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Speaker 1: Folks, we are returning with a classic episode for you.

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Speaker 1: Travel back with us to two thousand and one, where

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Speaker 1: something gripped the nation. There was hysteria about it, and

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Speaker 1: then people promptly forgot all about the anthrax letter attacks.

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Speaker 2: Yep, short memory sometimes, But I'm right there too, Ben,

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Speaker 2: I hadn't thought about the two thousand and one anthrax

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Speaker 2: letter attacks, which is fun to say in a very

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Speaker 2: long time.

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Speaker 3: There's weird stuff the saga of these letters and the

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Speaker 3: anthrax and the strain and how it got there and

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Speaker 3: whether or not there was inside government stuff going on.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, and there's also there's also a crazy context because

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Speaker 1: this occurs just days after the events of September eleventh,

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Speaker 1: two thousand and one, very very strange time for the

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Speaker 1: new cycle tragedy for the nation. Even back in twenty

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Speaker 1: twenty when we originally recorded this, folks were asking who

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Speaker 1: was actually responsible.

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Speaker 2: I seem to remember at the time kind of feeling

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Speaker 2: this sense of like adding insult to injury with this,

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Speaker 2: like after everyone was so you know, turned upside down

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Speaker 2: because of nine to eleven, that this just represented like

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Speaker 2: a further just destabilization, like everything's just going haywire, you know.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, and people were worried about possible false flags or

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Speaker 1: trying to amp the country up into a war or

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Speaker 1: even you know, to MAT's earlier point, inside forces striking

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Speaker 1: out for internal division, and some of the anthrax was

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Speaker 1: fake by the way, also we learned later. Anyway, this

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Speaker 1: is the episode. We can't wait to hear your thoughts,

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Speaker 1: and if you can solve the mystery, we'd love for

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Speaker 1: you to solve it for us, because I don't think

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Speaker 1: we do in this episode. But tell us what you think.

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Speaker 1: We'll be back after a word from our sponsors.

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Speaker 4: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies, history is

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Speaker 4: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 4: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 4: production of iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: Hello, and welcome back to the show.

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Speaker 1: My name is nol Our Rider Die Matt Frederick is

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Speaker 1: most likely playing Best Fiends while he's on vacation. They

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Speaker 1: called me Ben. We are joined as always with our

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Speaker 1: super producer Paul Mission Control Deck and most importantly, you

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Speaker 1: are You are here and that makes this stuff they

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Speaker 1: don't want you to know. This is a very interesting episode.

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Speaker 1: It's one that has fascinated Good Pal Matt for a

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Speaker 1: number of years. This episode is something that he cares

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Speaker 1: deeply about. So we're gonna do our best to We're

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Speaker 1: gonna do our best to make them proud.

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Speaker 2: Speaking of Matt, you blasted right by this whole Best

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Speaker 2: Fiends business. We got a bombshell yesterday that Matt Frederick

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Speaker 2: has reached level seven hundred and sixty four in the

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Speaker 2: mobile game Best Fiends. And I don't know whether to

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Speaker 2: be proud of him or concerned for him.

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Speaker 1: I mean, that's you know, he's nothing if not a

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Speaker 1: passionate dude. But I was likewise surprised. Now, you know, Noel,

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Speaker 1: if there's one thing that longtime listeners have learned from

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Speaker 1: stuff they don't want you to know, it's this. You

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Speaker 1: can blast by a lot of headlines. You can get

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Speaker 1: a lot of buried leads. The mainstream news is a fickle,

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Speaker 1: ephemeral thing. Some stories that seem pretty innocuous can receive

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Speaker 1: international attention. Like remember when the world was obsessed over

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Speaker 1: figuring out what color address was on Facebook?

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Speaker 2: What was the determination ultimately beij was it? What were

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Speaker 2: the choices? And how do you even interpret this? Ben?

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Speaker 2: With your color deficiency, did you feel that doubt of

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Speaker 2: that story.

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Speaker 1: No, I wouldn't have participated even if known white color.

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Speaker 1: I think it was it was blue, or it was

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Speaker 1: gold or as black. There was a whole thing. But

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Speaker 1: there are other stories, though, tremendously important stories that seem

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Speaker 1: to fade from the spotlight, and they're only followed up

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Speaker 1: on by people in specialized internet forums or in specialized

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Speaker 1: trade publications. For example, this, this is weird.

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Speaker 2: You know.

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Speaker 1: Today's story comes to us from josh P. Josh P,

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Speaker 1: you emailed us to ask about the anthrax attacks of

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Speaker 1: two thousand and one. Now, right as we say that,

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Speaker 1: a lot of us in the audience are going, huh, anthrax.

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Speaker 1: I kind of remember that, right, I. I know it's

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Speaker 1: a thing, But what do you mean? Well, to answer

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Speaker 1: that question, we have to first tell you what anthrax is.

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Speaker 2: So here are the facts. Yeah, So, just to get

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Speaker 2: it out of the way. No, not the thrash metal

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Speaker 2: band from the nineties with that ball dude with the

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Speaker 2: amazing goatee that you may have seen on episodes of

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Speaker 2: Beavis and butthead the CDC describes anthrax as a serious

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Speaker 2: infectious disease that's caused by something referred to as gram

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Speaker 2: positive rod shaped bacteria referred to as Bacillis anthracis, and

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Speaker 2: it is something that can absolutely sicken people when it's

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Speaker 2: inhaled or when they are they come into contact with

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Speaker 2: infected animals or you know, food stuffs. Another way of

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Speaker 2: looking at it is that it's a spore forming bacillus

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Speaker 2: that is absolutely deadly to humans. And there are three

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Speaker 2: main forms of transmission. Cutaneous which is when you contract

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Speaker 2: it through the skin. Gastro Intestinal which of course is

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Speaker 2: when you would ingest it when you know, eating a

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Speaker 2: contaminated food product. And then there is pulmonary, which is

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Speaker 2: mainly what we're going to be talking about today, which

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Speaker 2: is when it is inhaled.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, that's that's correct. So so a lot of

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Speaker 1: countries have stockpiled anthrax for a long time. When you

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Speaker 1: hear people talking about bioweapon research, they're usually referring to

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Speaker 1: things like anthrax. Because picture anthrax like picture it like

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Speaker 1: an agricultural product. With the right know how, you can

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Speaker 1: grow it, you can groom it, and you can change

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Speaker 1: it into various various mediums of consumption, right like you said,

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Speaker 1: with oral or pulmonary or cutaneous inhalation or ingestion. So

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Speaker 1: behind the scenes, while everybody is worrying about what color

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Speaker 1: addresses or what the Kardashians are doing, or you know

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Speaker 1: what the newest season of your favorite television show is,

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Speaker 1: governments and private partnerships around the world are constantly experimenting

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Speaker 1: with diseases. They're refining them. You're usually going to hear

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Speaker 1: about these in terms of national defense, right, like, like

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Speaker 1: I'm sure you know if you went to the CDC,

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Speaker 1: they would say, we're not making bioweapons, We're researching vaccines, right,

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Speaker 1: We're trying to save people, not harm them, That's right.

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Speaker 2: And you might hear a term like weaponized grade you know,

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Speaker 2: like weapons grade plutonium or weaponized anthrax, and that just

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Speaker 2: means it's refined to the point of being more easily dispersed,

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Speaker 2: you know, through say air ducts, you know in a

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Speaker 2: building for example, or you know, it's when I say refined,

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Speaker 2: I literally mean made into a fine substance that can

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Speaker 2: be released and become very very dangerous because it is

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Speaker 2: transmitted through you know, airflow in the case of like

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Speaker 2: a building or even outdoors. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, And when we talk about these experts who are

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Speaker 1: working on depending on on what you believe, working on

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Speaker 1: either weaponizing diseases or on creating cures for these diseases.

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Speaker 1: They also work on plans on scenarios, right, They work

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Speaker 1: on what's called emergency preparedness plans.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, and the CDC on their website does have an

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Speaker 2: emergency preparedness plan in place for an anthrax attack, but

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Speaker 2: in my opinion, and I'm no expert, it seems pretty

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Speaker 2: broad and kind of vague, almost more of a stop,

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Speaker 2: drop and roll situation than actually some sort of larger

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Speaker 2: government response plan that's in place. And it's interesting. In

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Speaker 2: more recent times, focus truly seems to have shifted away

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Speaker 2: from you know, bioterrorism protection and more towards pandemic preparedness.

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Speaker 2: Though based on our current situation, that does not seem

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Speaker 2: to have worked out quite so well, so you know,

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Speaker 2: the jury is still out on that. But bioterrorism was

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Speaker 2: much more of a top of mind thing during these

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Speaker 2: attacks that we're going to talk about today.

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Speaker 1: Right, Yes, fellow conspiracy realist, you may remember this story

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Speaker 1: from several years ago, almost twenty years ago now, beginning

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Speaker 1: on September eighteenth, two thousand and one, just a week

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Speaker 1: after literally just a week after the infamous terrorist attacks.

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Speaker 1: On September eleventh, two thousand and one, someone started mailing

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Speaker 1: letters laced with anthrax. They sent these to several places AB, NBCCBS,

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Speaker 1: the New York Post, American Media. That's that's such a

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Speaker 1: benign name. American Media is probably best known as the

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Speaker 1: publisher of the National Enquirer, a quite popular tabloid here

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Speaker 1: in the US. And they also sent someone sent these

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Speaker 1: sent anthrax leased letters to members of Congress.

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Speaker 2: That's correct, two Democratic Senators Tom Dashel and Patrick Lahey.

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Speaker 2: On October second, two thousand and one, the gentleman at

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Speaker 2: the American Media building in Florida, which is again the

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Speaker 2: parent company of the National Inquirer and also The Sun,

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Speaker 2: a photo editor by the name of Robert Stevens, opened

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Speaker 2: an innocuously labeled envelope and was exposed to anthrax. There

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Speaker 2: were various methods in these letters of dispersal, but like

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Speaker 2: some of them were more successful than others. And I

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Speaker 2: believe this is one where he pulled something out of

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Speaker 2: the envelope and it actually kind of ejected powder into

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Speaker 2: his face and he really took a deep whiff of

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Speaker 2: this substance.

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Speaker 1: Yep, absolutely, that's correct. Two days later, October fourth, two

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Speaker 1: thousand and one, Robert Stevens is diagnosed with what's called

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Speaker 1: inhalational anthrax, meaning he ingested it just the way you

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Speaker 1: described nol. Robert Stevens dies the next day, October fifth,

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Speaker 1: two thousand and one, and three days later, authorities start

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Speaker 1: running tests on his office, on his workspace, and they

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Speaker 1: find that his computer keyboard also tests positive for anthrax.

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Speaker 1: This was only the first confirmed death overall so far

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Speaker 1: as we know today. In twenty twenty, the anthrax attacks

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Speaker 1: of two thousand and one left seventeen people infected and

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Speaker 1: five people died. Five people died from exposure to anth

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Speaker 1: This became a international story, and the problem with some

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Speaker 1: of these international stories is that for one reason or another,

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Speaker 1: copycats come into play.

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Speaker 2: That's right. There was another copycat crime that occurred when

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Speaker 2: someone else mailed fake anthrax in the form of just

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Speaker 2: a harmless white powder, possibly baby powder or something like

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Speaker 2: that to the New York Times newsroom, and it was

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Speaker 2: opened by a reporter named Judith Miller. And it really

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Speaker 2: just goes to show, because of what you said, Ben,

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Speaker 2: that this truly just was a massive story because it

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Speaker 2: was in the wake of nine to eleven, where people

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Speaker 2: were just so on edge already and just really believing

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Speaker 2: that terrorism was coming at us from all directions, and

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Speaker 2: the close proximity to that attack on the World Trade

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Speaker 2: Center buildings really got people freaked out, and the FBI

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Speaker 2: acted accordingly, launching what they refer to as one of

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Speaker 2: the largest and most complex investigations in the history of

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Speaker 2: law enforcement and involved multiple agencies and thousands of hours

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Speaker 2: of investigative time.

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Speaker 1: So what did they find. Well, we have to remember,

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Speaker 1: as you said, that this occurred right after nine to eleven.

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Speaker 1: It is impossible to convey just how alert, how tense,

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Speaker 1: how crisis ready government agencies were. You have to remember, folks,

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Speaker 1: that war was in the air way before the anthrax.

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Speaker 1: It was already floating around, and war is its own

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Speaker 1: sort of infectious weapon, right, its own sort of disease.

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Speaker 1: The FBI scrambled and assembled what I think is a

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Speaker 1: terribly named task force, the Amerthrax Task Force. We didn't

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Speaker 1: write that, they wrote that.

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Speaker 2: It just does not really right off the tug, does it.

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Speaker 2: But you know, name aside, it was a serious business.

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Speaker 2: Roughly twenty five to thirty full time investigators from the

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Speaker 2: FBI and the US Postal Inspection Service and multiple other

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Speaker 2: law enforcement agencies, as well as federal prosecutors from the

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Speaker 2: District of Columbia and the Justice Department Counter Terrorism Section.

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Speaker 2: And as we said before, thousands of investigator work hours

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Speaker 2: were involved. That led to ten thousand witness interviews on

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Speaker 2: six different continents, execution of eighty search warrants, and the

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Speaker 2: recovery of more than six thousand items of potential evidence

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Speaker 2: during this investigation.

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Speaker 1: And you heard that right, six different continents. So that

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Speaker 1: means that the Amerithrax Task Force literally asked people everywhere

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Speaker 1: except for Antarctica. Somehow the folks in Antarctica slipped under

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Speaker 1: the radar. This case also ended up issuing more than

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Speaker 1: five seven hundred and fifty subpoenas for grand juries. They

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Speaker 1: collected five thousand, seven hundred and thirty environmental samples from

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Speaker 1: sixty different places they were on the search. This this investigation,

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Speaker 1: in addition to being very expensive, was very thorough. Here's

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Speaker 1: here's what they found. Here's how it shakes out. So

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Speaker 1: FBI agents trace the first wave of letters to a

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Speaker 1: single postmark. It's these letters came from Trenton, New Jersey,

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Speaker 1: and that's the first five letters. They had a theme

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Speaker 1: of sorts. You know, the letters weren't blank when people

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Speaker 1: opened the envelope, there was something written in there. And

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Speaker 1: we've got we've got the text of these. Let's let's

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Speaker 1: maybe start with the letter sent to New York Post

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Speaker 1: and NBC.

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Speaker 2: Absolutely, And by the way, if you want, you can

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Speaker 2: look up images of these. They've been cataloged and photographed

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Speaker 2: and you can see them. They're all handwritten in kind

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Speaker 2: of a weird, childish script. It's very Serial Killer esque, honestly,

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Speaker 2: the way the way they appear, and the notes really

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Speaker 2: lean into that. Even further so. The one said to

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Speaker 2: the New York Posts and the NBC News had this

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Speaker 2: note nine to eleven oh one, this is next. Take

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Speaker 2: penicillin now. Cool pro tip death to America, death to Israel.

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Speaker 2: Allah is great. Okay, it seems to have escalated there

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Speaker 2: to a little different place. But I appreciate the advice

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Speaker 2: about taking penicillin. I think that's actually really helpful.

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Speaker 1: You know, they also misspelled penicillin, by the way, it's true.

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Speaker 2: But also by the way, you know, people think of

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Speaker 2: anthrax and they think, like, I don't know, your mind

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Speaker 2: immediately goes to some sort of face melting, you know,

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Speaker 2: bio terror product, and it really just sickens you. It

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Speaker 2: can make you nauseous, and it's the respiratory thing that

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Speaker 2: can obviously kill you in the same way that COVID

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Speaker 2: nineteen can. I mean, it can escalate much more quickly.

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Speaker 2: But it is treatable with regular antibiotics. You know, it's

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Speaker 2: not a death sentence always. It's caught in enough time,

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Speaker 2: so it's not some kind of magical thing. It literally

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Speaker 2: is just a disease that can be treated with the antibiotics.

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Speaker 1: And we should note instantly, you know, the FBI investigators

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Speaker 1: had to say, well, is this a person writing English

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Speaker 1: as a second language, you know, or the ESL. Is

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Speaker 1: that why penicilan is misspelled? And of course you know,

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Speaker 1: there was a lot of anti Muslim sentiment at the time.

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Speaker 1: The letters sent to Senators Dashel and Lee he said

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Speaker 1: said very similar things. They said, you cannot stop us.

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Speaker 1: We have this anthrax. You die now, are you afraid?

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Speaker 1: Death to America, death to Israel Allah is great. So

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Speaker 1: clearly they're coming from the same source, just based on

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Speaker 1: the language there. You know, it is very difficult to

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Speaker 1: describe the level of panic that occurs here. We have

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Speaker 1: to remember this is again a week after the largest

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Speaker 1: attack on American soil in recent US history.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, so, I mean, obviously the first go to is

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Speaker 2: to investigate Al Qaeda. The White House pressured then FBI

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Speaker 2: Director Robert Muller to establish the letters were a second

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Speaker 2: wave of attacks relating to nine to eleven. And it's

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Speaker 2: always tough when you know, the brass kind of tells

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Speaker 2: you what results to get, you know what I mean,

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Speaker 2: because the question is like, you know, sure we can

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Speaker 2: read these and say, okay, is it an ESL situation

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Speaker 2: or is it someone trying to write in that voice

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Speaker 2: as to create that effect, you know what I mean,

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Speaker 2: to maybe cause that kind of panic. So yeah, obviously

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Speaker 2: that didn't pan out, this notion that this was in

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Speaker 2: fact the second wave, but that was whatever one thought.

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Speaker 2: I mean, it was just the first place your mind

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Speaker 2: would go. Hence the hysteria that was just you know,

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Speaker 2: in the air in our country at that time. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, And Muller was definitely under pressure, but you know,

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Speaker 1: from his estimation, the facts just weren't there. There wasn't

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Speaker 1: there was one potential link. One of the nine to

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Speaker 1: eleven terrorists was exposed to anthrax at some point, but

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Speaker 1: that was that was pretty much all they could find.

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Speaker 1: The initial actual suspects of the investigation ended up all

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Speaker 1: being domestic US residents. There were probably about one hundred

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Speaker 1: people or so who would have the know how, just

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Speaker 1: to know how alone, just the expertise, not even the

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Speaker 1: motivation of the opportunity. The FBI first turned to a

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Speaker 1: man named Stephen J. Hatfil. Doctor Hatfhil is alive today.

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Speaker 1: He is a pathologist, he's a bioweapons expert, and the

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Speaker 1: FBI ruined his life.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, for all intents and purposes. In mid two thousand

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Speaker 2: and two, the FBI served him with a search warrant

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Speaker 2: of his home, wearing hazmat suits, investigating whether he was

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Speaker 2: in fact this anthrax killer, as was dubbed in the

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Speaker 2: media at the time. He was at that point considered

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Speaker 2: a major person of interest. His phone was tapped, he

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Speaker 2: got fired from his job at Science Applications International Corporation. Yeah,

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Speaker 2: like you said, Ben, I mean this really, you know,

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Speaker 2: in the terms of the court of public opinion and

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Speaker 2: just his other associations professionally, this absolutely railroaded him. He

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Speaker 2: did ultimately get exonerated. He was very, very public exoneration.

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Speaker 2: There's a great clip of him where he says, and

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Speaker 2: now I can look my fellow Americans in the eye

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Speaker 2: and say unequivocally I am not the anthrac killer, you know.

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Speaker 2: And he definitely got some money where his mouth was,

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Speaker 2: in the form of five point eight million from the

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Speaker 2: Justice Department and in two other undisclosed settlements from some

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Speaker 2: of these other agencies that were involved. It was very

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Speaker 2: clear that they were acting on spurious evidence at best

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Speaker 2: and made really jump the gun on nailing this guy.

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Speaker 2: And the way they did.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, I like that you bring up the court of

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Speaker 1: public opinion. One of those groups that reached an undisclosed

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Speaker 1: settlement with him was Conde Nast. It's a huge player

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Speaker 1: in the media. They own Reddit for instance. So Hathhil. Luckily,

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Speaker 1: if you're listening, doctor Hail, we are glad that you

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Speaker 1: were able to be exonerated for a crime that you

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Speaker 1: clearly did not commit. But it's tough to recover from

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Speaker 1: that sort of stuff. He was ultimately found innocent of

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Speaker 1: this crime. The primary conclusion of the FBI, the official story,

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Speaker 1: is this. They concluded that a scientist named Bruce Ivans,

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Speaker 1: acting alone, was the source of the entirety of the

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Speaker 1: anthrax attacks, and he has if you're a profiler, he

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Speaker 1: has all of the right red flags in all of

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Speaker 1: the right places. He worked directly with anthrax. He was

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Speaker 1: one of those people that we mentioned at the top

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Speaker 1: of the show who develops vaccines. So he was working

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Speaker 1: with anthrax officially to develop vaccines in case some other

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Speaker 1: government had a weaponized strain that they deployed in the

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Speaker 1: US or in a battlefield.

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Speaker 2: And Ben wasn't he even involved in the investigation to

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Speaker 2: a degree.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, he volunteered, right, He volunteered to test samples. He

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Speaker 1: sent samples from his own lab. He was around fifty

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Speaker 1: five years old when the anthrax attacks occurred. He said,

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Speaker 1: you know, I will help you determine the origin of

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Speaker 1: the powder. Because everybody in the scientific community, everybody in

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Speaker 1: the FBI, they knew only a few people in the

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Speaker 1: world would even understand the science evolved here. So remember

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Speaker 1: that part for later, folks. This guy volunteered to help

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Speaker 1: the FBI determine the origin of the powder.

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Speaker 2: And let's not forget how much pressure the FBI was under,

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Speaker 2: especially since this public exoneration and having that egg on

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Speaker 2: their face from wasting all those millions of dollars and

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Speaker 2: thousands of hours, you know, focusing on the wrong purp.

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Speaker 2: Doctor Ivans was literally right under their noses. I mean

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Speaker 2: he was working, you know, in their labs essentially. I

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Speaker 2: mean he was an agent of the government, and he, uh,

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Speaker 2: you know, was kind of a goofball. He was he

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Speaker 2: was sort of a kook like. He was described as

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Speaker 2: being a bit arrogant and something of a flamboyant figure.

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Speaker 2: And you know, that was a term that was thrown around.

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Speaker 2: I'm not sure if if that's meant to be a

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Speaker 2: pejorative or just that he was kind of a little

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Speaker 2: bit of kookie. That's kind of the vibe that I got,

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Speaker 2: but not necessarily a red flag in terms that he

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Speaker 2: seemed like some kind of sociopath. He would send these

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Speaker 2: like chipper emails with bad dad jokes, which I can

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Speaker 2: get behind, as he talked through the dangers of anthrax.

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Speaker 2: But he was by some seen as being a bit disturbed.

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Speaker 1: Yes, that's correct, behind those puns, behind those cheerful exclamation

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Speaker 1: marks and tangents in his emails which the FBI obtained.

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Speaker 1: Of course, he had a lot of trauma. His therapist

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Speaker 1: said that he had a traumatic childhood and was described

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Speaker 1: as disturbing, and he himself as an adult seemed to

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Speaker 1: be disturbed. He was a married man, but back in

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Speaker 1: nineteen seventy six he was jilted by a fellow grad

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Speaker 1: student who would go on to be a colleague in

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Speaker 1: this field, a doctor Nancy Haigwood. And since he was

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Speaker 1: jilted again back in nineteen seventy six, he had apparently

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Speaker 1: become obsessed with her old sorority Kapa Kapa Gamma, and

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Speaker 1: sororities in general. One of boss. Yeah, yeah, he would

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Speaker 1: sit outside of sorority houses, just sit in this car,

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Speaker 1: and he would, you know, when he met a colleague

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Speaker 1: who was affiliated with a sorority, he would instantly start,

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Speaker 1: I don't know, like pressuring them, cracking down. He got

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Speaker 1: weird with it.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, But there's also part of me that like, is

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Speaker 2: he just socially awkward and maybe a bit on the spectrum,

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Speaker 2: or is this stockery kind of rapee behavior in saying

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Speaker 2: what's your secret password? What's your secret handshake? It seems

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Speaker 2: kind of like a goofball way of flirting, like saying,

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Speaker 2: ha ha, what's your secret handshake? You know what I mean?

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Speaker 2: As opposed to something genuinely creepy. But he was described

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Speaker 2: as as having an interest intellectually in secret things.

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Speaker 1: Yeah he uh this this recollection comes from one of

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Speaker 1: his former bosses, doctor Priscilla Weirrick. She had a she

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Speaker 1: was in a sorority in college chi Omega, and she

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Speaker 1: said that he was doing exactly what you described, nol.

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Speaker 1: He was always saying, you know, what's your what's your

401
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Speaker 1: secret password, what's your secret handshake? So she thought that

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Speaker 1: he was just maybe, as you said, a guy was

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Speaker 1: a little bit off, brilliant but a little bit awkward

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Speaker 1: who was really interested in secret things. The person we

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Speaker 1: mentioned earlier, doctor Nancy Hagwood, is the person who actually

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Speaker 1: brought doctor Bruce even to the attention of the FBI.

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Speaker 1: So what was their official conclusion. We'll tell you after

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Speaker 1: a word from our sponsor and we're back. So Noel, officially,

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Speaker 1: there's no reason for us to look into this for

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Speaker 1: stuff they don't want you to know, because the FBI

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Speaker 1: has an official conclusion.

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Speaker 2: Right, Nothing I trust more than an official FBI conclusion. Ben,

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Speaker 2: Let me tell you so. Yeah, it's true. Today, the

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Speaker 2: FBI's official position is that doctor Bruce Ivans was a

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Speaker 2: lone wolf acted without any influence outside of his own

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Speaker 2: troubled mind, and that he executed these anthrax attacks alone.

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Speaker 2: And there's some things that check out here. He had

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Speaker 2: the know how, he had the access, he had the

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Speaker 2: opportunity to do these things, but he never can. And

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Speaker 2: to boot he's not in prison. Doctor Bruce Ivans took

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Speaker 2: his own life. He was discovered on July twenty seventh,

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Speaker 2: two thousand and eight, unconscious in his home and taken

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Speaker 2: to the hospital. He had overdosed, apparently on Thailand. All three,

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Speaker 2: I think is what it's called. It's a combination of

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Speaker 2: tilanol and codeine that you'd get for a toothache or

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Speaker 2: a minor surgery, but taken in large doses, is actually

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Speaker 2: the tile in all that kills you.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, yep. He died at Frederick Memorial Hospital on July

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Speaker 1: twenty ninth, two thousand and eight. The FBI had found

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Speaker 1: their bad guy. They would never have to investigate further.

431
00:28:43,120 --> 00:28:49,680
Speaker 1: They established, to their you know, to their satisfaction, the timeline.

432
00:28:50,080 --> 00:28:54,080
Speaker 1: They established that he did, as you said, have the expertise.

433
00:28:54,960 --> 00:28:59,240
Speaker 1: They established that he did have the opportunity do what

434
00:28:59,360 --> 00:29:02,880
Speaker 1: a note, by the way, there was no official autopsy

435
00:29:03,080 --> 00:29:06,719
Speaker 1: there's not one. There's not one on the record, because again,

436
00:29:06,880 --> 00:29:09,440
Speaker 1: there's this pressure we got to close the case. You know,

437
00:29:09,600 --> 00:29:13,040
Speaker 1: it's it's something that's very familiar to fans of shows

438
00:29:13,160 --> 00:29:18,240
Speaker 1: like The Wire. The FBI found their guy, but their

439
00:29:18,240 --> 00:29:20,680
Speaker 1: guy didn't have a day in court.

440
00:29:21,240 --> 00:29:24,080
Speaker 2: No, if Ivan's dead, the FBI would never have to

441
00:29:24,200 --> 00:29:26,720
Speaker 2: prove their case to a jury. And we're going to

442
00:29:26,800 --> 00:29:30,120
Speaker 2: get into, you know, what their case was as we

443
00:29:30,240 --> 00:29:34,360
Speaker 2: progress with this episode. But what if Ben, what if

444
00:29:35,080 --> 00:29:39,040
Speaker 2: the official story kind of peters out in eight What

445
00:29:39,160 --> 00:29:44,160
Speaker 2: if another story begins because the case against Bruce Ivans

446
00:29:44,240 --> 00:29:48,480
Speaker 2: isn't nearly as ironclad as the news media and the

447
00:29:48,520 --> 00:29:51,960
Speaker 2: press conferences and briefings from the FBI would have had

448
00:29:53,320 --> 00:29:56,680
Speaker 2: viewers and citizens of the United States believe.

449
00:29:58,280 --> 00:30:03,440
Speaker 1: You see, one thing that was missing from the FBI's case,

450
00:30:03,480 --> 00:30:07,280
Speaker 1: one of several things was a real motive. There wasn't

451
00:30:07,320 --> 00:30:12,040
Speaker 1: one established. And this means that in the almost a

452
00:30:12,160 --> 00:30:18,160
Speaker 1: decade between when these attacks occurred and when this podcast publishes,

453
00:30:19,400 --> 00:30:26,520
Speaker 1: theories have proliferated. Speculation thrives even now about what actually happened.

454
00:30:26,600 --> 00:30:30,200
Speaker 1: The big question, the big what if here is what

455
00:30:30,440 --> 00:30:35,120
Speaker 1: if after millions of dollars and thousands of hours. The

456
00:30:35,200 --> 00:30:41,640
Speaker 1: FBI nailed the wrong man. Here's where it gets crazy. No,

457
00:30:41,880 --> 00:30:45,360
Speaker 1: let's like motivation, right. I love that you pointed out

458
00:30:45,400 --> 00:30:51,160
Speaker 1: the flamboyant thing, but the FBI didn't ever have like

459
00:30:51,320 --> 00:30:54,760
Speaker 1: a clear discernible reason.

460
00:30:55,760 --> 00:30:56,040
Speaker 5: Yeah.

461
00:30:56,080 --> 00:30:59,080
Speaker 2: And another thing we know from like murder shows is

462
00:30:59,520 --> 00:31:01,600
Speaker 2: you know, some murders don't have to have a motive.

463
00:31:02,000 --> 00:31:05,160
Speaker 2: It's not like a requirement. But with such an analytical

464
00:31:05,160 --> 00:31:10,280
Speaker 2: guy like this and such a pointed, targeted attack, a motive.

465
00:31:11,080 --> 00:31:13,200
Speaker 2: I would like to hear a little bit more about

466
00:31:13,240 --> 00:31:14,880
Speaker 2: a motive, you know what I mean? Like, I mean,

467
00:31:14,920 --> 00:31:20,320
Speaker 2: these were very specific individuals, politicians, news outlets that these

468
00:31:20,720 --> 00:31:25,360
Speaker 2: letters were sent to, seemingly for what you know, we

469
00:31:25,400 --> 00:31:28,480
Speaker 2: really just don't have the guy just crack. And if so,

470
00:31:28,880 --> 00:31:33,280
Speaker 2: why such a specific, targeted and pointed attack. Again, we're

471
00:31:33,320 --> 00:31:36,239
Speaker 2: not owed a motive. It's not a necessity to you know,

472
00:31:36,440 --> 00:31:40,080
Speaker 2: convict somebody of a crime. The possible motivations, like the

473
00:31:40,120 --> 00:31:42,200
Speaker 2: idea that he mailed anthrax NBC is a way of

474
00:31:42,240 --> 00:31:48,640
Speaker 2: punishing them. For journalist Gary Matsumoto's work on his lab

475
00:31:49,040 --> 00:31:52,200
Speaker 2: that fell apart. Because Matsumoto worked at ABC, not NBC.

476
00:31:52,840 --> 00:31:55,760
Speaker 2: He had written some not very flattering stories about some

477
00:31:55,800 --> 00:31:59,640
Speaker 2: of some of Ivan's research. Ben, isn't that right, Yeah, yeah,

478
00:31:59,720 --> 00:32:00,400
Speaker 2: that's correct.

479
00:32:00,520 --> 00:32:08,200
Speaker 1: He did an investigation into the actual lab that doctor

480
00:32:08,200 --> 00:32:12,720
Speaker 1: Bruce Ivans was working at. But again he worked for

481
00:32:12,760 --> 00:32:17,760
Speaker 1: ABC not NBC, so that that motivation doesn't add up,

482
00:32:18,120 --> 00:32:21,560
Speaker 1: because if Ivans did this, he would have at least

483
00:32:21,600 --> 00:32:26,200
Speaker 1: been aware of which news organization this journalist was working

484
00:32:26,200 --> 00:32:30,400
Speaker 1: for at the time. Additionally, doctor Ivans passed a Lie

485
00:32:30,440 --> 00:32:35,640
Speaker 1: detector test a polygraph polygraphs. We should mention here I've

486
00:32:35,640 --> 00:32:38,240
Speaker 1: got a brain stuff episode about this. I think they're

487
00:32:38,280 --> 00:32:42,960
Speaker 1: not scientifically sound, but it is rare for a guilty

488
00:32:43,000 --> 00:32:47,720
Speaker 1: person to pass Lie detector tests usually unless you know

489
00:32:47,800 --> 00:32:52,239
Speaker 1: a few handy tricks here. They are really quick. Not

490
00:32:52,440 --> 00:32:56,480
Speaker 1: saying that you should ever lie on a polygraph, but

491
00:32:57,040 --> 00:33:00,360
Speaker 1: if you want to pass a polygraph test, again, because

492
00:33:00,360 --> 00:33:03,959
Speaker 1: they are not scientifically sound, you can employ any number

493
00:33:04,080 --> 00:33:07,400
Speaker 1: of tricks, including doing some things to mess with your

494
00:33:07,400 --> 00:33:11,000
Speaker 1: own body temperature, such as meditation, et cetera. You can

495
00:33:12,440 --> 00:33:15,200
Speaker 1: this is is fairly explicit, but back in the day

496
00:33:15,280 --> 00:33:18,200
Speaker 1: people used to just really flex their kegel muscle for

497
00:33:18,240 --> 00:33:21,800
Speaker 1: an extended amount of time. That'll do it. You could

498
00:33:21,800 --> 00:33:24,240
Speaker 1: put thumb tacks in your palm or and your shoe.

499
00:33:24,320 --> 00:33:27,520
Speaker 1: Of course, there are a number of ways to invalidate it.

500
00:33:27,680 --> 00:33:30,240
Speaker 2: Because it's all about sort of messing with that base level,

501
00:33:30,320 --> 00:33:33,560
Speaker 2: that baseline, right, and then you know, because what's the

502
00:33:33,600 --> 00:33:36,760
Speaker 2: polygraph if not just kind of a slightly you know,

503
00:33:36,880 --> 00:33:39,640
Speaker 2: more complex like stress test. So if you can establish

504
00:33:39,920 --> 00:33:43,360
Speaker 2: a baseline using that thumb tack in your palm, that's

505
00:33:43,520 --> 00:33:46,720
Speaker 2: you know, sort of an elevated baseline, then everything else

506
00:33:46,760 --> 00:33:48,960
Speaker 2: is going to kind of you know, be affected by

507
00:33:48,960 --> 00:33:50,240
Speaker 2: that absolutely.

508
00:33:50,400 --> 00:33:56,360
Speaker 1: And and we also know that during the investigation, even

509
00:33:56,520 --> 00:33:59,680
Speaker 1: right after the conclusion of the investigation and right after

510
00:33:59,800 --> 00:34:03,720
Speaker 1: it was re examined, first in two thousand and eight,

511
00:34:03,840 --> 00:34:08,240
Speaker 1: then in twenty eleven, a lot of people, people in power,

512
00:34:08,600 --> 00:34:12,680
Speaker 1: some like victims of these attacks, did not believe the

513
00:34:12,719 --> 00:34:15,439
Speaker 1: FBI's conclusion. They thought it didn't add up.

514
00:34:16,080 --> 00:34:19,359
Speaker 2: Yeah. Even Senator Patrick Leahy, who you'll remember was the

515
00:34:19,400 --> 00:34:22,680
Speaker 2: target of one of the attacks, testify that he did

516
00:34:22,719 --> 00:34:27,480
Speaker 2: not believe that Ivans acted alone, though Senator Dashel, who

517
00:34:27,520 --> 00:34:31,680
Speaker 2: was the other political target, did not agree with that assessment.

518
00:34:32,160 --> 00:34:36,240
Speaker 2: So in two thousand and eight, FBI Director Robert Mueller figured, Okay,

519
00:34:36,400 --> 00:34:39,560
Speaker 2: if there's doubt, you know that's being publicly stated, let's

520
00:34:39,560 --> 00:34:41,040
Speaker 2: get to the bottom of this, and he called for

521
00:34:41,040 --> 00:34:44,480
Speaker 2: an independent review of the investigation by the National Academy

522
00:34:44,480 --> 00:34:51,440
Speaker 2: of Sciences, and that review found that prosecutors had largely

523
00:34:51,600 --> 00:34:57,480
Speaker 2: overstated the case in the certainty of their findings. Members

524
00:34:57,560 --> 00:35:01,200
Speaker 2: of that committee said that there there were some newly

525
00:35:01,280 --> 00:35:06,920
Speaker 2: available methods for testing these these samples of anthrax to

526
00:35:06,920 --> 00:35:10,920
Speaker 2: prove the FBI's case much more definitively or lead to

527
00:35:10,960 --> 00:35:17,000
Speaker 2: some other suspects, but they were not interested in exploring

528
00:35:17,400 --> 00:35:23,319
Speaker 2: such such tests. They relied on some I believe it

529
00:35:23,400 --> 00:35:26,479
Speaker 2: was a sort of a fingerprint to trace it back

530
00:35:26,520 --> 00:35:30,080
Speaker 2: to what they referred to as a flask of anthrax

531
00:35:30,160 --> 00:35:33,200
Speaker 2: that Ivans had control over. And it has a coded

532
00:35:34,000 --> 00:35:36,720
Speaker 2: kind of ID that I'm having a hard time finding

533
00:35:36,760 --> 00:35:38,400
Speaker 2: right now, but it's like two letters, a dash and

534
00:35:38,719 --> 00:35:47,840
Speaker 2: three numbers. And the technique involved tracing these particular mutations

535
00:35:47,920 --> 00:35:50,600
Speaker 2: that they could, you know, kind of match up with

536
00:35:50,680 --> 00:35:54,239
Speaker 2: the with the actual the flask that were it originated.

537
00:35:54,400 --> 00:35:57,680
Speaker 2: And apparently they tested more than a thousand samples throughout

538
00:35:57,680 --> 00:36:00,960
Speaker 2: this investigation and only eight of them had tested positive

539
00:36:01,000 --> 00:36:04,360
Speaker 2: for four of these mutations found in the germs that

540
00:36:04,400 --> 00:36:09,000
Speaker 2: were sent to Congress and the news media. So this

541
00:36:09,440 --> 00:36:12,960
Speaker 2: caused an issue. Even in the early stages of the investigation,

542
00:36:13,360 --> 00:36:15,359
Speaker 2: there was a group of scientists known as the Red

543
00:36:15,400 --> 00:36:19,280
Speaker 2: Team that said the FBI should do more basic research

544
00:36:19,719 --> 00:36:22,840
Speaker 2: and so why those mutations might have arisen, that it

545
00:36:22,880 --> 00:36:25,600
Speaker 2: wasn't a foregone conclusion just because the mutations existed, that

546
00:36:25,640 --> 00:36:31,080
Speaker 2: they necessarily were traced back to that original flask, and

547
00:36:31,120 --> 00:36:33,960
Speaker 2: that this woman named Jennifer Smith, who is a senior

548
00:36:33,960 --> 00:36:38,839
Speaker 2: manager at the FBI's lab, she expressed those concerns and

549
00:36:39,520 --> 00:36:41,840
Speaker 2: didn't feel that the FBI had a kind of full

550
00:36:42,040 --> 00:36:47,080
Speaker 2: understanding of how these mutations might have arisen and how

551
00:36:47,160 --> 00:36:50,359
Speaker 2: this would be seen by a judge, and how it

552
00:36:50,360 --> 00:36:52,600
Speaker 2: could potentially be thrown out entirely.

553
00:36:53,120 --> 00:36:59,399
Speaker 1: Right, right, this science is vital here that specific let's say,

554
00:36:59,440 --> 00:37:05,319
Speaker 1: brand or type of anthrax flask RMR ten twenty nine.

555
00:37:06,640 --> 00:37:12,080
Speaker 1: The reason we know this is because everything should be

556
00:37:12,160 --> 00:37:18,880
Speaker 1: obsessively documented in the field of biohazard research or bioweapons.

557
00:37:19,000 --> 00:37:23,879
Speaker 1: Right if you are working in the kind of lab

558
00:37:23,960 --> 00:37:27,320
Speaker 1: or situation that doctor Ivans was working in at the time,

559
00:37:28,160 --> 00:37:33,440
Speaker 1: your interactions with every single version of every single contagion

560
00:37:34,280 --> 00:37:39,120
Speaker 1: has to be documented, right, so that we know looking

561
00:37:39,160 --> 00:37:41,840
Speaker 1: at the records, we know every time the guy was

562
00:37:41,880 --> 00:37:44,719
Speaker 1: in his lab. We know that his time in the

563
00:37:44,800 --> 00:37:49,720
Speaker 1: lab on weekends and nights accelerated, right, He was spending

564
00:37:49,719 --> 00:37:52,359
Speaker 1: a lot of time there before the attacks occurred, and

565
00:37:52,640 --> 00:37:57,320
Speaker 1: we should know everything the guy touched. But even now,

566
00:37:57,440 --> 00:38:01,000
Speaker 1: even in twenty twenty, just it's like the experts you

567
00:38:01,120 --> 00:38:06,880
Speaker 1: mentioned earlier, Nol. We find large groups of people, including

568
00:38:06,960 --> 00:38:10,600
Speaker 1: some of the doctor's colleagues and some of his professional rivals,

569
00:38:10,880 --> 00:38:15,040
Speaker 1: who are convinced that this man was innocent. And you know,

570
00:38:15,120 --> 00:38:17,920
Speaker 1: the basis for their belief is not that they are

571
00:38:17,960 --> 00:38:21,319
Speaker 1: in a Bruce Edward Ivans fan club. In fact, one

572
00:38:21,320 --> 00:38:23,239
Speaker 1: of the reasons that a lot of people say he's

573
00:38:23,280 --> 00:38:26,920
Speaker 1: innocent is that they say the attacks were too sophisticated

574
00:38:27,440 --> 00:38:30,960
Speaker 1: for this guy to have figured out himself. The argument

575
00:38:31,040 --> 00:38:34,640
Speaker 1: is basically, yes, he had to know how and the

576
00:38:34,680 --> 00:38:40,640
Speaker 1: expertise to experiment with anthrax and maybe even to grow

577
00:38:41,120 --> 00:38:45,399
Speaker 1: this particular strain, but he had no training in the

578
00:38:45,680 --> 00:38:48,600
Speaker 1: delivery of bioweapons, which I think goes right to your

579
00:38:48,640 --> 00:38:52,440
Speaker 1: earlier point about how botched this attack was.

580
00:38:52,960 --> 00:38:55,680
Speaker 2: Yeah, that's true, and that all, honestly to me, in

581
00:38:55,680 --> 00:38:58,399
Speaker 2: some ways makes it seem like it could have been him,

582
00:38:58,960 --> 00:39:01,640
Speaker 2: because if it were executed by a more you know,

583
00:39:02,040 --> 00:39:05,200
Speaker 2: savvy group, then they maybe would have had a better

584
00:39:05,280 --> 00:39:09,360
Speaker 2: delivery method because you know, anthrax is toxic up to

585
00:39:09,719 --> 00:39:12,399
Speaker 2: the tiniest particles, and like we said at the top

586
00:39:12,400 --> 00:39:15,200
Speaker 2: of the show, you know, if dispersed through a ducts

587
00:39:15,239 --> 00:39:19,040
Speaker 2: of an office building could potentially infect thousands of people.

588
00:39:19,880 --> 00:39:23,200
Speaker 2: And as we know, the fatality count and even just

589
00:39:23,239 --> 00:39:27,680
Speaker 2: the people that were sickened by these was relatively quite low,

590
00:39:27,920 --> 00:39:30,920
Speaker 2: you know. So, yeah, definitely didn't seem like it went

591
00:39:31,000 --> 00:39:34,080
Speaker 2: as planned. But at the same time, the spores of

592
00:39:34,120 --> 00:39:39,120
Speaker 2: anthrax were like Walter White, Breaking Bad level, like strong,

593
00:39:39,480 --> 00:39:43,080
Speaker 2: high quality. You could, you know, call them something along

594
00:39:43,120 --> 00:39:46,279
Speaker 2: the lines of weapons grade, which is, you know, sort

595
00:39:46,320 --> 00:39:48,719
Speaker 2: of a vague term that doesn't necessarily mean one thing,

596
00:39:49,080 --> 00:39:53,319
Speaker 2: but it's the type basically, you know, the finest anthrax

597
00:39:53,400 --> 00:39:57,279
Speaker 2: grade that can be produced for bioweapons programs in either

598
00:39:57,360 --> 00:39:58,960
Speaker 2: the US or somewhere like Russia.

599
00:40:00,160 --> 00:40:02,839
Speaker 1: To interject here, yeah, the reason I think Breaking Bad

600
00:40:02,920 --> 00:40:06,240
Speaker 1: is a great comparison. This is like the blue meth

601
00:40:06,760 --> 00:40:10,879
Speaker 1: level of weaponized anthrax. There's a there's a scary thing

602
00:40:10,960 --> 00:40:14,640
Speaker 1: here that often gets ignored in this story, which is

603
00:40:14,760 --> 00:40:18,640
Speaker 1: this the spores of anthrax not to get too far

604
00:40:18,680 --> 00:40:20,960
Speaker 1: in the weeds. They were only one point five to

605
00:40:21,040 --> 00:40:26,160
Speaker 1: three micrometers wide individual spores. And it is fine grade.

606
00:40:26,200 --> 00:40:30,000
Speaker 1: You're correct, it is Walter White level. This type of

607
00:40:30,040 --> 00:40:36,880
Speaker 1: anthrax is smaller than the officially acknowledged or even open

608
00:40:36,960 --> 00:40:41,320
Speaker 1: secret level bioweapons created by the US or by Russia.

609
00:40:41,880 --> 00:40:47,320
Speaker 1: That should disturb people because that means that someone somewhere

610
00:40:48,400 --> 00:40:53,319
Speaker 1: is making something that neither world power there acknowledges.

611
00:40:52,880 --> 00:40:55,200
Speaker 2: Which isn't that much of a stretch. We know that

612
00:40:55,280 --> 00:40:58,560
Speaker 2: governments hold back technology all the time, you know, and

613
00:40:58,640 --> 00:41:02,200
Speaker 2: keep it for a military use, and they wouldn't necessarily

614
00:41:02,239 --> 00:41:04,479
Speaker 2: want to broadcast that they have that. That's not something

615
00:41:04,520 --> 00:41:07,400
Speaker 2: that they just like announce, Hey, we made a scarier

616
00:41:07,520 --> 00:41:11,160
Speaker 2: version of anthrax. You guys like check it out, But no,

617
00:41:11,239 --> 00:41:14,600
Speaker 2: it's it's it's true. And again when we say fine grade,

618
00:41:14,640 --> 00:41:18,560
Speaker 2: we literally are talking about the particulate size, because that's

619
00:41:18,600 --> 00:41:21,520
Speaker 2: what allows it to be just dispersed, like the wind

620
00:41:21,560 --> 00:41:24,439
Speaker 2: can pick it up like a you know, a dandylion

621
00:41:24,560 --> 00:41:27,799
Speaker 2: down and just carry it across the land, infecting you know,

622
00:41:28,160 --> 00:41:30,560
Speaker 2: everything in its path potentially, and obviously you have to

623
00:41:30,560 --> 00:41:32,799
Speaker 2: breathe it in. But these are you know that they

624
00:41:32,800 --> 00:41:35,800
Speaker 2: could be you know, just millions of tiny, tiny, tiny

625
00:41:35,840 --> 00:41:39,480
Speaker 2: particles in an envelope a full of powder, a powdered

626
00:41:39,560 --> 00:41:40,840
Speaker 2: version of this stuff, right, and.

627
00:41:41,160 --> 00:41:43,799
Speaker 1: You're opening it indoors. Yeah, and there are a lot

628
00:41:43,840 --> 00:41:47,239
Speaker 1: of people around, so yeah, you know, at the risk

629
00:41:47,280 --> 00:41:51,440
Speaker 1: of sounding cold, it is surprising that only seventeen people

630
00:41:51,560 --> 00:41:52,520
Speaker 1: were infected.

631
00:41:52,680 --> 00:41:52,799
Speaker 2: Uh.

632
00:41:53,160 --> 00:42:01,640
Speaker 1: There's another problem with this official conclusion, and that's the

633
00:42:01,719 --> 00:42:07,280
Speaker 1: doctor Ivans colleagues and people familiar with the lab can

634
00:42:07,320 --> 00:42:12,120
Speaker 1: confirm that the lab equipment cited in the FBI conclusion,

635
00:42:12,480 --> 00:42:15,480
Speaker 1: the lab equipment that he would have to have used

636
00:42:15,760 --> 00:42:22,279
Speaker 1: to create this stuff and to disperse it, that lab

637
00:42:22,320 --> 00:42:27,480
Speaker 1: equipment was not working. He did not have the capability

638
00:42:27,840 --> 00:42:31,520
Speaker 1: to make the spores if he were using the equipment

639
00:42:31,600 --> 00:42:35,080
Speaker 1: in that lab full stop. It was there. Yes, yeah,

640
00:42:35,120 --> 00:42:38,879
Speaker 1: the know how, but that equipment was broken down at

641
00:42:38,920 --> 00:42:40,680
Speaker 1: the time, you know what I mean. You can see

642
00:42:40,680 --> 00:42:42,960
Speaker 1: how this gets messy so quickly.

643
00:42:43,239 --> 00:42:46,080
Speaker 2: Yeah, you absolutely can. And just again to clarify, like

644
00:42:46,600 --> 00:42:49,719
Speaker 2: the we're talking about the flask that would be sort

645
00:42:49,719 --> 00:42:51,640
Speaker 2: of like the mother right, Like that's sort of the

646
00:42:51,640 --> 00:42:54,680
Speaker 2: origin material for what he would have used to then

647
00:42:54,800 --> 00:42:57,680
Speaker 2: I guess propagate them or grow them into you know,

648
00:42:57,760 --> 00:43:01,319
Speaker 2: a more usable version of of anthrax, and then you know,

649
00:43:01,440 --> 00:43:05,800
Speaker 2: make it into the powder. So yeah, that would require

650
00:43:05,880 --> 00:43:07,600
Speaker 2: a lot of know how and a lot of very

651
00:43:07,640 --> 00:43:10,640
Speaker 2: sophisticated equipment. And if it wasn't working in his lab,

652
00:43:11,040 --> 00:43:13,680
Speaker 2: what did he like have a secret lab like at

653
00:43:13,680 --> 00:43:16,040
Speaker 2: his house. I mean maybe you know, who are we

654
00:43:16,080 --> 00:43:19,080
Speaker 2: to say? But it definitely was highly unlikely that he

655
00:43:19,120 --> 00:43:21,359
Speaker 2: made it with its broken down equipment at his lab.

656
00:43:21,680 --> 00:43:26,160
Speaker 2: And numerous government officials and scientists also believe that this

657
00:43:26,239 --> 00:43:31,000
Speaker 2: official story doesn't add up. And there are numerous theories

658
00:43:31,080 --> 00:43:34,440
Speaker 2: that have kind of circulated in the years since this

659
00:43:35,400 --> 00:43:38,640
Speaker 2: conclusion about doctor Ivans, And we're going to get into

660
00:43:39,080 --> 00:43:42,320
Speaker 2: all of those after a quick word from our sponsor.

661
00:43:48,520 --> 00:43:55,240
Speaker 1: And we're back. Yes, the conspiracies, the theories, the speculation thrives, proliferates,

662
00:43:55,560 --> 00:43:59,280
Speaker 1: And to be clear, the people who are proposing these

663
00:43:59,400 --> 00:44:04,040
Speaker 1: alternative conclusions or these problems with the official investigation, they're

664
00:44:04,080 --> 00:44:08,560
Speaker 1: not what you would call tenfoil hat people. They include

665
00:44:09,200 --> 00:44:12,839
Speaker 1: people who were working with the FBI and the investigation.

666
00:44:13,000 --> 00:44:18,600
Speaker 1: They include scientists, They include experts and anthrax and they

667
00:44:18,640 --> 00:44:23,520
Speaker 1: have a lot of valid concerns here. Doctor Ivans, as

668
00:44:23,600 --> 00:44:25,919
Speaker 1: I believe we said at the top, was only one

669
00:44:26,120 --> 00:44:28,680
Speaker 1: of at least one hundred people who could have worked

670
00:44:28,680 --> 00:44:32,560
Speaker 1: with this specific brand of anthrax. Of course, RMR ten

671
00:44:32,719 --> 00:44:37,520
Speaker 1: twenty nine not the sexiest name, but it's a technical term,

672
00:44:37,760 --> 00:44:38,360
Speaker 1: the first.

673
00:44:38,120 --> 00:44:43,360
Speaker 2: Superior to RMR ten twenty eight. Oh my god, I mean, really,

674
00:44:43,400 --> 00:44:46,040
Speaker 2: it was a good year. Don't even talk to me

675
00:44:46,080 --> 00:44:48,959
Speaker 2: about ten twenty eight. Are you kidding? Ten twenty nine?

676
00:44:49,120 --> 00:44:54,040
Speaker 1: Come on, that's the connoisseur's choice apparently, But he was like,

677
00:44:54,160 --> 00:44:57,040
Speaker 1: he was not the only person who would have touched this. Also,

678
00:44:57,280 --> 00:45:02,479
Speaker 1: the FBI did not have a peer review of their

679
00:45:02,600 --> 00:45:06,120
Speaker 1: conclusions of the scientific end of it during their investigation.

680
00:45:06,360 --> 00:45:10,080
Speaker 1: The science, in short, to be very clear, the science

681
00:45:10,280 --> 00:45:11,440
Speaker 1: was not there.

682
00:45:11,680 --> 00:45:14,240
Speaker 2: Yeah. Taking it a step further, even a twenty eleven

683
00:45:14,280 --> 00:45:16,799
Speaker 2: review of the investigation was not able to rule out

684
00:45:16,800 --> 00:45:19,719
Speaker 2: the possibility that someone or some group other than Ivan's

685
00:45:19,920 --> 00:45:24,480
Speaker 2: committed the crime. The Government Accountability Office or GAL as

686
00:45:24,520 --> 00:45:26,960
Speaker 2: I like to call it, because I'm an acronym Junkie

687
00:45:27,560 --> 00:45:31,319
Speaker 2: found this quote. The FBI lacked a comprehensive approach or

688
00:45:31,400 --> 00:45:35,480
Speaker 2: framework that could have ensured standardization of the testing process.

689
00:45:35,600 --> 00:45:37,879
Speaker 2: We jumped into that a little early when we were

690
00:45:37,880 --> 00:45:41,680
Speaker 2: talking about testing for that mutation or those mutations, and

691
00:45:41,719 --> 00:45:46,440
Speaker 2: how people even within the FBI's lab kind of warned

692
00:45:46,480 --> 00:45:49,560
Speaker 2: them against you jumping to conclusions about what could have

693
00:45:49,640 --> 00:45:52,560
Speaker 2: caused those mutations. They could have been something outside of

694
00:45:52,600 --> 00:45:54,279
Speaker 2: what they were using it as a kind of a

695
00:45:54,280 --> 00:45:56,920
Speaker 2: foregone conclusion and tracing it back. It's sort of like,

696
00:45:57,640 --> 00:45:59,600
Speaker 2: I don't know, maybe this is a stretch, and science

697
00:45:59,640 --> 00:46:02,080
Speaker 2: people please debunk the crap out of me, because I'm

698
00:46:02,080 --> 00:46:03,920
Speaker 2: just sort of spitballing here. But it reminds me of

699
00:46:03,920 --> 00:46:07,880
Speaker 2: the way certain ballistics technology have kind of been debunked,

700
00:46:07,880 --> 00:46:11,640
Speaker 2: where you can, you know, say the striations or whatever

701
00:46:11,920 --> 00:46:14,960
Speaker 2: like on a particular bullet could have only been generated

702
00:46:14,960 --> 00:46:16,759
Speaker 2: by this one gun. And there's a version of that

703
00:46:17,040 --> 00:46:19,719
Speaker 2: technology that was in fact debunked, and it caused some

704
00:46:19,719 --> 00:46:22,960
Speaker 2: people to be exonerated because they were convicted using that

705
00:46:23,040 --> 00:46:27,920
Speaker 2: kind of spurious conclusion derived from, you know, something that

706
00:46:27,960 --> 00:46:31,600
Speaker 2: could have been caused by other factors. So they go

707
00:46:31,719 --> 00:46:35,120
Speaker 2: on to say the Government Accountability Office. As a result,

708
00:46:35,120 --> 00:46:38,279
Speaker 2: each of the contractors developed their tests differently, and one

709
00:46:38,320 --> 00:46:41,359
Speaker 2: contractor did not conduct verification testing, which is a key

710
00:46:41,360 --> 00:46:44,760
Speaker 2: step in determining whether a test will meet a user's requirement,

711
00:46:44,840 --> 00:46:47,440
Speaker 2: such as for sensitivity or accuracy.

712
00:46:47,880 --> 00:46:52,480
Speaker 1: Broken test sounds familiar, unfortunately, and these are days of pandemic.

713
00:46:53,080 --> 00:46:57,480
Speaker 1: So if there are problems with the FBI's official investigation,

714
00:46:57,960 --> 00:47:01,920
Speaker 1: does that mean there are problems with the bi's official conclusion.

715
00:47:02,400 --> 00:47:05,640
Speaker 1: The answer there logically is yes. So now we have

716
00:47:05,680 --> 00:47:08,880
Speaker 1: to ask what actually happened, and that means that we

717
00:47:09,000 --> 00:47:13,680
Speaker 1: have to look at the conspiracies. There's what you know

718
00:47:14,160 --> 00:47:18,279
Speaker 1: that's pretty interesting because a lot of people don't know this,

719
00:47:18,480 --> 00:47:24,160
Speaker 1: but before Vice President Mike Pence was in office in

720
00:47:24,200 --> 00:47:27,600
Speaker 1: the US, he was also he had a different career

721
00:47:27,719 --> 00:47:31,799
Speaker 1: as a prominent radio host and then he moved into politics.

722
00:47:32,080 --> 00:47:34,640
Speaker 1: He has some stuff to say about this investigation, right.

723
00:47:34,800 --> 00:47:38,440
Speaker 2: Yeah, he did. He kind of just made some sort

724
00:47:38,480 --> 00:47:41,920
Speaker 2: of shot in the dark kind of claims, released some

725
00:47:41,960 --> 00:47:48,839
Speaker 2: statements saying some pretty interesting things about this substance. He

726
00:47:49,360 --> 00:47:54,040
Speaker 2: essentially said, quote in a statement, the material found in

727
00:47:54,160 --> 00:47:57,520
Speaker 2: my office and in others in Capitol Hill was finally

728
00:47:57,560 --> 00:48:01,600
Speaker 2: milled weapons grade anthrax that had been this is the

729
00:48:01,680 --> 00:48:07,640
Speaker 2: key part genetically modified to increase its virulence. Huh, what

730
00:48:07,680 --> 00:48:10,600
Speaker 2: does that mean, ben genetically modified?

731
00:48:11,160 --> 00:48:14,000
Speaker 1: I mean, it's it's the same, it's the same thing.

732
00:48:14,120 --> 00:48:14,279
Speaker 2: Right.

733
00:48:14,320 --> 00:48:18,520
Speaker 1: He's arguing that this was weaponized, and again we have

734
00:48:18,560 --> 00:48:24,439
Speaker 1: to remember that this this stuff was officially better than

735
00:48:24,480 --> 00:48:28,320
Speaker 1: anything the US or Russia or China could make.

736
00:48:29,320 --> 00:48:29,759
Speaker 2: He was.

737
00:48:31,200 --> 00:48:33,640
Speaker 1: I think at that point he was in a he

738
00:48:33,719 --> 00:48:37,040
Speaker 1: was a representative, right, he was a congressional representative before

739
00:48:37,080 --> 00:48:40,640
Speaker 1: he became governor of Indiana, before he became vice president.

740
00:48:41,760 --> 00:48:44,880
Speaker 2: That's right. And you know, I mean it's he's The

741
00:48:44,960 --> 00:48:48,400
Speaker 2: notion that it was quote unquote weapons grade obviously is

742
00:48:48,520 --> 00:48:51,839
Speaker 2: true to a degree, though the term is a little

743
00:48:51,880 --> 00:48:54,360
Speaker 2: bit dubious in terms of like how it's used. The

744
00:48:54,400 --> 00:48:57,120
Speaker 2: idea of weapons grade. There isn't really a standard as

745
00:48:57,160 --> 00:49:00,960
Speaker 2: to what constitutes weapons grade anthrax. The LA Times reported

746
00:49:01,000 --> 00:49:05,520
Speaker 2: in an article by David Willman from July sixteenth of

747
00:49:05,520 --> 00:49:11,640
Speaker 2: twenty sixteen, and they spoke to a researcher at Johns

748
00:49:11,680 --> 00:49:15,200
Speaker 2: Hopkins University named Stephen L. Salzburg, who was actually part

749
00:49:15,239 --> 00:49:17,600
Speaker 2: of the first team to check out the material for

750
00:49:17,719 --> 00:49:20,439
Speaker 2: the US government, and he said that's just wrong. That's

751
00:49:20,440 --> 00:49:23,200
Speaker 2: simply wrong, and we knew at the time that.

752
00:49:23,200 --> 00:49:23,760
Speaker 1: It was wrong.

753
00:49:24,360 --> 00:49:29,560
Speaker 2: He's speaking, of course, of Pence's claims. And then Pence

754
00:49:29,600 --> 00:49:33,200
Speaker 2: even kind of doubled down further and said something to

755
00:49:33,239 --> 00:49:38,960
Speaker 2: the effect of, oh, it was coated with a chemical

756
00:49:39,000 --> 00:49:42,960
Speaker 2: of some kind. Like he definitely added some more fuel

757
00:49:43,040 --> 00:49:46,080
Speaker 2: to this fire in saying in a two thousand and

758
00:49:46,120 --> 00:49:50,880
Speaker 2: two letter to Ashcroft, the Attorney General, that the spores

759
00:49:51,040 --> 00:49:55,560
Speaker 2: had been coated with a chemical and that had also

760
00:49:55,880 --> 00:50:00,160
Speaker 2: been disproven by scientists at the SANDA National Laboratory in

761
00:50:00,200 --> 00:50:00,880
Speaker 2: New Mexico.

762
00:50:01,480 --> 00:50:04,040
Speaker 1: Yeah, a few months before he told Ashcroft.

763
00:50:03,560 --> 00:50:06,399
Speaker 2: That that's right. And I don't know, I'm fascinated by

764
00:50:06,400 --> 00:50:11,680
Speaker 2: this idea of it being genetically modified. And it's interesting

765
00:50:11,760 --> 00:50:15,400
Speaker 2: too because Colin Powell, who is a Secretary of State,

766
00:50:16,719 --> 00:50:21,560
Speaker 2: he used this, as you know, we know was a thing,

767
00:50:21,680 --> 00:50:23,799
Speaker 2: you know, in terms of weapons of mass destruction. He

768
00:50:23,920 --> 00:50:26,440
Speaker 2: used this as another call to kind of go to

769
00:50:26,520 --> 00:50:31,840
Speaker 2: war with Iraq, to support military action against Iraq that

770
00:50:32,000 --> 00:50:35,319
Speaker 2: you know, tying this these anthrax attacks and as we

771
00:50:35,360 --> 00:50:38,279
Speaker 2: did nine to eleven, which we now know really wasn't

772
00:50:38,280 --> 00:50:40,560
Speaker 2: the case at all, and we use that as an

773
00:50:40,560 --> 00:50:42,640
Speaker 2: excuse to go to war with Iraq, and that sort

774
00:50:42,680 --> 00:50:44,320
Speaker 2: of got us embroiled in the Middle East in a

775
00:50:44,880 --> 00:50:46,880
Speaker 2: way that we're still kind of dealing with today.

776
00:50:47,360 --> 00:50:50,200
Speaker 1: Still friends with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Though you

777
00:50:50,239 --> 00:50:53,480
Speaker 1: want to kill some journalists, want you want to support

778
00:50:53,520 --> 00:50:57,400
Speaker 1: some terrorists, that's fine. We'll see how oil prices affect

779
00:50:57,400 --> 00:51:01,520
Speaker 1: that geopolitical relationship. But that's a story for another day.

780
00:51:01,560 --> 00:51:06,480
Speaker 1: You're right, you know, people immediately tied this to terrorism.

781
00:51:06,600 --> 00:51:09,799
Speaker 1: Death to America, death to Israel is great, so on.

782
00:51:11,680 --> 00:51:16,120
Speaker 1: We also have to remember that at this time, millions

783
00:51:16,400 --> 00:51:21,680
Speaker 1: of innocent Americans are being vilified in the media for

784
00:51:21,719 --> 00:51:25,480
Speaker 1: their religious beliefs. Right. It's as dumb and disgusting as

785
00:51:25,560 --> 00:51:30,600
Speaker 1: any other sort of prejudice. So when we're talking about

786
00:51:31,000 --> 00:51:34,160
Speaker 1: the belief of terrorism or something, or you know, the

787
00:51:34,520 --> 00:51:39,840
Speaker 1: idea that religiously motivated terrorists might have perpetrated the anthrax attacks,

788
00:51:40,360 --> 00:51:45,360
Speaker 1: we're specifically talking about Al Qaeda. We're not talking about

789
00:51:45,360 --> 00:51:50,839
Speaker 1: some general, amorphous thing. We're talking about a real, concrete, discrete,

790
00:51:52,160 --> 00:51:57,359
Speaker 1: existing organization that did have a track record, a rap

791
00:51:57,400 --> 00:51:59,000
Speaker 1: sheet of committing terrorist acts.

792
00:51:59,080 --> 00:52:02,279
Speaker 2: Absolutely and let's also remember that this was used as

793
00:52:02,400 --> 00:52:06,680
Speaker 2: kind of, you know, a media device. Powell held a

794
00:52:06,800 --> 00:52:09,560
Speaker 2: press conference where he had a vial of white powder

795
00:52:09,600 --> 00:52:13,120
Speaker 2: in his hand, a small amount, and he said that

796
00:52:13,239 --> 00:52:18,319
Speaker 2: a teaspoon size quantity of anthrax in one of the

797
00:52:18,400 --> 00:52:23,400
Speaker 2: letters had you know, driven Washington into a state of chaos,

798
00:52:24,080 --> 00:52:29,359
Speaker 2: killed and killed two postal workers. And he suggested very

799
00:52:29,400 --> 00:52:34,240
Speaker 2: pointedly that Iraq had stockpiled enough anthrax to quote Phil

800
00:52:34,440 --> 00:52:41,239
Speaker 2: tens upon tens upon tens of thousands of teaspoons, right,

801
00:52:41,880 --> 00:52:44,480
Speaker 2: I mean, he's definitely trying to stir up some this.

802
00:52:44,560 --> 00:52:46,880
Speaker 2: It's definitely it's a a fear bongering move, is what

803
00:52:46,920 --> 00:52:49,960
Speaker 2: it is. And maybe it's well intentioned, but it seems

804
00:52:50,000 --> 00:52:54,120
Speaker 2: to me like a you know, a pretty callous maneuver.

805
00:52:54,480 --> 00:52:58,759
Speaker 1: I'm just laughing because I think that's a fantastic example

806
00:52:59,400 --> 00:53:04,280
Speaker 1: of the of just how far we in the United

807
00:53:04,280 --> 00:53:08,000
Speaker 1: States will go to avoid using the metric system. That's right, funny,

808
00:53:08,600 --> 00:53:11,239
Speaker 1: It's true though, He's like, he's like put it in

809
00:53:11,320 --> 00:53:13,480
Speaker 1: a number of people can understand.

810
00:53:13,239 --> 00:53:18,000
Speaker 2: Tens upon tens upon tens upon tens.

811
00:53:18,440 --> 00:53:21,480
Speaker 1: If each if each sport of anthrax was the size

812
00:53:21,520 --> 00:53:23,440
Speaker 1: of an oreo and you stack them on top of

813
00:53:23,480 --> 00:53:27,600
Speaker 1: each other, they could reach you know whatever, as long

814
00:53:27,640 --> 00:53:29,719
Speaker 1: as we don't use the metric system. That's one of

815
00:53:29,760 --> 00:53:32,239
Speaker 1: the that's one of the big rules. But but there's

816
00:53:32,280 --> 00:53:38,440
Speaker 1: another conspiracy here, the idea that that the idea that

817
00:53:38,480 --> 00:53:41,759
Speaker 1: the threat came closer to home, the idea that this

818
00:53:42,000 --> 00:53:45,480
Speaker 1: was a false front, or that some faction of the

819
00:53:45,600 --> 00:53:49,799
Speaker 1: US government actually planned this attack. You can imagine that

820
00:53:49,840 --> 00:53:53,320
Speaker 1: for the people who believe nine to eleven itself was

821
00:53:53,360 --> 00:53:56,759
Speaker 1: a false flag, the anthrax attacks of two thousand and

822
00:53:56,800 --> 00:54:00,960
Speaker 1: one were just another planned event or another sequence, larger plan,

823
00:54:01,440 --> 00:54:02,880
Speaker 1: another inside job.

824
00:54:03,239 --> 00:54:03,440
Speaker 2: You know.

825
00:54:03,520 --> 00:54:06,239
Speaker 1: This school of thought frames those attacks as a plan B,

826
00:54:06,880 --> 00:54:11,040
Speaker 1: a backup measure, just in case nine to eleven was

827
00:54:11,239 --> 00:54:15,400
Speaker 1: not enough of a push to make the public and

828
00:54:15,440 --> 00:54:20,359
Speaker 1: the government move forward with certain actions. Then this, this

829
00:54:20,400 --> 00:54:24,160
Speaker 1: sort of the equivalent of a double tap, would ensure

830
00:54:24,719 --> 00:54:28,440
Speaker 1: that the public moved in the direction that these powers,

831
00:54:29,360 --> 00:54:34,120
Speaker 1: whoever they are, wanted. You know, it's it's strange because

832
00:54:36,600 --> 00:54:40,440
Speaker 1: there's something comforting. This is weird. Walk with me here.

833
00:54:40,480 --> 00:54:44,560
Speaker 1: There's something comforting about the idea that there is a

834
00:54:44,600 --> 00:54:47,560
Speaker 1: grand design, you know what I mean, The idea that

835
00:54:48,760 --> 00:54:55,560
Speaker 1: the same people who cannot get their stuff together on

836
00:54:55,680 --> 00:55:00,720
Speaker 1: any given Tuesday are somehow also capable of this Rube

837
00:55:00,719 --> 00:55:05,240
Speaker 1: Goldberg esque control of the past, the future, and the present.

838
00:55:05,640 --> 00:55:08,759
Speaker 1: I don't know. I don't know. I feel like the

839
00:55:08,840 --> 00:55:12,600
Speaker 1: idea that they're super villainy at work and a grand

840
00:55:12,640 --> 00:55:17,319
Speaker 1: conspiracy is much more comforting than the other side of

841
00:55:17,360 --> 00:55:18,759
Speaker 1: the coin, which is.

842
00:55:18,719 --> 00:55:21,400
Speaker 2: That that it's just chaos, right.

843
00:55:21,640 --> 00:55:25,000
Speaker 1: Right, that maybe there's another conspiracy theory is that the

844
00:55:25,080 --> 00:55:31,320
Speaker 1: FBI is covering up for governmental incompetence, Like what about

845
00:55:31,320 --> 00:55:34,840
Speaker 1: that political pressure, Like what what if they just you know,

846
00:55:34,920 --> 00:55:37,080
Speaker 1: what if they have people breathing down their necks saying

847
00:55:37,160 --> 00:55:41,560
Speaker 1: close this case. Now, find me a person who's the

848
00:55:41,560 --> 00:55:44,560
Speaker 1: creepiest guy that we know has touched anthrax.

849
00:55:44,719 --> 00:55:48,359
Speaker 2: This is the lowest hanging fruit possibility of them all.

850
00:55:48,440 --> 00:55:50,239
Speaker 2: I mean, it makes the most sense. You know, you

851
00:55:50,280 --> 00:55:53,040
Speaker 2: want to say face. You want to get the job done,

852
00:55:53,239 --> 00:55:56,000
Speaker 2: even if it means putting away the wrong guy. You know,

853
00:55:56,239 --> 00:55:59,560
Speaker 2: maybe they even had a hand in his suicide. You know,

854
00:56:00,400 --> 00:56:03,759
Speaker 2: crazier things have been reported, you know, in terms of

855
00:56:03,800 --> 00:56:07,160
Speaker 2: the government's involvement in assassinating folks, and you know, trying

856
00:56:07,160 --> 00:56:09,520
Speaker 2: to cover that up you know, so I just I

857
00:56:09,600 --> 00:56:12,520
Speaker 2: have no problem believing this, and I find the false

858
00:56:12,520 --> 00:56:16,359
Speaker 2: flag narrative to be just such a go to kind

859
00:56:16,440 --> 00:56:18,959
Speaker 2: of looney tunes one. Like people are saying that about

860
00:56:19,000 --> 00:56:21,440
Speaker 2: the COVID situation right now, that like it's fault like

861
00:56:21,600 --> 00:56:23,600
Speaker 2: you know, some people that don't believe that it's real.

862
00:56:23,800 --> 00:56:27,120
Speaker 2: I equate it to like Holocaust denial or something. It's like, dude,

863
00:56:27,200 --> 00:56:30,080
Speaker 2: there's bodies piling up, they're making like you know, ice

864
00:56:30,120 --> 00:56:32,560
Speaker 2: skating rinks in New York and to make shift Morgus

865
00:56:32,640 --> 00:56:34,560
Speaker 2: like it's real, you know, like move on.

866
00:56:35,200 --> 00:56:39,240
Speaker 1: Yeah, I would say, you know, to that point, the

867
00:56:39,360 --> 00:56:40,920
Speaker 1: US government is such.

868
00:56:40,760 --> 00:56:47,720
Speaker 5: A byzantine, complicated maze like structure, with so many people

869
00:56:47,960 --> 00:56:51,600
Speaker 5: involved and so many groups involved, that it is completely

870
00:56:51,680 --> 00:56:54,800
Speaker 5: possible for factions.

871
00:56:54,400 --> 00:56:58,200
Speaker 1: Of the US government to do things that the you know,

872
00:56:58,239 --> 00:57:01,000
Speaker 1: the other groups in the government don't know about or

873
00:57:01,040 --> 00:57:03,680
Speaker 1: would object to, Like the CIA is the go to

874
00:57:03,800 --> 00:57:07,680
Speaker 1: example there. They're doing all sorts of dirty stuff, and

875
00:57:08,040 --> 00:57:10,600
Speaker 1: there are people who are supposed to have oversight of

876
00:57:10,600 --> 00:57:13,360
Speaker 1: that organization and they have no idea what's going on.

877
00:57:13,760 --> 00:57:17,160
Speaker 1: You know, they're in the dark. And the FBI has

878
00:57:17,240 --> 00:57:21,960
Speaker 1: done some very filthy things too in the past, so

879
00:57:22,600 --> 00:57:25,400
Speaker 1: I can see where this is coming from. At this point,

880
00:57:25,400 --> 00:57:29,800
Speaker 1: there is no conclusive proof that anyone affiliated with the

881
00:57:29,840 --> 00:57:35,840
Speaker 1: government in a law enforcement capacity conspired to mail anthrax

882
00:57:35,840 --> 00:57:40,040
Speaker 1: to people. But the problem remains. This is the biggest

883
00:57:40,120 --> 00:57:46,080
Speaker 1: problem here. The science, the science upon which the FBI's

884
00:57:46,160 --> 00:57:51,600
Speaker 1: conclusion depends is not itself sound. Regardless of whether you

885
00:57:51,680 --> 00:57:54,800
Speaker 1: think the FBI found their culprit or whether you you

886
00:57:54,840 --> 00:57:59,320
Speaker 1: know what, if you think that some government agents actually

887
00:57:59,400 --> 00:58:03,200
Speaker 1: conducted this attack, or if you think that political pressure

888
00:58:03,360 --> 00:58:06,320
Speaker 1: rushed the investigation, there is one thing for sure, and

889
00:58:06,360 --> 00:58:12,360
Speaker 1: that is numerous experts, not just doctor Ivans colleagues, agree

890
00:58:12,480 --> 00:58:17,919
Speaker 1: the FBI has never conclusively proven doctor Ivans was one

891
00:58:18,000 --> 00:58:22,480
Speaker 1: hundred percent the man behind the mail and all that

892
00:58:22,600 --> 00:58:25,400
Speaker 1: lab work. That is what the case hinges on it,

893
00:58:25,440 --> 00:58:27,080
Speaker 1: and it's not solid.

894
00:58:27,320 --> 00:58:31,040
Speaker 2: There's a really fantastic series on pro Publica, one of

895
00:58:31,080 --> 00:58:35,480
Speaker 2: which was FBI's science good enough to id Anthrax Killer,

896
00:58:36,160 --> 00:58:38,600
Speaker 2: And we talked about this a little bit earlier, but

897
00:58:39,120 --> 00:58:43,240
Speaker 2: just to hit home again, to quote the article, investigators

898
00:58:43,240 --> 00:58:45,560
Speaker 2: had invented a new form of genetic fingerprinting for the

899
00:58:45,600 --> 00:58:48,640
Speaker 2: case testing anthrax collected from US and foreign labs for

900
00:58:48,800 --> 00:58:52,560
Speaker 2: mutations detected in the attack powder. Out of more than

901
00:58:52,560 --> 00:58:56,360
Speaker 2: a thousand samples, only eight tested positive for four mutations

902
00:58:56,520 --> 00:58:58,920
Speaker 2: found in the deadly germs sent to Congress and the

903
00:58:58,960 --> 00:59:03,400
Speaker 2: news media. Even so, the outside sciences quote known as

904
00:59:03,440 --> 00:59:06,560
Speaker 2: the Red Team just saying this is a quote, urged

905
00:59:06,560 --> 00:59:08,880
Speaker 2: the FBI to do more basic research into how and

906
00:59:08,880 --> 00:59:11,200
Speaker 2: when the mutations arose, to make sure the tests were

907
00:59:11,320 --> 00:59:15,160
Speaker 2: sound and the results unchallengeable. And they didn't do that.

908
00:59:15,960 --> 00:59:22,320
Speaker 2: So you know, this review showed that the FBI definitely

909
00:59:22,320 --> 00:59:26,080
Speaker 2: overstated its case and possibly would not have gotten a conviction.

910
00:59:26,560 --> 00:59:28,960
Speaker 2: In fact, seems to me quite likely would not have

911
00:59:29,000 --> 00:59:34,640
Speaker 2: gotten a conviction against Ivans because they based their conclusions

912
00:59:34,680 --> 00:59:36,160
Speaker 2: on some pretty shaky science.

913
00:59:36,640 --> 00:59:41,200
Speaker 1: And what does doctor Ivans think. Will never know because

914
00:59:41,200 --> 00:59:47,000
Speaker 1: again he died of an overdose of thailand old codine

915
00:59:47,040 --> 00:59:49,800
Speaker 1: or as he said, an old tiler all three that

916
00:59:50,040 --> 00:59:53,880
Speaker 1: was ruled a probable suicide. So he never got his

917
00:59:53,960 --> 00:59:59,280
Speaker 1: day in court, and technically in this country, days in

918
00:59:59,360 --> 01:00:02,400
Speaker 1: court are you know, they're a thing. They're a tradition

919
01:00:02,600 --> 01:00:04,680
Speaker 1: that we like to say we practice.

920
01:00:04,880 --> 01:00:07,520
Speaker 2: But you know what I mean, I would say it's

921
01:00:07,520 --> 01:00:10,480
Speaker 2: a formality. At times, it seems really just kind of

922
01:00:10,520 --> 01:00:13,320
Speaker 2: like a smoke screen of Hey, look, justice is being

923
01:00:13,360 --> 01:00:16,560
Speaker 2: carried out, you know, but it quite often is not.

924
01:00:16,840 --> 01:00:19,800
Speaker 2: You know, there there is that court of public opinion

925
01:00:20,840 --> 01:00:24,160
Speaker 2: and and this is really all doctor Ivan's truly got

926
01:00:24,200 --> 01:00:27,640
Speaker 2: tried in and he was pilloried and he you know,

927
01:00:28,160 --> 01:00:30,720
Speaker 2: lost his life because of it. And you know, he

928
01:00:30,760 --> 01:00:32,560
Speaker 2: may have been a weirdo and he may have had

929
01:00:32,600 --> 01:00:35,520
Speaker 2: a hand in this, but I don't buy that he

930
01:00:35,600 --> 01:00:37,880
Speaker 2: was acting alone, if he had anything to do with

931
01:00:37,920 --> 01:00:38,360
Speaker 2: it at all.

932
01:00:39,480 --> 01:00:44,880
Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, that's the issue. Let's you know, there's one

933
01:00:45,120 --> 01:00:48,440
Speaker 1: person that we should introduce here at the toward the

934
01:00:48,480 --> 01:00:52,960
Speaker 1: end of this episode, and that is Claire Frasier Leggott.

935
01:00:53,440 --> 01:00:57,000
Speaker 1: She was a pivotal member of the Amerthracks I can't

936
01:00:57,000 --> 01:01:00,120
Speaker 1: believe that's the real name, the Americal Tracks investigation. And

937
01:01:00,920 --> 01:01:04,040
Speaker 1: she was a genetic consultant working with the FBI, one

938
01:01:04,040 --> 01:01:08,400
Speaker 1: of those people who helped nail down the specific type

939
01:01:08,400 --> 01:01:13,120
Speaker 1: of anthrax. Let's give the last word to her again.

940
01:01:13,240 --> 01:01:17,360
Speaker 1: This is an expert. This is one of the protagonists, right,

941
01:01:17,480 --> 01:01:19,920
Speaker 1: This is a person who's attempting to solve this case.

942
01:01:20,280 --> 01:01:23,439
Speaker 1: And she says, quote This was not an air tight

943
01:01:23,560 --> 01:01:26,280
Speaker 1: case by any means. You know, I think that for

944
01:01:26,360 --> 01:01:28,600
Speaker 1: an awful lot of people, there is a desire to

945
01:01:28,720 --> 01:01:31,919
Speaker 1: really want to say that, yes, Ivans was the perpetrator,

946
01:01:32,400 --> 01:01:35,040
Speaker 1: this case can reasonably be closed and we can put

947
01:01:35,080 --> 01:01:38,600
Speaker 1: this tragic chapter in US history behind us. But I

948
01:01:38,680 --> 01:01:41,520
Speaker 1: think part of what's driving that is the fact that

949
01:01:42,000 --> 01:01:45,640
Speaker 1: if he wasn't the perpetrator, then it means that person

950
01:01:46,200 --> 01:01:46,960
Speaker 1: is still out there.

951
01:01:47,320 --> 01:01:51,360
Speaker 2: So if not Bruce Ivans, then who That's the question

952
01:01:51,440 --> 01:01:54,440
Speaker 2: we leave you with today. What do you think? Please

953
01:01:54,920 --> 01:01:57,080
Speaker 2: let us know. You can write to us in the

954
01:01:57,160 --> 01:02:00,200
Speaker 2: usual usual places, the social media's or where some form

955
01:02:00,240 --> 01:02:04,040
Speaker 2: of conspiracy stuff or conspiracy stuff show. You can also

956
01:02:04,200 --> 01:02:07,240
Speaker 2: find us as individuals on social media. I am on

957
01:02:07,280 --> 01:02:09,520
Speaker 2: Instagram at how Now Noel Brown.

958
01:02:09,680 --> 01:02:12,800
Speaker 1: And you can find me on Twitter at Ben bullin HSW.

959
01:02:13,080 --> 01:02:16,120
Speaker 1: You can also find me on Instagram in a burst

960
01:02:16,200 --> 01:02:19,680
Speaker 1: of creativity calling myself at Ben Bolling. Do you hate

961
01:02:19,680 --> 01:02:24,040
Speaker 1: social media? Totally? Get it? Why not leave us a message,

962
01:02:24,080 --> 01:02:26,200
Speaker 1: give us a call. You can reach us at one

963
01:02:26,400 --> 01:02:31,360
Speaker 1: eight three three st d WYTK. It feels weird when

964
01:02:31,360 --> 01:02:33,360
Speaker 1: we're not saying it together. And you know, I miss.

965
01:02:33,440 --> 01:02:35,720
Speaker 1: When Matt says this, I hope he likes this episode.

966
01:02:35,840 --> 01:02:36,280
Speaker 1: I do too.

967
01:02:36,280 --> 01:02:37,880
Speaker 2: I really hope he likes this episode. And it's a

968
01:02:37,920 --> 01:02:39,680
Speaker 2: bummer that he isn't here for it, but I hope

969
01:02:39,680 --> 01:02:41,680
Speaker 2: we did him proud. And speaking of Matt, if you

970
01:02:41,760 --> 01:02:44,400
Speaker 2: call that number that we just mentioned, even now while

971
01:02:44,440 --> 01:02:48,120
Speaker 2: Matt's on vacation, you may well he may give you

972
01:02:48,160 --> 01:02:50,800
Speaker 2: a call back. No promises, but he's been known to

973
01:02:50,800 --> 01:02:52,400
Speaker 2: do it. He's a lovely man and would love to

974
01:02:52,440 --> 01:02:53,320
Speaker 2: talk to you.

975
01:02:53,360 --> 01:02:55,480
Speaker 1: Consider you know. I wouldn't even say that's a promise.

976
01:02:55,600 --> 01:02:57,880
Speaker 1: I would say consider it a warning. Be careful as

977
01:02:57,920 --> 01:03:01,600
Speaker 1: possible as you will exactly exactly so do let us know.

978
01:03:01,800 --> 01:03:04,439
Speaker 1: And while you're at it, let us know if there

979
01:03:04,480 --> 01:03:09,520
Speaker 1: are any other stories of scientists who have died under

980
01:03:09,560 --> 01:03:13,760
Speaker 1: mysterious circumstances. If there's another angle of the anthrax attacks

981
01:03:13,840 --> 01:03:17,000
Speaker 1: that you feel like your fellow listeners should know about,

982
01:03:17,880 --> 01:03:20,840
Speaker 1: you can tell us. As Noel said, on social media,

983
01:03:20,920 --> 01:03:24,680
Speaker 1: you can also find us on your local telephone. And

984
01:03:24,920 --> 01:03:28,000
Speaker 1: if you say, hey, I hate phones, Hey I hate

985
01:03:28,040 --> 01:03:31,640
Speaker 1: social media, but I have something you need to know.

986
01:03:32,040 --> 01:03:34,400
Speaker 1: We are all ears, we are all eyes. You can

987
01:03:34,480 --> 01:03:37,479
Speaker 1: reach us twenty four to seven, any day of the year,

988
01:03:37,600 --> 01:03:40,400
Speaker 1: anytime of the day, at our good old fashioned email

989
01:03:40,400 --> 01:03:41,320
Speaker 1: address where we.

990
01:03:41,400 --> 01:04:01,920
Speaker 2: Are conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com.

991
01:04:02,520 --> 01:04:04,560
Speaker 3: Stuff they Don't want you to know is a production

992
01:04:04,680 --> 01:04:09,200
Speaker 3: of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app,

993
01:04:09,280 --> 01:04:21,080
Speaker 3: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.