WEBVTT - Surfing the Web Like a Super Spy

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<v Speaker 1>Get in touch with technology with tex Stuff from dot

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<v Speaker 1>com either and welcome to tex Stuff. I'm Jonathan Strich

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<v Speaker 1>and we have a special person joining us this week.

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<v Speaker 1>Special persons. That makes it sound a little bit well,

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<v Speaker 1>he's a special guest. There you go. And he is special.

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<v Speaker 1>He's very special. He is he is our good friend

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<v Speaker 1>and yours. Uh. He's the guy who tells you the

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<v Speaker 1>stuff that they don't want you to know. Mr. Been Both. Hey, guys, thanks,

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<v Speaker 1>thanks so much for having me on the show. I've

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<v Speaker 1>got news from my co host Matt Frederick. Unfortunately, Matt

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<v Speaker 1>is diligently working. Uh and right now he said he

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<v Speaker 1>is here in spirit, um, but he can't be in

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<v Speaker 1>here in person, right he he is. Actually, he had

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<v Speaker 1>planned on joining us and this would have been a

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<v Speaker 1>crazy four person podcast, something that has never been attempted

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<v Speaker 1>ever in the history of the Internet. I'm not sure

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<v Speaker 1>if that's but yeah, no, very impressive, yes, at least

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<v Speaker 1>the history of tech stuff at anywhere. So but unfortunately,

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<v Speaker 1>as he is, he has slammed. He of course is

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<v Speaker 1>also a video editor and uh, you guys might not

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<v Speaker 1>know this. Uh, that takes some time. So but the

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<v Speaker 1>reason we decided to bring Ben in is because you

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<v Speaker 1>may remember if you listen to this show often. Back

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<v Speaker 1>in April, Lauren and I did an episode about tour

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<v Speaker 1>and the Deep Web, and at the end of the

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<v Speaker 1>show we said, hey, guys, would you like to learn

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<v Speaker 1>more about how you can actually surf the web anonymously?

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<v Speaker 1>And all of you said yes, every single life. In fact, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>some of you voted more than once, which we appreciate

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<v Speaker 1>the enthusiasm. So we have been trying to find the

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<v Speaker 1>right time to to get together and have a discussion

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<v Speaker 1>about what exactly it takes to really serve the web

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<v Speaker 1>anonymously and and Ben, as we have all discovered, it's

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<v Speaker 1>it's not it's not just a simple thing that you

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<v Speaker 1>hit a little switch in your browser and you're good

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<v Speaker 1>to go. Yeah. It's a situation where we quickly learn

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<v Speaker 1>the difference between the concept of something being possible and

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<v Speaker 1>the concept of something being plausible. Yeah, it is possible

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<v Speaker 1>two access the web anonymously finger quotes if you're very,

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<v Speaker 1>very careful and you take a lot of time and

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<v Speaker 1>you do some things that we're going to talk about today. Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>it is not plausible that you will succeed. It's not

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<v Speaker 1>plausible certainly the more frequently you access the web, absolutely right, Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>because the more times you need to do it, the

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<v Speaker 1>harder it's going to become for you to to to

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<v Speaker 1>sustain that anonymity, and the more you want to do.

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<v Speaker 1>If you're doing like one thing, that's fine. If you're

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<v Speaker 1>trying to browse Netflix, it's not really Yeah, if you're

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<v Speaker 1>logging into your Netflix account, really, uh, we have some

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<v Speaker 1>bad news for you. Anything that involves the user name

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<v Speaker 1>password probably not really the most anonymous of activities. But first,

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<v Speaker 1>just as an overview, Yeah, there are a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>different reasons why someone might want to serve the web anonymously.

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<v Speaker 1>Some are even completely legit. Yeah, there we can get

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<v Speaker 1>the the the ones, the shady ones out of the way.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, obviously if you're planning on doing something that

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<v Speaker 1>is you know, not strictly speaking legal. Yeah, Like, uh, Lauren, Jonathan,

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<v Speaker 1>you and I Matt decide that it's finally time that

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<v Speaker 1>we robbed that bank, and then we say, okay, there

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<v Speaker 1>are a couple of things we need to learn about

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<v Speaker 1>banks and security cameras and escape routes and stuff like that.

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<v Speaker 1>We would want to serve the web anonymously, but that is,

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<v Speaker 1>as you said, just something we need to get away

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<v Speaker 1>from at the top, because there are so many legitimate

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<v Speaker 1>reasons that people not just in the United States, but

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<v Speaker 1>around the world especially would have to serve the web anonymously. Right. So,

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<v Speaker 1>for example, one of the one of the ones that

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<v Speaker 1>you hear over and over our journalists reporters, right, people

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<v Speaker 1>who perhaps have to communicate with a source and that

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<v Speaker 1>source needs to remain anonymous in order for this this

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<v Speaker 1>uh information exchange to happen, or to protect their own

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<v Speaker 1>safety exactly. Yeah, we could be talking about someone who's

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<v Speaker 1>giving a very high level security leak kind of information

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<v Speaker 1>that really has the potential to affect millions of people.

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<v Speaker 1>This is kind of like that Snowden situation, Edward Snowden,

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<v Speaker 1>So you would definitely want to maintain that person's anonymity

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<v Speaker 1>as well as you know, the communications that are going

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<v Speaker 1>on between you until you are ready to publish a

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<v Speaker 1>full story. Now, you know, responsible journalists are going to

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<v Speaker 1>be doing things like making sure that the information they

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<v Speaker 1>get is as verifiable as possible before moving forward. So

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<v Speaker 1>it's not like we're just saying, you know, this is

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<v Speaker 1>a way for people to spread misinformation, although that does happen,

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<v Speaker 1>but is totally cromulent for journalists to want to have

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<v Speaker 1>this kind of level of an emity when trying to

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<v Speaker 1>to to coordinate the source of stuff. Sure, also in

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<v Speaker 1>the tech sector, for example, if you're developing a new

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<v Speaker 1>a new piece of technology, or a new iteration of

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<v Speaker 1>a technology and you don't want other companies to know

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<v Speaker 1>what you're up to, Yeah, yeah, I mean you know

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<v Speaker 1>we how many times have we seen leaks from things

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<v Speaker 1>like a supply chain where we learn about upcoming as

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<v Speaker 1>Apple is probably the best example of this, right because

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<v Speaker 1>everyone is so invested in learning what Apple's next product

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<v Speaker 1>is that you've got an intense level of scrutiny on

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<v Speaker 1>the entire supply chain from the point where they're building

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<v Speaker 1>the chips to the screens to assembling the whole piece together,

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<v Speaker 1>so that you can have security totally locked down at Apple,

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<v Speaker 1>and somewhere else along the chain there might be a leak. Well.

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<v Speaker 1>Even that that extends even to just the research and

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<v Speaker 1>development phase where people are using the Internet for for

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<v Speaker 1>legitimate purposes and they don't want that information getting out there.

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<v Speaker 1>They want to have as much secrecy there as possible,

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<v Speaker 1>especially if people are aware like Hey, you know Jem

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<v Speaker 1>down the street. Did you know that Jem is like

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<v Speaker 1>the head of product development for Apple's I phone. That

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<v Speaker 1>would be like people, Oh, you don't say exactly, which

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<v Speaker 1>is good that they're using such a non suspicious voice

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<v Speaker 1>to to play it off. The news about Jim certainly

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<v Speaker 1>should not be twirling your mustache. So there there are

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<v Speaker 1>a number of other reasons as well, and in many

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<v Speaker 1>cases these are these are things that might sound overly dramatic,

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<v Speaker 1>but it really does happen. Internet access is not created

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<v Speaker 1>equally by any means, and we're gonna explore some things

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<v Speaker 1>that might sound foreign to a lot of viewers or

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<v Speaker 1>excuse me, a lot of listeners who are not who

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<v Speaker 1>are not acquainted with this. And one of the one

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<v Speaker 1>of the biggest reasons that people would need anonymous internet

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<v Speaker 1>access is something that's kind of um personally important to

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<v Speaker 1>me for people to have this right. If you're in

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<v Speaker 1>a country where government descent is not allowed, or where

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<v Speaker 1>you can be penalized for going on you know, the

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<v Speaker 1>Chinese version of Twitter or some short uh, then you

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<v Speaker 1>need to be able to have some sort of safe

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<v Speaker 1>way to do this, and um, unfortunately, many countries there's

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<v Speaker 1>not really a legal way to do this. Sure, Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>so we have a like, let's let's take the definition

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<v Speaker 1>of human rights as say, would be defined by the

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<v Speaker 1>United Nations. Okay, there are some countries out there that

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<v Speaker 1>have have policies that kind of go against a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of those definitions. And if you if you believe that

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<v Speaker 1>humans actually possess these rights, whether they belong to one

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<v Speaker 1>country or another, then you probably also believe that they

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<v Speaker 1>need to have this kind of ability to remain anonymous

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<v Speaker 1>and yet voice their concerns, their thoughts, to be able

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<v Speaker 1>to assemble at least virtually, and be able to to

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<v Speaker 1>tell that they are not a lone person in a

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<v Speaker 1>sea of darkness. This kind of it does sound like

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<v Speaker 1>we're going dramatic, but this is the Arab spring work. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>this is a literal situation that happens. You know, being

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<v Speaker 1>able to share your ideas and also access information is

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<v Speaker 1>so important and is denied to too many citizens of

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<v Speaker 1>this world, and for those of us who live who

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<v Speaker 1>are fortunate enough to live in places that at least

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<v Speaker 1>ostensibly protect those human rights. Um, you know, there's still

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<v Speaker 1>other things that we could become victim to. For example,

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<v Speaker 1>just people who want to cause midschief or hackers who

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<v Speaker 1>want to target you for one reason or another. Um

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<v Speaker 1>and it may not even be that they want to

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<v Speaker 1>target you specifically, but you just kind of want to

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<v Speaker 1>avoid all of that and cut down on all that possibility.

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<v Speaker 1>You may just want to serve the web anonymously because

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<v Speaker 1>they're there are only certain things you want to have

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<v Speaker 1>access to. You don't care about everything else out there.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's not like you're gonna go on YouTube and

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<v Speaker 1>watch a billion videos. It's not like you're gonna go

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<v Speaker 1>on Facebook and update your status profile. All you want

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<v Speaker 1>to do is be able to research something, read up

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<v Speaker 1>on something, whatever, and that's it. You might want to

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<v Speaker 1>be able to serve the web anonymously just to avoid

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<v Speaker 1>the possibility that you're going to run into, you know, troublemakers.

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<v Speaker 1>But here's the question then, right, and I think we've

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<v Speaker 1>done a great job showing this, uh, this need and

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<v Speaker 1>this legitimate interest in anonymous web us. Why is it

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<v Speaker 1>so difficult? Why is it possible but not plausible? Okay? Well,

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<v Speaker 1>first of all, just the way the internet works makes

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<v Speaker 1>it really really hard, right, because in order for you

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<v Speaker 1>to be able to get any information to your computer,

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<v Speaker 1>that information has to has nowhere to go, right. It

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<v Speaker 1>has to know what pathway to take so that it

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<v Speaker 1>gets from the server where it lives on to your

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<v Speaker 1>computer so you can see it. Now. This is no

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<v Speaker 1>matter what kind of service you're using on the internet,

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<v Speaker 1>if you're trying to access something, as long as you're

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<v Speaker 1>not just pushing stuff out and you're expecting to get

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<v Speaker 1>something back, it has to know where to go. Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>The thing I was thinking, I was imagined like you

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<v Speaker 1>are trying to send a message to somebody, and I,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, like I want to get a note specifically

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<v Speaker 1>to Lauren. And Lauren has happened to take a trip

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<v Speaker 1>where she's all the way out in California. And the

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<v Speaker 1>way I've chosen to get the message to her is

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<v Speaker 1>I've written the messaging code and I've left no identifying

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<v Speaker 1>information on it whatsoever. I've even I've even used my

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<v Speaker 1>right hand instead of my left hand to right the code,

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<v Speaker 1>so my handwriting is disguised. I then wrapped that that

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<v Speaker 1>message up in a little ribbon, tie it to a

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<v Speaker 1>helium balloon, let it go, and hope that somehow the

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<v Speaker 1>balloon finds its way to Lauren, that she is able

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<v Speaker 1>to decode the message, able to decipher despite the fact

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<v Speaker 1>that I've left no identifiable information in there about who

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<v Speaker 1>sent the message, who it was, who wrote it, and

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<v Speaker 1>then in turn be able to respond in a in

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<v Speaker 1>a similar way and send that message back to me

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<v Speaker 1>where it just magically makes its way to me. Clearly,

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<v Speaker 1>that scenario is impossible, right, yeah, Yeah. The the real

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<v Speaker 1>way that the Internet works is more like if the

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<v Speaker 1>postal system was made entirely of clear boxes and and

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<v Speaker 1>everyone passing the box along the route from you to

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<v Speaker 1>whoever you're sending it to, you can see exactly what's

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<v Speaker 1>going on in it unless you've taken some kind of

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<v Speaker 1>step to you or to encrypted. Right, So, if if

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<v Speaker 1>you have an encrypted message, let's say, then you've got

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<v Speaker 1>a clear box which inside of it is a a

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<v Speaker 1>an opaque box. So you know that there's a box,

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<v Speaker 1>you know approximately how much information is there, and you

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<v Speaker 1>know where it's coming from, and you know where it's

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<v Speaker 1>going to because you have to have that address or

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<v Speaker 1>else the data just doesn't go anywhere. It would just

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<v Speaker 1>would you, It would go to that first stop on

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<v Speaker 1>the internet, and then there'd be nowhere to go because

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<v Speaker 1>you wouldn't have any information saying hey, send this message

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<v Speaker 1>to this destination. So, because you have to have these

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<v Speaker 1>IP addresses so that information can actually go to where

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<v Speaker 1>it needs to go and get back to where it

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<v Speaker 1>needs to get back to, that limits how anonymous you

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<v Speaker 1>can be. Right now, that IP address can be assigned

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<v Speaker 1>by an Internet service provider and it doesn't have to

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<v Speaker 1>have anything to do with whatever machine you're on, right,

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<v Speaker 1>the computer you're using does not necessarily it's not going

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<v Speaker 1>to have the same IP address all the time. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>it's not like tattooed with barcode or something like that,

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<v Speaker 1>but well, I mean probably it literally is. Barcode is

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<v Speaker 1>not its IP address, right, right, So the that IP

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<v Speaker 1>address is going to at least have a general idea

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<v Speaker 1>of the geography that you are in, uh and based

0:12:35.520 --> 0:12:40.280
<v Speaker 1>upon your habits what you use the Internet for, that

0:12:40.360 --> 0:12:43.520
<v Speaker 1>might be enough. Just the general geography and and your

0:12:43.600 --> 0:12:46.200
<v Speaker 1>pattern of using the Internet, that could be enough to

0:12:46.320 --> 0:12:50.200
<v Speaker 1>identify who is using the Internet, because the way eyebrows

0:12:50.240 --> 0:12:52.840
<v Speaker 1>the Internet could be extremely different from the way say

0:12:52.920 --> 0:12:56.319
<v Speaker 1>Lauren does, and I highly suspect it is, I imagine,

0:12:56.400 --> 0:12:59.200
<v Speaker 1>so aside from when we're researching the same topic. In

0:12:59.200 --> 0:13:01.800
<v Speaker 1>that case, we think we find literally all the same articles.

0:13:01.800 --> 0:13:04.840
<v Speaker 1>I am pretty sure that I watch a lot more

0:13:05.000 --> 0:13:08.240
<v Speaker 1>YouTube videos about family surprising their kids with trips to

0:13:08.280 --> 0:13:11.319
<v Speaker 1>Disney than Lauren does. I think you guys are about

0:13:11.480 --> 0:13:14.880
<v Speaker 1>one for one on Corgy videos though. Corgy videos, yes,

0:13:14.960 --> 0:13:17.800
<v Speaker 1>or I mean they rank highly on both sides, but

0:13:18.200 --> 0:13:21.439
<v Speaker 1>they're they're sure there are anomalies. If you're only looking

0:13:21.440 --> 0:13:24.040
<v Speaker 1>at Corgy video activity, then you might not be able

0:13:24.080 --> 0:13:26.560
<v Speaker 1>to determine whether it's Lauren or whether which. Which is

0:13:26.559 --> 0:13:30.000
<v Speaker 1>a great point because it goes back to earlier. We

0:13:30.040 --> 0:13:32.959
<v Speaker 1>can all recall hearing the big stink in the United

0:13:33.000 --> 0:13:38.200
<v Speaker 1>States about um the government tracking metadata, and people would say, well,

0:13:38.240 --> 0:13:41.199
<v Speaker 1>you know, metadata is not a big deal. It's just

0:13:41.720 --> 0:13:45.160
<v Speaker 1>stuff like the address and the time, and and it's

0:13:45.200 --> 0:13:52.000
<v Speaker 1>more the it's more like the measurement of the pages

0:13:52.080 --> 0:13:55.600
<v Speaker 1>of a book than the description of the story. However,

0:13:56.440 --> 0:13:59.360
<v Speaker 1>from that, the reason it's important is exactly what you're saying, Johnathan,

0:13:59.440 --> 0:14:03.800
<v Speaker 1>because it is possible to build um, not just a

0:14:03.800 --> 0:14:06.760
<v Speaker 1>profile of a person, but to find the actual person. Yeah,

0:14:07.000 --> 0:14:09.680
<v Speaker 1>from enough of that metadat Yeah, And and it doesn't

0:14:09.720 --> 0:14:13.800
<v Speaker 1>take that much really, especially for particular types of meta data.

0:14:13.880 --> 0:14:16.600
<v Speaker 1>For example, if you have like a zip code and

0:14:16.679 --> 0:14:20.400
<v Speaker 1>maybe a car make and model, well that and and

0:14:20.440 --> 0:14:23.080
<v Speaker 1>a gender, Well, then you've really got enough information to

0:14:23.160 --> 0:14:25.320
<v Speaker 1>really narrow it down to a handful of people. Because

0:14:25.960 --> 0:14:28.320
<v Speaker 1>you know that you've got a population within a zip code.

0:14:28.440 --> 0:14:31.160
<v Speaker 1>The gender will divide that essentially in half, and so

0:14:31.200 --> 0:14:33.080
<v Speaker 1>how many of those people have a two thousand and

0:14:33.120 --> 0:14:37.520
<v Speaker 1>four Yeah, and then you have essentially really narrowed it

0:14:37.560 --> 0:14:41.480
<v Speaker 1>down to a very small number of potential people. This

0:14:41.560 --> 0:14:45.440
<v Speaker 1>is why it doesn't really require that much personal identifiable

0:14:45.440 --> 0:14:48.520
<v Speaker 1>information to track it back to a specific person. Now,

0:14:48.520 --> 0:14:51.320
<v Speaker 1>there's some things on the Internet that are not necessary

0:14:51.400 --> 0:14:54.120
<v Speaker 1>for the Internet to work right or like, especially for

0:14:54.200 --> 0:14:58.119
<v Speaker 1>web browsing. So, for example, cookies. Cookies are not necessary

0:14:58.200 --> 0:15:00.360
<v Speaker 1>to make the web work, although you'll probably go to

0:15:00.400 --> 0:15:03.000
<v Speaker 1>a page occasionally that says, this website uses cookies, and

0:15:03.280 --> 0:15:05.880
<v Speaker 1>let us tell you how ye enable them so that

0:15:06.240 --> 0:15:09.000
<v Speaker 1>this website will work the way it's supposed to. Cookies

0:15:09.000 --> 0:15:12.920
<v Speaker 1>are just text files. They can include enough information that

0:15:12.960 --> 0:15:16.160
<v Speaker 1>could be useful to the person using the website to

0:15:16.560 --> 0:15:20.600
<v Speaker 1>customize your experience that the intent is so that if

0:15:20.640 --> 0:15:23.840
<v Speaker 1>you keep going back to the same website frequently, it

0:15:23.880 --> 0:15:27.320
<v Speaker 1>already knows things that you do and do not need,

0:15:27.520 --> 0:15:29.360
<v Speaker 1>and so it will load much faster. It will give

0:15:29.360 --> 0:15:32.400
<v Speaker 1>you more personalized experience, but it also means that there's

0:15:32.440 --> 0:15:35.000
<v Speaker 1>some tracking that can happen there and identification that can

0:15:35.000 --> 0:15:38.360
<v Speaker 1>happen there. So turning that off is probably something you

0:15:38.360 --> 0:15:40.360
<v Speaker 1>would want to do if you want to be anonymous.

0:15:40.520 --> 0:15:42.960
<v Speaker 1>I'll go into more about that in a bed. Oh, Jonathan,

0:15:43.040 --> 0:15:47.000
<v Speaker 1>welcome back to Amazon based on your browsing preferences. I

0:15:47.000 --> 0:15:50.400
<v Speaker 1>can't wait to hear this. Yeah, here are several calendars

0:15:50.440 --> 0:15:53.840
<v Speaker 1>of quarkies. Okay, that's fair, that's fair. Uh, that I

0:15:53.960 --> 0:15:55.880
<v Speaker 1>just recently made a purchase, so I was wanting to

0:15:55.880 --> 0:15:58.160
<v Speaker 1>see if perhaps somehow it was going to tie into

0:15:58.160 --> 0:16:01.680
<v Speaker 1>what I actually bought. But ows but not quite um

0:16:01.720 --> 0:16:06.920
<v Speaker 1>And then things like like search engines can maintain activity logs,

0:16:07.000 --> 0:16:09.120
<v Speaker 1>so and those will link back to an IP address.

0:16:09.320 --> 0:16:12.440
<v Speaker 1>So let's say that you are using a computer, You've

0:16:12.480 --> 0:16:15.760
<v Speaker 1>logged into the Internet, your computer has an IP address,

0:16:15.840 --> 0:16:18.600
<v Speaker 1>and you start searching for various terms. This kind of

0:16:18.600 --> 0:16:20.880
<v Speaker 1>goes back to that idea of the four of us

0:16:20.880 --> 0:16:25.280
<v Speaker 1>are all searching about robbing a bank. Now that that information,

0:16:25.360 --> 0:16:27.560
<v Speaker 1>if we're let's say we're all using Google because it

0:16:27.600 --> 0:16:28.960
<v Speaker 1>makes it easier if we just go ahead and use

0:16:28.960 --> 0:16:33.200
<v Speaker 1>an example, Google's maintaining this activity log of all four

0:16:33.240 --> 0:16:36.920
<v Speaker 1>of us independently using Google to research everything that is,

0:16:36.960 --> 0:16:41.080
<v Speaker 1>to research about robbing a bank, and then later on

0:16:41.120 --> 0:16:44.640
<v Speaker 1>the lawn law enforcement officials, uh subpoena Google to get

0:16:44.640 --> 0:16:47.360
<v Speaker 1>those activity logs so that they can see who it

0:16:47.520 --> 0:16:51.640
<v Speaker 1>is in this geographic region that was looking for this stuff. Um,

0:16:51.840 --> 0:16:54.800
<v Speaker 1>you know that's again that's another reason why when you

0:16:54.800 --> 0:16:58.000
<v Speaker 1>start talking about really being anonymous using the web, you

0:16:58.040 --> 0:17:00.520
<v Speaker 1>have to shy away from all the convenient says that

0:17:00.600 --> 0:17:03.960
<v Speaker 1>make the web so useful in situations where you're not

0:17:04.040 --> 0:17:07.280
<v Speaker 1>as concerned about your anonymity. Yeah, that's a really great point,

0:17:07.359 --> 0:17:10.960
<v Speaker 1>and that's something that, oddly enough, we were exploring both

0:17:11.000 --> 0:17:14.560
<v Speaker 1>on this show and on car stuff, because there's this

0:17:14.600 --> 0:17:18.800
<v Speaker 1>big idea about cars becoming connected to the cloud, right

0:17:18.840 --> 0:17:21.520
<v Speaker 1>and the whole internet of cars knowing exactly where you

0:17:21.560 --> 0:17:24.440
<v Speaker 1>are all the time, exactly exactly. And North has been

0:17:24.440 --> 0:17:28.679
<v Speaker 1>parked outside of this dance club for a really long time.

0:17:29.119 --> 0:17:35.200
<v Speaker 1>He's cutting a rug and that's how Jonathan's car would sound. Yeah,

0:17:35.600 --> 0:17:37.880
<v Speaker 1>I like to think that all my technology has has

0:17:37.960 --> 0:17:42.000
<v Speaker 1>weird affectations in its speech, I hope so, because what

0:17:42.080 --> 0:17:45.000
<v Speaker 1>else is the future would be no fun that you

0:17:45.040 --> 0:17:46.800
<v Speaker 1>couldn't do. It would just be Yeah, it could all

0:17:46.840 --> 0:17:49.360
<v Speaker 1>be like robot voice. But that gets old pretty quickly, right,

0:17:49.400 --> 0:17:54.040
<v Speaker 1>So the um, the purpose of this this great thing

0:17:54.320 --> 0:17:58.760
<v Speaker 1>called the Internet is inherently to share things that are

0:17:58.840 --> 0:18:04.640
<v Speaker 1>easily seen. It is not to hide things. So it's already, um,

0:18:04.920 --> 0:18:08.480
<v Speaker 1>it's already unsurprising if you think about it that it's

0:18:08.560 --> 0:18:11.720
<v Speaker 1>it's really difficult to participate in something that is all

0:18:11.720 --> 0:18:14.840
<v Speaker 1>about telling people's stuff in a way that doesn't it's

0:18:14.880 --> 0:18:18.119
<v Speaker 1>a communications platform, and if you're if you're trying to

0:18:18.200 --> 0:18:21.840
<v Speaker 1>be completely anonymous in a communications platform, that's tricky. I mean,

0:18:21.880 --> 0:18:24.760
<v Speaker 1>there are obviously message boards out there that allow for

0:18:24.880 --> 0:18:30.399
<v Speaker 1>complete anonymity and uh complete complete being an in air

0:18:30.480 --> 0:18:34.040
<v Speaker 1>quotes which work really well over the radio. But yeah,

0:18:34.040 --> 0:18:37.960
<v Speaker 1>it's it's it's definitely one of those things where, uh,

0:18:38.000 --> 0:18:43.359
<v Speaker 1>you know, the the anonymity kind of can inhibit a

0:18:43.440 --> 0:18:47.720
<v Speaker 1>lot of what makes the Internet so useful. So especially

0:18:47.720 --> 0:18:50.320
<v Speaker 1>in these are modern Internet times, like as the Internet

0:18:50.320 --> 0:18:52.920
<v Speaker 1>has grown in, big data has grown and and all

0:18:52.920 --> 0:18:56.119
<v Speaker 1>these things we've we've been talking about websites storing information

0:18:56.480 --> 0:18:58.640
<v Speaker 1>from you so that they can serve you better headlines

0:18:58.680 --> 0:19:01.040
<v Speaker 1>that you're more likely to want to click on. Uh,

0:19:01.520 --> 0:19:05.280
<v Speaker 1>you're you're evading the point. Yeah, yeah, yeah, that's a

0:19:05.440 --> 0:19:08.240
<v Speaker 1>that's a good way to say it. So with with this,

0:19:08.320 --> 0:19:11.439
<v Speaker 1>we've we've painted the difficulty. We've talked about the reasons

0:19:11.440 --> 0:19:14.560
<v Speaker 1>why you want to do it. So for all the

0:19:14.600 --> 0:19:17.679
<v Speaker 1>people who wrote in and voted more than once saying yes,

0:19:18.320 --> 0:19:21.440
<v Speaker 1>tell me how to surf anonymously? What? What? What would

0:19:21.480 --> 0:19:24.240
<v Speaker 1>they do? You? Guys, I'm asking for a friend. Okay, Well,

0:19:24.359 --> 0:19:27.639
<v Speaker 1>then your friend needs to know that if if your friend,

0:19:28.320 --> 0:19:32.000
<v Speaker 1>if he or she is truly determined to surf the

0:19:32.040 --> 0:19:36.199
<v Speaker 1>web anonymously, he or she should be prepared to go

0:19:36.320 --> 0:19:41.280
<v Speaker 1>to great lengths in order to do so, including if

0:19:41.320 --> 0:19:43.760
<v Speaker 1>he or she plans on doing this more than once.

0:19:44.400 --> 0:19:48.760
<v Speaker 1>Not using the same device burner, laptops, I like it, ye.

0:19:48.920 --> 0:19:52.159
<v Speaker 1>Step Step one don't use your own device ever, No,

0:19:53.480 --> 0:19:55.879
<v Speaker 1>not not connected to the internet anyway. Step one is

0:19:55.920 --> 0:19:58.359
<v Speaker 1>don't use your own device. Step two is you probably

0:19:58.440 --> 0:20:01.280
<v Speaker 1>don't want to use like a mobile device that connects

0:20:01.280 --> 0:20:04.560
<v Speaker 1>to the Internet because it's likely registered to you or

0:20:04.680 --> 0:20:08.280
<v Speaker 1>to someone you know, and most of them have some

0:20:08.359 --> 0:20:12.400
<v Speaker 1>form of way of identifying where you are. So even

0:20:12.400 --> 0:20:15.560
<v Speaker 1>if somehow you magically have a phone working where there's

0:20:15.600 --> 0:20:19.560
<v Speaker 1>not a direct link between you and the phone, the

0:20:19.600 --> 0:20:21.880
<v Speaker 1>fact that it is going to be able to determine

0:20:21.880 --> 0:20:26.119
<v Speaker 1>where it is geographically, either just cell phone towers or

0:20:26.280 --> 0:20:29.520
<v Speaker 1>it may have GPS enabled to that's going to give

0:20:29.560 --> 0:20:34.320
<v Speaker 1>it even more specific location. Sure, you can turn three

0:20:34.359 --> 0:20:37.000
<v Speaker 1>G or four G or whatever you have. You can

0:20:37.080 --> 0:20:39.879
<v Speaker 1>turn satellite service off on your phone. However, then you

0:20:39.920 --> 0:20:42.960
<v Speaker 1>need to be connected to WiFi, and you can't just

0:20:43.000 --> 0:20:44.760
<v Speaker 1>connect to you I mean, you can't just call up

0:20:44.920 --> 0:20:47.400
<v Speaker 1>Comcast and be like, hey, I'd like to get some Internet,

0:20:47.680 --> 0:20:52.840
<v Speaker 1>but anonymously never mind. Yeah, that's a really good way

0:20:52.840 --> 0:20:54.439
<v Speaker 1>to not get an account, right that, Not that I

0:20:54.480 --> 0:20:57.840
<v Speaker 1>know personally. The same thing is true about just Internet

0:20:57.840 --> 0:21:01.080
<v Speaker 1>service providers in general. Litering, Like like whether it's Comcast

0:21:01.200 --> 0:21:03.720
<v Speaker 1>or whatever, whatever the i s P is, if you

0:21:03.760 --> 0:21:06.320
<v Speaker 1>are trying to use your own, say your own setup

0:21:06.359 --> 0:21:11.120
<v Speaker 1>at home, then automatically your I s P, you know, yeah,

0:21:11.240 --> 0:21:13.639
<v Speaker 1>and know exactly they know which account it goes to

0:21:13.720 --> 0:21:16.880
<v Speaker 1>at any rate, So you know that means that it's

0:21:16.920 --> 0:21:20.800
<v Speaker 1>narrowed down who could potentially be the person actually doing

0:21:20.840 --> 0:21:23.359
<v Speaker 1>the searches. It's pretty much anyone who has access to

0:21:23.400 --> 0:21:25.560
<v Speaker 1>your household, which is why if you're really trying to

0:21:25.600 --> 0:21:28.480
<v Speaker 1>make this happen, ladies and gentlemen, you will need to

0:21:28.520 --> 0:21:34.040
<v Speaker 1>find the most public computer possible. We're talking about libraries,

0:21:34.440 --> 0:21:39.439
<v Speaker 1>cyber cafes, uh, college campuses. Yeah. Yeah, you want to

0:21:39.440 --> 0:21:42.960
<v Speaker 1>be able to use a computer where uh the real

0:21:43.080 --> 0:21:45.760
<v Speaker 1>First of all, there's a possibility that any number of

0:21:45.760 --> 0:21:49.520
<v Speaker 1>individuals could have been using that ability, right right, Yeah,

0:21:49.520 --> 0:21:51.320
<v Speaker 1>It's one of those safety and numbers kind of issues

0:21:51.359 --> 0:21:53.600
<v Speaker 1>that kind of comes up a lot in in our discussion.

0:21:53.640 --> 0:21:56.520
<v Speaker 1>I think, yeah, so that's that's one thing you're and

0:21:56.600 --> 0:21:58.720
<v Speaker 1>you don't want to use the same one twice in

0:21:58.760 --> 0:22:01.560
<v Speaker 1>a row. So if your session is over and then

0:22:01.600 --> 0:22:04.119
<v Speaker 1>you think, oh shoot, I need to go do something else,

0:22:04.600 --> 0:22:07.600
<v Speaker 1>you probably need to go to a different site. In fact,

0:22:07.760 --> 0:22:10.680
<v Speaker 1>a different site entirely, like not even on that same

0:22:10.720 --> 0:22:14.119
<v Speaker 1>network would be the best choice for you. I mean, ideally,

0:22:14.440 --> 0:22:17.159
<v Speaker 1>the scary thing is about this that the more you

0:22:17.200 --> 0:22:22.160
<v Speaker 1>think about it, uh, the larger the scale becomes. Because then, yes,

0:22:22.440 --> 0:22:24.400
<v Speaker 1>you don't want to be on the same site. Yes,

0:22:24.440 --> 0:22:26.520
<v Speaker 1>you don't want to be on the same network. Do

0:22:26.600 --> 0:22:28.879
<v Speaker 1>you want to be in the same city. Do you

0:22:28.920 --> 0:22:30.200
<v Speaker 1>want to be in the you know what I mean,

0:22:30.240 --> 0:22:32.600
<v Speaker 1>because it should be preferable to jump state borders really

0:22:32.600 --> 0:22:34.919
<v Speaker 1>at that point, which which is a heck of a

0:22:35.040 --> 0:22:39.480
<v Speaker 1>long drive just to uh, you know here in Georgia. Yeah,

0:22:39.520 --> 0:22:42.040
<v Speaker 1>maybe you should try to serve the web anominous anonymously

0:22:42.160 --> 0:22:48.160
<v Speaker 1>from Rhode Island. Uh. And also you would you would

0:22:48.160 --> 0:22:53.000
<v Speaker 1>probably want to still try and hide the IP address

0:22:53.040 --> 0:22:57.200
<v Speaker 1>you're actually using, So you probably want to use a proxy. Proxies,

0:22:57.280 --> 0:22:59.879
<v Speaker 1>by the way, come in all shapes and sizes, So

0:23:00.359 --> 0:23:02.840
<v Speaker 1>some proxies you might see and you think, oh, well,

0:23:02.840 --> 0:23:05.480
<v Speaker 1>this is perfect. I'm gonna go log into this proxy.

0:23:05.600 --> 0:23:11.040
<v Speaker 1>Then from the the perspective of anyone outside of my browser,

0:23:11.480 --> 0:23:14.480
<v Speaker 1>it's going to look as if the proxy is the

0:23:14.480 --> 0:23:18.120
<v Speaker 1>computer that's doing all the searches. Right. So, Ben, let's

0:23:18.119 --> 0:23:21.760
<v Speaker 1>say you are in our bank robbery scenario. You log

0:23:21.800 --> 0:23:24.920
<v Speaker 1>into a proxy, you start searching information because you're gonna

0:23:24.960 --> 0:23:27.400
<v Speaker 1>be the bagman. You need to know what a bagman

0:23:27.560 --> 0:23:29.840
<v Speaker 1>is because you actually don't know. You agree to it

0:23:30.480 --> 0:23:33.360
<v Speaker 1>without actually knowing what the definition of the term one. Yeah,

0:23:33.359 --> 0:23:35.520
<v Speaker 1>I just yes ended and now I'm like the intern

0:23:35.560 --> 0:23:38.240
<v Speaker 1>in this. You didn't want to admit to the other

0:23:38.280 --> 0:23:40.760
<v Speaker 1>people that you didn't know what a bagman to look

0:23:40.840 --> 0:23:43.240
<v Speaker 1>cool like, I'm like, I you about proxies. Yeah, so

0:23:43.280 --> 0:23:46.440
<v Speaker 1>now you've gone to look up the definition of bagman.

0:23:46.560 --> 0:23:49.280
<v Speaker 1>We don't have any dictionaries nearby. So you know, you're thinking,

0:23:49.280 --> 0:23:53.160
<v Speaker 1>I gotta get online. You log into a cyber cafe

0:23:53.760 --> 0:23:57.119
<v Speaker 1>and you go use a proxy, so that instead it

0:23:57.160 --> 0:23:59.560
<v Speaker 1>looks like the proxy computer is the one that's doing

0:23:59.600 --> 0:24:02.639
<v Speaker 1>the rees ur So that way, if someone ever starts

0:24:02.680 --> 0:24:05.159
<v Speaker 1>to try and trace it back, they're going to go

0:24:05.240 --> 0:24:07.359
<v Speaker 1>to this proxy, but they're not going to get to you,

0:24:08.560 --> 0:24:12.640
<v Speaker 1>at least in theory, because a proxy could very well.

0:24:12.680 --> 0:24:14.880
<v Speaker 1>I mean, first of all, they know that you are

0:24:14.960 --> 0:24:19.080
<v Speaker 1>using the service. Otherwise, again, the communication can't ultimately get

0:24:19.119 --> 0:24:21.840
<v Speaker 1>to your computer. It's just somebody else too. To Lauren's

0:24:21.840 --> 0:24:25.080
<v Speaker 1>earlier comparison, it's just somebody else carrying that clear box

0:24:25.160 --> 0:24:29.800
<v Speaker 1>for you. Yeah. So if the proxy keeps activity logs,

0:24:30.160 --> 0:24:34.240
<v Speaker 1>then there's the potential that law enforcement could trace back

0:24:34.280 --> 0:24:37.320
<v Speaker 1>to that proxy and then service subpoenas saying we want

0:24:37.359 --> 0:24:39.160
<v Speaker 1>to see all the activity logs, so we can figure

0:24:39.160 --> 0:24:44.040
<v Speaker 1>out which individual user used this proxy service to get

0:24:44.080 --> 0:24:47.720
<v Speaker 1>access to this information. And this has happened. This is

0:24:47.760 --> 0:24:51.920
<v Speaker 1>not a theoretical thing. Law enforcement has gone to VPNs

0:24:51.960 --> 0:24:55.560
<v Speaker 1>and two proxies and said, okay, give us the paperwork,

0:24:55.640 --> 0:24:59.680
<v Speaker 1>tell us who was here in the afternoons googling bagman.

0:25:00.040 --> 0:25:04.359
<v Speaker 1>There's there's no guarantee either that a proxy is going

0:25:04.480 --> 0:25:07.880
<v Speaker 1>to encrypt information for you, So it may very well

0:25:07.920 --> 0:25:11.399
<v Speaker 1>be that again that pathway leads to the proxy, but

0:25:11.440 --> 0:25:13.639
<v Speaker 1>there might be enough information anyway for them to be

0:25:13.640 --> 0:25:15.640
<v Speaker 1>able to identify that Ben in fact, was the one

0:25:15.680 --> 0:25:19.000
<v Speaker 1>doing all the searches. So vpn tends to be a

0:25:19.040 --> 0:25:21.800
<v Speaker 1>better choice because VPNs do encrypt a lot of stuff.

0:25:21.880 --> 0:25:24.160
<v Speaker 1>So the problem with VPNs, of course, is that first

0:25:24.160 --> 0:25:26.080
<v Speaker 1>of all, you've got to pay into them, so again

0:25:26.119 --> 0:25:29.520
<v Speaker 1>there's a connection between you and the vpn um and

0:25:29.600 --> 0:25:33.119
<v Speaker 1>depending upon the VPNs policy, that may end up becoming

0:25:33.119 --> 0:25:35.920
<v Speaker 1>an issue because even if we're not talking about bank rubbing,

0:25:35.960 --> 0:25:38.040
<v Speaker 1>if we're instead we're talking about Ben is in a

0:25:38.119 --> 0:25:40.880
<v Speaker 1>foreign country and he's trying to get a message out

0:25:40.880 --> 0:25:44.320
<v Speaker 1>to his family, that's a that's an issue rights for

0:25:44.359 --> 0:25:48.520
<v Speaker 1>the redeeming example that, uh, why why am I the guy?

0:25:48.560 --> 0:25:52.320
<v Speaker 1>Why can't you be in Turkmenistan? Well, because I I

0:25:52.359 --> 0:25:57.280
<v Speaker 1>don't really leave my house. I think statistically speaking, you

0:25:57.359 --> 0:25:59.480
<v Speaker 1>are of the three of us here the most likely

0:25:59.520 --> 0:26:02.480
<v Speaker 1>to did see you, like walking down Morland taking a

0:26:02.480 --> 0:26:05.440
<v Speaker 1>wrong turn and ending up there. I mean, that's true.

0:26:05.480 --> 0:26:09.040
<v Speaker 1>I have a terrible sense of direction, Like it just

0:26:09.320 --> 0:26:12.480
<v Speaker 1>hits a little wormhole and goes from goes from downtown Atlanta,

0:26:12.520 --> 0:26:16.840
<v Speaker 1>Georgia to other people. Yeah, people do have to have

0:26:17.160 --> 0:26:21.160
<v Speaker 1>UM communications that way. But even with all we've done

0:26:21.160 --> 0:26:25.520
<v Speaker 1>now is we're talking about ways to UM raise the

0:26:26.240 --> 0:26:31.040
<v Speaker 1>to make it more inconvenient. Now, if you want to

0:26:31.080 --> 0:26:34.840
<v Speaker 1>go the next step, so we're talking about you're you're

0:26:34.920 --> 0:26:37.879
<v Speaker 1>using some sort of proxy service, whether it's VPN or

0:26:37.920 --> 0:26:41.159
<v Speaker 1>an actual web proxy to hide. But let's say that

0:26:41.200 --> 0:26:43.320
<v Speaker 1>you want to go even further. One thing you've got

0:26:43.320 --> 0:26:45.760
<v Speaker 1>to be concerned about is the computer you are actually

0:26:45.960 --> 0:26:49.320
<v Speaker 1>on the device you're using at that moment. So if

0:26:49.320 --> 0:26:51.399
<v Speaker 1>you are at a public place like a library, and

0:26:51.440 --> 0:26:53.920
<v Speaker 1>you're logging into a computer, and you want to make

0:26:53.960 --> 0:26:56.240
<v Speaker 1>sure that all of your activity on that computer does

0:26:56.280 --> 0:26:59.280
<v Speaker 1>not stay there so that the you know, let's say

0:26:59.280 --> 0:27:01.879
<v Speaker 1>that they get access to the actual physical computer you used,

0:27:02.160 --> 0:27:04.560
<v Speaker 1>they could track back who you are that way, right,

0:27:05.160 --> 0:27:07.280
<v Speaker 1>So you want to be able to disable the cookies

0:27:07.440 --> 0:27:09.679
<v Speaker 1>on that browser. You don't want anything coming back. You

0:27:09.680 --> 0:27:13.080
<v Speaker 1>want to disable things like Flash and Java because these

0:27:13.119 --> 0:27:17.720
<v Speaker 1>programs can often have identifiable information sent along, stuff that

0:27:17.800 --> 0:27:21.720
<v Speaker 1>doesn't even seem to be necessary for whatever it's supposed

0:27:21.720 --> 0:27:24.720
<v Speaker 1>to be doing within the context of the web page.

0:27:25.440 --> 0:27:29.800
<v Speaker 1>Disable all that. If you really want to go super spy,

0:27:29.880 --> 0:27:33.439
<v Speaker 1>then you should also probably load a program onto like

0:27:33.480 --> 0:27:36.320
<v Speaker 1>a USB flash drive that will allow you to boot

0:27:36.359 --> 0:27:39.840
<v Speaker 1>the computer into a separate operating system than the one

0:27:39.880 --> 0:27:44.000
<v Speaker 1>the computer natively runs that is specifically geared to allow

0:27:44.040 --> 0:27:47.360
<v Speaker 1>you to log into something like tour the Onion router.

0:27:47.960 --> 0:27:52.040
<v Speaker 1>So there are such things. There are such devices that,

0:27:52.280 --> 0:27:55.119
<v Speaker 1>or such programs you can put onto a USB device

0:27:55.200 --> 0:27:59.800
<v Speaker 1>like the Amnesia Incognito Live system also known as TAIL.

0:28:00.680 --> 0:28:04.120
<v Speaker 1>That's a Linux based stripped down operating system. Really, all

0:28:04.119 --> 0:28:06.040
<v Speaker 1>it's meant to do is, you know, you would you

0:28:06.040 --> 0:28:07.760
<v Speaker 1>would turn the computer off, which is already going to

0:28:07.800 --> 0:28:10.639
<v Speaker 1>be an issue in a public library. Trust me, you

0:28:10.760 --> 0:28:14.000
<v Speaker 1>plug this USB thumb drive into the into the port,

0:28:14.280 --> 0:28:16.960
<v Speaker 1>turn the computer back on. It will boot from the USB,

0:28:17.119 --> 0:28:20.120
<v Speaker 1>so instead of running its normal boot system, it will

0:28:20.200 --> 0:28:23.320
<v Speaker 1>go to the USB for it, load the stripped down OS.

0:28:23.400 --> 0:28:27.280
<v Speaker 1>That's just launching this tour uh interface, and then you

0:28:27.280 --> 0:28:32.280
<v Speaker 1>could access what you needed. Turn everything off again, unplugged

0:28:32.280 --> 0:28:34.600
<v Speaker 1>the USB, turn it back on, and then you're gone.

0:28:36.880 --> 0:28:42.800
<v Speaker 1>Even the first idea, Yeah, you probably exfoliated thoroughly to

0:28:42.800 --> 0:28:50.000
<v Speaker 1>get rid of all possible Right. It sounds it sounds

0:28:50.040 --> 0:28:51.959
<v Speaker 1>like we're being silly, but no, if you seriously are

0:28:51.960 --> 0:28:56.360
<v Speaker 1>talking about doing everything you possibly can to preserve anonymity,

0:28:56.400 --> 0:28:58.280
<v Speaker 1>this is like the level of extreme you have to

0:28:58.280 --> 0:29:01.240
<v Speaker 1>go to because there's so many different ways to leave

0:29:01.240 --> 0:29:05.120
<v Speaker 1>behind traces. Yeah. Absolutely, And I'm really glad that you

0:29:05.160 --> 0:29:08.200
<v Speaker 1>said that, because when when we talk about this, this

0:29:08.360 --> 0:29:11.360
<v Speaker 1>booting up, in this turning off the computer and having

0:29:11.360 --> 0:29:14.080
<v Speaker 1>and turn it back on, one thing that a lot

0:29:14.120 --> 0:29:17.360
<v Speaker 1>of you are probably realizing out their listeners is that

0:29:17.720 --> 0:29:21.600
<v Speaker 1>some libraries will check for an I d uh. It's true.

0:29:21.720 --> 0:29:26.200
<v Speaker 1>We can again scale this up. Maintaining anonymity requires more

0:29:26.240 --> 0:29:29.760
<v Speaker 1>than just the use of software. Of consider a closed

0:29:29.800 --> 0:29:35.600
<v Speaker 1>circuit television, right, and this this sounds like some tinfoil

0:29:35.640 --> 0:29:40.360
<v Speaker 1>stuff to people. But uh, just for comparison, one of

0:29:40.440 --> 0:29:44.280
<v Speaker 1>the most observed populations in the world is the population

0:29:44.360 --> 0:29:47.280
<v Speaker 1>of the United Kingdom. According to the Telegraph, there's one

0:29:47.320 --> 0:29:50.920
<v Speaker 1>surveillance camera there for every eleven to fourteen people. So

0:29:51.320 --> 0:29:54.160
<v Speaker 1>that means that no matter what you do, uh, just

0:29:54.240 --> 0:29:56.960
<v Speaker 1>in your day to day walking, even if you never

0:29:57.080 --> 0:29:59.920
<v Speaker 1>leave your house. And and I should tell you that

0:30:01.160 --> 0:30:04.160
<v Speaker 1>there's a fair percentage of those cameras that aren't connected

0:30:04.200 --> 0:30:06.200
<v Speaker 1>to anything, but there are enough of them that are

0:30:06.320 --> 0:30:09.280
<v Speaker 1>connected to something that Yeah, that's a really good point.

0:30:09.320 --> 0:30:12.240
<v Speaker 1>There are dummy cameras a lot of the UK, but

0:30:12.280 --> 0:30:14.680
<v Speaker 1>that that's one of those things like if you panopticon,

0:30:14.760 --> 0:30:17.640
<v Speaker 1>it's great. Yeah, because if you think you're being watched,

0:30:17.640 --> 0:30:20.800
<v Speaker 1>then you're more likely to behave yourself. That's kind of creepy,

0:30:20.920 --> 0:30:23.880
<v Speaker 1>that's the idea, but that's totally the idea. Sure, sure,

0:30:23.880 --> 0:30:26.040
<v Speaker 1>And just because you happen to live in a country

0:30:26.040 --> 0:30:29.080
<v Speaker 1>that doesn't have such a widespread governmental program does not

0:30:29.160 --> 0:30:31.280
<v Speaker 1>mean I mean, here in the U S. They're cameras everywhere,

0:30:31.320 --> 0:30:34.240
<v Speaker 1>but they're mostly privatized, or I mean some cities do

0:30:34.360 --> 0:30:36.160
<v Speaker 1>have a lot of traffic cameras or stuff like that

0:30:36.200 --> 0:30:39.280
<v Speaker 1>in a local level. But I mean, but also the

0:30:39.360 --> 0:30:41.280
<v Speaker 1>number of cameras that are watching you every time you

0:30:41.320 --> 0:30:45.320
<v Speaker 1>step into a mall or Disney World or anything like that.

0:30:45.800 --> 0:30:48.040
<v Speaker 1>Are just a lot of cameras, just the cameras that

0:30:48.080 --> 0:30:50.760
<v Speaker 1>are owned by private citizens that aren't doing they're not

0:30:50.800 --> 0:30:55.000
<v Speaker 1>trying to observe you. They're they're they're taking selfies. Are

0:30:55.040 --> 0:30:58.280
<v Speaker 1>taking Yeah no, I'm just telling like people, there's stuff

0:30:58.320 --> 0:31:01.320
<v Speaker 1>where and this you have no idea what kind of

0:31:01.840 --> 0:31:04.320
<v Speaker 1>a security they may or may not be used. So

0:31:04.400 --> 0:31:08.080
<v Speaker 1>that information may end up becoming public publicly available because

0:31:08.080 --> 0:31:10.640
<v Speaker 1>they're uploading it to Twitter or something. Yeah. Sure, sure

0:31:10.720 --> 0:31:13.960
<v Speaker 1>if if Ben is down in internet cafe searching for

0:31:14.160 --> 0:31:17.040
<v Speaker 1>whatever bank robbery related stuff he's searching for, and Matt

0:31:17.080 --> 0:31:19.680
<v Speaker 1>across the tree across the street is taking a selfie

0:31:19.760 --> 0:31:23.240
<v Speaker 1>and it's like, oh, hey, isn't that Ben, And he's

0:31:23.360 --> 0:31:26.200
<v Speaker 1>he's and he's tagged his selfie as my bank robbing

0:31:26.280 --> 0:31:30.320
<v Speaker 1>adventure with Ben. The cat is out of the bagman. Yeah,

0:31:30.720 --> 0:31:33.360
<v Speaker 1>there we go. That's nice. But that's that is a

0:31:33.400 --> 0:31:36.080
<v Speaker 1>really good point. So if you wanted to be completely anonymous,

0:31:36.080 --> 0:31:38.000
<v Speaker 1>one of the things you would have to worry about

0:31:38.520 --> 0:31:40.960
<v Speaker 1>is your appearance, and now it would look so as

0:31:40.960 --> 0:31:43.760
<v Speaker 1>silly as it's may sound. Uh, it would be better

0:31:43.840 --> 0:31:46.800
<v Speaker 1>to vary your appearance while you're access in these different sites,

0:31:47.080 --> 0:31:51.160
<v Speaker 1>which just sounds bizarre to me. If if I had

0:31:51.200 --> 0:31:53.360
<v Speaker 1>to do that, if I had to be anonymous, if

0:31:53.360 --> 0:31:56.320
<v Speaker 1>any of us had to be that anonymous, wouldn't it

0:31:56.320 --> 0:31:59.400
<v Speaker 1>be time for us to really sit down and have

0:31:59.400 --> 0:32:03.440
<v Speaker 1>have a come to I would definitely need to start

0:32:03.520 --> 0:32:06.360
<v Speaker 1>questioning my life choices. Yeah, like what led me to

0:32:06.400 --> 0:32:09.680
<v Speaker 1>this point where I can't let anyone know that I'm

0:32:09.680 --> 0:32:12.400
<v Speaker 1>looking up a recipe for Scotch eggs? And if the

0:32:12.440 --> 0:32:15.280
<v Speaker 1>world itself had reached that point, then you sit there

0:32:15.280 --> 0:32:19.280
<v Speaker 1>and say, we have become one of those dystopian science

0:32:19.320 --> 0:32:22.160
<v Speaker 1>fiction novels that I used to love because I thought

0:32:22.160 --> 0:32:24.280
<v Speaker 1>of it as a warning for what the future could be.

0:32:24.360 --> 0:32:27.560
<v Speaker 1>And now the future is that. Then then you have

0:32:27.600 --> 0:32:32.640
<v Speaker 1>a serious like okay, what now moment? But beyond that,

0:32:32.760 --> 0:32:34.920
<v Speaker 1>I mean, you also have to think about the other

0:32:34.920 --> 0:32:37.680
<v Speaker 1>devices that you own and whether you probably don't want

0:32:37.680 --> 0:32:41.640
<v Speaker 1>to carry them with you when you're like, you don't

0:32:41.640 --> 0:32:44.880
<v Speaker 1>want to have a smartphone with you, right, You certainly

0:32:44.880 --> 0:32:46.880
<v Speaker 1>don't want to wear your fit. Now you don't want

0:32:46.880 --> 0:32:50.200
<v Speaker 1>to you don't want anything that's got Bluetooth on it. Like. Uh,

0:32:50.280 --> 0:32:53.040
<v Speaker 1>and and we didn't even mention this, but I should

0:32:53.040 --> 0:32:55.400
<v Speaker 1>go back and point this out to when you go

0:32:55.520 --> 0:33:00.640
<v Speaker 1>and you're using some other places uh internet. H. Let's

0:33:00.680 --> 0:33:03.720
<v Speaker 1>say that you do have like a super cheap notebook

0:33:03.760 --> 0:33:05.480
<v Speaker 1>and you're just going to use it this one time.

0:33:05.600 --> 0:33:08.000
<v Speaker 1>You you've planned it out, this is this is you're

0:33:08.040 --> 0:33:11.640
<v Speaker 1>you're going to send some messages. Maybe you are in

0:33:11.760 --> 0:33:13.920
<v Speaker 1>like a foreign country and you just you have to

0:33:13.960 --> 0:33:15.880
<v Speaker 1>get this information out and this is this is your

0:33:15.880 --> 0:33:19.120
<v Speaker 1>best chance. If you're going someplace that's using WiFi, then

0:33:19.160 --> 0:33:21.520
<v Speaker 1>you also have to remember there are programs that can

0:33:21.560 --> 0:33:25.440
<v Speaker 1>sniff it. Essentially, they're looking for the messages that are

0:33:25.440 --> 0:33:29.840
<v Speaker 1>going between your computer and the the the wireless router

0:33:30.120 --> 0:33:35.320
<v Speaker 1>in that business, right, you want a hard connection for better? Yeah,

0:33:35.520 --> 0:33:38.520
<v Speaker 1>hard connection is better. Or you want to have a

0:33:38.600 --> 0:33:42.320
<v Speaker 1>way of making sure that you're encrypting any information that's

0:33:42.360 --> 0:33:45.840
<v Speaker 1>coming between your computer and going to the router, Like

0:33:45.880 --> 0:33:49.080
<v Speaker 1>if it's encrypted to a point where anyone listening in, uh,

0:33:49.160 --> 0:33:51.200
<v Speaker 1>you know, they can grab the data but they can't

0:33:51.200 --> 0:33:53.720
<v Speaker 1>make sense of it, then you're better off, which is

0:33:53.760 --> 0:33:56.400
<v Speaker 1>probably realistically the best you can hope for. There are

0:33:56.440 --> 0:34:01.000
<v Speaker 1>some fantastic encryption programs out there, um, there are also

0:34:01.160 --> 0:34:04.720
<v Speaker 1>some fantastic code breaking programs out there right, and there's

0:34:04.760 --> 0:34:08.279
<v Speaker 1>some that are classified. We don't know their capability. And

0:34:08.320 --> 0:34:11.560
<v Speaker 1>it's always an arms race encryption. Yeah, yeah, it's that's

0:34:11.560 --> 0:34:13.880
<v Speaker 1>just the nature of it. It pushes encryption forward, but

0:34:14.000 --> 0:34:16.879
<v Speaker 1>also pushes hacking forward. For example, the fact that now

0:34:16.920 --> 0:34:20.400
<v Speaker 1>we have graphics processors that have multiple cores. That's well,

0:34:20.440 --> 0:34:22.680
<v Speaker 1>a lot of hackers used to try and break encryption.

0:34:22.800 --> 0:34:26.239
<v Speaker 1>They just they write up a program, or more frequently,

0:34:26.320 --> 0:34:29.800
<v Speaker 1>they download a program that someone else's written that will

0:34:30.080 --> 0:34:32.080
<v Speaker 1>do a brute force attack, but they're doing it by

0:34:32.160 --> 0:34:36.200
<v Speaker 1>dividing up the attack among multiple processor cores. So something

0:34:36.239 --> 0:34:39.239
<v Speaker 1>that would traditionally take, you know, a hundred years for

0:34:39.280 --> 0:34:42.200
<v Speaker 1>a computer to crack, because you've got other processor cores

0:34:42.200 --> 0:34:44.279
<v Speaker 1>and they can all work on it in parallel. The

0:34:44.320 --> 0:34:46.800
<v Speaker 1>more cores you have, the less time it's going to

0:34:46.880 --> 0:34:49.799
<v Speaker 1>take you to actually break that encryption. That's kind of

0:34:49.800 --> 0:34:52.560
<v Speaker 1>a scary world, but it's it's the world that's that,

0:34:52.719 --> 0:34:54.919
<v Speaker 1>you know. It's it's one of the tradeoffs of having

0:34:54.920 --> 0:34:58.840
<v Speaker 1>this amazing technology that lets me go online and get

0:34:58.960 --> 0:35:04.520
<v Speaker 1>my my avatar blown away by a sniper for thirty

0:35:04.600 --> 0:35:07.880
<v Speaker 1>second time. Hey, that guy's camping. Don't be it's a

0:35:07.960 --> 0:35:10.839
<v Speaker 1>legitimate strategy. Yeah it is, it is, but it did not.

0:35:11.760 --> 0:35:13.920
<v Speaker 1>Camping is not a legitimate strategy. Oh my gosh, are

0:35:13.920 --> 0:35:17.440
<v Speaker 1>you the sniper? Have you been anonymously? Actually, Lauren is

0:35:17.440 --> 0:35:20.560
<v Speaker 1>the sniper. She likes to go to the end of

0:35:20.600 --> 0:35:23.200
<v Speaker 1>the map and in a nice little crow's nest area

0:35:23.239 --> 0:35:27.799
<v Speaker 1>and pick people off. I circulate. Okay, well, that's that's

0:35:27.880 --> 0:35:31.920
<v Speaker 1>true sniper tactics. That sniper's work. You fire and then

0:35:31.920 --> 0:35:34.960
<v Speaker 1>you change locations, kind of off on a tall I

0:35:35.000 --> 0:35:37.439
<v Speaker 1>have something important that we we should remember to see.

0:35:37.480 --> 0:35:41.320
<v Speaker 1>And yes, that I forgot one of the biggest disadvantages.

0:35:41.480 --> 0:35:45.200
<v Speaker 1>Let's say everything works out. You have a spot on

0:35:45.400 --> 0:35:48.600
<v Speaker 1>disguise and and there you are and your poncho and

0:35:48.640 --> 0:35:53.640
<v Speaker 1>your sombrero at the library monocle and your crazy makeup

0:35:53.680 --> 0:35:56.439
<v Speaker 1>to prevent any kind of facial recognition to yah, yeah,

0:35:56.760 --> 0:35:58.640
<v Speaker 1>you just just forget eight and a half yards, right,

0:35:58.920 --> 0:36:00.879
<v Speaker 1>let's do this. If right really doing it, And there

0:36:00.920 --> 0:36:04.200
<v Speaker 1>you are checking out your your bank robbery stuff or

0:36:04.239 --> 0:36:08.120
<v Speaker 1>whatever it is Matt's doing over there, and then you say, uh.

0:36:08.239 --> 0:36:11.920
<v Speaker 1>Then then you say, oh, okay, I'm in. I have

0:36:12.640 --> 0:36:15.160
<v Speaker 1>X amount of time that I can spend here. And

0:36:15.239 --> 0:36:18.839
<v Speaker 1>that's when you realize that accessing the web anonymously it's

0:36:18.960 --> 0:36:23.120
<v Speaker 1>pretty slow. Oh yeah, yeah, because you're routing that traffic

0:36:23.320 --> 0:36:27.000
<v Speaker 1>through a proxy or VPN before it even gets to you.

0:36:27.760 --> 0:36:30.319
<v Speaker 1>That does end up adding a lot of time. So

0:36:30.440 --> 0:36:32.879
<v Speaker 1>if you're using something like Tour, if you've ever used Tour,

0:36:33.480 --> 0:36:36.640
<v Speaker 1>then you may think like, man, this is just crawling today.

0:36:36.680 --> 0:36:40.840
<v Speaker 1>But that's because yeah, the process that tour uses and

0:36:40.920 --> 0:36:42.719
<v Speaker 1>go back and listen to our Tour episode if you

0:36:42.800 --> 0:36:44.719
<v Speaker 1>if you want to learn more about it. But the

0:36:44.760 --> 0:36:48.480
<v Speaker 1>process that uses, while it is uh a pretty secure

0:36:49.239 --> 0:36:53.840
<v Speaker 1>um approach, recently we've found out that not necessarily completely

0:36:53.840 --> 0:36:58.319
<v Speaker 1>secure approach UM, but that that does take time because

0:36:58.520 --> 0:37:01.799
<v Speaker 1>instead of it going from the regular route it would

0:37:01.840 --> 0:37:04.280
<v Speaker 1>across the Internet if you were just using the surface Web,

0:37:04.719 --> 0:37:07.120
<v Speaker 1>it has to do all these jumps from one node

0:37:07.160 --> 0:37:09.800
<v Speaker 1>to the next through a circuit of nodes before it

0:37:09.840 --> 0:37:12.600
<v Speaker 1>can finally get to you. And that's on top of

0:37:12.760 --> 0:37:16.120
<v Speaker 1>just the regular traffic it would normally do well. Luckily,

0:37:16.160 --> 0:37:19.280
<v Speaker 1>you're you're not again, you're you're probably not browsing Corgy

0:37:19.400 --> 0:37:23.160
<v Speaker 1>videos viator. I hope not, because you will be waiting

0:37:23.280 --> 0:37:25.520
<v Speaker 1>far too long for the adorable nous to come and

0:37:25.560 --> 0:37:27.279
<v Speaker 1>hit you in the face. Or at least that's what

0:37:27.320 --> 0:37:33.520
<v Speaker 1>Big Corgy wants you to think. That's that's that's both

0:37:33.640 --> 0:37:40.200
<v Speaker 1>terrifying and and just absolutely you know, as it's a

0:37:40.239 --> 0:37:44.479
<v Speaker 1>slightly shorter Clifford the Red Dog. Yeah, I welcome our

0:37:44.480 --> 0:37:52.440
<v Speaker 1>our Corky overlords, cork overlords lords at any rate. The

0:37:52.480 --> 0:37:55.200
<v Speaker 1>message you have to take home here is that the

0:37:55.239 --> 0:38:00.640
<v Speaker 1>Internet is meant, like Ben said, as a communication device,

0:38:00.719 --> 0:38:04.400
<v Speaker 1>as something where people are accessing and sharing, and in

0:38:04.480 --> 0:38:06.040
<v Speaker 1>order to do that you have to give up some

0:38:06.719 --> 0:38:10.280
<v Speaker 1>anonymity in order for it to be effective and easy

0:38:10.320 --> 0:38:13.440
<v Speaker 1>to do. It doesn't mean that you absolutely must give

0:38:13.520 --> 0:38:17.440
<v Speaker 1>up all anonymity. It does not mean that you cannot,

0:38:17.480 --> 0:38:21.200
<v Speaker 1>at least upon occasion, UH do your best to cover

0:38:21.280 --> 0:38:25.440
<v Speaker 1>all of your digital tracks and have a reasonable expectation

0:38:25.680 --> 0:38:28.840
<v Speaker 1>of being you know, pretty much under the radar. But

0:38:29.000 --> 0:38:31.720
<v Speaker 1>in order to do it, as like that's the way

0:38:31.800 --> 0:38:35.439
<v Speaker 1>you access the web, it's really not practical, Yeah, it's

0:38:36.080 --> 0:38:40.040
<v Speaker 1>it's not practical. At all and for everyone listening in

0:38:40.040 --> 0:38:41.960
<v Speaker 1>this UM. First one, I say, guys, thank you so

0:38:42.040 --> 0:38:45.840
<v Speaker 1>much for having me on your show. It's always it

0:38:45.880 --> 0:38:48.600
<v Speaker 1>always makes my day. UM. And I want to special

0:38:48.719 --> 0:38:51.600
<v Speaker 1>message to any of your listeners. I hope you guys

0:38:51.640 --> 0:38:55.560
<v Speaker 1>already know this. Incognito mode just doesn't leave a trace

0:38:55.600 --> 0:39:01.120
<v Speaker 1>on your computer. Everybody knows what you're looking at. Yeah, no,

0:39:01.239 --> 0:39:03.560
<v Speaker 1>I mean yeah, because the router that your computer is

0:39:03.600 --> 0:39:07.120
<v Speaker 1>going to everything is clear. Like you know, you the

0:39:07.160 --> 0:39:12.120
<v Speaker 1>when you type in www dot corgis rob Banks dot com.

0:39:12.560 --> 0:39:14.840
<v Speaker 1>The router knows that that's the website you went to.

0:39:15.040 --> 0:39:18.720
<v Speaker 1>Your sp knows. Yeah, everyone knows, and they know which

0:39:18.760 --> 0:39:22.440
<v Speaker 1>I p which, which computer looked up that information. The

0:39:22.480 --> 0:39:26.000
<v Speaker 1>only thing that is is being white clear is your browser. Right.

0:39:26.120 --> 0:39:28.280
<v Speaker 1>That's just so that other people in your house cannot

0:39:28.280 --> 0:39:33.600
<v Speaker 1>immediately access the information. Like Jonathan's got a real corgy

0:39:33.640 --> 0:39:35.319
<v Speaker 1>problem and I'm going to prove it by looking at

0:39:35.400 --> 0:39:40.600
<v Speaker 1>search history. Oh he's been using incognito mode boiled again. Yeah,

0:39:40.600 --> 0:39:43.680
<v Speaker 1>that's the only time that works, right that machine. So

0:39:43.719 --> 0:39:47.040
<v Speaker 1>I just wanted to save anybody the trouble and also

0:39:47.320 --> 0:39:51.719
<v Speaker 1>disclaimer for anyone listening in that might be working for

0:39:51.840 --> 0:39:56.239
<v Speaker 1>a government agency. I have not planned Rabba Bank, nor

0:39:56.280 --> 0:39:59.400
<v Speaker 1>do I ever planned Rabba Bank. I do, however, have

0:39:59.440 --> 0:40:02.280
<v Speaker 1>a soft spot for quirkies, and I'll go on record

0:40:02.320 --> 0:40:05.040
<v Speaker 1>with that one. I mean, Ben actually helped produce an

0:40:05.080 --> 0:40:08.160
<v Speaker 1>episode about why you shouldn't rob banks over on brain stuff.

0:40:08.160 --> 0:40:17.600
<v Speaker 1>It's the perfect cover. You just ruin everything. Well once,

0:40:17.640 --> 0:40:20.040
<v Speaker 1>once you do learn the definition of bagman, it'll all

0:40:20.080 --> 0:40:23.680
<v Speaker 1>just kind of fall into place. Well, Ben, thank you

0:40:24.000 --> 0:40:28.120
<v Speaker 1>for for joining us. And also, guys, if you haven't

0:40:28.160 --> 0:40:30.440
<v Speaker 1>listened to stuff they don't want you to know, are

0:40:30.520 --> 0:40:33.799
<v Speaker 1>gone to see the videos and the incredible work that

0:40:33.840 --> 0:40:35.799
<v Speaker 1>Ben and Matter are doing. You definitely got to check

0:40:35.800 --> 0:40:38.520
<v Speaker 1>it out. It's some phenomenal stuff. There will be a

0:40:38.560 --> 0:40:42.360
<v Speaker 1>companion episode to this episode you're listening to right now,

0:40:43.160 --> 0:40:45.520
<v Speaker 1>on stuff they don't want you to know, which will

0:40:45.600 --> 0:40:49.279
<v Speaker 1>we will be recording almost immediately after we sign off

0:40:49.320 --> 0:40:52.120
<v Speaker 1>of this episode. So if you couldn't, if you didn't

0:40:52.120 --> 0:40:54.200
<v Speaker 1>get enough, if you thought, I have got to hear

0:40:54.239 --> 0:40:58.120
<v Speaker 1>these three people talk more about anonymity and the deep

0:40:58.200 --> 0:41:01.640
<v Speaker 1>Web and things of that nature, and Coregs will probably

0:41:01.719 --> 0:41:05.080
<v Speaker 1>somehow make an appearance. We can't promise that. Maybe we'll

0:41:05.120 --> 0:41:07.120
<v Speaker 1>have worked out the coregies in our system by then

0:41:07.760 --> 0:41:10.719
<v Speaker 1>go check that out it. Uh, you'll definitely if you

0:41:10.800 --> 0:41:14.560
<v Speaker 1>enjoyed tech stuff, there's gonna be tons of episodes on

0:41:14.600 --> 0:41:16.160
<v Speaker 1>stuff they don't want you to know that are really

0:41:16.160 --> 0:41:19.000
<v Speaker 1>going to appeal to you. Absolutely. In that next episode,

0:41:19.000 --> 0:41:20.960
<v Speaker 1>I wanted to put in we will go more into

0:41:21.080 --> 0:41:24.840
<v Speaker 1>that tour thing that we alluded to, the recent problems

0:41:24.880 --> 0:41:27.240
<v Speaker 1>that tour has had and and some of the reasons

0:41:27.280 --> 0:41:31.000
<v Speaker 1>why even using tour does not completely protect you, which

0:41:31.040 --> 0:41:33.719
<v Speaker 1>which is pretty fascinating and terrifying at the same time. Right,

0:41:33.760 --> 0:41:35.560
<v Speaker 1>So if you want to know more about that, well

0:41:35.600 --> 0:41:38.640
<v Speaker 1>then you're gonna have to subscribe to another podcast. But

0:41:38.680 --> 0:41:40.760
<v Speaker 1>that's okay, because it's an awesome podcast and you should

0:41:40.760 --> 0:41:42.919
<v Speaker 1>be subscribing to it already. But yeah, you can find

0:41:42.960 --> 0:41:45.439
<v Speaker 1>all of their content I believe at stuff they don't

0:41:45.440 --> 0:41:50.000
<v Speaker 1>want you to know dot com. Yes, absolutely excellent. Um,

0:41:50.120 --> 0:41:54.760
<v Speaker 1>and uh, their YouTube channel I believe is a conspiracy stuff.

0:41:54.760 --> 0:41:56.680
<v Speaker 1>We have like three names because we're trying to be

0:41:56.800 --> 0:41:59.640
<v Speaker 1>an anonymous show on the internet. Yeah, it does help

0:41:59.680 --> 0:42:02.040
<v Speaker 1>to be a really good on YouTube. Change your identity

0:42:02.040 --> 0:42:05.360
<v Speaker 1>every twenty or thirty minutes. Yeah, you guys know that

0:42:05.360 --> 0:42:09.200
<v Speaker 1>when people asking some publics, we say that we're YouTube. Okay,

0:42:09.200 --> 0:42:13.239
<v Speaker 1>that's fair, all right. Well then, well that's all for

0:42:13.280 --> 0:42:16.160
<v Speaker 1>our show today, guys. Thanks Ben for wrapping up. Yeah,

0:42:16.200 --> 0:42:18.920
<v Speaker 1>if you guys have any suggestions for future topics that

0:42:19.000 --> 0:42:21.520
<v Speaker 1>we can cover on tech Stuff, send us an email

0:42:21.560 --> 0:42:25.240
<v Speaker 1>that addresses tech Stuff at how stuff works dot com,

0:42:25.719 --> 0:42:28.040
<v Speaker 1>or you can drop us a line on Tumbler, Twitter,

0:42:28.239 --> 0:42:30.760
<v Speaker 1>or Facebook or handle it. All three is tech Stuff

0:42:31.040 --> 0:42:37.719
<v Speaker 1>hs W and we'll talk to you again. Released for

0:42:37.840 --> 0:42:40.160
<v Speaker 1>more on this and thousands of other topics because it

0:42:40.239 --> 0:42:51.040
<v Speaker 1>has to works dot com