first call date and that's how those securities are priced. 244 00:13:09,720 --> 00:13:13,120 Speaker 3: We still expect Australian banks to call the eighty one 245 00:13:13,120 --> 00:13:15,360 Speaker 3: securities on the first call date. The a couple of 246 00:13:15,400 --> 00:13:19,200 Speaker 3: structural reasons why they would do that because the eighty 247 00:13:19,200 --> 00:13:23,160 Speaker 3: one high bits. For example, they have a mandatory convusion 248 00:13:23,280 --> 00:13:26,400 Speaker 3: date three month three years after the first call date, 249 00:13:26,679 --> 00:13:28,680 Speaker 3: so for them, it makes sense to call the eighty 250 00:13:28,720 --> 00:13:32,319 Speaker 3: one securities of the first called aid. For Canadian banks, 251 00:13:32,760 --> 00:13:35,480 Speaker 3: they are not known for calling the eighty one securities 252 00:13:35,520 --> 00:13:37,440 Speaker 3: on the first cal date, so we don't expect them 253 00:13:37,800 --> 00:13:40,880 Speaker 3: to call the eighty ones. But Australian banks we two thinks. 254 00:13:41,040 --> 00:13:43,840 Speaker 3: So in terms of extension risk, I see a little 255 00:13:43,880 --> 00:13:46,320 Speaker 3: bit for Canadian banks, but not for Australian banks. 256 00:13:46,440 --> 00:13:49,000 Speaker 1: Okay, So over all the financial institutions. Where do we 257 00:13:49,040 --> 00:13:49,679 Speaker 1: go from here? 258 00:13:50,679 --> 00:13:53,800 Speaker 3: I think, as I said before, the risk has shifted 259 00:13:54,240 --> 00:13:57,200 Speaker 3: to a few banks with idiosyncreative risk, and what I 260 00:13:57,240 --> 00:14:00,800 Speaker 3: mean by that is banks with more on show loans, 261 00:14:01,679 --> 00:14:03,760 Speaker 3: what we're seeing with First Republic, where you have a 262 00:14:04,760 --> 00:14:09,400 Speaker 3: interest only mortgages on your balance sheet. So the focus 263 00:14:09,400 --> 00:14:12,120 Speaker 3: has shifted to those kinds of banks. So I think 264 00:14:12,200 --> 00:14:16,079 Speaker 3: overall the risk is going down. But something to watch 265 00:14:16,080 --> 00:14:19,640 Speaker 3: out is what will be the impact of the crisis 266 00:14:19,640 --> 00:14:23,720 Speaker 3: we had in March on the economy, the economic growth 267 00:14:23,760 --> 00:14:29,640 Speaker 3: and credit growth. And that's important why because if we 268 00:14:29,720 --> 00:14:34,720 Speaker 3: see a significant technique of underwriting standards from here on, 269 00:14:35,800 --> 00:14:39,600 Speaker 3: that will have an impact on households and businesses, which 270 00:14:39,640 --> 00:14:41,920 Speaker 3: will in turn have an impact on the labor market 271 00:14:42,080 --> 00:14:46,880 Speaker 3: right and that will put pressure on borrowers low in 272 00:14:46,920 --> 00:14:51,480 Speaker 3: the credit spectrum. And if we have that, that will 273 00:14:51,600 --> 00:14:56,880 Speaker 3: have an impact on the bank's asset quality. And that's 274 00:14:56,880 --> 00:15:00,000 Speaker 3: what we're watching right now. So I cover the big 275 00:15:00,080 --> 00:15:03,280 Speaker 3: give US credit card issues, and what I'm watching is 276 00:15:03,480 --> 00:15:08,040 Speaker 3: asset quality for card issus. With more subprime loans. 277 00:15:07,840 --> 00:15:10,080 Speaker 1: Surely we're going to be running into trouble and credit cards. 278 00:15:10,080 --> 00:15:12,800 Speaker 1: Though with the consumer when we tip into recession. I mean, 279 00:15:12,800 --> 00:15:13,720 Speaker 1: are you're not worried about that? 280 00:15:14,320 --> 00:15:17,160 Speaker 3: Not really, Because all the US card is shows that 281 00:15:17,200 --> 00:15:20,880 Speaker 3: I covered, they have ample allowance for credit losses. And 282 00:15:20,960 --> 00:15:23,640 Speaker 3: what I mean by ample, so all the card is 283 00:15:23,640 --> 00:15:27,800 Speaker 3: shows have reserved assuming that unemployment will peak at five percent. 284 00:15:28,360 --> 00:15:31,760 Speaker 3: That's what our in house Bloomberg view is. Even if 285 00:15:31,840 --> 00:15:35,960 Speaker 3: unemployment goes above five percent. We know that the Federal 286 00:15:36,000 --> 00:15:39,040 Speaker 3: Reserve last year stress tested all these card issuers at 287 00:15:39,120 --> 00:15:45,480 Speaker 3: ten percent peak unemployment, So banks have time to add 288 00:15:45,480 --> 00:15:49,200 Speaker 3: more provisions to their reserves, and on top of that, 289 00:15:49,240 --> 00:15:52,680 Speaker 3: they have ample capital to absorb any unexpected losses. So 290 00:15:52,760 --> 00:15:56,760 Speaker 3: I don't think it's a big issue for it's a 291 00:15:56,760 --> 00:16:00,040 Speaker 3: big concern for credit card is shows now. Obviously the 292 00:16:00,080 --> 00:16:04,200 Speaker 3: bonds will remain sensitive to a recession, but I think 293 00:16:04,200 --> 00:16:06,320 Speaker 3: the credit profile of all the US cardish shows should 294 00:16:06,320 --> 00:16:07,160 Speaker 3: be stable. 295 00:16:07,480 --> 00:16:10,080 Speaker 1: Are there any that are particularly concerning to you? I mean, 296 00:16:10,240 --> 00:16:13,200 Speaker 1: obviously places like Amex that have sort of high net 297 00:16:13,200 --> 00:16:16,040 Speaker 1: worth customers, they're pretty be okay. But the other ones 298 00:16:16,080 --> 00:16:18,480 Speaker 1: that maybe you know, give cards out to Banana Republic 299 00:16:18,600 --> 00:16:20,480 Speaker 1: or whatever, are they not going to be struggling a bit? 300 00:16:21,160 --> 00:16:23,480 Speaker 3: So yeah, as you said, Amex. Yes, they have a 301 00:16:23,560 --> 00:16:27,040 Speaker 3: more affluent super prime client base, so Amex should be fine. 302 00:16:27,160 --> 00:16:30,880 Speaker 3: Discovers another one that I cover, again more prime focus. 303 00:16:31,520 --> 00:16:35,280 Speaker 3: But the two that I'm looking carefully, I think the 304 00:16:35,280 --> 00:16:37,520 Speaker 3: first one is Capital One because about thirty percent of 305 00:16:37,560 --> 00:16:40,560 Speaker 3: their loan book is subprime, fifty percent of their auto 306 00:16:40,600 --> 00:16:43,160 Speaker 3: loan book is subprime. And then the other one is 307 00:16:43,200 --> 00:16:46,920 Speaker 3: Synchrony Financial, about twenty seven percent of their loan book 308 00:16:47,000 --> 00:16:49,360 Speaker 3: is subprime. So those are the two we are watching. 309 00:16:49,880 --> 00:16:54,160 Speaker 3: But these two banks also have higher alarms for credit 310 00:16:54,200 --> 00:16:56,320 Speaker 3: losses than the other two piers I mentioned with more 311 00:16:56,320 --> 00:16:59,840 Speaker 3: prime focus, and they also have higher capital. And so 312 00:17:00,000 --> 00:17:02,840 Speaker 3: even though they are taking more risk, they are actually 313 00:17:03,640 --> 00:17:06,200 Speaker 3: when the underwrite, the underwrite to the risk, they understand 314 00:17:06,200 --> 00:17:08,480 Speaker 3: what the risk is, they have higher margins, they have 315 00:17:08,600 --> 00:17:12,240 Speaker 3: more capital against that risk. So as I said, even 316 00:17:12,280 --> 00:17:15,280 Speaker 3: though their bond spreads may remain sensitive in a downtown, 317 00:17:15,880 --> 00:17:18,040 Speaker 3: overall the credit profile of even these two banks should 318 00:17:18,040 --> 00:17:18,479 Speaker 3: be fine. 319 00:17:18,840 --> 00:17:21,919 Speaker 1: So you sound remarkably up beaten optimistic, and you know 320 00:17:21,960 --> 00:17:23,960 Speaker 1: this is a credit show, and I'm very pessimistic, And 321 00:17:24,000 --> 00:17:27,080 Speaker 1: does Reshmi was saying earlier, there's a ton of things 322 00:17:27,080 --> 00:17:30,240 Speaker 1: to worry about. What keeps you up worrying mindshew. 323 00:17:30,520 --> 00:17:33,199 Speaker 3: I think, as I said before, the one thing that 324 00:17:33,200 --> 00:17:36,280 Speaker 3: I'm looking at is the impact of the banking crisis 325 00:17:36,359 --> 00:17:41,280 Speaker 3: on the economy and the credit growth. Because, as I said, 326 00:17:41,280 --> 00:17:45,080 Speaker 3: the subprime blenders that we're looking at, Capital One and 327 00:17:45,240 --> 00:17:49,800 Speaker 3: Synchrony I mentioned, they still have good regulatory supervision. So 328 00:17:49,840 --> 00:17:52,560 Speaker 3: those are not the banks that I'm concerned about. I 329 00:17:52,600 --> 00:17:55,440 Speaker 3: think the risk lies more in the small non bank 330 00:17:55,440 --> 00:17:59,520 Speaker 3: financial institutions, which they don't have much regulatory supervision, and 331 00:17:59,560 --> 00:18:02,560 Speaker 3: that's why concerned about. I don't cover those companies, but 332 00:18:02,840 --> 00:18:05,320 Speaker 3: I think the risk is over there in my view. 333 00:18:05,880 --> 00:18:08,520 Speaker 1: Thanks very much, she Manchu Bakshi of Bloomberg Intelligence. 334 00:18:08,560 --> 00:18:09,320 Speaker 3: Thank you, James. 335 00:18:09,480 --> 00:18:11,840 Speaker 1: You can see all of his analysis on the Bloomberg Terminal. 336 00:18:12,080 --> 00:18:14,000 Speaker 1: There's a ton of stuff going on in that sector, 337 00:18:14,040 --> 00:18:16,639 Speaker 1: so do check it out. And thanks again to Reshmi 338 00:18:16,640 --> 00:18:17,920 Speaker 1: Basu from Bloomberg News. 339 00:18:18,920 --> 00:18:19,680 Speaker 2: Thanks so much. 340 00:18:20,000 --> 00:18:22,119 Speaker 1: Read all of her scoops on the terminal and at 341 00:18:22,119 --> 00:18:25,520 Speaker 1: Bloomberg dot com. I'm James Crumby. It's been a pleasure 342 00:18:25,600 --> 00:18:27,880 Speaker 1: having you. See you next week on the Credit Edge