1 00:00:01,760 --> 00:00:07,880 Speaker 1: Also media Welcome back to It Could Happen Here, a 2 00:00:08,039 --> 00:00:11,800 Speaker 1: podcast in which every week I sit down with my 3 00:00:11,960 --> 00:00:16,560 Speaker 1: friends Mia and Garrison and I walk them through a 4 00:00:16,600 --> 00:00:18,800 Speaker 1: little backyard chemistry project. 5 00:00:19,000 --> 00:00:23,959 Speaker 2: Now, today we are building a common commonly used explosive 6 00:00:24,360 --> 00:00:27,600 Speaker 2: nodicators called Oh what's that? 7 00:00:27,600 --> 00:00:29,640 Speaker 3: That is? We cannot give those instructions on air? 8 00:00:29,840 --> 00:00:32,440 Speaker 2: Oh oh oh, well, what about what about for our 9 00:00:32,520 --> 00:00:35,000 Speaker 2: DX like hexogen safe? We can make hexogen? 10 00:00:35,080 --> 00:00:35,239 Speaker 4: Right? 11 00:00:35,320 --> 00:00:38,800 Speaker 3: I think you need a special uh tech stamp or 12 00:00:38,840 --> 00:00:40,360 Speaker 3: permit to teach that. 13 00:00:40,479 --> 00:00:42,440 Speaker 2: Sorry, all right, what if we talk about how to 14 00:00:42,479 --> 00:00:43,680 Speaker 2: make it in roadblocks? 15 00:00:43,960 --> 00:00:46,280 Speaker 3: Oh? Yeah, no, that's fine. They haven't They haven't cracked 16 00:00:46,320 --> 00:00:47,879 Speaker 3: roadblocks yet. You have a correct minecraft. 17 00:00:47,960 --> 00:00:50,040 Speaker 2: That's good, that's good. The FEDS don't know about that one. 18 00:00:50,080 --> 00:00:51,760 Speaker 3: Okay, they don't know about that one yet. 19 00:00:51,880 --> 00:00:54,160 Speaker 2: Well, in that case, I'm going to read these this 20 00:00:54,440 --> 00:00:57,880 Speaker 2: ingredient list for pet in that I found in a 21 00:00:58,000 --> 00:01:01,600 Speaker 2: torrent of Taylor Swift song. So this is I'm certain 22 00:01:01,720 --> 00:01:05,960 Speaker 2: the best information available right now. Anyway, we're talking this 23 00:01:06,000 --> 00:01:09,800 Speaker 2: week about explosives. We're talking particularly about the fact that 24 00:01:09,920 --> 00:01:14,399 Speaker 2: Israel just carry out an attack against Tesblah, a militant 25 00:01:14,640 --> 00:01:19,360 Speaker 2: organization in Lebanon using pet in, which is one of 26 00:01:19,400 --> 00:01:23,080 Speaker 2: the two ingredients in Semtex. It is commonly used as 27 00:01:23,160 --> 00:01:27,119 Speaker 2: the detonator. It's a stable, high explosive, so it's often 28 00:01:27,200 --> 00:01:30,760 Speaker 2: used to like basically trigger the larger explosive charge, which 29 00:01:30,760 --> 00:01:33,120 Speaker 2: is generally like hexygen. You know, you mix the two 30 00:01:33,200 --> 00:01:36,440 Speaker 2: together with like plastic agents and you get like that's 31 00:01:36,440 --> 00:01:40,640 Speaker 2: where you get the traditional plastic explosives. And it's come 32 00:01:40,680 --> 00:01:44,360 Speaker 2: out recently that the Masad managed to sneak some of 33 00:01:44,400 --> 00:01:47,280 Speaker 2: this stuff. Well sneak's not even really the right word, 34 00:01:47,319 --> 00:01:50,440 Speaker 2: but they managed to impregnate a batch of pagers and 35 00:01:50,640 --> 00:01:53,680 Speaker 2: radios with pet in. Now, this was a pretty big 36 00:01:53,720 --> 00:01:56,120 Speaker 2: story last week. I think a lot of people are 37 00:01:56,120 --> 00:01:59,800 Speaker 2: focusing kind of on the wrong parts of it. But yeah, 38 00:02:00,080 --> 00:02:02,320 Speaker 2: that's what we're going to be talking about today because 39 00:02:03,440 --> 00:02:08,239 Speaker 2: there's an element of this story that hasn't gotten out, 40 00:02:08,360 --> 00:02:11,920 Speaker 2: which is the degree to which what Israel did to 41 00:02:12,200 --> 00:02:16,600 Speaker 2: Hasblah Here is something that anybody with roughly thirty thousand 42 00:02:16,639 --> 00:02:21,280 Speaker 2: dollars could imitate to a surprising degree of fidelity, Like 43 00:02:21,320 --> 00:02:25,400 Speaker 2: this is an attack that is deeply easy to carry out, 44 00:02:25,919 --> 00:02:29,360 Speaker 2: and the fact that Israel has kind of made the 45 00:02:29,400 --> 00:02:33,840 Speaker 2: decision to pull this up is a kind of the 46 00:02:33,880 --> 00:02:37,600 Speaker 2: breaking of a seal in a way, and I think 47 00:02:37,639 --> 00:02:40,240 Speaker 2: it portins some very frightening things for all of us, 48 00:02:40,280 --> 00:02:42,320 Speaker 2: and particularly for air travel. So that's what we're going 49 00:02:42,360 --> 00:02:43,400 Speaker 2: to be talking about today. 50 00:02:43,600 --> 00:02:46,640 Speaker 3: Do you think like the the either like hijacking or 51 00:02:46,680 --> 00:02:50,480 Speaker 3: infiltration of the supply chain is as replicable for yes, 52 00:02:50,680 --> 00:02:53,240 Speaker 3: a non state agency. Yes, that is the. 53 00:02:53,200 --> 00:02:55,160 Speaker 2: Thing that is scariest about this attack to me, and 54 00:02:55,200 --> 00:02:56,760 Speaker 2: that is going to be kind of the meat of 55 00:02:56,800 --> 00:02:59,239 Speaker 2: what we're talking about. We should probably start by this 56 00:02:59,400 --> 00:03:02,200 Speaker 2: sort of laying out the scale the attack. 57 00:03:02,560 --> 00:03:05,600 Speaker 3: I mean, I also have one main question. What's a pager? 58 00:03:07,080 --> 00:03:10,360 Speaker 2: So Garrison, Once upon a time, Uh huh, we kind 59 00:03:10,360 --> 00:03:14,800 Speaker 2: of had the ability to broadcast signals over large areas, 60 00:03:15,200 --> 00:03:16,920 Speaker 2: but it was a real pain in the ass to 61 00:03:17,040 --> 00:03:19,480 Speaker 2: like do that with a phone call or anything but 62 00:03:19,520 --> 00:03:20,920 Speaker 2: a couple of words at a time. 63 00:03:21,280 --> 00:03:23,640 Speaker 3: Oh so like a text message, Like a. 64 00:03:23,560 --> 00:03:26,520 Speaker 2: Text message, except for you can't really respond to it. 65 00:03:26,919 --> 00:03:29,239 Speaker 3: Oh okay, but it looked pretty. 66 00:03:29,080 --> 00:03:31,519 Speaker 2: Cool to clip on your belt in the late nineties. 67 00:03:31,600 --> 00:03:33,800 Speaker 2: If you were like one of the doctors on the 68 00:03:33,840 --> 00:03:36,600 Speaker 2: set of Er did you ever watch Er? Garrison? 69 00:03:36,640 --> 00:03:39,600 Speaker 3: Were you too young for that. That's the George Clooney show, right. 70 00:03:39,560 --> 00:03:42,880 Speaker 2: Cluone tang, But yes, he looked great in it. Yeah, 71 00:03:42,920 --> 00:03:45,520 Speaker 2: so that's where pagers came from. Was the television show 72 00:03:45,840 --> 00:03:49,120 Speaker 2: Er written by Michael Crichton, which means pagers are related 73 00:03:49,160 --> 00:03:53,640 Speaker 2: to dinosaurs. And yeah, so Israel managed to get We'll 74 00:03:53,640 --> 00:03:57,080 Speaker 2: talk a little bit later about how, but they managed 75 00:03:57,080 --> 00:04:00,960 Speaker 2: to get explosives in an unknown number of but certainly 76 00:04:01,040 --> 00:04:04,680 Speaker 2: hundreds of these walkie talkies, particularly in the batteries. By 77 00:04:04,680 --> 00:04:07,560 Speaker 2: the end of the first day of attacks, round a 78 00:04:07,600 --> 00:04:10,640 Speaker 2: dozen people were dead and twenty seven hundred had been wounded. 79 00:04:10,920 --> 00:04:14,280 Speaker 2: Many people. Seriously, there's like horrible videos of folks going 80 00:04:14,360 --> 00:04:17,560 Speaker 2: flying off of bicycles and the like when this stuff detonates, 81 00:04:17,600 --> 00:04:21,520 Speaker 2: Like it takes very little petn to create a pretty 82 00:04:21,520 --> 00:04:25,040 Speaker 2: significant explosion, and we're looking at about like zero point 83 00:04:25,160 --> 00:04:29,160 Speaker 2: one point one grams I think of explosive agent actually 84 00:04:29,240 --> 00:04:32,000 Speaker 2: in each walkie talkie, which was enough to kill in 85 00:04:32,080 --> 00:04:34,880 Speaker 2: may Mae shitload of people. Some of these folks were 86 00:04:34,880 --> 00:04:37,720 Speaker 2: members of Hezbelah I think. HESBLA has confirmed that eight 87 00:04:37,960 --> 00:04:40,599 Speaker 2: of their fighters were killed. At least four of the 88 00:04:40,640 --> 00:04:43,440 Speaker 2: dead are children and the second day of the attack, 89 00:04:43,480 --> 00:04:46,559 Speaker 2: a bunch of radios went off as well. Another twenty 90 00:04:46,600 --> 00:04:49,680 Speaker 2: people were killed and hundreds more wounded. So you're talking 91 00:04:49,680 --> 00:04:54,040 Speaker 2: about a very sizable attack. Israel is not claimed credit 92 00:04:54,160 --> 00:04:56,720 Speaker 2: for this, but The New York Times has done some 93 00:04:56,720 --> 00:04:59,760 Speaker 2: pretty deep reporting on this, and per that quote, twelve 94 00:05:00,240 --> 00:05:02,960 Speaker 2: and former defense and intelligence officials who were briefed on 95 00:05:03,000 --> 00:05:06,440 Speaker 2: the attack say the Israelis were behind it. And it's 96 00:05:06,520 --> 00:05:09,560 Speaker 2: just also obvious that this was Israel who else, Like 97 00:05:10,920 --> 00:05:14,919 Speaker 2: who else would do this? Now, one of the reasons 98 00:05:14,960 --> 00:05:17,760 Speaker 2: I'm getting into this is that there were a lot 99 00:05:18,320 --> 00:05:21,159 Speaker 2: like the first kind of concern that people had when 100 00:05:21,160 --> 00:05:24,240 Speaker 2: this attack was carried out is like, oh shit, was 101 00:05:24,279 --> 00:05:27,920 Speaker 2: this some sort of a hack? Did Israel exploit some 102 00:05:27,960 --> 00:05:31,400 Speaker 2: sort of a glitch in how these products batteries worked 103 00:05:31,440 --> 00:05:35,560 Speaker 2: and basically like hack them to cause a runaway thermal 104 00:05:35,839 --> 00:05:38,359 Speaker 2: escalation within the battery that led to it detonating. 105 00:05:38,920 --> 00:05:41,000 Speaker 3: Is all of our electronics just one hack away from 106 00:05:41,000 --> 00:05:42,680 Speaker 3: turning from being turned into a bomb? 107 00:05:42,960 --> 00:05:49,080 Speaker 2: No, And I understand why people focused on that aspect 108 00:05:49,160 --> 00:05:51,279 Speaker 2: of it, but it led to I think some articles 109 00:05:51,279 --> 00:05:53,000 Speaker 2: that are this is going to be one of those 110 00:05:53,160 --> 00:05:55,920 Speaker 2: we always we try to. I hope we usually managed 111 00:05:55,920 --> 00:05:58,760 Speaker 2: to be the like calm voices in the room, but 112 00:05:58,839 --> 00:06:01,000 Speaker 2: this is one of those cases where really people need 113 00:06:01,040 --> 00:06:03,239 Speaker 2: to be less calm. And I do want to highlight 114 00:06:03,320 --> 00:06:06,359 Speaker 2: an article that I think went in the wrong direction 115 00:06:06,520 --> 00:06:08,760 Speaker 2: on that front. It's a CNN business piece called we 116 00:06:08,800 --> 00:06:11,520 Speaker 2: still don't know how the Lebanon pager attack happened. Here's 117 00:06:11,520 --> 00:06:14,680 Speaker 2: what we do know about our own electronic devices, and 118 00:06:14,720 --> 00:06:17,679 Speaker 2: I'm going to read a quote from that. In short, 119 00:06:17,760 --> 00:06:21,200 Speaker 2: your communications device is not at risk for exploding unless 120 00:06:21,200 --> 00:06:24,280 Speaker 2: it's heavily tampered with and least with explosives. Experts who 121 00:06:24,320 --> 00:06:28,880 Speaker 2: spoke to CNN set Justin Kappos, a cybersecurity professor at NYU, 122 00:06:28,920 --> 00:06:31,159 Speaker 2: said that it's possible to cause damage to a variety 123 00:06:31,200 --> 00:06:34,640 Speaker 2: of batteries, most commonly lithium batteries, but he said it 124 00:06:34,640 --> 00:06:38,200 Speaker 2: seems like the devices were intentionally designed to explode when triggered, 125 00:06:38,279 --> 00:06:40,919 Speaker 2: not a pager that everyone else in the world is using. 126 00:06:41,160 --> 00:06:43,680 Speaker 2: If you're a normal person with a lithian and ion battery, 127 00:06:43,800 --> 00:06:46,720 Speaker 2: I would not be over concerned about this CAPO set 128 00:06:47,000 --> 00:06:49,080 Speaker 2: and I think that that is an error and we're 129 00:06:49,720 --> 00:06:51,280 Speaker 2: going to get into as to why. But let's talk 130 00:06:51,279 --> 00:06:54,120 Speaker 2: about how Israel did this first. And this is again 131 00:06:54,160 --> 00:06:57,040 Speaker 2: all kind of per the New York Times reporting how 132 00:06:57,160 --> 00:06:59,480 Speaker 2: Israel built a modern day trojan horse. They seem to 133 00:06:59,480 --> 00:07:01,599 Speaker 2: be the first piece people who have kind of put 134 00:07:01,640 --> 00:07:04,120 Speaker 2: all of this together to an extent that is probably 135 00:07:04,160 --> 00:07:07,440 Speaker 2: pretty close to accurate. There are some debates as to 136 00:07:07,600 --> 00:07:10,440 Speaker 2: like did they actually have a detonator in here or 137 00:07:10,480 --> 00:07:14,560 Speaker 2: did they cause a thermal because PETN, while it's very stable, 138 00:07:15,040 --> 00:07:18,440 Speaker 2: can be set off by heat. So it's theoretically possible 139 00:07:18,480 --> 00:07:21,560 Speaker 2: to get a battery hot enough that it can detonate PETN, 140 00:07:22,000 --> 00:07:24,240 Speaker 2: but it's not going to be as reliable as using 141 00:07:24,280 --> 00:07:26,360 Speaker 2: something like a bridge wire cap like a like a 142 00:07:26,440 --> 00:07:30,360 Speaker 2: traditional like triggering device. Yeah, and so it's a little 143 00:07:30,360 --> 00:07:34,880 Speaker 2: bit unclear as to how this was made, but whatever 144 00:07:34,880 --> 00:07:38,680 Speaker 2: the case, basically what Israel did is they made their 145 00:07:38,720 --> 00:07:43,640 Speaker 2: own batteries for walkie talkies that were clones of an 146 00:07:43,760 --> 00:07:46,960 Speaker 2: earlier kind of walkie talkie made by a Taiwanese company 147 00:07:47,000 --> 00:07:50,200 Speaker 2: that were no longer in production. Right, so this Taiwanese 148 00:07:50,240 --> 00:07:53,240 Speaker 2: company had made real walkie talkies for a while, they 149 00:07:53,240 --> 00:07:56,600 Speaker 2: stopped making them. Israel got their hands on some originals 150 00:07:56,720 --> 00:07:59,600 Speaker 2: and manufactured copies. Now that is the part of this 151 00:07:59,640 --> 00:08:02,600 Speaker 2: that would be hard to replicate. But the copies of 152 00:08:02,640 --> 00:08:07,040 Speaker 2: the walkie talkies themselves were not the explosive agent. What 153 00:08:07,600 --> 00:08:11,080 Speaker 2: actually where the explosives were was in the detachable battery. 154 00:08:11,640 --> 00:08:16,320 Speaker 2: And Masad crafted batteries themselves for these walkie talkies and 155 00:08:16,480 --> 00:08:20,080 Speaker 2: wove PETN into the batteries. So if you haven't really 156 00:08:20,120 --> 00:08:23,360 Speaker 2: looked at a lithium ion battery, like one of the 157 00:08:23,440 --> 00:08:25,840 Speaker 2: kinds of batteries that you're going to like, I mean, 158 00:08:25,880 --> 00:08:27,960 Speaker 2: it's similar to the ones in your phone, but it's 159 00:08:27,960 --> 00:08:31,280 Speaker 2: just also like any kind of electronics battery, they are 160 00:08:31,400 --> 00:08:35,880 Speaker 2: kind of these weird folded things, Like they look just 161 00:08:36,000 --> 00:08:39,040 Speaker 2: like a little square packet, usually with like a cord 162 00:08:39,080 --> 00:08:41,320 Speaker 2: coming off of it if you actually look at the battery. 163 00:08:41,320 --> 00:08:43,679 Speaker 2: But the way they're as symboled is they're like laminated 164 00:08:43,960 --> 00:08:47,920 Speaker 2: into an aluminum foil pouch. And while you are kind 165 00:08:47,920 --> 00:08:51,640 Speaker 2: of doing that laminating process, you can basically just weave 166 00:08:51,760 --> 00:08:56,240 Speaker 2: some PETN into like alongside the battery, and it will 167 00:08:56,280 --> 00:09:00,400 Speaker 2: cost you a small fraction of the batteries like life like, 168 00:09:00,440 --> 00:09:02,840 Speaker 2: you won't get as much actual battery time out of it, 169 00:09:03,240 --> 00:09:06,480 Speaker 2: but it's not going to detonate on its own. Ptn is. 170 00:09:06,520 --> 00:09:08,920 Speaker 2: They actually just conducted in twenty twenty a study to 171 00:09:08,960 --> 00:09:12,200 Speaker 2: show that it can last for years. This is like 172 00:09:12,240 --> 00:09:14,959 Speaker 2: the compound we use in the detonators in our nuclear devices. 173 00:09:15,280 --> 00:09:17,920 Speaker 2: Once you get a bunch of walkie talkies that are 174 00:09:17,920 --> 00:09:21,120 Speaker 2: impregnated with this stuff out there, you could sit on 175 00:09:21,160 --> 00:09:25,480 Speaker 2: them for years until like you needed to actually use them. Now, 176 00:09:25,480 --> 00:09:27,480 Speaker 2: the key thing about this, it seems like when you're 177 00:09:27,480 --> 00:09:31,120 Speaker 2: talking about wrapping a battery that's got you know, plastic 178 00:09:31,160 --> 00:09:33,280 Speaker 2: explosives in it, well, that's the kind of thing that 179 00:09:33,360 --> 00:09:36,040 Speaker 2: only a state level actor can do. And this is 180 00:09:36,080 --> 00:09:38,240 Speaker 2: going to bring me to the source that I really 181 00:09:38,240 --> 00:09:40,559 Speaker 2: want to get to people for this episode, which is 182 00:09:40,600 --> 00:09:44,920 Speaker 2: an article by a guy named Andrew Hwang at Bunny's Studios. 183 00:09:45,280 --> 00:09:48,400 Speaker 2: Andrew is a computer scientist. He's got a doctorate in 184 00:09:48,480 --> 00:09:52,720 Speaker 2: philosophy from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and kind of 185 00:09:52,760 --> 00:09:55,720 Speaker 2: critically for some personal projects that he had done. Recently, 186 00:09:56,040 --> 00:10:00,400 Speaker 2: he has manufactured his own the them Ion batteries, and 187 00:10:00,440 --> 00:10:03,000 Speaker 2: in doing so he's figured out like how to actually 188 00:10:03,040 --> 00:10:06,520 Speaker 2: build a personal production line to make batteries like this 189 00:10:07,040 --> 00:10:10,400 Speaker 2: that you could customize to fit into kind of basically 190 00:10:10,440 --> 00:10:14,079 Speaker 2: any kind of electronic device you want. You can buy 191 00:10:14,240 --> 00:10:17,600 Speaker 2: an entire pouch cell production line that will allow you 192 00:10:17,679 --> 00:10:22,200 Speaker 2: to make your own custom lithium ion batteries using Alibaba 193 00:10:22,240 --> 00:10:30,520 Speaker 2: dot Com. Yeah, oh boy, Yeah, so that's great, right 194 00:10:31,040 --> 00:10:33,719 Speaker 2: or lithi. Yeah, these are lithium pouch batteries. And it 195 00:10:34,080 --> 00:10:37,000 Speaker 2: costs about fifteen thousand dollars in order to be able 196 00:10:37,000 --> 00:10:40,120 Speaker 2: to make somewhere between like a few dozen and several 197 00:10:40,240 --> 00:10:43,600 Speaker 2: hundred of these, right, So fifteen grand will provide you 198 00:10:43,600 --> 00:10:45,600 Speaker 2: with all of the materials you need to from the 199 00:10:45,640 --> 00:10:48,439 Speaker 2: ground up make at least, you know, probably a couple 200 00:10:48,520 --> 00:10:52,400 Speaker 2: hundred pouch sell batteries. Right. And it's the kind of 201 00:10:52,440 --> 00:10:55,880 Speaker 2: thing where it's not just any idiot could do it, 202 00:10:56,040 --> 00:10:59,679 Speaker 2: but any reasonably intelligent person with the degree of like 203 00:11:00,000 --> 00:11:02,400 Speaker 2: experience in engineering can do it. 204 00:11:02,720 --> 00:11:02,920 Speaker 1: Right. 205 00:11:03,360 --> 00:11:06,120 Speaker 2: Andrew is obviously a very smart guy with a lot 206 00:11:06,160 --> 00:11:09,440 Speaker 2: of capabilities that you know, a layperson might not have. 207 00:11:10,080 --> 00:11:13,880 Speaker 2: But basically any kind of competent engineer could figure this 208 00:11:13,960 --> 00:11:18,000 Speaker 2: out pretty much. And you're talking again, a few thousand 209 00:11:18,040 --> 00:11:20,880 Speaker 2: dollars to get potentially you know, hundreds or even more 210 00:11:20,920 --> 00:11:23,480 Speaker 2: of these made now The other side of the attack 211 00:11:23,559 --> 00:11:27,439 Speaker 2: here is that the Israelis created a bunch of shell companies. 212 00:11:27,920 --> 00:11:31,520 Speaker 2: You know, they started manufacturing copies of these walkie talkies 213 00:11:31,760 --> 00:11:35,000 Speaker 2: so that they could put their own explosives impregnated batteries 214 00:11:35,000 --> 00:11:37,320 Speaker 2: in them, and then they built a bunch of shady 215 00:11:37,400 --> 00:11:40,200 Speaker 2: ass companies in order to sell them. This was effectively 216 00:11:40,559 --> 00:11:43,840 Speaker 2: what they were doing was creating like an Amazon like 217 00:11:44,280 --> 00:11:47,280 Speaker 2: shipping company, right and the same way that like anybody 218 00:11:47,320 --> 00:11:50,920 Speaker 2: who wanted to, can you know, get a business license 219 00:11:51,240 --> 00:11:54,000 Speaker 2: and get access to like a bunch of electronics and 220 00:11:54,040 --> 00:11:57,000 Speaker 2: sell them on Amazon, like you could buy a consignment 221 00:11:57,040 --> 00:12:01,000 Speaker 2: of a thousand walkie talkies, make your own batteries for them, 222 00:12:01,400 --> 00:12:04,520 Speaker 2: and sell them on Amazon. Amazon does not do a 223 00:12:04,600 --> 00:12:08,360 Speaker 2: particularly like any really checking up on the people who 224 00:12:08,440 --> 00:12:10,880 Speaker 2: choose to sell through their site. And even if they 225 00:12:10,880 --> 00:12:15,920 Speaker 2: were to do that, PETN is effectively impossible to find. 226 00:12:16,200 --> 00:12:16,360 Speaker 1: Right. 227 00:12:16,440 --> 00:12:18,760 Speaker 2: There is a way to scan for it, but it 228 00:12:18,800 --> 00:12:21,400 Speaker 2: takes like a half hour per package, And it's the 229 00:12:21,480 --> 00:12:23,720 Speaker 2: kind of thing where even if you're taking this stuff apart, 230 00:12:23,840 --> 00:12:27,040 Speaker 2: unless you have someone who is like doing chemical tests 231 00:12:27,120 --> 00:12:30,560 Speaker 2: on what's in there, anyone who's even someone who is 232 00:12:30,640 --> 00:12:33,400 Speaker 2: moderately trained is not going to be able to recognize 233 00:12:33,440 --> 00:12:35,679 Speaker 2: a battery that's had some pet and put into it 234 00:12:35,920 --> 00:12:38,760 Speaker 2: from like a regular battery. So I'm going to read 235 00:12:38,760 --> 00:12:41,679 Speaker 2: another quote from that New York Times article about how 236 00:12:41,840 --> 00:12:44,560 Speaker 2: the Masad kind of structured the shell companies here that 237 00:12:44,640 --> 00:12:48,800 Speaker 2: allowed them to pose as a company making pagers. By 238 00:12:48,840 --> 00:12:52,080 Speaker 2: all appearances, BAC Consulting was a Hungary based company that 239 00:12:52,160 --> 00:12:54,599 Speaker 2: was under contract to produce the devices on behalf of 240 00:12:54,640 --> 00:12:57,920 Speaker 2: a Taiwanese company, gold Apollo. In fact, it was part 241 00:12:57,920 --> 00:13:00,640 Speaker 2: of an Israeli front. According to Three and Tell officers 242 00:13:00,679 --> 00:13:04,920 Speaker 2: briefed on the operation, BAC did take on ordinary clients, 243 00:13:04,960 --> 00:13:07,800 Speaker 2: for which it produced a range of ordinary pages, but 244 00:13:07,880 --> 00:13:10,520 Speaker 2: the only client that really mattered was Hesbelah, and its 245 00:13:10,559 --> 00:13:12,280 Speaker 2: pages were far from ordinary. 246 00:13:12,880 --> 00:13:15,800 Speaker 3: Why were hesblow using pages in the first place? 247 00:13:15,800 --> 00:13:17,000 Speaker 4: Oh yeah, I can talk about that. 248 00:13:17,080 --> 00:13:20,880 Speaker 3: Couldn't they afford it an iPhone? Great question or something? 249 00:13:22,480 --> 00:13:24,560 Speaker 2: Well, I think we'll let me talk about that a second, 250 00:13:24,559 --> 00:13:26,360 Speaker 2: But gar I will say an initial response to that. 251 00:13:26,400 --> 00:13:28,920 Speaker 2: You know how, like all of the activists in the 252 00:13:29,000 --> 00:13:31,640 Speaker 2: United States after twenty twenty especially, are saying like, Hey, 253 00:13:31,640 --> 00:13:35,080 Speaker 2: your phone isn't safe, don't use your phone. You know, 254 00:13:35,280 --> 00:13:38,600 Speaker 2: for for any kind of like actions, the state can 255 00:13:38,640 --> 00:13:39,640 Speaker 2: listen in on that. 256 00:13:39,720 --> 00:13:40,000 Speaker 5: Yah. 257 00:13:40,040 --> 00:13:43,080 Speaker 2: Yeah, well Hesbelah has been paranoid about that for a 258 00:13:43,160 --> 00:13:46,800 Speaker 2: long time, and the Masad actually has spent a lot 259 00:13:46,840 --> 00:13:53,000 Speaker 2: of effort spreading rumors within Hesbola about how capable Israel's 260 00:13:53,200 --> 00:13:56,720 Speaker 2: smartphone exploits are, like how strong their ability to like 261 00:13:56,800 --> 00:14:00,800 Speaker 2: listen in on conversations, and that played a sgnificant role 262 00:14:01,000 --> 00:14:03,959 Speaker 2: in changing like policy from the top and hes a 263 00:14:04,040 --> 00:14:05,920 Speaker 2: lot to like we are going to use the lowest 264 00:14:06,080 --> 00:14:09,440 Speaker 2: tech communications solutions possible, and we're going to talk some 265 00:14:09,480 --> 00:14:11,760 Speaker 2: more about that. You know, it's not low tech. 266 00:14:12,160 --> 00:14:15,840 Speaker 3: These products and services that support this very podcast. 267 00:14:15,440 --> 00:14:19,080 Speaker 2: That's right, high tech and absolutely no explosives in them, 268 00:14:19,120 --> 00:14:21,600 Speaker 2: probably but really there would be no way to tell 269 00:14:21,600 --> 00:14:34,800 Speaker 2: if there were. And we're back Mia, you wanted to talk. Yeah. 270 00:14:34,840 --> 00:14:36,760 Speaker 4: Thelnlyst thing I want to mention about that is so 271 00:14:36,800 --> 00:14:38,440 Speaker 4: there's been a lot of focus in terms of the 272 00:14:38,480 --> 00:14:41,960 Speaker 4: page you use on like on Hesbela trying to build 273 00:14:41,960 --> 00:14:46,560 Speaker 4: this communications grid that's like more difficult to like do 274 00:14:46,680 --> 00:14:49,280 Speaker 4: to compromise. Yeah, yeah, well, well it's to compromise from 275 00:14:49,360 --> 00:14:53,120 Speaker 4: like digitally, right. But the other thing that's kind of 276 00:14:53,160 --> 00:14:54,920 Speaker 4: going on here that I think is getting a lot 277 00:14:54,960 --> 00:14:58,680 Speaker 4: less attention is that so Lebanon's economy has been an 278 00:14:58,800 --> 00:15:03,120 Speaker 4: absolute shit show for probably like eight nine years now. 279 00:15:03,120 --> 00:15:04,720 Speaker 3: There's a massive dollars front. 280 00:15:05,120 --> 00:15:08,640 Speaker 2: Kind of the terminal like heart attack moment was that 281 00:15:08,720 --> 00:15:11,320 Speaker 2: barge exploding, but it had not been doing it had 282 00:15:11,360 --> 00:15:12,480 Speaker 2: been on the road down. 283 00:15:13,480 --> 00:15:14,640 Speaker 4: I mean there were there were, I mean there were 284 00:15:14,680 --> 00:15:17,080 Speaker 4: there have been huge riots there over. So part of 285 00:15:17,080 --> 00:15:19,400 Speaker 4: what's going on is like there aren't dollars in the economy, 286 00:15:20,360 --> 00:15:23,360 Speaker 4: and this has made everything unbelievably expensive. And one of 287 00:15:23,400 --> 00:15:27,960 Speaker 4: the things that's unbelievably expensive is phone calls, and so 288 00:15:28,240 --> 00:15:31,520 Speaker 4: there are I don't think there's been much coverage of this, 289 00:15:31,560 --> 00:15:34,600 Speaker 4: but it's like there's also just regular people also use 290 00:15:34,680 --> 00:15:36,960 Speaker 4: pages for things in order to set up when a 291 00:15:36,960 --> 00:15:39,240 Speaker 4: phone call is going to be because like, if you're 292 00:15:39,280 --> 00:15:41,120 Speaker 4: going to have a phone call with someone, you have 293 00:15:41,200 --> 00:15:44,160 Speaker 4: to make sure that both of you are like there. 294 00:15:45,240 --> 00:15:49,680 Speaker 4: So it's it's not purely just a military thing. It's 295 00:15:49,680 --> 00:15:54,240 Speaker 4: also just because of how unbelievably expensive like calling people 296 00:15:54,280 --> 00:15:58,360 Speaker 4: has gotten and this sort of terminal crisis of the 297 00:15:58,440 --> 00:16:01,800 Speaker 4: Lebanese economy in the sense that like there aren't dollars 298 00:16:01,840 --> 00:16:04,000 Speaker 4: to pay for things, and so we've gotten to this 299 00:16:04,080 --> 00:16:06,400 Speaker 4: point where even even sort of stuff that we consider 300 00:16:06,560 --> 00:16:09,360 Speaker 4: like fairly basic and not that expensive, like phone service, 301 00:16:09,400 --> 00:16:12,360 Speaker 4: has just gotten unbelievably expensive for everyone. And this is 302 00:16:12,880 --> 00:16:16,680 Speaker 4: sort of caused yeah, a lot of like regular people 303 00:16:16,680 --> 00:16:18,760 Speaker 4: who have no affiliation with this whatsoever to sort of 304 00:16:18,760 --> 00:16:22,200 Speaker 4: move down the technology chain because it's just expensive. 305 00:16:22,520 --> 00:16:26,200 Speaker 2: Yeah, and again it's this kind of perfect storm of 306 00:16:26,280 --> 00:16:31,000 Speaker 2: like paranoia and economics sort of factors colliding here. But 307 00:16:31,640 --> 00:16:35,760 Speaker 2: the sort of gist of it is Israel definitely wanted 308 00:16:35,800 --> 00:16:39,440 Speaker 2: to push has a lot to adopting, Like they clearly 309 00:16:39,480 --> 00:16:43,640 Speaker 2: had an understanding of what they could do and wanted 310 00:16:43,880 --> 00:16:46,320 Speaker 2: deliberately to kind of push for this because it's a 311 00:16:46,360 --> 00:16:49,920 Speaker 2: lot easier to get some a manufactured explosive and it 312 00:16:49,920 --> 00:16:51,640 Speaker 2: would have been a lot harder to do this with 313 00:16:51,720 --> 00:16:53,960 Speaker 2: like iPhones, right, not that Israel hasn't done this with 314 00:16:54,040 --> 00:16:56,480 Speaker 2: cell phones in the past, sure, very famously, back I 315 00:16:56,520 --> 00:16:59,440 Speaker 2: think it was the nineties, there was this Palestinian man 316 00:16:59,520 --> 00:17:02,680 Speaker 2: yah Ya Yash who was I think generally credited as 317 00:17:02,840 --> 00:17:06,359 Speaker 2: like kind of an architect of like car bombing attacks, 318 00:17:06,680 --> 00:17:09,800 Speaker 2: who the Masad killed with a cell phone that they 319 00:17:09,840 --> 00:17:11,879 Speaker 2: had put it explosives in it. In that case, it 320 00:17:11,880 --> 00:17:15,119 Speaker 2: was a very labor intensive process with a single phone 321 00:17:15,200 --> 00:17:17,000 Speaker 2: meant to target and blow the head off of like 322 00:17:17,080 --> 00:17:20,520 Speaker 2: one guy. This is like a much more reckless and 323 00:17:20,640 --> 00:17:26,439 Speaker 2: much more like civilian casualty open operation. Again, I'm going 324 00:17:26,480 --> 00:17:29,720 Speaker 2: to quote from that New York Times article. In Lebanon's 325 00:17:29,720 --> 00:17:32,520 Speaker 2: Baca Valley, in the village of Sarain, one young girl, 326 00:17:32,560 --> 00:17:35,040 Speaker 2: Fatima Abullah, had just come home from her first day 327 00:17:35,080 --> 00:17:37,400 Speaker 2: of fourth grade when she heard her father's pager begin 328 00:17:37,480 --> 00:17:40,040 Speaker 2: to beep. Her aunt said she picked up the device 329 00:17:40,080 --> 00:17:41,600 Speaker 2: to bring it to him and was holding it when 330 00:17:41,600 --> 00:17:46,000 Speaker 2: it exploded, killing her. Fatima was nine. It's probably worth 331 00:17:46,040 --> 00:17:49,040 Speaker 2: noting here that while HESBLA is a militant group, they 332 00:17:49,080 --> 00:17:52,760 Speaker 2: are also effectively the state in a decent chunk of 333 00:17:52,800 --> 00:17:55,360 Speaker 2: Lebanon and a lot of the folks who would have 334 00:17:55,480 --> 00:17:58,480 Speaker 2: these because these these pagers and radios were generally seen 335 00:17:58,520 --> 00:18:01,440 Speaker 2: as part of like a offensive measure, like if there 336 00:18:01,520 --> 00:18:03,920 Speaker 2: is an attack, if we go to war again, these 337 00:18:03,960 --> 00:18:07,560 Speaker 2: are our safe comm system, right like this is our 338 00:18:07,680 --> 00:18:09,919 Speaker 2: like low tech comm system to allow us to like 339 00:18:09,960 --> 00:18:12,480 Speaker 2: stay in touch. So a lot of these people would 340 00:18:12,480 --> 00:18:14,760 Speaker 2: have been folks whose role was more on the social 341 00:18:14,840 --> 00:18:17,879 Speaker 2: side of things rather than like actual armed militants. You 342 00:18:17,880 --> 00:18:20,480 Speaker 2: have no way of knowing who you're blowing up. Everyone's 343 00:18:20,560 --> 00:18:25,160 Speaker 2: just getting these devices. And it's interesting to me that 344 00:18:25,760 --> 00:18:28,400 Speaker 2: the Masad or that that net Yahoo, because I'm sure 345 00:18:28,400 --> 00:18:31,040 Speaker 2: this order had to have come from the top, gave 346 00:18:31,040 --> 00:18:33,879 Speaker 2: the order to carry out this attack. Now, they had 347 00:18:33,920 --> 00:18:37,199 Speaker 2: had these in place for a while. Exactly when is 348 00:18:37,240 --> 00:18:40,080 Speaker 2: a little bit unclear, but long enough that there was 349 00:18:40,160 --> 00:18:44,480 Speaker 2: like a nickname for the attack itself that everyone knew 350 00:18:44,480 --> 00:18:47,000 Speaker 2: they were going to carry out at some point. So 351 00:18:47,040 --> 00:18:49,920 Speaker 2: it's a little bit like, I wonder why this was 352 00:18:49,960 --> 00:18:52,520 Speaker 2: specifically targeted for this point in time. I kind of 353 00:18:52,520 --> 00:18:54,199 Speaker 2: suspect it may have been due to the fact that 354 00:18:54,840 --> 00:18:58,520 Speaker 2: Israel's actual like ground forces are still tied up in Gaza, 355 00:18:58,600 --> 00:19:00,720 Speaker 2: and so they were looking for a way to escalate 356 00:19:00,800 --> 00:19:05,199 Speaker 2: with Lebanon, with Hesbelah that didn't necessitate the deployment of 357 00:19:05,680 --> 00:19:08,960 Speaker 2: forces that you know, would still have a massive impact 358 00:19:09,040 --> 00:19:12,600 Speaker 2: and be disruptive, which this certainly was. But you know, 359 00:19:12,960 --> 00:19:16,440 Speaker 2: when it comes to kind of us and like why 360 00:19:16,480 --> 00:19:20,119 Speaker 2: we're talking about this today, it's the fact that this 361 00:19:20,320 --> 00:19:23,639 Speaker 2: is I think a Pandora's Box style attack, right like, 362 00:19:23,760 --> 00:19:27,320 Speaker 2: you have at this point opened up the possibility to 363 00:19:27,400 --> 00:19:30,159 Speaker 2: doing this to any actor that has the resources. And 364 00:19:30,240 --> 00:19:33,080 Speaker 2: as we've noted about, fifteen grand will get you the 365 00:19:33,080 --> 00:19:36,760 Speaker 2: capacity to manufacture battery packs like this. You can just 366 00:19:36,800 --> 00:19:39,639 Speaker 2: go on Ali Baba and buy things like radios or 367 00:19:39,680 --> 00:19:41,399 Speaker 2: other It doesn't have to be that you could get 368 00:19:41,560 --> 00:19:43,639 Speaker 2: you know, like most a lot of people now carry 369 00:19:43,640 --> 00:19:47,639 Speaker 2: around battery devices, right like external batteries to charge their 370 00:19:47,680 --> 00:19:50,560 Speaker 2: phones when they're out. Sure, you can purchase those from 371 00:19:50,600 --> 00:19:55,399 Speaker 2: Ali Baba by the thousand. You can disassemble them, stick 372 00:19:55,440 --> 00:19:57,520 Speaker 2: in your own batteries, and it's not the kind of 373 00:19:57,520 --> 00:19:59,159 Speaker 2: thing where you have to be capable of doing this 374 00:19:59,320 --> 00:20:02,000 Speaker 2: on the scale that the Masade did. You could stick 375 00:20:02,040 --> 00:20:05,160 Speaker 2: this and you could buy two thousand batteries. You could 376 00:20:05,160 --> 00:20:07,880 Speaker 2: stick this in two hundred of them, your own replacement 377 00:20:07,920 --> 00:20:11,600 Speaker 2: explosive packs, and you could just send those out into 378 00:20:11,680 --> 00:20:14,879 Speaker 2: the world, right Especially, One of the things that scares 379 00:20:14,920 --> 00:20:16,679 Speaker 2: me is the idea of you get a bunch of 380 00:20:16,720 --> 00:20:19,919 Speaker 2: these shipped, you impregnate a few with explosives, but you 381 00:20:19,960 --> 00:20:23,840 Speaker 2: have a bunch of batteries that you then have on 382 00:20:24,320 --> 00:20:27,240 Speaker 2: you know, shipping through the air right and trigger in 383 00:20:27,280 --> 00:20:29,959 Speaker 2: the air like while they're being shipped to a destination. 384 00:20:30,680 --> 00:20:32,080 Speaker 2: Like It's the kind of thing you would eventually be 385 00:20:32,160 --> 00:20:34,600 Speaker 2: able to unravel who had created the front companies and 386 00:20:34,640 --> 00:20:37,040 Speaker 2: the like. But there really is nothing built into the 387 00:20:37,160 --> 00:20:41,440 Speaker 2: system that would very effectively be able to tell that 388 00:20:41,480 --> 00:20:43,639 Speaker 2: you'd done this as long as you there was a 389 00:20:43,680 --> 00:20:46,679 Speaker 2: degree of like caretaken in the manufacturing process. And I 390 00:20:46,720 --> 00:20:49,520 Speaker 2: want to turn back to Andrew Hwang's article here, and 391 00:20:49,600 --> 00:20:51,520 Speaker 2: this is him talking about the way in which you 392 00:20:51,600 --> 00:20:54,480 Speaker 2: could hide the fact that you had impregnated these battery 393 00:20:54,480 --> 00:20:57,960 Speaker 2: packs with explosives. Once folded into the core of the battery, 394 00:20:58,000 --> 00:21:01,560 Speaker 2: it is sealed in an aluminum pouch. Manufacturing process carefully 395 00:21:01,600 --> 00:21:04,600 Speaker 2: isolates the folding line from the laminating line and or 396 00:21:04,680 --> 00:21:07,240 Speaker 2: rinses the outside of the pouch with acetone to dissolve 397 00:21:07,240 --> 00:21:10,879 Speaker 2: away any pet in residue. Prior to marking, No explosive 398 00:21:10,920 --> 00:21:14,160 Speaker 2: residue can escape the pouch, thus defeating swabs that look 399 00:21:14,200 --> 00:21:17,080 Speaker 2: for chemical residue. It may also well evade methods such 400 00:21:17,119 --> 00:21:19,680 Speaker 2: as X ray fluorescence because the elements that compose the 401 00:21:19,760 --> 00:21:22,880 Speaker 2: battery separator and PETN are too similar and too light 402 00:21:22,920 --> 00:21:27,240 Speaker 2: to be detected, and through case methods like sours spatially 403 00:21:27,280 --> 00:21:30,640 Speaker 2: offset Ramen spectroscopy would likely be defeated by the multi 404 00:21:30,680 --> 00:21:33,920 Speaker 2: layer copper laminate structure of the battery itself, blocking light 405 00:21:33,960 --> 00:21:36,760 Speaker 2: from probing inner layers. Thus, I would pose it that 406 00:21:36,800 --> 00:21:39,760 Speaker 2: a lithium battery constructed with a pet and layer inside 407 00:21:39,800 --> 00:21:43,600 Speaker 2: is largely undetectable. And this is from like folks I 408 00:21:43,640 --> 00:21:45,720 Speaker 2: have talked to who have a degree of expertise in 409 00:21:45,760 --> 00:21:49,240 Speaker 2: the matter, I think very accurate, and I think, you know, 410 00:21:49,320 --> 00:21:52,600 Speaker 2: even if you're not striking air travel here number one, 411 00:21:52,720 --> 00:21:54,760 Speaker 2: it would be easy to get stuff like this on 412 00:21:54,840 --> 00:21:57,960 Speaker 2: planes and people. There was in December somebody attempted to 413 00:21:58,119 --> 00:22:01,520 Speaker 2: and just kind of their detonation method failed, which is 414 00:22:01,920 --> 00:22:05,639 Speaker 2: kind of with explosives. When people don't die and explosive attacks, 415 00:22:05,680 --> 00:22:08,439 Speaker 2: what always saves them is it's kind of tricky to 416 00:22:08,440 --> 00:22:11,879 Speaker 2: get the detonators right. But I'm very worried that the 417 00:22:11,920 --> 00:22:16,159 Speaker 2: masade has effectively provided people with a perfect plan of 418 00:22:16,200 --> 00:22:19,080 Speaker 2: attack to fuck with air travel or to fuck with 419 00:22:19,119 --> 00:22:22,480 Speaker 2: the supply lines, because it imagine, just like a couple 420 00:22:22,600 --> 00:22:24,840 Speaker 2: hundred people over the space of a week or so 421 00:22:25,000 --> 00:22:28,879 Speaker 2: have battery packs or other electronics detonate on their person, 422 00:22:29,080 --> 00:22:31,720 Speaker 2: like or a couple of dozen people. What that does 423 00:22:31,880 --> 00:22:34,640 Speaker 2: both to the economy, to the supply lines, Like the 424 00:22:34,800 --> 00:22:39,119 Speaker 2: extint to which that would be disruptive in society is like, 425 00:22:39,160 --> 00:22:42,600 Speaker 2: the potential is enormous, and the potential for like runaway 426 00:22:42,720 --> 00:22:43,960 Speaker 2: terror is enormous. 427 00:22:44,320 --> 00:22:46,240 Speaker 3: Yeah, I mean that that was one of the first 428 00:22:46,240 --> 00:22:49,040 Speaker 3: things that we talked about once news of this drop. 429 00:22:49,160 --> 00:22:52,720 Speaker 3: Is like, beyond the actually physical injuries and death caused 430 00:22:52,760 --> 00:22:56,399 Speaker 3: by this attack, this is like primarily an infrastructure attack. 431 00:22:56,600 --> 00:23:00,960 Speaker 3: In this case completely destroys like the communications infrastructure of HASBLA, 432 00:23:01,160 --> 00:23:03,800 Speaker 3: but in like, yeah, the strategy behind the attack. It 433 00:23:03,840 --> 00:23:06,800 Speaker 3: can be used just to target various types of infrastructure, 434 00:23:06,800 --> 00:23:10,320 Speaker 3: whether that be like supply chains, travel, It puts distrust 435 00:23:10,400 --> 00:23:13,600 Speaker 3: in your own equipment, and certainly it's application on like 436 00:23:13,920 --> 00:23:17,120 Speaker 3: airlines is obviously very worrying. 437 00:23:17,760 --> 00:23:19,919 Speaker 2: Well, it's very worrying. And one of the things that 438 00:23:19,960 --> 00:23:22,119 Speaker 2: I keep thinking about is the degree to which the 439 00:23:22,119 --> 00:23:26,200 Speaker 2: way Amazon has restructured the economy, and particularly the way 440 00:23:26,200 --> 00:23:30,760 Speaker 2: that like digital commerce works, has created an opportunity for 441 00:23:31,320 --> 00:23:34,199 Speaker 2: a malicious actor to carry out an attack like this 442 00:23:34,359 --> 00:23:37,919 Speaker 2: with excellent security because you don't even have to be 443 00:23:38,000 --> 00:23:41,840 Speaker 2: the one shipping these out right now. You can get 444 00:23:41,880 --> 00:23:43,160 Speaker 2: I mean you have to shift them at some point, 445 00:23:43,200 --> 00:23:45,000 Speaker 2: but you can ship them to a third party that 446 00:23:45,119 --> 00:23:48,240 Speaker 2: is the actual company that deals with Amazon, if you 447 00:23:48,320 --> 00:23:51,400 Speaker 2: have enough kind of resources and ingenuity behind it, basically 448 00:23:51,400 --> 00:23:53,919 Speaker 2: set up a drop shipping scam where you wearving someone 449 00:23:53,920 --> 00:23:58,040 Speaker 2: else send explosives to Amazon, which provides a lot of 450 00:23:58,080 --> 00:24:01,239 Speaker 2: opportunity for you to both get away and a lot 451 00:24:01,280 --> 00:24:04,000 Speaker 2: of opportunity to you could seed with a couple of 452 00:24:04,000 --> 00:24:06,240 Speaker 2: different manufacturers, different devices. 453 00:24:06,640 --> 00:24:09,800 Speaker 3: It's like terrorism in the era of the gig economy. Yeah, 454 00:24:10,040 --> 00:24:11,679 Speaker 3: And that was one of the reasons I like to 455 00:24:12,080 --> 00:24:15,879 Speaker 3: Fincher's recent movie The Killer, Yeah, just in terms of 456 00:24:15,880 --> 00:24:18,840 Speaker 3: how much of the gig economy was like worked into 457 00:24:19,040 --> 00:24:23,000 Speaker 3: these traditional industries, whether they be like terrorism, because like 458 00:24:23,200 --> 00:24:27,560 Speaker 3: hitmen aren't really real, but certainly terrorism. And I think 459 00:24:27,640 --> 00:24:29,439 Speaker 3: there's a lot of ways that these things can be 460 00:24:29,680 --> 00:24:34,560 Speaker 3: applied in this kind of bizarre uber Amazon world that 461 00:24:34,600 --> 00:24:37,000 Speaker 3: we've created where the economy is just so fractured in 462 00:24:37,040 --> 00:24:37,800 Speaker 3: all these little ways. 463 00:24:38,040 --> 00:24:41,720 Speaker 4: There's also I think the sort of production angle to 464 00:24:42,560 --> 00:24:46,320 Speaker 4: which is that because the way that manufacturing is happening 465 00:24:46,320 --> 00:24:49,040 Speaker 4: has become so decentralized, and because it's become based on 466 00:24:50,040 --> 00:24:52,720 Speaker 4: these it's kind of less so now. But a lot 467 00:24:52,760 --> 00:24:54,960 Speaker 4: of like Chinese manufacturing had worked like this, where you'd 468 00:24:54,960 --> 00:24:58,440 Speaker 4: get these sort of like smaller pop up things, and 469 00:24:58,560 --> 00:25:02,600 Speaker 4: each of these sort of like fairly small production facilities 470 00:25:02,720 --> 00:25:05,439 Speaker 4: is like shipping stuff to like a larger one who's 471 00:25:05,440 --> 00:25:07,560 Speaker 4: like doing assembly or whatever. But that means that, Yeah, 472 00:25:07,600 --> 00:25:09,120 Speaker 4: like as you're saying with Alli Bob, it's like all 473 00:25:09,119 --> 00:25:12,560 Speaker 4: of this stuff is just available to purchase because it's 474 00:25:12,600 --> 00:25:15,760 Speaker 4: designed to be sold to these people who are like 475 00:25:15,800 --> 00:25:19,480 Speaker 4: starting their sort of like small scale like production line. 476 00:25:19,680 --> 00:25:23,400 Speaker 3: Yeah, there's no quality control, there's no intense vetting. It's 477 00:25:23,440 --> 00:25:27,400 Speaker 3: all extremely accessible. It's very easy to infiltrate this process. 478 00:25:28,680 --> 00:25:32,040 Speaker 2: Yeah, here's another line from that Andrew Huang article on 479 00:25:32,080 --> 00:25:35,520 Speaker 2: Bunny's at Bunny's Studios, Be You in an Ie Studios, 480 00:25:35,960 --> 00:25:38,119 Speaker 2: which is his blog. You don't even have to go 481 00:25:38,200 --> 00:25:40,280 Speaker 2: so far as offering anyone a bribe or being a 482 00:25:40,320 --> 00:25:43,400 Speaker 2: state level agency to get tampered batteries into a supply chain. 483 00:25:43,760 --> 00:25:46,080 Speaker 2: Anyone can buy a bunch of items from Amazon, swap 484 00:25:46,160 --> 00:25:48,879 Speaker 2: out the batteries, restore the packaging and seals and return 485 00:25:48,920 --> 00:25:51,400 Speaker 2: the goods to the warehouse. And yes, there is already 486 00:25:51,440 --> 00:25:55,080 Speaker 2: a whole industry devoted to copying packaging and security seals 487 00:25:55,080 --> 00:25:57,960 Speaker 2: for the purpose of warranty fraud. The perpetrator will be 488 00:25:58,000 --> 00:26:00,000 Speaker 2: long gone by the time the device is resold. 489 00:26:00,440 --> 00:26:00,600 Speaker 3: Yeah. 490 00:26:00,760 --> 00:26:03,600 Speaker 4: And the other worrying part about that too is that 491 00:26:03,960 --> 00:26:06,560 Speaker 4: you know, okay, so getting the explosives to work is 492 00:26:06,840 --> 00:26:09,520 Speaker 4: kind of difficult, right, Like bomb making is not easy, 493 00:26:09,560 --> 00:26:10,400 Speaker 4: but you have to have. 494 00:26:10,359 --> 00:26:11,480 Speaker 2: A degree of competition. 495 00:26:11,520 --> 00:26:15,600 Speaker 4: Yes, yes, but the actual cost fifteen thousand dollars like that, 496 00:26:15,600 --> 00:26:17,960 Speaker 4: that's not even like you're looking at like a millionaire, 497 00:26:18,280 --> 00:26:20,879 Speaker 4: Like that's just something your local dentist can afford to 498 00:26:20,880 --> 00:26:21,359 Speaker 4: pull off. 499 00:26:21,680 --> 00:26:24,440 Speaker 2: You could carry out an attack like this in terms 500 00:26:24,480 --> 00:26:26,960 Speaker 2: of cash expenditure for the cost of like a reasonably 501 00:26:27,040 --> 00:26:31,679 Speaker 2: nice car, which is not prohibitive to a large scale 502 00:26:31,720 --> 00:26:33,880 Speaker 2: international terrorist organization, or even. 503 00:26:33,720 --> 00:26:37,680 Speaker 4: Just like a rich guy. Yeah, not even that rich 504 00:26:37,720 --> 00:26:38,840 Speaker 4: guy can pull this off. 505 00:26:38,920 --> 00:26:40,080 Speaker 2: Yep, which is. 506 00:26:40,840 --> 00:26:42,919 Speaker 3: I guess the kind of the main inhibiting factor is 507 00:26:43,040 --> 00:26:47,240 Speaker 3: we still don't quite know how Israel got these two detonates. Yes, 508 00:26:47,640 --> 00:26:51,320 Speaker 3: whether that is some sort of hack that overheated the battery, 509 00:26:51,640 --> 00:26:53,840 Speaker 3: whether it was like a message that was sent out 510 00:26:53,920 --> 00:26:56,000 Speaker 3: that like triggered something within the device. 511 00:26:56,160 --> 00:26:58,240 Speaker 2: It seems to have been a message. 512 00:26:57,840 --> 00:26:59,760 Speaker 3: That made the explosive debtonates because they. 513 00:26:59,640 --> 00:27:03,320 Speaker 2: Did into message immediately before, so it seemed to have 514 00:27:03,320 --> 00:27:06,760 Speaker 2: been tied to some extent with a message. Andrew Hwang 515 00:27:06,960 --> 00:27:09,439 Speaker 2: kind of looked into and came to the conclusion that 516 00:27:09,480 --> 00:27:11,960 Speaker 2: you could very well do a thermal runaway to set 517 00:27:12,000 --> 00:27:15,000 Speaker 2: this off, but obviously the messade doesn't have any trouble 518 00:27:15,000 --> 00:27:18,640 Speaker 2: getting a hold of military detonators. Wlang also walked through 519 00:27:18,680 --> 00:27:23,679 Speaker 2: how you could build a circuit into the actual battery itself, 520 00:27:23,800 --> 00:27:27,000 Speaker 2: like a trigger circuit. You know, I'm just gonna go ahead, 521 00:27:27,040 --> 00:27:28,800 Speaker 2: and I'm going to go ahead and talk about this 522 00:27:28,800 --> 00:27:30,320 Speaker 2: a little bit when we come back. But let's do 523 00:27:30,320 --> 00:27:32,920 Speaker 2: our second ad break now before we tell everyone how 524 00:27:32,960 --> 00:27:35,320 Speaker 2: to detonated plastic explosives. 525 00:27:36,800 --> 00:27:38,480 Speaker 4: This is going to be the one that gets all arrested. 526 00:27:39,200 --> 00:27:52,919 Speaker 2: Yeah, and we're back. Here's a quote from Andrew on 527 00:27:53,080 --> 00:27:56,680 Speaker 2: how these might have been detonated. Detonating the PETN is 528 00:27:56,720 --> 00:27:59,760 Speaker 2: a bit more tricky. Without a detonator, PETN make conflagrate 529 00:28:00,080 --> 00:28:03,040 Speaker 2: and fast instead of detonating and creating the much more 530 00:28:03,119 --> 00:28:06,280 Speaker 2: damaging shock wave. However, the Wikipedia page notes that an 531 00:28:06,320 --> 00:28:08,560 Speaker 2: electric spark with an energy in the range of ten 532 00:28:08,600 --> 00:28:12,520 Speaker 2: to sixty millidules is sufficient to initiate detonation. Based on 533 00:28:12,560 --> 00:28:15,480 Speaker 2: available descriptions of the devices getting hot prior to detonation, 534 00:28:15,600 --> 00:28:18,119 Speaker 2: one might suppose that the detonation is initiated by a 535 00:28:18,160 --> 00:28:21,480 Speaker 2: trigger circuit shorting out the battery pack, causing the internal 536 00:28:21,520 --> 00:28:25,000 Speaker 2: polymer spacers to melt, and eventually the cathode anode pairs 537 00:28:25,040 --> 00:28:28,040 Speaker 2: coming into contact, creating a spark. Such a spark may 538 00:28:28,040 --> 00:28:31,120 Speaker 2: furthermore be guaranteed across the pet and sheet by introducing 539 00:28:31,160 --> 00:28:33,520 Speaker 2: a small defect, such as a slight dimple in the 540 00:28:33,560 --> 00:28:36,879 Speaker 2: surrounding cathode anoid layers. Once the packets to the melting 541 00:28:36,920 --> 00:28:39,720 Speaker 2: point of the spacers, the dimpled region is likely to connect, 542 00:28:39,880 --> 00:28:42,080 Speaker 2: leading to a spark that then detonates the pet and 543 00:28:42,160 --> 00:28:45,320 Speaker 2: layer sandwich between the cathode and anode layers. But where 544 00:28:45,360 --> 00:28:47,600 Speaker 2: do you hide this trigger circuit? It turns out that 545 00:28:47,680 --> 00:28:51,160 Speaker 2: almost every lithium polymer pack has a small circuit board 546 00:28:51,160 --> 00:28:54,560 Speaker 2: embedded in it, called the PCM or protection circuit module. 547 00:28:54,760 --> 00:28:59,200 Speaker 2: It contains a microcontroller, often in a TSSOP eight package 548 00:28:59,360 --> 00:29:01,680 Speaker 2: and at least one are more large transistors capable of 549 00:29:01,680 --> 00:29:05,320 Speaker 2: handling the current capacity of the battery, and basically that's 550 00:29:05,360 --> 00:29:07,200 Speaker 2: where you put it. 551 00:29:07,240 --> 00:29:07,960 Speaker 3: Oops. 552 00:29:08,200 --> 00:29:12,160 Speaker 2: Oops, And again I did talk to someone with expertise 553 00:29:12,240 --> 00:29:15,000 Speaker 2: and explosives who said that they thought it was likelier 554 00:29:15,120 --> 00:29:18,320 Speaker 2: that there was a conventional detonator, not because it would 555 00:29:18,360 --> 00:29:20,920 Speaker 2: have been impossible to do with a thermal runway or 556 00:29:20,960 --> 00:29:23,400 Speaker 2: the way that Andrew's set up, but because this is 557 00:29:23,400 --> 00:29:25,800 Speaker 2: the masade they have access to detonators, and a detonator 558 00:29:25,880 --> 00:29:30,160 Speaker 2: guarantees right that you get the proper kind of explosion. 559 00:29:30,640 --> 00:29:34,320 Speaker 2: But again, even if you're using kind of the less 560 00:29:34,680 --> 00:29:37,320 Speaker 2: Gucci method here, that would be available to a non 561 00:29:37,360 --> 00:29:40,720 Speaker 2: state actor. If only fifty out of the three hundred 562 00:29:40,720 --> 00:29:43,800 Speaker 2: devices you impregnate with explosives do a proper explosion and 563 00:29:43,840 --> 00:29:46,520 Speaker 2: the rest just kind of conflagrate, well, that's still a 564 00:29:46,600 --> 00:29:49,360 Speaker 2: very successful attack. You can do a tremendous amount of 565 00:29:49,440 --> 00:29:52,440 Speaker 2: damage to people's sense of well being, into the economy 566 00:29:52,480 --> 00:29:55,240 Speaker 2: to supply lines by carrying out an attack like that. 567 00:29:55,480 --> 00:29:58,520 Speaker 3: This is so terroristic in nature, and like if any 568 00:29:58,560 --> 00:30:01,480 Speaker 3: other group did this like it has blitded this a Yeah, 569 00:30:01,600 --> 00:30:03,600 Speaker 3: if homosits attack, oh my god. 570 00:30:03,520 --> 00:30:05,400 Speaker 2: We would be we would be bombing them right now. 571 00:30:05,480 --> 00:30:09,040 Speaker 3: Yeah, if some like just random like accelerationist networks somehow 572 00:30:09,080 --> 00:30:11,600 Speaker 3: pulled this off, like yeah, we would be pulling our 573 00:30:11,680 --> 00:30:13,880 Speaker 3: hair out. We would we would like go to war 574 00:30:13,920 --> 00:30:15,800 Speaker 3: over something like this. And the fact that it's like 575 00:30:15,880 --> 00:30:19,040 Speaker 3: it's this type of attack is only okay when this 576 00:30:19,080 --> 00:30:22,000 Speaker 3: one military does it is just I don't know what 577 00:30:22,000 --> 00:30:23,760 Speaker 3: to do any They've endangered. 578 00:30:23,280 --> 00:30:27,080 Speaker 2: There, They have endangered everyone, right, Like, like every single 579 00:30:27,080 --> 00:30:29,840 Speaker 2: person listening to this is less safe because it is 580 00:30:29,880 --> 00:30:31,000 Speaker 2: real carried out this attack. 581 00:30:31,080 --> 00:30:33,440 Speaker 3: What is airport screening going to look like? If this 582 00:30:33,520 --> 00:30:34,120 Speaker 3: keeps happening? 583 00:30:34,120 --> 00:30:35,640 Speaker 2: Importantly? Am I going to be able to take all 584 00:30:35,680 --> 00:30:37,600 Speaker 2: of my batteries on the planes that I could play 585 00:30:37,680 --> 00:30:41,160 Speaker 2: video games on a fourteen hour flight? Garrison? You know, yeah, 586 00:30:41,200 --> 00:30:43,680 Speaker 2: the plugs in the seats don't always work well. 587 00:30:43,680 --> 00:30:45,200 Speaker 3: I mean, and even like what if you're able to 588 00:30:45,240 --> 00:30:48,000 Speaker 3: do this to like the electronics of like the pilot jeez, 589 00:30:48,040 --> 00:30:49,920 Speaker 3: and then you just you just like take out an 590 00:30:50,000 --> 00:30:52,760 Speaker 3: entire area. Yeah, It's like it's such a fucked up 591 00:30:52,800 --> 00:30:54,640 Speaker 3: Pandora's box that it feels like there's gonna be no 592 00:30:54,720 --> 00:30:57,400 Speaker 3: real consequences for which is just kind of how things 593 00:30:57,400 --> 00:30:58,960 Speaker 3: have been this past year, I guess. Yeah. 594 00:30:59,000 --> 00:31:01,160 Speaker 4: And the other the other issue with it is that 595 00:31:01,240 --> 00:31:04,760 Speaker 4: like the only way to fix this would be an 596 00:31:04,840 --> 00:31:08,200 Speaker 4: actual like you would you would have to change how 597 00:31:08,200 --> 00:31:10,520 Speaker 4: our supply chains work. And it's like, well, no one's 598 00:31:10,520 --> 00:31:13,160 Speaker 4: gonna do that, no one. There is no number of 599 00:31:13,160 --> 00:31:16,200 Speaker 4: people that you like, maybe if they literally killed the 600 00:31:16,200 --> 00:31:19,120 Speaker 4: president of the United States, maybe you could get enough 601 00:31:19,160 --> 00:31:22,560 Speaker 4: political capital together to try to do something about it, 602 00:31:22,600 --> 00:31:23,840 Speaker 4: But like there's no way. 603 00:31:24,040 --> 00:31:26,720 Speaker 2: No, and there's there's no way, And like the way 604 00:31:26,760 --> 00:31:29,000 Speaker 2: the state will respond to this is by making air 605 00:31:29,040 --> 00:31:32,120 Speaker 2: travel vastly worse. Right, Yeah, it's probably not the only 606 00:31:32,200 --> 00:31:34,680 Speaker 2: thing that they will do. But that is like because 607 00:31:34,720 --> 00:31:38,040 Speaker 2: there's just not an actual, It's not really with present technology, 608 00:31:38,120 --> 00:31:42,360 Speaker 2: there's not an easy way to actually find these things 609 00:31:42,680 --> 00:31:46,040 Speaker 2: like within kind of the context of like air travel 610 00:31:46,240 --> 00:31:50,160 Speaker 2: or the way in which like digital merchandising works, right, 611 00:31:50,760 --> 00:31:53,840 Speaker 2: which is again why the Masad probably shouldn't have done this. 612 00:31:54,080 --> 00:31:55,240 Speaker 3: No, what many reasons? 613 00:31:55,240 --> 00:31:59,000 Speaker 2: What of many reasons, the dead kids being another. Yeah, 614 00:31:59,200 --> 00:32:02,240 Speaker 2: I do want to conclude. I've quoted a lot from 615 00:32:02,600 --> 00:32:07,040 Speaker 2: Andrew Huang's wonderful article. Turning everyday gadgets into bombs is 616 00:32:07,040 --> 00:32:09,760 Speaker 2: a bad idea, but I want to quote from his 617 00:32:09,840 --> 00:32:14,200 Speaker 2: conclusion here. Not all things that could exist should exist, 618 00:32:14,280 --> 00:32:18,160 Speaker 2: and some ideas are better left unimplemented. Technology alone has 619 00:32:18,160 --> 00:32:20,520 Speaker 2: no ethics. The difference between a patch and an exploit 620 00:32:20,600 --> 00:32:23,840 Speaker 2: is the method in which a technology is disclosed. Exploding 621 00:32:23,920 --> 00:32:26,640 Speaker 2: batteries have probably been conceived of and tested by spy 622 00:32:26,720 --> 00:32:30,240 Speaker 2: agencies around the world, but never deployed en Moss because 623 00:32:30,280 --> 00:32:32,680 Speaker 2: while it may achieve a tactical win, it is too 624 00:32:32,720 --> 00:32:35,800 Speaker 2: easy for weaker adversaries to copy the idea and justify 625 00:32:35,840 --> 00:32:40,160 Speaker 2: its redeployment in an asymmetric and devastating retaliation. However, now 626 00:32:40,160 --> 00:32:42,000 Speaker 2: that I've seen it executed, I am left with the 627 00:32:42,080 --> 00:32:45,560 Speaker 2: terrifying realization that not only is it feasible, it's relatively 628 00:32:45,600 --> 00:32:49,080 Speaker 2: easy for any modestly funded entity to implement. Not just 629 00:32:49,120 --> 00:32:51,760 Speaker 2: our allies can do this. A wide cast of adversaries 630 00:32:51,800 --> 00:32:54,440 Speaker 2: have this capability in their reach, from nation states to 631 00:32:54,480 --> 00:32:58,040 Speaker 2: cartels and gangs to shady copycat battery factories just looking 632 00:32:58,040 --> 00:33:01,040 Speaker 2: for a big payday. If chemicals players can moonlight and 633 00:33:01,080 --> 00:33:04,920 Speaker 2: illicit drugs, what stops battery factories from dealing in bespoke munitions. 634 00:33:05,280 --> 00:33:07,680 Speaker 2: The bottom line is we should approach the public policy 635 00:33:07,680 --> 00:33:10,320 Speaker 2: debate around this, assuming that someday we could be victims 636 00:33:10,320 --> 00:33:14,280 Speaker 2: of exploding batteries too. Turning everyday objects into fragmentation to 637 00:33:14,280 --> 00:33:17,320 Speaker 2: grenades should be a crime as it blurs the line 638 00:33:17,480 --> 00:33:21,360 Speaker 2: between civilian and military technologies, and that should be something 639 00:33:21,400 --> 00:33:22,520 Speaker 2: everyone can agree on. 640 00:33:23,480 --> 00:33:27,360 Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, I think so. Jesus Christ. He just is 641 00:33:27,480 --> 00:33:30,720 Speaker 3: enacting terrorism through like the gig economy ecosystem. Yeah, and 642 00:33:30,840 --> 00:33:33,800 Speaker 3: oh boy, what a fun time we've we've built for ourselves. 643 00:33:33,920 --> 00:33:35,640 Speaker 2: What a great fresh hell for us all. 644 00:33:36,040 --> 00:33:38,920 Speaker 4: Yeah, very excited first to have our first drop shaping 645 00:33:39,040 --> 00:33:42,120 Speaker 4: terrorist attack. It's going to be great. It's going to 646 00:33:42,200 --> 00:33:43,680 Speaker 4: be it's going to be great. 647 00:33:44,560 --> 00:33:47,520 Speaker 2: Yeah. Yeah. Anyway, folks, maybe drive next trip you got 648 00:33:47,640 --> 00:33:51,000 Speaker 2: to take. Probably should note before we come out here. 649 00:33:51,120 --> 00:33:54,400 Speaker 2: The obvious question, and there's not a long answer to 650 00:33:54,480 --> 00:33:57,240 Speaker 2: this for obvious reasons, is like, well, could a non 651 00:33:57,240 --> 00:34:01,200 Speaker 2: state actor get their hands on PETN or RDX, you know, 652 00:34:01,960 --> 00:34:04,200 Speaker 2: these kind of explosive compounds that you can make into 653 00:34:04,200 --> 00:34:07,880 Speaker 2: plastic explosives. And the short answer is yes, any moderately 654 00:34:07,920 --> 00:34:11,520 Speaker 2: competent chemist with the right ingredients could make this stuff 655 00:34:11,520 --> 00:34:14,360 Speaker 2: and they're not super hard to find. But also a 656 00:34:14,400 --> 00:34:18,319 Speaker 2: lot of people in commercial spaces particularly have access to PETN. 657 00:34:18,719 --> 00:34:19,640 Speaker 2: It's a kind of thing. 658 00:34:19,520 --> 00:34:23,279 Speaker 3: That like is common like demolition, right, yeah, it's. 659 00:34:23,160 --> 00:34:26,120 Speaker 2: Coming to demolition. It's also something artists use a good amount. 660 00:34:26,200 --> 00:34:28,799 Speaker 2: There is a specific formulation of pet in where they 661 00:34:28,840 --> 00:34:31,279 Speaker 2: make it like a thin sheet that you can use 662 00:34:31,360 --> 00:34:35,680 Speaker 2: to suddenly weld metals together explosively. And there are a 663 00:34:35,680 --> 00:34:39,400 Speaker 2: couple of specific famous artists who like use PETN in 664 00:34:39,520 --> 00:34:44,279 Speaker 2: order to like make bob relief sort of artworks. So 665 00:34:44,280 --> 00:34:48,600 Speaker 2: it's again not something that is like impossible for people 666 00:34:48,640 --> 00:34:50,400 Speaker 2: who are not the masade to gain access to. 667 00:34:50,920 --> 00:34:53,920 Speaker 4: You need a chemist, an engineer, and someone who knows 668 00:34:53,960 --> 00:34:55,839 Speaker 4: how to set up businesses, and between the three of them, 669 00:34:55,880 --> 00:34:57,359 Speaker 4: they are going to have enough money to do this, 670 00:34:57,760 --> 00:35:01,680 Speaker 4: which is yeah, not great, Yeah, not great. 671 00:35:02,280 --> 00:35:05,160 Speaker 2: Anyway, everybody, have a good night, enjoy your next plain flight. 672 00:35:09,200 --> 00:35:09,799 Speaker 3: It could happen. 673 00:35:09,880 --> 00:35:12,239 Speaker 5: Here is a production of cool Zone Media. For more 674 00:35:12,280 --> 00:35:16,560 Speaker 5: podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website foolzonmedia dot com, 675 00:35:16,680 --> 00:35:19,800 Speaker 5: or check us out on the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, 676 00:35:19,880 --> 00:35:20,680 Speaker 5: or wherever. 677 00:35:20,400 --> 00:35:21,719 Speaker 3: You listen to podcasts. 678 00:35:22,000 --> 00:35:23,920 Speaker 5: You can now find sources for it could happen here, 679 00:35:23,960 --> 00:35:26,920 Speaker 5: listed directly in episode descriptions. Thanks for listening.