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Speaker 1: Get in touch with technology with tex Stuff from dot

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Speaker 1: com either and welcome to tex Stuff. I'm Jonathan Strich

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Speaker 1: and we have a special person joining us this week.

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Speaker 1: Special persons. That makes it sound a little bit well,

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Speaker 1: he's a special guest. There you go. And he is special.

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Speaker 1: He's very special. He is he is our good friend

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Speaker 1: and yours. Uh. He's the guy who tells you the

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Speaker 1: stuff that they don't want you to know. Mr. Been Both. Hey, guys, thanks,

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Speaker 1: thanks so much for having me on the show. I've

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Speaker 1: got news from my co host Matt Frederick. Unfortunately, Matt

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Speaker 1: is diligently working. Uh and right now he said he

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Speaker 1: is here in spirit, um, but he can't be in

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Speaker 1: here in person, right he he is. Actually, he had

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Speaker 1: planned on joining us and this would have been a

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Speaker 1: crazy four person podcast, something that has never been attempted

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Speaker 1: ever in the history of the Internet. I'm not sure

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Speaker 1: if that's but yeah, no, very impressive, yes, at least

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Speaker 1: the history of tech stuff at anywhere. So but unfortunately,

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Speaker 1: as he is, he has slammed. He of course is

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Speaker 1: also a video editor and uh, you guys might not

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Speaker 1: know this. Uh, that takes some time. So but the

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Speaker 1: reason we decided to bring Ben in is because you

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Speaker 1: may remember if you listen to this show often. Back

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Speaker 1: in April, Lauren and I did an episode about tour

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Speaker 1: and the Deep Web, and at the end of the

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Speaker 1: show we said, hey, guys, would you like to learn

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Speaker 1: more about how you can actually surf the web anonymously?

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Speaker 1: And all of you said yes, every single life. In fact, yeah,

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Speaker 1: some of you voted more than once, which we appreciate

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Speaker 1: the enthusiasm. So we have been trying to find the

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Speaker 1: right time to to get together and have a discussion

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Speaker 1: about what exactly it takes to really serve the web

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Speaker 1: anonymously and and Ben, as we have all discovered, it's

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Speaker 1: it's not it's not just a simple thing that you

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Speaker 1: hit a little switch in your browser and you're good

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Speaker 1: to go. Yeah. It's a situation where we quickly learn

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Speaker 1: the difference between the concept of something being possible and

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Speaker 1: the concept of something being plausible. Yeah, it is possible

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Speaker 1: two access the web anonymously finger quotes if you're very,

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Speaker 1: very careful and you take a lot of time and

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Speaker 1: you do some things that we're going to talk about today. Uh,

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Speaker 1: it is not plausible that you will succeed. It's not

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Speaker 1: plausible certainly the more frequently you access the web, absolutely right, Yeah,

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Speaker 1: because the more times you need to do it, the

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Speaker 1: harder it's going to become for you to to to

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Speaker 1: sustain that anonymity, and the more you want to do.

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Speaker 1: If you're doing like one thing, that's fine. If you're

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Speaker 1: trying to browse Netflix, it's not really Yeah, if you're

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Speaker 1: logging into your Netflix account, really, uh, we have some

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Speaker 1: bad news for you. Anything that involves the user name

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Speaker 1: password probably not really the most anonymous of activities. But first,

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Speaker 1: just as an overview, Yeah, there are a lot of

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Speaker 1: different reasons why someone might want to serve the web anonymously.

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Speaker 1: Some are even completely legit. Yeah, there we can get

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Speaker 1: the the the ones, the shady ones out of the way.

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Speaker 1: I mean, obviously if you're planning on doing something that

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Speaker 1: is you know, not strictly speaking legal. Yeah, Like, uh, Lauren, Jonathan,

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Speaker 1: you and I Matt decide that it's finally time that

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Speaker 1: we robbed that bank, and then we say, okay, there

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Speaker 1: are a couple of things we need to learn about

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Speaker 1: banks and security cameras and escape routes and stuff like that.

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Speaker 1: We would want to serve the web anonymously, but that is,

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Speaker 1: as you said, just something we need to get away

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Speaker 1: from at the top, because there are so many legitimate

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Speaker 1: reasons that people not just in the United States, but

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Speaker 1: around the world especially would have to serve the web anonymously. Right. So,

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Speaker 1: for example, one of the one of the ones that

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Speaker 1: you hear over and over our journalists reporters, right, people

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Speaker 1: who perhaps have to communicate with a source and that

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Speaker 1: source needs to remain anonymous in order for this this

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Speaker 1: uh information exchange to happen, or to protect their own

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Speaker 1: safety exactly. Yeah, we could be talking about someone who's

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Speaker 1: giving a very high level security leak kind of information

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Speaker 1: that really has the potential to affect millions of people.

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Speaker 1: This is kind of like that Snowden situation, Edward Snowden,

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Speaker 1: So you would definitely want to maintain that person's anonymity

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Speaker 1: as well as you know, the communications that are going

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Speaker 1: on between you until you are ready to publish a

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Speaker 1: full story. Now, you know, responsible journalists are going to

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Speaker 1: be doing things like making sure that the information they

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Speaker 1: get is as verifiable as possible before moving forward. So

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Speaker 1: it's not like we're just saying, you know, this is

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Speaker 1: a way for people to spread misinformation, although that does happen,

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Speaker 1: but is totally cromulent for journalists to want to have

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Speaker 1: this kind of level of an emity when trying to

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Speaker 1: to to coordinate the source of stuff. Sure, also in

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Speaker 1: the tech sector, for example, if you're developing a new

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Speaker 1: a new piece of technology, or a new iteration of

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Speaker 1: a technology and you don't want other companies to know

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Speaker 1: what you're up to, Yeah, yeah, I mean you know

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Speaker 1: we how many times have we seen leaks from things

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Speaker 1: like a supply chain where we learn about upcoming as

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Speaker 1: Apple is probably the best example of this, right because

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Speaker 1: everyone is so invested in learning what Apple's next product

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Speaker 1: is that you've got an intense level of scrutiny on

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Speaker 1: the entire supply chain from the point where they're building

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Speaker 1: the chips to the screens to assembling the whole piece together,

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Speaker 1: so that you can have security totally locked down at Apple,

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Speaker 1: and somewhere else along the chain there might be a leak. Well.

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Speaker 1: Even that that extends even to just the research and

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Speaker 1: development phase where people are using the Internet for for

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Speaker 1: legitimate purposes and they don't want that information getting out there.

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Speaker 1: They want to have as much secrecy there as possible,

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Speaker 1: especially if people are aware like Hey, you know Jem

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Speaker 1: down the street. Did you know that Jem is like

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Speaker 1: the head of product development for Apple's I phone. That

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Speaker 1: would be like people, Oh, you don't say exactly, which

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Speaker 1: is good that they're using such a non suspicious voice

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Speaker 1: to to play it off. The news about Jim certainly

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Speaker 1: should not be twirling your mustache. So there there are

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Speaker 1: a number of other reasons as well, and in many

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Speaker 1: cases these are these are things that might sound overly dramatic,

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Speaker 1: but it really does happen. Internet access is not created

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Speaker 1: equally by any means, and we're gonna explore some things

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Speaker 1: that might sound foreign to a lot of viewers or

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Speaker 1: excuse me, a lot of listeners who are not who

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Speaker 1: are not acquainted with this. And one of the one

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Speaker 1: of the biggest reasons that people would need anonymous internet

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Speaker 1: access is something that's kind of um personally important to

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Speaker 1: me for people to have this right. If you're in

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Speaker 1: a country where government descent is not allowed, or where

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Speaker 1: you can be penalized for going on you know, the

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Speaker 1: Chinese version of Twitter or some short uh, then you

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Speaker 1: need to be able to have some sort of safe

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Speaker 1: way to do this, and um, unfortunately, many countries there's

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Speaker 1: not really a legal way to do this. Sure, Yeah,

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Speaker 1: so we have a like, let's let's take the definition

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Speaker 1: of human rights as say, would be defined by the

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Speaker 1: United Nations. Okay, there are some countries out there that

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Speaker 1: have have policies that kind of go against a lot

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Speaker 1: of those definitions. And if you if you believe that

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Speaker 1: humans actually possess these rights, whether they belong to one

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Speaker 1: country or another, then you probably also believe that they

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Speaker 1: need to have this kind of ability to remain anonymous

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Speaker 1: and yet voice their concerns, their thoughts, to be able

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Speaker 1: to assemble at least virtually, and be able to to

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Speaker 1: tell that they are not a lone person in a

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Speaker 1: sea of darkness. This kind of it does sound like

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Speaker 1: we're going dramatic, but this is the Arab spring work. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: this is a literal situation that happens. You know, being

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Speaker 1: able to share your ideas and also access information is

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Speaker 1: so important and is denied to too many citizens of

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Speaker 1: this world, and for those of us who live who

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Speaker 1: are fortunate enough to live in places that at least

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Speaker 1: ostensibly protect those human rights. Um, you know, there's still

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Speaker 1: other things that we could become victim to. For example,

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Speaker 1: just people who want to cause midschief or hackers who

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Speaker 1: want to target you for one reason or another. Um

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Speaker 1: and it may not even be that they want to

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Speaker 1: target you specifically, but you just kind of want to

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Speaker 1: avoid all of that and cut down on all that possibility.

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Speaker 1: You may just want to serve the web anonymously because

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Speaker 1: they're there are only certain things you want to have

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Speaker 1: access to. You don't care about everything else out there.

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Speaker 1: So it's not like you're gonna go on YouTube and

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Speaker 1: watch a billion videos. It's not like you're gonna go

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Speaker 1: on Facebook and update your status profile. All you want

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Speaker 1: to do is be able to research something, read up

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Speaker 1: on something, whatever, and that's it. You might want to

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Speaker 1: be able to serve the web anonymously just to avoid

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Speaker 1: the possibility that you're going to run into, you know, troublemakers.

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Speaker 1: But here's the question then, right, and I think we've

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Speaker 1: done a great job showing this, uh, this need and

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Speaker 1: this legitimate interest in anonymous web us. Why is it

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Speaker 1: so difficult? Why is it possible but not plausible? Okay? Well,

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Speaker 1: first of all, just the way the internet works makes

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Speaker 1: it really really hard, right, because in order for you

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Speaker 1: to be able to get any information to your computer,

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Speaker 1: that information has to has nowhere to go, right. It

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Speaker 1: has to know what pathway to take so that it

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Speaker 1: gets from the server where it lives on to your

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Speaker 1: computer so you can see it. Now. This is no

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Speaker 1: matter what kind of service you're using on the internet,

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Speaker 1: if you're trying to access something, as long as you're

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Speaker 1: not just pushing stuff out and you're expecting to get

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Speaker 1: something back, it has to know where to go. Uh.

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Speaker 1: The thing I was thinking, I was imagined like you

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Speaker 1: are trying to send a message to somebody, and I,

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Speaker 1: you know, like I want to get a note specifically

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Speaker 1: to Lauren. And Lauren has happened to take a trip

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Speaker 1: where she's all the way out in California. And the

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Speaker 1: way I've chosen to get the message to her is

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Speaker 1: I've written the messaging code and I've left no identifying

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Speaker 1: information on it whatsoever. I've even I've even used my

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Speaker 1: right hand instead of my left hand to right the code,

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Speaker 1: so my handwriting is disguised. I then wrapped that that

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Speaker 1: message up in a little ribbon, tie it to a

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Speaker 1: helium balloon, let it go, and hope that somehow the

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Speaker 1: balloon finds its way to Lauren, that she is able

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Speaker 1: to decode the message, able to decipher despite the fact

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Speaker 1: that I've left no identifiable information in there about who

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Speaker 1: sent the message, who it was, who wrote it, and

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Speaker 1: then in turn be able to respond in a in

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Speaker 1: a similar way and send that message back to me

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Speaker 1: where it just magically makes its way to me. Clearly,

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Speaker 1: that scenario is impossible, right, yeah, Yeah. The the real

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Speaker 1: way that the Internet works is more like if the

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Speaker 1: postal system was made entirely of clear boxes and and

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Speaker 1: everyone passing the box along the route from you to

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Speaker 1: whoever you're sending it to, you can see exactly what's

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Speaker 1: going on in it unless you've taken some kind of

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Speaker 1: step to you or to encrypted. Right, So, if if

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Speaker 1: you have an encrypted message, let's say, then you've got

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Speaker 1: a clear box which inside of it is a a

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Speaker 1: an opaque box. So you know that there's a box,

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Speaker 1: you know approximately how much information is there, and you

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Speaker 1: know where it's coming from, and you know where it's

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Speaker 1: going to because you have to have that address or

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Speaker 1: else the data just doesn't go anywhere. It would just

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Speaker 1: would you, It would go to that first stop on

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Speaker 1: the internet, and then there'd be nowhere to go because

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Speaker 1: you wouldn't have any information saying hey, send this message

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Speaker 1: to this destination. So, because you have to have these

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Speaker 1: IP addresses so that information can actually go to where

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Speaker 1: it needs to go and get back to where it

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Speaker 1: needs to get back to, that limits how anonymous you

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Speaker 1: can be. Right now, that IP address can be assigned

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Speaker 1: by an Internet service provider and it doesn't have to

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Speaker 1: have anything to do with whatever machine you're on, right,

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Speaker 1: the computer you're using does not necessarily it's not going

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Speaker 1: to have the same IP address all the time. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's not like tattooed with barcode or something like that,

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Speaker 1: but well, I mean probably it literally is. Barcode is

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Speaker 1: not its IP address, right, right, So the that IP

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Speaker 1: address is going to at least have a general idea

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Speaker 1: of the geography that you are in, uh and based

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Speaker 1: upon your habits what you use the Internet for, that

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Speaker 1: might be enough. Just the general geography and and your

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Speaker 1: pattern of using the Internet, that could be enough to

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Speaker 1: identify who is using the Internet, because the way eyebrows

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Speaker 1: the Internet could be extremely different from the way say

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Speaker 1: Lauren does, and I highly suspect it is, I imagine,

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Speaker 1: so aside from when we're researching the same topic. In

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Speaker 1: that case, we think we find literally all the same articles.

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Speaker 1: I am pretty sure that I watch a lot more

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Speaker 1: YouTube videos about family surprising their kids with trips to

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Speaker 1: Disney than Lauren does. I think you guys are about

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Speaker 1: one for one on Corgy videos though. Corgy videos, yes,

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Speaker 1: or I mean they rank highly on both sides, but

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Speaker 1: they're they're sure there are anomalies. If you're only looking

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Speaker 1: at Corgy video activity, then you might not be able

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Speaker 1: to determine whether it's Lauren or whether which. Which is

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Speaker 1: a great point because it goes back to earlier. We

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Speaker 1: can all recall hearing the big stink in the United

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Speaker 1: States about um the government tracking metadata, and people would say, well,

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Speaker 1: you know, metadata is not a big deal. It's just

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Speaker 1: stuff like the address and the time, and and it's

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Speaker 1: more the it's more like the measurement of the pages

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Speaker 1: of a book than the description of the story. However,

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Speaker 1: from that, the reason it's important is exactly what you're saying, Johnathan,

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Speaker 1: because it is possible to build um, not just a

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Speaker 1: profile of a person, but to find the actual person. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: from enough of that metadat Yeah, And and it doesn't

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Speaker 1: take that much really, especially for particular types of meta data.

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Speaker 1: For example, if you have like a zip code and

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Speaker 1: maybe a car make and model, well that and and

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Speaker 1: a gender, Well, then you've really got enough information to

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Speaker 1: really narrow it down to a handful of people. Because

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Speaker 1: you know that you've got a population within a zip code.

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Speaker 1: The gender will divide that essentially in half, and so

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Speaker 1: how many of those people have a two thousand and

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Speaker 1: four Yeah, and then you have essentially really narrowed it

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Speaker 1: down to a very small number of potential people. This

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Speaker 1: is why it doesn't really require that much personal identifiable

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Speaker 1: information to track it back to a specific person. Now,

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Speaker 1: there's some things on the Internet that are not necessary

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Speaker 1: for the Internet to work right or like, especially for

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Speaker 1: web browsing. So, for example, cookies. Cookies are not necessary

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Speaker 1: to make the web work, although you'll probably go to

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Speaker 1: a page occasionally that says, this website uses cookies, and

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Speaker 1: let us tell you how ye enable them so that

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Speaker 1: this website will work the way it's supposed to. Cookies

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Speaker 1: are just text files. They can include enough information that

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Speaker 1: could be useful to the person using the website to

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Speaker 1: customize your experience that the intent is so that if

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Speaker 1: you keep going back to the same website frequently, it

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Speaker 1: already knows things that you do and do not need,

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Speaker 1: and so it will load much faster. It will give

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Speaker 1: you more personalized experience, but it also means that there's

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Speaker 1: some tracking that can happen there and identification that can

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Speaker 1: happen there. So turning that off is probably something you

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Speaker 1: would want to do if you want to be anonymous.

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Speaker 1: I'll go into more about that in a bed. Oh, Jonathan,

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Speaker 1: welcome back to Amazon based on your browsing preferences. I

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Speaker 1: can't wait to hear this. Yeah, here are several calendars

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Speaker 1: of quarkies. Okay, that's fair, that's fair. Uh, that I

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Speaker 1: just recently made a purchase, so I was wanting to

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Speaker 1: see if perhaps somehow it was going to tie into

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Speaker 1: what I actually bought. But ows but not quite um

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Speaker 1: And then things like like search engines can maintain activity logs,

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Speaker 1: so and those will link back to an IP address.

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Speaker 1: So let's say that you are using a computer, You've

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Speaker 1: logged into the Internet, your computer has an IP address,

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Speaker 1: and you start searching for various terms. This kind of

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Speaker 1: goes back to that idea of the four of us

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Speaker 1: are all searching about robbing a bank. Now that that information,

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Speaker 1: if we're let's say we're all using Google because it

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Speaker 1: makes it easier if we just go ahead and use

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Speaker 1: an example, Google's maintaining this activity log of all four

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Speaker 1: of us independently using Google to research everything that is,

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Speaker 1: to research about robbing a bank, and then later on

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Speaker 1: the lawn law enforcement officials, uh subpoena Google to get

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Speaker 1: those activity logs so that they can see who it

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Speaker 1: is in this geographic region that was looking for this stuff. Um,

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Speaker 1: you know that's again that's another reason why when you

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Speaker 1: start talking about really being anonymous using the web, you

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Speaker 1: have to shy away from all the convenient says that

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Speaker 1: make the web so useful in situations where you're not

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Speaker 1: as concerned about your anonymity. Yeah, that's a really great point,

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Speaker 1: and that's something that, oddly enough, we were exploring both

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Speaker 1: on this show and on car stuff, because there's this

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Speaker 1: big idea about cars becoming connected to the cloud, right

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Speaker 1: and the whole internet of cars knowing exactly where you

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Speaker 1: are all the time, exactly exactly. And North has been

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Speaker 1: parked outside of this dance club for a really long time.

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Speaker 1: He's cutting a rug and that's how Jonathan's car would sound. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I like to think that all my technology has has

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Speaker 1: weird affectations in its speech, I hope so, because what

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Speaker 1: else is the future would be no fun that you

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Speaker 1: couldn't do. It would just be Yeah, it could all

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Speaker 1: be like robot voice. But that gets old pretty quickly, right,

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Speaker 1: So the um, the purpose of this this great thing

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Speaker 1: called the Internet is inherently to share things that are

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Speaker 1: easily seen. It is not to hide things. So it's already, um,

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Speaker 1: it's already unsurprising if you think about it that it's

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Speaker 1: it's really difficult to participate in something that is all

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Speaker 1: about telling people's stuff in a way that doesn't it's

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Speaker 1: a communications platform, and if you're if you're trying to

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Speaker 1: be completely anonymous in a communications platform, that's tricky. I mean,

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Speaker 1: there are obviously message boards out there that allow for

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Speaker 1: complete anonymity and uh complete complete being an in air

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Speaker 1: quotes which work really well over the radio. But yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's it's it's definitely one of those things where, uh,

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Speaker 1: you know, the the anonymity kind of can inhibit a

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Speaker 1: lot of what makes the Internet so useful. So especially

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Speaker 1: in these are modern Internet times, like as the Internet

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Speaker 1: has grown in, big data has grown and and all

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Speaker 1: these things we've we've been talking about websites storing information

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Speaker 1: from you so that they can serve you better headlines

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Speaker 1: that you're more likely to want to click on. Uh,

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Speaker 1: you're you're evading the point. Yeah, yeah, yeah, that's a

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Speaker 1: that's a good way to say it. So with with this,

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Speaker 1: we've we've painted the difficulty. We've talked about the reasons

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Speaker 1: why you want to do it. So for all the

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Speaker 1: people who wrote in and voted more than once saying yes,

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Speaker 1: tell me how to surf anonymously? What? What? What would

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Speaker 1: they do? You? Guys, I'm asking for a friend. Okay, Well,

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Speaker 1: then your friend needs to know that if if your friend,

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Speaker 1: if he or she is truly determined to surf the

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Speaker 1: web anonymously, he or she should be prepared to go

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Speaker 1: to great lengths in order to do so, including if

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Speaker 1: he or she plans on doing this more than once.

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Speaker 1: Not using the same device burner, laptops, I like it, ye.

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Speaker 1: Step Step one don't use your own device ever, No,

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Speaker 1: not not connected to the internet anyway. Step one is

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Speaker 1: don't use your own device. Step two is you probably

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Speaker 1: don't want to use like a mobile device that connects

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Speaker 1: to the Internet because it's likely registered to you or

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Speaker 1: to someone you know, and most of them have some

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Speaker 1: form of way of identifying where you are. So even

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Speaker 1: if somehow you magically have a phone working where there's

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Speaker 1: not a direct link between you and the phone, the

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Speaker 1: fact that it is going to be able to determine

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Speaker 1: where it is geographically, either just cell phone towers or

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Speaker 1: it may have GPS enabled to that's going to give

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Speaker 1: it even more specific location. Sure, you can turn three

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Speaker 1: G or four G or whatever you have. You can

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Speaker 1: turn satellite service off on your phone. However, then you

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Speaker 1: need to be connected to WiFi, and you can't just

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Speaker 1: connect to you I mean, you can't just call up

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Speaker 1: Comcast and be like, hey, I'd like to get some Internet,

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Speaker 1: but anonymously never mind. Yeah, that's a really good way

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Speaker 1: to not get an account, right that, Not that I

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Speaker 1: know personally. The same thing is true about just Internet

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Speaker 1: service providers in general. Litering, Like like whether it's Comcast

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Speaker 1: or whatever, whatever the i s P is, if you

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Speaker 1: are trying to use your own, say your own setup

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Speaker 1: at home, then automatically your I s P, you know, yeah,

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Speaker 1: and know exactly they know which account it goes to

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Speaker 1: at any rate, So you know that means that it's

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Speaker 1: narrowed down who could potentially be the person actually doing

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Speaker 1: the searches. It's pretty much anyone who has access to

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Speaker 1: your household, which is why if you're really trying to

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Speaker 1: make this happen, ladies and gentlemen, you will need to

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Speaker 1: find the most public computer possible. We're talking about libraries,

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Speaker 1: cyber cafes, uh, college campuses. Yeah. Yeah, you want to

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Speaker 1: be able to use a computer where uh the real

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Speaker 1: First of all, there's a possibility that any number of

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Speaker 1: individuals could have been using that ability, right right, Yeah,

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Speaker 1: It's one of those safety and numbers kind of issues

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Speaker 1: that kind of comes up a lot in in our discussion.

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Speaker 1: I think, yeah, so that's that's one thing you're and

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Speaker 1: you don't want to use the same one twice in

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Speaker 1: a row. So if your session is over and then

395
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Speaker 1: you think, oh shoot, I need to go do something else,

396
00:22:04,600 --> 00:22:07,600
Speaker 1: you probably need to go to a different site. In fact,

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Speaker 1: a different site entirely, like not even on that same

398
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Speaker 1: network would be the best choice for you. I mean, ideally,

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Speaker 1: the scary thing is about this that the more you

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Speaker 1: think about it, uh, the larger the scale becomes. Because then, yes,

401
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Speaker 1: you don't want to be on the same site. Yes,

402
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Speaker 1: you don't want to be on the same network. Do

403
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Speaker 1: you want to be in the same city. Do you

404
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Speaker 1: want to be in the you know what I mean,

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Speaker 1: because it should be preferable to jump state borders really

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Speaker 1: at that point, which which is a heck of a

407
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Speaker 1: long drive just to uh, you know here in Georgia. Yeah,

408
00:22:39,520 --> 00:22:42,040
Speaker 1: maybe you should try to serve the web anominous anonymously

409
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Speaker 1: from Rhode Island. Uh. And also you would you would

410
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Speaker 1: probably want to still try and hide the IP address

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Speaker 1: you're actually using, So you probably want to use a proxy. Proxies,

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Speaker 1: by the way, come in all shapes and sizes, So

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Speaker 1: some proxies you might see and you think, oh, well,

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Speaker 1: this is perfect. I'm gonna go log into this proxy.

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Speaker 1: Then from the the perspective of anyone outside of my browser,

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Speaker 1: it's going to look as if the proxy is the

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Speaker 1: computer that's doing all the searches. Right. So, Ben, let's

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Speaker 1: say you are in our bank robbery scenario. You log

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Speaker 1: into a proxy, you start searching information because you're gonna

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Speaker 1: be the bagman. You need to know what a bagman

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Speaker 1: is because you actually don't know. You agree to it

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Speaker 1: without actually knowing what the definition of the term one. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I just yes ended and now I'm like the intern

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Speaker 1: in this. You didn't want to admit to the other

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Speaker 1: people that you didn't know what a bagman to look

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Speaker 1: cool like, I'm like, I you about proxies. Yeah, so

427
00:23:43,280 --> 00:23:46,440
Speaker 1: now you've gone to look up the definition of bagman.

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Speaker 1: We don't have any dictionaries nearby. So you know, you're thinking,

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Speaker 1: I gotta get online. You log into a cyber cafe

430
00:23:53,760 --> 00:23:57,119
Speaker 1: and you go use a proxy, so that instead it

431
00:23:57,160 --> 00:23:59,560
Speaker 1: looks like the proxy computer is the one that's doing

432
00:23:59,600 --> 00:24:02,639
Speaker 1: the rees ur So that way, if someone ever starts

433
00:24:02,680 --> 00:24:05,159
Speaker 1: to try and trace it back, they're going to go

434
00:24:05,240 --> 00:24:07,359
Speaker 1: to this proxy, but they're not going to get to you,

435
00:24:08,560 --> 00:24:12,640
Speaker 1: at least in theory, because a proxy could very well.

436
00:24:12,680 --> 00:24:14,880
Speaker 1: I mean, first of all, they know that you are

437
00:24:14,960 --> 00:24:19,080
Speaker 1: using the service. Otherwise, again, the communication can't ultimately get

438
00:24:19,119 --> 00:24:21,840
Speaker 1: to your computer. It's just somebody else too. To Lauren's

439
00:24:21,840 --> 00:24:25,080
Speaker 1: earlier comparison, it's just somebody else carrying that clear box

440
00:24:25,160 --> 00:24:29,800
Speaker 1: for you. Yeah. So if the proxy keeps activity logs,

441
00:24:30,160 --> 00:24:34,240
Speaker 1: then there's the potential that law enforcement could trace back

442
00:24:34,280 --> 00:24:37,320
Speaker 1: to that proxy and then service subpoenas saying we want

443
00:24:37,359 --> 00:24:39,160
Speaker 1: to see all the activity logs, so we can figure

444
00:24:39,160 --> 00:24:44,040
Speaker 1: out which individual user used this proxy service to get

445
00:24:44,080 --> 00:24:47,720
Speaker 1: access to this information. And this has happened. This is

446
00:24:47,760 --> 00:24:51,920
Speaker 1: not a theoretical thing. Law enforcement has gone to VPNs

447
00:24:51,960 --> 00:24:55,560
Speaker 1: and two proxies and said, okay, give us the paperwork,

448
00:24:55,640 --> 00:24:59,680
Speaker 1: tell us who was here in the afternoons googling bagman.

449
00:25:00,040 --> 00:25:04,359
Speaker 1: There's there's no guarantee either that a proxy is going

450
00:25:04,480 --> 00:25:07,880
Speaker 1: to encrypt information for you, So it may very well

451
00:25:07,920 --> 00:25:11,399
Speaker 1: be that again that pathway leads to the proxy, but

452
00:25:11,440 --> 00:25:13,639
Speaker 1: there might be enough information anyway for them to be

453
00:25:13,640 --> 00:25:15,640
Speaker 1: able to identify that Ben in fact, was the one

454
00:25:15,680 --> 00:25:19,000
Speaker 1: doing all the searches. So vpn tends to be a

455
00:25:19,040 --> 00:25:21,800
Speaker 1: better choice because VPNs do encrypt a lot of stuff.

456
00:25:21,880 --> 00:25:24,160
Speaker 1: So the problem with VPNs, of course, is that first

457
00:25:24,160 --> 00:25:26,080
Speaker 1: of all, you've got to pay into them, so again

458
00:25:26,119 --> 00:25:29,520
Speaker 1: there's a connection between you and the vpn um and

459
00:25:29,600 --> 00:25:33,119
Speaker 1: depending upon the VPNs policy, that may end up becoming

460
00:25:33,119 --> 00:25:35,920
Speaker 1: an issue because even if we're not talking about bank rubbing,

461
00:25:35,960 --> 00:25:38,040
Speaker 1: if we're instead we're talking about Ben is in a

462
00:25:38,119 --> 00:25:40,880
Speaker 1: foreign country and he's trying to get a message out

463
00:25:40,880 --> 00:25:44,320
Speaker 1: to his family, that's a that's an issue rights for

464
00:25:44,359 --> 00:25:48,520
Speaker 1: the redeeming example that, uh, why why am I the guy?

465
00:25:48,560 --> 00:25:52,320
Speaker 1: Why can't you be in Turkmenistan? Well, because I I

466
00:25:52,359 --> 00:25:57,280
Speaker 1: don't really leave my house. I think statistically speaking, you

467
00:25:57,359 --> 00:25:59,480
Speaker 1: are of the three of us here the most likely

468
00:25:59,520 --> 00:26:02,480
Speaker 1: to did see you, like walking down Morland taking a

469
00:26:02,480 --> 00:26:05,440
Speaker 1: wrong turn and ending up there. I mean, that's true.

470
00:26:05,480 --> 00:26:09,040
Speaker 1: I have a terrible sense of direction, Like it just

471
00:26:09,320 --> 00:26:12,480
Speaker 1: hits a little wormhole and goes from goes from downtown Atlanta,

472
00:26:12,520 --> 00:26:16,840
Speaker 1: Georgia to other people. Yeah, people do have to have

473
00:26:17,160 --> 00:26:21,160
Speaker 1: UM communications that way. But even with all we've done

474
00:26:21,160 --> 00:26:25,520
Speaker 1: now is we're talking about ways to UM raise the

475
00:26:26,240 --> 00:26:31,040
Speaker 1: to make it more inconvenient. Now, if you want to

476
00:26:31,080 --> 00:26:34,840
Speaker 1: go the next step, so we're talking about you're you're

477
00:26:34,920 --> 00:26:37,879
Speaker 1: using some sort of proxy service, whether it's VPN or

478
00:26:37,920 --> 00:26:41,159
Speaker 1: an actual web proxy to hide. But let's say that

479
00:26:41,200 --> 00:26:43,320
Speaker 1: you want to go even further. One thing you've got

480
00:26:43,320 --> 00:26:45,760
Speaker 1: to be concerned about is the computer you are actually

481
00:26:45,960 --> 00:26:49,320
Speaker 1: on the device you're using at that moment. So if

482
00:26:49,320 --> 00:26:51,399
Speaker 1: you are at a public place like a library, and

483
00:26:51,440 --> 00:26:53,920
Speaker 1: you're logging into a computer, and you want to make

484
00:26:53,960 --> 00:26:56,240
Speaker 1: sure that all of your activity on that computer does

485
00:26:56,280 --> 00:26:59,280
Speaker 1: not stay there so that the you know, let's say

486
00:26:59,280 --> 00:27:01,879
Speaker 1: that they get access to the actual physical computer you used,

487
00:27:02,160 --> 00:27:04,560
Speaker 1: they could track back who you are that way, right,

488
00:27:05,160 --> 00:27:07,280
Speaker 1: So you want to be able to disable the cookies

489
00:27:07,440 --> 00:27:09,679
Speaker 1: on that browser. You don't want anything coming back. You

490
00:27:09,680 --> 00:27:13,080
Speaker 1: want to disable things like Flash and Java because these

491
00:27:13,119 --> 00:27:17,720
Speaker 1: programs can often have identifiable information sent along, stuff that

492
00:27:17,800 --> 00:27:21,720
Speaker 1: doesn't even seem to be necessary for whatever it's supposed

493
00:27:21,720 --> 00:27:24,720
Speaker 1: to be doing within the context of the web page.

494
00:27:25,440 --> 00:27:29,800
Speaker 1: Disable all that. If you really want to go super spy,

495
00:27:29,880 --> 00:27:33,439
Speaker 1: then you should also probably load a program onto like

496
00:27:33,480 --> 00:27:36,320
Speaker 1: a USB flash drive that will allow you to boot

497
00:27:36,359 --> 00:27:39,840
Speaker 1: the computer into a separate operating system than the one

498
00:27:39,880 --> 00:27:44,000
Speaker 1: the computer natively runs that is specifically geared to allow

499
00:27:44,040 --> 00:27:47,360
Speaker 1: you to log into something like tour the Onion router.

500
00:27:47,960 --> 00:27:52,040
Speaker 1: So there are such things. There are such devices that,

501
00:27:52,280 --> 00:27:55,119
Speaker 1: or such programs you can put onto a USB device

502
00:27:55,200 --> 00:27:59,800
Speaker 1: like the Amnesia Incognito Live system also known as TAIL.

503
00:28:00,680 --> 00:28:04,120
Speaker 1: That's a Linux based stripped down operating system. Really, all

504
00:28:04,119 --> 00:28:06,040
Speaker 1: it's meant to do is, you know, you would you

505
00:28:06,040 --> 00:28:07,760
Speaker 1: would turn the computer off, which is already going to

506
00:28:07,800 --> 00:28:10,639
Speaker 1: be an issue in a public library. Trust me, you

507
00:28:10,760 --> 00:28:14,000
Speaker 1: plug this USB thumb drive into the into the port,

508
00:28:14,280 --> 00:28:16,960
Speaker 1: turn the computer back on. It will boot from the USB,

509
00:28:17,119 --> 00:28:20,120
Speaker 1: so instead of running its normal boot system, it will

510
00:28:20,200 --> 00:28:23,320
Speaker 1: go to the USB for it, load the stripped down OS.

511
00:28:23,400 --> 00:28:27,280
Speaker 1: That's just launching this tour uh interface, and then you

512
00:28:27,280 --> 00:28:32,280
Speaker 1: could access what you needed. Turn everything off again, unplugged

513
00:28:32,280 --> 00:28:34,600
Speaker 1: the USB, turn it back on, and then you're gone.

514
00:28:36,880 --> 00:28:42,800
Speaker 1: Even the first idea, Yeah, you probably exfoliated thoroughly to

515
00:28:42,800 --> 00:28:50,000
Speaker 1: get rid of all possible Right. It sounds it sounds

516
00:28:50,040 --> 00:28:51,959
Speaker 1: like we're being silly, but no, if you seriously are

517
00:28:51,960 --> 00:28:56,360
Speaker 1: talking about doing everything you possibly can to preserve anonymity,

518
00:28:56,400 --> 00:28:58,280
Speaker 1: this is like the level of extreme you have to

519
00:28:58,280 --> 00:29:01,240
Speaker 1: go to because there's so many different ways to leave

520
00:29:01,240 --> 00:29:05,120
Speaker 1: behind traces. Yeah. Absolutely, And I'm really glad that you

521
00:29:05,160 --> 00:29:08,200
Speaker 1: said that, because when when we talk about this, this

522
00:29:08,360 --> 00:29:11,360
Speaker 1: booting up, in this turning off the computer and having

523
00:29:11,360 --> 00:29:14,080
Speaker 1: and turn it back on, one thing that a lot

524
00:29:14,120 --> 00:29:17,360
Speaker 1: of you are probably realizing out their listeners is that

525
00:29:17,720 --> 00:29:21,600
Speaker 1: some libraries will check for an I d uh. It's true.

526
00:29:21,720 --> 00:29:26,200
Speaker 1: We can again scale this up. Maintaining anonymity requires more

527
00:29:26,240 --> 00:29:29,760
Speaker 1: than just the use of software. Of consider a closed

528
00:29:29,800 --> 00:29:35,600
Speaker 1: circuit television, right, and this this sounds like some tinfoil

529
00:29:35,640 --> 00:29:40,360
Speaker 1: stuff to people. But uh, just for comparison, one of

530
00:29:40,440 --> 00:29:44,280
Speaker 1: the most observed populations in the world is the population

531
00:29:44,360 --> 00:29:47,280
Speaker 1: of the United Kingdom. According to the Telegraph, there's one

532
00:29:47,320 --> 00:29:50,920
Speaker 1: surveillance camera there for every eleven to fourteen people. So

533
00:29:51,320 --> 00:29:54,160
Speaker 1: that means that no matter what you do, uh, just

534
00:29:54,240 --> 00:29:56,960
Speaker 1: in your day to day walking, even if you never

535
00:29:57,080 --> 00:29:59,920
Speaker 1: leave your house. And and I should tell you that

536
00:30:01,160 --> 00:30:04,160
Speaker 1: there's a fair percentage of those cameras that aren't connected

537
00:30:04,200 --> 00:30:06,200
Speaker 1: to anything, but there are enough of them that are

538
00:30:06,320 --> 00:30:09,280
Speaker 1: connected to something that Yeah, that's a really good point.

539
00:30:09,320 --> 00:30:12,240
Speaker 1: There are dummy cameras a lot of the UK, but

540
00:30:12,280 --> 00:30:14,680
Speaker 1: that that's one of those things like if you panopticon,

541
00:30:14,760 --> 00:30:17,640
Speaker 1: it's great. Yeah, because if you think you're being watched,

542
00:30:17,640 --> 00:30:20,800
Speaker 1: then you're more likely to behave yourself. That's kind of creepy,

543
00:30:20,920 --> 00:30:23,880
Speaker 1: that's the idea, but that's totally the idea. Sure, sure,

544
00:30:23,880 --> 00:30:26,040
Speaker 1: And just because you happen to live in a country

545
00:30:26,040 --> 00:30:29,080
Speaker 1: that doesn't have such a widespread governmental program does not

546
00:30:29,160 --> 00:30:31,280
Speaker 1: mean I mean, here in the U S. They're cameras everywhere,

547
00:30:31,320 --> 00:30:34,240
Speaker 1: but they're mostly privatized, or I mean some cities do

548
00:30:34,360 --> 00:30:36,160
Speaker 1: have a lot of traffic cameras or stuff like that

549
00:30:36,200 --> 00:30:39,280
Speaker 1: in a local level. But I mean, but also the

550
00:30:39,360 --> 00:30:41,280
Speaker 1: number of cameras that are watching you every time you

551
00:30:41,320 --> 00:30:45,320
Speaker 1: step into a mall or Disney World or anything like that.

552
00:30:45,800 --> 00:30:48,040
Speaker 1: Are just a lot of cameras, just the cameras that

553
00:30:48,080 --> 00:30:50,760
Speaker 1: are owned by private citizens that aren't doing they're not

554
00:30:50,800 --> 00:30:55,000
Speaker 1: trying to observe you. They're they're they're taking selfies. Are

555
00:30:55,040 --> 00:30:58,280
Speaker 1: taking Yeah no, I'm just telling like people, there's stuff

556
00:30:58,320 --> 00:31:01,320
Speaker 1: where and this you have no idea what kind of

557
00:31:01,840 --> 00:31:04,320
Speaker 1: a security they may or may not be used. So

558
00:31:04,400 --> 00:31:08,080
Speaker 1: that information may end up becoming public publicly available because

559
00:31:08,080 --> 00:31:10,640
Speaker 1: they're uploading it to Twitter or something. Yeah. Sure, sure

560
00:31:10,720 --> 00:31:13,960
Speaker 1: if if Ben is down in internet cafe searching for

561
00:31:14,160 --> 00:31:17,040
Speaker 1: whatever bank robbery related stuff he's searching for, and Matt

562
00:31:17,080 --> 00:31:19,680
Speaker 1: across the tree across the street is taking a selfie

563
00:31:19,760 --> 00:31:23,240
Speaker 1: and it's like, oh, hey, isn't that Ben, And he's

564
00:31:23,360 --> 00:31:26,200
Speaker 1: he's and he's tagged his selfie as my bank robbing

565
00:31:26,280 --> 00:31:30,320
Speaker 1: adventure with Ben. The cat is out of the bagman. Yeah,

566
00:31:30,720 --> 00:31:33,360
Speaker 1: there we go. That's nice. But that's that is a

567
00:31:33,400 --> 00:31:36,080
Speaker 1: really good point. So if you wanted to be completely anonymous,

568
00:31:36,080 --> 00:31:38,000
Speaker 1: one of the things you would have to worry about

569
00:31:38,520 --> 00:31:40,960
Speaker 1: is your appearance, and now it would look so as

570
00:31:40,960 --> 00:31:43,760
Speaker 1: silly as it's may sound. Uh, it would be better

571
00:31:43,840 --> 00:31:46,800
Speaker 1: to vary your appearance while you're access in these different sites,

572
00:31:47,080 --> 00:31:51,160
Speaker 1: which just sounds bizarre to me. If if I had

573
00:31:51,200 --> 00:31:53,360
Speaker 1: to do that, if I had to be anonymous, if

574
00:31:53,360 --> 00:31:56,320
Speaker 1: any of us had to be that anonymous, wouldn't it

575
00:31:56,320 --> 00:31:59,400
Speaker 1: be time for us to really sit down and have

576
00:31:59,400 --> 00:32:03,440
Speaker 1: have a come to I would definitely need to start

577
00:32:03,520 --> 00:32:06,360
Speaker 1: questioning my life choices. Yeah, like what led me to

578
00:32:06,400 --> 00:32:09,680
Speaker 1: this point where I can't let anyone know that I'm

579
00:32:09,680 --> 00:32:12,400
Speaker 1: looking up a recipe for Scotch eggs? And if the

580
00:32:12,440 --> 00:32:15,280
Speaker 1: world itself had reached that point, then you sit there

581
00:32:15,280 --> 00:32:19,280
Speaker 1: and say, we have become one of those dystopian science

582
00:32:19,320 --> 00:32:22,160
Speaker 1: fiction novels that I used to love because I thought

583
00:32:22,160 --> 00:32:24,280
Speaker 1: of it as a warning for what the future could be.

584
00:32:24,360 --> 00:32:27,560
Speaker 1: And now the future is that. Then then you have

585
00:32:27,600 --> 00:32:32,640
Speaker 1: a serious like okay, what now moment? But beyond that,

586
00:32:32,760 --> 00:32:34,920
Speaker 1: I mean, you also have to think about the other

587
00:32:34,920 --> 00:32:37,680
Speaker 1: devices that you own and whether you probably don't want

588
00:32:37,680 --> 00:32:41,640
Speaker 1: to carry them with you when you're like, you don't

589
00:32:41,640 --> 00:32:44,880
Speaker 1: want to have a smartphone with you, right, You certainly

590
00:32:44,880 --> 00:32:46,880
Speaker 1: don't want to wear your fit. Now you don't want

591
00:32:46,880 --> 00:32:50,200
Speaker 1: to you don't want anything that's got Bluetooth on it. Like. Uh,

592
00:32:50,280 --> 00:32:53,040
Speaker 1: and and we didn't even mention this, but I should

593
00:32:53,040 --> 00:32:55,400
Speaker 1: go back and point this out to when you go

594
00:32:55,520 --> 00:33:00,640
Speaker 1: and you're using some other places uh internet. H. Let's

595
00:33:00,680 --> 00:33:03,720
Speaker 1: say that you do have like a super cheap notebook

596
00:33:03,760 --> 00:33:05,480
Speaker 1: and you're just going to use it this one time.

597
00:33:05,600 --> 00:33:08,000
Speaker 1: You you've planned it out, this is this is you're

598
00:33:08,040 --> 00:33:11,640
Speaker 1: you're going to send some messages. Maybe you are in

599
00:33:11,760 --> 00:33:13,920
Speaker 1: like a foreign country and you just you have to

600
00:33:13,960 --> 00:33:15,880
Speaker 1: get this information out and this is this is your

601
00:33:15,880 --> 00:33:19,120
Speaker 1: best chance. If you're going someplace that's using WiFi, then

602
00:33:19,160 --> 00:33:21,520
Speaker 1: you also have to remember there are programs that can

603
00:33:21,560 --> 00:33:25,440
Speaker 1: sniff it. Essentially, they're looking for the messages that are

604
00:33:25,440 --> 00:33:29,840
Speaker 1: going between your computer and the the the wireless router

605
00:33:30,120 --> 00:33:35,320
Speaker 1: in that business, right, you want a hard connection for better? Yeah,

606
00:33:35,520 --> 00:33:38,520
Speaker 1: hard connection is better. Or you want to have a

607
00:33:38,600 --> 00:33:42,320
Speaker 1: way of making sure that you're encrypting any information that's

608
00:33:42,360 --> 00:33:45,840
Speaker 1: coming between your computer and going to the router, Like

609
00:33:45,880 --> 00:33:49,080
Speaker 1: if it's encrypted to a point where anyone listening in, uh,

610
00:33:49,160 --> 00:33:51,200
Speaker 1: you know, they can grab the data but they can't

611
00:33:51,200 --> 00:33:53,720
Speaker 1: make sense of it, then you're better off, which is

612
00:33:53,760 --> 00:33:56,400
Speaker 1: probably realistically the best you can hope for. There are

613
00:33:56,440 --> 00:34:01,000
Speaker 1: some fantastic encryption programs out there, um, there are also

614
00:34:01,160 --> 00:34:04,720
Speaker 1: some fantastic code breaking programs out there right, and there's

615
00:34:04,760 --> 00:34:08,279
Speaker 1: some that are classified. We don't know their capability. And

616
00:34:08,320 --> 00:34:11,560
Speaker 1: it's always an arms race encryption. Yeah, yeah, it's that's

617
00:34:11,560 --> 00:34:13,880
Speaker 1: just the nature of it. It pushes encryption forward, but

618
00:34:14,000 --> 00:34:16,879
Speaker 1: also pushes hacking forward. For example, the fact that now

619
00:34:16,920 --> 00:34:20,400
Speaker 1: we have graphics processors that have multiple cores. That's well,

620
00:34:20,440 --> 00:34:22,680
Speaker 1: a lot of hackers used to try and break encryption.

621
00:34:22,800 --> 00:34:26,239
Speaker 1: They just they write up a program, or more frequently,

622
00:34:26,320 --> 00:34:29,800
Speaker 1: they download a program that someone else's written that will

623
00:34:30,080 --> 00:34:32,080
Speaker 1: do a brute force attack, but they're doing it by

624
00:34:32,160 --> 00:34:36,200
Speaker 1: dividing up the attack among multiple processor cores. So something

625
00:34:36,239 --> 00:34:39,239
Speaker 1: that would traditionally take, you know, a hundred years for

626
00:34:39,280 --> 00:34:42,200
Speaker 1: a computer to crack, because you've got other processor cores

627
00:34:42,200 --> 00:34:44,279
Speaker 1: and they can all work on it in parallel. The

628
00:34:44,320 --> 00:34:46,800
Speaker 1: more cores you have, the less time it's going to

629
00:34:46,880 --> 00:34:49,799
Speaker 1: take you to actually break that encryption. That's kind of

630
00:34:49,800 --> 00:34:52,560
Speaker 1: a scary world, but it's it's the world that's that,

631
00:34:52,719 --> 00:34:54,919
Speaker 1: you know. It's it's one of the tradeoffs of having

632
00:34:54,920 --> 00:34:58,840
Speaker 1: this amazing technology that lets me go online and get

633
00:34:58,960 --> 00:35:04,520
Speaker 1: my my avatar blown away by a sniper for thirty

634
00:35:04,600 --> 00:35:07,880
Speaker 1: second time. Hey, that guy's camping. Don't be it's a

635
00:35:07,960 --> 00:35:10,839
Speaker 1: legitimate strategy. Yeah it is, it is, but it did not.

636
00:35:11,760 --> 00:35:13,920
Speaker 1: Camping is not a legitimate strategy. Oh my gosh, are

637
00:35:13,920 --> 00:35:17,440
Speaker 1: you the sniper? Have you been anonymously? Actually, Lauren is

638
00:35:17,440 --> 00:35:20,560
Speaker 1: the sniper. She likes to go to the end of

639
00:35:20,600 --> 00:35:23,200
Speaker 1: the map and in a nice little crow's nest area

640
00:35:23,239 --> 00:35:27,799
Speaker 1: and pick people off. I circulate. Okay, well, that's that's

641
00:35:27,880 --> 00:35:31,920
Speaker 1: true sniper tactics. That sniper's work. You fire and then

642
00:35:31,920 --> 00:35:34,960
Speaker 1: you change locations, kind of off on a tall I

643
00:35:35,000 --> 00:35:37,439
Speaker 1: have something important that we we should remember to see.

644
00:35:37,480 --> 00:35:41,320
Speaker 1: And yes, that I forgot one of the biggest disadvantages.

645
00:35:41,480 --> 00:35:45,200
Speaker 1: Let's say everything works out. You have a spot on

646
00:35:45,400 --> 00:35:48,600
Speaker 1: disguise and and there you are and your poncho and

647
00:35:48,640 --> 00:35:53,640
Speaker 1: your sombrero at the library monocle and your crazy makeup

648
00:35:53,680 --> 00:35:56,439
Speaker 1: to prevent any kind of facial recognition to yah, yeah,

649
00:35:56,760 --> 00:35:58,640
Speaker 1: you just just forget eight and a half yards, right,

650
00:35:58,920 --> 00:36:00,879
Speaker 1: let's do this. If right really doing it, And there

651
00:36:00,920 --> 00:36:04,200
Speaker 1: you are checking out your your bank robbery stuff or

652
00:36:04,239 --> 00:36:08,120
Speaker 1: whatever it is Matt's doing over there, and then you say, uh.

653
00:36:08,239 --> 00:36:11,920
Speaker 1: Then then you say, oh, okay, I'm in. I have

654
00:36:12,640 --> 00:36:15,160
Speaker 1: X amount of time that I can spend here. And

655
00:36:15,239 --> 00:36:18,839
Speaker 1: that's when you realize that accessing the web anonymously it's

656
00:36:18,960 --> 00:36:23,120
Speaker 1: pretty slow. Oh yeah, yeah, because you're routing that traffic

657
00:36:23,320 --> 00:36:27,000
Speaker 1: through a proxy or VPN before it even gets to you.

658
00:36:27,760 --> 00:36:30,319
Speaker 1: That does end up adding a lot of time. So

659
00:36:30,440 --> 00:36:32,879
Speaker 1: if you're using something like Tour, if you've ever used Tour,

660
00:36:33,480 --> 00:36:36,640
Speaker 1: then you may think like, man, this is just crawling today.

661
00:36:36,680 --> 00:36:40,840
Speaker 1: But that's because yeah, the process that tour uses and

662
00:36:40,920 --> 00:36:42,719
Speaker 1: go back and listen to our Tour episode if you

663
00:36:42,800 --> 00:36:44,719
Speaker 1: if you want to learn more about it. But the

664
00:36:44,760 --> 00:36:48,480
Speaker 1: process that uses, while it is uh a pretty secure

665
00:36:49,239 --> 00:36:53,840
Speaker 1: um approach, recently we've found out that not necessarily completely

666
00:36:53,840 --> 00:36:58,319
Speaker 1: secure approach UM, but that that does take time because

667
00:36:58,520 --> 00:37:01,799
Speaker 1: instead of it going from the regular route it would

668
00:37:01,840 --> 00:37:04,280
Speaker 1: across the Internet if you were just using the surface Web,

669
00:37:04,719 --> 00:37:07,120
Speaker 1: it has to do all these jumps from one node

670
00:37:07,160 --> 00:37:09,800
Speaker 1: to the next through a circuit of nodes before it

671
00:37:09,840 --> 00:37:12,600
Speaker 1: can finally get to you. And that's on top of

672
00:37:12,760 --> 00:37:16,120
Speaker 1: just the regular traffic it would normally do well. Luckily,

673
00:37:16,160 --> 00:37:19,280
Speaker 1: you're you're not again, you're you're probably not browsing Corgy

674
00:37:19,400 --> 00:37:23,160
Speaker 1: videos viator. I hope not, because you will be waiting

675
00:37:23,280 --> 00:37:25,520
Speaker 1: far too long for the adorable nous to come and

676
00:37:25,560 --> 00:37:27,279
Speaker 1: hit you in the face. Or at least that's what

677
00:37:27,320 --> 00:37:33,520
Speaker 1: Big Corgy wants you to think. That's that's that's both

678
00:37:33,640 --> 00:37:40,200
Speaker 1: terrifying and and just absolutely you know, as it's a

679
00:37:40,239 --> 00:37:44,479
Speaker 1: slightly shorter Clifford the Red Dog. Yeah, I welcome our

680
00:37:44,480 --> 00:37:52,440
Speaker 1: our Corky overlords, cork overlords lords at any rate. The

681
00:37:52,480 --> 00:37:55,200
Speaker 1: message you have to take home here is that the

682
00:37:55,239 --> 00:38:00,640
Speaker 1: Internet is meant, like Ben said, as a communication device,

683
00:38:00,719 --> 00:38:04,400
Speaker 1: as something where people are accessing and sharing, and in

684
00:38:04,480 --> 00:38:06,040
Speaker 1: order to do that you have to give up some

685
00:38:06,719 --> 00:38:10,280
Speaker 1: anonymity in order for it to be effective and easy

686
00:38:10,320 --> 00:38:13,440
Speaker 1: to do. It doesn't mean that you absolutely must give

687
00:38:13,520 --> 00:38:17,440
Speaker 1: up all anonymity. It does not mean that you cannot,

688
00:38:17,480 --> 00:38:21,200
Speaker 1: at least upon occasion, UH do your best to cover

689
00:38:21,280 --> 00:38:25,440
Speaker 1: all of your digital tracks and have a reasonable expectation

690
00:38:25,680 --> 00:38:28,840
Speaker 1: of being you know, pretty much under the radar. But

691
00:38:29,000 --> 00:38:31,720
Speaker 1: in order to do it, as like that's the way

692
00:38:31,800 --> 00:38:35,439
Speaker 1: you access the web, it's really not practical, Yeah, it's

693
00:38:36,080 --> 00:38:40,040
Speaker 1: it's not practical. At all and for everyone listening in

694
00:38:40,040 --> 00:38:41,960
Speaker 1: this UM. First one, I say, guys, thank you so

695
00:38:42,040 --> 00:38:45,840
Speaker 1: much for having me on your show. It's always it

696
00:38:45,880 --> 00:38:48,600
Speaker 1: always makes my day. UM. And I want to special

697
00:38:48,719 --> 00:38:51,600
Speaker 1: message to any of your listeners. I hope you guys

698
00:38:51,640 --> 00:38:55,560
Speaker 1: already know this. Incognito mode just doesn't leave a trace

699
00:38:55,600 --> 00:39:01,120
Speaker 1: on your computer. Everybody knows what you're looking at. Yeah, no,

700
00:39:01,239 --> 00:39:03,560
Speaker 1: I mean yeah, because the router that your computer is

701
00:39:03,600 --> 00:39:07,120
Speaker 1: going to everything is clear. Like you know, you the

702
00:39:07,160 --> 00:39:12,120
Speaker 1: when you type in www dot corgis rob Banks dot com.

703
00:39:12,560 --> 00:39:14,840
Speaker 1: The router knows that that's the website you went to.

704
00:39:15,040 --> 00:39:18,720
Speaker 1: Your sp knows. Yeah, everyone knows, and they know which

705
00:39:18,760 --> 00:39:22,440
Speaker 1: I p which, which computer looked up that information. The

706
00:39:22,480 --> 00:39:26,000
Speaker 1: only thing that is is being white clear is your browser. Right.

707
00:39:26,120 --> 00:39:28,280
Speaker 1: That's just so that other people in your house cannot

708
00:39:28,280 --> 00:39:33,600
Speaker 1: immediately access the information. Like Jonathan's got a real corgy

709
00:39:33,640 --> 00:39:35,319
Speaker 1: problem and I'm going to prove it by looking at

710
00:39:35,400 --> 00:39:40,600
Speaker 1: search history. Oh he's been using incognito mode boiled again. Yeah,

711
00:39:40,600 --> 00:39:43,680
Speaker 1: that's the only time that works, right that machine. So

712
00:39:43,719 --> 00:39:47,040
Speaker 1: I just wanted to save anybody the trouble and also

713
00:39:47,320 --> 00:39:51,719
Speaker 1: disclaimer for anyone listening in that might be working for

714
00:39:51,840 --> 00:39:56,239
Speaker 1: a government agency. I have not planned Rabba Bank, nor

715
00:39:56,280 --> 00:39:59,400
Speaker 1: do I ever planned Rabba Bank. I do, however, have

716
00:39:59,440 --> 00:40:02,280
Speaker 1: a soft spot for quirkies, and I'll go on record

717
00:40:02,320 --> 00:40:05,040
Speaker 1: with that one. I mean, Ben actually helped produce an

718
00:40:05,080 --> 00:40:08,160
Speaker 1: episode about why you shouldn't rob banks over on brain stuff.

719
00:40:08,160 --> 00:40:17,600
Speaker 1: It's the perfect cover. You just ruin everything. Well once,

720
00:40:17,640 --> 00:40:20,040
Speaker 1: once you do learn the definition of bagman, it'll all

721
00:40:20,080 --> 00:40:23,680
Speaker 1: just kind of fall into place. Well, Ben, thank you

722
00:40:24,000 --> 00:40:28,120
Speaker 1: for for joining us. And also, guys, if you haven't

723
00:40:28,160 --> 00:40:30,440
Speaker 1: listened to stuff they don't want you to know, are

724
00:40:30,520 --> 00:40:33,799
Speaker 1: gone to see the videos and the incredible work that

725
00:40:33,840 --> 00:40:35,799
Speaker 1: Ben and Matter are doing. You definitely got to check

726
00:40:35,800 --> 00:40:38,520
Speaker 1: it out. It's some phenomenal stuff. There will be a

727
00:40:38,560 --> 00:40:42,360
Speaker 1: companion episode to this episode you're listening to right now,

728
00:40:43,160 --> 00:40:45,520
Speaker 1: on stuff they don't want you to know, which will

729
00:40:45,600 --> 00:40:49,279
Speaker 1: we will be recording almost immediately after we sign off

730
00:40:49,320 --> 00:40:52,120
Speaker 1: of this episode. So if you couldn't, if you didn't

731
00:40:52,120 --> 00:40:54,200
Speaker 1: get enough, if you thought, I have got to hear

732
00:40:54,239 --> 00:40:58,120
Speaker 1: these three people talk more about anonymity and the deep

733
00:40:58,200 --> 00:41:01,640
Speaker 1: Web and things of that nature, and Coregs will probably

734
00:41:01,719 --> 00:41:05,080
Speaker 1: somehow make an appearance. We can't promise that. Maybe we'll

735
00:41:05,120 --> 00:41:07,120
Speaker 1: have worked out the coregies in our system by then

736
00:41:07,760 --> 00:41:10,719
Speaker 1: go check that out it. Uh, you'll definitely if you

737
00:41:10,800 --> 00:41:14,560
Speaker 1: enjoyed tech stuff, there's gonna be tons of episodes on

738
00:41:14,600 --> 00:41:16,160
Speaker 1: stuff they don't want you to know that are really

739
00:41:16,160 --> 00:41:19,000
Speaker 1: going to appeal to you. Absolutely. In that next episode,

740
00:41:19,000 --> 00:41:20,960
Speaker 1: I wanted to put in we will go more into

741
00:41:21,080 --> 00:41:24,840
Speaker 1: that tour thing that we alluded to, the recent problems

742
00:41:24,880 --> 00:41:27,240
Speaker 1: that tour has had and and some of the reasons

743
00:41:27,280 --> 00:41:31,000
Speaker 1: why even using tour does not completely protect you, which

744
00:41:31,040 --> 00:41:33,719
Speaker 1: which is pretty fascinating and terrifying at the same time. Right,

745
00:41:33,760 --> 00:41:35,560
Speaker 1: So if you want to know more about that, well

746
00:41:35,600 --> 00:41:38,640
Speaker 1: then you're gonna have to subscribe to another podcast. But

747
00:41:38,680 --> 00:41:40,760
Speaker 1: that's okay, because it's an awesome podcast and you should

748
00:41:40,760 --> 00:41:42,919
Speaker 1: be subscribing to it already. But yeah, you can find

749
00:41:42,960 --> 00:41:45,439
Speaker 1: all of their content I believe at stuff they don't

750
00:41:45,440 --> 00:41:50,000
Speaker 1: want you to know dot com. Yes, absolutely excellent. Um,

751
00:41:50,120 --> 00:41:54,760
Speaker 1: and uh, their YouTube channel I believe is a conspiracy stuff.

752
00:41:54,760 --> 00:41:56,680
Speaker 1: We have like three names because we're trying to be

753
00:41:56,800 --> 00:41:59,640
Speaker 1: an anonymous show on the internet. Yeah, it does help

754
00:41:59,680 --> 00:42:02,040
Speaker 1: to be a really good on YouTube. Change your identity

755
00:42:02,040 --> 00:42:05,360
Speaker 1: every twenty or thirty minutes. Yeah, you guys know that

756
00:42:05,360 --> 00:42:09,200
Speaker 1: when people asking some publics, we say that we're YouTube. Okay,

757
00:42:09,200 --> 00:42:13,239
Speaker 1: that's fair, all right. Well then, well that's all for

758
00:42:13,280 --> 00:42:16,160
Speaker 1: our show today, guys. Thanks Ben for wrapping up. Yeah,

759
00:42:16,200 --> 00:42:18,920
Speaker 1: if you guys have any suggestions for future topics that

760
00:42:19,000 --> 00:42:21,520
Speaker 1: we can cover on tech Stuff, send us an email

761
00:42:21,560 --> 00:42:25,240
Speaker 1: that addresses tech Stuff at how stuff works dot com,

762
00:42:25,719 --> 00:42:28,040
Speaker 1: or you can drop us a line on Tumbler, Twitter,

763
00:42:28,239 --> 00:42:30,760
Speaker 1: or Facebook or handle it. All three is tech Stuff

764
00:42:31,040 --> 00:42:37,719
Speaker 1: hs W and we'll talk to you again. Released for

765
00:42:37,840 --> 00:42:40,160
Speaker 1: more on this and thousands of other topics because it

766
00:42:40,239 --> 00:42:51,040
Speaker 1: has to works dot com