1 00:00:04,000 --> 00:00:06,760 Speaker 1: Hello, and welcome to the December twenty one edition of 2 00:00:06,800 --> 00:00:10,560 Speaker 1: Odd Lots. I'm Joe Wisn'tal, Managing editor at Bloomberg Markets, 3 00:00:10,640 --> 00:00:14,400 Speaker 1: and I'm Tracy Alloway, Executive editor Bloomberg Markets. So last 4 00:00:14,480 --> 00:00:18,160 Speaker 1: week was pretty momentous with the Federal Reserve raising interest 5 00:00:18,239 --> 00:00:21,880 Speaker 1: rates getting off zero exactly seven years to the day 6 00:00:21,920 --> 00:00:24,720 Speaker 1: that the Fed um cut its rates to zero. I 7 00:00:24,720 --> 00:00:27,480 Speaker 1: feel like it's a real bookend to a certain chapter 8 00:00:27,560 --> 00:00:30,400 Speaker 1: of the financial crisis. Yeah, I think you're definitely right. 9 00:00:30,400 --> 00:00:33,000 Speaker 1: It's a new era for both of us because I 10 00:00:33,040 --> 00:00:37,840 Speaker 1: think we both kind of started our careers right when 11 00:00:37,920 --> 00:00:41,040 Speaker 1: the financial crisis was picking up and interest rates were 12 00:00:41,040 --> 00:00:44,000 Speaker 1: at rock bottom. So neither you nor I have ever 13 00:00:44,120 --> 00:00:47,239 Speaker 1: covered financial markets above the zero bound, and so we 14 00:00:47,320 --> 00:00:49,960 Speaker 1: have no idea what we're going to cover anymore. We 15 00:00:49,960 --> 00:00:52,320 Speaker 1: were just talking about this issue. What do we talk 16 00:00:52,400 --> 00:00:55,560 Speaker 1: about now, because everything that we've been writing about and 17 00:00:55,600 --> 00:00:59,800 Speaker 1: talking about for years has to some extent been tied 18 00:01:00,040 --> 00:01:04,039 Speaker 1: into the financial crisis, the housing crash and it's aftermath, 19 00:01:04,080 --> 00:01:08,280 Speaker 1: whether it's the FED, the slow economy, the Eurozone crisis, 20 00:01:08,319 --> 00:01:12,120 Speaker 1: everything has basically been about this one thing, absolutely correct. 21 00:01:12,200 --> 00:01:15,080 Speaker 1: We've been dealing with the fallout of all those issues 22 00:01:15,280 --> 00:01:17,920 Speaker 1: for years and years and years, and it's time to 23 00:01:18,080 --> 00:01:21,160 Speaker 1: enter a new chapter. But before we enter that new chapter, 24 00:01:21,600 --> 00:01:23,840 Speaker 1: we're going to bookend the old one, right Right, It's 25 00:01:23,880 --> 00:01:26,600 Speaker 1: just sort of a perfect time for a little nostalgia 26 00:01:26,680 --> 00:01:30,720 Speaker 1: trip because right now the Big Short is in theater, 27 00:01:30,840 --> 00:01:34,240 Speaker 1: the film based on the book about one of the 28 00:01:34,280 --> 00:01:37,160 Speaker 1: hedge fund managers that made a fortune betting that the 29 00:01:37,319 --> 00:01:40,839 Speaker 1: entire system of housing finance was going to collapse long 30 00:01:40,920 --> 00:01:44,800 Speaker 1: before most people saw it. That's right. So Michael Lewis 31 00:01:44,840 --> 00:01:48,600 Speaker 1: wrote that amazing book that basically set out exactly what 32 00:01:48,760 --> 00:01:51,760 Speaker 1: happened in the subprime crisis and the guys who saw 33 00:01:51,800 --> 00:01:55,000 Speaker 1: it coming. And the group of those guys were all 34 00:01:55,520 --> 00:01:59,040 Speaker 1: usually hedge fund managers, analysts, uh, you know, guys like 35 00:01:59,080 --> 00:02:02,520 Speaker 1: Steve Eisman, hedge fund manager, Michael Burry also a hedge 36 00:02:02,520 --> 00:02:06,320 Speaker 1: fund manager. And so I think the reality is when 37 00:02:06,360 --> 00:02:09,000 Speaker 1: people think about who saw the crisis coming, they usually 38 00:02:09,040 --> 00:02:12,679 Speaker 1: think about smart money guys like that. But there were 39 00:02:12,760 --> 00:02:15,520 Speaker 1: some other people who were really smart about this issue, 40 00:02:15,880 --> 00:02:18,400 Speaker 1: That's exactly right. Like, there were some of these hedge 41 00:02:18,400 --> 00:02:21,320 Speaker 1: fund managers that absolutely made a fortune, and there were 42 00:02:21,360 --> 00:02:24,720 Speaker 1: some of these general doomsayers that were always warning about something. 43 00:02:25,320 --> 00:02:28,200 Speaker 1: But one of the you know, speaking of journalism and 44 00:02:28,240 --> 00:02:30,520 Speaker 1: speaking of our careers, both of us in the early 45 00:02:30,600 --> 00:02:34,560 Speaker 1: years of our careers, we're reading the blog Calculated Risk, 46 00:02:35,160 --> 00:02:37,720 Speaker 1: and it was one of the first financial blogs. I 47 00:02:37,760 --> 00:02:40,880 Speaker 1: started off blogging, and it was one of the first 48 00:02:40,880 --> 00:02:44,360 Speaker 1: sites that sort of really chronicled the economic data in 49 00:02:44,400 --> 00:02:48,440 Speaker 1: a very detailed way, and early on was warning, hey, 50 00:02:48,480 --> 00:02:51,800 Speaker 1: something isn't exactly right here with the way housing works 51 00:02:52,200 --> 00:02:55,200 Speaker 1: in the US these days, right, so that is exactly right. 52 00:02:55,280 --> 00:02:59,720 Speaker 1: I remember being a baby financial blogger reading Calculated Risk, 53 00:02:59,760 --> 00:03:04,320 Speaker 1: which was then and still is an incredibly influential blog 54 00:03:04,360 --> 00:03:07,919 Speaker 1: when it comes to the housing market. They were amazing 55 00:03:08,200 --> 00:03:11,320 Speaker 1: on the housing crash. It's been great on the recovery 56 00:03:11,360 --> 00:03:13,919 Speaker 1: ever since. Yeah, I think that's a key point to 57 00:03:14,040 --> 00:03:17,359 Speaker 1: about how good Calculated Risk has been on the recovery, 58 00:03:17,400 --> 00:03:19,320 Speaker 1: because a lot of people could say, oh, I saw 59 00:03:19,320 --> 00:03:21,600 Speaker 1: it coming, this is the guy who called the crash. 60 00:03:21,919 --> 00:03:24,560 Speaker 1: But a lot of those people their track records since 61 00:03:24,600 --> 00:03:28,959 Speaker 1: the crisis, they haven't really done anything that extraordinary. Calculated 62 00:03:29,040 --> 00:03:32,480 Speaker 1: Risk has really chronicled the recovery too, in a very 63 00:03:32,480 --> 00:03:36,800 Speaker 1: clear way. And while the main author of Calculated Risk. 64 00:03:36,960 --> 00:03:40,160 Speaker 1: This guy, Bill McBride will be joining us today. In 65 00:03:40,200 --> 00:03:42,960 Speaker 1: the early days, he had a code blogger, a woman 66 00:03:43,040 --> 00:03:47,080 Speaker 1: named Doris Dungee, a mortgage industry professional. She went under 67 00:03:47,120 --> 00:03:51,440 Speaker 1: the norm de blog Tanta, and everybody was obsessed with 68 00:03:51,480 --> 00:03:54,600 Speaker 1: her writings because she could write about the mortgage industry 69 00:03:55,120 --> 00:03:58,080 Speaker 1: from the perspective and insider better than anyway. She was amazing. 70 00:03:58,120 --> 00:04:01,000 Speaker 1: She knew the ins and outs like no else. Sadly, 71 00:04:01,280 --> 00:04:05,480 Speaker 1: uh Doris Dungee died in November two thousand eight. No 72 00:04:05,480 --> 00:04:07,880 Speaker 1: one knew who she was except under her pen name 73 00:04:08,000 --> 00:04:11,520 Speaker 1: until then. But today we're going to talk to Bill McBride, 74 00:04:11,520 --> 00:04:15,200 Speaker 1: who's still writing Calculated Risk, about those early years and 75 00:04:15,320 --> 00:04:19,839 Speaker 1: about Tanta's legacy and why people loved her writing so much. 76 00:04:20,160 --> 00:04:22,440 Speaker 1: Right So, I think for those of you listening, if 77 00:04:22,480 --> 00:04:24,560 Speaker 1: you get one thing out of this, it should be 78 00:04:24,760 --> 00:04:26,719 Speaker 1: when you go to see the big short in movie 79 00:04:26,760 --> 00:04:30,000 Speaker 1: theaters and you're watching Christian Bale and whoever else on 80 00:04:30,040 --> 00:04:33,440 Speaker 1: the screen shorting the subprime market, and they're the smart 81 00:04:33,480 --> 00:04:36,160 Speaker 1: guys that saw it all coming. Remember that there were 82 00:04:36,200 --> 00:04:39,960 Speaker 1: some really really intelligent bloggers who were out there saying 83 00:04:40,000 --> 00:04:43,080 Speaker 1: the exact same thing at the exact same time. We 84 00:04:43,160 --> 00:04:46,960 Speaker 1: are joined now by the Calculated Risk founder Bill McBride. Bill, 85 00:04:47,000 --> 00:04:49,800 Speaker 1: thank you for joining us. Cool. Thank you so Bill. 86 00:04:49,920 --> 00:04:54,320 Speaker 1: I've been reading Calculated Risk for years, watching you chronicle 87 00:04:54,600 --> 00:04:59,159 Speaker 1: the housing collapsed, the economic crisis, and then the subsequent recovery. 88 00:04:59,200 --> 00:05:03,800 Speaker 1: How did you start Calculated Risk and why? Well, you know, 89 00:05:03,880 --> 00:05:07,719 Speaker 1: I started. I've always been interested in housing, and probably 90 00:05:07,800 --> 00:05:10,200 Speaker 1: in late two thousand three, two thousand four, I started 91 00:05:10,320 --> 00:05:13,760 Speaker 1: really noticing. I mean, obviously house prices were really taking off, 92 00:05:13,839 --> 00:05:16,920 Speaker 1: but I I was talking to somebody at the gym, 93 00:05:17,320 --> 00:05:20,800 Speaker 1: a young woman who was working in an accounting department. 94 00:05:20,880 --> 00:05:22,680 Speaker 1: She told me she just bought a condo for four 95 00:05:22,760 --> 00:05:25,760 Speaker 1: hundred thousand. She made forty thousand a year and put 96 00:05:25,800 --> 00:05:29,320 Speaker 1: no money down, And I said, how did that work? 97 00:05:29,680 --> 00:05:32,320 Speaker 1: So that got me really interested, and then I was 98 00:05:32,360 --> 00:05:34,440 Speaker 1: busy in two thousand four, but the ner two thousand four, 99 00:05:35,360 --> 00:05:37,800 Speaker 1: in January two five, I started really digging into it, 100 00:05:37,839 --> 00:05:40,040 Speaker 1: and that's when I started the blog. Did you actually 101 00:05:40,080 --> 00:05:44,440 Speaker 1: have a mortgage background? I did not have a mortgage background. 102 00:05:44,560 --> 00:05:47,920 Speaker 1: I have an economics background, not a mortas background. And 103 00:05:48,000 --> 00:05:50,440 Speaker 1: that that actually I'm sure we're going to talk about 104 00:05:50,480 --> 00:05:55,880 Speaker 1: Tanta but tanta Is was an absolute mortgage banker expert. Yeah, 105 00:05:56,000 --> 00:05:58,599 Speaker 1: tell us about her. How did you find her? She 106 00:05:58,680 --> 00:06:01,719 Speaker 1: was a mortgage professional and then she ended up being 107 00:06:01,839 --> 00:06:08,560 Speaker 1: one of the great bloggers, financial writers, whistleblowers in covering finance. 108 00:06:08,560 --> 00:06:10,720 Speaker 1: How did that happen? How did how did how did 109 00:06:10,760 --> 00:06:12,320 Speaker 1: you meet up? And how did she become such a 110 00:06:12,320 --> 00:06:15,120 Speaker 1: great writer? Well, this is what happens. You know. I 111 00:06:15,279 --> 00:06:19,000 Speaker 1: started writing about really the economics of housing. You know, 112 00:06:19,160 --> 00:06:23,320 Speaker 1: I saw speculation, I saw uh, you know, the price appreciation. 113 00:06:24,000 --> 00:06:27,839 Speaker 1: There's a blogger, uh down to San Diego economics professor 114 00:06:27,880 --> 00:06:31,200 Speaker 1: Jim Hamilton who writes ecarm Browsers, and he one day 115 00:06:31,240 --> 00:06:33,000 Speaker 1: he said to me, he goes, you know, Bill, you're 116 00:06:33,040 --> 00:06:35,800 Speaker 1: making a really plausible argument that there's a big bubble. 117 00:06:36,000 --> 00:06:38,599 Speaker 1: But why would make people make these loans that they're 118 00:06:38,600 --> 00:06:41,040 Speaker 1: not going to get repaid on? And so I started 119 00:06:41,080 --> 00:06:43,760 Speaker 1: the really digging into the mortgageesitor where that's a great question, 120 00:06:43,839 --> 00:06:47,239 Speaker 1: you know, that was the question. And one of the 121 00:06:47,560 --> 00:06:51,040 Speaker 1: uh readers of my blog was taught to real name 122 00:06:51,120 --> 00:06:53,880 Speaker 1: Doris Dungey, and she started whenever I would talk about 123 00:06:53,880 --> 00:06:56,920 Speaker 1: mortgages on my blog, if I got any little detail wrong. 124 00:06:56,960 --> 00:06:58,960 Speaker 1: She would send me a little comment and go, well, 125 00:06:59,000 --> 00:07:01,480 Speaker 1: actually it works if your close, but it works kind 126 00:07:01,520 --> 00:07:04,080 Speaker 1: of like this, And so I kept wanting her to 127 00:07:04,160 --> 00:07:07,039 Speaker 1: come and you know, right, maybe write something for the blog. 128 00:07:07,080 --> 00:07:09,720 Speaker 1: And then she disappeared and at the end of two 129 00:07:09,720 --> 00:07:13,119 Speaker 1: thousand five. Reappeared in the middle of two thousand six, 130 00:07:13,760 --> 00:07:17,120 Speaker 1: and sadly she she sent me a little note um 131 00:07:17,160 --> 00:07:21,640 Speaker 1: that she had been diagnosed with stage four overarian cancer. 132 00:07:22,320 --> 00:07:24,400 Speaker 1: So she didn't know if she was going to be around, 133 00:07:24,640 --> 00:07:28,720 Speaker 1: and she had left her job and so she had 134 00:07:28,840 --> 00:07:32,360 Speaker 1: as she recovered. When we discussed it, she decided, uh, 135 00:07:32,480 --> 00:07:34,520 Speaker 1: and I think she started in December two thousand and six. 136 00:07:34,720 --> 00:07:36,640 Speaker 1: She came and started writing for the blog, and her 137 00:07:36,760 --> 00:07:39,200 Speaker 1: entire focus was on the mortgage industry, how it worked, 138 00:07:39,600 --> 00:07:43,720 Speaker 1: you know, originations, mortgage servicing, you know how you know 139 00:07:44,080 --> 00:07:47,480 Speaker 1: how mortgage backed securities worked. You know every foreclosures are 140 00:07:47,480 --> 00:07:50,520 Speaker 1: everything that you want to know about mortgages. So YouTube 141 00:07:50,720 --> 00:07:54,000 Speaker 1: really became a sort of dynamic duo of the housing 142 00:07:54,040 --> 00:07:58,280 Speaker 1: market because you covered it from a economics perspective and Tanta, 143 00:07:58,320 --> 00:08:00,680 Speaker 1: of course covered it from the sort of ins and 144 00:08:00,720 --> 00:08:04,200 Speaker 1: outs of the industry. Yeah, it was it was a 145 00:08:04,200 --> 00:08:06,920 Speaker 1: lot of fun and and it really put all the 146 00:08:06,920 --> 00:08:09,600 Speaker 1: pieces together for me. I mean, she she was just 147 00:08:09,800 --> 00:08:13,040 Speaker 1: so she's an outstanding writer. Everybody should read what she wrote. 148 00:08:13,520 --> 00:08:18,040 Speaker 1: And and you know, she really clarified why people would 149 00:08:18,080 --> 00:08:20,640 Speaker 1: make loans that they're not going to get repaid on now. 150 00:08:20,640 --> 00:08:23,440 Speaker 1: And of course nobody would intentionally do that, no individual, 151 00:08:23,920 --> 00:08:26,240 Speaker 1: but she, you know, she made it clear that they 152 00:08:26,240 --> 00:08:30,120 Speaker 1: had moved away from a system where you used to 153 00:08:30,160 --> 00:08:33,040 Speaker 1: do lend to the three seeds and you know, you 154 00:08:33,080 --> 00:08:36,480 Speaker 1: would have credit and capacity and collateral, and they just 155 00:08:36,559 --> 00:08:39,280 Speaker 1: moved to credit and so you know, people weren't paying 156 00:08:39,320 --> 00:08:43,040 Speaker 1: attention to a collateral and capacity to pay the loans anymore. 157 00:08:43,480 --> 00:08:46,480 Speaker 1: And and so you know what was happening is you 158 00:08:46,559 --> 00:08:49,480 Speaker 1: were you know, if people had a good score credit score, 159 00:08:49,480 --> 00:08:52,080 Speaker 1: they give them as much as they want. Bill. There's 160 00:08:52,120 --> 00:08:56,479 Speaker 1: a series of posts that Tanta wrote called the Complete 161 00:08:56,559 --> 00:08:59,160 Speaker 1: uber Nerd, and she had a definition of what an 162 00:08:59,240 --> 00:09:02,280 Speaker 1: uber nerd is. What were these posts and what did 163 00:09:02,280 --> 00:09:04,840 Speaker 1: she mean to convey by saying, you know this this 164 00:09:04,920 --> 00:09:09,320 Speaker 1: idea of the complete uber Nerd. Well, I actually I 165 00:09:09,400 --> 00:09:11,320 Speaker 1: have part of the if she was trying to explain 166 00:09:11,360 --> 00:09:14,000 Speaker 1: to people in detail how things were I have a 167 00:09:14,040 --> 00:09:16,520 Speaker 1: little quote for you. She said, the complete uber nerd 168 00:09:16,679 --> 00:09:19,640 Speaker 1: was intended for someone who was compelled to understand how 169 00:09:19,679 --> 00:09:22,880 Speaker 1: things work in grim detail. Even I think in question 170 00:09:22,880 --> 00:09:25,840 Speaker 1: are tedious in the extreme. And so what you would 171 00:09:25,880 --> 00:09:28,560 Speaker 1: do is just go into every fine detail of mortgage 172 00:09:28,559 --> 00:09:32,640 Speaker 1: servicing or or mortgage insurance and and and by the way, 173 00:09:32,679 --> 00:09:36,080 Speaker 1: she's a very funny writer, and she has a undergraduate 174 00:09:36,080 --> 00:09:40,000 Speaker 1: degree in literature, so she had she was very entertaining too. 175 00:09:40,360 --> 00:09:42,760 Speaker 1: So even though she said it's tedious to the extreme, 176 00:09:42,840 --> 00:09:46,400 Speaker 1: it was great. Well, were some of the more outrageous 177 00:09:46,520 --> 00:09:49,920 Speaker 1: things that you remember from that era of blogging, Things 178 00:09:49,960 --> 00:09:54,000 Speaker 1: that really made you think this is getting out of hand? Well, 179 00:09:54,640 --> 00:09:57,120 Speaker 1: I think one of the most outrageous things for me personally, 180 00:09:57,200 --> 00:10:01,240 Speaker 1: this is pretty Tunta was in two thousands five. One 181 00:10:01,280 --> 00:10:05,640 Speaker 1: of the things I was doing was calling regulators and 182 00:10:05,679 --> 00:10:09,199 Speaker 1: I was I was, you know, talking to senior field 183 00:10:09,240 --> 00:10:11,360 Speaker 1: examiners at the f D, I C. I was talking 184 00:10:11,360 --> 00:10:13,480 Speaker 1: to state regulators and I was going, what's going on, 185 00:10:13,559 --> 00:10:16,960 Speaker 1: Why aren't you guys doing anything? And on the record, 186 00:10:17,000 --> 00:10:19,439 Speaker 1: I would report that on my blog. What they would say, Oh, well, 187 00:10:19,480 --> 00:10:22,720 Speaker 1: we're trying to write a new guidance for non traditional 188 00:10:22,720 --> 00:10:25,240 Speaker 1: warriages and things like that. Off the record, they were 189 00:10:25,240 --> 00:10:29,480 Speaker 1: all saying the same thing, They're terrified and that they've 190 00:10:29,520 --> 00:10:33,080 Speaker 1: never seen such risk concentration in their lives. Anytime anyone 191 00:10:33,120 --> 00:10:37,240 Speaker 1: wrote a memo that would move up the chain, the 192 00:10:36,200 --> 00:10:39,640 Speaker 1: the pointees at the top of each of the organizations, 193 00:10:39,679 --> 00:10:43,600 Speaker 1: the fd I, CE, etcetera. Would would just slam it down. 194 00:10:43,880 --> 00:10:45,360 Speaker 1: And so that, you know, to me, that was one 195 00:10:45,360 --> 00:10:48,040 Speaker 1: of the most shocking things, just how much the political 196 00:10:48,080 --> 00:10:53,079 Speaker 1: appointees were blocking any attempt to adopt the nonsense. That 197 00:10:53,240 --> 00:10:56,080 Speaker 1: is shocking because one of the narratives we hear nowadays 198 00:10:56,120 --> 00:10:58,800 Speaker 1: about the subprime crisis is that not a lot of 199 00:10:58,840 --> 00:11:01,960 Speaker 1: people saw umming, and the people who did see it 200 00:11:02,040 --> 00:11:05,960 Speaker 1: coming are are glorified in books like Michael Lewis's Big 201 00:11:06,000 --> 00:11:08,400 Speaker 1: Short Yeah, but you know, if you look at the 202 00:11:08,400 --> 00:11:10,480 Speaker 1: time frame we were writing about it long before that, 203 00:11:12,200 --> 00:11:15,079 Speaker 1: the plenty of people saw it come, especially from my perspective, 204 00:11:15,080 --> 00:11:20,200 Speaker 1: the economics perspective. Um Tanta had that unique perspective because 205 00:11:20,200 --> 00:11:22,840 Speaker 1: she was, you know, she was an amspolutely expert in mortgages, 206 00:11:23,120 --> 00:11:26,000 Speaker 1: and people would write to me from the mortgage industry 207 00:11:26,000 --> 00:11:27,880 Speaker 1: and go, I know who Tante has to be who 208 00:11:27,880 --> 00:11:31,160 Speaker 1: else could it be? You know, and they go with her. 209 00:11:31,440 --> 00:11:34,199 Speaker 1: You know, I'd love her and her her secret safe 210 00:11:34,200 --> 00:11:35,839 Speaker 1: with me. And the reason she was writing under a 211 00:11:35,840 --> 00:11:37,480 Speaker 1: student and if she wanted to go back to work, 212 00:11:38,480 --> 00:11:40,200 Speaker 1: she was afraid she was giving away too much of 213 00:11:40,200 --> 00:11:42,760 Speaker 1: what the mortgage industry did. Yeah, I wanted to ask 214 00:11:42,760 --> 00:11:45,800 Speaker 1: about that because you know, nowadays most a lot of 215 00:11:45,800 --> 00:11:48,840 Speaker 1: people who blog blog under their real names, but ten 216 00:11:48,920 --> 00:11:53,000 Speaker 1: years ago, a lot of blogging was done under pseudonyms. Um, 217 00:11:53,040 --> 00:11:55,600 Speaker 1: I didn't know your name for a long time. Obviously, 218 00:11:56,000 --> 00:11:59,000 Speaker 1: Tanta blogged under a pseudonym for a long time. But 219 00:11:59,080 --> 00:12:01,840 Speaker 1: talk to us about the influence she had. What kind 220 00:12:01,880 --> 00:12:04,720 Speaker 1: of people were reaching out back in those early days 221 00:12:04,720 --> 00:12:07,160 Speaker 1: and just saying, oh my god, what is such an 222 00:12:07,160 --> 00:12:10,520 Speaker 1: incredible wealth of knowledge you're bringing him? Well, you know 223 00:12:10,559 --> 00:12:15,079 Speaker 1: that she was quoted as Tanta in the in the 224 00:12:15,160 --> 00:12:18,520 Speaker 1: Federal Reserve paper in two thousand seven. You know, Paul 225 00:12:18,600 --> 00:12:23,439 Speaker 1: Krugman mentioned her several times. Uh, he thought that was 226 00:12:23,480 --> 00:12:25,840 Speaker 1: one of the greatest things about blogging. Was I think 227 00:12:25,840 --> 00:12:28,320 Speaker 1: he wrote about her was that an absolute expert in 228 00:12:28,320 --> 00:12:31,160 Speaker 1: this area can come out when you need her him 229 00:12:31,240 --> 00:12:34,400 Speaker 1: or her, and you learned this incredible thing about this 230 00:12:34,480 --> 00:12:36,840 Speaker 1: industry that you didn't know. You know, Campball be experts 231 00:12:36,840 --> 00:12:39,520 Speaker 1: in every industry. So that's me. It was amazing. And 232 00:12:39,800 --> 00:12:43,160 Speaker 1: let me add this too, is that content changed the 233 00:12:43,200 --> 00:12:46,880 Speaker 1: world of blogging. Every every single blogger out there owes 234 00:12:46,960 --> 00:12:50,560 Speaker 1: her something because she started writing for my blog in 235 00:12:50,559 --> 00:12:53,360 Speaker 1: two thousand six. In two thousand seven, she called. She 236 00:12:53,440 --> 00:12:56,120 Speaker 1: kept calling him and goes, Bill, New York Times just 237 00:12:56,160 --> 00:12:58,719 Speaker 1: stole one of your stories. The Wall Street Journal just 238 00:12:58,760 --> 00:13:01,600 Speaker 1: stole one of your stories, and frequently that. It wasn't 239 00:13:01,640 --> 00:13:04,640 Speaker 1: quite true because I was talking to journalists at every 240 00:13:04,960 --> 00:13:08,800 Speaker 1: major place, Financial Times, everywhere, and they weren't really stealing 241 00:13:08,840 --> 00:13:10,640 Speaker 1: our stories. But what they were doing, they're telling me 242 00:13:10,720 --> 00:13:12,719 Speaker 1: their editor wouldn't let a pension. They got it from 243 00:13:12,720 --> 00:13:15,959 Speaker 1: a blog. And so Times that wrote this piece that 244 00:13:16,720 --> 00:13:19,959 Speaker 1: you just said. But we mentioned every you know your name, 245 00:13:20,040 --> 00:13:23,400 Speaker 1: we linked to your stories, we expert briefly excerpt, we 246 00:13:23,520 --> 00:13:26,040 Speaker 1: tend you readers, and you won't mention that you know 247 00:13:26,080 --> 00:13:29,439 Speaker 1: our site. And uh in that week, Walter Journal, Financial 248 00:13:29,440 --> 00:13:32,920 Speaker 1: Times and are Times all major major risk. I remember 249 00:13:33,040 --> 00:13:35,400 Speaker 1: that happening, and I'm sure Joe does as well. This 250 00:13:35,480 --> 00:13:38,520 Speaker 1: was a very, very special time in the financial blog 251 00:13:38,559 --> 00:13:41,280 Speaker 1: is fair. This was really when it took off, And 252 00:13:41,440 --> 00:13:44,560 Speaker 1: part of the reason was because everything was moving so fast, 253 00:13:45,080 --> 00:13:48,160 Speaker 1: the blogs were in an excellent, excellent position to get 254 00:13:48,160 --> 00:13:52,640 Speaker 1: there before the sort of traditional media. Yeah. And you know, 255 00:13:52,679 --> 00:13:54,960 Speaker 1: in the blogging also brought out some experts like Taker 256 00:13:55,160 --> 00:13:58,160 Speaker 1: and experts in other areas to it. Really it really helped, 257 00:13:58,280 --> 00:14:00,400 Speaker 1: I think, and and and I think the some of 258 00:14:00,440 --> 00:14:02,200 Speaker 1: the best journalists got a lot of their you know, 259 00:14:02,240 --> 00:14:06,160 Speaker 1: they worked with us and other bloggers to build great stories. 260 00:14:06,200 --> 00:14:09,440 Speaker 1: There was some awesome stories in the major media did 261 00:14:09,880 --> 00:14:11,600 Speaker 1: pick up. Let me add just one thing there. The 262 00:14:11,640 --> 00:14:13,839 Speaker 1: downside is that in Tanta was here. I think you 263 00:14:13,880 --> 00:14:16,959 Speaker 1: would agree with me. Is that now now garbage sites 264 00:14:17,000 --> 00:14:21,440 Speaker 1: get credited? Yeah, I mean there's definitely been a big 265 00:14:21,920 --> 00:14:25,680 Speaker 1: proliferation of all kinds of quality since then. Yeah, um, 266 00:14:25,840 --> 00:14:29,280 Speaker 1: did you have did you have people working in finance 267 00:14:29,400 --> 00:14:32,520 Speaker 1: and in Wall Street want to you know, ask you know, 268 00:14:32,680 --> 00:14:35,320 Speaker 1: learning from Tanta And you know, you mentioned the sort 269 00:14:35,320 --> 00:14:38,320 Speaker 1: of influence she had on journalists, but what about the 270 00:14:38,400 --> 00:14:42,720 Speaker 1: influence she had on people working in uh in the industry. Yeah, Well, 271 00:14:42,840 --> 00:14:45,720 Speaker 1: a number of hitch fund managers would email me or 272 00:14:45,760 --> 00:14:49,200 Speaker 1: call me and ask me. You know, Tanta didn't want 273 00:14:49,200 --> 00:14:51,480 Speaker 1: to be available to them, so I would pass their 274 00:14:51,520 --> 00:14:53,680 Speaker 1: emails onto her and then she might send something back 275 00:14:53,680 --> 00:14:56,560 Speaker 1: to me that I could respond back. But a number 276 00:14:56,560 --> 00:14:58,960 Speaker 1: of people in New York were writing to me in 277 00:14:59,040 --> 00:15:03,720 Speaker 1: the financial industry. Did you ever get frustrated that regulators 278 00:15:03,840 --> 00:15:07,440 Speaker 1: or the financial industry didn't take some of the things 279 00:15:07,440 --> 00:15:10,320 Speaker 1: you were writing about more seriously and take some of 280 00:15:10,320 --> 00:15:14,800 Speaker 1: your warnings to heart. Well, you know, I I I 281 00:15:14,840 --> 00:15:17,440 Speaker 1: think that the majority of the people who actually work 282 00:15:17,520 --> 00:15:22,240 Speaker 1: as regulators that they were on board right away. They 283 00:15:22,240 --> 00:15:26,320 Speaker 1: were all terrified. Um and uh. And I still talk 284 00:15:26,400 --> 00:15:29,320 Speaker 1: to some of those people. But you know, if there 285 00:15:29,360 --> 00:15:32,000 Speaker 1: if the political points at the top of the agencies 286 00:15:32,000 --> 00:15:34,280 Speaker 1: are blocking everything they're trying to do, what can they do? 287 00:15:35,080 --> 00:15:36,960 Speaker 1: You know, now we have you know, now we have 288 00:15:37,000 --> 00:15:39,120 Speaker 1: a much better regulators. And as a matter of fact, 289 00:15:39,160 --> 00:15:41,120 Speaker 1: I don't know if you saw that, but the fd 290 00:15:41,240 --> 00:15:43,400 Speaker 1: I C and the Fellow Reserve and they all came 291 00:15:43,440 --> 00:15:47,000 Speaker 1: out and put out a statement on commercial real estate lending. 292 00:15:47,520 --> 00:15:50,400 Speaker 1: And this isn't saying that the commercial real estate lending 293 00:15:50,480 --> 00:15:53,840 Speaker 1: is dangerous of any sort, but they're reminding people not 294 00:15:53,920 --> 00:15:58,480 Speaker 1: to have too much risk calculation, concentration, and to keep 295 00:15:58,480 --> 00:16:01,840 Speaker 1: their underwriting standards you know, intact, and that's the right 296 00:16:01,880 --> 00:16:03,720 Speaker 1: way to do it. You know, they're getting in front 297 00:16:03,760 --> 00:16:05,880 Speaker 1: of the problem that you know, we don't want another 298 00:16:05,920 --> 00:16:08,560 Speaker 1: commercial real estate bus. Speaking of getting in front of 299 00:16:08,560 --> 00:16:12,080 Speaker 1: the problem, it's always you know, the next crisis is 300 00:16:12,120 --> 00:16:14,160 Speaker 1: never going to be the same as the last crisis, 301 00:16:14,200 --> 00:16:17,200 Speaker 1: but they're obviously going to be similarities and echoes of 302 00:16:17,240 --> 00:16:21,440 Speaker 1: past crises. From seeing the housing bubble and the housing crash, 303 00:16:21,560 --> 00:16:24,400 Speaker 1: you know, having a front row seat to that and 304 00:16:24,520 --> 00:16:27,680 Speaker 1: knowing the topic in such detail, what are the things 305 00:16:27,720 --> 00:16:30,000 Speaker 1: you would want to look out for that to you 306 00:16:30,440 --> 00:16:32,720 Speaker 1: scream bubble that to you you're always sort of have 307 00:16:32,800 --> 00:16:36,680 Speaker 1: a radar for for the next potential crisis, you know, 308 00:16:36,960 --> 00:16:39,560 Speaker 1: you know, I think, I think whenever you see a 309 00:16:39,680 --> 00:16:43,800 Speaker 1: rapid increase in lending, uh, you see a decrease in 310 00:16:43,920 --> 00:16:47,320 Speaker 1: underwriting standards, those are things to look for. I mean, 311 00:16:47,400 --> 00:16:49,960 Speaker 1: housing is the worst because it's the biggest market in 312 00:16:49,960 --> 00:16:52,320 Speaker 1: the world, you know, or in the you know, when 313 00:16:52,320 --> 00:16:54,360 Speaker 1: you're talking about the US, the commercial real estate is 314 00:16:54,400 --> 00:16:58,160 Speaker 1: a much smaller lending world. Um, you know, I I 315 00:16:58,360 --> 00:17:00,920 Speaker 1: I was one of those people in the late nineties, 316 00:17:01,160 --> 00:17:03,160 Speaker 1: arguing we had a big bubble in this body market 317 00:17:03,920 --> 00:17:06,960 Speaker 1: and that you know the specization there. You know, all 318 00:17:06,960 --> 00:17:09,399 Speaker 1: that was rampant was nothing. It was not as as 319 00:17:09,480 --> 00:17:13,080 Speaker 1: leverage as the album market. So what would I look for? 320 00:17:13,160 --> 00:17:15,760 Speaker 1: I had to look for for a fast increase in 321 00:17:15,760 --> 00:17:22,000 Speaker 1: in lending and decreasing underwriting standards. Do you see bubbles today? No, 322 00:17:22,280 --> 00:17:25,360 Speaker 1: I'm not really, I see none. Don't put it that way. 323 00:17:26,040 --> 00:17:28,000 Speaker 1: You know, you know you have to look for two things. 324 00:17:28,000 --> 00:17:30,920 Speaker 1: One is the fundamentals have to seem like they're out 325 00:17:30,920 --> 00:17:33,879 Speaker 1: of whacks with normal, and two you have to be 326 00:17:33,880 --> 00:17:36,480 Speaker 1: looking for a lot of speculations, so people kicking this 327 00:17:36,640 --> 00:17:40,159 Speaker 1: lending and speculating part. I don't really see that today, 328 00:17:40,560 --> 00:17:42,919 Speaker 1: So you know, I'm not worried about much today. What 329 00:17:43,520 --> 00:17:45,919 Speaker 1: going back to Tonta for a second, what would you 330 00:17:45,920 --> 00:17:48,440 Speaker 1: say was the number one thing you learned from her 331 00:17:48,600 --> 00:17:55,040 Speaker 1: in terms of how to analyze an industry. Are there 332 00:17:55,119 --> 00:17:57,720 Speaker 1: lessons that you learned from her just in generally working 333 00:17:57,720 --> 00:18:01,160 Speaker 1: alongside her that you still take with you today as 334 00:18:01,200 --> 00:18:05,080 Speaker 1: you write and analyze the economy and the housing market. Well, 335 00:18:05,119 --> 00:18:06,800 Speaker 1: she would you know, what she would always try to 336 00:18:06,800 --> 00:18:08,480 Speaker 1: do is She's like, she'd like to look at it 337 00:18:08,520 --> 00:18:10,680 Speaker 1: for one angle and then stepped back and try to 338 00:18:10,680 --> 00:18:13,600 Speaker 1: look at it from another angle. And she was really 339 00:18:13,600 --> 00:18:15,120 Speaker 1: good at that. As a matter of fact, I can't 340 00:18:15,119 --> 00:18:17,560 Speaker 1: tell you what it happened over and over against you said, well, 341 00:18:17,600 --> 00:18:19,960 Speaker 1: what if we look at this from from a different 342 00:18:19,960 --> 00:18:23,879 Speaker 1: perspective here and and it really would help clarify what 343 00:18:24,040 --> 00:18:26,200 Speaker 1: was happening. And I think that was part of the 344 00:18:26,240 --> 00:18:28,679 Speaker 1: reason Tonto was way ahead of everybody else on on 345 00:18:29,119 --> 00:18:31,440 Speaker 1: you know predicting. You know, she was naming names which 346 00:18:31,480 --> 00:18:33,920 Speaker 1: which mortgage companies are going to go under, in which 347 00:18:33,960 --> 00:18:36,720 Speaker 1: banks are going to go under. So that's why we 348 00:18:36,720 --> 00:18:39,560 Speaker 1: couldn't be out shorting people like you know, the big 349 00:18:39,560 --> 00:18:42,120 Speaker 1: short guys. They actually did something very different. What they 350 00:18:42,160 --> 00:18:44,199 Speaker 1: did is not only did they discover this was going 351 00:18:44,240 --> 00:18:46,400 Speaker 1: to happen, but they figured out a way to really 352 00:18:46,400 --> 00:18:48,000 Speaker 1: make a lot of money from it. And that wasn't 353 00:18:48,000 --> 00:18:49,639 Speaker 1: a hard of goal at all. I mean, we were 354 00:18:49,680 --> 00:18:52,520 Speaker 1: just trying to sell me more. Yeah, just a slight 355 00:18:52,680 --> 00:18:56,040 Speaker 1: difference there. So I got to ask the big short 356 00:18:56,119 --> 00:18:58,000 Speaker 1: is out, Are you going to go see it? Oh? 357 00:18:58,040 --> 00:19:02,080 Speaker 1: Absolutely absolutely? Were you a fan of the book. I 358 00:19:02,119 --> 00:19:06,320 Speaker 1: didn't read the books. Well, admit I haven't read it either. 359 00:19:06,600 --> 00:19:10,040 Speaker 1: What this is outrageous? Let me tell you why I 360 00:19:10,160 --> 00:19:12,800 Speaker 1: lived it. I wrote about it every day. You know, 361 00:19:13,000 --> 00:19:14,680 Speaker 1: I know what you did, but I want to see 362 00:19:14,680 --> 00:19:19,520 Speaker 1: the movie fair enough? All right, Well, thank you very much, 363 00:19:19,640 --> 00:19:24,840 Speaker 1: Bill McBride. Absolutely fascinating discussion. Really appreciate you calling, and 364 00:19:25,560 --> 00:19:27,280 Speaker 1: we'll have to get back in touch with you to 365 00:19:27,320 --> 00:19:29,200 Speaker 1: get your take on the movie, or at least you 366 00:19:29,200 --> 00:19:32,840 Speaker 1: should write about it. Okay, I will. Thanks, Thanks so much, 367 00:19:33,000 --> 00:19:38,720 Speaker 1: Thank you well, Tracy, that was a fascinating conversation. What 368 00:19:39,200 --> 00:19:41,400 Speaker 1: was your big take away from that? Well, I mean 369 00:19:41,480 --> 00:19:44,160 Speaker 1: it was kind of nostalgic for me since, as we discussed, 370 00:19:44,200 --> 00:19:47,320 Speaker 1: we we both sort of started our financial journalism careers 371 00:19:47,320 --> 00:19:50,520 Speaker 1: around that time. But even more than that, I really 372 00:19:50,560 --> 00:19:55,120 Speaker 1: like this idea um that you know, when you read 373 00:19:55,160 --> 00:19:57,159 Speaker 1: the Big Short, when you go and see the movie, 374 00:19:57,720 --> 00:20:00,840 Speaker 1: it makes it seem like there was this heiny group 375 00:20:01,040 --> 00:20:04,439 Speaker 1: of incredibly smart men on Wall Street who saw it 376 00:20:04,480 --> 00:20:08,160 Speaker 1: all coming and profited off of it, which wasn't strictly true. 377 00:20:08,200 --> 00:20:11,080 Speaker 1: There were lots of other people like Bill McBride, like Tanta, 378 00:20:11,400 --> 00:20:14,720 Speaker 1: who saw the warning signs there and weren't necessarily listened to. 379 00:20:15,680 --> 00:20:18,720 Speaker 1: You're absolutely right, and on the nostalgia point that you made, 380 00:20:18,720 --> 00:20:21,640 Speaker 1: like that really hit home for me because I started 381 00:20:21,640 --> 00:20:25,679 Speaker 1: off my career just blogging like Bill McBride. My first blog, 382 00:20:25,800 --> 00:20:28,240 Speaker 1: The Stollar, was kind of pseudonymous. I didn't really have 383 00:20:28,320 --> 00:20:31,560 Speaker 1: my name attached to it, and I had totally forgotten. 384 00:20:31,560 --> 00:20:34,480 Speaker 1: But I love the point that it wasn't standard like 385 00:20:34,560 --> 00:20:37,440 Speaker 1: now it's like a blog breaks news, then most news 386 00:20:37,520 --> 00:20:40,440 Speaker 1: organizations are pretty good at crediting them and citing them. 387 00:20:40,800 --> 00:20:43,679 Speaker 1: But I forgot how rare that was and for how 388 00:20:43,840 --> 00:20:46,320 Speaker 1: rare it was for anyone to acknowledge that there was 389 00:20:46,520 --> 00:20:49,760 Speaker 1: good information coming out of new media. And the idea 390 00:20:49,840 --> 00:20:52,600 Speaker 1: that Tanta was one of the people that really pushed 391 00:20:53,040 --> 00:20:55,119 Speaker 1: and said no, like we're doing all this great stuff, 392 00:20:55,160 --> 00:20:57,959 Speaker 1: like newspapers should give us credit, and this idea that 393 00:20:57,960 --> 00:21:01,040 Speaker 1: that turned out to be an influential thing beyond financial bloggers. 394 00:21:01,400 --> 00:21:03,280 Speaker 1: That was a really cool point. And I had never 395 00:21:03,640 --> 00:21:06,119 Speaker 1: had no idea about that, right, I hadn't thought about it. Yeah, 396 00:21:06,520 --> 00:21:09,200 Speaker 1: all right, Well that's it for today's odd LODs. I'm 397 00:21:09,280 --> 00:21:11,680 Speaker 1: Joe wisn't though you can follow me on Twitter at 398 00:21:11,680 --> 00:21:14,600 Speaker 1: the Stalwart and I'm Tracy Alloway. I'm on Twitter at 399 00:21:14,600 --> 00:21:30,400 Speaker 1: Tracy Alloway. Thanks for listening. Joe and I are very 400 00:21:30,440 --> 00:21:33,040 Speaker 1: proud of our new podcast, Odd Lots, but we are 401 00:21:33,160 --> 00:21:37,080 Speaker 1: also very proud of Bloomberg's other growing suite of original 402 00:21:37,160 --> 00:21:40,880 Speaker 1: podcast all designed to help you navigate the complexities of business, 403 00:21:40,960 --> 00:21:44,760 Speaker 1: financial markets, and the global economy. So in addition to 404 00:21:44,800 --> 00:21:48,359 Speaker 1: our own podcast, please don't miss Benchmark with Dan Moss, 405 00:21:48,440 --> 00:21:52,480 Speaker 1: Tory Stillwell and Aki Edo, an informative, jargon free look 406 00:21:52,560 --> 00:21:55,720 Speaker 1: at the inner workings of the global economy. 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